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
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NEW GOALS IN POLICE MANAGEMENT

Edited by

BRUCE SMITH

Secretary, Institute of Public Administration

New York City

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
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A Preface to Law Enforcement

By BRUCE SMITH

ADVANCES made by American police during the past thirty years are certain to be recorded in the history of our time. The brilliant record of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the emergence of a dozen or more state police forces of outstanding quality, and the striking reversal of old police patterns in many cities and villages—these are the physical evidence of a radical change in police thought and action that has exercised an influence in many ways.

UNEVEN PROGRESS

It is likely that all police establishments, at the federal, state, and local levels, have participated in some degree in this great upward surge. That some of the largest forces should not have responded as readily as others of moderate size or less, may be attributed in part to the operation of local and special influences. The manner in which partisan control is applied is bound to be a factor. Furthermore, the conditions making for police improvement are by no means equally distributed, and mere size can be a burden unless it also has animation and vitality. As a consequence, the advancing police front at all times offers a rather ragged appearance that is featured by the miscellany of the participants and the differing rates of their progress.

Such failures to maintain perfect order and to achieve full perfection need not concern us greatly. In fact, it may represent one of the superior features of the current movement, since no one type of police force and no single geographical region can enjoy exclusive opportunities or feel secure in a hard-won position. With improvement so

widely distributed and experimentation taking so many diverse forms, there is less likely to be a sudden drying up of the sources of inspiration; and the wide dispersion of both leaders and followers goes far towards assuring that today's adventurous efforts by a few will be experienced tomorrow by the many who are destined to move at a slower pace.

That so much should have been accomplished so quickly is the more remarkable since our country has the most decentralized police system in the world, and there is no central authority to set the standards of police service and then exact compliance with them. But precept, example, and a widespread desire to emulate have combined to produce a result so striking that one may doubt whether it could have been achieved in any other way.

When the various aspects of police are viewed in detail, the same marked irregularities of accomplishment are noted on every hand. Methods for selecting, promoting, and disciplining police are still obstructed by the outworn devices produced by civil service commissions during the past half-century and more. But new and more reliable devices are in the making, are now under test, or have already won acceptance among a widening circle of participants.

Especially notable is the response of Young America to our country's new police patterns. The best police forces have captured the imagination of millions of youths who stand at the verge of decision on their careers. If we are alert to this opportunity, we can attract ten thousand of them every year into police uniforms and so produce a steadily

rising quality of recruitment that will assure the police future as nothing else can.

SPECIFIC AREAS OF ADVANCE

Training for police has moved so far and so fast that it now stands breathless and somewhat fatigued with it all. A brief rest would do it good, while plans for fresh advances towards a vastly improved police pedagogy can be contrived and perfected. We shall continue to need more and more police training for some time to come—especially in the smaller forces—but the greatest need is for better training and a better grade of police teaching.

In material things the police administrator has little left to strive for. The plain fact is that American police have more physical equipment under their control than the combined police strength of all the rest of the world. While some of the pay scales now in effect are clearly inadequate, the upward trend is so emphatic as to hold promise that even the monetary inflation will not forever thwart police in the enjoyment of a better economic status. For the present, it is pertinent to note that the American policeman leads all others of his craft in his economic status, and that the end of the current upswing can be indefinitely postponed if standards for selection and the performance of duty can continue to rise.

Among the various police functions, traffic accident control has shown the most rapid and productive advances, at least as practiced by the limited number of traffic specialists in police uniforms. The problem now consists in transferring their techniques to the rank and file of the general patrol force, in order that a wider and more consistent enforcement of traffic laws and regulations may be effected.

By contrast, the applied arts of criminal investigation thus far have moved

forward in relatively few forces, but new techniques are on the way towards general acceptance, and when supported by laboratory tests in the examination of traces, they will effect a higher ratio of detections to crimes committed.

In dealing with the youthful offender we have greatly erred in seeking to go too far and too fast, without enough thought for our point of origin, our direction, or our goals. We have rashly assumed that juvenile delinquency is a distinctive product of our own time, and so have tended to treat current symptoms rather than causes. We have forgotten that crime and delinquency have always been a major preoccupation of youthful minds in active bodies. Real progress has been made towards a better and more humane treatment of juvenile offenders, but not enough is done to protect the community from even its thoroughly vicious young criminals.

Motor transport and radio broadcasts combine to work wonders in assuring an expeditious response to demands for emergency service of many kinds, but these advances have been made at the expense of circulating patrol, and so the basic work of policing stands still while most other forms of police service advance. With all our experimenting, we have neglected this largest single segment in the defense arc. Until patrol coverage rests upon a far more scientific basis, a substantial portion of police manpower will continue to be dissipated on unproductive tasks.

THREATS TO THE PROFESSION

Yet, all in all, there is much to cheer about, and the future appears even more promising of worth-while advances. If these bright prospects are not realized, it will probably be because police fail to meet the professional challenges that are implicit in militant unionism and various objec-

tionable practices in the interrogation and custody of police prisoners. While in no way interrelated, these two items are threats to a continuing police improvement.

Militant police unionism operates far outside the proper sphere of craft or professional association, and achieves its ends by aggressive methods that reject the professional ideal of service. Abuse of prisoners temporarily entrusted to police custody causes so much public concern that the police record becomes tarnished as fast as it is made. Much is made of the fact that the vast majority of today's police reject the use of force on prisoners who have submitted to arrest and are safely under lock and key; but they prove strangely reluctant to root out objectionable practices by vigorously disciplining the official offender. Police interrogations under circumstances that infringe basic liberties guaranteed by the Constitution also raise disturbing questions as to the extent to which justice under law is accepted as a guide to conduct.

Hence, until more responsible attitudes are assumed by portions of the rank and file, as well as by their police superiors, there can be no police profession in any worth-while connotation of the term.

STATUS OF POLICE ADMINISTRATORS

Meanwhile, the status of most of our chief police administrators continues to be uncertain at best. Where tenure is assured for a police chief by statute or civil service rule, one finds a pronounced tendency for the actual control to shift to a politically responsive official or commission. The exceptions are not numerous. Thus the time is probably still far distant which shall see the generality of police executives securely established in the official hierarchy. Pending such remote developments, their po-

sition can be made more comfortable for themselves and more attractive to their successors if they forgo the temptations of political involvement and leave all political issues to the elected representatives of the people.

In some cities and states this is not difficult to accomplish, but there are others where the administration of justice is so much influenced by partisan considerations that extraordinary patience and wisdom are essential to the professional equipment of police administrators. Where they have notably succeeded in avoiding the dangers of political controversy and intervention, they have been greatly aided by policies that rested upon demonstrable facts. Their public relations efforts have not been based upon mere publicity for themselves or their programs, but on the contrary have sought to determine and to understand popular attitudes and to conform their programs to them insofar as is compatible with the obligation of equal enforcement.

Similarly, they have frankly accepted crime and disorder not only as inevitable but often as inexplicable, and have wasted no time or popular good will in pretending that they can prevent all crime or remove the causes of delinquency. Instead they concentrate their efforts upon determining how much crime there is, where and when it occurs, and what forms of police action seem to be most effective in keeping it within reasonable bounds.

Thus fortified by reliable facts, both their law enforcement policies and their public relations acquire a consistency that is appreciated and accepted at city halls and state capitals. Assured tenure will be of slow growth, but can be greatly nurtured by the ability of police heads to analyze and attack their law enforcement problems before they assume threatening proportions.

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These are the indexes to the police future, and these appear to be the outlines of further progress. With them in mind, the present issue of THE ANNALS has been turned over to a distinguished group of administrators and specialists who have demonstrated their skills in law enforcement and are in the best possible position to define and discuss the aspirations and ultimate goals of our numerous and varied police systems. Taken together, the score of thoughtful papers here presented provide a blueprint for action that not only can meet today's exigencies but also can raise tomorrow's standards of policing.

Bruce Smith, New York City, is secretary of the Institute of Public Administration. For the past thirty-seven years he has conducted surveys and special studies of police and law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels. These have been supplemented by occasional similar inquiries in Canada and Great Britain and on the continent of Europe. Most recent of his major publications are the survey reports on the police forces of New York, Boston, and Cincinnati and the state police of Connecticut and Michigan, and the revised and enlarged edition of Police Systems in the United States, originally published in 1941.

The Police Challenge in Our Great Cities

By WILLIAM H. PARKER

IT would be difficult to devise a combination of factors more conducive to crime and disorder than is found in the typical great city of the United States. Rarely does history record so many people of varied beliefs and modes of conduct grouped together in so competitive and complex a social structure. The confusing variety of religious and political creeds, national origins, and diverse cultures is matched only by the extremes of ideals, emotions, and conduct found in the individual. Although proud of their independence, these people live so interdependently that food, shelter, and even their very movement on the streets require delicately balanced co-operation. Although sharing a tradition of individual liberty, their activities are regulated by the greatest and most complicated concentration of laws to be found anywhere.

Charged with maintaining this precarious order by enforcing this confusion of laws is the city police department. Although this would prove a difficult task under ideal conditions, it is aggravated by unusual factors. The police function is rarely considered by the members of the electorate to be a vital element of their life together. Further, its past operation is one of alternating inefficiency, corruption, and brutality. As a result, the individual police officer operates with a remarkable lack of public support, co-operation, or trust. Although this past is a legacy from corrupt political machines erected and supported by the people themselves, the policeman has become a public symbol upon which the wrath for such conditions is vented.

It must also be conceded that the police themselves have failed. Instead of analyzing the causes for lack of support and working toward their eventual removal, police have all too often withdrawn into a shell of "minorityism." There has been a near-fatal inability to recognize police dependence on public opinion, and the result has been great tugging at bootstraps without appreciable elevation.

INCREASED INTEREST MANIFEST

This is the "police problem" that has characterized every major American city in the past and complicates the administration of most police departments today. Yet there are indications that at least some factors are changing. The last few years have seen a great upsurge of attention to this aspect of government and, even more heartening, a growing appreciation of the vital part it plays in the affairs of men. If this rising tide of interest can be sustained, the professional police services our country so critically needs may, within our lifetime, be planned and their foundations laid.

It is inevitable that the police of our great cities will be thrust into leadership in this reformation. The reason is not that size alone attracts superior personnel or confers any monopoly on creative thinking. Rather, it is because the weaknesses of our system are more apparent there. Urban life concentrates and multiplies law enforcement problems. Police inefficiencies which may go nearly unnoticed in the relatively stable pattern of rural life are cast into prominence and grave import by the fast-paced social and economic

turmoil of the larger cities. Million-dollar budgets, strangling traffic congestion, and lucrative markets for organized crime make for spectacular police failures. It is here that the public outcry is heard first and loudest, and it is here that sheer necessity puts law enforcement to its crucial test.

THE BASIS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Despite the most aggressive and enlightened leadership, law enforcement cannot rise above the level set by the electorate. *A condition precedent to the establishment of efficient, professional law enforcement in a community is a desire and a demand on the part of the residents for that type of service.*

In this respect, law enforcement does not differ greatly from private industry. The one factor which predetermines the success of any business is the market. Unless the ultimate recipient of a product or service is convinced that he requires it, the most skillful organization and techniques are wasted.

A second lesson the police administrator can draw from industry is that markets are created. They seldom spring full-blown from the unshaped desires of the people. The vital elements of civilized life, including our most sacred institutions, at one time or another have been laboriously *sold* to the people. In this respect, it is heartening that unreceptiveness is not one of the faults of Americans. They respond quickly to new ideas, and peculiarly relish being proved wrong. Despite opinion to the contrary, they respond to large ideas as well as to the small and trivial. They buy comic books, but they also make best sellers of works on art, philosophy, and religion. This is of tremendous importance to the police administrator, because the ideas and ideals he must sell are not trivial ones.

The police administrator's first step toward professionalism must be to in-

troduce to the public a fact which is elemental to every society. This fact is, *the police function is a basic component of man's government by man which has determined the character and permanence of every social structure since human beings first sought collective security.* In the face of the extremes of conduct possible in human affairs, we manage to exist only because we set up and enforce certain limits of conduct. These rules or laws are promulgated, not because men agree on attitudes or conduct, but because they do *not* agree. Thus law, an artificial standard, is necessary to mark the limits of activity beyond which society is injured. Law, standing alone, is a fiction. It achieves reality only when it is observed. The character of every society lies in its method of establishing observance, and its permanence lies in its success in securing it.

CREATING DEMAND FOR PROFESSIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

This is not a call for the police administrator to garb himself in the robes of Socrates. It is not unlikely that if he did, he would suffer the same end. This concept, although it has a philosophical basis, is an immensely practical matter, and it can be sold to practical community leaders. Most of them are well aware of the exorbitant cost of ineffectual law enforcement. They are not entirely unfamiliar with the experience of other communities or of other nations. The creation of a market for professional law enforcement is not so much the sale of a startling new concept as it is the calling to memory of some well-known facts. Immediate tangibles which will be recognized are more effective security of goods, a higher rate of recovery of stolen property, lower insurance premiums, and improved traffic conditions. A few leaders will see the broader implications of the idea,

and through them the elemental thinking will be transplanted into other minds.

It should be emphasized and re-emphasized that the administrator is not selling "theory." The raw facts and figures are available. The manner in which they should be presented and the relative speed with which they will be accepted depends upon his ability and the political climate of the community. Some of the methods which have been used are narrative type annual reports, radio and television forums, pamphlets, motion picture and television films, well-trained police speakers, and written contributions to local magazines, industrial house organs, and other publications.

Of even more importance is the relationship of the chief administrator with the business and professional groups of the city. Included is the press, since it is primarily a business enterprise with a stake in community welfare. It should be noted that the administrator's concern is not with the news-gathering level of the press. He is not seeking "good publicity." He is not a press agent. He is a community leader seeking the solution to one of the community's most pressing problems. His business is not with reporters, but with publishers, stockholders, and directors. As he meets with other business groups he will talk with advertisers, radio and television station owners, motion picture producers, and members of chambers of commerce and of transit, banking, insurance, veterans, and other associations. Similar powerful influences of community thinking are school, religious, and interracial groups.

This effort should not be confused with "public relations." At this point the administrator is not concerned with shaping the police organization to meet public demands. Cries for "efficiency," "honesty," and "reduction of crime" cannot be answered effectively until he

creates a climate that will support the internal changes essential to those goals.

UNWARRANTED COMMUNITY SERVICES

Although the principles and practices of sound organization found in many texts would seem to fit police departments large and small, their application becomes progressively more difficult with size. As the growing complexity of the great cities creates more and more varied problems, the police organization tends to subdivide and take on new tasks in an effort to cope with them. Almost invariably, the lines of demarcation between primary, support, service, and nonpolice elements of the organization become narrower, and less distinguishable. Surgery is needed. At this point the wisdom of first laying a foundation of public support becomes apparent to the administrator. Every police activity, however ineffectual and costly, has public supporters who, because of selfishness or misunderstanding, will oppose its reduction or elimination. Unless the administrator has enlisted broad support, his attempts to reform the police structure will be defeated by small but vocal pressure groups.

Over the years the large city departments have gathered along their flanks a peculiar assortment of public services. Although many of these are not properly police responsibilities, they tend to assume greater bulk and they drain increasing money, manpower, and energies from the basic task.

Jail operation

The greatest offender in some cities is jail operation. This task consumes as much as 20 per cent of the police budget and 7 per cent of the personnel strength. It takes the time and energies of officers selected, trained, and paid to accomplish vastly more complex tasks. It encumbers police training with studies of institutional problems not remotely con-

nected with law enforcement. It necessitates assignments in conflict with aptitudes, which often give the jail a "Siberia" connotation by which general morale is lowered and other police tasks suffer. It adds a completely unnecessary and unjustifiable element to the chief administrator's nearly impossible span of attention. Worse, the detention of sentenced prisoners by the police is a dangerous violation of the democratic theory of law enforcement. The identification of police with the processes of punishment works to destroy the ideal of a nonjudging, nonpenalizing police.

The answer to the jail problem is not impossibly difficult. The facilities already exist. In many cities a change of management requires only administrative action. Jail personnel with suitable aptitudes should be recruited, given specialized training, and compensated at a level in keeping with the task.

Juvenile welfare

Another public service attached to most large police departments is some form of juvenile welfare activity. Not to be confused with the investigation of juvenile delinquency, it is actually an attempt to treat the multiple causes of adolescent maladjustment. It takes many forms, ranging from a boys' club to complicated advisory, treatment, and referral centers for potential or actual delinquents. Often included are summer camps, gymnasiums, and clubhouses. In some instances the total cost is financed from police budgets, and in others the activity merely utilizes the services of on-duty officers.

While no experienced police officer would dispute the great need for such a community program, some doubt as to its being a proper police function is justified. Many of the criticisms directed at police operation of the city jail are valid here. As long as the po-

lice are experiencing difficulty in accomplishing their primary tasks, the siphoning of men, money, and energy into social services not properly chargeable to law enforcement is difficult to rationalize. Ultimately the police must recognize that they are neither authorized nor equipped to deal with economic and social problems inherent in the prevention of crime. If they continue invading this most difficult field, they will ultimately saddle themselves with burdens so great that a single step forward will be impossible.

Various activities

Other efforts which are draining police vitality are probation and parole activities, assignments of investigators to other city departments, and traffic engineering. The administrator will also find officers who have been selected and trained to enforce the laws of the community performing routine duties as clerks, typists, librarians, laboratory technicians, fingerprint classifiers, and others—positions which could be filled at less expense and with greater efficiency by qualified civilians.

It is safe to say that the manpower problem of the average large department is to a great extent an organizational problem, created over the years by the police themselves. Although many of these extraneous activities are the result of commendable efforts to provide needed community services, from an organizational standpoint they must be classified as deadwood. The plea that they supply good public relations is rebuttable. Failure to meet successfully the harsh requirements of fundamental police tasks cannot so easily be disguised.

MAINTENANCE OF CONTROL

Another problem to be met by administrators of large police organizations is that of maintaining full control, while

at the same time reducing the span of executive attention to a workable minimum. Theoretically, it is sufficient to divide into a total of five to seven primary support and line units, headed by deputies serving also as a general staff or council. However, this plan often results in the formation of practically independent organizations which block the vertical flow of communication so vital to control. Consequently, instead of aggressively leading, the chief administrator finds himself cast in an increasingly impotent role in department affairs. The answer to this problem is not the abandoning of the principles of organization, but rather the retention of control of key activities. These are internal discipline, intelligence, public relations, vice control, and planning.

The most efficient method of handling these control functions appears to consist in giving to the field forces the line responsibility to accomplish the tasks, checking and balancing their efforts through administrative divisions with both staff authority and line responsibility. Thus, for example, vice control is directly accomplished by patrol and detective forces, with an administrative vice division co-ordinating their efforts, spot checking their effectiveness and integrity, and reporting to the chief the volume and direction of vice activities throughout the city. These staff services can be combined into a primary departmental unit, commanded by an administrative deputy.

LARGE CITIES PRODUCE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SITUATIONS

There can be little doubt that the well-established principles of administration should guide the chief of police in all but the most unusual cases. Yet certain problems peculiar to large city police organizations do not respond readily to broad generalizations. The first of these that the department head

is likely to meet is the question of an assistant chief. This position is usually created in the hope of reducing the administrative work burden. It is reasoned that an assistant chief can handle routine matters, act as a "buffer," and digest and condense information directed upwards.

There is no greater fallacy in police administration. The true assistants of the chief are his council of deputies. If these commanders are not functioning, little is gained by creating an intermediate position which obscures this fact. At best, an assistant chief accomplishes tasks that are properly the duties of an executive officer or adjutant; at worst, he isolates the chief from the department, takes over policy decisions without which the department head cannot be chief-in-fact, and becomes a sort of "grand vizier" to which all ranks must bow in order to have their requests granted.

The chief cannot share his ultimate responsibilities. If his work burden exceeds human limits, the answer will be found in his own organizational and administrative failures.

Specialization

As a police organization grows, it is inevitable that the question of specialization versus generalization will be raised. At first glance it will appear that the question has been answered by the experts who caution against "over-specialization." However, closer scrutiny will reveal no sure definition of that term.

Theoretically, the size of a department should have little effect on the broad competencies of the individual police officer. He should be able to perform effectively every task he may reasonably be expected to encounter, whether he patrols the entire area of Prairie Junction or a similar area and population in Chicago. This ideal has

been reversed, not by the growth of cities, but by the expanding police technology, which has increased at such a phenomenal rate that the ideal of complete competency has become a myth. No single officer can effectively perform in the diverse and highly technical fields which police science has created. A parallel can be found in the profession of medicine. The growth of medical science—not of cities—created its specialists. The fact that Prairie Junction will not support a group of medical specialists does not make this situation an ideal to be followed in Chicago.

Carrying the parallel further, the medical profession has found that the public is best served by creating a balance of field forces (general practitioners) and specialists. This is also the answer to the police administrator's problem. His is not a task of limiting specialization, but of balancing generalists and specialists so that crime and disorder will receive treatment best fitted to reduce it. This is not an organizational problem whereby ratios are abstracted and rigidly followed. Rather, it is a question of administration devoting attention to the soundest control and work-measurement devices available.

Transfers

The diverse organization of the large department also creates rotation problems. How often should personnel be transferred into new assignments? Is the public interest best served by long-term familiarity with one task or district, or by a work perspective born of varied police experience? The problem is best solved by avoiding extremes either way. An excellent key is frequent transfers of young officers, letting them perceive the breadth and intricacies of law enforcement. As they move about and test their abilities against various assignments, there is a natural tendency for them to fit into place.

A word of caution—transfers easily become a crutch which supports and disguises poor leadership. The fact that individuals vegetate and fail to produce after long assignment to one job is not a sign of the efficacy of frequent transfers. Rather, it should be a sign of command and supervisory failures which should be corrected. Although some assignments will always be favored, a police department should have no "corner pockets" or "Siberias." If they exist, the administrator cannot excuse his own failures by cursing the nature of mankind and using the "shake-up" as a cure. It logically follows that transfers should never be used as a disciplinary tool. There is no place in the police organization for a penal colony.

There are a few exceptions to the rule that transfers should not be an arbitrarily regular procedure. Certain police tasks are highly exhausting, conducive to the production of moral callousness, or are purely educational in nature. Vice control assignments are one example. No officer should be exposed too long to this emotionally and morally fatiguing task. Another example: the rotation of first-level supervisors through the planning division and the internal discipline division is an excellent training device calling for frequent short-term assignments.

Selection of supervisors

The intricate nature of the big city police department also creates problems in the selection of supervisors. Of the many systems which have been tried, strict and impartial promotion by civil service methods seems to work best. Although its inequities are obvious, they are not so conducive to corruption and destruction of morale as the practice of letting the chief administrator make his own selections. The advantages of having a leader pick supervisors with "loyal" or "compatible" attitudes may

be of some importance in a political organization, but are totally out of place in professional endeavor. The only loyalty professional men owe is to the ideals of their service; loyalty to a person is warranted only in so far as that person reflects those ideals.

A few administrators have great faith in their ability to choose subordinate leaders. In some cases that faith may be warranted. But such rare personal abilities must be balanced against the fact that the tenure of the chief is historically short. When he goes, his selectees and all possibility of long-term progress go with him. Few organizations can afford the frequent and conflicting changes in policy inherent in this system. At worst, the raw material presented to the chief administrator by civil service will seldom be less capable than the selections which personal error and prejudice will produce.

AIDS TO SUCCESSFUL POLICE ADMINISTRATION

A discussion of police techniques peculiar to the larger cities should be prefaced with a word of caution: there are few greater pitfalls in police work today than the practice of adopting technique for its own sake. Due to lack of accurate work-measurement devices, such as commerce has in its profit system, administrators and other officers often go through the motions of new procedures and scientific techniques with little attention to whether or not results are forthcoming. The police administrator's attention must be keyed to results, and a great part of his energy must necessarily be devoted to the creation of improved methods of measuring them.

Planning

The planning activity, intelligently executed, serves as a source both of improved techniques and of work measure-

ment. It is one of the vital administrative controls. It should be entrusted to a staff unit under the supervision of the chief. In this unit can be included related activities which are scattered and ineffectual in many departments. These include statistical studies, crime analysis, writing of manuals and orders, forms control, and procedure surveys.

The division should be manned with experienced officers and supervisors carefully selected with attention to necessary aptitudes. These men should be given considerable freedom to inspect, criticize, improvise, and recommend procedures. In this manner the organization is guaranteed a source of creative thinking without which any enterprise will stagnate. The division should be constantly aware, however, that, like all other activities, the life of the division will be determined by results produced. Moderately frequent transfers will serve to diminish "ivory tower" connotations, revitalize field thinking, and keep attention directed at current line problems.

A typical activity of this division is the planning of traffic and crowd control at large public gatherings. Although the majority of such events have little place in the crowded life of great cities, they are, unfortunately, common occurrences. They disrupt traffic, draw a significant amount of police strength from necessary duties, and inconvenience tens of thousands of citizens. Through studies of the planning division, it is possible for the chief to present the true cost of these spectacles to the city administration and obtain regulation of the most commercial and selfish of these events.

The size of the event must be closely approximated, the flow capacity of surrounding streets measured, and the points of traffic conflict established. Street and private parking facilities must be approximated and controls set up accordingly. Bypass traffic arteries

must be established and protected, and transit companies alerted in time to plan use of these paths. In the congested area, first-aid routes and stations must be planned. The volume of crowds at all points must be balanced with patrol forces adequate for control. If the assembly is of such a nature that disorder may be expected, reserve forces must be placed at key points, communications planned, and field booking, photography, and temporary detention facilities arranged. Occasional events will require field kitchens and rest facilities for officers, and a completely equipped command post.

The final task of the planning unit is to inspect the event, measuring the accuracy of the estimates and the effectiveness of techniques used. These studies should form the basis for standby plans which can be put into effect to control the various types of emergencies that can occur in the city.

Intelligence

Like planning, an intelligence division is a police activity necessary in great cities. Organized crime and subversive activity are controllable only if the department head has constant and current information of the activities of such groups. In gaining this information and maintaining necessary surveillance, the "arm's length" technique will ultimately prove more effective than the establishment of "personal" relations between officers and suspects. The latter arrangement will invariably fester into a spot of corruption or prove a source of embarrassment even when capably and honestly conducted.

Adequate intelligence of underworld activities is the administrator's most potent weapon against organized crime. These criminal operations are too cleverly conducted to respond to suppression by any unplanned combination of patrol and investigation. Law enforce-

ment's shockingly low arrest and conviction rate of known syndicate members bears the best evidence that traditional police techniques are not the answer to this problem. Organized crime can be reduced and stamped out by the police only when knowledge of its methods, personalities, and plans produces conviction hazards so great that operation becomes unprofitable.

APPRAISAL OF RESULTS

It is inevitable that in a paper directed by one police officer to others, "shop talk" concerning the technology of law enforcement will consume a major share of the space. For that reason it is necessary to assess the results of hard-won improvements before closing.

For a half-century police administrators in the United States have responded to the cry for better law enforcement by working to improve police techniques. In the past the telephone, the automobile, and the radio have been successively looked to as the answer to the problem of crime and disorder. During the years immediately past, sound principles of organization, supervision, selection, and training have been sought and adopted. Today's police administrators, even more advanced, are resolutely shouldering the enormous task of measuring the effect of social and economic factors on police problems. They are adapting advanced concepts of systems and procedures to law enforcement. Even the most critical observers agree that remarkable technical progress is apparent in this search for the still elusive answer.

The police service has benefited greatly from this improved technology. It is probable that today, without these advances, the expanding police departments of our larger cities, faced with increasing work loads and lengthening lines of supply and communication, would be completely ineffective. Every

step has been accomplished painfully and laboriously, and in the face of great difficulty. But the answer has not yet been found.

Despite the technology that has been acquired through no small effort and expense, the police service today fulfills its task with no greater success than it did a quarter- or half-century ago. This is a damaging accusation, but it is susceptible of proof. As inaccurate as our statistics are, they leave little doubt that the crime rate has been on the increase for the past several decades—the identical years in which the American police have shown their greatest technical progress. It is highly doubtful that our present crime rate is any lower than that which accompanied the brawling, lusty period of the nation's formation—years in which organized police protection scarcely existed.

It is true that the criminal today often wears a silk glove, but the hand beneath that sleek fabric exacts no less a toll than when it was exposed and easily recognized. Our years of greatest progress, instead of limiting the volume and scope of crime, have seen it shift from a predominantly individual enterprise against society to a system of huge and powerful cartels that control not only cities, but entire states of this Union. Indeed, our most accurate

crime statistics indicate that crime rates rise and fall on the tides of economic, social, and political cycles with embarrassingly little attention to the most determined efforts of our police.

WHERE THE ANSWER LIES

The purpose of this exposition is not to condemn the systematization and perfection of procedures, but to question whether the answer lies in that direction. It is not suggested that continuous effort toward refinement of techniques should cease, but it is suggested that since methodology has not yet produced significant results, the problem may have its deepest roots in causes other than police performance.

Those causes have been suggested here. To blame police failures on the police themselves is to confuse cause with effect. Law enforcement is totally dependent upon the public for its life, its strength, and its effectiveness. It can no more divorce itself from the electorate and seek growth alone than a plant can divorce itself from the soil that bears and feeds it. However critical the need may be for professional law enforcement, it will not come into being until the public itself recognizes that need. If this belief be true, it holds an answer to the police problem.

William H. Parker has been Chief of Police in Los Angeles, California, since 1950, having joined the police force of that city in 1927. He is a member of the California bar. During World War II he developed the Police and Prisons Plan for the Normandy Invasion and created new police systems for Munich and Frankfurt.

Policing the Smaller Cities

By JOHN M. GLEASON

IT may be appropriate to preface this article with a personal point of view respecting the operation of small-city police departments. In that context I accept the term "small" only as applied to population, geographical boundaries, tax rates, and the cost of municipal operation as related to the number of police. It is my firm opinion that the plan of operation for efficient police service should follow the well-established and time-proved methods that can be applied "across the board" irrespective of community size. The attack on crime, accidents and traffic congestion, juvenile delinquency, and other important phases of police operation is the same in cities of two million as in towns of 50,000 population. There is simply a difference in the extent and sometimes the degree of application of fundamentals generally accepted. But this point must be stressed: the smaller the community, the more personal the entire operation becomes.

PROBLEMS OF AREA ARE EASILY MET

Far too many of us who are chief executives in the smaller police departments acquire a defeatist attitude or mildly accept a position of inferiority. We sit back and complain that had we the manpower, the equipment, the facilities, the quarters, and so forth, of our larger counterparts, it would be so much easier to do a better protection job. This is not necessarily true. A great many of the smaller cities in the United States are turning in a very creditable performance and extending a high degree of police protection. They are also more quickly adapting themselves to current needs and changes than

either the very large or the very small police departments.

Much of this is made possible by the increasing use of central services that are available to the smaller city, though not a part of its own system or physical plant. We are all contributors to and recipients of information and help from such central agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's identification bureau, crime laboratory, and statistics section, together with state identification bureaus, crime laboratories, motor vehicle departments, and many others. Most of these services are rendered without cost to our cities, whether large or small. Those who are within the periphery of metropolitan areas also have experienced excellent co-operation from the central or nuclear forces in the use of equipment, laboratory, experts, and man-hours on joint cases, along with much necessary and vital aid on local complaints having a metropolitan area angle.

Because of the obvious necessity of centralizing and consolidating some phases of police work, some of our small-city executives feel that complete consolidation of police effort is necessary. I do not agree with this. The joining of independent political entities for economic savings in municipal services is no guarantee of increased police efficiency. It has been demonstrated that a basic pattern of local police systems can remain and be effective and elastic enough to meet current changes if present or expanded central services are used.

As America is "on wheels," so is its police problem. We can no longer be isolationists in our law enforcement.

We can have and must have uniformity at some points, but there is no compulsion to consolidate. Desirable uniformity starts with the selection of recruits; then on to training, discipline, welfare, identification, crime records, organization, and management systems. We are already using a National System of Identification of Criminals and Uniform Crime Reporting, without any noticeable conflict or confusion, and with excellent results. We are all subscribers to local, regional, and nationwide police communication systems of telephone, teletype, radio, document and photo transmission, television, and so forth. These are available to any police department, regardless of its size. Some of these facilities can even be borrowed on occasion.

In the matter of local police communications I believe the smaller cities are leading the way in replacing and abandoning expensive call-box land-line systems for routine reporting, using radio more extensively for this purpose. This is due in part to the more widespread use of motorized patrol in cities of this group. Discretionary use of motor patrolmen on an in-and-out-of-service basis for routine door trying and other basic patrol duties is also becoming more prevalent. It all adds up to a more economical and judicious use of manpower through communications.

In coping with the "criminal on wheels" situation, whether he owns the wheels or they be those of public transportation, we are faced with a real problem. The hit-and-run tactics of a persistent motor vehicle violator, a hold-up man, burglar, or sexual deviate, among others, make it imperative that adjoining communities have definite agreed-upon policies of mutual co-operation for both prevention and apprehension. When this is left to the chance of personal acquaintance, there are many slip-ups when the right men cannot be con-

tacted in a nearby department. Policies and procedures must be laid down and adhered to by mutual agreement.

There is urgent need for more area co-operation in the matter of roving sexual deviates. Area clearinghouses for information on these cases should be established. This can be headed up by state police, or by one of the larger forces of the area, on a cost- and responsibility-sharing basis for all surrounding towns and villages. The expense of maintaining such area files would prove negligible when compared with the results to be obtained.

The smaller communities know their own offenders but have little or no knowledge of others in adjacent communities. Central files area-wise would expedite identification and apprehension. Smaller cities will countenance without loud and public clamor many types of crimes such as larcenies, car stealing, and motor vehicle violations, but the same places insist upon quick and certain police action and results when molestation and other sex offenses are involved. Hence the need for more central services of the clearinghouse type is emphatically indicated.

IMPORTANCE OF THE PERSONAL FACTOR

The individual or personalized approach to law enforcement that is possible in a small city has this advantage: the chief and other ranking officers are likely to be personally known by most people in all walks of life and to be accepted by the community on both a business and a social level. Local residents come to think of their police force—of its honesty and integrity—on the same basis as they accept their other leaders. If these leaders are persons with high personal integrity, intelligence, and soundness, the people in a small city readily interpret all these personal qualifications as being synonymous with the level of operation in the police de-

partment. It is a reasonable conclusion, but one that cannot easily be formed in a large city where such personal acquaintance does not flourish.

Similarly, with the intimate knowledge the chief has of the qualifications and shortcomings of the local businessman, householder, city official, persistent lawbreaker, alcoholic, crank, or community leader, he is better able to evaluate, discount, question, or take immediate action as the case may be. He is prone to deal in first names. Along with this personal equation comes a sense of personal responsibility to see that every complaint shall reach a reasonable and fair conclusion.

The administrator in a small city is very close to the men in his command. This has its good and bad points. He can better evaluate the individual because of closer scrutiny and "elbow rubbing," but at the same time must not become a victim of the old and hackneyed but useful adage, "Familiarity breeds contempt." His personal conduct must be exemplary at all times; otherwise he is aiding and abetting a feeling among his subordinates that his policy is, "Do as I say, not as I do." One cannot instill morale or maintain discipline with such tactics.

A close personal relationship between the community at large and the police executive also has certain disadvantages: it would be far easier if there were a more impersonal relationship when it is necessary to take police action and to hew to the line and "let the chips fall where they may," even though the chips fall on the heads of friends and associates. However, this disadvantage can be largely overcome by a consistent public educational program.

In the matter of enforcing the laws relative to gambling and vice, the department of under a hundred men is at a certain disadvantage. These operations are not carried on in the open,

and the more efficiently and honestly the local government operates, the more necessary it is for such lawbreakers to work in a surreptitious manner. The local plain-clothes men and detectives are sure to be known to these criminals by name and appearance. Hence there is a growing use of "borrowed" police officers from a neighboring community in the same state or similar co-operative action by state and local police. The use of the sheriff's office in this type of mutual attack on gambling and rackets has also worked out very successfully in many areas.

This matter of loaning trained personnel invites further exploration. It has many possibilities once a mutual plan of compensation, authorization, liability, and pension coverage has been worked out. Many legal shackles must be removed while still staying within the framework of the various state laws and constitutions.

PUBLIC RELATIONS INVITE A NEW APPROACH

Because there are not enough sensational day-to-day stories generated in the average small city, the police administrator has a better chance to furnish interesting, factual educational items to the public through the daily press. The alert police official goes as far as he can in taking the public into his confidence by outlining present and future policies, problems, accomplishments, and trends. These are day-to-day accountings of his stewardship. At the same time, he can lay the groundwork for public acceptance of necessary policies or new action and required budgets.

In relationships with the editors of small-city dailies, the personalized approach can do the most good. Unless a partisan political angle is interjected, one will seldom find an unsympathetic editorial staff. Police work and human

interest stories are synonymous. Both, therefore, are good copy. There is much to be gained by both sides in a working relationship between press and police. The ultimate benefit will accrue to the public at large.

For example, our own community, which is suburban to New York City, is covered by one local daily, two dailies of adjacent communities, and one local weekly paper. In order to avoid daily interference with officers on duty, news sources within the police department are restricted. This is not a "gag" rule, but rather an attempt to channel news releases so as to simplify control and coordination. It relieves subordinate officers of any decisions as to what should or should not be released. If an honest, sincere, and constructive course is laid out for news representatives, they will accept it for what it is—an expeditious and worth-while system for news collection.

Our daily bulletin is open to the press and generally carries enough information for a story foundation. Every morning a press conference is held in the chief's office. This is done early enough to meet deadlines. Here the reporters gather the additional facts rapidly, accurately, and in detail. When any stories are "hot," the concerned division commander may release on-the-spot résumés subject to perusal by the chief. No information is withheld unless it concerns juvenile names, names of the victims of sexual attack, names of important witnesses, or any other information necessary to further investigation.

The reporters are allowed to see the reports, but by a gentlemen's agreement with the editors we are fortunate in not getting tangled into any "scoop" situation between editors. All items of general release are given to each reporter. But should one be working on a scoop of his own, we will furnish him with

whatever information he needs, providing he is actually working on his own lead. We will not cross him up by letting anyone else in on his story.

Any "no publicity" question is handled directly by the chief's office. These may be cases of internal or national security. The reports in this category are kept at a minimum, and at daily press meetings they are discussed. Generally speaking, the reporter will know the policy of his paper which has been established between the chief and the editor.

On occasion, the editor may call the chief, or vice versa, and the merits of the individual case in the "no publicity" category are discussed. This is another example of mutual understanding and relationship.

CAUTION IN REPORTING DISCIPLINARY ACTION

As has already been mentioned, there is a sequence of police—people—action—news. It therefore follows that all police action is under close scrutiny. In the small city this scrutiny is microscopic. The close personal association with most of the force, plus a pressing daily need for fresh news, leaves no item too small to hand in to these city editors. We as executives must therefore use great discretion and sound judgment in publicizing matters of disciplinary action involving members of our departments. As a semimilitary organization operating under a proper book of rules and regulations, there are few municipal services that function along similar lines. We must always consider our responsibility to our citizens and to our own men. The matter of morale and efficient, honest law enforcement go hand in hand.

These remarks are not to be construed in any way as favoring any suppression of the news on action taken by a disciplinary board or police chief in

the matter of any misconduct on the part of any member of his force. But too often bad publicity has been created towards an individual and the department as a whole, when only an infraction of the manual of procedure has occurred, having no connection with personal honesty, sobriety, or morals. We cannot publicly penalize men for honest mistakes or lack of training. There is a very fine line at times between what might be termed infraction of rules and lack of gentlemanly conduct.

We have a responsibility to our men as well as to the public in the indiscriminate releasing of this type of administrative action. Many injustices have been done as a result of this type of "fish bowl" existence in the smaller police department. This also calls for a thorough understanding between the press and police, to the end that there shall be no hiding legitimate news, but a judicious editing for fairness and accuracy.

STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE NEGLECTED

The war years have caused an accelerating growth in hundreds of small cities. With increase in population has come a mushrooming of police problems, and case loads that require rapid growth of police strength. In some instances we have "grewed like Topsy" without the necessary planning and use of organizational structure for logical division of labor and responsibility. This causes some uneven ballooning that is expensive and not conducive to efficient operation. Fortunately the average chief is now looking over his department with a critical eye. He realizes that there are far too many reins in his own hands. He spends so much time watching the horses that he neglects the main job of caring for the passengers. He is accordingly constrained to divide the re-

sponsibility and the work load on a division or bureau basis. This can be done without overspecialization.

Some very small cities are having auxiliary functions performed by men having special skill, training, and aptitude for these tasks, while some larger cities have created a fairly new group of semispecialists, examples of which are marine patrolman, radio maintenance patrolman, traffic technician patrolman, and laboratory technician patrolman. They are getting away from the old system of making a man a sergeant simply to increase his salary because of his increased knowledge in the needed specialist field. The belief that no officer should be in a sergeant's rank unless he supervises men in his daily work is rapidly gaining ground in police organization.

It is entirely feasible to break up the various departmental responsibilities in even the smallest department without ending up with all chiefs and no Indians. Organized planning, directing, and controlling, along with a proper chain of command, are being recognized more and more as a "must" in small-city police operation.

We in the small departments cannot support a continuous in-service police training program, and too often find ourselves trying to sell our over-all program to the public without first having sold it to our own personnel. All members of the department must feel that their efforts are necessary, reasonable, and effective. Yet police policies and even departmental orders may be read for the first time by police personnel in the local newspapers. This is poor administration; it builds up resentment in the ranks and lowers morale. All these matters should be thoroughly discussed and explained to staff and men before releasing any part of the plan for outside consideration and approval.

REMOVING UNNECESSARY RESTRICTIONS

Nowhere in our entire system of local government is there a more vigorous local autonomy in operation than in police. The development of minimum standards, the removal of residence restrictions, and the generally broader outlook that have been developed in the programs of such important government functions as education, public works, recreation, and welfare do not as yet feature police work. In the average small city, the idea of replacing the administrative head of the police department by an "outsider" is gaining ground, but canvassing the surrounding areas outside the geographical limitations of the city for police recruits is still unheard of.

If we are to meet the increasing demands for more and better protection, some familiar restrictions must be removed. This may be accomplished by rewriting regulations and amending legislation without loss to the community of any of its essential control in respect to the police.

As the forty-hour week becomes more general in police service, starting in the large metropolitan departments and finally catching hold in the smaller cities, it presents several new problems. In most instances, in order to make this advance in internal working conditions, it becomes necessary to increase the size of the force considerably. The need here is so apparent that I doubt very much if there has been any more compelling cause for personnel increase in the past decade or two.

It has been a comparatively easy task for the small city to recruit enough personnel to maintain an eligible list to provide additional manpower as needed; but it is becoming very evident that if requirements and standards are to be maintained at a high level, the recruitment of any sizable group of new men

strictly within narrow local boundaries will be increasingly difficult.

Police administrators who have been faced with this problem realize that there has been a gradual change in the number and the caliber of young men interested in law enforcement as a career. As various advances are made in industry—better working conditions, salaries, insurance, and pensions—the job of policing becomes relatively less attractive. When the reservoir of available manpower, starting with those who are definitely interested in becoming policemen, has been further reduced by written and oral tests, psychiatric screening, thorough character investigation, and physical qualifications, the proportion is generally about one accepted in five who applied. In some areas this proportion would go as low as one in ten.

Add to this the requirement that all applicants be bona fide residents of the city, and it becomes necessary in too many instances for the administrator to lower essential standards. Since we can only improve our force from the bottom up, we should always be thinking in terms of raising personnel standards rather than being forced to lower them. Industry could not function by lowering its standards, and neither should we in law enforcement.

It is my firm belief that residence at the time of application should not be limited to the community, but should be opened to a wide area. This lessens the grip of the political influence and gives a possible recruit a chance to become a policeman "for *what* he knows, not for *whom* he knows." Many a fine police career man has come from an out-of-town farm. Let us have better police, regardless of local residence.

With proper recruit training and follow-up in-service training, it is an easy matter for a so-called "stranger," or "outsider," to become an efficient po-

liceman in any community. What he may lose because of his lack of knowledge of local custom, he makes up for in being free of local fear or favor.

Too many have been wont to sit by and claim that we are hemmed in by state laws, local ordinances, regulations, and what not. On this subject, I think that every effort should be expended to break down narrow residence requirements, for it will prove to be time well spent in improving our local departments.

IMPORTANCE OF SUPERVISORS

One of the most important and yet one of the most neglected and least recognized officers in the small city is the patrol sergeant, or street sergeant. All outside supervision of both foot and motor patrol is generally done by this important officer. Where no in-service school is maintained, much of the guidance and on-the-job training is also done by the street sergeant.

Inasmuch as effective supervision is essential as a control device and guide for the administrator, the sergeant must be a person with definite qualities of leadership. He also holds an important position in the shaping of general department morale. In my opinion, one of the greatest weaknesses in the operation of small-city departments is the lack of proper supervision and the lack of appreciation of the importance of this position in the departmental setup.

In the small departments, because of the close personal relationship that exists, it is most difficult for a street sergeant to apply an "across the board" attitude towards the men, particularly in respect to the rules governing conduct and the manual of established procedure.

In the small department the aspirant to a sergeancy has literally grown up with the men under his direction. There-

fore, great discretion must be exercised in the selection of such supervisory personnel. They are key men in the operation of an efficient department. Their personal integrity, ability, alertness, and loyalty must be unquestionable.

The chief administrator must, therefore, have wide latitude in the selection of this important officer. If the examinations are not conducted within the department, all necessary and vital qualifications must be brought to the attention of the civil service commission or other agency, in order to get within the framework of such a system of selection. Upon this important selection rests the success or failure of the entire organization, particularly in the smaller city.

RELIEVING THE PRESSURES OF TRAFFIC CONTROL

The rise of vehicular traffic in the smaller cities has in many instances overtaken the rate of the larger ones. This is due in part to the lack of public surface transportation in the average small city, plus the mushrooming growth of suburban areas and the higher ratio of car ownership and car use in such areas. Accordingly more and more police personnel must be assigned on the day tour to school crossing details.

The pressure of parent-teacher associations and the general public insistence upon protecting our children at all costs, have made it necessary and possible for large portions of daytime personnel to be assigned to this police activity, to the extent that general police patrol and available manpower are reduced to the critical stage in many communities. While on this duty the officer is almost always out of the car, away from the radio, or off his motorcycle, and if he is a foot patrolman the crossing is generally removed from the busy part of his post. He is no longer counted on during approximately one-

half his tour by the desk man or dispatcher, who is left literally "strapped" for manpower during this operation.

Police executives are well aware of the importance of safeguarding the lives of school children. But as police protection grows in complexity, and in the face of ever increasing public demand for more and better service, some thought must be given to a revised plan of school crossing protection. Full use should be made of the accepted and standard system of schoolboy patrols. But in addition, a more general cognizance must be taken of the rapid increase of school crossing guards.

These were originally older men in nondescript makeshift uniforms. This early group is rapidly being replaced by women. They are carefully selected, trained, and uniformed. They have proved to be neat, conscientious, effec-

tive, and economical in their operation. Due to their part-time half-day work in their own neighborhoods, three of these women can be hired for the price of one patrolman of maximum salary.

The important item to the police administrator is the immediate freeing of active policemen for other important police duties; regular protection, complaint answering, traffic enforcement, parking meter checking, emergency calls, and others. This is not a question of replacing, but one of substituting. The system can be adopted in toto or in modified form tailored to suit the city budget. The plan will undoubtedly grow in use, but should be carefully applied. There will always be unusual conditions that can be handled only by a trained traffic policeman. Hence the use of these guards should not be viewed with reference to the dollar sign alone.

John M. Gleason is Chief of Police at Greenwich, Connecticut. He has been a member of the police force of that city for twenty-four years, and for half of that time has been its administrative head. He has served as president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and of the Connecticut Chiefs of Police Association, has been a special lecturer at several police and traffic training centers, and is active in traffic safety organizations and various regional police bodies.

Trends in Rural Police Protection

By EDWARD J. HICKEY

DURING the past forty years we have witnessed a phenomenal growth in state police agencies and highway patrol services throughout the United States. Four decades ago, only four states had state police agencies—Texas, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. In the latter two states the agencies were limited to certain activities in the detection of crime and in suppressing vice and gambling. Contrasted with this limited number, and an only slightly larger handful of forces in the New England and Middle Atlantic states a quarter of a century ago, we now see every state in the Union supporting state enforcement agencies of one type or another. The rapid expansion of existing state departments and the organization of new forces clearly indicate the trend of these years in the term of physical growth.

A CHANGING PATTERN

At the same time there has been much more than an increase in numerical strength. The entire pattern of state police administration and operation has been undergoing a decided change consistent with the times and the changing pattern of rural living. The suburban movement has brought a large segment of our population into areas policed by state departments. The convenience of modern travel and improved rural schools and other services have beckoned the urban dweller to migrate into the countryside. Another factor modifying the pattern of life in rural areas is the planned dispersal of vital defense industries outside of heavily populated centers. Small communities suddenly

find themselves reaping a tax bonanza, but with an accompanying host of problems, not the least of which are acute traffic and crime problems, far beyond the scope and resources of their present police operations.

Public realization of and interest in these problems of traffic and crime control in rural and suburban areas have brought demands for improved police operations and services. Police administrators, inspired by public demand and by higher professional standards set by leaders in their own field, have responded in large measure by striving for, and in most instances achieving, higher standards of performance through improved administration, supervision, personnel selection and management, and training.

Improved performance has, in turn, brought better working conditions, equipment, salaries, and retirement benefits to most departments. More is expected and more is given. We may well look back with nostalgia to the "good old days" and recall the iron men, those outstanding figures in law enforcement who made the unusual and the heroic look commonplace. These personalities stood out against a background of mediocrity, and achieved results despite almost insurmountable obstacles, most of which we do not meet today.

Realization of the vital importance, in our government, of law enforcement of a high caliber has brought about a changed attitude on the part of enlightened public officials. In 1939, at the Forty-sixth Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of

Police held in San Francisco, California, the Honorable Earl Warren, Governor of California, stated:

And in my humble opinion, whether or not democracy is to succeed depends more upon whether or not we have good, honest and efficient local government than any other combination of circumstances or things. And whether or not we are to have good local government depends upon you, depends upon the police departments of this country, because you perform the important functions of local government.

ENLARGED RESOURCES AND IMPROVED SERVICES

No institution stands still; it either progresses or fails to keep pace with changing times. The state police service has not stood still in the dynamic stream of social changes we have witnessed in the past three decades. What is true in Connecticut is true elsewhere. In 1928 the State Police Department in Connecticut, like most of the state forces existing at that time, had a small complement of men housed mostly in rented barracks which were not designed for the use to which they were being put. The men worked extremely long hours, and there was no round-the-clock patrol service such as we now have. Officers were expected to spend many nights at the barracks on stand-by duty in case of emergency. No preventive patrol service was attempted on an organized basis during the night hours. If a complaint was received, an officer was called from his bed and often had to drive many miles to reach the complainant. Barracks were run on an individual basis, with very little policy control from a top administrative level.

Public relations were hardly considered, and the public knew little of the operation of the state police except as their enforcement action reached the public press. Communications with state police on the highway were of the most

uncertain type. Training was adequate to meet the demands of the times, and officers entering the department in 1921 attended a training school. But needed equipment other than automobiles and motorcycles was not often available.

Supervision and control of the state police officer is one of the real problems of state-wide policing, and brings many problems to the administrator. State officers do not operate under the watchful eye of a patrol sergeant or a lieutenant as in the city service, where beats and other patrol areas are more or less restricted. There is no system of call boxes in rural areas to check and communicate with the personnel in the field. Early efforts to use a time-clock system at various points on patrols proved impractical and were quickly abandoned. The solution was found to lie in a close and careful check on the reports of operation submitted by each officer, covering his activities, rather than on attempts to supervise him directly.

Today the time and location of the officer's patrol contacts, his report of services rendered to the public, is supplemented by the use of the radiotelephone. These radio calls report checks of sensitive points in patrol areas and periodic checks by radio during the night hours, coupled with spot checks by patrol supervisors, serving to provide a degree of field supervision not previously possible.

Direct supervision by captains over all major crimes, traffic problems, and unusual emergencies in their respective districts brings top administrative control into the field and serves to unify policies and operations. A system of rotation of field captains further aids this unity of procedures and operations in all areas of the state to achieve the administrative aim of unity of action and state-wide co-ordination.

These changes have resulted in an increase in supervisory personnel which is

absolutely necessary because of the very nature and wide extent of individual operations in the state police service. It is at this point that many state administrators have the greatest control problem, and it is the point at which many administrative failures occur. The increase in command personnel opens new avenues of advancement and inspires greater activity on the part of the men eligible for such advancement. Efficient operation to render proper public service requires 24-hour coverage in the field, and since 1939 this has been established in many state police departments.

Sufficient personnel increases to meet this extended service were not immediately available, and manpower had to be utilized to its best advantage. Every good administrator is constantly striving to increase the efficiency of his personnel, and the question is not how many men he has at his service, but rather how good is the available manpower.

In many departments a sound program of public relations has been instituted during the period under review, which has helped to obtain the needed public understanding and legislative support. A police department must first do a good job of policing with the resources at hand, and then must tell the public it serves of the nature and the quality of that job. We must show the citizens what they are getting for their money invested for police service, and convince them that the police have nothing to sell but their services, many of which prove unpopular with a considerable segment of the public. This changing concept of public relations has proved to be one of the most important changes in administrative procedure.

During this same period, great advances have been made in communications. Many state departments have installed teletypewriter systems and im-

provements in radiotelephone communications. The latter has proved to be a boon to the state police service. The thin web of control over the officer in the field has been strengthened, and the officer on patrol is now as near to his immediate supervisor as to the radio set in his patrol car, thus greatly increasing the efficiency of the service.

DECLINING OPPOSITION OF ORGANIZED LABOR

In the early days of state police, the sponsors of such police services met head on with the opposition of organized labor. In many states organized labor was deeply concerned about the attempt to establish and increase state police services, fearing that such organizations would be used in strikes. Several eastern industrial states were confronted with this opposition, and in some instances special legislation controlled the use of state police in labor strikes.

State highway patrols established in the past three decades have not been confronted with this problem, as their police powers are often limited strictly to the state highways. Many states have passed legislation restricting the use of state police in labor matters, placing the responsibility on the governor of the state by requiring his approval for use of the police at strike scenes. Other states require, especially in municipalities having local organized police forces, a written request and the approval of the chief of police and the executive officer of the municipality in order to call upon the state police for assistance in preserving the peace.

While this opposition by organized labor has been on the decline in the past decade, experienced state police administrators are fully aware of the pressure exerted in many places when state police are sought to maintain law and order at strike scenes. Administrators

are also aware of the many changes in state and national laws relative to the use of police powers at such places. The use of too few or too many policemen at a strike scene often determines the attitude of those engaged in labor's opposition to increasing state police personnel.

In Connecticut, a successful policy was established by Governor Raymond E. Baldwin, now Associate Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court. In 1946 he declared:

We pursued a policy that I submit all state police departments ought to pursue. In the past it has always been customary for the police to use the facilities of the factory at which a strike was in progress, making their headquarters there, and being fed there. Thus, they might have the appearance of being supporters of the employer when, as a matter of fact, they should be impartial keepers of the peace between the disputant factions. The State Police Commissioner wisely provided all of the facilities needed by the state police, food, and otherwise, outside the gate of the plant.¹

DECLINE OF THE CONSTABLE AND SHERIFF

The office of constable is the oldest in police history. It comes down from medieval law. At one time the constable was in general the leader of the royal armies and had cognizance in all matters in war and arms, exercising both civil and military jurisdiction. He was a high functionary under the French and English kings, the dignity and importance of whose office were second only to those of the monarch.

In American law, the constable is an officer of a municipal corporation, elected by the people, whose duties are similar to those of the sheriff. Though

¹ Raymond E. Baldwin, *Let's Go into Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 120.

his powers are the same, his jurisdiction is smaller.

The sheriff likewise comes down through the ages, and is the principal peace officer in every county, being chosen by popular election in nearly all states. His chief duties are in aid of criminal courts and civil courts, and he has original jurisdiction in all criminal matters. Before the era of state police departments in this country, the sheriff was the high enforcement official of criminal laws in each county, while the constable had equal power in the town for which he was elected. The formal authority of both offices still stands, though their participation in law enforcement is steadily declining.

In the development of this country through the years, centers of population have banded together to form cities, which needed more protection than the sheriff of the county or the local constable could provide. City police departments have been given the same powers relating to criminal matters as sheriffs and constables. Citizens look to the police department for the investigation and detection of crime, rather than to the elected official.

Through experience, education, and public relations, the people in rural areas look to the state police for the enforcement of the criminal law.

The development of the motor vehicle era has also brought the need for more police officers, and the enforcement of law has in most places been left to a larger force of men, with wider jurisdiction, than those designated to county and town officials.

In Connecticut prior to 1939, the local constable received compensation for his efforts through a fee system. This amounted to a statutory regulation compensating him for each arrest that he made, whether the person arrested was convicted or not. If convicted, the accused paid the costs of the court, in

which were computed the constable's fee, and those of the justice of the peace and the prosecuting grand juror. When this law was changed, the constable was still elected to office, but after his election he was appointed by the first selectman of the town to be the special constable and to receive compensation from the town. This amount of compensation was so small that most elected constables did not care for this appointment.

The local constable likewise serves civil process, for which his compensation is regulated by statute. The trend in the past twenty-five years in civil matters is for the writs to be served through the office of the high sheriff. He in turn doles out these services to his deputies, as he has jurisdiction in more than one town.

So from a position of highest importance in medieval times, through the evolution of living standards, the constable is now relegated to a position of little service to the community.

The sheriffs have fared better with the general public, in that they are salaried county officials, elected in most places for a two- or four-year term. In the East, through popular demand, the sheriff has gradually relinquished his powers in criminal matters to local organized police departments. However, in some sections the governing bodies of counties still retain the sheriffs, who have organized patrol systems and deputies residing in the many towns within their precincts. These sheriffs are from the old school, and through politics have been able to succeed themselves in office through many years. In the Middle West and the Far West, the sheriff retains much of his popularity of frontier days.

Yet the shifting population of this country, the growth of urban areas, the relocation of various industries throughout the country, all tend to burden the

adaptability of the sheriff and the constable to current public needs.

MOUNTED VERSUS MOTOR PATROLS

Mounted units have gradually disappeared from state police forces as services and responsibilities have changed. In many instances they have been casualties of the machine age.

Pennsylvania is among the states which retain a mounted unit, although at present its strength has been reduced to a minimum. This mounted unit has proved its value in that state and is considered good insurance for the maintenance of law and order in riots and for crowd control in large gatherings of people.

State and metropolitan police departments which now maintain mounted units do so in the opinion that a mounted policeman is worth several dismounted men in maintaining order at outdoor gatherings and demonstrations, where exceptionally large or unruly crowds are assembled. Of course, the mounted troopers are used in co-operation with dismounted patrolmen in these operations.

At large outdoor gatherings, as in traffic work, the chief advantages of the mounted police are height and mobility. They are in a position to spot a difficulty at once, make their way to it rapidly, and take the situation quickly in hand. Their work is then supplemented by the foot patrolman. Mounted officers command a respect from a crowd. They have a psychological effect on crowds, since the average person is more or less afraid of being trampled on by the horses' feet.

In addition to these listed purposes, mounted troopers have value in mountainous or open areas in searches for criminals or lost persons, since they are able to reach trails and spots which are not accessible to motor vehicles. Also,

their use in ceremonial occasions or parades is impressive.

Other than for the specific uses mentioned, the modern methods and practices of state police departments have been geared to cope with crime and traffic in rural areas and high-speed parkways, and the use of horses is minor or nonexistent.

Routine state police criminal and highway patrol work necessitates the use of high-powered cars provided with radio receivers and transmitters, red flashing lights, sirens, first-aid kits, emergency equipment of various types, and, in some instances, specialized facilities such as identification kits and photographic apparatus. This equipment has the effect of turning the patrol car into a one- or two-man mobile substation capable of ranging far afield from its base station. This patrol car may be used as a field station to carry prisoners, or even may be pressed into service to transport injured persons to the hospital. In this age, the motor patrol has proved its value in all-round police work, whereas mounted troopers are limited to specialized services in a local area.

Even the "iron horse"—the motorcycle—has been retired from active service by many progressive state police forces during the past decade. The motorcycles which formerly were used for patrol service on the highways have been withdrawn from active patrol service in many instances and are now used strictly on assignments such as parades, ceremonies, crowd control, and liaison work. Motorcycles used in such efforts are ordinarily radio-equipped for control purposes. Use of motorcycles at present, however, is ordinarily dependent on clear and dry weather.

The all-purpose jeep, with its four-wheel drive, is fast replacing both the horse and the motorcycle. This vehicle, properly equipped with radio, siren, red

flashing light, and trailer hitch, is indeed an all-purpose instrument. Some of the jobs for which it has been utilized in state police work are perimeter crowd control, parade crowd control, searches for lost persons or criminals in terrain unsuitable for patrol cars, and towing rescue boats and emergency equipment to trouble scenes.

Modern inventions, it is apparent, have numbered the days of the state police horse, even though some of the old color and glory of the early troopers must also disappear as a consequence.

CIVIL SERVICE CONTROLS EXPAND

Unlike most other types of public employment, admission to the state police force is not predicated on special qualifications, vocational experience, professional training, or even general education in most instances. Recruits are sought among young men and women of good character and sound physical constitution, who appear to be able to learn what the police force has to teach them, and who it is hoped will prove adaptable to the conditions of police service.

Two decades ago, the majority of state police departments selected their recruits with an eye not only on their qualifications but also on their political affiliations and activity. In a few forces, high standards of selection and promotion were maintained without sharing these essential powers with civil service administrations. Today, the picture has changed; civil service and its occupational counterpart, the merit system, govern recruit selection and promotions in the majority of state police forces.

According to a survey of state enforcement units undertaken in 1950 by the International Association of Chiefs of Police,² 25 states had state police

² *Compilation of Comparative Data State and Provincial Law Enforcement Agencies, 1950*, by State and Provincial Section, Inter-

units which were invested with general powers in criminal and traffic cases. Of these 25 state police units, 13 operated under their own merit system, 5 were under civil service, and only 7 had neither. Further inquiry revealed that 13 state police organizations based promotions on the results of examinations, while the rest did not.

For any group of police administrators to satisfy the demands of the selection process with full justice to the individuals concerned and with due regard to the overriding interests of the state and its citizens proves exceedingly difficult. Such difficulties are minor, however, when compared with those confronting personnel agencies which seek to deal with questions of police management. In some states the state personnel department regularly turns to the police heads for aid in conducting written and oral examinations and in establishing the standards for service ratings, while in many others this close co-operation still is lacking.

Where personnel departments set up examination procedures independent of the police administrator, neither the police head nor the ranking officers of the force can directly apply any of their own wisdom, police sense, or experience to the primary selection of recruits. An improvement on this system would permit close collaboration between the police commissioner and the personnel department on the scope and contents of written examinations and would authorize the commissioner and state police ranking officers to conduct oral examinations of aspirants for appointment and promotion and to accord ratings on such interviews.

The merit system rule under which the appointing authority is given a choice among the three top names on

national Association of Chiefs of Police, G. R. Carrel, General Chairman (no page numbers).

the eligible list works well enough when only one appointment is involved, but often state police appointments must be made in large numbers when a group is being selected for training or when a policy change makes a large number of promotions necessary. With the system of selecting one applicant from three names and ten applicants from twelve names, the state police head actually enjoys less freedom of selection than do other department heads. It would prove desirable if the two-extraneous rule were relaxed for state police appointments, by providing not less than twice as many certifications as there are places to be filled.

Even with various faults, the civil service or merit system fulfills the needs of the police service much more satisfactorily than the system of appointment on a wholly political basis.

TRAINING OF RECRUITS

Every state police department and the vast majority of state and highway patrols today train recruit patrolmen prior to their assignment to duty. There is little difference of opinion among administrators today regarding the need for training of recruit police officers prior to their undertaking active duty in the field. This training is recognized as a necessity without which no recruit can render his best service to the public for whom he labors.

It is plainly understood that some form of training will take place in any police department even if no classroom instruction and practice are made available to the recruit. The costly process of trial-and-error training has given way to formal recruit instruction.

An awakened public demand for more efficient police service has been the motivating force for improvement in training methods in many cases, but in the majority of our more advanced police departments, improvements have come

as a result of a desire on the part of the administration of these departments to render better the public service they are sworn to provide.

While there is general agreement among police administrators as to the necessity for recruit training, great difference of opinion arises as to what kind of training and how much of that training should be undertaken. The length of the training period varies from department to department, and the subject matter and methods of presentation also differ. There is no set standard. Each department must be governed by the available material, time, and funds, and must do its best within the means provided.

POLICE CO-OPERATION

Police co-operation shows a tendency to expand, but the future of this co-operation must rest upon the mutual good faith of the agencies concerned. At the beginning of the present century, many of the devices which now aid co-operation, such as radio, teletype, and telephone, were unknown in many police departments and were not seriously considered in others. If they were not unknown at the time, the legality of these means of communication in police work might well have been questioned.

Rapid developments in communication and transportation have necessitated changes in modern methods of police operation. Today, crime is no longer always a local matter. Yet it should be handled as such, as long as it remains local. It is when crime crosses town, city, or state borders that the processes of departmental co-operation must come into play. Experience has demonstrated that the present system of law enforcement—national, state, and local—is the best system.

State police departments actively participate in state efforts to assist in the enactment of better crime control legis-

lation, as well as in similar activity on the national scene. Through membership in such organizations as state police associations and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, they have helped to raise professional standards, tighten national security, promote good public relations, widen police education and training, increase the efficiency of police communications, and obtain indirect police benefits.

Interstate enactments continue to assist the state police forces to control crime. The Interstate Probation and Parole Compact, in which participation is broadening; the Uniform Extradition Act, which has more than three-fourths of the states as signatories; the Out-of-State Witnesses Act, participated in by forty-three states; and the Fresh Pursuit Act, having more than three-fourths of the states as signatories—these are examples of close co-operation. Such compacts should be supported and enlarged in the future.

Uniform state laws, bringing the citizens of the various states closer together, will enable officials to work in closer harmony and result generally in a higher quality of law enforcement.

AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

Availability of special equipment in the future will have an effect on tomorrow's methods of operation. Such devices as the Electromatic Speed Meter (Radar), drunk meter or alcohol meter, and motion pictures have been used by state police throughout the nation with various degrees of success to gain evidence for use in the prosecution of traffic violations. However, these devices will not be universally acceptable until court decisions or statutes give legal substance to them.

Another point that will have to be determined in the future is the working schedules for state police patrolmen. The national shift to the 40-hour week

in public employment brings out the fact that of 25 state police departments, at least 16 have workdays of 10 hours or more. Working hours must be determined on a state basis and considered in relation to salary, days off, retirement benefits, and other emoluments such as uniform allowances. It is inconceivable that one pattern of hours and wages can be set that will be satisfactory to each state police department.

As we view the state police attack on

the problems of crime and traffic, we feel that we are fortunate in living in a nation where action results from public demand. That is one of the blessings of America—and one of the safeguards of our way of life. An aroused and informed citizenry can bring about changes which are needed to assist police in minimizing the constant threat to public safety and good order. State police administrators must be alert to identify and accept these changes.

Edward J. Hickey was Commissioner of Connecticut State Police and state fire marshal from July 1, 1939 until his death in September 1953. He was engaged in law enforcement for almost forty years. At various times he served with the Pinkerton Agency, the United States Department of Justice, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, and for seventeen years he was Hartford County detective with the prosecutor Hugh M. Alcorn. At various times he was president or chairman of numerous national or regional state groups of enforcement officers, and during World War II he was acting head of Connecticut's War Council.

Special Purpose Police Forces

By EARLE W. GARRETT

MOST of our special police bodies derive their enforcement authority from governments that exercise regulatory controls under the American constitutional distribution of the "police power." This is true whether the direct instrument of grant is an administration regulation, a municipal ordinance, a city charter, a state statute, a state constitution, a federal statute, or the federal Constitution. In many of the units exercising these powers the personnel wear no uniforms and therefore may not be thought of as enforcement officers. However, as the following paragraphs show, some of these nonuniformed officials necessarily exercise extensive and even summary enforcement powers in discharging their duties.

In every type of government—municipal, county, state, interstate, and federal—we find special police bodies that have been created by legislation as *ad hoc* authorities to accomplish ends that might not otherwise prove feasible. The enforcement features of some of these units are blurred by the administrative techniques and intents of which they are a part. Furthermore, the extent and intensity of the enforcement effort has diminished or increased in some units in relation to other special or general police units at the same or different levels of government.

Special bodies have been created to serve initially the particular function which they are now discharging, but, as often as not, the enforcement activity has developed in response to the changed requirements of its administrative parent. When a broad public interest is served by the special agency, contacts may occur and informal working agree-

ments may be made with general police forces at the federal, state, county, or municipal level. Such arrangements are generally of mutual benefit to the agencies involved, and in the interest of law enforcement.

SPECIAL FORCES AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL

A rapid and extensive urban growth gives rise to particular problems that create hazards to life, health, and property. The regular municipal police with their general police powers are required to cope with the hazards created by human agents. Other dangers arise from nonhuman sources, however, and may require separate handling measures. Fire and disease are examples.

City firemen, upon arriving at the fire ground, do whatever is necessary to get the flames under control or confine them to the premises. The entire structure and its contents may be destroyed in the process. This is a peremptory exercise of the police power of which the victims may sometimes prove critical but usually refrain from public complaint.

In the event of a sweeping fire or holocaust, fire forces may dynamite buildings in the path of the fire to prevent its spread to other areas. These fire-fighting measures, to be effective, must be promptly applied. No time is available to obtain a judicial warrant, and, of course, none is required. While this does not preclude civil suits for unnecessary damage, the general custom of insurance protection ameliorates the effects of most of such cases.

Most large cities have a fire prevention unit in the fire department, headed by a fire marshal, with a staff of inspec-

tors. Periodic inspections are made of places of public assembly, such as theaters, motion picture houses, schools, churches, hospitals, nursing homes, orphanages, and homes for the aged, and necessary changes are ordered and enforced. The common rooms of multiple-family dwellings are generally inspected also. Suspicious fires are investigated independent of the local police force.

Exercise of the police power in fire prevention is most uneven. It is usually possible to effect removal of oily waste or rubbish which might cause a fire, but compliance with an order to install a fire stop or fire wall, an outside fire escape, panic-proof hardware, outward-opening doors, additional exits, or fire doors is frequently obtained only through the courts. The resistance and occasional obstructive tactics generated in such cases may arise from the inability of the landlord to pass on the costs of the firesafety improvements to the tenants.

Public health protection

Questions of broad sociological interest also are involved in the exercise of police authority in the field of public health. Prompt action is required to abate unsanitary conditions which may be hazardous to the general health; hence summary and even arbitrary powers are sustained by the courts under the nuisance doctrine.

Cities sometimes provide smoke control inspectors, as in Washington, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and New York, where unconsumed soft coal belched into the air from numberless chimneys and stacks may endanger the health of the people and smudge the buildings.

Public health officials in most cities inspect restaurants under city license to assure standards of cleanliness and require food handlers to comply with the provisions of city permits which are

aimed at eliminating carriers of communicable diseases (of the type of "Typhoid Mary"). Sanitation police in New York are expected, among other duties, to see that garbage cans have proper covers and that garbage is not mingled with ashes in open receptacles.

Protection of buildings and public places

In most large cities there is a branch of the municipal government, usually under the direction of a building inspector, which enforces the zoning laws and regulations, approves construction plans for new buildings and alterations of existing ones, issues permits, and makes inspections. Plumbing, heating, and electrical inspectors, examined and licensed by the city for control purposes, are generally included on the staff. To make these controls work satisfactorily, there must be close liaison with other municipal inspection units—such as that of fire prevention in the fire department—whose personnel have opportunity to observe and discover violations hazardous to health, safety, or morals.

It is easy, of course, in return for a fee, to fail to observe and report a variety of violations, where the inspector works alone, as he usually does, and where it would be difficult to prove the existence of the violation at the time of the inspector's reported visit. An obstruction to a fire escape, a nonoperative fire door, and prohibited electrical wiring devices are cases in point. The fee for overlooking such violations is "what the traffic will bear"; that is, how much it is worth to the violator to be permitted to continue the offense. Unreasonable applications of the law and regulations can be used to extort bribes from parties who would never initiate such arrangements.

No permanent solution for this form of bribery has been discovered. The bribegiver and the bribetaker may be equally guilty, but the circumstances of

the conspiracy are generally such that witnesses are lacking and evidence is insufficient and unreported.

Some cities have park police, popularly known as "sparrow cops," whose duties are to preserve order, prevent littering of the park and vandalism, and prevent offenses against public morals. Chicago has a consolidated park district with some eight hundred police who operate apart from the city police force. Though its men have general police powers which they occasionally exercise in on-view cases, their duties are mostly traffic control on the two hundred miles of park boulevards, some of which interlace hundreds of Chicago streets. Municipal zoological gardens sometimes have special forces to maintain order, prevent unrestricted feeding of animals or birds, and suppress vandalism.

New York has a large transportation police force which confines itself to the control of spitting (basically to prevent spread of tuberculosis), smoking, public morals offenses, handbag snatching, mugging, and other offenses in the city-owned subways and elevated railways. Some cities have conferred special police powers on their school crossing guards, although most municipalities have succeeded in making this service work satisfactorily without granting such employees any law enforcement authority whatever.

Of the four levels of government, urban centers exhibit the greatest variety of special purpose police forces, although many of these activities are not generally recognized for what they are.

COUNTY SPECIAL POLICE FORCES

As legislative creatures of the state, and regarded as mere political subdivisions and quasi corporations to serve the purposes of the state, the counties in general have not developed special purpose police bodies in number and va-

riety in any way comparable to those of the cities. This, of course, follows from the rural setting and the limited number of governmental services performed by most counties.

Yet the more urbanized counties do have various special police bodies. Special park police have been established for the protection of county park areas.

Control of civil aviation, sometimes a county government activity, is an exercise of the police power to control a noise nuisance and prevent such acts as "buzzing" and stunting over populated areas in a manner endangering life and property. Certain Maryland counties in the vicinity of Washington, D. C., engage in the exclusive control and sale of packaged alcoholic beverages, mainly as a policing measure. In order to control the sale of liquor to some elements of the population, certain counties of a few southern states operate county package stores as the only lawful outlets for alcoholic beverages, sales by the drink for consumption on the premises being forbidden.

STATE SPECIAL POLICE

Inherent police powers rest with the sovereign states. Cities and counties exercise such powers only when permitted to do so by the state of which they are a part. Even the federal government may apply only such enforcement measures as were directly or indirectly conveyed to it by the states through the medium of the United States Constitution.

Several states have highway patrols, with limited police powers, which confine their activities to highway traffic control and enforcement of the motor vehicle laws. These forces are often denied general law enforcement authority and broader jurisdiction, because of the fear of organized labor that a general state police force might be used in strikebreaking. Historically,

this apprehension goes back to the early days of the Pennsylvania State Constabulary; and while labor's anxiety has long since been allayed, the pattern is firmly fixed in some of our southern and western commonwealths. The number of state police forces with full powers is steadily growing. In Delaware, in addition to a conservation commission, such as is common to many states, there is an oyster warden independently created for the Broadkill River and another for the Mispillion River. Texas has a game, fish, and oyster commission which, through its staff, enforces all laws relating to game birds, songbirds, fur-bearing animals, fish and marine life, and stream pollution.

Texas also has a livestock sanitary commission with limited police powers, responsible for tick eradication, extermination of predatory animals, and control of communicable diseases of livestock through inspections. Necessary control measures sometimes include seizure and destruction of infected barn cattle. Arizona has a sheep sanitary commission to enforce a program designed to prevent and eradicate sheep and goat diseases. Also, in Arizona, there is a livestock sanitary board which, in addition to disease prevention responsibilities, is required to "prevent theft of livestock."

Arizona has an office of the supervisor of inspection which is charged with the duty of enforcing the Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act controlling the grading of fruit and vegetables shipped from the state. In the discharge of this duty, the inspectors receive the co-operation of the State Commission of Agriculture and Horticulture, the State Highway Patrol, the United States Department of Agriculture inspectors, the agriculture extension service of the University of Arizona, and the county agricultural agents.

Most states have parks and monuments which are protected from fire and

vandalism by wardens or state employees with some degree of police power.

STATE LIQUOR CONTROL AUTHORITIES

Following repeal of prohibition in 1933, the states faced the problem of what to do about liquor control. The "evil" days of the saloon, prior to 1920, were remembered, as were the burlesque excesses of fourteen years of prohibition. Because the use of alcoholic beverages has broad social implications which characterize it as alone in its class, subject to strict regulation, several variations of control were worked out, according to the needs of the states concerned.

Four general control types are recognizable. Each bears some relation to the amount and distribution of dry sentiment in the state, the presence of large urban populations in the state or suburban areas serving large cities of neighboring states, and the population composition.

The achievements of these various types of control laws leave much to be desired. Prohibition has proved far from satisfactory in the states which retained it after 1933 in the face of the failure of the great national experiment. Liquor is available in such jurisdictions, but the price is high, and the brand is often untrustworthy and the quality correspondingly low.

In public monopoly states, unregistered stills, untaxed liquor, bootleggers, and speak-easies are policed by special state forces. The individual purchase permit has not dried up the chronic alcoholic (that interdicted unfortunate) or kept liquor away from minors. Nor have scandals among monopoly state liquor boards added to their prestige and public usefulness.

The dry areas where liquor is lawfully available only for medicinal purposes seem to have a host of ailing

people. Curiously enough, during early post-repeal days, Kentucky—the granddaddy of bourbon—permitted sale of whisky only for medicinal reasons, broadly interpreted.

Some of the license states, in their zeal to regulate, have become involved in a self-spun web of administrative law. Through the medium of state rules and regulations having the force and effect of law, they seek to stabilize retail liquor prices, eliminate the effects of competition, and prevent the social evils of price-cutting by putting a floor under prices. A similar result has been sought in the wholesale liquor trade by an attempt to regulate credit.

These attempts to put a rein on economic law and the fertility of human contrivance have generally stood the test of judicial review because the courts do not wish to interfere with the administrative problems of liquor control. But one rule has led, logically but unrealistically, to another until their weight and scope have limited their enforceability. Regulation of the countless possible forms of advertising has passed the point of absurdity. Control of the manner in which inducements may be presented becomes burdensome, costly, and futile.

Unscrupulous tradespeople, shrewdly cognizant of the possibilities offered by such overregulation, have joined together to press for ever more rules "for the good of the trade" which they know the decent members would obey, leaving to them a trade advantage in undetected violations. The burden on the state enforcement unit has been broadened and intensified by these layers of administrative law which are, as often as not, irritants rather than aids to the broad problem of social control.

Enforcement difficulties accordingly have increased. The financial burden of securing adequate evidence has curbed enforcement effectiveness because of in-

adequate "buy" funds. The understandable harmony of an astute retailer and a well-known, appreciative customer makes it difficult to acquire evidence.

Meanwhile, the dealer who tries to operate within the law but makes an inadvertent mistake, becomes the target of his sharp-eyed competitor. Then arises the cry for the "more equal enforcement" which the state unit has lost its capacity to give. So the query may now be raised whether the effort to benefit society is being applied at the proper point.

AN INTERSTATE POLICE FORCE

The states of New York and New Jersey found it expedient in 1921 to create the Port of New York Authority, an *ad hoc* body to co-ordinate and unify the administration of the New York port district. Its authority has since been extended and it now owns and operates motor vehicle tunnels, toll bridges, commercial airfields, freight transshipment facilities, and other revenue-producing establishments.

All of these tunnels, bridges, airports, and other facilities are policed by a single interstate force that is recruited and directed independent of the police forces of the states or cities involved.

FEDERAL SPECIAL PURPOSE POLICE

The federal government has at least fourscore agencies that exercise some measure of special police power. Many of these unit activities are expressions of administrative necessity where the agency dealing at close range with the problem feels itself better able to do its own policing. Much of this enforcement effort has grown out of changed or expanded responsibilities of the agencies over a period of years.

The best-known of the federal enforcement agencies are in the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Post Office.

The only federal body with general enforcement powers is the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Justice. Its activities are household knowledge throughout the land. While its jurisdiction within the federal sphere is not restricted by law, it deals most frequently with those crimes which are not the special responsibility of other federal police bodies.

The border patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Justice Department is charged with the investigation and suppression of the smuggling of aliens and such crimes.

The Post Office Department maintains a corps of inspectors who investigate mail losses and postal law violations in general. Among the time-consuming duties of the inspectors are numerous noncriminal inquiries and administrative activities.

The greatest number of special enforcement bodies is found in the Department of the Treasury. In the Bureau of Internal Revenue is the enforcement arm of the Alcohol Tax Unit, responsible for the investigation and suppression of violations of the laws taxing alcoholic beverages. Also in the Bureau of Internal Revenue is the Intelligence Unit, accountable for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws, which include the income tax laws. The United States Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing laws and regulations for safety at sea.

The Bureau of Narcotics directs its efforts toward the control of violations of the narcotic drug laws. In the Bureau of Customs there is a division which concerns itself with smuggling and unlawful exportation. A customs border patrol is also maintained on the Canadian and Mexican borders.

Finally, among the Treasury units the Secret Service is charged with the control of counterfeiting, the protection of the President and his family, and the

President-elect, and with an indefinite jurisdiction over crimes involving numerous federal agencies.

A variety of other agencies exercising some sort of limited police power may be found in the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce; in the Veterans Administration; and in the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the United States Maritime Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the United States Civil Service Commission, and other independent commissions.

INTERPLAY OF OLD AND NEW POLICE FORCES

Special purpose police forces sometimes arise in response to a need which the existing agencies cannot or will not satisfy. These newer units, when created under urgent administrative requirements, are generally utilitarian at the outset. As time passes and functional emphasis changes, their fitness may become less apparent.

When new agencies of special enforcement are created because existing agencies are not called upon to assume new tasks, the latter are not thereupon eliminated, but generally remain a charge upon the taxpayers. And when a general police force assumes these duties of specialized enforcement, the results are not always satisfactory. The hard fact is that we are still a long way from reconciling our urge to regulate with the demonstrated limitations of enforcement.

Special purpose police forces at the municipal, county, state, and federal levels often suffer from inadequate training, an imperfect knowledge of the value of evidence, limited personal identification, scanty criminal records data, and poor communications facilities. Some special forces at all levels of government, with sufficient personnel

and adequate finances, have taken the initiative in providing training, installing records, and arranging for the availability of communications and identification facilities. Out of the will to do, a way has been found.

It has been said of the numerous federal special and auxiliary police agencies that "each thinks of itself first." There have been proposals to cure this selfish, costly, independent attitude by a redistribution of police functions among the federal departments without eliminating the existing units; by turning over all of the police activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation; or by co-ordinating the existing police agencies through an interdepartmental committee or a single co-ordinator drawing authority directly from the Executive Office of the President. Of the three proposals, the single co-ordinator could, in time, bring about some consolidations of units and functions to reduce the number of jurisdictional disputes and administrative conflicts. The situation is one of tradition-soaked complexity. Too much should not be expected too fast.

Efforts have been made at the state level to co-ordinate enforcement agencies that exercise general and special police powers. In connection with its recent constitutional reorganization, New Jersey brought its state police, motor vehicle inspectors, alcoholic beverage control and alcoholic beverage tax departments, and a number of state inspection agencies together under the state's attorney general. No change was made in the enforcement powers of the participating agencies, but all personnel of all agencies are charged with the duty of observing and reporting to the attorney general all violations discovered by them, even if not within their own special sphere of activity. Broad dissatisfaction is reported with this arrangement, which was expected

to be a first step toward complete integration of all state enforcement units. The admixture of regulatory functions with enforcement activities is one source of trouble.

It appears wasteful and unnecessary to maintain motor vehicle inspectors and state police on the same highways, as is done in Arizona, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. A boulevard police force, operating on a mere twenty miles of county highway, cannot be justified when a separate county police force covers the state and county roads, as in Hudson County, New Jersey. Chicago's park district police, serving under a commission appointed by the mayor, distinct from the city police but patrolling boulevards which grid the city streets, is clearly unwarranted. Situations such as these can be cured by consolidation whenever the will to improve takes control.

The promise of administrative betterment

In time, the science of administration may so improve, and the selection and training of personnel so advance, that the special police activities of the several inspection services of large municipalities may be performed in conjunction with the general police activities. This new approach to an old problem may even provide collateral benefits for all participants. Several small municipalities in this country are now operating combined fire and police departments with the same personnel. When such diverse doctrines are brought into a common focus, hope soars for numerous other changes.

The future of special purpose police forces is far from clear. Tradition balks fundamental changes. Vested bureaucratic interests are generally powerful enough to block efforts to alter the existing arrangements. The county may

be an appropriate political unit for consolidating agencies in selected instances. In other cases, resort may be had to *ad hoc* authorities, already used to accomplish special purposes.

The police power is not an absolute thing, nor a fixed quantity. Its nature

is more a reflection of the economic, political, and social conditions of a people, and is an ever changing phenomenon. Law enforcement must therefore be flexible enough to develop in harmony with the requirements of a dynamic social order.

Earle W. Garrett, New York City, has directed or participated in more than a score of police surveys of cities, large and small, for the Institute of Public Administration, New York, and Griffenhagen and Associates, Chicago. He was for some years chief deputy and acting commissioner of the New Jersey State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. He is co-author of the Report on Police submitted by the National (Wickersham) Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.

The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement

By JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

IS a national police force necessary or advisable? Is there need for further centralization of law enforcement in a state or federal agency?

My answer to both of these questions is an unequivocal "No!" Nor should we, I maintain, take any steps which could feasibly lead to the ultimate consolidation of police power.

Throughout the course of history, freedom has been a universal goal of man. Like a golden thread in a woven pattern, the struggle for freedom is clearly visible in every age. The battle against tyranny has been, and is today, a constant one. Again and again, civilizations have fought their way upward against terrifying odds to achieve some form of individual freedom, only to see it engulfed again in the darkness born of ignorance, inaction, and lack of vigilance.

Freedom was the compass by which the Mayflower set its course. It was the magnet which drew thousands to the insecurity of a savage wilderness. It was the prize for which the freedom seekers and their children fought a bitter war.

When the dream had been fulfilled—when as a unified people they had achieved the goal of individual liberty—our forefathers sought to find the governmental structure necessary for its everlasting retention. Out of their endeavors and their indomitable faith a dynamic concept of government emerged. In beautiful and inspiring simplicity of language they penned the Constitution, the living pattern for translating that concept into vigorous reality.

For approximately one hundred and sixty-five years the plan of government conceived by our forefathers has op-

erated with unsurpassed success. It has preserved the freedom of the individual. It has enabled the United States to develop and advance beyond the broadest dreams of the Founding Fathers. Change has been a constant factor in that progressive advance.

As the population of the United States multiplied and modern systems of transportation and communication developed, a more prominent role was assigned the federal government in the development of the nation. With the passage of many new federal statutes, a more complex federal government gradually emerged—a central government which could exercise great power, but within the framework of the Constitution. The success of this great experiment in government remains the marvel and the envy of the world.

POLICE SYSTEM FOLLOWS PATTERN OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Our decentralized police system in America is a direct and necessary product of our historical development as a nation. The two are indissolubly intertwined. Both are born of the same mother—skepticism of concentrated power. Both are fathered by the concept of self-rule.

What of law enforcement in the past history of our nation? The pattern of our police forces follows closely the development of our whole governmental pattern. Tyranny was too recent a reality for Americans to desire any form of centralized police power. When circumstances dictated the necessity, therefore, systems of law enforcement developed as the need for them arose. As a

result of this growth, widely diverse systems of law enforcement emerged in the United States.

Just as the concept of home rule placed responsibility for the governing processes squarely on the individual in the community, the responsibility for the enforcement of the law rested on exactly the same shoulders.

Today the great and vital news with regard to law enforcement has been the significant steps forward from that early beginning—a series of progressive advances extending from administrative echelons to the rank and file—which have already transformed the over-all picture of law enforcement throughout the United States.

Decentralized law enforcement in this nation is fulfilling its promise. It is living up to the great trust which was implicit in the simple, liberty-giving concept of the Founding Fathers. Law enforcement in our Republic has come of age. I say this in the face of intensified criticism of local law enforcement and in the face of recurring "reform" proposals, the inevitable result of which would be the centralization of police powers in a state or federal agency—and the ultimate destruction of the tremendous gains which decentralized law enforcement has made. I emphasize this because the facts are known to few and because knowledge of the facts may preclude taking the first tragic step toward centralization of police powers.

As it stands today, law enforcement on the federal level is the direct result of our decentralized form of government. Its duties are concerned, in whole or in part, with the suppression of crimes defined by federal statute. It is limited. As the laws are presently constituted, no federal law enforcement agency can infringe upon the field reserved to the other branches of law enforcement. None is subservient to the other. Any legislative change which would render

local law enforcement subservient to state jurisdiction, or local and state law enforcement subservient to federal jurisdiction, would, in my opinion, be disastrous.

DANGERS OF CENTRALIZED POLICE POWER

I am unalterably opposed to a national police force. I have consistently opposed any plan leading to a consolidation of police power, regardless of the source from which it originated. I shall continue to do so, for the following reasons, which, in the same words, I have set forth on many earlier occasions:

1. Centralization of police power represents a distinct danger to democratic self-government.

2. Proposals to centralize law enforcement tend to assume that either the state or federal government can and should do for each community what the people of that city or county will not do for themselves.

3. The authority of every peace officer in every community would be reduced, if not eventually broken, in favor of a dominating figure or group on the distant state or national level. It is conceivable that such an official or group might be given the power by law to influence or dictate the selection of officers, the circumstances of their employment, and the decisions they make in arresting and prosecuting those who violate the law.

Threat to democracy

The first point, I believe, is the most compelling argument against any move toward centralization of police power. No one should be misled by representations that the power in question would be limited and would be sparingly used. While those who advance such a proposal may be acting from the best of motives, we must remember that power once granted to a sovereign authority is

seldom relinquished. It is more often used to the hilt and extended in scope, and if it falls into corrupt hands, it can become a deadly menace. The judgment of history is on the side of those who limit police power and who never allow the bulwarks of those limits to be breached.

Public support essential

The premise which is implicit in the second point is utterly fallacious. It assumes that "the government" holds the magic key of accomplishment, regardless of the will and responsibility of the people. This is fantastically naïve. If the majority of the communities in a state are unable to enforce a law, either directly as a result of widespread disobedience or indirectly from public apathy, by what reasoning are we to assume that a "higher" authority will be more successful? Federal experience during the prohibition era is strong evidence bearing on this point. The basic power of law enforcement resides in the citizens of the nation; without their co-operation no agency of government—local, state, or federal—can be effective.

Danger of corruption

With regard to point number three, the excuse advanced to justify supervisory authority over local law enforcement has been the alleged necessity to correct deficiencies in local law enforcement. It is contended that inasmuch as the local officer may fall victim to certain pressures and temptations, the higher arm of government must have the power to take over and do the job right. This novel argument assumes that there are two breeds of men, and that those in higher authority are not subject to the subtle influence of money and corrupt politics. While this may be true in any given case, experience gives little basis for expecting a con-

stant succession of such conscientious public servants. Should the power of law enforcement fall into the hands of a corrupt official, it would be quite as simple to reduce as to increase the effectiveness of the local peace officer by subjecting his work to corruption from above in addition to that exerted below.

The demand for better law enforcement can never be met by reducing the local peace officer to a subordinate position. Freeing local agencies from the shackles of public apathy and corrupt political control will help to guarantee better law enforcement. Improvement can be made only when local representatives are given an opportunity to exercise the authority which they already have. The great majority of our officers lack neither the ability nor the desire to enforce the law properly. They are, for the most part, honest, efficient, and able men. The fault does not lie with them. They need only to be free to do their work properly. Citizen action at polling places and in public opinion forums can loose the fetters which shackle so many law enforcement agencies and nullify the efforts of their members.

This is the proper course of action; subordinating the law enforcement officer to some higher authority whose decisions are just as likely to be a reflection of public morals, good or bad, as those of the local officer is a substitute measure which, in the long run, is far too likely to have a vastly different effect from that which promoters of such a plan intended.

Abuse of power

It is infinitely wiser to use the statutes presently available to us than to clamp a new control over every community in order to fashion a trap for improper law enforcement in a few communities. Defenders of currently circulated proposals along these lines

may argue that the authority proposed is to be used only in a limited and occasional situation where local law enforcement has broken down. This argument is not reassuring. A promise that the power requested will not be abused is a puny barrier. It is far wiser to make the need for such a promise unnecessary.

A due regard for the rights and advantages of democratic self-government in every community dictates that our present methods should not be abandoned, either in whole or in part, unless our peace officers are so ineffective that a surrender of their authority to a high agency of government has become an absolute necessity. If this condition cannot be shown to exist, any plan pointing to the eventual centralization of police powers in either a state or federal agency is no more than a dangerous expedient adopted to serve a narrow or temporary purpose.

Any heavy centralization of a widely dispersed police system such as ours is utterly impractical. This fact is apparent when one considers law enforcement in a small or large community being controlled by authorities located at a distance from the scene, who are thus necessarily insensitive to the pulse of the community. Central supervision at either the federal or state level can only result in impairing the vitality of local enforcement.

CO-OPERATION AMONG LOCAL AGENCIES

The need for police co-ordination is, of course, an imperative one. Contrary to the belief of many people, this problem is being met in a way which is both highly satisfactory and in keeping with our democratic traditions.

Any proposal for a shift of police powers on the basis that local officers lack the ability to enforce the law under today's conditions is inconsistent with the facts. Allegations that law en-

forcement has broken down at all levels simply are not true. There has been a tremendous change in law enforcement in the first half of the twentieth century—a change which in recent years amounts almost to a revolution—but the change has been for the better.

It was in the period of the late twenties and during the thirties that law enforcement as a profession became a generally accepted goal of law enforcement. Officer training on a major scale became accepted practice. Suspicion and jealousy between agencies gave way to mutual trust and interdependence. Each advance developed invaluable by-products of co-operation and unity, until today law enforcement in general has reached the goal of professionalization. Decency, fairness, and sound police work are the rule rather than the exception. Voluntary co-operation develops pride in performance. Efficiency and precision result.

The great majority of law enforcement offices are presently so efficiently equipped and operated that any officer can get immediate assistance merely by turning to his typewriter, telephone, or radio transmitter. These same methods can just as easily be applied to the exchange of necessary information. Any officer who obtains a report on criminal activity relating to another area as well as his own can transmit such data to the proper authorities and request what he needs in return.

FBI SERVICES

Assistance which cannot be obtained by interchange between local agencies is made available through the co-operative services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These services are tailored to fill a need in the standards and effectiveness of law enforcement and to implement the ability of the local peace officer to serve his community. The extent to which these services have been

and are being used is an indication of the values devolving from a voluntary relationship.

A review of recent data relative to FBI co-operative services indicates the successes already achieved through voluntary means in meeting an inherently difficult and complex situation.

Identification Division

The FBI Identification Division provides a national repository of identification data based on fingerprint records. It is a co-operative service which is utilized by practically all law enforcement in the United States. This division searches the fingerprints submitted by contributing agencies. It sends criminal arrest records both to the requesting agency and to any others shown as being interested in the subject. Arrangements are made to notify local officers if the same person is arrested later in another area. In one year, recently, 10,533 fugitives were identified by the FBI through fingerprints. In the same period, 1,383,425 criminal fingerprints (including suspects) were received. Of the 1,844 fingerprints of unknown dead received, 1,334 were identified. Latent fingerprint examinations totaling 4,149 were requested and made. While it is primarily operated for the use of American agencies, the FBI Identification Division also participates in the exchange of fingerprints with foreign countries as an aid to local law enforcement. Information on criminals is sent to foreign countries and obtained from them for individual agencies at no cost to the agency.

Laboratory

The services of the FBI Laboratory are available without charge to all regularly established police departments. The laboratory conducts scientific examinations of evidence sent in by local officers in criminal cases. A written re-

port is returned, and the examining technician is available for court testimony when needed. In a recent one-year period, the FBI Laboratory conducted 16,925 examinations of evidence for state and local law enforcement agencies. These examinations in the field of chemistry and physics include, among many others, fraudulent checks, firearms, paper, toolmarks, hairs and fibers, shoe prints, and tire treads.

Training facilities

Training is the essential factor in preparing for any profession, and it has played a major role in the development of law enforcement. The FBI National Academy was established in July 1935 for the purpose of training local, county, and state law enforcement officers as executives, administrators, and instructors. National Academy trainees are selected by the heads of the respective police departments. They come to Washington, D. C., where they receive intensive training for twelve weeks. Emphasis is placed on such subjects as police organization and administration, police records, and teaching methods. Scientific crime investigation methods, fingerprinting, firearms, traffic, defensive tactics, and legal subjects such as constitutional law and the Bill of Rights also are given special attention. Great emphasis is placed on professional and ethical standards. Brutality, third degree, duress, and entrapment are vigorously condemned. The proper principles of conduct for those engaged in law enforcement work are energetically promoted.

During the eighteen-year period from July 1935 through July 1953, 2,666 law enforcement officers were graduated by the FBI National Academy. It is interesting to note that at the present time more than one-fourth of all the graduates of the FBI National Academy are the executive heads of the law en-

forcement agencies by which they are employed. This fact alone is a definite indication that law enforcement is determined to establish its claim to the status of a profession beyond any doubt.

The FBI National Academy fulfills a specific purpose. In order to bring the professional training afforded Academy graduates to the rank and file of law enforcement, police training schools in the field have been instituted. When requests are received, the FBI assists state police agencies, sheriffs' offices, and local police departments with their training needs by conducting special schools on a departmental level. The schools may be the basic type designed to meet the needs of new and relatively inexperienced police officers, or "in-service" or advanced "in-service" for the more experienced men and those who have completed previous specialized schools. During a one-year period recently, the FBI participated in 2,350 such schools, and others are constantly being scheduled.

Conferences

Another factor serving to co-ordinate all the branches of law enforcement on a voluntary basis is the Annual Law Enforcement Conferences sponsored by the FBI. The personnel of the FBI field offices meet with representatives of local, county, state, and other federal law enforcement agencies to discuss mutual problems related to law enforcement in the various local areas. During a recent one-year period, 131 such conferences were held. These conferences and schools are of immeasurable benefit in bringing about a better understanding of the work of the various agencies and in ensuring closer co-operation among different branches of the profession on the local level.

The present magnificent co-ordination among the various branches of law en-

forcement was not born of the war emergency, at which time it was so brilliantly exhibited. It is, rather, the fulfillment of what is to be expected of free, decentralized law enforcement in a free land. The law enforcement profession during the past generation has achieved unity out of the desire to promote law and order. Mutual helpfulness and efficient teamwork have become an integral part of the training and conduct of today's officer.

Help with fugitives

While the FBI is requesting and receiving daily assistance from local law enforcement in conducting raids and apprehensions, as well as in the many other problems incident to our mutual work, it strives to co-operate in return through its central services. Under the Fugitive Felon Act, moreover, the FBI is able directly to assist local law enforcement in locating and apprehending certain fugitives. The FBI conducts investigations to locate and apprehend persons who have fled the jurisdiction of local officers to avoid prosecution or confinement after conviction for any of eight major crimes and attempts, as well as investigations of persons who flee to avoid giving testimony in criminal proceedings involving an offense carrying penitentiary imprisonment as punishment. In a recent one-year period FBI investigations led to the apprehension and return of 501 such fugitives. In addition, when the FBI has evidence that a crime has been planned or has been committed in another jurisdiction, the facts in our possession are promptly made available to the local officers charged with responsibility in the case.

Uniform Crime Reports

The *Uniform Crime Reports* are another co-operative service of the FBI,

and fulfill a valuable administrative purpose. These bulletins are compiled by the FBI from data presently supplied by 5,788 local law enforcement agencies. The bulletins enable police executives to follow the national crime picture and compare it with that of their own communities.

RESPONSIBILITY RESTS ON CITIZENS

A close examination of the facts indicates that the tools for effective law enforcement lie within the grasp of every city and county which chooses to use them. Those communities which do not utilize the weapons at hand, but attempt to shift the responsibility for crime in their area to other shoulders, are not seeking a solution; they are merely indulging in a maneuver which can have no good results.

A so-called parent organization cannot guarantee progress or improve law enforcement. On the contrary, the result of central supervision of law en-

forcement cannot be other than ultimate stagnation and retrogression.

The great need of the law enforcement profession is not "higher" authority. It is greater responsibility at the citizen level. The community which maintains a law enforcement agency free from political pressure with its attendant graft and corruption, and which assures its department sufficient funds, equipment, and personnel, and adequate training facilities, is helping law enforcement advance steadily toward the heights of professionalism.

The flaws in law enforcement are rapidly being eliminated. To let a few uncorrected faults serve as an excuse to destroy the whole magnificent edifice of democratic law enforcement based on individual responsibility would be to confess that this nation has utterly lost its sense of proportion. Local responsibility, recognized by our forefathers, remains the key to sound law enforcement.

*J. Edgar Hoover, Washington, D. C., has been director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, since 1924, having previously served in various capacities with the Department of Justice from 1917. He is a member of the bars of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, the United States Court of Claims, and the United States Supreme Court. He is author of *Persons in Hiding* (1938) and contributes to numerous magazines, law reviews, and police journals.*

Changing Patrol Methods

By STANLEY R. SCHROTEL

OVER four decades ago Leonhard Felix Fuld stated in his comprehensive work on police administration that the most important official duty of the police officer on patrol was the duty of knowledge. Fuld then proceeded to define "duty of knowledge" as an obligation imposed upon the officer to know the occupation and the character of all persons found in his jurisdiction, and to make himself acquainted with everything that takes place therein. Although couched in rather general language, this duty of knowledge could well serve as a statement of purpose when related to the modern enforcement unit responsible for the task of uniformed patrol.

Actually, the reasons for maintaining a uniformed patrol have varied little, if at all, since the inception of the police idea. While modern authorities may insist on a declaration of purpose more refined than Fuld chose to consider, there is no basic conflict.

In contrast with the abiding objectives of the patrol force are the changing and developing techniques and mechanics employed to achieve those objectives. Such techniques and mechanics should and must be as dynamic as the society they serve.

DISADVANTAGES OF FOOT PATROL

Until comparatively recent times the patrol function in American cities was performed almost wholly by men on foot. In some of the larger cities a limited number of patrolmen were assigned to duty as mounted police, but these never succeeded in supplanting the foot patrol. Later the bicycle was adopted for patrol work in some large

municipalities, but it never enjoyed the popularity of the horse. It was not until the automobile and the motorcycle became available for general police use that serious questions were raised as to the efficacy of foot patrol.¹ Some of these questions have never been satisfactorily resolved.

The delay in answering these questions springs from a failure to recognize two facts: (1) a uniformed patrolman is a field soldier possessed of certain skills acquired by training; and (2) by reason of these skills and training, he is prepared for action of an anticipatory or emergency nature. The quality and personal efficiency of the individual patrolman neither rises above nor falls below the standard of performance his organization demands or condones. Nor will these factors be influenced by the manner in which he is transported about the area which he serves. A craftsman is no less a craftsman for want of appropriate tools; nor do the palette and brush make the artist.

An attempt, therefore, to defend a deficiency in patrol operations on the basis of an inadequate number of foot patrolmen is begging the question. The time has arrived to adjust thinking and planning in patrol strategy in terms of the number of men that the available budget dollar will sustain. To calculate in areas of speculation is an open invitation to disappointment.

In a society as mobile as our own, it is expecting almost too much of a foot patrol force when we give them the responsibility of repressing crime and ap-

¹ Elmer D. Graper, *American Police Administration* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921), p. 132.

prehending offenders in constantly expanding geographic areas. This responsibility becomes patently absurd when we expect them to apprehend traffic violators and the more serious offenders who use motor cars to effect their escape.

Conceding merit to the contention that patrol on foot provides an opportunity for intimacy of association conducive to a better relationship between the clientele to be served and the police officer, two salient considerations cannot be ignored: (1) the mere fact that patrol is being conducted on foot is no assurance that the desired relationship will be forthcoming; and (2) foot patrol imposes definite limitations on the effectiveness of a police officer, both in extent of area served and in quality of the service.

It should be apparent that opportunities to develop contacts and carry on intelligence beneficial to over-all police operations are more available to the foot patrolman than to others. Whether or not such opportunities are profitably channeled depends to a preponderant degree on the inclination of the officer. Moreover, even though a foot patrolman may be disposed to use for his organization all the benefits emanating from his close beat contacts, his activities are necessarily restricted to a very small area. Even while on conscientious patrol of this limited area, the foot officer is not readily accessible for immediate dispatch. Such accessibility is of major importance in modern police work, where immediate emergency service is a fundamental.

Unsatisfactory communications

In order to meet this deficiency of foot patrol service, attempts have been made to provide headquarters control of foot men in the field. Such attempts have taken the form of a variety of call box systems, serving as a telephone

communication facility between the foot officer and a control center.

Unfortunately, conventional installations of call box equipment restrict its utility to calls initiated in the field. This is a regrettable limitation, in that requests for service addressed to headquarters cannot be satisfied until a routine call is received from the foot patrolman. Dependency of this nature prevents the immediate response to public demand for police service at the time it is needed.

In a society accustomed to rapid communication, such delay is beyond public understanding, and will not be tolerated in a progressive community. A police agency cannot overemphasize the value of immediate response to service demands. Expeditious and efficient service is an agency's basic asset and duty. To bargain for something less is to court criticism and risk withdrawal of public support.

It is not the public alone that is adversely influenced by a patrol system which lacks instant communication. The very nature of such a system prevents full administrative supervision. Effective supervision can safely be regarded as the most important factor affecting personnel management. Without such supervision, subordinates will not perform their best work. Under the foot patrol system, the patrol sergeant can exercise direct supervision over his men only at chance meetings or at previously determined rendezvous. Chance meetings are too infrequent to be of value, and predetermined contacts prevent scrutiny of performance under normal conditions. Thus the sergeant, however well intentioned, rarely has an opportunity to determine whether or not his charges are acquitting themselves in harmony with approved procedure and policy.

Some cities have attempted to overcome the defects inherent in a one-way

communication system. The objective has been achieved to a greater or less degree by the installation of expensive and sensitive recall devices. These devices generally implement the call box or field telephone system by means of a light so mounted on the telephone box stanchion as to be visible for a considerable distance when lighted at night. Control of the recall light is established either directly or remotely in headquarters. The operating principle involves the lighting of the lights either in series or at specific locations where contact with the foot man is desired. It is presumed that the foot man, on observing the illuminated recall light, will hasten to the nearest telephone to determine the nature of the call.

The visible recall technique is fragile to this extent: it does not lend itself to practical daylight operation; and it presupposes that a police officer, who is imbued with all the frailties of mankind, will respond with dispatch to an inanimate signal which beckons him to industrious attention to duty.

Recent developments in communication offer some promise of aid in the control difficulties implicit in foot patrol operations. Vest-pocket-sized transmitters and receivers of phenomenal range have already found commercial markets. Enterprises featuring paging service for ambulatory subscribers are springing up with surprising rapidity in many of the large cities. An innovation which provides a method of communication between a dispatcher at a fixed location and a pedestrian whose whereabouts is undetermined holds unusual promise for a more effective utilization of the foot patrol force.

Physical limitations

Another and frequently ignored disadvantage of foot patrol springs from sheer physical limitation. Fatigue is more rapidly induced by foot patrol

than by motor patrol. An accelerated state of fatigue has its concomitant deceleration of efficiency. A foot patrolman's response to a call for assistance is often less effective than that of an officer whose response requires less energy. On arrival at the scene of emergency the foot man may be out of breath and ill prepared for arduous effort.

Exposure of the foot officer to all phases of the weather poses another disadvantage. Such exposure tends to impair his health and may result in time loss from duty because of illness. All of these disadvantages are reflected unfavorably in increased service costs.

To police a city of even moderate size by means of foot patrol exclusively would require a personnel complement so large that the cost of maintenance would far exceed the value of the protection afforded. If police administration is to enjoy the reputation that stems from the application of sound principles of management, areas of diminishing returns must be recognized and avoided.

MOTORIZED FORCE, RADIO EQUIPPED

The defects and limitations identified with foot patrol serve as persuasive reasons to favor motorized patrol. Among the innovations of the Vollmer system of police administration, and one of the major contributions of the present century to crime control, was the complete motorization of the force. Vollmer held that the patrolman on foot was obsolete, and showed how motorization amplified enormously the striking power of the force through increased mobility, maneuverability, and speed of movement. The implications of this development in terms of combat strength or striking power are important.²

² V. A. Leonard, *Police Organization and Management* (Brooklyn, N. Y.: Foundation Press, 1951), p. 260.

The task of the modern police administrator is to expand and utilize fully this new development. First of all, he finds that the efficiency of motorized patrol is greatly enhanced by two-way radio communication. Personnel operating patrol vehicles so equipped are constantly available to headquarters, and when the occasion demands, they themselves can employ this facility to summon additional men or equipment.

Of course, the potential of motorized patrol, even though radio equipped, is no better in some respects than foot service, if radio contact cannot be made instantaneously. Experience reveals that persons assigned to radio cars sometimes have a tendency to make themselves and their equipment inaccessible. This is not a tendency peculiar to law enforcement personnel, but a trait that expresses itself in every vocation in which supervision is not continuous and direct. Since this frailty in police operation causes an unwarranted depletion of the patrol force, even though of a temporary nature, corrective measures should be adopted.

One method designed to obviate this abuse has been employed with some success. It consists of a requirement that radio car officers request permission of the dispatcher to take their equipment out of service, stating the reason for the request and the location of the car at the time. Supervisors at headquarters and in the field monitoring the transmission can evaluate its merit, and if necessary report to the announced location for verification. The result of such a procedure should be obvious, inasmuch as its salutary effect ensures an adequate striking power for constant field service.

Conveyance of hospital cases and prisoners

Radio-equipped motor cars have also brought about revolutionary develop-

ments in the transportation both of hospital cases and of prisoners. In the pre-radio era, motor equipment and personnel assigned to transport service were relegated to fixed posts either at police headquarters or at district station houses located throughout the city. The personnel and equipment operated entirely on a stand-by basis, since they were held in readiness for dispatch to the scene of an accident or an arrest.

Units of this type were frequently referred to as patrol wagons, but they did not patrol. The time required for such a unit to reach a given location proved to be a matter of considerable moment. If the conveyance was needed at a point somewhat remote from its quarters, priceless time was consumed in traversing the distance. If the dispatch concerned an injured person requiring hospitalization, public resentment was generated against the police agency because of the late response.

Where the dispatch was for the transportation of prisoners, public reaction may have been equally unfavorable; for no matter how tactfully the arrest had been made, if the prisoner was compelled to remain in public view under the dominant control of a conspicuously attired police officer, little encouragement was required to develop a sympathy for the prisoner and a critical attitude toward the police. Progressive administrators have moved rapidly to avoid like vulnerable areas of criticism.

A practical solution of this problem has been found in the adoption of a paneled body conveyance designed to accommodate both victims and prisoners. The vehicle is so light in weight and of such maneuverability as to lend itself to constant patrol operation. Thus men have been provided for patrol who heretofore idled their time in the cloistered recesses of a police building, waiting for a call.

Equipped with two-way radio, such a

conveyance is readily and quickly available for emergency service. Inasmuch as vehicles of this type patrol a predetermined area, the dispatcher need only inquire as to the location of the mobile units in order to ascertain which one is in a geographical position to provide the most expeditious response. Recipients and observers of such prompt service become staunch supporters of the police. Thus the time and talents of personnel manning the equipment are utilized for the all-important task of patrol.

Despite the necessary evils of a combined ambulance-prisoner transfer facility, its use is superior in many respects to the common patrol wagon with its untrained personnel.

Many police departments throughout the United States perform emergency ambulance duties. In most instances these are combined with the pickup and transfer of prisoners, with consequent neglect of common decencies. No patrol wagon crew can pick up arrested felons, helpless drunkards, persons suffering from contagious and infectious diseases, and the victims of gun, knife, poison, collision, sun stroke, and apoplexy, and still be expected to observe acceptable standards in handling each of them.

Where police operate an ambulance service that is independent of patrol wagon pickups, costs rise to unreasonable heights, and the irregularity of demands for service proves burdensome to overriding considerations of law enforcement.³

DANGERS OF SPECIALIZATION

Care must be exercised in placing in operation combined transport and patrol units as previously described. Because of the character of the service rendered, persons assigned to the units must of necessity have thorough training in first aid. While it is generally agreed that knowledge of first aid should

³ Bruce Smith, *The New York Police Survey* (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1952), p. 41.

be one of the basic skills of a police officer, those who have frequent opportunity to display such skill show a trend toward a kind of creeping paralysis, usually referred to as specialization, which is common to every enforcement agency. If not arrested, it eventually stifles the effective performance of the regular patrol force.

Specialization has disadvantages that deserve attention; otherwise, the disadvantages may outweigh the advantages. Specialization creates difficult problems of integration and co-ordination; it divides the department into separate forces that sometimes operate independently of each other. Sometimes the independence is so great that they function antagonistically and at cross purposes. The department is then no longer motivated by a common purpose; frictions arise; there is strong and hostile competition for staff, facilities, and equipment. Specialization also sometimes leads to neglect of police duties; specialists are prone to ignore work that is the primary responsibility of some other unit, and citizens are sometimes shunted from one specialist to another in search of service.⁴

BENEFITS OF SPECIALIZATION

The disadvantages of specialization should in no wise obscure the significance of an enforcement philosophy which, although extremely popular two decades ago, is currently viewed with some reserve. In the early thirties emphasis was placed on the need for specialization in defined areas within the pale of police operation. One area so identified had to do with the traffic problem; another, with the repression of juvenile delinquency.

Then, as now, both areas challenged the ingenuity of enforcement agencies. This challenge was met with considerable success by the establishment of highly specialized squads or units whose

⁴ International City Managers' Association, *Municipal Police Administration*, 3d ed., 1950, p. 59.

responsibility was limited to their particular assignment. The attendant development of skills in these limited fields resulted in immediate improvement to a greater or less degree, depending upon the intensity of specialization.

IMPORTANCE OF PATROL DIVISION

Gratified by the response to the application of principles of specialization, many police administrators attempted to resolve other acute enforcement situations by like techniques. Although personnel for such assignments must of necessity be recruited from the bulk of the enforcement body—the patrol force—no serious thought was given to the ultimate consequences of depleting this vital part of the enforcement unit. A well-known commentator has pointed up the issue in these words:

Since the work of the patrol force includes all police functions, the more effective the patrol division, the less need there is for the other, more specialized operating divisions and units. Although it is impossible for the patrol force to be one hundred per cent effective in the discharge of all police functions, the other operating line divisions are necessary only to the extent that the patrol division falls short of this ideal. It is axiomatic, therefore, that any attempt to improve or strengthen other divisions at the expense of the patrol division serves to pyramid the case load not only for the unit that has prospered through personnel transfers but for all other divisions and units in the department.⁵

Thus it is apparent that effort directed at sustaining the strength and effectiveness of the patrol division is both desirable and sound. Although the mobilization of the patrol division can

⁵ V. A. Leonard, *op. cit.*, p. 221. See also International City Managers' Association, *Municipal Police Administration*, 2d ed., 1943, p. 262; Public Administration Service, *Survey of the Greenwich, Connecticut, Police Department*, 1937, p. 19.

be translated in terms of such an effort, the desired objective is thwarted by assigning two men to a car in those instances where one could provide an equivalent service.

BRITISH EXPERIENCE

The British, traditionally sound in police philosophy, have also demonstrated an enviable audacity in their approach to the need for more productive patrol methods. A full generation ago, Chief Constable Frederick J. Crawley of Newcastle upon Tyne was pioneering a highly decentralized system for distributing and supervising patrols, even while Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Law, chief constable of the Hertfordshire Constabulary, was seeking central control in patrol coverage through prearranged patrol routes and detailed patrol schedules.⁶ The Hertfordshire plan did not make much headway, perhaps because it involved so much preparatory staff work and also limited the initiative of patrol personnel. But the Crawley plan has literally swept the British Isles during the past twenty years, thus demonstrating a commendable willingness to meet new problems with new methods.

Now comes a further departure in the form of "team policing" as employed in Aberdeen and in the borough of Salford, each with a population around 180,000. Designed to bring about a better integration of the use of all communications and motor equipment, and more varied duties for uniformed constables, these communities have produced a greater element of surprise in patrol coverage, a more adequate response in emergencies, and an increasing interest in patrol among the rank and file.

⁶ F. J. Crawley, "Decentralization and the Police Box System," *The Police Journal* (London), Vol. I (1928), pp. 118-27; Alfred Law, "Police Patrol Systems: Practice in an English County," *The Police Journal*, Vol. II (1929), pp. 280-93.

In Aberdeen

Aberdeen has abolished fixed beats worked by single constables, and substituted much larger patrol areas worked by a team of constables under a sergeant. Each team has been given a police car, which the sergeant uses to move his men from one part of the patrol area to another. Constables are encouraged to follow up any incidents themselves, without calling on specialist help except in cases of real difficulty. The main features of the system are its mobility and the fact that constables act as a team rather than as individuals. The results in Aberdeen have been good. A substantial saving in manpower has been effected, and the number of arrests has been increased.

The Salford plan

Salford retains the idea of a team of constables operating from a police car, but provides a greater flexibility than the Aberdeen plan affords. The city is divided into police districts, but the patrol areas in each district are kept flexible. Rough boundaries are laid down for beats during each of the three tours of duty, to assure that there are enough on duty when and where they are most likely to be needed. Boundaries of beats are changed three times a day to accommodate to changing needs, but the officer in charge of each district also exercises wide powers to change the beats whenever circumstances make it necessary. A beat bordering the docks, for example, may be made much smaller during a dock strike, with its abnormal possibilities of trouble, than would be necessary during normal working conditions.

According to the Salford plan, a police team consists of nine constables with a sergeant in charge. A police car fitted with radio serves each team. No

special driver is carried. Before each team starts its tour of duty, which lasts for eight hours, the district commander and the sergeant review the work that is likely to arise. They consider the recent incidence and location of crimes and street accidents, complaints from the public of general nuisances, any property requiring special protection, and similar matters. The sergeant then draws up a list of "operations" for each man. Two or three may be detailed for point duty, others will be given particular streets to patrol, and the chances are that one man will be kept with the sergeant and the driver in the car, which also will be used for patrol duties. The whole team is told what to look for and what sort of incidents are likely to occur. The car serves the dual purpose of a mobile police station and a quick means of moving the constables about from one area to another.

As in the traditional beat system, the constable remains individually responsible for a definite area or duty. The chief difference from more familiar systems is that the beat is changed immediately to fit any situation.

Particularly notable is the fact that the interest and keenness of the patrolmen are greatly increased. The monotony of patrolling the same area week after week, waiting for something to turn up, is broken, and the constable accordingly gains more experience in a shorter time than is possible under orthodox systems. Improvement in morale has been a salient feature.

On the basis of limited experience thus far, the proportion of indictable offenses cleared by arrest has risen by one-third. Patrols make nearly twice as many arrests as they did before the system was introduced, and the number of incidents reported has increased by nearly 50 per cent. With such a record of achievement, team policing appears destined for wider adoption in

Great Britain, and results there will be watched with keen interest here.⁷

The last word in police patrol theory

⁷*The Economist* (London), February 24, 1951.

and practice has, of course, not been said, here, in Britain, or elsewhere. Probably it has not even been dreamed. We can only aim our sights, and try to the best of our ability most fully to utilize the ideas, the men, and the material which we now have. If we do this, we cannot completely miss our goal.

Stanley R. Schrotel is Chief of Police at Cincinnati, Ohio. He is a member of the Ohio and Cincinnati Bar Associations and of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Progress in Criminal Investigation

By PAUL L. KIRK

THE most important trend in crime investigation today is unquestionably that toward more and better training for investigators. If this were the only progress being made, it would still portend a brighter future. In addition, like the other applied sciences, crime investigation is slowly but surely adopting many of the advances of fundamental science and technology which can serve it. As with other applied sciences, overenthusiasm, inadequate understanding of the problems, and the normal failures of human judgment have led to extravagances in some instances and to overcautious conservatism in others. The advances have been many and significant, but at times they have outrun the growth of fundamental philosophy and balanced understanding. These must develop before a new technique, instrument, or approach can be fitted solidly into its proper niche and be viewed in its correct perspective.

TRAINING

That crime investigation is more than normally susceptible to failure of perspective and judgment follows from the fact that its acceptance as a true profession is not yet universal, and its practitioners are by virtue of necessity largely self-trained, half-trained, or untrained. There is as yet no generally accepted type of standard training as is found in the other professions. Where efforts have been made to develop adequate standard training, it is given and administered by persons who themselves are not its product. Thus, educators in this field are still struggling to fashion curricula that are sound, logical, and inclusive, and at the same time adapted

to the practical needs of law enforcement agencies. The struggle of the latter with inadequate financing, public indifference, political complications, obsolete regulations, unsuitable applicants, and related difficulties tends to handicap the effective co-operation that is desired by both educational and law enforcement administrators.

That the situation is nevertheless hopeful is proved by the enthusiastic efforts of both groups to achieve a solid basis of co-operation. Medicine, and more recently the law, had to struggle through similar difficulties in standardizing their training programs and developing acknowledged and respected professions. Their great measure of success and the smaller but significant degree of success in professionalizing crime investigation point to continued progress in this direction. Time is needed, accompanied by the continued efforts of the large group that is truly interested in developing in this area the professional standards of training, ethics, and effective practice that are needed.

Numerous colleges and universities offer police training at various levels, and the number of them is increasing. The graduates of such curricula, after obtaining sufficient practical experience in police work, may be expected to raise significantly the standards of police operation. The proportion of police officers who can take advantage of advanced training will remain small for many years to come, and the large remaining group should have the opportunity to receive high-quality in-service training. Local police schools are meeting this need in some places, and the state and federal agencies are partially

effective in larger areas; but it is here that a tremendous unfilled need exists. The operation of such schools requires financing and local co-operation to a degree that is not obtainable in many regions. Increased public support of this effort is greatly to be desired.

The laboratory investigator requires extended training at the college level. In-service training can never be sufficient. And colleges cannot be effective in giving the necessary training if the time is restricted to less than a full four-year course. A longer curriculum is preferable. Intelligent and eager police officers have achieved significant results in very limited specialties by self-training, but to encourage this trend is to retard the more significant progress toward making criminalistics a truly scientific and professional subject. Criminalistic training and police training are quite different, even though they occupy common ground in some respects. The necessary knowledge of the basic sciences cannot be imparted rapidly by means of short courses or a little spare-time study.

IDENTIFICATION AS A SCIENCE

The science of criminalistics is largely the science of identification. Every method of identification—chemical, physical, biological, microscopical—is a potential tool. Items of evidence must be identified as to nature and as to source. The fiber must be found to be in turn a hair, a human hair, a head hair, and a hair of John Smith, if the facts can be made to yield their maximum information. The material must be identified as glass, and as glass from a specific broken window. Progress in this field has been marked and sometimes almost spectacular because of the constant availability of new techniques, instruments, and compilations of data that flow from the laboratories of the physical scientists.

Applications of the methods and data of the physical sciences have been discouragingly slow at times because of the small amount of research in the field of criminalistics as such. Educational institutions in which research in this field is a recognized function are few and inadequately staffed. The crime laboratories are overburdened with casework and often are poorly staffed and equipped for research. It is probable that no other applied science today has so little research output, in toto and possibly per capita, as criminalistics.

The picture is made even more dismal by the residual tendency of practicing investigators to consider their profession as a trade rather than a science, and to hide their specialized knowledge under the bushel of "trade secrets" rather than to disseminate it in the spirit of research science. One is always tantalized by the speculation as to how much is actually known, and how impressive an array of criminalistic skill could be compiled if all investigators were to pool their knowledge in a single repository such as is typical of any good scientific library. An even more unfortunate situation is the encouragement by certain investigative organizations to pool information within the organization but keep it secret from all but the elect. The suspicion that such semisecret information may not be worth revealing can at times be confirmed.

INSTRUMENTS VERSUS SKILLS

Instrumentation has been the most conspicuous focus of attention by laboratory investigators, and to a large degree general police investigators as well. Every convention of law enforcement organizations is likely to see featured a tremendous variety of special instruments which will include a ridiculously complex array of fingerprinting equipment with perhaps ten kinds of powder,

about two or three of which will be actually used, and a bewildering list of tools, the function of which is largely concerned with the profit of the manufacturer. Here also are pocket wire recorders, infrared scopes, easily concealed cameras, and much other paraphernalia of the private detective who is far more interested in obtaining evidence for divorces than in solving crimes.

While all of these devices have legitimate and valuable uses, the overemphasis on such investigative aids tends to obscure the more fundamental requirements placed on the investigator—thoroughness, common sense, care and thought in approaching the problem, and a definite and deliberate plan of action designed to achieve the desired result. In short, the tendency to substitute gadgets for skilled personnel is the most serious mistake that can possibly be made.

In the laboratory

Though the conditions are different, a similar tendency exists in the crime laboratory. There, the instrument is essential to operation. Optical devices extend the range of the eye to perceive minute details that allow identification. Physical devices provide information for which no special senses exist in the human body. Chemical tests reveal the fundamental nature of materials. All of these require instruments and equipment.

No other instrument or combination of instruments has made so intense and lasting an impression on criminal investigation practices as has the microscope. Without the lenses of a variety of common and special microscopes, most of the identification work of the crime laboratory would never be accomplished. The spectrograph, the spectrophotometer, and the X-ray diffraction camera have supplied additional

vital information regarding the identity of materials that could not be readily duplicated otherwise. Ultraviolet and infrared radiations with the necessary accompanying instruments are essential. The camera makes visible to all the results obtained by most of the other instruments.

To a great extent the laboratory investigator must be an instrumental specialist. On the other hand, undue stress on instruments in some laboratories has inevitably led to a complete failure to appreciate that no instrument is ever any better than the man who operates it. Unskilled and ineffective personnel equipped with every conceivable instrument cannot solve crimes. Skillful, effective personnel with a bare minimum of instruments will still solve a high proportion of crimes submitted to them.

The average crime laboratory has not an adequate budget to acquire the instruments that it could employ profitably, but an even more serious deficiency is that it often does not have investigators with sufficient ability to utilize even the most commonplace instruments to the best advantage. This error is doubly compounded in the occasional laboratory that has more money than it can spend legitimately. In such a laboratory a discussion developed as to whether two electron microscopes or only one should be purchased, even though no person present knew how to operate such an instrument. Moreover, no one has yet suggested a single significant application for one in identification work. While this situation is understandably rare, it is not absent in the field, particularly in laboratories supported by federal funds.

An instrument need not be complicated, rare, or expensive, to be effective. Biochemists made enormous investments in ultracentrifuges, elaborate extraction apparatus, complex diffusion and molecular distillation equipment, and other

expensive apparatus to fractionate complex biological mixtures. Today, a simple column of adsorbent or a sheet of filter paper and some common solvents are producing fractionations so much more spectacular that the biochemist has become largely a chromatographer. By adding a five-cent sheet of filter paper to a simple electrolytic apparatus, zone electrophoresis was accomplished with the saving of about five thousand dollars' worth of equipment previously held necessary to obtain the same information.

This is a valuable lesson on the importance of simplicity and ingenuity, as well as a strong indication of the necessity for being alert to new and valuable developments. With few exceptions, laboratory investigators have completely disregarded both chromatography and zone electrophoresis as crime investigation techniques, and have substituted expensive instruments for ingenuity and simplicity. Their most important instrument is still an ingenious and functional brain.

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION STILL INVITES RESEARCH

It is obvious that the final aim of all identification methods is to identify a person. While indirect identification is the most likely to be possible, it would be more satisfactory to utilize direct identification of the person if it could be done. Eyewitness testimony is so erratic and undependable, as is well known by all experienced investigators, that the fingerprint has long been the indispensable technique of direct personal identification. Criminals also know this, and are commonly able to prevent identification by avoiding contacts that would leave latent prints.

Criminalistic research has indeed been so sterile in finding better methods of identification by direct means that the

initiative appears already to be slipping from those most interested. Fundamental scientists, not even concerned with personal identification, are already reporting that blood is individual. Others are reporting the individuality of semen, and hair is far on the way toward being proved to be individual. How many times the expert testifies to the presence of O-type blood on a suspect's clothing and then has to admit that nearly half the population has O blood! The day is soon due when he can say that the suspect has on his clothes the blood of the victim and nobody else, or that the victim carried semen or a hair from the suspect and from nobody else.

The techniques are largely available, the fundamentals of the field are already well known in some quarters, but the laboratory investigators are still sitting on the side lines. The writer has a strong feeling that this is due at least in part to the gradual crowding of enthusiastic, scientifically trained amateurs from the field as the large, highly organized laboratories take over the practice of the profession and diminish the contacts with the wider scientific circles. Except when a large organization is directly organized for research, research will be stifled. There, the paycheck and the time clock tend to replace the thrill of accomplishment and the constructive imagination of the worker.

Fingerprint technique, though highly standardized and universally practiced, made its most significant advance through the early work of amateurs—Sir Edward Henry and some others. Little by little, the technically trained amateur with a real understanding of the specialized fields of biology, chemistry, and physics is being crowded from the crime investigation field without having his research ability replaced by that of the practicing laboratory in-

vestigator. Though the movement toward professional standardization itself constitutes progress, it would be tragic if the very seeds of continuing progress in the larger field were lost in the process.

It is time that the large and well-equipped laboratories, and even the small ones, give serious attention to this situation. They must remember that the more intelligent criminals are ever on the alert for better methods of thwarting the law. In the war on crime, the agents of the law must maintain the lead in development or be forced to ultimate failure. Financially, the criminal has the lead by a large margin. He also leads in numbers. The only advantage enjoyed by the agents of the law, aside from perfunctory support by the large majority of the public, is access to superior technical facilities. The most potent of these is research—a fact which must be realized and acted upon if progress is to be sustained at a sufficient rate to continue effective law enforcement.

CRIME LABORATORIES

Because of misunderstanding of the proper and necessary functions of crime laboratories, their proper integration into the law enforcement program is often not accomplished. The inevitable result is that the laboratory does not deliver the service of which it is capable, and dissatisfaction arises with its existence, when it should apply only to its operation. Sometimes miracles are expected from the laboratory by the overenthusiastic, but more often the laboratory is neglected or bypassed by the police or the administrators who do not understand it and may be suspicious of it.

Poor functioning of such a laboratory is sometimes explained as being due to poor facilities. Far more often the real

cause of the situation is inadequate personnel, or poor co-ordination of effort with the police investigators. The latter may not be adequately informed as to what the laboratory can do to help them, and they usually have a very limited appreciation of the nature and value of physical objects as evidence. Uncollected evidence cannot be made to assist in solving crimes. In a very large majority of cases, most of the valuable physical evidence is never collected, and the little that is recovered may often be inadequate to establish proof. When this occurs it is often listed as a laboratory failure, when in fact the laboratory never had a chance.

More serious, though less common, than the failure to obtain all the physical evidence is the inclination to destroy it. This is encountered on the part of police officers who do not realize its value, and has been known to occur in the laboratory itself on the part of technicians who lacked the necessary ability and/or inclination to deal intelligently with it. A very bloody garment is not a pleasant object to examine, and it is far easier to destroy it than to preserve and test it; but any laboratory in which this could occur requires immediate overhauling.

The local laboratory

The cost of the laboratory and the physical and organizational difficulties of establishing local laboratories have been major deterrents to their installation in many places, especially in medium and small cities. It is tragic when misunderstanding of the true nature of the difficulty is not appreciated and leads to delay in an obviously valuable acquisition. A small but efficient laboratory can be equipped for less than ten thousand dollars, even at today's inflated costs. It can operate on a total annual budget, including salary for a

skilled laboratory investigator, of five to ten thousand dollars and provide excellent service in 90 per cent or more of the cases requiring laboratory study. When it is realized that the police force, by increasing its efficiency, can actually save the salaries of additional officers otherwise necessary to carry a heavy investigative load, the total outlay may be written off entirely in the saving effected.

Even more significant is the saving in terms of court trials. A remarkably large proportion of guilty suspects, when confronted with a laboratory report that demonstrates their guilt, will plead guilty and save the cost of a contested trial. Even standing alone, this saving is probably more than enough to defray the cost of a small laboratory.

Aside from the less tangible but no less real fact that the proportion of convictions nearly always rises sharply when laboratory testimony is employed, there is ample argument for many laboratory installations in police departments today. The significant question now is whether the police department can afford to be without the laboratory, rather than whether it can afford a laboratory.

The central laboratory

There has been a marked tendency in recent years toward the establishment of central laboratories by states and various agencies of the federal government. Success in meeting many of the needs of law enforcement agencies is indicated by the considerable expansion of these laboratories when they have operated over a period of time. Along with this movement there has also developed a tendency to depend on them for all laboratory work, and at the same time a feeling on the part of administrators of such laboratories that they should monopolize the laboratory work

of the area served. While their services have markedly improved law enforcement as compared with the conditions prevailing in their absence, it can be demonstrated readily that these laboratories do not furnish a complete or ideal answer to the laboratory problem.

Proper functioning of any laboratory requires close co-ordination and exchange of information between the police investigator and the laboratory investigator. This starts with the collection of the evidence itself, which usually cannot be evaluated without full and complete understanding of the problems by both parties. It continues throughout the investigation. As each new fact emerges from the laboratory, it must be evaluated co-operatively to determine whether it is a significant finding regarding the crime or merely an extraneous fact which is totally unrelated. The laboratory may waste much valuable time studying materials that have no value as evidence, and the investigators in the field may overlook the most important evidence because they do not realize its potential value when examined in the laboratory. Further, they immediately apply the information obtained by the laboratory if they can receive it promptly.

Such close integration of effort is usually impossible when the central laboratory is involved. Only the police scientist is on the spot at the right time and in constant touch with the field investigation.

The small police laboratory, on the other hand, can rarely be provided with all the facilities that are associated with the central laboratory. Therefore, some types of examination cannot be made locally. Also, it is likely that the police scientist is more restricted in experience and training than his counterpart in the larger laboratory. The central laboratory can serve best as a co-operating agency that carries out those examina-

tions which the police scientist realizes are desirable but which he cannot make. He, in turn, is in an excellent position to serve as liaison man with the central laboratory on the one hand and the police investigator on the other. He can assure that evidence is not overlooked or disregarded, that the preliminary examinations perhaps involving much sterile exploratory work are carried out locally and in close co-ordination with the police, and that all necessary examinations he himself cannot make will be properly done with a minimum of wasted time by the central laboratory personnel.

An additional and extremely important function attaches to the central laboratory, namely, the training and orientation work that must be performed in making local law enforcement officials conversant with the significance and handling of physical evidence. Uniformity of practice and of instruction cannot be achieved by working on the local level alone, even though the efforts of local laboratory personnel in indoctrinating local officials is invaluable. Co-ordinated programs of training for sheriffs and others are in operation in various states and are yielding most significant and valuable results. These programs require direction in part by the state or federal laboratory officials, who need not infringe on the local efforts being made in the same direction. The two aspects of crime laboratory work are thus complementary when properly organized and directed. It is a mark of poor administration if they ever become truly competitive.

INTERVIEWING AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

The most extensive use of technical advances in the fundamental sciences has been made in the field of physical evidence examination. Investigation of

persons rather than things is still handicapped by the same basic difficulties that complicate the precise application of economic or political laws and generalizations. A new instrument may be readily understood because it is conceived, designed, and built by people, and will be operated by people. Interviewing witnesses, on the other hand, involves understanding of the human mind and of human behavior. No mysteries of science are so profound as these. The skillful examiner who can interview a person and usually uncover the truth of an event is certainly operating more in the realm of the artist than in that of the objective scientist.

Uncovering the facts of a crime by means other than direct interview and examination of physical evidence in the strict sense requires an active and practical imagination and the ability to substitute the mental processes of the culprit for one's own. This type of mind, so valuable in the investigator, may be inherent, but is more often acquired by experience when the person has an aptitude for investigative work. Recognition of such a person, and provision of ample opportunity for him to acquire experience under stimulating guidance, are a prime necessity if good investigators are to be developed. Along with this must go sound common sense and training in the two most important phases of investigation—interviews and physical evidence.

In the field of the interview, the great progress in psychology and psychiatry, supplemented by the development of objective tests to expose deception, has led to material advances in this old and difficult art. As with the more objective field of criminalistics, these advances have attracted both overenthusiasts and scoffers. Here also, the middle road of cautious enthusiasm, careful testing, and conservative application is the real goal. It is unfortunate that the

objective tests for deception have been so widely misunderstood and misinterpreted, for they are the only known substitutes for a very profound knowledge of and ability in probing the human mind.

Lie-detecting devices

The so-called "lie detector," or polygraph, is an excellent illustration of the confusion in popular thinking, which spreads into many police departments as well. It is not generally recognized that the polygraph is merely a device to detect emotional reactions of any type, but not to detect falsehood except as it stimulates an emotional reaction. Thus, it is the examiner and the question he asks that are important, and not the machine, which is merely designed to give a signal when a question stirs up an emotion. As in the laboratory, the machine is completely secondary, the operator being the important element. When this simple idea is finally grasped by investigators, courts, and the public, it will be safe to allow lie-detector evidence in court. Until then, training of operators and general education—not a change in legal attitude—should be the main objective.

Even more widely misunderstood is the so-called "truth serum," which is not a serum and has no relation to truth. The device of inhibiting the higher mental centers with a drug so that the normal inhibitions of the subject are suppressed is not new. Alcohol frequently does the same thing, though less efficiently. What emerges is not necessarily truth, and may be pure gibberish; but it may also impart to the skilled operator information not otherwise obtainable. Here again, the emphasis must be entirely on the operator, not the device. This points as before to training, practice, experience, and more training of investigators in this,

as in the other specialties of investigation.

NONTECHNICAL POLICE PERSONNEL

By any criterion, the police investigator is the most important person in the complex chain of crime investigation. The psychiatrist, the police scientist, and the lawyer supplement his efforts, but the case normally is solved or not solved depending on the ability, persistence, and skill of the investigator. In order to increase the probability of his ultimate success, he should have access to the best laboratory possible, and the training necessary to utilize it fully. He should have the services of skilled operators of detection-of-deception methods, and the training necessary to profit from them. His selection should be by persons who have a thorough understanding of the job requirements and a profound appreciation of the inherent qualities necessary for good investigators. The examiner may be a good psychiatrist, or a thoroughly competent police executive, but it should not be just a personnel board or civil service commission with a list of confusing and ambiguous questions gleaned from an obsolete textbook.

Above all, the investigator should be given the opportunity and the incentive to receive all the training possible and the best grade of training available. Low standards of training that too often prevail should be improved, and new training instituted. In this direction only will lie progress, progress that is now being seen in certain quarters where training is relatively good, and which stands in sharp contrast to that in other regions where training facilities are inadequate and where police are not encouraged to obtain even that which is available.

Not only will this lead to better police performance, but it will so increase po-

lice prestige that many of the other problems such as public indifference and poor financing will be markedly reduced. Professional standards and good performance can always demand and

get their own terms. This will be evident in the police field, as in other fields, when the quality of police work is good enough to command respect and consideration.

Paul L. Kirk, Ph.D., Berkeley, California, is professor of biochemistry and criminalistics at the University of California. He has investigated criminal and civil cases for many law enforcement and other agencies over a period of about twenty years. He is associate editor of Mikrochemie and the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science. He is author of Quantitative Ultramicroanalysis (1950), Density and Refractive Index—Their Application in Criminal Identification (1951), and Crime Investigation—Physical Evidence and the Police Laboratory (1953), and of about 125 research and review articles in various journals.



The Specialized Traffic Division

By FRANKLIN M. KREML

SPECIALIZATION in traffic law enforcement has come upon the scene for much the same reasons as have influenced other kinds of specialized activity. A high degree of professional specialization is one of the characteristics of our time. In no area is it more obvious than in the operations of government, which are expanding and becoming complicated, intricate, and expensive at a faster rate than ever before in history. Every department of every government is becoming more compartmentalized and more specialized in its functions, for the problems which government in all its departments is being called upon to manage are becoming more varied and demanding at an unprecedented rate.

It is by now an overworked truism that society as we know it is highly industrial, highly mechanized, and highly mobile. An important basis of its mobility, of course, is the motor vehicle.

In view of the enormous influences of the motor vehicle upon our culture and its daily conduct, it is not surprising that it—and its uses by men—has brought some new and disturbing public problems. These problems are no less complicated and no less varied than are the problems of industry, health, and commerce. In fact, problems in all these areas are closely interrelated and interdependent.

In industry, health, and commerce—among others—administrative and operational structures have been specialized to meet new problems and requirements as they arise. In enforcement of the traffic laws, which is part of the supervision of traffic movement, which in turn is part of the governmental man-

agement of community affairs, specialization is an essential requirement for meeting and dealing with the current problem. This specialization must be reflected in personnel selection, in training, in organization, and in management.

We know a great deal about the traffic problem and the demands it places upon the official agencies of government. If we do not yet know, however, that it is a problem involving extensive special knowledge and skill, techniques and procedures—both administrative and operational—we do not know the problem well enough to deal with it adequately.

This paper will discuss the nature of the problems related to motor vehicle traffic and enforcement of the laws related thereto; will indicate that this "old" problem, the traffic problem, has in fact become a new problem, in quality and dimensions, demanding new, highly specialized knowledge and skill in all those dealing with it. The new requirements can best be met in most urban areas through specialization—in the case of enforcement, traffic supervision through a specialized traffic division of the police department.

EARLY HISTORY

City police departments gave attention to traffic in the late nineteenth century with the assignment of bicycle-mounted police to apprehend speeding cyclists. Even prior to this, police had been engaged in traffic supervision, principally at intersections. In the main, such duty was delegated, along with other duties, to patrolmen from the uniformed force.

When the advent of the motor car created new problems in street and high-

way traffic, the police motorcycle replaced the police bicycle, and traffic forces were expanded to include foot patrolmen regularly assigned to direct traffic at intersections and effect some control of parking. Horse-mounted police were frequently used for parking control duty. Early motorcycle squads concentrated principally on enforcement of speed laws.

The problem of traffic was approached as another job of law enforcement—with quantity of enforcement increasing as public indignation over accidents and congestion arose, and decreasing as the public objected to enforcement. The objections sometimes reached rebellious proportions as motorists resented unreasonable, unplanned, and often severe enforcement measures which seemed to bear little relation to the safety or the economic needs of the community.

The police handled accidents as routine extensions of aid to and transportation of the injured. Accident reports, if any, were sketchy and inaccurate, and largely useless. Except in rare instances, little use was made of these reports except as records of the incidents themselves. In the main, accidents were handled and reports made by the regular patrol forces.

Prosecution of traffic law violations committed in connection with accidents were few, and generally confined to serious cases (measured by the severity of the accident). Cases were usually given such scant investigative attention and so little preparation that few were sustained in court. Even the more carefully prepared cases usually failed when the plaintiff withdrew his complaint or conveniently forgot essential testimony following payment of civil damages. The police operated, generally, under a misapprehension of the law of arrest, concluding that they could not, under any circumstances, file a complaint for a misdemeanor they had not witnessed.

As traffic conditions worsened, following World War I, police administrators and other public officials sought other approaches. Public education for traffic safety emerged, with its promise—perhaps overly enlarged in some minds—of resolving the problem at its roots. Some police agencies seized upon it as a happy solution to the problem. Other police officials, notably in Detroit and New York, turned to traffic engineering, employing engineers or assigning police officers to newly created traffic engineering bureaus of the police department.

But as accidents and congestion continued to grow, as did public demand for improvement of conditions (almost always directed at the police), some wise administrators saw the need for sounder procedures in investigation, recording, analysis, and assignment of force to permit concentration of specialized enforcement effort. Combined with a slow but certain recognition that public education and traffic engineering were no substitute for adequate traffic law enforcement, favorable enforcement results began to accrue in enough areas to begin the development of a trend.

TRANSITION

By the late twenties and in increasing numbers in the early thirties, where specialized police traffic divisions (or bureaus or departments) had been established, accidents were investigated by trained, selected police, traveling in specially equipped vehicles. Enforcement action against violators involved in accidents became the rule rather than the exception. Reasonably reliable information as to times, places, and proximate causes of accidents was recorded and filed in usable form. Analysis of the accumulated data made possible an effective assignment of traffic personnel by time and place. Some traffic divi-

sions consisted only of administrative staffs responsible for traffic planning, and in their staff capacity supplied traffic data to the uniformed force; but most of the newly created specialized bureaus were centralized line operations.

In 1936 the Traffic Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police was established. The division was staffed to assist police departments in organizing programs of accident investigation, recording, analysis, and concentration of force—now called selective enforcement. The activities of this organization gave considerable impetus to the improvement of police traffic functions through the establishment or reorganization of specialized police traffic bureaus and co-ordination of police traffic functions with engineering and education.

Resistance to such improvement from within the police service stemmed mainly from reluctance to assign the necessary manpower, provide equipment, and effect organizational and administrative changes with all of the attendant problems, ranging from administrative co-ordination to specialized training. This resistance continues, though to a less degree, despite increasing numbers of fatalities and injuries, business-throttling congestion, soaring insurance rates, and rising public demand—albeit unsound—for the establishment of separate traffic law enforcement agencies.¹

FAVORABLE RESULTS

Cities administering traffic law enforcement through a specialized traffic division have generally enjoyed favorable experiences in terms of safety. This has been brought about without any demonstrable loss in the control of vice and crime. In fact, the officers spe-

cially assigned to traffic frequently were and are outstanding in nontraffic criminal apprehension. On the other hand, some cities without specialized traffic divisions have also obtained good results, usually due to outstanding police administrators and exceptionally well trained forces.²

The rise to a rate of 15.9 deaths per hundred million vehicle miles of travel in 1935, and the killing of almost 40,000 people in traffic accidents in the United States in 1941, emphasized the need for positive, concentrated action. Through the forties and to this date, the specialized traffic division has been increasingly adopted as a weapon against this rising problem. Most cities with specialized traffic divisions have continued to reduce their rates and gross losses, and have, in the main, contributed importantly to the reduction in the national death rate to 7.3 deaths per hundred million vehicle miles in 1952.

Prime examples of the effective use of the completely specialized traffic division are shown in the accompanying table.³

REDUCTIONS IN DEATH RATE IN CITIES HAVING SPECIALIZED TRAFFIC DIVISIONS

City	Year of Adoption	Death Rate per 10,000 Registered Motor Vehicles	
		Year of Adoption	1952
Los Angeles	1941	8.9	4.1
Detroit	1937	6.9	3.1
Atlanta	1938	7.3	4.5
Chattanooga	1938	10.5	2.4
Chicago	1948	7.0	5.2
Cincinnati	1936	13.3	3.8
Cleveland	1937	10.2	3.8
Oakland	1939	7.5	2.4
Portland, Ore.	1940	6.1	2.8

Source: National Safety Council.

¹ For example, this was proposed repeatedly in Los Angeles before adoption of the present highly successful traffic law enforcement program.

² Wichita, Kansas, for example, 1935-39.

³ Space does not permit a full development of the statistical validity of these reductions

A STAGGERING TASK

The motor vehicle today presents to government one of its most critical and continually expanding problems. While we have become so dependent upon it economically, we have not yet learned how to control the 64 million drivers of 53 million vehicles. This is evidenced by an increasing number of accidents, producing an increasing number of deaths, and an annual economic loss amounting to billions of dollars. Added to this, the vehicle upon which we are so dependent is causing congestion so stifling as to force decentralization of business, with a resultant depreciation of high-value land areas. This, of course, has an adverse effect upon urban tax structures.

The problem does not result entirely from urbanization, since, while congestion is not generally a problem in rural areas, the motor vehicle produces twice as many deaths in rural areas as in urban areas.

To deal with this problem effectively now, city and state governments must provide adequate law enforcement machinery as quickly and as economically as possible.

SPECIALIZATION NEEDED

Few American cities today can successfully deal with the traffic law enforcement problem without the establishment of a full-fledged specialized traffic division, including accident investigation, the recording and analysis of data (desirably in co-ordination with

beyond average for cities in their population group and in their area. However, such studies have been made by the director of research and development of the Traffic Institute, Northwestern University. They clearly establish the fact that in most cities with specialized traffic divisions, there have been reductions beyond those of other cities in their respective groups.

a central records system), centralized traffic enforcement patrols, motorized parking and movement supervision, and intersection control functions. Attacking so great a problem through nonspecialized means has generally proved inadequate.

Fundamental to the entire program of traffic safety through specialization is accident investigation, through which causes of traffic accidents are determined, responsibility fixed, and sufficient information gathered to protect the interests of those involved. Traffic law enforcement must base its operation on accident facts, since accident prevention is one of its prime objectives.

For the accident prevention program to be wholly effective, accidents must be investigated in sufficient quantity to provide a broad, stabilized base, and investigated well enough to provide reliable information.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATORS

Experiments have indicated that substantially more time is usually required for investigations made by the average patrol force than is required by specialized investigators. Further, quality of investigation—and consequently, reliability of data—is usually poor when specially trained personnel are not used, and when supervision is not sufficiently well informed or interested. The real blow to public safety occurs when, after chastisement in court because of lack of investigative thoroughness or inadequate case preparation, the patrol force officer finds no basis for enforcement action in subsequent investigations.

Accident investigators must be trained sufficiently well to enable them to determine proximate causes of accidents and to determine in most cases whether a violation was committed in connection therewith. A measure of the effectiveness of investigation, particularly in

those cities showing the best reduction in traffic accidents and congestion, is that evidence to support chargeable violations in court is discovered in 55 out of every 100 cases investigated.

Whenever available evidence and procedural codes permit (and they generally do), the police officer should make the complaint. This will help ensure a trial of the case on its merits, and prevent withdrawal of charges by citizen complainants upon payment of civil damages, or summary dismissals by uninformed judges or prosecutors on the preposterous ground that such cases are purely civil in nature. Withdrawal by the complainant belittles the criminal process and does nothing toward solving the traffic problem. Refusal to pursue such prosecutions on the ground that they are civil cases results in a misplacement of emphasis in the traffic law enforcement program (that is, on the nonaccident violation) and thus reduces the effectiveness of the program.

RECORDS AND ANALYSIS

Next in importance to complete and thorough accident investigation is the recording and statistical compilation of the data returned by the accident investigation officer. Any effective traffic safety program must be based on facts obtained by accident investigators. Traffic engineers must know, factually, what physical inadequacies exist, safety educators must know errors of omission and commission, and traffic law enforcement administrators must know the violations predominant in accidents if they are to use their forces intelligently.

Enforcement officials must determine the percentages of accidents occurring during each hour of the day, and, insofar as possible, assign their total enforcement effort proportionately. Enforcement personnel must be directed to concentrate primary effort on those

violations predominant in accidents—at those locations where accidents are occurring. A good accident record system should provide the administrator with sufficient information for such an enforcement selectivity and to check its validity.

CO-ORDINATION A BASIC REQUIREMENT

Establishment of such a specialized traffic division (or detective division, for that matter) must not result in the development of separate operational forces within the department. This can be avoided through clearly enunciated policy and directives,⁴ implemented by supervision and training. There is too often a tendency toward separation of functions—even a disinclination to co-operate. This can and must be overcome.

The tendency toward separation has been abetted in some departments having specialized traffic divisions by the creation of traffic ranks, sometimes under civil service. This deprives the administrator of flexibility of assignment and gives impetus to the tendency toward separation of responsibility and function, increasing the problems of co-ordination. The civil service traffic sergeant, for example, is not strongly inclined to require his men to be alert to nontraffic violations, incidents, or crimes.

Important progress toward better traffic action by the general patrol force has often resulted from the assignment of superior and commanding officers from traffic to supervisory and command positions in patrol. Detroit, for example, has substantially improved the quantity and quality of traffic law enforcement in its precincts since a number of sergeants, lieutenants, and inspectors—precinct commanders—were assigned to general patrol duty from the traffic bureau.

⁴ See General Order No. 166, Chicago Police Department, 1948.

Whether a department has a highly specialized traffic division, or traffic is handled largely by the general patrol force, close and centralized co-ordination of operations is essential to efficiency. This requirement is most pressing now, when most departments are understaffed and the police problem in all its aspects requires the utmost efficiency in the expenditure of time and effort.

There must also be extensive co-ordination of effort between the police and other agencies—official and unofficial—functioning for traffic safety. Such collaboration can do much to make the enforcement effort more effective.

TRAFFIC ENGINEERING

This is particularly true with respect to the traffic engineer. Many departments have adopted the unfortunate attitude—even policy—of isolation from this official whose work relates importantly and intimately to their own traffic responsibilities. While usually somewhat less virulent in those departments which have specialized traffic divisions, this condition may be described as general. In fact, some police departments cannot—or will not—be reconciled to the performance of this function by another department, insisting that the function is theirs, or should be performed under their immediate direction and control.

Traffic engineering belongs in the engineering and public works department of the city government. But the engineering function requires the sympathetic and wholehearted support of the enforcement arm, which can, in turn, through close planning and operational co-ordination on such matters as the design and construction of streets, parking areas, and lighting systems, achieve a considerable lightening of its own responsibilities.

This is not to say that the police should not have engineering assistance in their own administrative and operational planning for enforcement purposes, insofar as needed. But, like legal assistance, it should be extended inter-departmentally—fully co-ordinated for the most efficient employment of the service, with the greatest public good at the lowest cost.

Engineering, traffic or other, is not an essential or even desirable element of the specialized police traffic bureau.

SAFETY EDUCATION

Similar problems of co-ordination prevail in other areas of intragovernmental relationships. Thus, in the matter of safety education, many of our departments have been reluctant to yield leadership in the safety education of children to the schools. In principle, the same arguments which apply to the police-engineer relationship apply here. The police should assist school authorities, co-operating as needed; but the job of safety education, whether in safe walking practices in the elementary schools or driver training in the secondary schools, belongs to the professional teacher.

The school safety patrol should be administered by the school authorities, too. Where the police seek to direct the activity, the usual result is conflict with the school authorities and a poorer result, both from the standpoint of supervision of pupil pedestrians and from that of the citizenship development of the school safety patrolmen.

However, the function of general supervision of traffic and particularly the control of crossings adjacent to schools must remain a police function, whether performed by regular police or civilian guards. Some spasmodic attempts have been made to have responsibility for this function transferred to school au-

thorities. This is usually unworkable administratively. Moreover, most school boards are without legal authority to establish and administer such activities.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

In the area of public safety education (public information) the police have a real interest, for upon public understanding, co-operation, and voluntary compliance depends, in important degree, the success of their enforcement work. The police should offer co-operation and assistance to the safety council, traffic commission, mayor's committee, or other agency supported by the public either through taxes or private subscriptions to carry forward such work. Police co-operation, particularly in supplying basic information on the problem, is necessary to its success.

While the police have sometimes carried the initial responsibility for such programs in the absence of other organizational work in safety education, it is not a primary police responsibility, and should be transferred as quickly and completely as possible. Police participation should be limited to such activities as are legitimately and essentially a part of their own general public relations program, plus such co-operation as is necessary, within reasonable limits, to ensure the success of the public safety education program.

INCREASING DEMANDS

The most critical problem of all is that of manpower. In the face of increasing demands upon police forces to provide adequate supervision of traffic, both for the prevention of accidents and the expedition of movement, including the control of parking, the daily available strength of many of our departments declines steadily. The installation each year of additional thousands

of parking meters, useless without police supervision, poses a problem of manpower and its distribution. More intersections require police supervision each year; more enforcement of traffic laws is needed in more areas of our cities as traffic volumes increase almost explosively and spill over into streets and areas which formerly required little traffic supervision. Special services such as the service of warrants, the processing of citations, and court appearances all eat into manpower.

The immediate future promises nothing but great increases in traffic and parallel needs for specialized police supervision. A recent California Highway Department study forecasts a 100 per cent increase in registered motor vehicles in the state in the next twenty years. The estimate is probably low, barring another world war or a major depression. Recognizing the special factors applying to California—migration particularly—indications force us to conclude that the number and use of motor vehicles will continue to increase sharply through the next decade or two. The need for police supervision and enforcement will certainly increase.

MEETING THE DEMANDS

Experience with established and well-directed specialized traffic activities indicates that they are the most productive, most economical means of combating this growing problem, though it is recognized that many specialized traffic divisions are only producing a part of the result one might expect in light of the size of the division, its equipment, and its cost.

In these instances better management is needed, and this requires better-trained administrators. The chief of police in many such cases dares not decentralize and decentralize this responsibility to his precinct commanders, be-

cause even a higher administrative skill is demanded to administer a dispersed multipurpose operation. Generally, at the district level of command, managerial resources are much lower. The police have learned the hard way that organizational form is no answer to the need for effective management—that it does not usually solve administrative problems.

Most United States cities, particularly those above 100,000 population, today can best and most quickly meet their traffic enforcement problems through the establishment of a specialized traffic division centrally directed. Only thus can enough trained men, adequately equipped, effectively supervised, with sufficient interest and morale, be welded together as an effective means to provide the badly needed, and in many cases sadly lacking, degree of traffic supervision, and the amount of high-quality enforcement needed.

Some cities, possessed of outstanding police leadership and a high state of police training, morale, and competence, are successfully meeting the problem without specialization. They are, for the most part, smaller cities. The future should bring more and better personnel—both administrative and rank and file. Some of our larger cities may then begin to despecialize without loss of efficiency in this important area of police service.

While bringing the problem under control through such a specialized division, intensive training and indoctrination of the general patrol force should be undertaken, so that it may effectively provide an increasing proportion of traffic enforcement, with corresponding reduction in the motorized traffic enforcement patrol.⁵

⁵ See studies of Worcester, Mass., Police Department, 1952, by Public Administration Service and Traffic Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police.

How rapidly this can be done, and to what ultimate degree, depends upon the quality of the force and its command, the sufficiency of its training, and the coincidence of the demands for other police service and traffic service as to time and place.

Ultimately, particularly in the small and medium-sized cities, even the highly technical function of accident investigation may be performed well by general investigators of the patrol force.⁶ In most jurisdictions, however, this is too much to expect in the foreseeable future.

RURAL SPECIALIZATION

It has not been possible for state police agencies to specialize in the same organizational pattern as have city police departments, because of the fundamental problem of area coverage.

There has been, however, a marked increase in the number of state departments giving specialized staff attention to traffic through headquarters traffic personnel. Further, some departments have established staff specialization in the field at post or district levels—principally because of the growth of the problem and the difficulty of providing sufficiently close staff supervision from general headquarters.

In several states, state police traffic law enforcement activity has not adequately met the public need, and other agencies such as the motor vehicle department have taken on some police traffic law enforcement functions. This reflects the dilemma of those state police administrators who are unable to get adequate enforcement activity with state police personnel and yet, because of the necessity of decentralized operation, are not able to meet the problem through specialization.

In Pennsylvania this problem was met

⁶ *Ibid.*

by the establishment of an agency separate and distinct from the Pennsylvania State Police—the Pennsylvania Motor Patrol. This was, of course, undesirable specialization, vesting enforcement responsibilities in two separate uniformed police departments of the same state government. The shortcomings of this bifurcated arrangement have long since been recognized, and the entire state enforcement operation is back in the hands of the Pennsylvania State Police.

Many states have sought to solve the problem by creation of state highway patrols. These organizations are frequently limited by law to enforcement of the traffic code on state highways, leaving enforcement of the criminal code mainly in the hands of county enforcement officers.

As desirable as this may be from the standpoint of dealing with the traffic problem, it is generally uneconomical, unwieldy, and inefficient. Most desirable is one rural law enforcement agency (state-wide) with sufficient means to give attention to all aspects of public safety, including traffic.

For example, Texas, through the establishment of a department of public safety, retains most of the advantages of specialization without completely dividing the responsibility for criminal law enforcement and traffic law enforcement between the counties and the state. Thus, the Texas Rangers, a division of the department of public safety, deals with criminal investigation, while the highway patrol deals principally with traffic. The highway patrol, of course, is a specialized traffic unit. Through the department director, a degree of co-ordination is effected that permits full employment of the highway patrol in nontraffic matters, insofar as public necessity requires.

This arrangement provides sufficient specialization to get the traffic job done,

and yet sufficient co-ordination to ensure flexibility in the use of the entire field strength of the department to meet the other responsibilities of the department. It seems probable that this pattern is a desirable one, toward which the several states will move increasingly in the future.

Neither the specialized highway patrol giving little or no attention to crime, nor the state police department of the old pattern giving little or no attention to traffic, is desirable from the public's standpoint. Specialization of the urban type is presently impractical except in port areas adjacent to principal cities. The department of public safety pattern seems most suitable, organizationally, administratively, and economically.

EVOLUTION—A POSSIBILITY

In summary, police forces in the United States today are faced with a gigantic traffic supervision problem which, as has been indicated, can be effectively controlled through efficient use of manpower and equipment. The best organizational facility for the accomplishment of this mission is highly trained, specialized forces. Except in a few instances, the general patrol forces are incapable of the function because of lack of training, administrative skill, and competent, interested, supervision. Every effort should be made at once to attack the problem of reducing traffic accidents and congestion through the specialized traffic division, while, at the same time, the general patrol forces and the general administrative personnel are trained to assume an increasing share of this responsibility.

Thus, as administrative and supervisory skills are perfected and training programs of a high order are developed, the following evolution lies in the future:

1. The traffic problem is attacked and brought under control by completely specialized, centralized traffic divisions.

2. The centralized traffic division headquarters undertakes staff responsibility for traffic operations of the uniformed force.

3. Gradually, in larger cities particularly, possibly through traffic precincts, there commences a decentralization of the specialized traffic activity.

4. Simultaneously with the increased responsibility of the patrol force for traffic activity, the traffic force is reduced progressively in the following order: (a) outlying crossing duty is absorbed by general patrol; (b) general patrol assumes a larger share of traffic law enforcement responsibility, including parking enforcement; (c) investigation of less serious accidents is begun by general patrol; (d) general patrol assumes responsibility for the entire traffic law enforcement patrol activity, including parking enforcement; (e) downtown crossing duty is consolidated with general patrol or eliminated through use of engineering devices; (f) general patrol assumes responsibility for investigation of all accidents.

5. During the course of this evolution the command of the traffic division, to

an increasing degree, becomes staff to the chief of police, recommending policy and program for issuance by the chief and implementation by general patrol.

Much of this development would be concurrent or overlapping, and the rate of such evolution depends, it is emphasized, upon the administrative competence of the department and the state of training, morale, and discipline of the rank and file and their supervisors. Attempts to force this result by organizational fiat must fail, with disservice to the police, their prestige, and, most important, the public they serve.

The evolution from one process to another must be based on need and tempered by ability. We must face up to the basic requirement—the need to reduce traffic accidents sharply and relieve congestion. This need cannot be met without adequate traffic law enforcement, which is present today in only a minority of our cities and states. Failure to meet this demand will result in traffic chaos, even more shocking loss of life, and a drain upon our economic and industrial strength which even the United States cannot absorb without material reduction in social gains, reduction in living standards, and lessened strength to defend the nation if need be.

Franklin M. Kreml, Evanston, Illinois, has been director of the Traffic Institute of Northwestern University and of the Traffic Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police since those two organizations were established in 1936. He worked his way through the ranks of the Evanston Police Department to lieutenant commanding traffic, and director of the city's accident prevention bureau. He organized that bureau, the first of its kind in the country. He is author or collaborator of Public Safety (1937), Accident Investigation Manual (1940), Evidence Handbook for Police (1943), Traffic Engineering and the Police (1946), and Judge and Prosecutor in Traffic Court (1951).

Widening the Traffic Enforcement Front

By WILBUR S. SMITH

AS recently as 1920, few police officers were concerned with traffic duties. But development of automotive transportation, great as it was, was destined to attain still higher levels. It is common knowledge that the manufacture, sale, and use of automobiles in this country have occurred at rates that are without parallel in transportation history. Even during the last seven years, registration and travel have increased more than 50 per cent. Since the leveling-off point does not appear to be in sight, automotive traffic has become a major problem in every city and state. People and vehicles make traffic, and both population and vehicle ownership curves are growing at a rapid rate.

THE EXPANDING TRAFFIC CONTROL PROBLEM

The police, as well as practically every other agency of the government, are required to make traffic control a principal part of their work. In just slightly more than a quarter-century, the police have had to expand a relatively minor traffic effort into a major responsibility and activity. Many law enforcement units are today almost solely concerned with traffic. Perhaps as a consequence, accident rates have declined sharply. In 1925 about nineteen deaths occurred for each hundred million vehicle miles of travel. Today, the rate is about seven fatalities per hundred million vehicle miles. Since 1941, when more persons were killed in traffic than in any other year, there has been an annual decrease in the number of traffic deaths, even though highway travel has increased tremendously.

Pressures due to traffic congestion continue to grow. In some large cities, the streets are so clogged that speeds are little better than in the days of the horse-drawn vehicle. Though improvements have been effected, it has not been possible to expedite traffic movement greatly, if at all. Many changes and improvements only serve to accommodate increasing numbers of people and vehicles. New and superior facilities are no sooner created than they become saturated.

When complete physical facilities to handle traffic cannot be afforded, maximum efficiency must be developed from existing facilities. This necessarily implies more stringent control and regulation, and a greater enforcement strength. With every change in the general traffic picture, there must be changes in enforcement activities and plans. All the resources and talents of the police will be needed to cope with the ever growing traffic problem. Police must be capable of great comprehension and flexibility in dealing with traffic problems. They must know much about many things. In most areas they have come close to achieving all that they can through simple day-to-day enforcement efforts, yet these efforts cannot be diminished in the slightest. Our patterns of enforcement need to be re-examined in the light of the new conditions.

When the problem of traffic control became a sizable one, police executives were faced with decisions on how best to enforce existing regulations, how to suggest and plan for new regulations, and how to allocate responsibility for police activity in the traffic law enforcement field. Several methods of organi-

zation to discharge these responsibilities were possible. One was to absorb the added traffic duties into the other duties of the police department, using the existing organization. Another was to establish a separate traffic division and place in it responsibility for performance of all traffic duties. A third method, which was briefly adopted in a few states, consisted in turning traffic enforcement over to an agency that was separate and apart from the regular state police setup.

It seems too clear to require discussion here, that traffic duties are a logical and even necessary part of the duly established law enforcement bodies, and that they should not be assigned to a separate agency. Overlapping duties and efforts, inadequacies, and ineffectiveness necessarily develop under separation.

As the automotive transportation problem grew, police naturally began to specialize to cope with it. This pattern has been a common one in handling the organizational structure for other branches of police work, as well as in most areas of public administration. When a new and pressing problem arises, special skills and procedures are developed. Many police departments, therefore, have established specialized divisions and have given them full or partial responsibility for traffic law enforcement. In most cities, particularly in large cities, specialization in traffic is desirable at the staff level. However, in some cases specialization has been carried too far with the result that maximum effectiveness has been lost.

MORE ENFORCEMENT BY BASIC PATROLS

Since traffic has become a major problem of most law enforcement agencies, and is too large to be effectively handled solely as a specialty, it follows that much of the effort of the total force

should be directed to traffic work. Traffic law enforcement requires the attention and interest of the entire uniformed force. To achieve this, a logical and simple transition is required. The objective is to develop additional effort on traffic matters without losing the values of staff specialization and without infringing upon other enforcement requirements.

Traffic duties of an operational type, such as point direction and control of traffic, enforcement of traffic regulations, routine accident investigations, and other line activities, should become the concern and responsibility of the entire uniformed force. Better and more general enforcement is provided by this arrangement, and all officers develop a greater sense of responsibility to enforce traffic laws as well as other laws in performance of their assignments. Traffic enforcement problems are usually worse during daylight and early evening hours, when criminal activity is usually at a minimum, so a favorable time separation develops. The plan assumes, of course, that the "average" police officer will receive basic training in traffic matters.

The values of special training and experience are retained in traffic by having a headquarters traffic unit which exercises functional supervision over all traffic activities of the police department. The size of this unit will vary with the size of the city, but in any case it should develop standards, methods, and plans for handling traffic problems, to be administered through established lines of authority.

The principal objective in making traffic line activities the responsibility of all enforcement personnel is to increase the total traffic enforcement effort. Budget and manpower limitations make it impossible for most cities to achieve the optimum enforcement effort in traffic under any other plan. In

this way, more efficient use is made of all the department's manpower and equipment, and better enforcement coverage is obtained, than through a separate traffic division. Maximum utilization of the entire force is achieved, with potentials for work in traffic often greatly increased.

Police administrators have also found several other ways of quickly and economically reducing manpower shortages. The values of some of these in broadening traffic activities are becoming widely recognized.

SCHOOL CROSSING GUARDS

There is a heavy demand on the police for personnel to direct traffic at key street locations near schools. The periodic nature of this demand makes it difficult to meet with the regular forces. Morning school openings normally occur during peak traffic hours, so policemen are needed on general traffic duty at the same time that they are needed at schools. The schools are widely scattered geographically, so problems of transportation and travel-time losses develop. Yet the requests and needs for providing maximum protection for children cannot be ignored.

To meet this problem, many cities have assigned school crossing duties to the patrol division rather than to the traffic division. Even with this method, the requirements are difficult to meet without neglecting other police functions.

To relieve the uniformed force from providing protection at school crossings, special school crossing guards may be employed. Such guards are frequently women. Usually they are employed on a part-time basis. In some cities, retired police officers, or elderly persons who are still physically fit, are employed as school guards to work only a few hours in the morning and again in the afternoon. It is customary to give the guards general enforcement powers, but

they are not armed, nor are they expected to do more than perform the usual school-child protection duties.

POLICEWOMEN AND CIVILIANS FOR SPECIAL TRAFFIC DUTIES

Favorable reports also are being received on the use of policewomen for the enforcement of nonmoving violations. In some cities, such action is taken to enforce curb parking regulations in the core area of the city—usually the area controlled by parking meters. This procedure proves quite effective in developing better compliance with parking regulations. Because of the limited and short-time nature of the work, women are procured at lower rates of pay than apply to regular police officers.

Increasing problems of traffic congestion also have brought forth the employment of women for other special peak-hour traffic duties. In some instances they are stationed along streets where "all rolling" regulations (no stopping, standing, or parking) are necessary to develop sufficient capacity to meet peak traffic requirements. They are very effective in reducing curb parking and loading violations which would greatly retard traffic flow and reduce street capacity.

Women also are employed by the police department to supervise critical loading and unloading points. In other cases they serve to bring about compliance with pedestrian regulations, particularly where pedestrian actions handicap traffic flow and develop hazards.

In some instances police have been given technical positions which have little connection with day-to-day law enforcement responsibilities. Experience shows that a sizable percentage of the manpower strength can be tied up in connection with the installation, maintenance, and operation of parking meters. In some cases men who have

been trained and are qualified to do general police duty are found giving their full time to traffic signals, to signs and markings, or to other practices with which the police are concerned. By having these positions created apart from the regular enforcement strength, it is possible to staff them without using regular police officers.

It seems apparent that one very effective means of relieving traffic enforcement is to use policewomen and specially employed guards for special tasks which do not require the efforts and training of regular police officers.

AIDS IN TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT

Police also are seeking opportunities to increase their traffic enforcement effort through the use of recently developed devices and scientific aids. The speed meter and the drunkometer are getting widespread acceptance and usage. Popular attitudes which have entered into the concept of "fair play" in traffic are changing. It seems obvious that scientific aids and equipment should be just as available in the enforcement of traffic laws as in the enforcement of criminal laws.

Electronic scales capable of weighing vehicles in motion, central control indicators for parking meters, and other such devices can have a profound influence on police manpower requirements to accomplish a given level of enforcement.

Fortunately for the police, the early obstacles are disappearing, so increasing use can be made of such devices.

For many years traffic signals have been timed in most cities for progressive speeds along a given traffic artery. The principal purpose was to achieve minimum delay and maximum speed. Now this principle is being applied in some instances on high-speed roads solely for speed control purposes. It has not yet been proved that such an approach to

speed control is realistic or effective. On the other hand, it is obvious that a successful method of controlling speeds through signals or other devices would greatly relieve the manpower requirements of police. Nor should considerations of economy be overlooked. If necessary, substantial investments in equipment can be capitalized with the savings in police salaries. When methods are found for aiding in traffic law enforcement, they also make available manpower and equipment for the performance of duties that are not now undertaken.

Improved traffic control devices, and new applications in the use of the devices, promise to provide important additional relief for police. Sometimes a very simple thing such as retiming a traffic signal will release one or more officers for several hours each day for other traffic or police work.

All parts of our country are familiar with the tendency to enact regulations which are viewed as unreasonable by the motoring public. Modernization of traffic laws, keeping them in step with changing conditions and attitudes, could be one of the greatest aids to police in broadening their traffic activities. It also would enable them to command greater respect and co-operation from the public, not only in traffic but in all police efforts.

CO-ORDINATING POLICE AND OTHER TRAFFIC ACTIVITIES

The modern traffic task involves governmental agencies other than the police. Activities of these agencies must be co-ordinated with those of the police if objectives are to be reached. Traffic engineers and police must work in the closest harmony in order that a satisfactory traffic program can be developed. Mutual satisfaction in their collaboration can come about through sympathetic understanding on the part

of chief executives of each department. Such understanding can be maintained only by close working relations carried on day after day through duly designated liaison agents. Each department must learn what the other can do for it in achieving city-wide traffic actions.

Other public activities with which the police should maintain close working relations include street construction and maintenance, sanitation, state highway work, public utilities, and special areas in which there are major traffic considerations.

New businesses that attract large numbers of motor vehicles are placing increased demands on the police. A new retail store, an automatic auto laundry, a shopping center, a drive-in theater, a curb-service restaurant, and many other types of private activities are causing problems of traffic congestion and hazard requiring the assignment of police officers during large parts of the average day.

In some cities these special problems are handled by private police officers, or by regular officers on their hours of off-duty from the city. In this way the

expense is borne exclusively by the groups that are directly benefited, and avoidable inroads are not made into the manpower and equipment of the public police agency.

Police can be given important relief if city planning and construction officials will anticipate the problems that are likely to develop and will insist on designs and locations that will minimize or altogether obviate these problems before they come into being.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE BASIS

The administrator must constantly measure and evaluate the quality of movement and accidents. Measures and procedures for greater effectiveness in police work can then be devised. Since all needs probably will never be met, the administrator must carefully evaluate each in terms of the others, and give proper priority assignments. An objective study of needs is the best way to develop the support needed to continue and expand police activities in traffic. Assignment of manpower and equipment on the basis of factual data is a safe administrative approach.

Wilbur S. Smith, New Haven, Connecticut, is associate director of the Bureau of Highway Traffic at Yale University; chairman of the Traffic Operating Department of the Highway Research Board; technical adviser to the Eno Foundation for Highway Traffic Control; and traffic consultant and lecturer at the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy at Washington. He was formerly state traffic engineer of South Carolina, and has directed and participated in numerous traffic surveys. He is a frequent contributor to Traffic Quarterly, of which he is associate editor.

Supervising the Juvenile Delinquent

By JANE E. RINCK

ANY specialized police approach to the juvenile problem is necessarily limited to the small minority of American forces enjoying a numerical strength that is sufficient to staff and support the operation. Such devices prove far beyond the resources of the vast majority of police establishments, which must deal with all offenders through their general, unspecialized personnel. That in itself implies no inferiority as to either methods or results, since experience shows that results obtained through mere inauguration of a so-called specialized unit can fall far short of those secured through more general means.

In practically all major cities and in some small communities, police have established special bureaus for the purpose of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency. These special bureaus are relatively new; most have been established within the last twenty years. The activities of the juvenile bureaus differ widely from city to city. Activities include sponsorship and administration of recreation programs, organization of neighborhood councils, patrol of areas that harbor juvenile offenders, guarding school crossings, extensive casework advice and counseling, referral to other social agencies, community education through public speaking programs, use of volunteer counselors, "gang workers" to tame street gangs, and search for missing persons.

No one bureau does all of these things. In fact, considerable disagreement may be found as to the activities that are most valuable and those that should not be performed at all. Some bureaus, for example, never patrol; others rely mainly on patrol. Some

carry on extensive recreation programs; others make no attempt to conduct such programs.

In addition to these special bureaus, which generally emphasize a sociological approach to prevent delinquency, some large police departments have youth squads attached to detective bureaus. The squads deal with young offenders in a manner more in line with usual police methods. They tend to deal with young criminals, whereas juvenile bureaus tend to deal with children who have not advanced so far on the road to crime. Differences in the methods employed by the two units can be a source of trouble, and the allocation of cases correspondingly hard to make.

CONFUSING FEATURES

The very words "juvenile delinquent" cause confusion. They now serve as a large receptacle into which all kinds of young human problems are tossed at random; problems of case-hardened junior criminals, of high-spirited offenders who will never do it again and who never do, and of small children who persist in running away. In addition, a special category has been devised called the "predelinquent," for children who will probably turn delinquent unless somebody does something. What the "something" is may also be debatable. Furthermore, since no one wants to tack an unfavorable label on a child, much double talk has been indulged in to avoid the use of precise definitions to describe a child's misdeeds or problems.

To compound the difficulty, various agencies and private individuals struggle with this problem. The result is

that the identical misbehavior which would be subject to official action and official recording in one part of a city may be settled by private individuals or families in another part of the city, with no records to assist and guide later investigations. Even in the same neighborhood, differences arise according to the person or agency that happens to be concerned about the child. Private agencies or public departments of welfare may carry some cases which are indistinguishable from those carried by probation officers. Some school principals are exceedingly defensive concerning the reputations of their schools, and so settle or attempt to settle major difficulties in their own offices. Juvenile courts add to the hazy picture by handling some cases on an unofficial basis. Hence it is very difficult to count heads or to measure the success or failure of a given type of program in curbing or preventing delinquency.

Police have the task of holding a course though buffeted by confused seas and shifting winds. It need scarcely be emphasized that cities vary, that counties and towns may have quite different problems. Fortunately, not all of the problems arise in one place. Yet, despite many differences, some general truths for the operation of police programs for supervising juvenile delinquents seem to be emerging.

THE ROLE OF THE POLICE

Police should enforce the law. If police do not do it, no one else will. If the police department turns into just one more social agency, the community and its children have lost a valuable asset. No one wants police to be rough with children or ignorant of what little has been learned about delinquency. On the contrary, police should know more about delinquency than any other organization in the community.

When police concentrate on doing a good job of law enforcement for children as well as adults, they help to set a standard of acceptable conduct that becomes both vivid and helpful to children. This means stopping children who are violating laws, taking them home when it is apparent that they are getting into trouble. Day and night, endlessly, police need to explain the law and the trouble that comes through its violation. Children need this kind of curbstone schooling.

A program for law enforcement for children includes three main duties: (1) thorough patrol, (2) intelligent use of social and other agencies to aid individual children, and (3) police leadership in community planning for delinquency control.

PATROL AS A FOUNDATION FOR A JUVENILE PROGRAM

In those cities with specialized juvenile bureaus, the staff often is comparatively small; therefore patrol has to be somewhat selective. Special attention is usually given to such trouble spots as bus terminals, railway stations, all-night movies, parks, and hotels. When patrol duty is performed during school hours, it is likely to duplicate work of attendance officers; therefore it is a less rewarding use of time. Delinquent acts increase when school lets out, and finally taper off at dawn. Saturdays and Sundays also bring extra opportunities for trouble. A nine-to-five schedule, five days a week, does not meet problems when they are still urgent. As with other police patrol, the juvenile patrol must be round the clock, with emphasis on the leisure and night hours.

Some bureaus attempt to get along without performing any patrol duty, and depend upon referrals from other branches of the force. This cannot provide adequate coverage, since other branches are usually tied up with traffic

control or investigations of adult offenses. No matter how willing the regular patrol force may be to interest itself in children, members cannot take time to visit licensed premises, cannot leave their beats, and are not always free to escort children home.

Juvenile officers are not usually assigned to particular patrol sectors. Each one tries to cover the whole city or a very large section of it. Often an officer will cover a different section each night. No juvenile officer has a territory of his own for which he is definitely responsible. Hence he has no opportunity to become fully acquainted with people who can give him leads about where trouble may lie. No amount of spot maps or statistics can substitute for the knowledge of a district that comes only with long association. Other branches of police service rely heavily on this kind of localized knowledge. Juvenile bureaus should be so organized that they can assign a particular officer to a particular area.

As a valuable by-product, localized patrol can help to keep the juvenile bureau staff in close working association with the rest of the force. A staff that sits it out in a warm downtown office is readily forgotten, and if not forgotten, may earn some disfavor. Patrol work keeps the bureau personnel in touch with the regular stream of police work, and with the youth squads in particular. Patrol work can break up easily developed unprofessional habits of dealing only with nice children.

REFERRALS TO OTHER AGENCIES

A major police function of most juvenile work is to refer children who have been picked up on patrol to the agency or organization best able to help the child. This should entail a brief study by the officer of the child's situation and a reasonably rapid decision as to what should be done. The emphasis of

most bureaus is placed not on arrest and prosecution, but rather on the adjustment of a child's problems so that he may become a happy and useful member of society. Not all cases are referred. The majority seem to be simple matters handled in a single interview. Experience indicates that most cases involve only one offense, or at most two offenses of minor significance. But when real trouble is brewing, other social agencies are called in. Most juvenile bureaus use the social service exchange in order to learn what other agencies may be acquainted with the child or his family.

On the surface, this seems like a simple matter; but it is not. In establishing a referral service, the police department is immediately and inextricably involved in all the problems which confront social workers, in all the difficulties arising from gaps in welfare services, the shortcomings of juvenile courts, and the tribulations of social agencies.

Of all these problems, the one which is most baffling is the refusal of some private social agencies to accept cases referred by police unless the child or his parent physically appears at the agency and verbally and specifically asks for advice and counseling service. Many private agencies do not go out into the field, but rather write letters assigning time for an office interview. Rarely can children meet such conditions, particularly delinquent children. Private social agencies justify their policies by citing limitations of funds and staff. They do not want to be so burdened with following up people who have not asked for help that they have to refuse help to those who ask for it. However, they secure their funds through heartwarming appeals which do not jibe with such laissez faire policies. Some modification of policies should be possible more nearly to meet the broad responsibilities of a community agency.

Public welfare departments, no less than private social agencies, have established working methods that do not always help a child who has gotten into trouble. Public welfare agencies have been preoccupied with the granting of public assistance and the intricacies of investigation of need. Public child welfare agencies have tended to concentrate time on children who need placement outside their own homes. Children who happen to need such service may receive a great deal of careful consideration, understanding, and thorough medical care. The unfortunate child who is delinquent but who remains at home receives little if any attention from the public agency. Whether or not a child receives help from a public child welfare agency is therefore largely accidental and without any rational basis.

The textbook idea of a juvenile court as a place where a child receives the attention of experts is sometimes a reality, but often only partially true. At its worst, the court has become a placement agency for state institutions and is called upon only when such placement is needed. The quality of the institutions thereafter determines the value of the court. If the juvenile courts were all that they should be, many problems might be more easily solved. At present, some police go to considerable lengths to bypass the juvenile courts. A high-quality probation service could lift much of the burden now carried by police.

Schools

A plan for true collaboration between the schools and the police is essential. A child's world centers around the school, and when the child fails in school or quits too early with no developed skills to assist in the transition, police and the social agencies can never quite patch up gaps that appear. Police can sometimes find out about a

child's trouble even before the school authorities, for some children apparently get along well in school but are in serious trouble outside of school hours. Minor adjustments of school program and extra attention by the teacher may help.

Some schools have rather elaborate guidance services, with staffs of psychiatrists, psychologists, and trained visiting teachers. Some guidance services will accept referrals only through classroom teachers, and so are not readily available to police. That policy does not take into account the total needs of the child, and may exclude the very children most in need of expert help. Thus, rigid intake policies go a long way toward destroying co-operation among the various government services. Even though guidance services are short of staff in some communities, selection of cases should be governed by the needs of the child rather than the source of the referral.

The regular staff of a school system can be a great source of help. Many school principals are alert to the problems of their neighborhoods and are well able to give intelligent and useful guidance to their students. Some teachers are leaders of the community and have an unmatched interest in the well-being of their pupils. Police can easily find these people and enlist their support.

Complicating factors

The relative strength or weakness of community agencies is only one aspect of the problem of referral. Police must also contend with other problems. Of no small import is the prejudice against police officers among social workers. The concepts of law and order, restraint and punishment, do not fit neatly into the psychological theories which form the basis of casework treatment.

Unfortunately, in this matter it has become necessary to state and restate

the obvious; that ours is a government of law; that laws were passed with serious intent; that laws must be administered and applied with equality. We do not have one set of laws for clients of social agencies and another for the rest of our citizens. The two professions of police and social work alike are bound to comply with the provisions of law. Neither has any choice. This being the case, the two professions might just as well resolve their differences and each strive to appreciate the other's unique contributions to social living. Social workers do not want to be robbed or murdered; police do not want to clap little children into jail.

A further problem in referral is this: sometimes no one knows what to do. All the caseworkers, police officers, psychiatrists, teachers, and others cannot help. Everyone does his best and we still lose. By a frank acknowledgment of the fact that we still have not found all the solutions, we can keep the way open for further explorations. The professional insistence that it knows all the answers can obstruct us all in getting results.

POLICE SHOULD NOT BE PROBATION OFFICERS

Where police have found that large gaps in services for children greatly hampered their efforts to prevent delinquency, they have developed programs of continuous supervision, a case-work treatment service comparable to that of social agencies or probation departments. Programs of this kind include weekly or biweekly visits by police officers to children's homes, many conferences with parents, study of children's background to learn the sources of trouble, employment placement, and use of medical and psychiatric services.

In spite of laudable motives, continuous supervision of this kind constitutes a misuse of police authority. Though

most officers are not uniformed when doing this work, police authority is present whatever the informality or disguise. Police enter homes and extract a measure of co-operation when social agencies cannot. Parents of delinquent or near-delinquent children are likely to consider themselves in no position to protest: the alternative may be institutional placement for their children. Some may not realize that they have a right to ask the officer to leave, so their ignorance is exploited.

Continuous supervision of parents by police would be intolerable. It is no less so for children. The police department may call it "social treatment in an authoritarian setting," but it is nothing more or less than probation without adjudication. It is a violation of our system of justice.

It is not recommended here that children needing supervision should be abandoned by government services. Far from it. Police also need a few days to investigate and determine whether or not a child needs referral, and if so, where he should be referred. However, the public funds now used to pay for police "probation" work should be re-allocated into regular probationary channels. In regular probationary work, authority is exerted openly, the police are not set up as judges, and children are not denied their right to treatment with a scrupulous regard for their substantial rights.

POLICE CAN LEAD SOME PARTS OF COMMUNITY PLANNING

Of all the governmental or private organizations in a community, the police department is the one that should know the most about juvenile delinquency and the effectiveness with which the problem is being handled. A well-informed police administrator can know exactly where his trouble spots lie, at

what hours, with what age groups of children. He can know which social agencies are able to work in this field, and which ones cannot. He can know very readily and exactly what facilities are lacking to meet precise needs. Furthermore, he can make some very accurate predictions of the fate of many unfortunate children known to his department.

All too often this information does not get out into the daylight where it can be of some use. People doing community planning underestimate the perceptiveness of the police department. For its part, the police department does not publicize its information so that it can be understood by those who are less well informed. Information that is pulled together in some form can help to direct the efforts of the well-intentioned and ever present committees on juvenile delinquency. Information can shape a specific program and cut down aimless generalizations about the horrors of modern youth. Police can, with little trouble, show a need for service for children aged 10 to 14 years at the corner of X Street and Y Avenue at 7:00 P.M.

The police could use the same information to pull together many different governmental services to help clean up particularly troublesome areas. A glance at a spot map of residences of delinquent children will reveal that there are clusters of spots in particular neighborhoods. Within an entire area that is well seeded with delinquency, some streets will be much worse than others, with troubles piling up in well-defined centers. A regular drive on these clusters by all agencies of government—public welfare, sanitation, housing, health, school attendance officers, and others—might serve to clean them up. Such areas need more than run-of-the-mill service. They need direct and coordinated action.

Concentrated attention is also needed for the small minority of children known to be growing up into full-fledged criminals. Police, as well as anyone else, can distinguish between the casual, happy-go-lucky lawbreakers and the children who are in serious difficulty. The latter are now filed away alphabetically with casual offenders. Their records grow longer and longer. One after another the social workers take a turn, and finally give up and close the case. The police never really close their case. All the people who have struggled to help the particular child never or only rarely get together to compare notes, to lay out a plan, to review what they have done, or to analyze why they have failed. With the present lack of coordination, communities are doomed to repeat mistakes. If the city has no effective council of social agencies to call case consultations, this task could fall to the police. Regardless of the auspices, it should be done.

PROVIDING RECREATION IS NOT A TASK FOR POLICE

In their earnest desire to halt juvenile delinquency, many police departments have initiated recreation programs for children. Such programs are intended to do double duty by creating public good will towards police. Police do not want to be considered tough thief catchers, and the recreation program probably gives them some affirmative publicity from time to time. But as they actually work out, police recreation programs are obsessed by many delusions. A police force that does its job efficiently, courteously, and with high professional standards will receive freely all the public good will that it thus earns. It will have no need to prove that "police are human" by conducting police softball tournaments or soapbox derbies, or by teaching boxing. If the department is not doing a good job of

promoting public safety, the public will not be fooled by games with children. If it is doing a good job, it does not need the publicity.

Other departments of government should be able to conduct recreation programs better than police. Recreation is a full-time, lifetime profession with many men and women. Its techniques have no relation to the kinds of skills taught in police academies. Public recreation programs can be full of color and variety, can appeal to all ages, can make use of city-owned facilities. The know-how of an experienced, qualified recreation leader can bring into being city-wide programs almost by magic, certainly with professional ease. Such people can avoid many of the problems that arise in controlling large programs.

The inadequacy of some public and private recreation programs is cited by police as a reason for police sponsorship. Even though true, the problem is not properly solved by setting up a new, duplicating, and perhaps competing program in the police department. Recreation will always be an auxiliary function, outside the main purpose of the police task. Recreation policies are inevitably guided by higher police officers who, also inevitably, are amateurs in organized recreation.

In some communities, police collect or sponsor the collection of funds to support the recreation program. When police collect and handle such funds, public misunderstanding is certain to arise. Police are able to collect money from private sources when other privately sponsored recreation fails. The plain fact is that many people will not refuse a policeman. Even though no one intends extortion, the objective manifestations are identical. The worthiness of the cause is no excuse. Police should not collect money for any purpose, from anyone, under any circumstances.

Those who work with children who already are well along the road to delinquency and adult crime express considerable doubt as to the effectiveness of recreational programs in helping these children. Such children will not participate; or if they do, they break the place up. Many private agencies definitely do not welcome hefty and destructive adolescents. Cure through referral to a recreation center is not automatic. The child must be fitted into a suitable group and must be accepted by the group. The recreation leader has to make a special effort to help. When delinquency arises from serious personality disorders, it may be quite unreasonable to expect a child to fit in at all.

In any event, a recreation program that is founded on the negative idea of preventing trouble is founded on a distorted conception. Most children are not delinquent and never will be, even in the worst of our slum areas. The majority of children are reasonably well behaved, have a healthy interest in sports, and enjoy lawful fun. If the community provides well for these children, plenty of room will be left to handle the small minority of delinquents. It is not a part of the police job to provide recreation for all.

The positive interest of police in working with groups of children should, however, be preserved and cultivated. On an off-duty basis, away from official sponsorship, much good can be done. As in police probation work, abandonment of needed recreation programs is not suggested, but rather a transfer to other auspices.

THE JUVENILE BUREAU IS NO BETTER THAN ITS PERSONNEL

The effectiveness of the juvenile program is determined in large measure by methods of personnel selection, training, and supervision. It is not practical to pin a new title on a man or woman and

expect a qualified performance that fits the title. Nor can the police administrator rely solely on fixed educational qualifications or the results of intelligence tests to make his selection for him. Some units have tried both, and the results are not good.

Usually a basic qualification for a male juvenile officer is membership on the force. Two or three years of experience are often required. He must have proved himself a reliable officer who can be called for other duty in an emergency.

Since women cannot be recruited from within the force, other qualifications are needed. The day of the hard-boiled police matron has passed, and nothing should be allowed to recall it. Matrons are still needed, but should not be confused with women police officers. College education and some work experience are usable minimum requirements. Since women also do detective work, their adaptability for this service must be considered. Stringent physical requirements are necessary to ensure that a woman can stand the wear and tear of patrol duty. Basic training along with men recruits is essential.

Juvenile officers, both men and women, must have a genuine liking for children. This qualification is so obvious that sometimes it is overlooked. It is a quality that can be observed readily, and its absence is a categorical imperative for removal to other duty. Other personal qualifications of tact, judgment, and mental balance are required for all police work, and in equal measure in juvenile bureau work.

Training and supervision

Juvenile officers need training beyond regular police work. Some departments have developed their own training courses, some depend wholly on supervisory conferences to train, and some have sponsored the pursuit of advanced

degrees at schools of social work. Training should help to develop skillful interviewers and bring some understanding of children and the reasons why they get into trouble. Training can give the officer something to work with, tools that are more useful than monotonous warnings to be "good."

Training has to include precise information regarding the social agencies in the community and the state. In small communities this is not a great chore, but in larger cities the list of available agencies may be very long. These agencies are the tools of the trade, and the juvenile officer must know not only the avowed policies of the agencies, but also their actual working policies. The better the officer knows the agency staff, the more likely he is to receive good service.

Furthermore, the officer can develop unofficial contacts that can be useful for individual children. Some church workers can be of great help. Most areas have leading citizens who in effect act as guardians for certain children in the neighborhood. These people can be discovered if sought; it may be the postman, the keeper of a drug-store, the editor of the neighborhood newspaper, or a housewife with an exceptionally warm and understanding heart.

Despite good training, personnel will not be effective without supervision. In new units, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who may be able supervisors of regular police services can find themselves somewhat baffled by the problem of supervising a unit with functions that are not clearly defined. As a result, the atmosphere of a soft berth can develop, disguised however as a noble purpose, and trimmed with academic degrees.

The supervisor has to know what he wants. If it is patrol work, are his people patrolling, shopping, in the movies, or at home? Where do they go? Where

does he want them to go? If it is referrals, are they referring all the cases to one or two agencies? Do most of the referrals bounce back? Are decisions made, or do cases dangle? Does the staff follow his policy, or is each man and woman his own mentor? Are the records in order? What is the staff doing with children and with children's problems?

Promotion

The juvenile bureau will not be a good place to work unless some provision is made for promotion, either within the bureau or to other departments of the force. A large bureau may provide satisfactory promotion within the four corners of juvenile work. In such instances some preference should be given to those who have experience and special training in the bureau and its work. If this is not

done, the fieldworkers will always know more than the supervisors—an unwholesome situation. Small bureaus of two or three persons cannot provide such opportunities, and so promotions must be made to other branches of the force. If the bureau demands extra training and stiff standards of performance, additional salary opportunities should be part of a promotion system.

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The time has long since passed for expressions of pride in our methods of tackling the problem of delinquency. Adult crime furnishes tragic proof of the fact that what is being done is by no means the answer. Police are newcomers in the field of juvenile delinquency. They have started out in every direction at once. But they have a fresh zeal that should be welcomed; and they do not give up easily.

Jane E. Rinck, Glen Ridge, New Jersey, has been a fieldworker for the Newark Welfare Council and the Philadelphia Council of Social Agencies. While a fellow of the Institute of Public Administration (New York City), she wrote Governmental Organization in the City of New York, published by the Institute, and participated in a survey of the Cincinnati Police Department. In 1951 she was assistant director of the New York State Legislature's study of public welfare administration. As research associate with the (New York) Mayor's Committee on Management Survey, she conducted the study entitled Career and Salary Features of the New York City Police and Fire Uniformed Forces (1952).

Toward a Better Merit System

By O. W. WILSON

SOUND personnel management operates on the merit principle that to the best-qualified goes the job—not to the victor belong the spoils. The purpose of this paper is to examine the objectives of sound police-personnel administration, to catalogue policies that will assure their achievement, to review procedures that will effectively implement the policies, and to consider how their implementation may be assured. The last point is the most important, because policy statements are nothing more than the expression of pious hopes until they are placed in effect. Responsibility for their implementation, therefore, must be placed on some person or agency that can be held accountable for the results.

The success of any organization is so strongly influenced by the wisdom of its personnel policies and the effectiveness of their administration that this categorical statement may be emphatically made: *Personnel administration is the most fundamental and important task of the head of any organization.* Whenever this administrative theorem is ignored, the objective of the organization is jeopardized.

The influence of personnel administration on organization success varies in proportion to the number, the complexity, and the rarity of the virtues and qualities that are requisite to the superior performance of the tasks involved. It varies also in proportion to the need for inspiration, direction, and control of the members of the organization. For example, a ditchdigger with a strong back and a willingness to work may dig a good ditch even though he is mentally, morally, and emotionally deficient and temperamentally unsuited to

work with people. Also, he does not need great inspiration, direction, and control to perform this relatively simple task. On the other hand, work that entails dealing with people under trying circumstances, sometimes with emotionally disturbed persons in legally complicated situations, requires qualities of a much higher order, as well as a more inspired direction, detailed supervision, and effective control of the workers.

POLICE SERVICE DEPENDS ON PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

In police work the wisdom of personnel policies and the effectiveness of their implementation exert a greater influence on the quality of service and success in achieving the objective than in any other field of endeavor. The importance of personnel management in police service results from the fact that the qualities and virtues essential to successful performance of police tasks are more numerous and less frequently found combined in one individual than the essential characteristics of successful practitioners in other fields. The following paragraphs make this fact apparent.

The nature of police service imposes unusual demands on the individual policeman; he must consequently excel in intellectual, emotional, ethical, and physical qualities if he is to be successful.

Police officers deal with extremely complicated situations and often with unusually intelligent malefactors. To do so requires resourcefulness, alertness, decisiveness, knowledge, and sound judgment; these are all attributes of intelli-

gence. To assure success, all policemen must have above-average intelligence.

Police are frequently confronted with emotion-charged situations that may evoke strong responses from them. Important to success in dealing with such situations is a stability impervious to work-related or other emotional stresses and unhampered by prejudice or undesirable attitudes. Emotional stability in the officer also assures dependability and success in getting along with people under trying circumstances. His emotional qualities likewise influence his enthusiasm, will-to-do, and interest in his work.

The nature of police service affords unusual opportunities and temptations to graft, to indulge in other forms of dishonesty, immorality, and excesses, and to wreak vengeance on persons who have offended. Successful police service is predicated on the integrity, morality, and fairness of its members.

Policemen must also excel in physical qualities. Body fitness is essential to withstand the rigors of police service and to avoid early disability retirement and loss of time due to illness—both of them heavy drains on the public exchequer. Appearance is important in winning compliance with requests and orders intended to control individuals and crowds. Speed, agility, co-ordination, and strength are important assets in overtaking a fleeing culprit and in overcoming resistance. Voice, bearing, courage, and energy are all obviously important characteristics that assist in dealing with human situations.

The total personality of the policeman, composed of the above-mentioned characteristics, is also important. It will reflect his attitudes, prejudices, and feelings; it will influence his ability to get along with others, to accept responsibility and blame, to give credit, and to be sympathetic to the unfortunate

and persuasive to the recalcitrant.

The qualities essential to effective performance by subordinates are even more important characteristics for police leaders. Superiority in these traits assures the ability of officers in supervisory and command positions to win the confidence, inspire the loyalty, and maintain the enthusiastic interest of their men. It also enables these officers to delegate authority and to support their subordinates. The essence of leadership is the ability to obtain the highest quality of service that each member has the capacity to render. Under good leadership the harmonious and effective effort of all members is directed in maximum degree toward the accomplishment of the police purpose. The achievement of the police objective, therefore, clearly depends on superior qualities of leadership.

Most authorities agree that the American police have not demonstrated their full potential in crime prevention and that their services are not entirely satisfactory. Since police success is influenced so strongly by personnel management, it seems logical to blame police failures, at least partially, on improper personnel policies and on weaknesses in the implementation of good policies.

OBJECTIVE OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

The objective of personnel management in any organization is to assure maximum benefits through superior service. The goal in the administration of police personnel, then, is to assist in the accomplishment of the basic police purpose. To achieve this end, competent personnel must be recruited and prepared to perform essential tasks; they must be inspired, directed, controlled, and disciplined; and their welfare must be assured.

While the welfare of personnel is an

important and integral part of its management, this aspect of administration must not be considered more important than the fundamental objective of providing superior police service. *A philosophy of personnel administration that subordinates the basic objective of superior service to any other consideration is unsound and must be uprooted.*

POLICIES IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

In order to achieve this personnel-administration objective of superior service, personnel policies need to be clearly stated and consistently adhered to. Unfortunately, some personnel agencies concede the wisdom of the policies but fail to implement them, either because they do not know how or because they are influenced not to do so. The following policy statements are pertinent:

1. The best-qualified man—the one who excels in the previously mentioned qualities—must invariably be selected for appointment. He must be chosen without regard to residence or other extraneous consideration, and youth must be given preference. The fact that candidates have no vested right in a police job must be recognized in order to forestall deviation from this policy.

2. The best-qualified man must invariably be selected for promotion. He is the one who excels in present and potential qualities of leadership.

3. The promotion of talented leaders must be accelerated. Leadership qualities should not be wasted and stultified by years of repression in subordinate service. Seniority must be given no greater consideration in promotion than bears on the ability to lead.

4. Recruit, continuation, and special training must be provided, as well as instruction for superior officers in techniques related to their supervisory and command tasks.

5. Compliance with departmental regu-

lations and procedures must be exacted continuously and consistently from subordinates by their superiors. There must be no interference with routine disciplinary requirements.

6. The service provided by each member must be continuously evaluated by suitable criteria of performance.

7. Incompetent, indifferent, dishonest, immoral, and otherwise unqualified members must be removed from the service. Recruit training must be recognized as an instrument of appraisal to discover the unqualified appointee. Thorough appraisal must be continued during the entire probationary period; the unqualified must be dismissed before its expiration.

8. Any doubt as to qualifications for appointment, promotion, or continuation in service must be resolved in favor of the department, not in favor of the individual.

9. A disciplinary board composed of members of the department should be created to review the facts in serious offenses where the suspension, demotion, or dismissal of a member may be considered, to make further investigation when necessary, and to recommend suitable action to the chief. A disciplinary board relieves the chief of some of the onus of disciplinary action, and it also diminishes the likelihood of capricious or hasty action.

10. A grievance committee should also be created to afford a wholesome vent for the pent-up feelings of the more timid and a suitable channel for the spleen of the chronic malcontent, and to bolster sagging morale by considering complaints of members, initiating action against unsatisfactory conditions, and discovering and dealing with morale-destroying influences. Action by the committee should be taken only through the chief.

11. The welfare of the officers must be considered in terms of adequate pay

and pensions and suitable weekly, annual, sick, and other leaves of absence.

PERSONNEL-POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES

A detailed description of procedures to implement personnel policies will not be undertaken. Instead, the discussion will be restricted, for the most part, to the manner in which common failures may be avoided and to devices that will assist in the accomplishment of the purpose of the policy.

In the past, attention has been given almost exclusively to body fitness in judging the competence of a candidate to perform police duties. The importance of physical qualities is recognized, and high standards must be rigidly imposed. This additional fact, however, must also be recognized: *In police service, intellectual, emotional, and ethical qualities are more important than physical ones.*

Intellectual qualities

The intelligence of a candidate can be measured with reasonable accuracy by validated general intelligence tests. Some progressive departments have used them for more than twenty years. The superior service thus provided has clearly demonstrated the wisdom of including such devices for screening out less competent candidates.

Some jurisdictions have enacted laws that specify that police candidates may be examined only on "practical" subjects in order to prevent the use of intelligence tests. Other jurisdictions have laws that state that the candidate must be able to read and write, and some civil service agencies have interpreted them to mean that no higher educational requirement can be imposed.

Such laws and their restrictive interpretations have resulted from the influence of friends and relatives and the

pressure of persons who would be barred from police service by the use of intelligence tests. Some police and fire associations have actively campaigned against the use of such tests for the same reasons, and also because some of their members resent the fact that they themselves might have been rejected had such tests been applied.

Laws and regulations that have the effect of preventing the accurate measurement of the intelligence of a candidate for police service must be repealed. Chiefs of police must insist that the intelligence of all candidates shall be measured by validated intelligence tests or their equivalent. When an examination is used that is considered the equivalent of an intelligence test, the chief must require that its equivalence be demonstrated. The appointment of any with below-average intelligence must invariably be avoided; a higher level of performance is assured when appointment is restricted to those having an intelligence quotient of more than 112, as measured by a validated standard group general intelligence test.

In addition to the measurement of native intelligence, the intellectual attainments of the candidate should be appraised to assure a wide fund of knowledge and ability in written and verbal expression; these are especially important assets in police service. The extent of formal education is considered a simple and reasonably accurate measure of intellectual attainment. Since the majority of young people are now legally required to complete their high school education, if the better-than-average rule is to be applied, a minimum standard of some college education must be established.

Since pre-employment training is not widespread, candidates should not be tested as to their knowledge of law, police techniques and procedures, or street locations in the community.

Emotional qualities

The appraisal of the emotional qualities of candidates requires the services of a qualified psychiatrist. An adequate examination by him may reveal emotional conditions that should bar the candidate from police service. Failure to include psychiatric tests in the selection procedure raises the possibility of appointing those who are psychopathic, neurotic, paranoid, sadistic, or otherwise emotionally or temperamentally unsuited for police service. Such persons are serious liabilities; to give them guns and authority is to court disaster. Their emotional deficiencies may be manifested in the future by behavior that may range in seriousness from a mild inability to get along with others to sadistic brutality, rape, murder, and other forms of serious misconduct. Only by psychiatric examination can there be assurance that emotionally unqualified persons are excluded from police service.

Ethical and other personal qualities

Ethical qualities are evidenced by past behavior. A thorough investigation must be made of the character and the childhood and adult history of each candidate. The investigation should be conducted by the police themselves; no other agency is so well qualified to do this work. Relatives, friends, neighbors, associates, former employers and teachers, fellow workers, and fellow students should be interviewed to obtain pertinent information. The candidate's fingerprints should be submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to state bureaus of identification in each state and to the police of each community in which he has lived.

In addition to seeking information that may enable an evaluation of ethical qualities, the investigation should seek facts that may assist in an appraisal of the personality and social

adaptability of the candidate. Diligent search should be made for information relating to conduct that may indicate emotional instability, attitudes or prejudices that might interfere with successful police performance, or other undesirable emotional reactions.

Judicious appraisal must be made of the information thus obtained. The policy of resolving doubts in favor of the department should be adhered to.

The complete appraisal of the candidate requires that he be examined as to appearance, alertness, and ability to express himself verbally, his social adaptability to his interview situation, and his reason for wishing to enter the service. This evaluation must be made in a face-to-face situation, and can best be accomplished by an oral examining board. The board, however, should be restricted to an appraisal of personal qualities that cannot be evaluated in a better way; it should not undertake to appraise intellectual, emotional, ethical, and physical characteristics that may be judged more accurately by other tests. It may, however, supplement the personality and social-adaptability appraisal that is based on facts discovered by the character investigation.

Promotion

The principal weakness in selections for promotion consists of basing them almost entirely on tests of knowledge, to the neglect of more fundamental qualities of leadership. Written tests of knowledge are favored by personnel technicians and frequently by the police themselves, because these tests are objective and simple to administer and score. Their use minimizes charges of favoritism and lessens the opportunity to promote dishonestly a less informed person. The appraisal of more fundamental qualities of leadership, on the other hand, is difficult; the evaluation

is subjective, and the personalities of both the appraiser and the subordinate are likely to influence the judgment. Such evaluations are subject to charges of favoritism, and provide opportunity for unjustified advancement of undeserving persons.

The selection of persons for promotion on the basis of their knowledge to the exclusion of more fundamental qualities of leadership is evidence of lack of courage in personnel administration. In spite of difficulties and risks, selections for promotion must be based on a fair appraisal of leadership qualities; talented leaders will otherwise not be advanced to key positions.

A basic objective in personnel management should be the rapid advancement of persons possessing leadership talent into positions of ever increasing responsibility. Seniority by itself should be given no consideration; if experience has developed leadership ability, promotion should be based on it—not on the number of years of service.

Discipline

The police force must be well disciplined. This means only that its members must be required to conform to department regulations and procedures. This is a task of leadership. The ability of superior officers to win compliance from their subordinates is increased through training in supervisory techniques; the ability of the subordinate to comply is likewise affected by his own training.

Winning compliance may involve disciplinary measures in some instances. Supervisory officers should have authority, with the consent of their immediate superior, to impose punishment in the form of less desirable assignment within the command. Delinquencies that may justify more drastic disciplinary action should be referred through

approved channels to a disciplinary board which should review the facts and recommend action to the chief.

Dismissal

The removal of incompetents from police service is as important as the recruitment of the best man; while improved selection techniques lessen the likelihood of unwise appointments, the only conclusive test of a man's fitness is trial on the job. The most perfect selection procedure is subject to human error; men may be selected who will later demonstrate their incompetence while at work.

Implementation of a sound removal policy is more difficult than assuring the appointment of the best-qualified, because the appointee has now a vested interest in his job; he has assumed obligations in the purchase of uniform and equipment; he has resigned his previous position and is relying on police work to support himself and his family. Consideration must be given to the effect of his removal on his personality and on his future usefulness as a citizen. Under these circumstances, his removal cannot be undertaken lightly; to remove him capriciously would be a moral wrong.

To this moral obligation there must be added other forces that array themselves against his removal. Persons in both public and private employment promote the development of protective devices to strengthen their own security. Dismissal of anyone is considered by them to be evidence of a weakness that jeopardizes their own tenure. Their case is strengthened by the memory of the political spoils system that made impossible the development of a professional career in public service. Some citizens are of the belief that it is better to protect the incompetent in his job than to grant an authority to dismiss that may permit a return of the spoils

system. And from the point of view of a weak administrator, dismissal is an unpleasant task that is accompanied by so much protest and recrimination as to make it scarcely worth while.

Dismissal of the incompetent requires three steps: first, the discovery of the suspected incompetent; second, analysis of facts that will enable a wise decision as to his competency; and third, the act of removal. Justice to the individual as well as to the service demands that his incompetency be discovered and acted on as soon as possible; his financial obligations based on his appointment are thus cut short; he is away from more suitable employment for a shorter time; the shock to his personality is not so pronounced; and finally, police prestige is less jeopardized. These reasons urge the discovery of the incompetent during recruit training, or certainly no later than the end of his probationary period; complications that arise in later dismissals add weight to this point.

The unfitness of the policeman is quite apparent when he commits aggressive acts of brutality, steals, rapes, gets drunk in public places, or is guilty of other acts that come to public and official attention. Not so easily discovered, however, is the man who through indifference and laziness fails to perform an effective service, although by doing nothing at all he avoids being guilty of an aggressive breach of discipline. His detection rests on supervisory techniques and on a rating system and measures of accomplishment that will fairly compare the quality of his service with that of his fellow officers.

Criteria of performance should be established to identify the most and least competent. The former may be considered for promotion and special assignment; the latter for closer supervision and special instruction, and, should these measures fail to effect an improvement, for eventual dismissal.

To raise the quality of service to its highest potential requires the invariable dismissal of incompetent policemen, an action that requires moral courage not found in all administrators. This does not mean that members should be dismissed hastily, without just cause. On the contrary, it means that sound judgments must be made that are based on an expert appraisal of qualities essential to police service and of the ability of the officer to meet these requirements. Otherwise these decisions are likely to be unsound.

And finally, the dismissal must be effected. No influence must be permitted to prevent the removal of the incompetent policeman. Unfortunately, it is in this step that police administrators are most frequently thwarted. The previously mentioned influences have created such formidable machinery to protect the job security of the individual policeman, and the forces in his favor are so powerful, as to render many police chiefs well-nigh powerless to effect their purpose. Under these circumstances, who is to be held responsible for the quality of police service?

AUTHORITY FOR PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The management of personnel was once accepted as an essential part of administration. The police head, sometimes with the approval of the chief executive of the city, exercised exclusive control over the members of his organization. Authority to manage police personnel has remained the prerogative of management in some jurisdictions, while in others it has been vested in an independent civil service agency.

However, the concept that management of personnel rests exclusively in one or the other is not completely true. Under civil service the police may be given some right to train, assign, in-

struct, supervise, rate, reprimand, and initiate disciplinary action against their members. This is accomplished with the acquiescence of the members; the police chief has no real authority in his own right to require compliance. The police are usually permitted to choose from the top three on the eligible list for appointment and promotion, although in some jurisdictions they are restricted to the top man. Aside from these concessions, authority to make decisions relating to the management of personnel rests with civil service.

Before the development of modern principles of personnel and police administration, the authority of police chiefs was sometimes abused by the dismissal of members of a force at each change of political administration. The spoils system prevented the development of professional careers and superior service. Although civil service was created to prevent such unjustifiable dismissals, it had, from its inception, the authority to implement other personnel policies through the use of modern procedures and techniques.

Those interested in the improvement of police service are confronted with the question: In whom may authority to manage police personnel be placed with the greatest assurance that there will also be accountability for the effective application of wise policies and procedures? The answer involves the choice of leaving police personnel management as an integral task of administration or vesting it in civil service.

In considering the answer to this vital question, it must be recognized that the task of applying policies and procedures has two phases: first, fact gathering and comparative appraisals, and second, final decisions based on the facts.

The services of skilled and honest technicians are needed for the first; they must be able and willing to use vali-

dated techniques and procedures to accomplish their purpose. Once these facts are assembled and evaluated, wise decisions relating to them require expert police judgment. Norms must be established: what qualities are essential in police work? Decisions must be made in many doubtful cases: is the conduct or characteristic evidence of unfitness for either appointment or continuation in service? Sound judgment and wise action are also dependent on the ability to resist personal sympathy and external influences that urge compassion and favorable consideration in violation of sound policy.

In studying the question of where to place authority to manage police personnel, consideration will be restricted to the decision-making tasks, since they are obviously the more important. While many decisions must be made in the management of personnel, those relating to appointment, promotion, discipline, and dismissal are the principal ones at issue.

Proponents of civil service seem to reason that mere candidacy for a job gives the applicant a vested interest in it; that once appointed, his job security should be rigorously safeguarded; that the employing agency is likely to commit acts injurious to its members; and that public interest in superior service is more certainly met by vesting control over appointment, promotion, discipline, and dismissal in an independent agency than by leaving this power in the hands of the employing agency.

Poor results under civil service

The quality of service provided by civil service agencies varies from good to bad. Poor service may be the result of restrictions imposed by law; of unsound policies formulated by uninformed, ignorant, or misinformed board members; or of failure to use modern techniques. The following attendant

evils unduly hamper the police chief in achieving his objective.

The best-qualified man is not invariably made available for appointment or promotion. This results in part from a failure of the civil service agency to adopt suitable standards, and in part from a failure to appraise or to permit the appraisal of less easily measured intangible personal qualities such as character and personality. In their eagerness to prevent favoritism they rule out the appraisal of all qualities that are not susceptible of exact measurement. For example, the character requirement is sometimes restricted to absence of felony conviction; less serious conduct which may, nevertheless, indicate unsuitability for service is then ignored. In consequence of these failures, eligible lists are sometimes headed by men who are completely unsuited for police service or lacking in essential leadership qualities. And the police chief usually has no choice but to make appointments and promotions that he knows are unwise.

Punishment and dismissal under civil service are not undertaken in many instances where such action is desirable. This results from the unwillingness of the police chief to undertake the long-drawn-out and red-taped procedure that frequently is more nearly a trial of him than of his delinquent subordinate. When punishment is meted out, its measure is influenced by the personal background and feelings of the board members, and consequently in nearly all instances it is too lenient. Their lack of intimate knowledge of police work renders them unqualified to establish sound behavior standards for policemen. For example, it is not uncommon for civil service boards to deal more leniently with a policeman who has stolen than would the criminal court. Evil, of course, results from his return to police service, which fre-

quently happens. Civil service machinery usually serves to protect the unqualified policeman rather than to assure his removal.

Authority entails responsibility

Finally, civil service robs the police chief of his most vital tool—the management of his personnel. In this way there is violation of an important administrative principle: *every delegation of authority must be accompanied by a commensurate placing of responsibility*. Civil service boards have tremendous authority, but they are not held accountable for the use they make of it.

The public ordinarily think that the chief is responsible for the quality of police service they receive. Since the quality is so completely dependent on personnel management, the chief cannot be held responsible for shortcomings in police service unless he exercises control over his personnel. Principal responsibility for shortcomings in police service rests on civil service in communities that have placed the police under its control. The civil service board, however, would be quick to deny such responsibility.

Value and role of civil service

These remarks must not lead to the conclusion that the contributions of civil service have all been negative. Civil service has been valuable insofar as it has assured the application of superior personnel policies and procedures in backward police forces that would not otherwise have adopted them, and insofar as it has prevented the operation of the spoils system in departments that otherwise would have dismissed members capriciously.

But not all departments have needed civil service to attain these same ends. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Detroit Police Department operate without civil service,

as do other leading police forces. These forces have demonstrated by the superiority of their service that they are competent to manage their own personnel. Their personnel policies and procedures are considered in some respects and on general balance to be superior to the best under civil service.

The management of his personnel must be vested in the chief of police so that he may be empowered to improve the quality of police service and be held responsible for police failures and shortcomings. The competent professional police chief may be safely entrusted with this essential authority; he understands the relationship between superior

service and wise personnel management.

In order to forestall abuse by an incompetent chief, civil service should serve as an auditing agency to assure that superior policies and procedures are adopted and that disciplinary power is not used capriciously. Its authority, however, should be restricted to informing the public and the chief's superior of any failure to apply sound and progressive personnel policies and procedures, and of any unwise disciplinary acts. Civil service should also be given the responsibility to demand that the appointing authority remove a chief of police who clearly thus demonstrates his incompetence.

O. W. Wilson, Berkeley, California, is dean of the School of Criminology, University of California. He has been chief of police in two cities, has conducted a number of police surveys, was a colonel in the corps of military police during World War II, and is author of three books on police administration.

Operation of a Police Merit System

By ROBERT A. LOTHIAN

IN many American cities, large and small, the recruitment and discipline of police is conducted by local or state civil service commissions. Placing responsibility for such important personnel activities apart from the police force directly concerned creates serious problems not only for internal relationships within the department but also in the quality of the police service rendered to the community. The inconsistency in having a law enforcement agency that is responsible for protecting the lives and property of persons within a specific area but is not responsible for the selection and complete control of its personnel has become so apparent that police leaders are demanding that steps be taken to give them administrative control over police personnel policies.

That police departments are capable of performing their own personnel functions has been demonstrated repeatedly. The manner in which such a merit system functions is illustrated by the procedures adopted by the Detroit Police Department. Until the present system was set up, its personnel practices had fluctuated greatly from year to year. But beginning with 1939 a marked improvement occurred, which since has been enlarged from time to time.

In the spring of 1941 a new charter amendment was submitted to and approved by the voters of Detroit. The procedures for recruiting and promotion established during the two years immediately preceding were continued and fortified. The major difference is that complete control for the personnel activities—recruiting, promotion, and retirement—is now vested in the police commissioner. An appeal board, com-

posed of the deputy commissioner of police, the president of the civil service commission, and the corporation counsel of the city, does not establish policies or procedures but does have "the right of review" over the requirements and results of any and all examinations for patrolman or policewoman on sufficient cause shown; also for promotions to and including the rank of lieutenant or its present equivalent; and "the right of review" over all retirements of police officers where it shall appear that the retirement is not made in good faith or for the good of the service. As a result of this right of review, the police commissioner must follow recognized personnel procedures which conform with the merit principle.

MINIMUM ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS

Age limits

The age limits for entrance at the present time are 21 to 27 years inclusive. There is general agreement that the minimum age level should be 21 years provided that thorough investigation is made to determine that a recruit at this comparatively young age possesses sufficient maturity to perform the difficult duties of a police officer, and further, that he is well trained and later assigned with a well-qualified and mature fellow officer for a considerable period of time under strict supervision. By thoroughly investigating an applicant's work record, school record, home environment, and reputation in the community, valuable data can be gathered with which to judge his maturity.

If the minimum age level is placed above 21 years, too long a time elapses

between the average applicant's completion of high school and the time when he becomes eligible for appointment. Police work requires men of mature years in order to assure discretion, sound judgment, and settled habits, but it appears that these can be better acquired and directed under discipline in the police service than before entering the service. Young men are much more flexible than older ones, have not yet established habits of doing things their own way, and may be molded by proper training and supervision into excellent police officers.

A low minimum age level is also an important factor in reducing turnover. Young men who have not already established themselves in a trade or occupation are less likely than others to leave the department during periods of economic prosperity. They can also be expected to fulfill their maximum work span, and during their later work years still be able to perform rigorous duties while on the job.

Establishment of a maximum age level has been the subject of much controversy. It is believed that a maximum of 27 years is desirable because, first, if an applicant has not established a life work by the time he has reached that age it is often an indication that he will never become well established in any line of work. Second, at this higher age level most candidates will have developed definite ideas of their own, and as a result will be difficult to train and discipline. Third, the relation of maximum induction age to the retirement age is important from the standpoint of the ability of the officer to perform regular duties in the later years of his career, and also to relieve the pension system.

High school education

The educational requirement is graduation from an accredited high school or

a Veteran's Diploma secured after having passed the General Education Development Test.¹ Education approximating the level of a high school graduate is an absolute necessity for the satisfactory performance of police work both in the lower and in the advanced ranks. Written examinations, which Detroit applicants are required to pass before police induction, are designed to test intelligence rather than knowledge. It is therefore necessary to establish some standard of acceptable educational attainment even though there is an absence of uniformity between different high schools and between different geographical areas.

Police officers need much of the knowledge acquired through a high school education to perform adequately the wide variety of duties. Interviews with complainants in the enforcement of traffic laws and city ordinances require a good command of the English language and clear and coherent expression. Increased reliance on information recorded in reports obviously requires ability to write in a logical, clear, and concise manner. The social attitude and outlook toward the community developed in high school courses in government, sociology, economics, civics, and history also are essential qualifications for a police officer.

With the educational opportunity available at this time, it is reasonable to assume that the average person has had a chance to attain a high school education. Except in rare cases, the very fact that a police applicant has not completed high school is an indication of his lack of initiative, ability, or personal judgment.

Residence

Nearly all civil service commissions restrict applicants to residents of the

¹ United States Armed Forces Institute, *Tests of General Education Development*,

city. Some agencies point out that this is an advantage because such applicants have a knowledge of the geography of the area; also, they are familiar with the people and will be easy to investigate. Others believe that the hometown boys are entitled to the job.

None of these contentions appear valid in light of the policy of selecting officers on a state-wide and even a nation-wide basis. Knowledge of the city in terms of the location of important buildings, transportation lines, industrial concerns, and other locations is readily acquired in the Police Academy. A personal acquaintance with people in the area is often a disadvantage because it increases the difficulty of enforcing the law in a strictly impartial and objective manner. As for the difficulty encountered in the character investigation, excellent co-operation can be secured through outstate sheriffs' departments and the state police to form the basis for a sound investigation.

For these reasons the Detroit police merit system extends eligibility to residents of the state of Michigan for one year prior to the date of examination.

Height and weight requirements

Minimum height is five feet, eight inches; minimum weight is 148 pounds. There is some disagreement as to exactly what the minimum height should be, but it is generally agreed that under no circumstances should it be less than 5'8" and preferably it should be higher. Regardless of how much change there has been in the nature of police duties in recent years, emergency situations still arise where a good big man is much more effective than a good little man. A taller man presents a better appearance in uniform and can be much more easily seen in a crowd or when direct-

ing traffic. Weight should correspond with height in accordance with the scales established by most large insurance companies. However, the police medical division should be given discretion in accepting applicants who vary from such standards because of body build and bone structure.

RECRUITING CAMPAIGNS

In recruiting efforts a complete examination announcement is developed, including the examination date and location, vacancies, subjects and weights, passing percentage, duties, and complete entrance qualifications. This form of announcement is necessary to meet statutory requirements, and it provides the department with a publicized specification of the type of applicant who is acceptable. It is somewhat comparable to a specification which would be used by the city in accepting bids from commercial concerns for paint, paper, or automobiles.

This specification is published in the official paper of the city and posted on the bulletin boards at the city hall and the police department. Some civil service agencies restrict their advertising to this type of announcement, although it is not a good method of attracting qualified applicants.

Methods which have been used with success to encourage qualified young men to apply are as follows:

1. *Local newspaper advertisements.*—Advertisements in the classified section of local newspapers have been used extensively with success, particularly during periods of unemployment. Greater success has been attained when these advertisements have been inserted on Sunday and Wednesday than on other days of the week.

2. *Local newspaper stories.*—Feature stories of local police activities, usually accompanied by a series of pictures, prove to be a successful method of de-

Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1945.

veloping interest in the police department. Short articles describe the various steps in the training of police recruits; problems which confront an officer during a typical working day; and various police activities showing the opportunity for specialists in the department, such as traffic, scientific laboratory, medical division, and photography.

3. *Radio and television programs.*—Local merchants and industrial concerns will normally co-operate in sponsoring announcements of the need for police personnel. Interviews with police officers have proved successful. Slide films showing various activities of police work have been used on television at the time of a station break.

4. *Bulletin board notices.*—Attractive notices may be placed on bulletin boards in local schools, libraries, and other public buildings. The usual examination announcement is not suitable for this type of advertising. It should be revised and only the most pertinent information included.

Other methods used with some degree of success include articles and feature stories in the smaller local community papers and in other cities throughout the state; billboard advertisements sponsored through the co-operation of local industries and business concerns; announcements over public address systems at large public gatherings; and the encouragement of members of the department to interest their friends and relatives who meet the qualifications.

To determine the effectiveness of the various methods of advertising, it is advisable at frequent intervals to have each applicant, at the time of filing his application, check the source of information which resulted in his interest in becoming a police officer.

PRELIMINARY APPLICATIONS

A continuous recruiting campaign is carried on so that applicants may apply

at any time. Written examinations are conducted every two weeks, so that there is not a long waiting period, and further, so that each group examined is small enough to be processed in a comparatively short time.

Preliminary applications are accepted daily on a form that is short and easily completed. It contains information relative to traits which are observable. This provides the basis for rejection at the initial interview. The application form usually adopted by both private and public employment is cumbersome and involved, requiring answers to numerous questions many of which are of little value at this point in the selection process. A detailed application is a necessary step and should be completed at a point in the procedure where it is definite that the information submitted will be used in arriving at a judgment of the applicant's qualifications for the position.

After determining that an applicant is basically qualified, the usual procedure in most civil service agencies is merely to inform him to make certain that he reports at the time and location for the written examination. Those who ask further questions are sometimes referred to the uninformative specification description of the job classification. This is contrary to good personnel practice. Applicants are entitled at this time to be informed as to the type of examinations which they will be required to pass, the successive steps in the selection process, the amount of time for completion, and a detailed description of the duties and working conditions. A pamphlet should be made available to them at this point covering all these factors.

WRITTEN EXAMINATIONS

The principal difficulty in selecting a test or battery of tests to select candi-

dates who will be likely to succeed in police work is that as yet no reliable criterion has been found to measure success on the job. It is not very difficult to cite the desirable traits which a good officer should possess, but it is difficult to measure such traits. This arises principally from the fact that success in police work results from many intangible factors, some of which are the exercise of good judgment; clear decision in extreme emergencies; the influence of physical presence and personal effectiveness in preventing crime; initiative; and courtesy.

Few types of police work are readily susceptible to any type of quantitative measurement. A recent study shows that there is little correlation between success on induction examinations and the number of meritorious awards or demerits. Likewise there appears to be little relationship between turnover and results on induction examinations.

In default of a more scientific reason, the induction examination is chosen for the purpose of determining whether candidates who have a high school education possess sufficient mental capacity and alertness to absorb the material which is disseminated in police training classes and later to carry out the required duties.

The written examinations now used consist of a battery of tests which include a recognized standard intelligence test and at least four other sections developed by the Detroit Police Department. One of eight alternative intelligence tests is used, along with at least four sections chosen from the following subjects:

1. Reading Ability
2. Observation—Crime Scene
3. Memory for Names and Faces
4. Report Writing
5. Memory for Oral Selection
6. Memory for Reading Selection
7. Understanding Written Directions

8. Understanding Oral Directions
9. Arithmetical Reasoning
10. Spelling
11. Vocabulary

By using one of the intelligence tests along with any four of the above eleven supplementary sections, an applicant who takes the examination on different occasions is always confronted by a different battery. It has been found that persons interested in securing employment in the public service will make every effort to prepare themselves for the written examination. They study intelligence tests that are available in most public libraries, they confer with other applicants who have taken the examination, and in some instances they enroll in correspondence courses to assist them in passing.

All examinations consist of short-answer questions that are adaptable for scoring on International Business Machine answer sheets. Complete anonymity is maintained throughout the scoring process, as each paper is identified by number only. Each section is weighted individually and statistical methods used so that the distribution of the scores does not affect the assigned weights. A passing mark is established on each examination on the basis of an intelligence quotient of 100 on the standardized intelligence test, and acceptable scores, based on past experience, on the other sections of the battery.

PHYSICAL AGILITY TEST

Police work demands men who possess not only intelligence and good health but also physical agility and coordination. In some agencies it is assumed that if applicants meet specific height and weight requirements and pass a medical examination, they are physically qualified to perform the duties of a police officer. This is an

erroneous assumption. Because police work does require physical agility and co-ordination, it should be measured on some phase of the recruiting process on a qualifying and not a competitive basis.

The present standards in the Detroit Police Department are rope climb 6 feet, 6 pull-ups, 12 push-ups, and a broad jump of 6'6". These standards were developed after experimenting with a wide variety of physical tests used in various jurisdictions. They included lifting dumbbells, rope climb, pole vault, standing broad jump, 50-yard dash, push-ups, chinning, scaling a barrier, baseball throw, and carrying weights. It was found that there was a high correlation among all the various tests, and after a process of elimination the events were reduced to the six now in use. Neither gymnasium shoes nor athletic suits are required for applicants to participate in any of these events.

No attempt has been made to score the results on this test in any other way than on a strict pass-or-fail basis. Prior to the time the physical agility test was used, every class seemed to include at least three or four candidates who lacked sufficient co-ordination and strength to perform the work given in the gymnasium. These candidates required special attention absorbing valuable time of the instructors. In some instances there was a undesirable effect on the incompetent individual, in that he was made a scapegoat not only in the gymnasium but in the classroom also. Considerable improvement has been noted since the adoption of this test.

MEDICAL EXAMINATION

A thorough medical examination is conducted by the regular physicians assigned to the police medical division, for candidates who have passed the written and physical agility tests. Some cities conduct a medical examination

before the written test. This is entirely the wrong sequence, because the paper-and-pencil test is by far the most simple and economical filter to eliminate unqualified candidates.

Responsibility for the medical examination should be that of the doctors of the police medical division. This places the responsibility for selecting physically qualified candidates in the hands of the same doctors who are responsible for the physical welfare of all members of the department. Greater care is therefore exercised in the initial examination.

The experience gained by regular police doctors in observing physical ailments which result in light duty assignments or retirement has proved invaluable in determining candidates who are definite physical risks. The medical phase of the selection process is designed to obtain recruits who possess physical qualifications necessary to withstand the rigors of police routine over a period of at least twenty-five years. Police work places a severe strain on an individual. Changing shifts, irregular sleeping habits, and absence of physical exercise have a tendency to break down men much more rapidly than other types of employment.

To make certain that all recruits are examined under the same uniform standards, a complete specification of physical requirements should be developed.

Too much cannot be said for the necessity for maintaining rigid medical induction standards. In 1948 a study was completed by Dr. Wilfred C. Wood covering the experience of the Detroit Police Medical Division in examining recruits over the previous seventeen-year period. A comparison was made between the period 1920-30 when officers were selected in a haphazard manner and the period 1930-48 when rigid physical standards were maintained. This study showed:

1. During the period 1920-30, 42 per cent of the officers appointed either quit or were dismissed, and 5.6 per cent died. During the period 1930-48, only 13 per cent quit or were dismissed, and 1 per cent died.

2. Of the group selected in 1920-30, 479 officers were retired on a disability pension, whereas in the 1930-48 period, only 19 were retired because of disability. Of these 19, 12 were retired for service-connected injuries over which the Medical Division had no control, leaving only 7 retired on non-service-connected disability.

3. The average number of days per man lost because of sick leave each year is only 4.3.

CHARACTER INVESTIGATION

An important phase of the selection process consists of a thorough investigation, by trained personnel, of the character, the work and academic record, the home environment, and the personal habits of applicants. The objective is to forecast the future success of each applicant by evaluating his conduct in the past.

Some departments and agencies conduct these investigations in a casual and ineffective manner. Some conduct the major portion by telephone, and others assign the task to the precinct commander nearest the applicant's home for investigation by ranking officers who very often are not competent to perform the duty.

This function should be entrusted only to fully qualified and trained investigators who possess such desirable traits as aggressiveness, initiative, intelligence, and pleasing appearance. The mere selection of investigating officers who are well qualified is not sufficient to ensure good investigations. They must be thoroughly trained in the techniques of investigation.

In order that the facts obtained through the investigation may be recorded in an orderly manner, printed forms are provided to cover the findings concerning residence, education, work record, personal conduct, social status, financial standing, references, and military service.

In the investigation of residence, it is advisable to check all the places the applicant has lived for at least the past ten years. If the applicant is renting, a check is made with his landlord to determine how much rent he pays, whether he pays his rent regularly, and the condition in which he keeps the property. If he is buying, a check is made as to the general condition of the home, the amount of his monthly payments, and whether he meets those payments regularly. Particular attention is directed toward observing the cleanliness and manner in which the home is maintained. The presence or absence of a congenial atmosphere, the furnishings, the applicant's attitude toward his wife, children, or parents, all are important factors.

In investigating the applicant's scholastic record, a personal call is made to the grade school, the high school, and the college, if necessary. The principal, the counselor, and in some instances individual teachers are contacted. The record of scholastic credits and dates of completion of specific grades are necessary but not so important as information concerning his conduct, citizenship, attitudes, and punctuality. Information should be gathered as to the degree of his participation in extracurricular activities, his ability to get along with other students, and his qualities of leadership.

Every place where the applicant has worked should be described in chronological order, including type of employment, salary, nature of duties, and recommendations. If there is any reason

to believe that the records of the employer are inadequate, the immediate supervisor should be contacted if possible. If there is any question as to the applicant's birth date or education, these can be cross checked by closely examining the records at each place of employment.

Personal conduct and home life

The section covering personal conduct is included so that the investigator does not omit facts which are merely routine. These include a check of the applicant's criminal record and traffic record, verification of birth certification, marriage license, registration for selective service, and clubs or organizations of which he is a member.

The section covering social status is designed to determine whether or not the candidate has a well-adjusted home life. The duties and working conditions of a police officer are explained to the wife or parents to learn their attitude toward the applicant's becoming a member of the department. Insight into the applicant's character and personal habits can be gained by observing conditions in the home. Information is also secured about the applicant's mother, father, brothers, and sisters. It is of value to know where they live; where they work, if employed; their police record; and history of any unusual diseases or serious illnesses.

It is imperative definitely to establish that a police officer is able to maintain a reasonably high standard of living on the salary he receives from the department. He must be able to withstand constant pressure from persons or groups who profit by operating outside the law. The manner in which an applicant has managed his financial affairs in the past is an indication of what he might be expected to do in the future on a police officer's salary. It is because of these

factors that the applicant's financial status must be completely analyzed.

Each applicant is asked to furnish the names of six persons as character references. These reference forms should be delivered personally by the investigator and an attempt made to explain the importance of the request. More significance should be attached to confidential reports by references not given by the applicant, including businessmen near the applicant's home, fellow workers, neighbors, and landlords.

MEASURING RESULTS

The question may well be asked, Does the present system of recruiting and promotion of personnel for and within the department result in the selection of better-qualified officers? By utilizing every effort to attract qualified applicants—the preliminary sifting to eliminate the obviously unfit, the filtering of the remainder through written and medical examinations, physical agility test, character investigation, and oral interview—it would appear that better police officers would be selected.

To arrive at a definite conclusion, criteria for measuring success on the job have to be developed. Unfortunately this has proved to be a very difficult and discouraging task. Criteria which have been studied for possible use in correlation with induction and promotional examinations are as follows:

1. *Number of merits or demerits.*—It would appear that the officer who had accumulated a large number of merits for performing outstanding police work and had received no demerits for the infraction of departmental rules and regulations would be a superior type officer. This is not always the case. The ability to accumulate merits is often due to the opportunity made available for an officer to perform police work. Throughout the years there has not been a

uniform policy for the issuance of merits or demerits. The reluctance on the part of superior officers toward accepting requests for meritorious awards also fluctuates.

2. *Work record.*—This criterion is not adaptable to police work because the opportunity for creating a quantitative record on arrest, ordinance complaints, court cases, and other phases is not equally available to every officer. Oftentimes the efficiency is more correctly measured by the absence of what might appear to be an outstanding record.

3. *Tenure.*—The fact that an officer remains with the department for a long period of time would seem to imply that he was capable. The reluctance of disciplinary boards to discharge men except for major offenses, the failure to enforce disciplinary action for incompetency, the desire of officers to serve twenty-five years to collect their pension, and the absence of methods to measure efficiency, all contribute to discounting longevity of service as a criterion of efficiency.

4. *Service ratings.*—Service ratings have not as yet been developed to a point where they can be used as a measure of efficiency.

Indications of success

The following may be cited purely from a subjective viewpoint as being indicative of the success of the Police Merit System.

(a) *Appeal board activities.*—Even though every recruit who is rejected for appointment and every officer who is unsuccessful in securing a position on an eligible register for promotion knows that he may take his case to the appeal board, only five cases have been heard by this board since 1941. In 1945 there was one appeal on a service rating for promotion and another on the results of an oral interview, and in both instances

the appeal was denied. In 1947 there was one on a written examination and one on service rating. The latter was upheld. In 1949 one applicant appealed on the ground that he was discriminated against in the minimum qualifications established for a promotional examination. This also was denied. There never has been an appeal of any phase of the recruiting process. The convening of the appeal board on so few occasions would indicate that police commissioners and other personnel who are charged with administering this system have followed accepted merit principles.

(b) *Newspaper support.*—There has been practically no newspaper criticism of the methods used in selecting and promoting police officers. Instead, the newspapers have given complete co-operation in assisting the recruiting program and in defending the methods of promotion.

(c) *Co-operation of members of the community.*—The success of the traffic enforcement program and the Crime Prevention Bureau has been due to a large extent to the co-operation received from business and industry in this community. The caliber of the officers heading these programs has had a great deal to do with their success. The phenomenal success of the Police Field Day, which is conducted to provide funds for insurance, also is indicative that the department has excellent public support. In 1941 the people were asked to vote on a more liberal pension system for police. It was approved by a two-thirds majority.

(d) *Absence of political influence.*—Politicians have learned that because of the rigid charter requirements and the methods followed in administering the system, the police department is not the place to exert any political influence. Not only do politicians refrain from making requests, but also recruits and

candidates for promotion have learned that it is to their disadvantage rather than advantage to seek outside political influence.

(e) *Support by departmental organizations.*—There are two organizations within the department, one the patrolmen's association and the other the sergeants' and lieutenants' organization. Neither of these organizations is affiliated with any union. On occasions when the merit system has been criticized,

both of these organizations have come to its support.

(f) *Interest of other police officials.*—The department has frequent visitors from other police agencies both in this and foreign countries. All have shown a marked interest in the personnel practices followed. For example, the Detroit service rating system now being used in one of the largest cities in Japan is a result of a study made by representatives from that country.

Robert A. Lothian, Detroit, Michigan, is personnel examiner for the Detroit Police Department. He has been in charge of the recruiting and promotion of police officers in Detroit since 1941. He formerly served as a high school teacher in government and history at Port Huron and Yale high schools in Michigan.

The Police Cadet

By ROBERT S. SEARES

THE police service has long been at a disadvantage in competing for the services of able and ambitious young men at the time they first become available for regular career employment. For many, this is at 18 or 19 years of age, while the police minimum is about 21. As a result, many excellent police prospects are lost because they go into business or industry and become so well adjusted there that they are not inclined to start over again at the bottom of the police ladder. Too often those who do come seeking the permanency and the security of police service at a much later date are the misfits and rejects who find it difficult to adjust to any employment situation. The elimination of this type of person, both before and after appointment, is a costly and often painful process.

The police cadet plan, now well established in England, has attracted the attention of American police administrators as a possible solution. The plan has been introduced in at least one large city, Milwaukee, and is under serious consideration in several others, including Detroit and New York.

HOW THE PLAN WORKS

The plan is simple and is susceptible of many variations. In essence it provides for a new classification known as "cadet," or "aide," which is below the rank of patrolman. This position is open to young men who, except for age, appear to meet the basic requirements for appointment to the force. Cadets do not have police authority. They are assigned to duties normally performed by non-sworn employees. Assignments are rotated in order that the cadets may

learn through experience and in order that their performance in various work situations may be evaluated. Through in-service training, both on duty and off duty, they are prepared for their ultimate police responsibilities. Finally, upon completion of the prescribed period of time in cadet status and upon reaching the police minimum entrance age, they are considered for appointment to police rank.

The plan does not guarantee that every cadet will become a policeman. Only those cadets who give indication of probable success in police status are retained. Neither does the plan contemplate that all future police appointments shall be made from the cadet ranks. It is doubtful that any plan can or should attempt to supply enough candidates to supplant general recruiting. Any such narrow approach would exclude good prospects who in their mid-twenties decide to seek admittance to the police service, and would discourage many high school graduates from continuing on to college in preparation for a police career. But police cadets can provide a new and valuable source for improved police recruiting that seeks its candidates wherever they may be found.

ENGLISH EXPERIENCE

The police cadet idea appears to have originated quietly in England about 1935. It appeared first in Lincolnshire and has since extended to many other departments, including the Metropolitan Police of London. The most ambitious undertaking, however, is that of Liverpool, where approximately forty cadets are continuously in training. The West

Riding (Yorkshire) force has enrolled female cadets who are in training for appointment as policewomen.

Under the British educational system, a natural breaking point occurs at about 16 years of age. Also, all youths must enter military service at the age of 18½. In England, therefore, police cadets usually are recruited at 16 to 17 years of age and serve until the time comes for entry into military service. Upon completion of their obligations under the National Service Act, they are considered for appointment to the regular force.

In Liverpool the training of cadets is divided into three parts.¹ Part I, "The Initial Training Course," consists of four weeks of full-time classroom work. The aims of the course are

to fit the cadets as far as possible, for the actual work they will be required to perform, to give the cadets a thorough appreciation of the Police Service, and to encourage at all times a high standard of conduct in all possible respects so that the characters of the cadets may be properly developed towards ideals of good citizenship and good policing.

Part II, "Subsequent Training at the School," and Part III, "Duties in Divisions and Departments," take place simultaneously. Cadets continue to take additional classroom work two days each week, but the remainder of the week is spent in the performance of actual duties in the various divisions and departments of the force. Cadets are rotated every few weeks so that by the end of twelve months each will have had experience in almost every branch. If at the end of one year a cadet is still below military age, he may be permitted to start around the cycle again until called into the military service.

The extent to which the cadet plan has been accepted in England and the

¹ *Liverpool City Police Cadet Corps, Conditions of Service and Scheme of Training*, Central Police Office, Liverpool, 1949.

official attitude towards it are reflected in the following excerpt from the 1951 report of the Inspectors of Constabulary:

The number of cadets employed in the county, city and borough forces in 1950 was 1,021 and by the end of the inspection year this number had increased to 1,201. Since the end of September, 1950, this system has been introduced into 11 more forces but there are still eight county and 27 borough forces which do not offer employment to suitable youths in this capacity. In these forces which have made a success of this scheme, we have noted how much has been done in the past year to institute sound programmes of training and to vary the duties on which these lads are employed. While these youthful aspirants to a police career do much useful work in the different branches of the force and thus relieve police officers of a variety of routine tasks, their interests are encouraged and fostered by these methods and they are given a first rate grounding in the principles and high ideals of policing. As a long-term aid to recruiting, this scheme has a very distinct value as has been proved by those forces who were pioneers in its inception.²

NEED FOR THE PLAN

The need in the United States for the police to seek out and make a place for promising young men before they are snapped up by business and industry was expressed by Bruce Smith in the 1941 *Baltimore Police Survey*. His suggestion that Baltimore consider some kind of pre-service or cadet training appears to be the first proposal of the cadet idea in this country. In support of the idea he said:

If the young men the department can and should recruit do not become eligible for appointment until they become 23 or 25 years, they will find other jobs after completing their educations and succeed so well that neither the police service nor any other

² *Report of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary* (London, 1951), p. 8.

radical change in employment will divert them. The only chance the police department will enjoy really to have a fair choice among the more promising members of the rising generation, will consist in reaching them before they are securely settled into other work.³

Eleven years later Mr. Smith included the police cadet plan as a major recommendation in the *New York Police Survey*. In this report he says:

Youths of quite extraordinary qualities leave promising careers of many kinds to join the police force. But not enough of them are impelled by such urgent preferences. If more men of high intelligence and sanguine temperament really are to fill the blue ranks they must be sought at the high school age; employed for some time at police tasks not requiring law enforcement authority; schooled, guided, coached, transferred, and rigorously screened by special supervisors until the best of them can finally be offered as preferred candidates for appointment as probationary patrolmen.⁴

PLANS OF SOME CITIES

The Milwaukee Police Department, under the direction of Chief John W. Polcyn, introduced in 1952 "The Police Aide Program." Twelve outstanding young men were recruited from local high schools and appointed as police aides on July 1, 1952. They attended the Vocational High School for instruction in typing and shorthand four hours per day at city expense and spent four hours per day in the various districts, offices, and bureaus of the department. In this way they became familiar with the functions and administration of all branches and units of the organization.

³ Bruce Smith, *Baltimore Police Survey* (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1941), pp. 63-64.

⁴ Bruce Smith, *New York Police Survey* (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1952), p. 2.

On May 1, 1953 they were assigned to full-time, permanent duties in clerical capacities where they will remain until they are 21 years of age. If their services have been satisfactory up to that time, they will be appointed as patrolmen.

Chief Polcyn has expressed great satisfaction with the success of the plan so far, and it is his belief that it can be used advantageously by police departments of all sizes, particularly by the larger departments. In a letter to the author, he writes:

It is my firm belief that we in Milwaukee are on the right track. This program indoctrinates young men with law enforcement philosophy at an early age and as a result they should develop into efficient police officers and eventually some will reach the top as efficient police administrators.

Kansas City is definitely interested and has undertaken the preliminary steps towards the introduction of a program similar to that adopted in Milwaukee. An outline of the proposed program has been circularized to all high schools, and the response has been most encouraging, according to Chief of Police Bernard C. Brannon. Starting in the fall of 1953, Chief Brannon expects a considerable enrollment in courses designed to prepare students for selection. In Kansas City, as in Milwaukee, the title used is "aide" rather than cadet.

Commissioner Donald S. Leonard of the Detroit Police Department reports that the plan is being considered there. He writes that one of the methods used by his department to develop interest in police work is to participate in the career days sponsored by the high schools of the area. He says:

In this experience we have been encouraged by the interest shown by high school seniors. There evidently are many young men who would like to enter the field of law

enforcement who are greatly disappointed when they learn that the opportunity is not available to them for at least three years beyond the normal age of graduation. It seems entirely logical that we should open the door to them for a three year cadet apprenticeship and training program. Their assignments could be of a semi-routine nature, such as operating central and precinct switchboards, guarding school crossings, various types of clerical work, and driving certain police vehicles. This would enable police officials to observe and control their activities during these formative years and select those for permanent appointment who show aptitude for police work.⁵

The Pasadena Police Department, under the direction of Chief Clarence H. Morris, has under consideration a modification of the cadet plan which is advanced as a practical device for raising the educational standards of the force. In California the junior college is firmly established and provides an easy way for youths to continue their education through the fourteenth year of formal schooling. Under the Pasadena plan the co-operation of school authorities would be solicited for the purpose of encouraging promising high school graduates to go on to the junior college, where they would take a police preparatory course. This would include a thorough grounding in American history and institutions, psychology, sociology, semantics, public speaking, typing and office procedure, and certain special police courses such as history of the police service, police law, and police organization and administration. Cadets would be selected from youths who completed this course. They would serve two years in cadet status before becoming eligible for appointment to the regular force. Under this plan, it is argued, police recruits would have four years of preparation for the job, through two years of academic work and two years of on-the-job training.

⁵ Personally communicated.

DOES MILITARY SERVICE HINDER?

Besides the cities already mentioned, several others have shown an interest in the idea. Not all reactions have been favorable. In the opinion of some experienced police chiefs, there are practical objections to be overcome. The most frequently advanced objection is the inescapable fact that most youths who would be acceptable as cadets are the ones most likely to be called into military service. In England and Scotland the probability of military service has been accepted and incorporated into the plan. Youths train as cadets, then go into military service, and are considered for police appointment only after this obligation has been discharged. This is viewed as an advantage rather than a disadvantage. The 1950 *Report of His Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary* has this to say on the subject:

It is true that not all the cadets return to the police force on completion of their National Military Service, but of those who do experience shows that they are often above the average type of police recruit. Their training as police cadets, if concurrent with employment on appropriate duties, is undertaken at a comparatively early age, which is consistent with a youth in training, and the scheme has the advantage of offering a career straight from school. Looked at broadly, the training is good for any vocation, and if a few gain promotion during National Service and decide to stay in H. M. Forces, the police should not regard this as wastage, but rather as a *quid pro quo* for the services which the Armed Forces render in providing many good candidates for the police.⁶

The obstacles presented by the military service aspect, therefore, do not appear to be insurmountable. The goal is not solely to get young men into police service at an early age, but rather to attract them when they come out of

⁶ *Report of His Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary* (London, 1950), p. 9.

school and are weighing various means of making a livelihood. There is no harm in interruption of cadetship, provided the latter attracts desirable youths to police service, gives them the opportunity to acquire some knowledge of the work, and impels them to seek appointment to the force when their military tour is ended.

PREPARATION FOR POLICE DUTIES

It has been argued also that to bring young men into the police department without giving them police authority would be unwise—that since their indoctrination would not be that of policemen, they might acquire various slants on police work which would impair their future usefulness. This contention does not appear to be valid. Many present policemen began their careers as civilian clerks in police commands. They were “cadets” in a sense, without benefit of a formal cadet program. It is doubtful that they were harmed by the experience. To assume that they were would be to assert that a year or two as a gasoline station attendant, as a construction worker, or as a bus driver will better fit a man to accept and absorb the responsibilities of police work than the equivalent time within the police structure performing closely supervised work that is directly related to his future duties.

THE ENTRANCE AGE

Under the cadet plan many men would enter the police service at an earlier age than at present. Even allowing time out for military service, the recruit who came to the force from the cadet ranks would be about 21 to 23 years of age. It has been argued that few men at this age are mature enough to handle the job. This may be true in some cases. If altogether true, it would indicate that the entrance minimum for police should be raised. We have learned, however, that

mere chronological age is no guarantee of maturity. If adequate psychological screening of candidates is undertaken, the immaturity of all ages can be eliminated.

The earlier entrance age has definite advantages that should be mentioned. It extends the physically active years of the men employed and opens the way to more flexible pension arrangements which are less costly to both the policeman and the public. Even more important is the prospect for revising the whole pay structure to make police work more attractive as a true career service. If cadets were started at a moderate pay scale which carried a step-up when full police status was achieved, and then advanced by two- or three-year steps over a considerable period of time, the police service would be able to offer an important incentive to the great majority of men who for various reasons never get beyond the rank of policeman.

THE PAY INCENTIVE

The absence of incentives for men in this category is a serious problem of police administration. When we recruit men in their middle or late twenties who are heads of families, we must provide a salary that at least covers their family obligations. When step increases are provided, the time required to attain the maximum is rarely in excess of three years. As a result, many men, after reaching the maximum pay for the rank of policeman and after failing to finish high enough in competitive examinations to be considered for promotion, find themselves facing a long pay plateau leading to retirement. Some quit the service while young enough to make a change. Of the remainder, it must be admitted that a considerable number lose interest and thereafter do only what is necessary to “get by.”

Because police departments cannot yet hire in sufficient numbers men who

have been educated for the job, it must be admitted that most recruits are raw material which must be laboriously turned into police officers. Opinions differ as to how much time is required for this process, but even with accelerated training programs, it is not accomplished in a few weeks. Most experienced police officers will agree that the time must be measured in years. If this is true, then it would seem more logical to pay the apprentice an apprentice's pay and to recognize the greater worth of the master by paying him master's pay. This means lower starting pay and higher maximum pay.

Robert S. Seares, Pasadena, California, is Assistant Chief of Police in Pasadena and lecturer in police administration at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He is past president of the California Chapter of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Associates, and past president of the California Division of the International Association for Identification.

The police cadet plan, with its emphasis on youth, opens the way for the establishment of a pay plan that provides continuing incentives to those who cannot or do not care to climb the administrative ladder. But even if these considerations are disregarded, the plan stands as a device for tapping a source of manpower that is presently out of reach. If viewed not as a substitute for, but rather as supplementing, present methods of recruiting, it appears to be sound. It is simply another approach to the familiar objective, which is to select and hire the best available men for police service.

Police Training

By RAYMOND E. CLIFT *

A FEW years ago I read a remarkable book. The title of it was *Up from Slavery*, the author, Booker T. Washington. He was an emancipated slave and his work dealt with the efforts of the Negroes to educate themselves following their emancipation in 1863.

I was fascinated by this book. Its account of "improvement" among the Negroes was interesting, but Booker Washington's own ideas of "self-improvement" were even more so. He described how his colleagues plunged into the study of literature, of the arts and sciences, in an effort quickly to gain the culture of their former masters. While they were studying, however, filth, degradation, and economic want existed all around them. Booker Washington's approach was different. He believed in doing the little things first, such as fixing up his home, getting a job, and properly clothing his children. Refinements could come later.

I think of the book in the preparation of this article because the situation it describes is analagous to police development. We have suddenly come of age too—and we are going places. Thousands of us regard our work as a profession and we are out to raise ourselves by "our own bootstraps." How else can we explain the mushrooming of police schools in this country? Education means something. Few top administrators feel they can hold up their heads unless they have a diploma of some sort to show their police-training

background. All of this is relatively new.

As a veteran policeman, I am not sorry to see this development. If training raises our status in the public eye, I am all for it. As a realist in police training, however, I sometimes feel we are making a mistake in some of our procedures. Like Booker Washington's friends, we are growing in stature but we are going up too fast and in the process missing many of the fundamentals in genuine police improvement.

Consider our service as a pyramid and you will see what I mean. Our training for the most part is geared to the top level, and our pyramid is getting higher and higher. The base remains practically the same. To put it another way, police work today seems to be leaning in the direction of putting more and more smart men at the top while the little fellow on the "doing level" is sometimes neglected. It is a case of all chiefs and no Indians. I think it is high time to arrest this development and to re-examine and appraise our entire training structure.

PRE-SERVICE TRAINING FOR POLICEMEN

One of the evidences of a wrong start in the police field is in the matter of pre-service training for policemen. There is a lot of this going on in our country, both correspondence courses and actual classroom work. All of it has some small value, but it seems to be largely of the "cram" flavor and is designed almost solely to get the student on the force, that is, to squeeze him through the civil service barrier. The training is superficial. For that reason it is objectionable, just as the various law-

* The views expressed in this article are the personal opinions of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of his department or of any other organization with which he is affiliated.

review courses are objectionable to the American Bar Association.

The various college courses of instruction for young men and women hoping to enter the police field are not very different from courses mentioned above. These studies are designed to give the young man a head start in his career in law enforcement. I receive many letters from these students. They want to know what job opportunities await them on graduation from college. Many of them evidently feel they have only to present a diploma to receive a police job and then, in no time at all, they can rise right to the top. Obviously, many of them are going to be disappointed.

Courses of training differ throughout the country. I am thinking here of the police administration or police science courses designed particularly to fit young people for high police administrative posts. These courses are about as valuable in my estimation as the widely advertised correspondence courses in detective work. Also, the job opportunities are about the same. How could it be otherwise when the entrance qualifications are so low? I visited one of these schools and observed the class. In a group of twenty there was scarcely one who possessed the physical qualifications for a policeman. When appearance, stature, and general deportment are so important in today's policeman, why should any school waste the time of one not physically qualified for the job?

The type of pre-service training known as "cadet training" is quite different from the above. Here we have a procedure that seems to be pointing in the right direction. Milwaukee was the first American city to institute this kind of training, and others have adopted a modified version of it. In Los Angeles a youth who wishes to enter the police service but who is not yet old enough is advised to take certain courses of study. These are available at the Uni-

versity of Southern California and are especially arranged to equip him for police work.

The essence of "cadet training" is apprenticeship. Qualified young people planning to enter the police service are contacted early in their high school days and instructed on all matters connected with the service. Possibilities are explained to them—pay, promotion, pension, and so forth—and thereafter they aim as much of their training as possible in the police direction. When they graduate from high school, they are taken into the police department on such jobs as clerks or typists. Later, they move on to patrolman when their age allows it. Thus a promising young man who wants to be a policeman finds out all he wishes to know about the job while working as an apprentice, and graduates to patrolman through regular civil service channels after his twenty-first birthday.

It is probably a little early to evaluate the cadet training plan but it seems to be reasonably good pre-service training and the kind the public will buy. It enables the chief to hand-pick his men. For the youngster himself, coming pretrained as he is, it offers promise of a successful career in police work. I like the plan for this reason, even though in that very fact lies a danger. If a man enters a growing department, with plenty of opportunity for promotion, he is likely to be a happy and satisfied employee. But what happens if a man enters a department where numerical growth has stopped? There can be too many "brainy" men in such a department. Competent men demand continual job opportunities to keep them interested and satisfied. If the opportunities do not exist, some of them will be frustrated and become knockers and cynics in their work.

A development like this must always be considered as a possibility in police

training. If we close our eyes to it we do so at our peril. In police work there have to be a great number of men who are willing to remain on the bottom rung of the ladder and do the everyday work of patrolmen. If our recruitment and training programs ignore this requirement, we are building on an insecure foundation.

RECRUIT AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING

Recruit and in-service training programs lend themselves to wide criticism in many departments but for reasons that are quite different from the above. Here we are not plagued with problems of selection, but with problems of penetrating the complicated maze of police subjects. We have the job of training men in every facet of police work and of doing it in a limited time. Courses vary in length from a few weeks to a few months but, in any case, are regrettably short. Recruit schools are especially guilty of inefficiency in "pouring it on" the young officers. If this were the kind of instruction that did not rub off, we might praise it highly. But it does rub off. Consequently, while the curriculum and method of training in many recruit schools expose the student to a vast amount of knowledge, it also often serves utterly to confuse him. He gains his real learning from a few weeks of experience and observation in the field under the able tutelage of a fellow officer.

This is not to say that all present-day recruit training is inferior. On the contrary, some recruit schools I have visited have very good training programs and teaching techniques. Some of the best I have seen, however, were in England and Germany. At the London Police College in 1952, I was most impressed by the care and thoroughness of the British in their training of young constables. The number of subjects in their

curriculum was held to a minimum; also the number of students in each class was kept small. With only fifteen or twenty men to instruct, individual attention kept the performance of each class at an even level.

The situation at the Kiel Police School, in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany, was much the same as in London. The German classes were somewhat larger, but here, too, the number of subjects was held to a minimum with considerable attention given to each student. As in London, the Germans made great use of visual aids in their training schools. This contrasts sharply with American schools which seem to rely so much upon unrelieved lectures in the training process.

In-service training in many police departments is much like that of recruit training. The big fault here is the total absence of such training in many agencies or, in others, the failure to fit the training to the needs of the department. When central training is conducted, the variety of subjects is often more than the mind can absorb. Sometimes the courses are merely a rehash of things learned earlier. Moreover, they are not "dressed up" as they need to be for experienced men. These fellows have been in the field and know all the answers—so they believe. If an instructor is to hold their attention at all, he has to have a new and refreshing approach to his subject.

Recruit and in-service training programs can stand considerable refurbishing from time to time. Such revised programs are necessary as a department grows. As methods and procedures change over the years, the personnel must constantly be told about them. If the instruction is carefully prepared and is disseminated from the central training unit, supplementary instruction at the roll-call and performance level is made much easier.

ADVANCED IN-SERVICE TRAINING

Probably the most encouraging thing in the whole field of police training today is the continued operation and growth of advanced in-service training schools. The Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy and the Northwestern University Traffic Institute are perhaps the best known of these schools. The Southern Police Institute is also attracting attention, not to mention the various schools in the East and the far West. Each of these institutes does a tremendous job in breaking the ice in police training matters and in developing qualified police teachers. The weight of their work will undoubtedly be felt more as improved police training programs come into existence.

The one grave weakness of these advanced schools is that they do not always select the best-qualified person in a department to be trained. Office pets creep into the program. This may be a fault of the police system itself and not of the schools but, wherever the blame lies, there is no question that many police officers spend time in police institutes who should never be there. These men may return to their departments as experts in one field or another, but the truth of it is that not more than 50 per cent of them do anything about disseminating their knowledge.

Of course, even though a man does not return to a training capacity, the money his department has invested in his training is not wholly wasted. He himself has learned to do the job better and, though he does not pass this information along, his department is still better off. It is only when a man goes away to school at the expense of his department, learns about his chosen calling, returns to his department, but shortly afterwards resigns to go into a different profession, that his chief can properly complain.

Such things do occur now and then, but they are exceptional rather than routine. By and large the advanced in-service training schools are doing a fine job and promise nothing but good for the future.

CLASSROOM VERSUS ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

We come now to what I believe is the crux of the whole training question, namely, where are we going to train our policemen? It is a common misconception, I believe, to assume that all training takes place in the classroom. Many chiefs will say they do no training in their departments, as they lack the necessary facilities. Yet as they themselves will acknowledge after a little thought, they carry on training all the time although it is largely of the on-the-job type.

As I shall show later, on-the-job instruction is really the best kind. However, I do know that some types of training are effectively given in the classroom. Matters of policy or matters of general knowledge can best be disseminated to a group of people. It is more economical that way. Moreover, there is no necessity to be ornate in this type of instruction. The greatest Teacher who ever lived did not have ornate surroundings or a lot of fancy gadgets in getting His message across; nevertheless He did a pretty fair job of it. It is the same way in police work. We do not require a lot of paraphernalia in getting across our fundamental messages in police work.

I must admit that certain procedures in teaching are much better than others. Likewise, the schools that are able to employ the various training devices and teaching aids do a better job than those without such aids. It is said that a man learns best by doing, next best by seeing someone else do it, and least well by hearing a person tell how to do it.

Police work, of course, does not lend itself to demonstrations all the time, save in firearms work, arrest procedures, and so forth. When it does, a man ought to go through the training—step by step. If he cannot do this himself he ought at least to see someone else do it.

Central training units, equipped to teach as I have indicated, can do a very creditable job in training. When such provisions are not made and the training effort is allowed to deteriorate to the straight lecture method, there is no question that the training effort suffers.

The fact that many police schools have relied on the lecture method of teaching is one of the reasons the whole field of police training ought to be reappraised today. It has not been responsive to our greatest training need.

ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

The police training that in my judgment is most effective is on-the-job training. This is essentially a matter of supervision, but I think it represents one of the grave weaknesses in our service today. Sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who have not seen in their job the dual responsibility of discharging their administrative tasks and at the same time developing their subordinates have missed a golden opportunity for the greatest kind of training.

No man operates at top efficiency. Even when he is carefully supervised, the average man will not function much above 75 per cent of his capacity, just because it is natural for all of us to be a bit lazy. This fact adds emphasis to the work of the supervisor. When he, knowing that the subordinate is not doing his best, puts his stamp of approval on a job, he carelessly establishes a standard of performance below that of which the subordinate is capable.

Let us take an example. Suppose a patrolman has been sent to investigate

a breaking and entering. He comes in with a report, but the report is defective in several particulars and the supervisor does not take the time to instruct the patrolman properly in how to make out the report. Moreover, he doesn't require the patrolman himself to revise the report, but does it for him. Here again, the supervisor puts his approval on an inferior grade of work. In addition to letting a training opportunity slip by him, he has actually rendered a disservice to the patrolman by doing his work for him. On-the-job instruction can come in here and do the work better than it could be done in the classroom.

On-the-job training is the secret of really good police development, and it is a job that falls largely on the shoulders of the immediate supervisor. The supervisor has to know enough about human nature and, in particular, about the man he supervises, to be able to judge how he can be developed into a good trained employee. Then he has to inspire him to develop in that direction. The gist of that is "leadership" but there ought not be any dearth of that in police circles today. The kind of schools we have been talking about in the preceding paragraphs have developed our police leaders, and it is now their job to use their knowledge in the direct improvement of their subordinates.

If a patrolman, through able supervision by a sergeant or lieutenant, can see the importance of what he is learning, he can more easily be induced to exert himself in the learning process. Things make sense to him then. A warrant becomes not just a piece of paper but a legal writ of considerable importance upon which the whole structure of justice might, at a given moment, depend. People grow and develop in this kind of atmosphere, and it is the job of the supervisor to see that these stimuli and inducements exist.

There are times, however, when a supervisor ought not to rock the boat. By this I mean that some men simply are not capable of great development, regardless of the training technique employed, and in such cases the supervisor should not try to achieve the impossible. A traffic man, for example, might be a whiz of an officer in directing pedestrians and motorists in a congested area, and yet be a total loss in detective headquarters. The same thing can be said of a man not especially handy in the use of his gun. One should not give up altogether with such a person, since firearms training is necessary; yet, on the other hand, it is a waste of time and money to go on trying to make a pistol expert out of him. The detection of ways in which a man can develop into a better employee is the function of the supervisor. It is an important knack in training and it is also good supervision.

CONCLUSION

From what I have said, it can be seen that I place great reliance on police training. There is much of it going on in police circles today and I believe in it. In none of the training I have discussed can I see any grave weaknesses—save that I am afraid not all of it is responsive to our needs. Pre-

Captain Raymond E. Clift is superintendent of the Police Academy in Cincinnati, Ohio, and secretary of the Hamilton County Police Association. As a member of the bar in Ohio, he has been active in many training schools in his home community, teaching chiefly legal subjects. In 1952 he visited England, Germany, and France to study police organizations in those countries. He has written several pamphlets on the subject of police training.

service, recruit, in-service, advanced in-service training—all these types are, I believe, just a little afield of our need today. They are making smart policemen out of a few of us. In that sense we are growing in stature, but I wonder if we are not neglecting a number of little tasks in the process.

Recall again our simile of the pyramid. It seems to me we are building our pyramid of training higher and higher, with more and more smart men at the top, while the thing we really need to do is to widen our base. It is the obscure man on the beat who determines the acceptance or rejection of the police service, not the man at the top. Therefore, it seems to me, in police training today we must exert ourselves to the limit in developing our subordinates. This, in the final analysis, is the supervisor's job on the lowest level of execution. It means on-the-job training—careful supervision and leadership. Actually, if we in the police service today could develop really good supervisors, we could dispense entirely with other kinds of training. For in the last analysis it is the supervisor who determines the level of performance. If he sets the standard high enough and so leads his men that they perform at their best, the training problem is solved.

The Policeman's Hire

By BRUCE SMITH, JR.

SUBSTANTIAL progress is being made towards a professional police service. A growing recognition by states, counties, and municipalities that capable men should be adequately paid is aiding the trend. Liberal pension programs, progressive pay plans, a shorter work week, fair promotion, and equal opportunities—all these help to attract men who are well adapted to the special requirements of police duty. Unfortunately legislatures and city councils have increased police salaries more readily than they have raised recruitment standards. In consequence, the taxpayer has seldom received the full benefit of costly salary increases and has thus become apathetic toward efforts to raise the level still further.

Reluctance of appropriating bodies to formulate a coherent pay plan also has restricted the public benefits of increased salaries. "Across the board" pay raises prove to be politically more attractive than the more discriminating scaled increase plan. Hence while progress toward a professional police service is being made, it is not unerring, nor does it show any large regard for cost and return.

THE SALARY BARGAIN

An almost constant increase in police salaries has been brought about by four factors: (1) the rise in living costs, (2) the need for attracting recruits of superior quality, (3) a desire to retain experienced policemen, and (4) a recognition by politicians of the city employee vote.

Although police departments show wide variations in pay, nearly all are able to recruit men in sufficient numbers

to replace losses caused by retirement or resignation. The lower-salaried departments appear in general to attract poorly educated recruits or middle-aged men who have thus far been unsuccessful in a trade or business. Applicants for appointment to the better-paid departments include both run-of-the-mill aspirants and a few of the better-educated, younger, and more promising men. Stiff recruiting standards may separate out the unpromising applicants in the better-paid departments, just as slack standards may pass them in.

The salary level that a city or state should establish is a matter of public policy. If our people desire police of superior quality a decent salary scale must be maintained. If a community or state has not the resources to support an expensive police establishment, either a lower salary scale must be adopted or operating economies must be effected so that the higher level may be achieved. In either event, if a benefit is to be derived from a high salary level for police, strict standards for recruitment and retention must be applied.

SALARY LEVELS

Salary differences as between cities are always wide. Thus it is no uncommon thing to find some large cities with maximum scales that are two-thirds higher than those prevailing in other important centers. Even the median of maximum salaries for patrolmen in the large cities runs one-third higher than in smaller places. Similar contrasts mark the averages for different parts of the country.¹ Our nation is too varied

¹ International City Managers' Association, *Municipal Year Book*, 1953, p. 415.

to permit easy generalization concerning local government policies. Hence it is clear that no single level can be considered adequate under all conditions. However, observation of police recruitment efforts suggests that desirable recruits can be attracted by a pay rate for senior patrolmen that meets the prevailing local rate for junior accountants and senior clerks. If a still higher level of recruit is sought, governments must expect to pay accordingly.

In times of business distress, low salary scales have attracted young men with degrees in law and in the arts and sciences. Accordingly communities and states which cannot afford a high salary level may still be able to recruit capable policemen during periods of economic depression. The retention of men so recruited later becomes a problem which may be solved through a variety of personnel practices.

SALARIES AND INFLATION

Salary studies demonstrate the relatively conservative movement of government salary scales as compared to the cost of living.² Police officers are quite cognizant of this fact, as they are also familiar with the advantages to them of a return to deflationary conditions. Police belief that the purchasing power of their pay-check dollars will soon increase has served somewhat as a steadying influence upon police turnover and police retirement. In any case, police salaries should not be too closely geared to an upward spiral in living costs, unless police are prepared to accept later adjustments when the inevitable reaction sets in. Reasonable though this position is, it can be fraught with grave difficulties if governments restrain police from joining police unions, and then neglect their

² U. S. Department of Labor, *Salaries of Firemen and Policemen: A Quarter Century Review* (1952), p. 1.

most pressing requirements in times of soaring prices. For if the salary bargain is to be fairly reached, it must be approached with a full recognition by both sides of the various equities that are involved.

FLAT RATES VERSUS PAY RANGES

Two general patterns of compensation apply to the police grades.

Traditionally a flat pay rate often prevails for patrolman, another flat rate for sergeant, a third for lieutenant, and so into the higher ranks. The flat rate system is attractive to new entrants, who are offered as much pay immediately as is allowed an experienced man. This facilitates recruiting. Departments which use the flat rate system of pay may carry a competitive advantage in securing more mature recruits if these are wanted. Flat rate pay is often higher than the minimum rate of ranged pay scales, though lower than the maximum. On the whole, the flat pay rate scheme has not been satisfactory when applied to police patrolmen.

In a more discriminating plan the patrolman may be paid a fairly low rate upon entrance to the force, possibly for the first six months or first year of membership. The pay rate thereafter may be increased annually or biennially for a period varying from two to twenty years. A few departments require a patrolman to pass a written civil service examination for promotion to the various classes of patrolman before eligibility is established for the higher pay bracket. Still other departments provide an increment such as 5 per cent every three or five years, which may be automatic or granted upon recommendation of the chief administrative officer.

Each of these possible pay range plans is intended to serve as a reward for experience and increased police service value. In addition, pay plans with a

salary range serve as an inducement for experienced policemen to remain in service, since they are better able to meet family obligations that tend to increase with mere lapse of time.

The need for pay ranges for ranks above patrolman lessens with each rise in rank. Some city and state police forces provide salary ranges through all ranks to and including that of chief or commissioner. While a patrolman with five years of police experience may be expected to be a more expert policeman than the recruit, the rank of police chief has no such correlation between years of service and competence in the job. In departments with the ranks of patrolman, sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and assistant chief and chief, probably only the first three ranks require pay ranges. Large forces have found it convenient to leave the pay of captains flexible, the rate for an individual captain being dependent upon the type of duties he performs. Assistant chiefs and chiefs (or commissioners) should be paid at a flat rate, as their rank is coincident with a position.

THE DESIRABILITY OF A WIDE PAY RANGE

No uniformity exists among police departments as to the breadth of a pay range. In major cities that have established a modern pay range plan for patrolman, a common range is about 20 or 30 per cent on the minimum pay. Since comparatively few police can expect to rise above the rank of patrolman, the pay range for patrolman should be wide—even a spread between minimum and maximum of 60 to 70 per cent may be reasonable if the entrance wage is low. A sergeant's expectation of becoming a lieutenant is comparatively good, and the pay level is comparatively high; thus a pay range of 25 to 30 per cent is sufficient. For similar

reasons the range in pay for the rank of lieutenant may be quite narrow—10 to 15 per cent.

The basis for any sound pay plan is the equitable assignment of ranks to positions. Unless each position in the department is allocated to the proper rank in accordance with the position's demands and responsibilities, a pay differential is meaningless or even harmful.

It is a general rule in industry that the supervisor should be paid at least 15 per cent more than the highest that is paid to any person supervised by him. The rule is simple to apply to a series of flat pay rates, but more difficult to apply to a plan that provides a series of pay ranges based upon years of service.

In virtually all major cities with pay ranges, the maximum pay for patrolman is lower than the minimum pay for sergeants, the maximum pay for sergeants is lower than the minimum pay for lieutenants, and the maximum pay for lieutenants lower than the minimum pay for captains. Police officers favor this common pay scheme in which the young supervisor is paid more than even a senior subordinate. Policemen contend that the hierarchy of command will be confused if a senior patrolman is paid more than his young or less experienced sergeant, or if senior sergeants are paid more than a young or less experienced lieutenant.

Though police tradition is against overlapping the pay range of the several ranks, progressive police administrators recognize its value to the service. If the broad pay ranges now so generally recognized as being advantageous to the police are adopted, and the traditional lack of pay range overlap is also adhered to, the maximum pay of a lieutenant must be at least twice that of the minimum pay for patrolman. Pay rates for captains, assistant chiefs, and chiefs then must be so much higher that they prove unac-

ceptable to city councils and state legislatures. An artificial restriction of entrance salaries is the inevitable result. Broad pay ranges without any overlapping are difficult to achieve and should not be sought in most American jurisdictions.

The military services have freely accepted the practice of overlapping pay ranges. The young Army captain with only a few years' experience is paid appreciably less than his subordinate lieutenant with twenty years of service. Yet overlapping pay ranges have not confused the hierarchy of command in the military. They have not been subversive of discipline. But overlapping pay ranges have made it possible for the military to increase each individual's pay appreciably as the years pass without a promotion. The police service also will benefit by the adoption of generously wide pay ranges, overlapping them as necessary.

THE POLICE WORK WEEK

Recent years have brought a shorter work week to most of the country's policemen. Our larger cities prove more ready to accept the 40- or 44-hour week than are the smaller cities. The median work week for cities under 100,000 population is still the traditional 48 hours, while in cities over 500,000 population the median is 44 hours.

Undoubtedly the work week reduction has been made to meet the working conditions prevalent in other professions. Yet many thoughtful police officers doubt the value of the 40-hour week to themselves. Accountants, teachers, or technicians may be able to perform as much work in a short week as in a longer one. A shortened work week may be applied to them without serious cost or inconvenience to their employers. The same is true of a few headquarters assignments that are filled by

policemen. But in every police force are patrol or operating posts, filled by policemen, which cannot be left uncovered at any time. These are the 365-days-a-year posts, the backbone of the crime suppression effort. A reduction in the hours of work requires a proportionate increase in the number of policemen assigned to everyday posts, if the police effort is to be maintained. To thoughtful policemen, the addition of extra men to the force means a lessened chance of substantial pay raises in the years ahead.

Although less than one-fourth of our cities have as yet adopted the 40-hour week for police and almost one-tenth still have duty schedules calling for more than 48 hours, the trend to shorter hours is unmistakable. Yet there are crosscurrents that cannot be ignored. In some cities patrols are required to report to their stations before going on duty, or after coming off post, or both. This lengthening of the actual hours of duty for patrols is largely or wholly offset by the much more common practice of permitting police to take their meals while on or near their posts. Some allowance must be made for such shortening of the police day when comparisons with other governmental agencies, or with commerce and industry, are attempted.

In virtually all municipal departments the standard workday is now eight hours, including a half hour or more for meals. While men assigned to intersection traffic control may have their workday set at seven hours, the scheme is by no means common.

OVERTIME DUTY AND PAY

Policemen assigned to patrol or investigative duty must expect to spend some overtime in court. A patrolman who has arrested a drunk at midnight must, in many jurisdictions, attend court

on the following day. A long court docket may force an officer to return to duty with but a few hours of sleep, and no time for his family. Since court appearances are the most frequent cause of overtime duty, various cities have searched for methods of adjusting conditions that are viewed as inequitable.

Some places have considered making a direct payment to officers for court time, either on the basis of one hour of overtime pay for two hours in court or on a flat rate basis. While the directness and simplicity of court time payments appeal to some, other police officers recognize the likelihood of a bad reaction by the public. American cities have not paid policemen for making an arrest for the past hundred years, and no official move now should weaken that tradition.

A more workable plan, and one in use in large and small cities alike, is the granting of leave time on the basis of one hour of leave for two hours in court. Other cities have a fixed schedule of time allowances to fit the average time spent in each type of court. Because its benefits are indirect, leave time for overtime in court has produced no unfavorable public reaction.

Public disturbances, riots, strikes, or major crimes occasionally require police officers to work many hours of overtime. Such extra service is generally looked upon by police as a part of their professional obligation. To balance it, most departments either formally or informally allow some compensatory time off whenever such added duties are especially extended.

Another type of overtime duty arises from the effort to make up for a recurrent shortage of personnel. Every force experiences peak demands for additional manpower. The heavy flow of traffic at 5:00 P.M., coverage of school crossings, ball games, special events, Friday or Saturday night patrol duty, all require

additional manpower. It is unduly costly to build up a force numerically to meet such peak loads, for it then will be overmanned much of the time. Short, sharp peaks cannot be easily fitted into fixed duty schedules.

Planned, compensated, and voluntary overtime duty is a possible answer. Under such a plan a patrolman may be permitted to volunteer for an overtime roster. As the demand arises, names are drawn from the roster in rotation. Designees must accept the assignment or arrange for a substitute. Thus the department is assured that sufficient men will be available when needed. Compensation for volunteer overtime may be at the rate of straight time or time and a half. Experience has been that policemen welcome the opportunity to work overtime, even at straight time rates, thereby indicating the advantages in this device for a flexible distribution of manpower when and where the need is greatest.

HOLIDAYS AND VACATIONS

Many national or regional holidays create unusual police problems due to the release of citizens from their routine occupations. The police effort therefore cannot be relaxed to permit policemen to celebrate the holiday along with their neighbors. Compensating time off may be provided in one of two ways—either on a day-for-day basis or as an additional vacation allowance. Under the latter arrangement, if other governmental employees receive two weeks of vacation annually, policemen may be allowed three weeks or more. Either arrangement is considered fair by policemen, though most would naturally prefer to have the holidays whenever that proves feasible.

In other respects police usually receive the same number of days of vacation as other employees of their government.

Most frequently a policeman's vacation is two calendar weeks. December being a most active month for property crimes and highway accidents, it is common practice to spread vacations over the remaining eleven months—January through November. A few departments attempt to limit the vacation period to the summer months—June through September. While police prefer the summer vacation plan, it has one distinct disadvantage. Two-week vacations spread over 48 weeks sap the strength of a force by only 4 per cent at any one time, but the same vacation allowance, when compressed within 16 weeks, reduces the manpower available during the vacation period by 13 per cent. Unless a police jurisdiction is unusually inactive during the summer months, police vacations should be spread over most of the calendar year.

POLICE UNIFORMS

A police uniform normally consists of a cap, winter blouse, winter overcoat, trousers, and summer and winter shirts. The initial cost of such a uniform is several hundred dollars and its annual maintenance and replacement cost about a hundred dollars. Pistols, handcuffs, night stick, and other special equipment may be purchased but once, without a recurrent renewal cost. A few cities furnish all uniforms and equipment. Most supply special equipment only; a few supply only the badge and cap piece. Some designate a part of the policeman's pay as "a uniform allowance" and seek to dispose of the question in that way. Considering the high cost of police salaries to a city, the expenditure of city funds to assure the proper uniforming and equipping of policemen appears justified. This is particularly true of the initial outfit which represents a heavy financial burden to the recruit.

It is almost universal practice to require policemen assigned to plain-clothes duty to supply their own clothing. However, a few places supply detectives with a new suit, overcoat, and shirts periodically at public expense. This is intended to be the equivalent of uniforms provided to other branches.

JOB SECURITY

Shortly after the end of World War II, a major southern city experienced a change in political party control. Since no job security law was in effect many policemen were demoted and discharged on a summary basis. The effects upon the rank and file will be felt for many years. Such overturns are no longer so common as they once were, but they do still occur and their effect is always destructive.

To prevent the police from becoming a political football nearly all states and municipalities have enacted laws assuring tenure of office. Such arrangements are usually supervised by a civil service commission. By and large the civil service laws have been effective in assuring policemen job security. In fact, most cities and states make it extremely difficult to demote or discharge a policeman for any cause. Thus the civil service laws for assuring job security have operated to undermine police discipline.

As compared with other employments the police enjoy a high degree of job security. During periods of economic depression the police profession is especially attractive—the pay is regular, there are no general layoffs, and administrative action to discharge the individual officer is unlikely. The issue is no longer one of job security. The big problem is to reconcile this with an effective discipline.

PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT

It is common practice for cities and states to contribute toward police pen-

sions. The pensions are usually paid to officers disabled in the line of duty, or those disabled from any cause after a number of years of service, or those who have reached a given age or completed a prescribed number of years of service. The amount and conditions of benefits vary considerably between police departments, and even between men in the same department. A common benefit is half pay for superannuation retirement, two-thirds or three-fourths pay for line of duty disability retirement.

In sound pension plans periodic contributions are made to a pension fund, the amount of the payment being determined by qualified actuaries. Frequently both the police and the employing government contribute an established fraction of base pay to the fund, which in extreme cases may be 10 or 15 per cent for each. In addition the pension fund may benefit from various license or court fees. Actuarially sound pension funds provide a strong inducement for police to remain in the service.

A far less desirable pension fund is of the nonactuarial variety. In this type the police officer may contribute to a fund at a low fixed rate, while the city or state contracts to pay the difference between benefits and fund income. Non-actuarial funds may promise more liberal benefits than do actuarially sound programs, but it is a glib and almost meaningless promise, unfair to the police officer who serves the public long and well. Financial difficulties have forced some nonactuarial funds to reduce their benefit payments, and grave uncertainties becloud the future of many others.

Within recent years the federal old-age and survivors insurance program and various industrial pension plans have somewhat lessened the relative attractiveness of some police funds. Changes in the federal act permit state and mu-

nicipal governments to participate in the federal plan, though local governmental plans must then be abandoned. In jurisdictions which do not have an actuarially sound pension fund, acceptance of the federal program is probably desirable, if locally augmented by disability, surviving dependents, and pre-retirement benefits as need arises. In jurisdictions which do have sound pension funds the federal plan offers generally smaller benefits with no substantial increase in the certainty of payment.

A third possible pension arrangement is the use of an actuarial private pension fund which is operated without government aid, in conjunction with the federal program. Under such an arrangement a pension plan supported by police and citizen contributions can provide disability and superannuation benefits until the officer becomes eligible for benefits under the federal program. Since the liability of the private fund is thereby limited, costs need not be excessive.

NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A GOOD COP

Higher personnel standards for police recruits, an effective discipline, and attractive compensation for all—these hold the key to large areas of police improvement. While the rate of pay necessary to attract and hold competent policemen varies with the locality and with time, it is obvious that governments must strive to offer to police a compensation that will be roughly comparable with that of other professional or semiprofessional men. Well-adjusted pay scales make possible an attractive pay schedule, often at no greater annual cost. The fringe benefits enjoyed may include a shorter work week, provision of uniforms, job security, and pensions. Advances by industrial workers over the past ten years in pay rates and fringe benefits have greatly reduced the relative attractiveness of police service. If

legislatures and city councils can redress some of the competitive balance between the police force and other forms of employment, modern police personnel techniques can lead to levels of police service hitherto unattained.

Bruce Smith, Jr., is a public safety and personnel consultant who has conducted numerous administrative surveys of local and state governments in many parts of this country. He entered the U. S. Army in 1941, serving there as commander of infantry and military police companies, and as chief of counter intelligence in the office of the Chief of Ordnance. His military assignments also included the conduct and direction of industrial security and protection surveys for the Ordnance Department.

Crime Reporting as a Police Management Tool

By A. E. LEONARD

THE early years of the police profession in America were dark and forbidding. Not only has this relatively new craft experienced the usual growing pains brought about by a rapidly expanding population, but in addition social and economic changes during the past century have complicated the police task with discouraging regularity. Effects upon the problems of law enforcement often were not detected in time to produce remedial action. Only within our own generation has the police administrator had anything in the nature of a yardstick with which to measure local crime problems and the effectiveness of his efforts.

Prior to the establishment of uniform crime reporting each police administrator in his own way could determine how much crime faced his department locally and whether it was on the rise or decline. He could calculate a crime rate—valueless as it often was—the percentage of offenses solved by his force, the employee strength per unit of population, and the like; but he had no knowledge as to whether his crime rates were high or low, whether the batting average of his department met any acceptable standards, whether his police strength was above or below average—in short, whether his administrative procedures were sound or faulty. He existed in statistical isolation.

Uniform crime reporting should hold a very practical interest for all of us who are privileged to pay taxes in this country. Local law enforcement is big business, second only to education in the operational expenditures of municipal funds.¹ Hence the comparative size

and nature of the crime problem facing us should have a bearing upon the amounts we are inclined to expend to combat it. While of special interest to police, crime is nonetheless also a primary concern of legislators and sociologists and a burden upon the entire community. The crime picture of a community may not be an attractive one, but its details should not be obscured on that account. The crime record is everybody's business and everybody should know the score.

ORIGINS OF UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING

Systematic crime reporting in the United States has been a reality only since 1930, although for some fifty to sixty years prior to that time there had been occasional and largely ineffective agitation to that end. From time to time criminologists, statisticians, and the police alike would direct attention to the dearth of any crime statistics worthy of the name, and there the matter would rest until the next wave of futile criticism rose and passed on.

Significantly, it was the local law enforcement agencies themselves through their International Association of Chiefs of Police that took the first definite steps which ultimately brought about the uniform crime reporting program as we know it today. In 1927, Police Commissioner William P. Rutledge of Detroit proposed that the Association designate a Committee on Uniform Crime Records. As a result, twelve police executives were designated with Commissioner Rutledge as chairman. Distinguished counsel to this committee was drawn from agencies of federal and state governments, universities, and the like, under the farsighted leadership

¹ International City Managers' Association, *Municipal Year Book*, 1952, p. 195.

of Dr. Lent D. Upson of the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research, who served as chairman of the advisory group.

When the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial made its unsolicited offer to finance a thorough study of the problem, it was possible for the Committee on Uniform Crime Records to engage a highly competent technical staff under the direction of Bruce Smith of the Institute of Public Administration, who brought to the task unusual qualifications. His long and enviable record in the field of police surveys, combined with the professional and practical experience of the other members of his staff, Donald C. Stone, L. S. Timmerman, and Audrey Davies, resulted in the development of a general program for the collection of police statistics.

In setting up the program in the beginning, all offenses were classified under twenty-six separate headings according to their general common-law definitions, and these classes were assembled in two broad groups. Part I consisted of seven classifications of serious crimes of the type which were found to be those generally brought to the attention of the police as they occurred. Part I includes criminal homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. All other major crimes, together with the less serious violations, are grouped under nineteen classes, in Part II.

Recognizing the diversity of definitions for the various offenses among the several states, possessions, and territories, all the local statutes were examined and a uniform classification of offenses established. These definitions under the uniform classification follow in a general way the definitions found in the state statutes although necessarily differing slightly from most of them in some respects. Painstaking and exhaustive research at this point was

essential if comparability was to be achieved in the crime statistics collected from the various states.

In addition to extensive research in this country, a firsthand examination was conducted of the systems of criminal statistics maintained in Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany, and the technical staff thereafter brought forth a manual entitled *Uniform Crime Reporting*, which was adopted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and published by the Committee on Uniform Crime Records in November 1929. The manual stands today as a worthy monument to the vision and perseverance of such men as Commissioner William P. Rutledge and to the very capable and thorough work of Bruce Smith and his competent staff.

Monthly crime reports initiated

The collection of the monthly crime reports was started with the January 1930 returns by the Committee on Uniform Crime Records. In September of the same year the program was turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with the original plans outlined in the manual *Uniform Crime Reporting*. The manual was distributed to local law enforcement agencies from which reports were requested, and it has always served as the basic reference work in the field, although it has since been condensed somewhat and published in handbook form by the FBI. The handbook, *Uniform Crime Reporting*, is furnished to all contributing police agencies.

The response to the program was excellent from the beginning. Some four hundred departments sent in reports in January 1930, and the reporting area has grown steadily. In 1952, 5,788 local police agencies participated in the program. Table 1 indicates the percentage of the population represented

TABLE 1

Population Group	Percentage Represented
Cities over 100,000.....	100.0
Cities from 25,000 to 100,000.....	97.6
Cities from 2,500 to 25,000.....	83.3
Total Urban.....	94.6
Total Rural.....	80.7
National Total.....	89.0

by returns sent to the FBI by local law enforcement agencies.

SUPERVISORY ROLES OF THE FBI AND THE IACP

From the foregoing it will be seen that the coverage is substantial, particularly so for a statistical program that is wholly voluntary as regards the contributors. In large measure the coverage is as great as it is by reason of unique circumstances. To the local authorities, the various crime returns are not merely additional statistical reports requested by the federal government. The report forms as well as the basic explanation as to the manner of their execution were designed not by some new arm of government but by a committee of police executives selected from and by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

It also must be remembered that the FBI as the central repository of the uniform crime reports is itself a law enforcement agency with which municipal and county police, sheriffs, and state law enforcement agencies regularly collaborate. Not only are FBI agents throughout the nation in frequent personal contact with the local police in connection with investigative matters of mutual interest but in addition the FBI in Washington provides a variety of services to local law enforcement agencies in matters other than police statistics. They include such matters as the operation of a central repository of fingerprint records, services

of the FBI Laboratory, publication of the *Law Enforcement Bulletin*, and operation of the FBI National Academy where officers from all over the country are trained as instructors and administrators. Agents of the FBI with specialized training are available on request to assist in local police training schools regardless of the size of the department.

Thus, when a local police agency receives a crime reporting form or a letter concerning the submission of reports from John Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI in Washington, this communication is recognized as coming from an organization sharing many interests and activities with the local agency. All this places the FBI in a unique position as a government agency operating a statistical service as a by-product of its regular functions. We have here a wholly co-operative venture, yet because of an almost within-the-family relationship the co-operation shown in participation and in response to suggestions about the preparation of reports is a continuing source of satisfaction to those concerned.

FBI's system of checks on crime reports

The monthly and annual uniform crime reports as received at the FBI in Washington are subjected to a variety of checks for dependability. Apparent discrepancies result in correspondence with local police departments. As an indication of the extent of these inquiries during one recent year, 1,654 annual returns from city forces were used in preparing the summary tabulations for publication and 441 of them were made the subject of correspondence with the contributors. The monthly reports, being in much less detail, are challenged less frequently, but the response to this correspondence by way of adjustments or clarification of entries is always encouraging to those of us

who are engaged in this co-operative program.

On occasion, after correspondence with the contributor there remain on the returns uncorrected or unexplained entries which indicate that a misunderstanding of established procedures and standards still exists. In these cases a personal visit to the department may be the only solution, and hundreds of such visits have been made, in most instances by representatives of the FBI but on a number of recent occasions by representatives of the Committee on Uniform Crime Records of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. In any event, all members of that committee are kept fully informed when for any reason the reporting by a local department continues to fall short of established standards. In some instances the Committee on Uniform Crime Records has recommended to the FBI that the figures for a certain city should be omitted from tabulations showing offenses arranged by communities. This practice has proved invigorating and has resulted in a higher degree of uniformity in the crime statistics reported and published than might have been possible otherwise.

SCOPE OF THE CRIME REPORTS

The uniform crime reporting program provided for the collection of information of two basic types: (1) offenses known to the police for the Part I division only and (2) persons arrested for all classes of offenses.

The term "offenses known to the police," adopted from foreign practice, includes all crimes known to have been committed. The manner in which they are discovered, the age of the offender if the offender is known, the value of property stolen, and whether restitution was made do not affect the scoring of an offense under uniform crime reporting. If a building is unlawfully entered for

the purpose of committing a felony or any theft, one offense of burglary is scored regardless of whether one man or six boys were responsible. Thus, the offense committed stands alone as the unit for scoring under "offenses known to the police" as well as in tallies of the number of those crimes "cleared by arrest."

The other basic statistical unit, persons arrested, is based on the number of individuals taken into custody or answering a summons, citation, or other police notice, regardless of the number of charges that may be placed against them.

Crime statistics are collected and tabulated separately for urban and rural areas of the country, as defined by the Bureau of Census. For the 1950 decennial census the Census Bureau adopted a new definition, which does not always correspond with the jurisdictional boundaries of the reporting police agencies. As a result, the reports from some agencies would combine both rural and urban crime figures, if the 1950 census distinction were used. For that reason and in the interest of continuity over the years, while utilizing the 1950 population count, the uniform crime reporting distinction between urban and rural areas continues to follow generally the 1940 census definition, which includes as urban communities incorporated places of 2,500 or more inhabitants and some areas classed as urban under special rules relating to population, size, and density. Other areas are treated as rural.

At this stage in the program the reporting for the rural areas has not reached so high a degree of uniformity and completeness as that of the urban reports. In connection with the tabulations for known offenses it is recognized that in some instances the rural reports may be limited to cases in which arrests were made. Any incompleteness thus

TABLE 2—CRIME RATES, 1952

Offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in 105 cities with population of over 100,000

Classes of Crime	Lowest	First Quartile	Median	Third Quartile	Highest
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	0.0	1.8	4.4	9.0	30.8
Robbery	6.3	24.0	53.2	80.0	175.0
Aggravated assault	0.0	23.2	55.7	106.1	572.4
Burglary—breaking or entering	104.6	295.0	439.9	602.7	1,190.8
Larceny—theft	208.1	730.6	1,034.9	1,406.9	3,043.5
Auto theft	70.1	137.8	216.0	294.6	683.4

resulting would be most pronounced for crimes against property, where arrests are less likely to occur than for the more serious crimes against the person.

WIDE RANGE OF CRIME RATES

Because of the heterogeneous nature of American cities, it is only natural to find substantial variations in the crime rates among individual communities. For an indication of the range, reference may be made to the differences in the crime rates for 1952 among cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, as shown in Table 2.

As a general rule, the larger cities show the highest crime rates per unit of population. In robbery, for example, the rate during 1952 for cities of over 250,000 inhabitants was seven times the

rate in cities with population under 10,000.

Substantial differences are observed, for reasons indicated above, in the crime rates in different sections of the country. Table 3 indicates the range in state crime rates for 1952. The irregular distribution of crime among the several states is normal, since the frequencies of crime as well as of other social phenomena, such as births, deaths, diseases, marriages, and divorces, are affected by such a large variety of factors.

POPULAR VIEW OF CRIME RATES

In the earlier days of uniform crime reporting, some police forces were reluctant to compile and publish reports on the volume of crime, partly because

TABLE 3—STATE CRIME RATES, 1952

Offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in 2,449 cities in 48 states representing an urban population of 75,292,411

Classes of Crime	Lowest	First Quartile	Median	Third Quartile	Highest
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	0.0	2.0	3.8	8.3	20.7
Robbery	1.7	20.2	36.4	58.4	121.4
Aggravated assault	1.7	19.6	41.1	93.3	384.4
Burglary—breaking or entering	143.6	266.6	383.2	476.3	917.7
Larceny—theft	393.5	683.0	907.3	1,322.4	2,585.5
Auto theft	38.6	130.3	182.7	217.2	538.7

many people tended to treat crime as a charge against the police rather than as a social misfortune for which the entire community was responsible. Fortunately this reaction is gradually disappearing.

It cannot be denied that the size, training, and general efficiency of the police department do have some effect on the local crime picture. On the other hand, there are other factors affecting the amount of crime which merit careful consideration. These include such matters as the composition of the population of the city as regards age, sex, and race, as well as the size and characteristics of the population of any adjacent metropolitan area; the economic status of the population; the climate of the area; the general nature of the community, that is, residential, agricultural, industrial, or resort; the educational, recreational, and religious facilities of the community; and the attitudes of public prosecutors, the courts, and the public in general towards the problems of law enforcement.

A comparison of the raw figures or even the crime rates of one community with another may not be particularly significant. The important thing is the extent to which the local crime rates exceed or fall short of the average for cities of the same population group, geographic division, or state. Such a comparison sheds light on the relative size of the problem at hand.

We recognize that to some extent certain types of crimes are considered preventable. Because of the presence of police patrols, and through police public relations programs and the like, would-be offenders in some instances are deterred in their efforts to violate the law, just as comparable programs of the fire department tend to reduce fires. But an outbreak of fires rarely prompts a series of charges of inefficiency against the fire department, an influenza epi-

demic is not recorded as a breakdown in efficiency in the health department, nor is the blame for an unusually heavy trash accumulation placed on the shoulders of the sanitary branch of government, *unless* these public services (1) fail to recognize candidly the size and nature of the problem or (2) fail to attack the problem by prompt and effective action. So should it be with our police forces.

APPLICATION OF PUBLISHED DATA

While the size of the crime problem should have a bearing on the size of the police department, there certainly are better measures of the efficiency of the force. Foremost among them would be the proportion of offenses cleared by arrest, for which the authors of the uniform crime reporting program carefully provided. The phrase generally means that one or more of the offenders involved in the commission of an offense have been arrested and made available for prosecution. (There are a few exceptions to this general provision such as the suicide of the offender or the case where a person known to have been responsible for a local offense is taken into custody in another jurisdiction.)

Accordingly, the police executive finds it possible to use this device as a measure of efficiency of individual segments of his force. Also, the reports received by the FBI from his department and others provide average figures on the percentage of offenses cleared by arrest which can be used as valuable comparisons for investigative efforts of his department. The averages are available for cities grouped by size and also by location.

Other average figures of practical interest to police executives, presented from time to time in *Uniform Crime Reports*, include percentages of the various types of stolen property recovered, time and place of commission of offenses, and

value of property stolen, in the several offense classes.

The total offenses reported by a single group of cities over a period of two or more years are always shown in *Uniform Crime Reports* to indicate the trend from year to year in the various types of offenses. Police executives find these national trends helpful for comparison with trends experienced locally.

The crime trend tabulations are not intended to serve as an index to the fluctuation in the criminal tendency of the citizenry in the area represented, since shifts in population as to size and composition or other changing factors in the reporting communities are not considered. The figures simply show the offense totals for each of the periods covered as reported by a specific group of cities without regard to underlying causes.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM

Under the original plans of the Committee on Uniform Crime Records it was anticipated that reports pertaining to the age, sex, and race of persons dealt with by the police would be collected. During the early years of the program, however, the introduction of new reports was held to a minimum for obvious reasons and in lieu of such reports the FBI gleaned what information of this type was available from fingerprint arrest records received in Washington. This source was always recognized as largely incomplete, since it was necessarily limited to cases in which persons taken into custody were fingerprinted and their fingerprints forwarded to Washington. Practice as to fingerprinting arrested persons, particularly in the lower age groups, is far from consistent. However, for two decades considerable information about the personal characteristics of individuals arrested was provided by this source.

After several years of experimenting with different types of arrest reports, one was finally adopted and placed in use for the calendar year 1952. For that year reports of 232 cities of over 25,000 inhabitants were utilized in preparing the summary data. The response to the form has been highly encouraging and it is anticipated that its use will increase rapidly.

Another matter covered in some detail as a part of the uniform crime reporting program is the subject of police employee strength. Once each year there are collected from all municipal police departments report forms showing the number of employees on the rolls as of a given date, separated into civilians and police officers and, incidentally, converting all part-time employees into terms of equivalent full-time personnel. With this device it has been possible to publish annually average figures showing the number of police employees per 1,000 inhabitants in cities grouped according to size and location.

There is considerable variation in the relative number of police employees, as indicated in the following data showing the range in the number of police employees per 1,000 inhabitants as of April 30, 1952 in the 266 reporting cities with population from 25,000 to 50,000: lowest, 0.55; first quartile, 1.10; median, 1.35; third quartile, 1.67; highest, 3.65.

In addition to the numerous factors affecting the extent of crime, a reasonable police employee figure for a community cannot be approached without due consideration of the working hours of the department, the extent of the use of auxiliary services (for example, school crossing guards and private merchant police), the highway traffic problem, and other related matters.

As a by-product of the data on police strength, the report also provides for the collection of information on police

fatalities. Data are published annually showing the number of police killed and the rate per 5,000,000 inhabitants in cities grouped by size and location.

Uniform Crime Reports is compiled and distributed by the FBI in two issues annually. Generally, the semiannual issue, covering the first six months of the year, is distributed in the fall, and the annual issue comes out in the spring following the year covered. The publication is sent to all police agencies participating in the program, as well as to any other individuals or organizations who have expressed an interest in receiving it.

THE FUTURE OF UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING

Further development of the uniform crime reporting program, in the next few years at least, will be directed largely to extending the reporting area for data pertaining to the age, sex, and race of persons arrested to include the

smaller cities and the rural areas. Beyond that, future development will depend upon the expressed desires of police executives across the country, and the pulse of that group is not difficult to feel because of the circumstances under which the program is conducted by the FBI, as outlined above.

In the meantime, efforts will be continued to promote the highest possible degree of uniformity in the reporting by local agencies. Relaxation in this phase might well prove disastrous to the significance of the published data and, therefore, each monthly and annual report will continue to be subjected to close scrutiny. This critical evaluation of each report by the FBI, together with the active support and interest of the Committee on Uniform Crime Records of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, must continue over the years if uniform crime reporting is to flourish as a co-operative venture and go on growing in usefulness as a police management tool.

A. E. Leonard, Washington, D. C., an accountant by profession, has been chief of the statistical section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1945, having been connected with the FBI in various capacities for twenty years. He has conducted and supervised crime records surveys in numerous cities, large and small. In 1951-52 he conducted an extensive review of crime reporting in New York City for the Institute of Public Administration. His final report, Crime Records in Police Management, New York City, provided the basis for a reform of New York's crime reporting.

Police Public Relations

By G. DOUGLAS GOURLEY

DURING the past hundred years American police have made great strides along the road toward professionalization. As in other fields, however, the greatest advances have been those which deal with scientific techniques and equipment. The social problems in policing have not received their fair share of attention. Outstanding among these problems is the need for development and maintenance of a satisfactory relationship between the police and the public—commonly called police public relations.

IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT

Under our Anglo-Saxon form of policing, in high contrast with totalitarian forms, the police and the public are in a sense identical. Our citizens cannot discard their responsibility to police themselves merely by retaining professional police to perform the daily tasks for which citizens have neither the time, the capacity, nor the inclination. Hence the importance of public support in the enforcement of law and order cannot be overemphasized. Police represent only a small fraction of the public they serve, and can never adequately discharge their obligations to protect life and property unless they are reinforced by the good will and co-operation of the public.

It is highly important that the citizen and the policeman understand and appreciate each other's problems and viewpoints. The citizen has definite obligations in this matter. He must realize that his security and welfare are, to a large measure, dependent upon the maintenance of an orderly society, which in turn is dependent upon the efficiency and prestige of the police.

The policeman, on his part, must always remember that law enforcement is not an end in itself, but is rather a means to an end. That end is the maintenance of an orderly society that enjoys the support of law-abiding citizens.

No matter how well a police department is organized or how efficient and honest is its administration, it is judged by individual citizens, and consequently by the nature of its public contacts. Good public relations involve far more than *saying*—they involve *doing*. It is the policeman out on his beat, the police officer in a radio car or on a motorcycle, and the desk officer or jailer in the station who make friends or enemies for the department. Though there are other influences involved, *the police themselves are the most important factor in determining public attitudes.*

The building of proper relations and attitudes between the police and the public will result in a high degree of popular acceptance, and other media affecting public relations, such as press, radio, motion pictures, and fiction writers, will both reflect and strengthen this underlying influence. The policies of these media are determined by what the public wants, and consequently by beliefs and attitudes of the public itself.

Despite the difficulties involved, every effort must be made to create as many favorable contacts as possible between the police and the public, because the cumulative effect created by these thousands of man-to-man contacts determines the degree of public acceptance or the state of police public relations.¹

¹ For a discussion of the public relations role of the individual police officer, see Richard L. Holcomb, *The Police and the Public*,

UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARD POLICE

In building good public relations, many handicaps must be overcome. Not only do we have a product to sell (law enforcement) which often meets with strong sales resistance, but some of our predecessors have been responsible for unfavorable attitudes which make our job more difficult today.²

Among these are the widely held beliefs that policemen are uneducated and of low mentality; that they are selected for physical strength and courage alone; that they are of doubtful honesty and integrity; that they are engaged in a continuous offensive against society; that they are often rude and domineering; that they get angry easily, and assume a "smart-alecky" attitude even more easily; that they resort to the illegal "third degree"; and that the only way to be safe from this tyranny is to have either wealth or "pull."

Not all of these indictments can be fairly charged to any one police department; but, unfortunately, at various times and places each has been successfully proved. Also, despite the fact that many police organizations have made rapid strides and are on the verge of professionalization, current standards in others leave much to be desired.

PUBLIC RELATIONS HAZARDS

In the early days of police departments, the "good" citizens of the community felt a sincere alliance with the police against thieves and outlaws who preyed upon them. Today, in an urban

community, citizens too often have no such feeling of alliance. Police work is no longer concerned primarily with a small outlaw group. Modern police departments have become large, complex organizations whose many new duties require intimate day-to-day contacts with all citizens. The greatest number of police contacts today is not with the criminal element of society, but rather with the "good" citizens of a community. It has been estimated that at least 90 per cent of all police business is not of a strictly criminal nature.

Extensive use of the automobile has made necessary an increasing number of restrictions upon the driving public, and the old division of the community into lawbreakers and law observers has thus been destroyed.

As long as policemen confined their activities to repression, detection, and investigation of offenses which were common-law crimes, they won a great measure of popular support. However, as the police have become overburdened with duties outside the sphere of what people usually consider criminal law enforcement, public support has weakened. These additional duties are often of a minor regulatory nature, rarely produce impressive social benefits, and often prove irritating to people who believe they have a right to do as they please.

Defiance of law and authority is not entirely an individual phenomenon. It is practiced by groups as well. The individual whose activities the policeman may be required to restrict is often a symbol of a racial, social, religious, or economic group. To become involved with such an individual is to invite the resentment of the entire group; and it is extremely easy to become involved, for most members of minority groups are sensitive and defensive.

It is almost a necessary consequence that any efforts of the police to control actions of citizens meet with resistance

The American citizen is in some respects a rugged individualist, and strongly resists any efforts to control his personal freedom. This American individualism, and revolt against authority, is traditional.

No other form of public service is more likely to cause ill feeling among the public it serves than is the agency whose duty it is to enforce laws and restrict the citizen's activities and control his conduct. Actually, it is the governmental agency which restricts the activities of its citizens; but as far as the individual is concerned, the government is an abstraction. He regards its symbol—the policeman—as the cause of his troubles; and his resentment is reserved for the officer, and no one else.

RESULTS OF GOOD AND BAD PUBLIC RELATIONS

There are many distinct advantages to be gained from maintaining a spirit of free co-operation with the public. When such co-operation exists, police morale is improved; this in turn leads to increased police effort and improved police service. Difficult programs, which would otherwise be impossible to undertake, then become possible. A general increase in police efficiency results in still greater appreciation of police, creating a desire on the part of citizens to observe laws, comply with regulations, and assist the police in the performance of their functions.

Without the public's assistance, arrests become difficult, and convictions almost impossible. Without it, the police are held up to ridicule, criticism, and censure at every move. Under such circumstances, the public overlooks no opportunity to make the task of the policeman more difficult and his working conditions more disagreeable. Legislatures are nothing more or less than segments of the public, and reflect its attitudes and beliefs. In the courtroom the

most carefully prepared cases may fail because the testimony of policemen is ignored or greatly discounted by jurymen, who are, after all, only small parts of the public at large, and who naturally and even properly reflect current attitudes and prejudices.³

NEED FOR MUTUAL INFORMATION

If, then, police public relations or contacts are made under such difficult circumstances, and are so extremely important to the successful operation of a police department, it seems only logical that procedures should be devised to measure the status of public relations at any particular time, and to determine which police techniques, actions, and attitudes are approved—and which are not.

We must not think of the public as one vast body labeled "The Average American." Every police agency must deal with many publics of divergent interests and attitudes. The same citizen may be a member of several publics. "Public" is a name for any group that has at least one thing in common, whether it be education, occupation, income, sex, age, ethnic characteristics, or something else.⁴

The very first thing that should be done in any public relations program is to determine what these many publics think of us and our services. Only after this has been done will we be in a position to evaluate their attitudes and, in turn, our own policies, procedures, and services. Only after this evaluation, and any corrective action which may be indicated, can we be in a position to report to our publics and correct popular misconceptions.

Unfortunately this first important step in police public relations has too

³ O. W. Wilson, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 388.

⁴ Curtis D. MacDougall, *Understanding Public Opinion* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 14.

36 pp., State University of Iowa, 1950; Rollin M. Perkins, *Elements of Police Science* (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1942), pp. 73-90; O. W. Wilson, *Police Administration* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950), pp. 391-406.

² John B. Massen, "Selling Police Work to the Public," *Public Management*, Vol. 23, May 1941, p. 135.

often been ignored. Public relations has too often been thought of as a one-way street by which the department tells citizens those things it feels they should know. Public relations should be a mutual affair, which will enable law enforcement officers and administrators to keep informed as to what their publics want and to determine what publics are in need of what information, so that these publics can be adequately informed.

There is an urgent need for the application of this principle of selectivity to police public relations so that available time, energy, and money will be most effectively applied in informing citizens who most need informing regarding police activities about which the greatest lack of information exists, and in instructing policemen regarding modes of conduct which bring about the greatest acceptance of their activities.

METHODS OF DETERMINING PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Attitudes, beliefs, and desires can be determined in many ways, some of which are rather informal.

Determining attitudes in a small city or town may be a fairly simple task, for police officials may be personally acquainted with most of the residents. In larger places the problem is not so simple; but even here, in their day-to-day personal contacts, policemen can learn much of the feeling toward their department and its policies. Advisory bodies made up of representatives of important interest groups provide a good sounding board for public opinion. A very valuable device is to keep track of complaints, commendations, and requests for information.

Probably the most reliable method of appraising attitudes is the public opinion poll. The conduct of such polls or surveys naturally requires special skills.

THE LOS ANGELES SURVEY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES

An intensive study of citizens' attitudes toward the police was recently concluded in Los Angeles.⁵ A scientifically selected sample of 3,100 citizens was used. The questionnaire contained three principal sections: the first listed personal or biographical data; the second set forth 22 multiple-choice questions; and the third solicited free-answer or voluntary statements as to favorable and unfavorable contacts which the respondents had had with Los Angeles policemen.

A list of personal data, or background information, such as sex, nationality, age, and occupation, was included for two reasons: (1) to permit comparative studies among the various classes and groups indicated, and (2) to select a representative sample or "universe" based on a quota system; that is, to select groups of people in the same age, sex, nationality, and economic classifications, and in the same proportion as they appear in the community.

A method of coding the free answers was devised, and results of the written responses, together with biographical information and answers to the multiple-choice questions for each respondent, were placed on punched cards. Tabulations of the punched cards brought to light many facts which should prove of interest and value not only to police administrators and students of police administration, but also to persons concerned with public administration and public relations in general.

⁵ This survey, which points out the nature, the intensity, and to some extent the causes of public attitudes toward the police, together with instructions for conducting similar surveys, is reported in G. D. Gourley, *Public Relations and the Police*, 160 pp., Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1953.

Attitudes of citizens in general

Generally, the citizens of Los Angeles felt that they had a very good police department. The ratings of the respondents were highest for those traits or modes of conduct which could be physically seen or easily judged; that is, appearance, physical condition, and education; and lower for the more intangible traits like honesty, professional interest, basis of selection, and influence of politics. The "Do Not Know" responses were generally lowest for those traits rated highest, and highest for the traits rated lowest. This is significant, for it indicates that the more people actually know about their policemen, the better they like them.

About one-fourth of all respondents admitted that they did not know how to rate policemen as regards the more intangible factors. It was amazing, for instance, to discover that in a city like Los Angeles, where the civil service system is thoroughly entrenched and scrupulously administered, 27 per cent of the citizens did not know whether policemen were selected on the basis of merit or not.

When people were given an opportunity to tell in their own words about personal contacts they had had with policemen, they reported as many favorable as unfavorable experiences.

As might have been expected, the greatest number of recorded experiences dealt with traffic situations. Again, however, half of these were favorable.

It is of further interest to note that although 40 per cent of all unfavorable responses referred to traffic, 47 per cent of all favorable responses also referred to traffic. Fifty per cent of the unfavorable traffic comments, and 30 per cent of the favorable, concerned traffic citations. On the other hand, 22 per cent of the favorable, and only 12 per

cent of the adverse, statements had to do with the direction of traffic.

These and other figures from the survey indicate that people form their opinions about us, whether we try to shape those opinions or not. Also, that our public relations, whether good or bad, are a direct result of the number and the nature of our contacts with the public.

It is interesting and significant to observe that the only police activity which brought out more favorable than unfavorable comments was traffic. Here is evidence that by proper selection, training, and supervision, a function that is inherently full of public relations hazards can be made acceptable to the public.

Concerning officers' attitudes, again about half of the comments were favorable. Of the favorable comments, 60 per cent were about officers' courtesy. Most other favorable statements were about officers' co-operation, their sympathetic and concerned attitudes, and their helpfulness. Most adverse comments were about officers' discourtesy, prejudice, overbearing or superior attitudes, lack of co-operation or indifference, and their sarcastic or belligerent attitudes.

Actions of officers which people most liked were competency, helpfulness, promptness, and assistance of various kinds.

Attitudes by age groups

Concerning age, the older people (55 or over) were definitely the most favorably inclined.

The severest critics were between 18 and 44 years of age. For many traits, the boys and girls (17 and under) were the most favorably inclined of all. This was particularly true for the traits of honesty, training, and basis of selection.

Of the juveniles, 35 per cent felt that the police were liked by boys and girls;

40 per cent believed boys and girls were indifferent toward the police; and 18 per cent were convinced that the police were feared by boys and girls. On the other hand, 65 per cent of these same juveniles believed that the police were usually watchful to prevent juvenile delinquency, and only 4 per cent felt that the police were indifferent concerning juvenile delinquency.

As for the relative strength of their convictions, the young adults (18 to 24 years of age) were the most positive in their beliefs, and those over 55 admitted most often that they did not know how to rate their police.

Attitudes by sex, ethnic origin, and education

Generally speaking, men expressed more favorable attitudes than did women. Of the 22 traits listed, the only two rated higher by women than by men were appearance and physical condition. The outstanding feature of a tabulation by sex was the indication of a great lack of knowledge by women concerning their police. For most traits, twice as many women as men admitted that they did not know how to rate policemen.

That Negroes take a dimmer view of their police department than do other ethnic groups is clearly indicated by this survey. The Mexicans are more favorably inclined, but still not so favorably as are the white respondents. Of the various nationality groups, the Mexicans appear most certain and the white respondents least certain as to how policemen should be rated.

Although educational group differences were not great, there was a definite tendency for people with the least schooling to look most favorably, and for the college graduates to look least favorably, upon the police. For 20 of the 22 traits, college graduates rated their po-

lice in the top bracket less often than did persons with less of formal schooling. The exceptions were appearance and physical condition.

Attitudes by occupation

Undoubtedly one of the most significant factors affecting attitudes towards the police, as revealed by this survey, is occupation. Contrary to many popular beliefs, unskilled laborers are most favorably inclined, followed closely by skilled laborers.

An interesting and enlightening picture was obtained by dividing the skilled laborers into two groups—transportation workers, and all others. The transportation group included streetcar operators, bus drivers, truck drivers, and taxicab operators. This group rated consistently higher than did all others. These findings are very significant because transportation workers are in daily contact with the police, and are in a much better position than others to observe their conduct. It serves further to emphasize that the more contacts people have with the police, the better they like them and appreciate their problems.

Among the lowest votes of confidence were those by professional groups. However they showed a wide range of opinion. Executives rated police highest, and entertainers lowest. Attorneys rated police highest in only one trait (influence of politics) and lowest in six. Of interest is the fact that doctors and dentists rated police lower than all others for physical condition.

Although housewives rated their policemen lower than did others for only 7 of the 22 traits, they admitted far more often than others that they did not know how to rate Los Angeles policemen. The percentage of housewives who did not know how to rate their policemen averaged for all traits more than

50 per cent higher than the percentage of all others who did not know how to rate them.

As unsatisfactory as the housewives' ratings are, they are not nearly as unfavorable as the ratings of female school teachers. For instance, only 13 per cent of the teachers (as compared with 38 per cent of the housewives) believe that their police are habitually courteous in dealing with the public.

This lack of information by housewives and the relatively low ratings by female school teachers seem to indicate the need for a public relations program directed towards the women. They to a great extent influence the attitudes of our children, who then in turn will be the citizens of tomorrow.

OUTSTANDING LESSONS FROM THIS SURVEY

Among the outstanding lessons to be learned from this survey are the following:

1. There is an appalling lack of information on the part of the public concerning the caliber of their police and concerning the conditions under which they operate.

2. Women, especially, are lacking in information about their police.

3. Current relations between the police and minority groups leave much to be desired.

a) Recruit and in-service training in race relations should be improved and intensified.

b) Actual performance of police in dealing with members of minority groups must be critically scrutinized, and improved if improvement is indicated.

c) The police should publicly cooperate whenever possible in movements to advance understanding and harmony between persons of all races and creeds.

4. Public attitudes (both good and

bad) toward the police are primarily the result of personal contacts between individual citizens and individual policemen.

5. In order to obtain the greatest possible approval for the police, the following things must be discouraged by effective selection, training, and supervision:

a) Attitudes of discourtesy, prejudice, superiority, and indifference.

b) Actions of unjustified arrests or citations, rough treatment, and inconsistency of traffic law enforcement.

6. The following things must be encouraged:

a) Attitudes of courtesy, co-operation, sympathy, helpfulness, and tolerance.

b) Actions of honesty, competency, promptness, and assistance of all kinds.

7. The things of which the public most need convincing are that their policemen

a) Have a high professional interest in their work.

b) Are selected for personal merit and ability.

c) Operate under excellent discipline.

d) Apprehend criminals indiscriminately, without regard for pressure brought by influential persons.

e) Operate independent of newspaper publicity.

f) Usually apprehend criminals in difficult cases.

g) Respect the constitutional rights of suspected criminals.

h) Are usually fair in dealing with minority groups.

i) Are careful not to arrest innocent persons.

j) Are directed by competent supervisors and top administrators.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Under our form of government a cooperative relationship between the po-

lice and the public is essential. Both citizens and police have responsibilities in this matter, but the police must take the initiative in building good public relations.

Although other factors also are involved, the police themselves are the most important in determining public attitudes. Because of this, every effort must be made to create as many favorable contacts as possible between individual policemen and citizens.

Favorable contacts will require planning and training, for they will often be difficult to arrange, not only because of the police past but also because of the potential friction inherent in the duties we are called upon to perform. We are also handicapped because we do not have sufficient factual information concerning the attitudes and desires of our many publics.

Citizens' attitudes can be determined in many formal and informal ways. Re-

gardless of what methods are used, however, if a finger is to be kept on the pulse of public opinion, it must be done persistently. The ultimate criterion of the success of any democratic police agency is its acceptance by the citizens it serves. One of our most important public relations tasks is to identify our various publics and to secure their reactions. Only after this has been done can we undertake a candid analysis of our operations and correct weaknesses that are brought to light. Only after this evaluation and corrective action will we be in a position to report sincerely and intelligently to our publics.

We must always remember that public relations is a two-way proposition by which the police and the people for whom they work can freely communicate with each other. Only through such a mutual exchange can our police service be maintained on a truly democratic basis.

Captain G. Douglas Gourley, Los Angeles, California, commands the Venice Division of the Los Angeles Police Department. He joined the department in 1937 and has held all police ranks and has been assigned to all phases of police activity. He is a lecturer in police science and administration at the Civic Center Division of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California. During World War II he was Security Officer for the Naval Air Station and Naval Air Bases, Norfolk, Virginia, advancing to the rank of Lieutenant Commander. He is author of Public Relations and the Police (1953) and of articles in law enforcement journals.

Police, the Law, and the Individual

By AUDREY M. DAVIES

THE rights surrounding a person suspected or accused of crime have their origins in some of the most gruesome pages of history. It is a far cry from the ruthless proceedings of the Court of Star Chamber of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the substantial safeguards available to an accused today. In the reaction against the cruelties inflicted during regimes when an accused person had practically no rights, the pendulum has swung to a point where many people, both experts and laymen, seriously question whether the law—if sedulously followed—does not now operate, not merely to protect those charged with the commission of major crime, but actually to aid their escape from conviction.

This problem, which exists at all stages of the administration of criminal justice, is particularly acute at the police level. Responsibility for the investigation and apprehension of criminal offenders rests primarily upon the police. In their resistance to the legal strait jackets sometimes imposed so as to defeat their best efforts, they have beyond any doubt frequently resorted to practices and devices outside the law which have brought down upon them the anathemas of the general public. An irritating factor has been the unprofessional attitudes of a segment of the criminal bar, particularly in the larger cities. The activities of these lawyer-fixers have led police to retaliatory measures which they cannot successfully defend.

ILLEGAL POLICE PRACTICES

The more flagrant police practices which cut squarely across the rights and

privileges guaranteed to the individual by the basic law of this land—by the constitutions, federal and state, the courts, and statutory enactments—are the use of "third-degree" methods to extort confessions from arrested persons, the use of excessive brutality in making arrests, and the use of wire-tapping devices in securing evidence of illegal acts. These practices have extremely serious implications. They invade the historic rights and freedoms of every American: the right to avoid self-incrimination, the right to trial by due process of law, defense against unlawful searches and seizures, and such correlative rights as freedom from assault, from false imprisonment, and from protracted detention, the right to bail, and the right to counsel. To the extent that they are indulged in they turn the police—the sworn defenders of the law—into prime lawbreakers. Their continued use by some law enforcement officers accounts in large part for the low esteem in which police in this country are quite generally held.

It is proposed to examine the nature of these practices and their status under the law, with a view to considering what steps, if any, can be taken toward their replacement by legally and morally acceptable procedures which would both restore public confidence in the police and increase police efficiency.

THE THIRD DEGREE

"The third degree" is an elastic term which connotes the use of force or threats amounting to intimidation by police or prosecuting officials in extorting confessions from those arrested for crime. In its worst form it is nothing

more nor less than old-time torture in modern dress. In addition to outright physical brutality or threats of force, it is interpreted to include such practices as protracted detention of prisoners, who are often held incommunicado without recourse to counsel, relatives, or friends; prolonged questioning of suspects by relays of interrogators, sometimes under glaring lights or other physical discomforts, and often under conditions of extreme weariness or hunger induced by deprivation of sleep or food and water; confinement in overcrowded or unsanitary or vermin-ridden cells, or cells kept excessively hot or excessively cold; various forms of mental torture; and numerous other devices calculated to coerce the accused into making the admissions his tormentors are determined to extract.

The defects of such methods of law enforcement are so apparent that it is amazing they have persisted so long. They are frequently depraving to the perpetrators and inconceivably harmful to the victims. They violate an array of legal principles and prohibitions fundamental to the liberty and security of the individual. They breed contempt for law and engender public resentment and hostility toward the police. They fail to achieve their only conceivably justifiable end—the speedy conviction of the guilty—because the confessions so induced sometimes prove false, or are inadmissible in evidence because of their compulsory element, or arouse sympathy for the defendant, so that the guilty go free. Moreover, their use actually impairs police efficiency since it encourages resort to lazy and ignorant means rather than the development of scientific techniques of interrogation and investigation by the police.

Reaction against the third degree

A decided reaction against the use of these self-defeating methods appears to

have set in. The President's Committee on Civil Rights in 1947, in speaking of third-degree methods and police brutality, found that they are not universal and that "many law enforcement agencies have gone far in recent years toward stamping out these evils."¹ Lieutenant Kidd of the Berkeley (California) Police Department characterizes the use of the third degree as "not only vicious, but useless" and states: "It is an encouraging trend that this practice is becoming more and more shunned by the great majority of our police departments."² Similarly Captain Harold Mulbar, of the Michigan State Police, offsets his somewhat startling assertion that "in some parts of our country today the 'third degree' is still the most popular form of lie detection," with the reassuring comment:

Of course we know that the vast majority of police officials almost everywhere are today enlightened and decent men who would not think of condoning such barbarian practices. They realize the futility of all such methods and will have nothing to do with such unwarranted and unethical brutality. Responsible for this change has been the higher educational standards regularly offered to police officers and certainly the much better training systems everywhere available.³

Possibly the most portentous indication of reaction is the greatly expanded role of the federal government in recent years in combating police lawlessness. This role has a twofold approach: (1) the enunciation of new standards of police practice by the Supreme Court of the United States; and (2) the prosecution of local officials who are charged with police brutality directly by the

¹ *To Secure These Rights* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 25.

² *Police Interrogation* (New York: Basuino, 1940), pp. 46, 48.

³ *Interrogation* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1951), p. 89.

federal government under the federal civil rights acts.

JUDICIALLY IMPOSED REQUIREMENTS

The "civilized standards" rule

The United States Supreme Court in a number of cases involving the use of third-degree practices by state law-enforcement officers to compel a confession by the defendant has consistently ruled that convictions based on coerced confessions constitute a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.⁴ Doubtless this reviewing power of the Court in state cases involving coerced confessions has a deterrent effect on the use of improper police practices.

In 1943, in *McNabb v. United States*,⁵ the Supreme Court imposed a far stricter rule in the case of federal law-enforcement officers when it held that mere failure to arraign the defendants promptly—as required by statute—invalidated any confessions obtained during the illegal detention. The decision was based, not on any constitutional issue, but solely on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over the administration of justice in the federal courts, which, the opinion stated, implied the duty of imposing "civilized standards of procedure and evidence." Despite the deluge of criticism that greeted this decision, and its supposed modification in *United States v. Mitchell*,⁶ the

* For recent excellent collections and analyses of pertinent court decisions, see Thomas Irwin Emerson and David Haber, *Political and Civil Rights in the United States* (Buffalo: Dennis & Co., 1952), pp. 106-48; Virginia Wood, *Due Process of Law, 1932-1949* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), pp. 218-37; and Fred E. Inbau, *Lie Detection and Criminal Investigation* (2d ed.; Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1948), pp. 150-71.

⁵ 318 U. S. 332 (1943).

⁶ 322 U. S. 65 (1944).

strict rule of the *McNabb* case was reaffirmed in *Upshaw v. United States*.⁷

The "inherently coercive" rule

The rule of the *McNabb* decision is limited to federal law-enforcement officers; it does not extend to state systems of criminal law enforcement, over which the United States Supreme Court has no supervisory powers. But in *Ashcraft v. Tennessee*⁸ the United States Supreme Court propounded a doctrine applicable to state cases which in effect imposed a new standard for police practice upon state law-enforcement officers by judicial legislation. It held the questioning of arrested persons for thirty-six hours without food or rest to be "inherently coercive," regardless of its effect in inducing the confession, and a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This arbitrary presumption of coercion amounts to an extension of federal judicial control over state law-enforcement officers comparable to that effected over federal officials through the *McNabb* rule.

Obviously the United States Supreme Court has traveled a long way in its efforts to eradicate improper police practices associated with the third degree.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY

Physical abuse of prisoners, of those belonging to minority racial or religious groups, or of any member of the general public—particularly the use of unnecessary force or brutality when making arrests—is a common subject of complaint. There is no record of the extent of these abuses, as they are frequently concealed from the public by the department concerned. Only recently a newspaper campaign forced into the open a consistent policy of the New York City Police Department to bypass the Federal Bureau of Investiga-

⁷ 335 U. S. 410 (1948).

⁸ 322 U. S. 143 (1944).

tion when police brutality cases were investigated as required under federal civil rights statutes. A federal grand jury inquiry immediately resulted; Congress appointed a House Judiciary subcommittee to investigate the situation and its report is being awaited with considerable interest; the City Council also appointed a committee to inquire into police brutality cases; and the police department set up machinery for the investigation of citizens' complaints of brutality. Disciplinary action was also instigated immediately by the department against policemen charged with assaults on citizens in civil actions for damages. The conditions revealed in New York City may not be characteristic of a great many other places, but they raise ugly questions when thrown into such high relief.

While recourse against these wrongs may be had through such means as civil actions against the wrongdoers, their punishment under state criminal statutes, and police discipline, the difficulties in applying these remedies in most cases make them largely ineffectual; hence the significance of the revitalization, since 1939, of federal civil rights legislation long on the statute books but virtually ignored. These civil rights acts were part of a series enacted during the decade following the Civil War to implement the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.

The Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice

In 1939 a Civil Rights Section was installed in the Department of Justice by Attorney General Frank Murphy, for the avowed purpose of pursuing "a program of vigilant action" in prosecuting infringement of civil rights. This movement inaugurated a new governmental policy which has armed the federal government with a potent new weapon, in at least the more extreme

cases of brutality by state officials where the state itself takes no effective punitive steps. It was under the operation of this program that the New York City incident described in the preceding paragraph arose.⁹

The work of the Civil Rights Section of the United States Department of Justice is still somewhat new and experimental. It labors under inadequacies of organization and procedures; it has to combat local prejudices, since much of its work concerns Negroes in the South; it arouses antagonisms as interfering with states' rights, as indicated by the angry outbursts of some governors at the 1953 Governors' Conference, which were misdirected at the FBI; and it encounters enormous difficulties in bringing specific cases within the vague wording of the civil rights statutes, about which even the Supreme Court justices are in heated disagreement. All these are complicating factors which cause it to push forward slowly and with the utmost care. Possibly for this reason it confines prosecutions largely to cases where the facts show serious infringement by a public officer of an important civil right. In spite of the many handicaps, it has made substantial progress, both through the prosecutions it has undertaken and through its deterrent influence on police abuse of prisoners and on resort to mob violence.

J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a letter to the *New York Times* of August 26, 1953 protesting the attack on the FBI by the governors of Pennsylvania, Vir-

⁹ For an excellent study of the Civil Rights Section and its work, see Robert K. Carr's *Federal Protection of Civil Rights: Quest for a Sword*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947. Legal and related materials on civil rights are collected in *Emerson and Haber, op. cit.*, Chap. I. See also *To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights*, *supra* note 1.

ginia, and New York at the Governors' Conference, pointed out that its investigations in civil rights cases were carried out at the order of the Department of Justice in the performance of its duty to enforce the law of the land. Commenting on the results achieved, he remarked:

The record, I think, is clear and convincing. More progress has been accomplished in developing a consciousness, understanding and respect for civil rights since 1940 than in any other period in our national history.

In the last thirteen years, for example, a total of thirty-six lynchings have occurred. This, of course, does not reflect credit either upon the community where the acts occurred or upon the United States. In the thirteen years preceding 1940, however, a total of 157 lynchings occurred. Thus in this one field alone there is no question that phenomenal improvement has taken place. Public education has contributed much to this improvement, as has public opinion, which in the final analysis determines the degree of respect which any community has for law and order.

The fact that the FBI investigates lynchings no doubt causes many would-be lynchers to stop and consider the consequence before engaging in mob violence. In such cases, or in others of the type which the Governors had in mind, it makes little difference whether the victim is the most lecherous type of a criminal. He still is entitled to be treated as a human being. No one has the right in common decency or under our constitutional republic of taking unto himself the responsibility of inflicting punishment.

The potentialities for development of the federal civil rights program are vast. Through it the Department of Justice may eventually assert by direct positive action—should state inaction so necessitate—the restraining influence that the Supreme Court is indirectly effectuating by its repudiation of third-degree methods in confession cases.

WIRE-TAPPING PRACTICES

Another field of police lawlessness to which attention should be drawn because of its wide prevalence and the wholly unethical features involved is that of the secret interception of telephone conversations by law-enforcement officials to obtain evidence of criminal acts, in direct violation of state and federal statutes.

It might well seem that the practices in question entail such invasion of individual privacy as to amount to an unreasonable search and seizure within the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment and that the use of evidence so obtained in a criminal proceeding would violate the self-incrimination principle of the Fifth Amendment. But the United States Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision in *Olmstead v. United States*¹⁰ declared otherwise—with Brandeis vigorously dissenting and Holmes characterizing wire tapping as "dirty business." Many people agree with Justice Holmes. Wire tapping was finally barred by federal statute in 1934 by the enactment of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, which in *Nardone v. United States*¹¹ was expressly held applicable to federal officials. Evidence obtained indirectly from leads provided by wire tapping was likewise outlawed in the subsequent case of *Nardone v. United States*.¹²

The Department of Justice has alternately banned and condoned the use of wire tapping by the FBI. Present policy confines its use to such urgent cases as espionage or sabotage, or where grave risks to internal security are involved or human lives are in jeopardy, and express approval of the Attorney General is required in each instance.

There is no doubt that the dangers to

¹⁰ 277 U. S. 438 (1928).

¹¹ 302 U. S. 379 (1937).

¹² 308 U. S. 338 (1939).

the national security in the war and postwar periods have placed a heavy burden of responsibility on the federal police. Nevertheless, wire-tapping practices in direct violation of law involve grave ethical—if not constitutional—issues. In recognition of this situation, repeated proposals have been made for the enactment of federal legislation which will legalize wire tapping by federal officials in limited situations and subject to appropriate safeguards. The growing and sometimes crucial importance of investigations involving the national defense or internal security has stimulated the use of wire tapping. Since not all of these investigations are clearly of a criminal character, practical considerations of national security may require adjustments of any general rule on the subject to fit the peculiar circumstances of the nation at this critical juncture in the world's history.

The chaotic and dangerous conditions existing at the federal level have their counterpart in the states, except that wire tapping by local police is largely in the domain of gambling and vice. Statutes of some type or other forbid wire tapping in practically every state. Yet a recent authoritative study reached the melancholy conclusion that "despite the statutes and judicial decisions which purport to regulate wire tapping, today this practice flourishes as a wide-open operation at the federal, state, municipal and private levels."¹³

Measures adopted by New York State under a constitutional amendment of 1938, designed to bring wire tapping by law enforcement officials in that state under adequate legal controls, have so far proved ineffectual. Abuses under the statute, which permits wire tapping by the police under court order, have led to specific proposals by the New

York State Bar Association for tightening up the procedure so as to eliminate the indiscriminate use of wire tapping.¹⁴

ENGLISH PRACTICE

Probably the one single element which is responsible above all others for the unparalleled co-operation prevailing today between the police and the public in England is the complete integrity of the police under the law. They enjoy popular confidence and esteem because the people know they will not overstep the safeguards to individual liberty provided under the law and rigorously protected by the courts. These safeguards have their basis in the same great common-law doctrines recognized also by all American courts—the rule against self-incrimination and its counterpart, the rule against the admission of compulsory confessions in evidence.

The Judges' Rules

To simplify the practical application of these doctrines, certain working rules for the guidance of the police of England and Wales in the questioning of suspected or arrested persons have been formulated, known as the Judges' Rules. The first four were drawn up at the request of the Home Secretary in 1912, and the remaining five in 1918, at which time they were first brought prominently to the notice of the police. While intended merely as administrative directions, they have come to have the force of law and are a very important part of the instructions issued to every constable. The text of these rules appears in full in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure* of March 16, 1929, which will be referred to subsequently.¹⁵

¹⁴ New York State Bar Association, *Proceedings*, Vol. 69 (1946), pp. 332-36.

¹⁵ Cmd. 3297, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1929. The Rules are also printed in full in Cecil C. H. Moriarty, *Police Law* (11th ed.; London, Butterworth, 1951),

The Judges' Rules relate mainly to police cautioning of suspects and persons in custody. They permit a police officer, when endeavoring to discover the author of a crime, to question anyone, whether suspected or not, from whom he thinks he may obtain useful information. But upon deciding to charge a person with a crime, he should first caution such person. The usual form of the police caution today is: "You are not obliged to say anything, but anything you say may be given in evidence."¹⁶ Formerly, the phrase "in evidence against you" was employed, but the last two words are now omitted.

The Rules also provide that the usual caution should be given when persons in custody are questioned, or if the prisoner wishes to volunteer any statement, or when a person in custody wishes to reply to a statement taken separately from a person charged with the same offense. When a person is formally charged with a crime, the wording of the caution is as follows: "Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence." Any suggestion that his answer can only be used in evidence against him should be avoided, as it might prevent an innocent person from making a statement which might help to clear him. If there is not time to give the caution before the prisoner makes a statement, that will not render the statement inadmissible in evidence but he should be cautioned as soon as possible.

pp. 58-60, and in the article by T. E. St. Johnston, "The Legal Limitation of the Interrogation of Suspects and Prisoners in England and Wales," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (May-June 1948), p. 94.

¹⁶ Moriarty's *Police Law*, *supra* note 15, p. 59.

Regarding the questioning of persons in custody, the Rules specifically prohibit the cross-examining or questioning of a prisoner making a voluntary statement, except such questioning as may be necessary to remove an ambiguity in something he has actually said—for example, whether an hour mentioned was in the morning or evening. They are also interpreted as prohibiting questions to a person on the crime for which he is in custody.¹⁷ Any statement made in accordance with the Rules should, whenever possible, be taken down in writing and signed by the maker after it has been read to him and he has been invited to make any corrections.

The caution referred to in the Judges' Rules was originally administered by the examining magistrate, whose duties formerly were similar to those of a police officer investigating crime today. It had become a police practice by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Its purpose is to insure that the prisoner's statement is voluntary and to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner knew he was under no obligation to make a statement or to incriminate himself.

The Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure

A Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure was appointed in 1928 to consider the general powers and duties of police in England and Wales in the investigation of crimes and offenses, and specifically to inquire into the practice followed in interrogating or taking statements from persons interviewed in the course of the investigation of crime. The Commission was requested to report on whether such powers and duties were properly exercised "with due regard to the rights and liber-

¹⁷ See St. Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹³ Alan F. Westin, "The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal," 52 *Columbia Law Review* 167 (1952).

ties of the subject, the interests of justice, and the observance of the Judges' Rules both in the letter and the spirit."

The report of the Royal Commission, after an intensive survey of police practices, gave the police practically a clean bill of health. It covered a wide range of problems and offered many valuable suggestions concerning the taking of voluntary statements and other police practices and procedures. It found no credible evidence of the existence of third-degree methods, and stated, "We do not believe that the practice either exists or would be tolerated by the Force itself."¹⁸

The report found concerning the Judges' Rules that the "spirit" of the Rules was faithfully observed by the police, although certain ambiguities in the language of the Rules had caused some divergencies in practice. The report strongly recommended that all persons in custody, immediately on arrival at the police station, be allowed facilities to consult with their legal advisers, and also with their friends except where the interests of justice might forbid, and that each person be specifically informed of his rights in these respects.

The entire document—while by no means uncritical at many points—is a testimonial to the high standards of conduct and performance achieved under English police practice.

PROPOSALS FOR HIGHER POLICE STANDARDS

The one best remedy for the specific abuses considered in this article is their outlawing by the police themselves through the adoption of higher standards of police practice. Not only is this entirely feasible; it has already been done in two conspicuous examples. The English police changed in relatively

short order from a state of utter inefficiency and corruption to a model system through the establishment of professional standards of practical operation early in the nineteenth century. Our own FBI under its present direction has attained such world-wide eminence through the adoption of superior standards of investigation and procedure that it is hard to believe that only a little over thirty years ago it was considered "one of the worst law enforcement organizations in the country" and "almost a national disgrace."¹⁹

The following proposals are offered as effectual steps toward eliminating the use of the third degree, other police brutality, and wire-tapping abuses. Most of them are already the law or the practice, and all have the endorsement of leading police authorities or official bodies.

1. No law enforcement official should use force, threat, or other inducement of any kind to obtain a confession or other evidence of crime.

2. In all cases of arrest, the arresting officer shall take the person arrested before the committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. What might constitute unnecessary delay must be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. But it should definitely not be interpreted to include prolonged detention to determine guilt or innocence. This determination is the function of the court, not of the police, whose duty consists solely in the collection of sufficient evidence to support a charge against the accused.

3. Upon the arrest of a suspected person, and upon the taking of a voluntary statement from a person in custody, he should be cautioned that he is not obliged to say anything but if he does it may be used in evidence.

4. Persons taken into custody should be afforded the opportunity to consult legal counsel, and also relatives or friends if the interests of justice will not thereby be endangered.

5. Every complaint by a private person against a police officer should be investigated promptly. In minor cases the complainant should be informed of the outcome and the disciplinary action taken, if any; in cases involving attendance of the complainant at an inquiry, the hearings should be public; and a public accounting should be made at regular intervals of all charges and dispositions involving police officers.

6. Wire tapping by law enforcement

officials to obtain evidence in criminal and subversive cases should be discontinued, except where authorized by court order or warrant, to be issued only in cases where there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime or subversive activities may be thus obtained. Such an order must specify the line and the person involved, a time limit, and who may have access to the record or to whom the information may be disclosed. An accounting as to use of the order must be made to the court within a specified time and disposition of the record be provided for by the court. Violators of this procedure should be penalized.

Audrey M. Davies, J.D., is a senior staff member of the Institute of Public Administration, New York, and a member of the California State Bar. She was a staff member of the Committee on Uniform Crime Records of the International Association of Chiefs of Police during the years when the nation-wide system of crime reporting was initiated. As a member of the staff of various New York State commissions she has made legal studies of various governmental problems. She is the author of a number of articles on municipal government and on the police.

¹⁸ *Report, op. cit.*, p. 100.

¹⁹ Kidd, *op. cit. supra* note 2, p. 11.

Police Unions and the Public Safety

By DON L. KOOKEN and LOREN D. AYRES

UNIONIZATION for the police service has presented troublesome questions of policy for many years. A majority of police administrators are of the opinion that any attempt to apply modern concepts of unionism to the administration of public police service would disclose formidable disadvantages to police employees and to public safety as well. Despite the opinions of police leaders on the question, whenever and wherever severe public criticism of police service occurs, union organizers are quick to seize upon the occasion as an opportunity to arouse among police employees an interest in unionization. As a matter of fact low morale from any cause renders a police department vulnerable to the sales arguments of union organizers.

IMPLICATIONS

Although the past quarter century of police progress has recorded many great achievements, police service has failed to cope with crime. Effective enforcement of criminal law has been a basic responsibility of police service since the birth of the nation but, despite substantial additions of personnel at all levels of police service, statistics show continuing percentage increases in criminal offenses. Some of the blame may be placed upon political intervention, low salaries, overlapping jurisdiction, or corruption of officials, but these factors are not the basic causes of the breakdown. They are symptomatic of more fundamental factors, such as disorganization, lack of cohesion, or inadequate realistic leadership. A situation of this character has a profound effect on the public as well as on police personnel. The public becomes more and more critical

of police service and the thousands of loyal and capable police officers throughout the nation find themselves confused and greatly apprehensive of the future.

In other areas of public service there has been a marked trend toward employee unions, but the majority of police administrators are of the opinion that unionism in its present form cannot solve their problem. Before the question can be resolved, a careful examination must be made of unionism—what it offers and whether its objectionable features could be alleviated.

CRAFT UNIONS

Unions are organizations of craftsmen and tradesmen who are primarily engaged in the production of tangible products. The basic function of the union obviously is to deal with the problems arising between management and workmen. In these relationships the union represents the employee collectively in dealing with management; and though the published objectives of the union may include some altruistic aims, in reality they are more deeply concerned with matters of financial betterment.

The success of a union in discharging its obligation to its members is in direct ratio to the number of members involved. The negotiating power of a union depends upon the relative size of the organization; for that reason unions must rely to a great extent upon the power represented nationally rather than locally. Experience has demonstrated clearly that labor unions rely upon threats of force or even violence to obtain their objectives.

The professed aims of craft unions include the assurance of "majority rule,"

words which imply the autonomy of the local union. In practice, however, we find many instances where national labor leaders in the craft exercise dictatorial power over the locals throughout the nation. There are also recorded instances where organized criminal bands have seized control of local unions and have blocked all attempts of the members to remove them.

The craft unions point to the alluring benefits of collective bargaining in matters pertaining to wage and working conditions, the closed shop, and the checkoff system. The courts have declared, however, that municipalities, counties, and states are without power to enter into collective bargaining agreements with their employees. Statutes, civil service rules and regulations, and departmental regulations define the procedure under which police officers are selected and appointed and thus deny to police employees the benefits of the closed shop so greatly emphasized by craft unions. The courts have declared that in public employment there can be no discrimination of citizen against citizen, union member against nonunion member, where all other eligibility requirements are met. Finally the checkoff system, which provides for withholding union dues from the salaries due to employees, cannot be legally applied to police service, since state and local governments cannot legally be used as collection agencies for private debts.

Over the years a most effective weapon of the union has been the right to strike and although this right may be of importance to a local union when faced with an impasse in local negotiations, it would prove untenable when applied to the public service.

THE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL

In contrast with the selfish interest of craft unions, professional organizations

are composed of persons who are engaged in rendering a public service, a service that demands specialized performance and one that is unlimited by compensatory or financial evaluation. The objectives of professional service may seem less tangible than the aims of unionism, and professional ideals transcend all individual financial and social benefits.

The present complexity of law enforcement and public safety has increased the importance of police service to the extent that its present level is comparable to that of public health and public welfare. Both of these public services have enjoyed professional status for some time. For many years police leaders have been using the word profession in speaking of their activities, but as yet they have not given proper consideration to the responsibilities that the word implies.

If police service expects to take its place along with the honored professions of law, medicine, and education, it must accept the appurtenant responsibilities. Police service as it is now conducted does not meet all the requirements of a true profession and, though great progress has been made in a few departments, much remains to be done in the adjustment of police organizations to modern professional concepts. There are no obstacles to attainment of professional status so great that they cannot be surmounted if the police are willing.

The professional concept

Certain essentials are recognized in all professions. These essentials were clearly presented in a report of a committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police; they are in substance as follows:

1. A profession requires an organized body of knowledge held as a common

possession and extended by the united efforts of those engaged in the calling.

2. Facilities must be provided for professional training in these knowledges and procedures.

3. Standards or qualifications must be established and recognized by the members for admission to and identification with the profession.

4. There must be a professional organization of a substantial number of members qualified to practice the profession who will exercise an influence on the maintenance of professional standards and disciplines and who will promote programs of study and research to strengthen and improve present procedures.

5. There must be a code of ethics prescribing standards of conduct in the relationships of the members of the profession with the public and with each other and insisting on the obligation to render professional service for reasons beyond exclusively economic considerations.¹

The professional concept was very aptly presented by Philip Allen, assistant secretary of the Home Office in England, when he said:

The efficiency of the English police service depends at the bottom on the maintenance of happy relationships between police and the public. Sixty thousand unarmed policemen have the responsibility of maintaining the King's peace amongst forty million citizens and they can only do this if they preserve the regard and esteem of the community.

Through sheer devotion to the public interest, without other advantages, the police of Great Britain have come closer to the full acceptance of professional ideals than have those of any other country.

¹ International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Report of Committee on Professions*, 1938-39.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CRAFT UNIONS

The public demands of its servants more exemplary conduct than it expects of private citizens. It is an inescapable fact that a public official has no private life; as soon as he enters public service and as long as he remains therein, his conduct, whether on or off duty, will be subjected to the unrelenting scrutiny and critical analysis of the public he serves. The agents of law enforcement by reason of their specific responsibilities are bound to an even more exacting code than that applied to other public servants. Delinquencies in conduct that pass unchallenged when committed by other public officials, and acts that are accepted as commonplace in judging the propriety of the private citizen's conduct, are adjudged reprehensible when committed by policemen.

Police have done little as a group to set standards of official conduct for their members. They have relied in the main upon departmental rules and regulations to set the pattern for their public relationships. In most police organizations, however, such rules and regulations relate principally to specific techniques and procedures, and therefore they cannot have much influence in shaping the general official conduct of policemen in their relations with the public. Some law enforcement agencies place great reliance on the solemnity of the oath of office or departmental pledge to impel men to exemplary conduct but these oaths and pledges are usually at the other extreme from departmental regulations, being too brief and general to be of any great value as guides.

Inasmuch as craft unions are built upon the basic concepts of collective bargaining, the closed shop, and the right to strike, their objectives are concerned with the interests of a majority of the membership with emphasis upon

shorter hours, higher pay, and better working conditions, and they evince little concern over how their demands will affect the employer. When their basic concept is that the interests of the union override and are often contrary to the interests of the employer, their position becomes incongruous and untenable.

The union's consideration of employee capabilities usually ends with the prescribed apprenticeship, and from then on promotion is based principally upon seniority. This practice, with the theory behind it, runs contrary to the common principles of all merit systems, including civil service.

An example of the potential incompatibility of unionism and the professional ideal is found in the pledge required of members of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees:

I pledge my honor to observe faithfully the constitution and laws of this local of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and the rules and regulations for the government thereof; not to make public any of the proceedings of this local; to perform faithfully all the duties assigned to me; to support the products and services of organized labor by making purchases of such products and services; to so conduct myself at all times as not to bring reproach upon my local; and at all times to bear true and faithful allegiance to the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and to the labor movement in general.

Can a public police officer accept the above pledge and still be true to his oath of office?

REPRESENTATION

Although there are a large number of public police officers in the United States, they are not represented by any organization that would be comparable to the professional associations of law,

medicine, and education. This lack of an official representative body has resulted in the formation of many police associations and benefit societies, the majority of which are restricted to single departments or to specific services within a single department, even though they may have ambitions toward national or even international expansion. A few have developed rapidly; for example, the Fraternal Order of Police now has lodges located in twenty states of the Union and the order is still growing. Some of these associations are of long standing and include all levels of police personnel in their membership. They have recorded satisfactory accomplishments in many areas and a few have developed sufficient strength to constitute effective lobbying groups.

Departmental benefit and fraternal associations provide social activities for policemen and their families that have been strong incentives toward better morale. In the main these benefit associations have not aspired to national or international growth. In some areas the organization of police groups, leagues, and associations has been undertaken by professional organizers whose objectives are primarily mercenary. In these attempts some solicitation of funds from outside usually develops and often results in damaging compromise. In most cases these activities are short-lived but in their brief period of existence they may become very damaging to public support.

Some police administrators bitterly oppose the formation of any outside association of police officers, on the ground that as public servants policemen cannot subject themselves to control by any outside agency. A few police administrators have taken exception to a practice followed by a number of police associations of issuing associate membership and courtesy cards to citizens who are in no way connected with police

services. One administrator, who fears the compromising implications in such associate memberships, has enacted departmental regulations which forbid any member of the department to accept membership in an association that solicits associate memberships among persons not connected with law enforcement.

Even though some of these police associations have national and international possibilities, in no instance has there been any real progress toward welding the rank and file of police into a truly professional organization. Although the International Association of Chiefs of Police, as presently organized, does not represent the rank and file of police service, it claims that one of its principal purposes is to emphasize the professional character of policing to the public in order to secure full public support of law enforcement. To carry out this obligation, a committee on professionalization was formed. Yet after fifteen or more years of existence, the IACP has failed to record any decisive action toward its avowed purpose. Therefore it would seem that the greatest deterrent to professionalization, at this time, is the police themselves. There is no question that the American Bar Association has been eager to help the police service to attain professional standing and that it has made constructive efforts in this direction. In the last year the American Bar Association's Committee on Organized Crime prepared a model statute by which it sought to improve police service and initiate a step toward professionalization, but its efforts in this instance were very coolly received by the IACP.

A strong selling argument of craft unions in their attempt to penetrate the field of public service has been their claim that by group action ends may be gained that cannot possibly be secured by individual means; they particularly

stress the fact that unionization means strength. This promise is particularly alluring to policemen, who naturally desire benefits—social, financial, and other—and who feel that most of the rank and file have no voice or part in shaping their own destiny.

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

The most effective weapon used by unions in pressing their demands is the threat of strike, and although wide publicity has been given to their political strength it now appears that this alleged power was greatly overrated. The larger craft unions do considerable lobbying at both national and state levels, yet they are not much more effective than are the present police organizations and associations.

There is little direct legislation or judicial opinion relating to the right of police officers to organize into unions and to resort to the use of the strike as a means of securing compliance with their demands. In the absence of legal interpretation it is necessary to examine some trend implied in informal opinions and a few court decisions on questions that were closely related. In these instances the comments and opinions, which are reflective of public opinion and desire, are based upon four concepts.

1. The people, as the employer, must have unilateral control of policy in the management of public police service.²
2. No person acting for the employer can bind the employer in a contractual relationship.³
3. Police service is concerned with emergencies and therefore intentional

² Coane v. Geary, 298 Ill. App. 199, 18 N.E. 2d 719 (1939).

³ Charles S. Rhyne, *Labor Unions and Municipal Employee Law* (Washington: National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, [cop. 1946]), pp. 416-18.

work stoppages would constitute misfeasances.

4. Employment as a police officer does not constitute a right, but on the contrary is a privilege, subject to such control groups as boards of safety and civil service commissions, who may set the conditions of employment.⁴

Government exists for the protection of life and property and to safeguard the liberty of its citizens. In order to insure the full protection of all citizens sovereignty must be maintained. Any defect in police service is a weakness of the governmental unit. As agents of government policemen can have no other allegiance than to their government, particularly in the exercise of the authority granted them by law.

Despite the limitations which are placed upon our police, their authority and power is great. As long as control remains in the hands of government and government remains in the hands of the people, we need have no fear of this chartered power and authority.

Various opinions

The peculiar status of our police forces has been recognized by our courts whenever issues involving the loyalties and obligations of police have come up. In *Coane v. Geary* the court quoted as follows:

A police force is peculiar, *sui generis*, you may say, in its formation and its relation to the city government. It is practically an organized force resembling in many respects a military force, organized under the laws of the United States and equally as important as to the functions it is required to perform. . . . It is a department which requires that the members of it shall surrender their individual opinion and power to act, and submit to that of a controlling head just as much as the com-

mon soldier must surrender his own opinion and power of action to that of his commanding officer. And there is the same necessity of discipline—of regulation existing in the police department that exists in regard to the military department.⁵

The American Federation of Labor as early as 1897 was opposed to police unions on the ground that "it is not within the province of the trade union movement to especially organize policemen."⁶ Later the American Federation of Labor reversed its earlier holding.

Calvin Coolidge, as governor of Massachusetts, said in justifying the dismissal of Boston police after their strike of 1919:

A strike of policemen of a great city, leaving that city at the mercy of an army of thugs, is a crime against civilization. In my judgment, the obligation of a policeman is as sacred and direct as the obligation of a soldier. He is a public servant, not a private employee, and the whole honor of the community is in his hands. He has no right to prefer any private advantages to public safety.⁷

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a letter to the president of the National Federation of Federal Employees in 1937, said:

All government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The

⁵ Coane v. Geary, 298 Ill. App. 199, 18 N.E. 2d 719 (1939), quoting "an opinion of the late Judge Murray F. Tuley, . . . rendered in the case of *O'Regan v. City of Chicago*, on November 29, 1904 (Chicago Legal News, Vol. 37, p. 150, Dec. 24, 1904)."

⁶ Emma Schweppe, *The Firemen's and Patrolmen's Unions in the City of New York* (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1948), p. 25.

⁷ Sterling Denhard Spero, *Government as Employer* (New York: Remsen Press, 1948), p. 252.

⁴ McNatt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); *City of Jackson v. McLeod*, 24 So. 2d 319 (Miss. 1946).

very nature and purposes of government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with government employee organizations. The employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personal matters.

Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of Government employees. Upon employees in the Federal service rests the obligation to serve the whole people, whose interests and welfare require orderliness and continuity in the conduct of government activities. This obligation is paramount. Since their own services have to do with the functioning of the government, a strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.⁸

CONCLUSION

Law enforcement machinery is an instrument of the people, and the effectiveness of its application depends upon the preparation, training, and integrity of the policemen upon whose shoulders the burden of application falls. There is no short cut to a solution; there is no new technique or procedure that can be

advanced as a panacea. The crime problem is slowly but steadily growing despite increases in police strength, exposures of crime combines, investigations by legislative committees and by civilian crime commissions, and eloquent promises of political aspirants. At every session of our legislatures, state and national, myriads of new laws are passed, some describing new criminal offenses, many amending the old, a great majority introduced in the fatuous belief that crime may be reduced by putting teeth into the law.

As the records stand, unions have in no way demonstrated their ability to aid in meeting the past needs of law enforcement, and an examination into their methods and procedures fails to give any encouragement that they can be depended upon in future developments. August Vollmer states that it is now evident that an entirely new method of combating crime must be devised, one based upon facts and scientific research, and that every law enforcement officer should be professionally trained for the office he occupies.⁹

The professionalization of police service now rests in the hands of the policemen themselves, but it is doubtful whether there is sufficient interest among them at this time to effect the transition. Recently a growing public dissatisfaction in police service has been evident, and this public interest and concern may do much to expedite a true professionalization of police service.

⁹ *The Criminal* (Brooklyn, N. Y.: Foundation Press, 1949), pp. 447-48.

Don L. Kookan, Bloomington, Indiana, is assistant professor of police administration and chairman of the Department of Police Administration of Indiana University and also associate editor, for police science, of the *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*. Earlier he was a special agent of the United States Treasury Department and director of personnel and training for the Indiana State Police.

Loren D. Ayres, Bloomington, Indiana, is an instructor in the Department of Police Administration of Indiana University. He was formerly a member of the Indiana State Police.

Book Department

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

BROWN, WILLIAM ADAMS, JR., and REDVERS OPIE. *American Foreign Assistance*. Pp. xii, 615. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1953. \$6.00.

Over \$90 billion of foreign assistance was made available by the United States during the twelve years, 1941-52. This support, as an instrument of American foreign policy, has raised many complex and controversial issues, which Drs. Brown and Opie analyze in carefully competent and meticulous detail. They trace the various programs, from lend-lease through mutual security, examine the policy issues that arose, and appraise the results achieved, in this first authoritative survey of the assistance record as a whole.

The study is divided into six parts. The first deals with aid during World War II; the second with early postwar assistance policy; the third with European recovery, principally the Marshall Plan and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA); the fourth mainly with aid programs for Asia and the underdeveloped countries. Part Five is devoted to military assistance and mutual security, while the final part provides an evaluation of policies and op-

erations over the whole twelve-year period.

That our foreign aid programs were effective first in helping to defeat wartime fascist dictatorships, and later in containing what was likely, in the absence of postwar help, to have been a far greater expansion of the Communist dictatorship than actually occurred, is made abundantly clear. That Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, France, and others might have been engulfed by the octopus tentacles of Soviet Communist imperialism, had it not been for the Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan, ECA, and the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), is an inescapable conclusion of this excellent study. The authors declare: "Whatever degree of confidence may be felt that the existing crisis in international relations may be overcome without another world war is in large measure attributable to the counterpoise to the forces of aggression provided by American power," and, "In looking at the record of foreign assistance during the past 12 years, the conclusion is inescapable that impressive results have been achieved in overcoming the economic and military weaknesses of the immediate postwar years. By maintaining foreign assistance during the cold war, the United States has in addition exposed increasingly the mere-

tricious character of the Communist ideological appeal and kept people from going over into the Communist camp."

Whatever impact this survey may have on the formulation of future policy will be all to the good in view of its wise and reasoned conclusions. The authors, for example, warn against the end of economic assistance, declaring, "Least of all should economic strength be put in a secondary place, because it is the foundation of military strength." And they realistically note that an almost indefinite continuation of foreign aid may be a necessity of American policy. It is to be regretted that policy developments of the new administration in this area could not have been subjected to the authoritative and informed scrutiny of the authors. It would not be very difficult, however, to guess how they view the probable end of all economic aid, the evisceration of Point Four, and the unfortunate prospect of less trade and less aid.

JEROME B. COHEN

College of The City of New York

MACK, ROBERT T., JR. *Raising the World's Standard of Living; The Coordination and Effectiveness of Point Four, United Nations Technical Assistance, and Related Programs*. Pp. xviii, 285. New York: Citadel Press, 1953. \$4.00.

This work presents a detailed documentation of the efforts over the first half of this century of the more developed nations to aid in the socioeconomic development of the less advanced countries. Viewed only as such a documentation, it is of importance both to the observer and the practitioner in the current national and international efforts to aid the underdeveloped areas. This history of activity before the last war provides perspective often lost sight of in discussions of this problem.

However, this is more than a mere historical treatment of the problem. With the historical base, the author demonstrates the growing need for co-ordination of the activities of the various agencies, national and international, offering assistance. It is here, perhaps, that the author presumes too great an understanding of the problem on the part of the casual reader. There is no clear-cut analysis of the dangers inherent

in the lack of, and thus the imperative need for, co-ordination in this field. This is unfortunate because the need is apparent to the practitioners but perhaps is not so evident to that very casual reader whose assistance is necessary if effective corrective measures are to be insisted upon and taken.

The author then proceeds with an exhaustive study of the procedural steps taken by the United Nations to provide co-ordination for the expanded program of Technical Assistance being undertaken by it and the specialized agencies; of the similar steps taken by illustrative regional organizations; and of the steps taken by the United States as an aid-giving nation. There is here a fine portrayal of the conflict of interest inherent in attempts at any level to achieve co-ordination of the activities of groups of agencies with specialized interests whose representatives want the blessings of co-ordination but dislike sacrificing their own control of their individual programs. The description of the UN and regional actions is also a good portrayal of the conflicting interests of the participating governments.

The study is rounded out by a description of an aid-recipient country. This does disclose the conflicts in an aid-recipient country which interfere with the carrying out of balanced development programs but since it is limited to one country would seem to be of limited value as an illustration.

It is unfortunate that the study was ended in June of 1950 because by that time the programs of Technical and Economic Assistance in question had not been in operation long enough to allow the author to analyze the effectiveness of the co-ordination procedures in action.

WILLIAM E. MORAN, JR.

Washington, D. C.

THOMAS, ANN VAN WYNEN. *Communism Versus International Law: Today's Clash of Ideals*. Pp. xiv, 145. Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 1953. \$3.75.

The author holds degrees of A.B., LL.B., and LL.M., from Rochester, Texas, and Southern Methodist Universities respec-

tively. As State Department Foreign Service Officer she was assigned to the Union of South Africa to study social welfare problems and "had ample opportunity to observe the workings of international law."

From an impressive background of recent literature the author surveys the development of international law among the ancient Chinese, Hindus, Greeks, and Romans, tracing it through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Reformation, and through the periods of Enlightenment, Positivism, and present-day Scepticism. Of the post-Reformation era, Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and followers are duly cited as Protestant writers with the religio-ethical approach. Following the vogue among latter-day authors, Mrs. Thomas passes by Victoria, Ayala, and Suarez, of the Counter-Reformation, though Grotius concedes that the works of the first two "may be of service to others." Suarez, whom Grotius does not mention, anticipated the latter in the significant differentiation between *jus gentium* and *jus inter gentes*, law of nations and law among nations (international law). The writings of Victoria, Ayala, Suarez, Grotius, and followers are available in English in *Classics of International Law* published by the Carnegie Institution for International Peace.

The author's fundamental approach is revealed in the chapter- and subheadings, here condensed and simplified: Ethical nature of international law in relation to natural law, Christianity, and democracy, with derivative concepts of tolerance, equity, good faith, and indestructible rights of the individual. Concepts of international law toward a core of common reaction and sense of justice. Marxian ideological impact on international law in relation to morality, individual, and war, in the setting of semantic fraud. Revitalization of the ethical basis and efficacy of mid-twentieth century international law in the frame of Western concepts and democratic co-operation.

In summary, the basis of law and order is the golden rule for individual, family, community, and nation, as the foundation for the security of civilization. Militant Shintoism, Fascism, and Nazism were checked in World War II. Expanding

in its ruthless materialism, Communism threatens to succeed where the other isms failed. Only by mutual practice of the golden rule may the free world hope to stem the new aggressor in his cold war designs.

This crusading little book commends attention from lay and professional organizations alive to the problem of enforcement of international law as posed by the inconclusive results of the United Nations' punitive Korean venture.

JOHANNES MATTERN

The Johns Hopkins University

CLINE, HOWARD F. *The United States and Mexico*. Pp. xvi, 452. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$6.00.

This original, penetrating analysis will awaken interest and commendation not only among students of Mexico and of Mexican-United States relations but among students of international affairs generally. Employing the techniques of anthropology, Dr. Cline has produced a study which is at once substantial and sensitive, solid and perceptive. Not before have we had such a book on Mexico. Now that it has come it will afford much stimulation and delight.

Mexico and the United States are neighboring countries. Thus they have been for an appreciable time. Thus they promise to be for some time to come. Over the years, their relations have presented all the variety which one would have considered most tempting to the taste of historians and analysts of international fare. It is curious that they have been relatively so neglected by scholars on both sides of the border.

The works of such scholars as Samuel Flagg Bemis, J. Fred Rippey, J. M. Callahan, and Frank Tannenbaum have provided introductions to the subject of United States-Mexican relations. The studies of F. S. Dunn, S. A. McCardle, R. D. Gregg and W. C. Gordon have been on specialized aspects of these relations. All of these have been notable and useful but we have been greatly in need of more. This need the full and perceptive study of Dr. Cline goes far toward meeting. As the first com-

prehensive study of our neighbor to the south and our relations with it, his book achieves an enviable familiarity with the wide range of factors—psychological as well as economic, political, and military—which have strangely compounded these relationships. It possesses, as I have said, all the perceptiveness of an anthropological approach.

At the same time, I know Dr. Cline will be the first to welcome a discussion of certain of his views. This cannot be extensive in so concise a space as this. But I can give a few samples of the questions which he raises. Dr. Cline states it as a "fundamental consideration" that Mexico "will remain very Mexican" (p. 2). However, Mexico grows less and less "Mexican" with each passing year, and its uneasiness over this development is one of the most perceptible factors in its political and commercial relations with the United States. I find it also difficult to agree that "the late-nineteenth-century Mexican system against which the Revolution was launched had been largely constructed and run by Porfirio Díaz and his supporters" (p. 5). "Run," yes; but I believe a fairly creditable case could be made that the Revolution was and continues to be against a system in many significant features indigenous, some of which were reinforced by Cortés. The Díaz regime seems to have been a later veneer of an old system. Nor do I believe Mexican history justifies the statement that "Mexicans since 1910 have been valiantly and stubbornly starting nearly everything from scratch" (p. 5).

There will be readers who will question, also, such statements as that which credits Mexico with exercising "consistent leadership in hemispheric affairs" (p. 9). Dr. Cline's belief that contacts between the two countries are now "largely routine" may have been responsible for a treatment of the *afosa* story (pp. 394-5) in routine fashion whereas the latter was as revealing as any development of recent years of the imaginative tact and ingenuity that are contributed to the relationships of these two countries of different histories and mentalities. Such passages as these make the book something less than perfect, but it stands as an original, penetrating, well-

rounded analysis for which all those who seek understanding of and among the human family can be indeed most grateful.

R. SMITH SIMPSON

Bombay, India

HUGHES, H. STUART. *The United States and Italy*. Pp. xiii, 256. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$4.00.

This short book (overpriced in view of its brevity) is published in the "American Foreign Policy Library," now edited by Professor Donald C. McKay. The first three chapters give a bird's eye view of Italy, its land, people, and history. Chapters 3-6 briefly describe the Fascist regime both before and during World War II. Chapters 7-9 deal with the Christian Democrats, their political policies as well as their failure to handle the underlying economic and population pressures of Italy in an effective and imaginative manner. The tenth, and last, chapter of the book covers "Italy and the Atlantic Community," including an all-too-brief discussion of Italo-American relations. Despite the title, the book is therefore more in the nature of a general introduction into Italy's past and present rather than an analysis of the United States and Italy, as the title promises.

Professor Stuart is very well qualified to write on Italy, as he understands both the pressing economic and institutional problems of the country as well as its psychological imponderables. It is therefore doubly regrettable that the book does not quite come off. In the first place, the volume is so short that the material rarely opens up new vistas of fact or interpretation. Secondly, in the opinion of this reviewer too much of the scarce space is allocated to background and history, and too little to contemporary problems. Italy is vulnerable to both Communist penetration and neo-Fascist revival, and its loss to the free world would be of immense importance. The author would therefore have performed a greater service by concentrating on the crucial issues of the present and the prospects of the near future rather than by going over well covered ground of

the pre-Fascist and Fascist periods. Professor Hughes shows penetrating judgment and perspective in appraising the postwar regime under the leadership of de Gasperi and other Christian Democrats. He sharply criticizes the Christian Democrats for their failures, in particular, in the economic and social realm, but he is realistic enough to see that, given the circumstances of the Italian situation, the alternatives of Communism or Fascism would hardly have been preferable from the Italian or general Western viewpoint.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN

Princeton University

HUREWITZ, J. C. *Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy*. Pp. xiv, 273. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. \$3.75.

Written early in 1953, this volume is a concise summary of the foreign affairs of Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Palestine-Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. With the emphasis on the contemporary scene, Dr. Hurewitz has demonstrated the rapid growth of American concern and involvement within the area during the last decade. He classifies, perhaps unjustly, most of the present unresolved situations in the region, and principally those of Suez, Iranian oil, and the partition of Palestine as the dilemmas for the United States in the Middle East.

The impasse of the British with regard to Egypt and the Canal and the Sudan and to Iran and the oil company is still with us, but present indications lead one to surmise that acceptable compromises and solutions may not be too far removed. Thus, some of the dilemmas may be more apparent than real. As for the Arab-Israeli struggle, Dr. Hurewitz has marshaled facts and figures to support his contention of a dilemma there for the United States. The manner in which some of these facts have been presented leaves in a number of places something to be desired, with the result that the total picture is not entirely objective. Anyway, the dilemma on this point is not in the Middle East so much as it is on this side of the Atlantic!

The most important sections of the book

are those which tell the story of the evolving affairs of the individual states of the Middle East with the outside world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The rivalries of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Germany are shown in fine perspective within the framework of the Ottoman Empire and the growing nationalisms of the local populations. Dr. Hurewitz rightly emphasizes the problems facing the United States in this area and stresses the difficulties of strengthening the political, economic, and military forces of the countries as part of the policy of containment of Soviet Russia at a time when the force of Britain, America's ally, is being sorely tried by Iran's nationalization of oil resources and by the demands of the renaissance Arabs.

For the moment this is the true dilemma, and Dr. Hurewitz's two concluding chapters indicate how the United States is trying to remove this dilemma—one by economic and technical assistance, and the other through a more skillful diplomacy in explaining American aims and in clearly demonstrating the meaning of American democracy.

SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER

Ohio State University

KIMCHE, JON. *Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East 1945-1952*. Pp. xxvi, 439. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. \$4.50.

At the end of 1951, the author of this book reminds us, Americans picked the Persian Premier Mossadegh as "the Man of the Year," and the British selected him as their choice for "the Joke of the Year." The Middle East, in the words of Jon Kimche, is becoming an American, rather than a British, headache. As British influence is declining, American is taking its place. And the author's great question is: Can American capitalism embark in this area on a progressive social policy which alone, he believes, can bring political stability? Can it find willing allies among the local peoples in that policy's pursuit?

They can do so only if they are willing to heed the lessons of the past and learn from made-in-Britain mistakes. "To trace how, often with the highest motives, the

British went wrong, is the main purpose of this book."

The British made common cause, the author tells us, with the pashas and effendis of the region. That was and still is the ruling minority, feudalistically self-centered, unaware of the existence of the great twentieth century "revolt of the masses." They preach patriotism but seldom practice it, except when xenophobia pays rich dividends.

It is the paradox of paradoxes that the British cultivated effendi affiliations for presumably democratic reasons. The Middle East became their bailiwick after World War I, where Pax Britannica had one of its main pivots. That peace could be maintained, in their view, by co-operating with the regional masters. Theirs was not the mission to foment social revolutions. Democracy demanded that the wishes of the "natives" should be heeded. These natives were the effendis and through them Britain ruled.

The falsity of this policy was revealed in the spring of 1948, the author tells us, when a handful of Jews defeated the Arab world. "The Arab officers were too fat," another observer had said, "the soldiers were too lean." The effendi rule was then exposed to the challenge to which the response was missing. This revealed the danger facing the Western World. The Arab Middle East is filled with independent countries only on the map. In reality, no country is independent that displays such weakness. The pivotal point of one of the great strategic areas has turned out to be a power vacuum. On the very edges of this void the Soviets are in ambush. This is the kind of situation furnishing the explosive ingredients of which world tragedies are made.

The "Seven Pillared Worthy House" of T. E. Lawrence, which was to house the free people of the Middle East, is in ruins. However, the author does not despair if America can learn from Britain's error and makes an attempt to work with the representatives of the people and not merely with those of material interests. The two forgotten people, Arab and Jew, may yet build up the Worthy House.

EMIL LENGYEL
New York University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

BURKE, ROBERT E. *Olson's New Deal for California*. Pp. xi, 279. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. \$4.00.

If, as President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt had the advantage of all the breaks, they were all against Culbert Olson as Governor of California. As Burke points out, California embraced the New Deal too late; Olson was a victim of bad luck—his own ill health, the death of his wife, the almost complete absence of press support; his strange lack of tact and statesmanlike leadership created enemies who blocked his reform program.

The book is based upon Mr. Burke's doctoral dissertation—which comes as no surprise to the reader. He has employed something like 100,000 words to develop his thesis, which is more than ample copy; his bibliography covers almost a dozen pages, including between 35 and 40 unpublished theses and dissertations; footnote citations, collected at the end of the book, run to a staggering total of between 800 and 900. The inclusion of innumerable details, many of them of slight significance, and the introduction of numerous quite inconspicuous persons may unfortunately be characteristic of doctoral dissertations, but they certainly do not make for smooth reading and do tend to impair the perspective of the whole. • There is evidence of prodigious industry and meticulousity; but the busy reader is likely to complain that the product savors of the boy Einstein referred to as "trying to split wood with his razor." Because of this, certain matters of major import, as the evacuation of the Japanese from California during the Second World War, under orders of General John L. DeWitt, are not given sufficient relative importance.

The author succeeds in presenting a dispassionate treatise, though the style of the book would be considerably enhanced if it had a little of the sparkle of Upton Sinclair as he proclaimed his E P I C program preceding the Olson administration.

Governor Olson came to power in the depth of the great depression (the election was held November 8, 1938)—the first

Democratic governor following a long succession of Republican administrations. He had his moments of triumph and glory, as when in 1940 he headed the delegation to the Democratic National Convention. But bitter disappointment was his when he failed to hold his own party in line, or even to hold it together. He was never quite able to discover the correct formula for really successful administration. And then, during much of his administration, there was the constant threat of recall hanging over his head. There was precious little clear sailing throughout his entire term. Here was "a governor whose New Deal never came to pass," despite his high professions and lofty ideals.

The publisher of Burke's book has done an expert job of printing, as one would expect, though a very small number of errors and a few pages with blurred printing (pp. 86, 98, 114) have slipped in. But two or three questions come to the reviewer's mind. Was it desirable to emphasize further the already solemn subject matter by binding the book in lugubrious dead black? And just how do the innovations of using completely lower case letters for chapter headings and the placing of page headlines at the bottom—in caps—comport with the otherwise somber appearance of the volume and the seriousness of its contents?

Dr. Burke's book will probably not attract a very large number of popular readers; but it constitutes a detailed account of one of the most interesting chapters in California's recent political history. The serious student will be grateful for his scrupulously painstaking record.

ROCKWELL D. HUNT
College of the Pacific

Craven, Avery O. *The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861*. Vol. VI of "A History of the South" edited by Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter. Pp. xv, 433. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953. \$6.50.

To obtain the integrated picture of the development of Southern nationalism, one should read in rapid succession Professor Sydnor's *The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-48* and Professor Crav-

en's *The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861*. For, as Craven points out, the period covered by his volume is a continuation and an acceleration of the trends and forces already active. The sectional issues of the entire period from 1800 to 1860 were concerned chiefly with the acquisition and organization of territories and states. The Louisiana Purchase, the admission of the state of Louisiana, the admission of Missouri, and the annexation of Texas were the larger issues prior to 1845; the Mexican War with its territorial acquisitions, the Kansas-Nebraska controversy, the Dred Scott decision, and the campaign of 1860 were the basic sectional territorial issues after 1845.

The sectional balance of power, the expansion or restriction of slavery as a political and moral issue, were the very essence of all these sectional controversies over territories. The winning side in the organization of a territory or state stood to gain two senators and one or more representatives.

In the earlier years, the issue of slavery had been primarily political. But as time passed, spokesmen of the North, swayed by the abolitionist zealots, more and more cast slavery in the role of an all-pervasive sin. Slavery came to be the dark symbol of all things Southern. For the North, to keep slavery out of the territories, and thus put an end to its expansion and to the power of the South in the national government, was a great moral duty. At the same time, however, it was understood that such weakening of the political power of the agricultural South would bring untold benefits to the economic interests of the rapidly industrializing Northern sections—often at Southern expense.

With the annexation of Texas, the territorial limits of slavery seem to have been reached. After that the territorial issue was a battle over abstractions: The North insisted on the moral right to exclude slavery from those arid and barren regions from which nature had already excluded it; and at the same time Southern leaders were demanding their "constitutional rights" to carry slavery into these same territories where it could not go, and to have it protected.

Running through Mr. Craven's volume is the theme that, in the minds of the Northern people on the one hand, and of the Southern people on the other, the sectional quarrel was between *moral right* and *constitutional rights*. But it should always be remembered that the American people from the days of the Revolution had regarded constitutional rights—life, liberty, property, freedom of speech, and so on—as God-given natural rights, certainly *moral rights*: *Right* and *rights* were identical in the minds of most Americans.

The great contribution that Mr. Craven makes in this generally readable and useful account of the period is his thorough study of popular Southern reaction to the sectional issues as revealed in the public press. It is the picture of a conservative people, not greatly swayed by the bitter debates in and out of Congress, slowly and regretfully reaching the conclusion that separation from the North was necessary for the survival of the South.

FRANK L. OWSLEY

University of Alabama

PRATT, FLETCHER. *Stanton: Lincoln's Secretary of War*. Pp. xiii, 520. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953. \$5.95.

This book will bring pleasure to those who have wanted a new, virile, and appreciative book-length account of Edwin Stanton. Probably no one has ever minded having Stanton's faults pointed out; but many have been annoyed at the malevolent calumny that has been heaped upon him. They have wished to have it reaffirmed in ringing sentences that Stanton was truly a great Secretary of War—exact, efficient, incorruptible himself and dreaded by those who were corruptible—who did not engage in devious practices to thwart his Chief or frustrate generals.

The book moves swiftly. But Mr. Pratt was not so eager to see Stanton cleaning up the bad legacy of Simon Cameron that he slighted his youth and education in Ohio, his rapid rise to the top of the legal profession, his family life, and his previous service to the country. Stanton cleared government titles to lands in California

worth about \$150 million, showing alleged conveyances from Mexico to be fraudulent; no dollar tag can be put on his stiffening influence in the Buchanan administration after he became Attorney General in December 1860.

With preliminaries well disposed of, one can imagine Mr. Pratt taking satisfaction in having Stanton post, in the War Office on January 20, 1862, an order saving one day a week for Congressmen, one for the public, and reserving the other four to "active operations in the field." Effectively he comments, "He was the man of war in the place of war." The 270 pages that follow are essentially an account of the Civil War as seen from the Secretary's office, with emphasis on capacities—frequently incapacities—of generals, Stanton's relations with Lincoln, and his own acts. Occasionally there may be a minor error (Confederate forces did not go through Cumberland Gap in August 1862, for it was then in Federal hands), but the over-all account and evaluations are, according to this reviewer's judgment, discriminating and sound.

Less than 40 pages are devoted to the period from Lincoln's death to that of Stanton, a few days after he was appointed to the Supreme Court. (Mr. Pratt has him die on December 23, 1869, instead of December 24.) But the essentials of the Reconstruction controversy are there, unencumbered, clearly analyzed, and readably set forth. Just as Mr. Pratt sees military events and personages from a good background, so he grasps political questions realistically. He does not gloss over attacks on Stanton. He gives, in fact, an appendix that deals with the controversies.

Some may criticize because Mr. Pratt did not delve extensively into new sources and come up with fresh facts. No new facts, however, will change the minds of those who accept what McClellan and Welles said about Stanton; and without discounting the importance of further research, one can urge that what was first needed was a reappraisal such as Mr. Pratt has given.

KENNETH P. WILLIAMS

Indiana University

RODICK, BURLEIGH CUSHING. *American Constitutional Custom: A Forgotten Factor in the Founding*. Pp. xx, 244. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. \$4.75.

The theme of this volume is that the United States has a political and constitutional heritage derived from English customs and at the same time from constitutional customs which were the product of the American political climate. In support of this conclusion Mr. Rodick mobilizes documentary and secondary materials from English history and American colonial and national history from 1620 to 1829 in seven chapters, 140 pages of text, 66 pages of notes, and 26 pages of bibliography. With the author's emphasis on the historical continuity of English political principles, institutions, and practices in American constitutional development few will take exception. However, by this time it is no novelty to read that the Constitution was not an original invention of the framers, but rather the product of generations and even centuries of English history and colonial experience.

Of a different nature is the manner in which the author links specific phases of American constitutional growth with certain so-called counterparts in English history and his extremely loose use of the term *custom* to which Mr. Rodick attributes a versatility it hardly possesses. Custom is used synonymously with traditions, habits, institutions, practices, and principles. Thus we find designated as customs such things as English feudalism (p. 13), struggles for power (p. 19), identification of one's intent with the general welfare (p. 20), poor administration and lax law enforcement (p. 26), the conflict between seaboard and frontier (p. 31), checks and balances (p. 28), smuggling (p. 37), and the oppression of the weak by the strong (p. 66), not to mention other examples of a similar nature.

Narrowly specific counterparts and parallels are found in the English Puritan Revolution and the American Revolution to demonstrate the continuity of custom broadly defined. Analogies between the defections of Edmund Waller and Charles Lee, the failures of the Uxbridge and

Staten Island Conferences (p. 49), the difficulties of Cromwell and Washington with Parliament and Congress (p. 49), John Milton and Thomas Paine (p. 55), and Stuart Restoration and the Constitution of 1789 (p. 67) are interesting, but have little bearing on the continuity of political traditions or institutions, however well they may describe a revolutionary process.

The author is on more solid and more familiar ground when he emphasizes the influence upon American constitutionalism of such matters as natural rights, Dr. Bonham's Case, the separation of powers, representative and judicial institutions, colonial charters, and the common law. Even here, however, he tends toward overemphasis when he finds a possible link between the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire and Presidential electors or when he magnifies the influence of Royal disallowance of laws upon the American scheme of judicial review.

By failing to confine his use of custom to a more scientific definition and by introducing interesting, but nonetheless irrelevant items, the author has impaired the effectiveness of his general theme. At the same time, however, he has compiled much valuable material in a short volume and has rendered a service in reminding us once again that American institutions, doctrines, and practices are neither so new and original nor so different as the mystical patriots would endeavor to make us believe. Because of the importance of the footnotes to the text of this book the irritating tendency of publishers to place footnotes at the end of books makes for an especial inconvenience in this instance.

ROBERT J. HARRIS

Louisiana State University

DUFFY, JOHN. *Epidemics in Colonial America*. Pp. xi, 274. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953. \$4.50.

Those who revel in the good old times should read this book! As epidemic followed epidemic, people lived in dread; people mourned the loss of the last one, and dreaded the next one. The task of assembling the data concerning infectious

diseases in Colonial America was not an easy one. There was very little formal medical literature concerning the matter, and this was very inaccurate. Statistics were almost unknown. So, from letters or diaries, newspapers, in fact anywhere that a record was made, Mr. Duffy has gleaned information which makes up this book.

The most dramatic and spectacular diseases were smallpox and yellow fever. They struck hard, and both had a high fatality. Yet it is surprising to find that the almost daily toll of diphtheria and dysentery probably exceeded the sum total of all deaths from yellow fever and smallpox. Respiratory diseases are placed next. It is interesting to know what a great ally infectious disease was to the Colonists—this because of the great susceptibility of the Indians, and their utter lack of any notion of quarantine! Many more Indians died from European diseases than from European weapons. The impression is gained from reading the book that these diseases assumed the greater importance not only in America but also in Europe during Colonial times. At any rate, we have better records of them. The recounting of one epidemic after another of smallpox becomes almost tedious because of the similarity. The tremendous variations in mortality also are notable. A great diminution of smallpox through inoculation is well brought out by the story. Yellow fever played less of a role because its ravages were principally confined to New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, South Carolina. Though the case mortality was extremely high, the total deaths were not great.

Diphtheria, called putrid sore throat, was regarded as a new disease. The case fatality among children was tremendous. Throughout the whole book the utter helplessness of the medical profession stands out. They do not appear to have been even the best informed persons, as some of the clergy wrote excellent descriptions. Measles, whooping cough, and mumps are seldom mentioned, had a low case mortality, and we know of their existence only through an occasional letter.

The book is a valuable compilation of data concerning epidemics. Much of the

evidence is inferential since there was great confusion concerning the identity of many of the diseases. However, it is a book to be well regarded and ought to hold a permanent place in medical history.

A. WARREN STEARNS, M.D.
Billerica, Massachusetts

BENEDICT, MURRAY R. *Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950: A Study of Their Origins and Development.* Pp. xv, 548. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953. \$5.00.

In the first place, this is a much larger book than the number of pages indicates, being printed in double columns running to 47 lines each. The first six chapters, covering 110 years in as many pages, are essentially just such chapters as might be found in a good general economic history textbook. Much of the material could be found in a general American history textbook. In fact, connecting links throughout the work are taken from one general American history and one American economic history textbook—good ones, but nevertheless elementary treatises. A brief treatment of the first century is justifiable on the basis that the full development of farm policy did not come until after 1900. The remainder of the book covers the first half of the present century in a wealth of detail, more factual than interpretative. It is a good book for ready reference but should be used by the reader only as a starting point for further investigation.

The author persistently ignores certain fundamental monographic works as though some preceptor was always at his elbow to warn against controversial matters. Certain other less reliable sources are sometimes used instead. For example, a statement on page 73 relating to the amount of land given by the federal government to railroads is taken from an article written by a railroad lobbyist and is flatly contradicted by the best, unbiased official studies that the present author does not even mention. Again, on page 112, he makes no attempt to defend the safety-valve theory against its attackers, but merely accepts it as though it had never been questioned. These approaches are typical of the book,

which can nevertheless be profitably read with caution.

FRED A. SHANNON

University of Illinois

DANIELS, WALTER M. (Ed.). *Presidential Election Reforms.* Pp. 200. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1953. \$1.75.

An excellent collection of secondary materials, this volume is brought out for the 1953-54 high school debates. It covers practically all phases of presidential elections, from the preconvention candidacies to the operation of the electoral college. One can scarcely think of a more fundamental area of our politics, for it encompasses the whole party system and the institutional organizations designed to create the executive and legislative agencies.

The editor has followed two criteria in the selection of materials—simplicity of language and brilliance of style. As a result, the great bulk of the materials come from professional journalists. This is both a strength and a weakness. On the credit side, these analysts are in constant contact with political operations. They write from the scene of "the Washington mess," from the press galleries of national conventions, from the presidential specials. But they know it, and understand it, largely from the personality angle. And, as a result, their analyses emphasize political figures and minimize institutional aspects which, after all, are far more important to the United States. The end result is that, as a collection, this is far inferior to the excellent textbooks which we have on the party system.

There are incisive articles by Dean McHenry, Harold Gosnell, Henry Steele Commager, James MacGregor Burns, Hugh Bone, and the late Carl Becker. These generally seek to evaluate the practices in terms of the Democratic schematization. But there are also articles by James A. Farley and Edward J. Flynn which are little more than exercises in self-appraisal. A great team makes a great coach. Franklin Delano Roosevelt could have been elected in any of his races with a national chairman who did nothing more than "pass out the chewing-gum." Reading them, one might easily come to the conclusion that

voters are docile creatures who can be herded by the stern shepherd into almost any political corral. The election of 1952 should successfully inter those antediluvian ideas about political allegiance. The editor might have overcome this weakness by including materials from Samuel Lubell and John Fischer.

Finally, the least satisfactory section is that dealing with the reform of the electoral college. Most of the materials included are written from a narrow partisan viewpoint. Messrs. Lodge and Gossett were thinking of the party system fifty years hence and not in the next election. For the most part, the commentaries on the Lodge-Gossett and Coudert proposals reveal very little interest in, or even understanding, of the higher philosophic demands of democracy.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING

University of Oklahoma

PINKOWSKI, EDWARD. *Washington's Officers Slept Here: Historic Homes of Valley Forge and Its Neighborhood.* Pp. 278. Philadelphia: Sunshine Press, 1953. \$5.00.

Valley Forge is one of our most hallowed places and symbols. The courage and consecration evidenced by Washington and his men during the winter of 1777-1778 will be remembered as long as Americans cherish liberty. Thus any book which deals with Valley Forge will find a receptive audience.

Edward Pinkowski, former newspaper columnist and book reviewer, has spent many years absorbing the atmosphere of the region and doing the research for this volume. His book is divided into 34 chapters, most of them dealing with a single house in which one or more of Washington's officers had headquarters during the winter. The typical chapter is made up of four parts: an account of the use of the house as a military headquarters, a brief account of the military career of the officer or officers quartered there, the history of the building of the house and its early owners, and an account of the present owners and of what they have done to improve, beautify, or otherwise change the building and grounds. It thus becomes a combination of military

history, local history, folklore, and contemporary guide book.

The two opening chapters deal with Washington's headquarters and the camp's bakehouse. Some of the following chapters are concerned with the headquarters of such Revolutionary generals as Baron von Steuben, James M. Varnum, Jedediah Huntington, Johann deKalb, John Sullivan, Enoch Poor, Casimir Pulaski, Anthony Wayne, Henry Knox, William Alexander (Lord Stirling), Marquis de Lafayette, Charles Lee, and Nathanael Greene.

There are 36 illustrations (largely photographs of the various houses described), a bibliography, and an index which is of only limited usefulness. There is no documentation. The end papers consist of an interesting map of the Valley Forge region, locating all of the houses discussed in the text. The book contains frequent generalizations which are unfounded, ridiculous, or both, such, for example, as the following: "Don't you think Benedict Arnold would be one of our national heroes today—if it hadn't been for his meeting with Robert Shewell on June 4, 1778, in the Coates house?" (p. 237), or the uncritical acceptance of the traditional account of the Conway Cabal (pp. 50, 51, 103-104). The style is clumsy with awkward, disjointed sentences and poorly organized paragraphs. The book is also characterized by some of the most careless typesetting and proof-reading that this reviewer has ever seen. Yet from the very nature of the material there is much here that will interest many people.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
State University Teachers College
Cortland, New York

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

HARROD, R. F. *Economic Essays*. Pp. xiii, 301. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953. \$4.50.

This welcome volume comprises a select collection of essays by one of the foremost British economists of the past three decades. Many of the articles first appeared in leading English and American economic

journals; these are supplemented, and the general framework of the volume rounded out, by others written for this specific occasion.

The collection is presented under four general headings, of which the second is the most extensive: (1) Man-Power, (2) Competition, (3) Employment, and (4) General.

The first block comprises two essays on "The Population Problem" (1944) and on "Equal Pay for Men and Women" (1945).

The second block contains several articles concerning the economic theory of the firm and industry, articles that are familiar landmarks to any serious student of the theory of imperfect or monopolistic competition as it unfolded in the late 1920's and 1930's. Reprinted here are the "Notes on Supply" (1930), "The Law of Decreasing Costs" (1926), "A Further Note on Decreasing Costs" (1932), "The Equilibrium of Duopoly" (1934), "Doctrines of Imperfect Competition" (1934), "The Theory of Imperfect Competition" (new), "Theory of Profit" (new), and "Profiteering: an Ethical Study" (1939).

The third section includes four essays in the general field of macro-economic analysis: "The Expansion of Credit in an Advancing Community" (1934), "Keynes and Traditional Theory" (1937), "An Essay in Dynamic Theory," and "Supplement on Dynamic Theory," the latter rounding out the previous discussion.

The last section contains one paper, "Professor F. A. Von Hayek on Individualism" (1945).

One cannot but be impressed, in reading (or rereading) these essays, with the sense of current relevance that they convey. Nor can he fail to note with appreciation the conciseness, clarity, and directness of expository writing which are distinguishing hallmarks of Harrod's work. Would that more of us could follow his example.

This collection is one that should be a welcome addition to the library of any serious student of economic theory and public affairs, and a virtual must on the reading list of the potential doctoral candidate in economics. Much of it can be perused with profit by any intelligent layman who is interested in the texture and

content of contemporary economic thinking on questions of basic theory and policy.

A. M. McISAAC

Syracuse University

UPGREN, ARTHUR, and STAHL EDMUNDS. *Economics for You and Me*. Edited by Robert W. Smith. Pp. viii, 246. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$4.00.

One might easily misjudge this popularization by its style, samples of which follow: Chapter titles: "1. Sliding Downhill on Codfish Heads" and "4. Your Money Went Thataway, Partner"; text: "Suppose Coonskin Edmunds is out on the frontier. He reckons he could use \$500 to plant himself a big field of 'tobaccy.' Then he'll have something to chaw on when he's fighting Indians." Perhaps, as Lincoln supposedly wrote for an author who sought a recommendation of his book, "For those who like this sort of thing, this will be just the sort of thing they like." Despite the style, the book contains much interesting information and effective exposition on the general subject of "national-income-approach economics."

The Foreword states the intention to make economics "easy to read and easy to understand." But easy reading does not equal easy understanding where the elements of economics are concerned. The considerable success the authors enjoy in their attempt to reconcile the two comes much less from style than from the omission of material too elementary and important to leave an adequate introduction to economics. The emphasis is heavy on "monetary" economics, such as total money demand, total employment, gross national product, business cycles, central banking, and central government fiscal policy. It is light on the rationing of given products, on the allocation of productive services, on imputation and the pricing of productive services, and on the personal distribution of income, all of which are fundamental and persistent economic problems.

Some parts of the exposition are unclear to this reviewer. (1) The adherence to *gross* as contrasted with *net* national product. When we are dealing with the contribution of capital accumulation to

progress, figures on the volume of machines, buildings, and so forth "turned out" are not much help, since there is no addition to capital till we more than replace what we use up in the process of production. (2) When it is said that "demand" changes far more than "supply," what is meant by "demand" and "supply"? The statement is not explained on the assumption either that both are physical concepts or that both are value concepts. If "demand" means total money demand and "supply" means a physical interpretation of GNP (gross national product), how do we get a "law of supply and demand" without prices on the supply side? (3) The impression that "big business" and "monopoly" are interchangeable terms lends itself to the highly questionable conclusion that the antitrust policy has been a failure. (4) Although the authors are not gullible about "government," why not call a spade a spade by pointing out the downright dishonesty involved in such governmental activities as borrowing, encouragement of monopoly, and control of money interest rates? Integrity, too, is a vital and persistent problem of "political economy."

BRUCE KNIGHT

Dartmouth College

WOYTINSKY, W. S., and ASSOCIATES. *Employment and Wages in the United States*. Pp. xxxii, 777. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953. \$7.50.

This study is the most comprehensive single volume on wages and employment in the United States. It was prepared by the Twentieth Century Fund to provide a source book of data useful to those engaged in collective bargaining.

At the outset Mr. Woytinsky presents a statement on the underlying framework of the study—that the American economy is still expanding. An examination of trends in national income, wages, and productivity follows this exposition. While no extrapolations of recent trends into the future are made, the expectations of long-run growth of the economy with increased productivity and a rise in real wages are clearly indicated. The next part of the study deals with the institutional setting of col-

lective bargaining and wage determination. The role of government is examined first, followed by a survey of labor organizations and collective bargaining practices. The size and composition of the labor force and the factors that control the supply of and demand for labor are discussed in the next section of the volume. The fourth, and final part of the study, deals with wage rates and earnings.

A total of 360 tables are presented in the text and appendix. These data are based on original Fund surveys and numerous government and other sources, some of which are not readily available.

As is usual in the case of major Twentieth Century Fund studies, the present volume is accompanied by a report of a special committee whose function it was "to formulate a program of action in the public interest to deal with the problems disclosed by the research." While the members of the committee were selected because of their individual eminence, the composition of the committee is tripartite in nature, consisting of a former chairman of the War Labor Board, a labor journalist, three college professors, three union research directors, and two presidents of large industrial corporations.

Despite the wealth of information in the volume, and the obvious desire of the committee members to achieve a meeting of minds, the area of agreement is disappointingly small. "The report," one of the members states, "has no single point of view (or any clear point of view) in its approach to the problem of wage determination." Apparently one point on which all the members agreed was that more study is necessary as to how wages are set. But even in the pious agreement on the desire for more light, there is considerable divergence as to where light is most necessary. The research director whose union membership is concentrated in a low wage-paying industry would like more information on the *evil* effects of substandard wages on the economy. Another member of the committee, searching for broader horizons, would investigate profit sharing as a form of employee compensation. A third participant throws doubt on the practical effects of research, at least in some

areas, upon collective bargaining processes.

But the failure of the distinguished committee to reach unanimity on wide policy implications flowing out of the abundance and excellence of the material presented in the survey should not detract from its potential usefulness. It merely emphasizes again the difficulty that a tripartite body has in arriving at general policy recommendations in the absence of immediate pressures. In the daily higgling and bargaining of the market place well-organized data are useful and necessary. Undoubtedly parties that face practical situations and have a stake in labor management relations will find the survey helpful. Mr. Woytinsky and his associates, under the sponsorship of the Twentieth Century Fund, have presented a major contribution to the literature of wages and collective bargaining.

SAR A. LEVITAN

Washington, D. C.

ULRIKSSON, VIDKUNN. *The Telegraphers: Their Craft and Their Unions*. Pp. v, 218. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953. \$3.75.

It is not often that a scholarly volume on a particular union, or on unionism in an industry, is produced by someone who has lived and worked in the industry. Vidkunn Ulriksson has had the unusual experience of spending some two dozen years as a railroad and commercial telegrapher, of being active in the industry's leading union, and of finally achieving the post of Associate Director of the University of Wisconsin School for Workers and Assistant Professor of Economics in the Extension Division. Despite his obvious and acknowledged union sympathies, however, the author has not hesitated to be critical of union tactics and policies.

The volume itself is not as broad in scope as the title would indicate, for it is confined to commercial telegraphy and eschews the important field of the railroad telegraphers. After an introductory chapter on the development of the industry, the author sets forth in detail the attempts of various unions to organize the industry. In effect, this is a story mainly of Western Union be-

cause of the dominance of this company. The account is carried forward in a combination of topical and chronological treatment. This is a most difficult form of presentation to handle—sometimes producing odd effects as the chronology is interrupted for a one-paragraph "aside." The history prior to the National Labor Relations Act is an unrelieved account of defeat, attributed by the author to the telegraph operators' white collar illusions, union weakness and incompetence, and the resolute and undeviating opposition of Western Union. After the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the legal defeat of the company union, the entry of the American Federation of Labor's Commercial Telegraphers Union and its victory over the left-wing rival American Communications Association (ACA) was almost foreordained.

The dominance of the CTU, however, did not produce immediately a responsive and unified organization. For one thing, some of the units which ran under the AFL banner for NLRB election purposes were not even in the CTU proper and did not come in until some time later. Secondly, bargaining and dealing with Western Union was in itself so surrounded by hoary traditions and antiquated company organization that a feeling of frustration was inevitable. The union had not only to put the company's labor relations on a modern basis, it had also to wait on the company's reformation of its own organization. A "business history study" of Western Union might well produce a classic document of organizational decay to be laid at the door of near-monopoly.

From the documentation in the volume it is apparent that there is no abundance of source material on unionism in this industry. This probably accounts for the inclusion of some detail, the intrinsic value of which is small, such as the text of an early union's oath. In the same vein is the somewhat uncritical acceptance of testimony at congressional hearings. One can also wish for some information on the nonoperators—the other workers in the industry get barely a nod. It is apparent that the CTU has some organizational and structural problems of its own, but of this there is little. And how about the mecha-

nism of collective bargaining? Here too we draw a blank.

The volume as a whole is a good beginning. Some of the gaps have been indicated above. But there is still much to be explored in the story of a small and impotent union coming suddenly into its own, confronted with the problems of unifying an inexperienced membership, of solving structural difficulties, and of bargaining over a sprawling countrywide domain which, to boot, has a future which is none too bright at this reading.

HERBERT J. LAHNE

Washington, D. C.

VITELES, MORRIS S. *Motivation and Morale in Industry*. Pp. xvi, 510. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953. \$8.50.

This book is the result of research on the basic motives in work by a distinguished psychologist who believes that the three great continuing needs in industry are: to increase production; to promote employee satisfaction and adjustment at work; and to curtail industrial strife. It includes experimental studies and attitude surveys made in America and England. The author's own attitude is objective but with faith in the ultimate mutuality of interest between management and labor.

The plan of the book is orderly except for considerable overlapping. There are five parts, each one taking from 60 to 100 pages. Part 1, "Mobilizing the Will to Work," plunges directly into wage-incentives and the setting of tasks for them. All kinds of views are given, in fact our only regret is that the author quotes other authors so continually that it is sometimes difficult to find where he makes his own conclusions. There are over 1,400 references made in the whole book to other authors. Part 2, "The Background of Motivational Theory," continues on the attitudes regarding incentives and then goes into social psychology and group dynamics. Together these two parts supply the reader with about everything known regarding employee motives and attitudes. Part 3, "Experimental Studies," treats such problems as job preference, size of work-group, teamwork, and employee participation in

decision-making, all pointed to what supervision might do to improve morale and productivity. Part 4, "Employee-Attitude Surveys," shows an employer how to assess morale and how to get along with unions. The role of supervision comes up again. Part 5, "Guideposts for Management," attempts to apply correctives and provides excellent thought provocation for top management.

It is in this fifth part that the author expresses best his own conclusions, and he does not mince matters either. For instance he disagrees with those who interpret the Western Electric Company experiments to mean that "money, as an incentive for productivity, is no longer the paramount incentive." As Dr. Viteles puts it, "in the opinion of this author, a viewpoint emphasizing the importance of the financial incentive is to be preferred to . . . facile generalization concerning the menace of an economic orientation and the belittling of the role of the financial incentive in reports on the Hawthorne studies."

As a scholarly collection of the findings of many psychologists the book is remarkable. Certainly enlightened employers, teachers, and graduate students may learn some timely lessons regarding the relationships between attitude and action.

CHARLES W. LYTLE

New York University

OSBORN, DAVID S. *Geographical Features of the Automation of Industry*. Pp. xiii, 108. Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1953. \$3.00.

Automation is essentially the substitution of manufactured instruments for people "as a source of decisions required for guiding machines." In this volume Dr. Osborn examines the effects of automation in a number of establishments upon their requirements for production workers and space per unit of product. He then speculates on the changes reduced requirements would have upon the location of industry both within metropolitan areas and throughout the nation.

Although the number of plants studied were few, the data presented by the author clearly indicate that the automation of industrial processes will save labor and space.

What is much less clear are the effects the introduction of labor and space-saving devices have on the location of economic activity. The cases cited in the text do not bear out the author's generalization that automation will become an important factor in the location of industry. In almost all of the plants described, the labor and space requirements were irrelevant to the selection of the site. Analysis of the effects of past widespread labor-saving innovations on the location of industry might better serve the author's objectives.

The theory that the location of industry is influenced most markedly by transportation costs for raw materials and finished goods seems undisturbed by Dr. Osborn's examples. It is questionable that land and labor force are often of "controlling importance." More attention might have been given to the possibilities of lowering fuel and raw material requirements by the substitution of continuous monitoring of equipment by control instruments for intermittent checking by employees. The costs of fuels and raw materials have frequently been determining factors in the geographical distribution of industries.

Dr. Osborn considers the influence of instrument service availability on the location of future automation, but notes that "customer density" may determine in large part the location of instrument service-sales offices.

The author's assumption that industries locate in downtown business districts rather than in suburbs because of the need for labor is unconvincing. Even if it were admitted, the effect of automation on urban location is uncertain, as he notes that reduced space needs may operate in a different direction than reduced manpower requirements. This reader was confused by some of the conclusions. In close proximity are printed (pp. 98-99): "Automation brings human occupancy a step closer to an ideal of possible decentralization," and "With labor force reduced and less space required, increased centralization becomes a possibility." The author is certain there might be a change.

The subject and future of automation are exciting, and the case studies are well presented. It is probably too early to base

forecasts of the effect of automation on data of the few existing installations. Projections into the future without better data call for a more penetrating study of the nature of the revolutionary potentialities of automation systems than Dr. Osborn has presented.

ROBERT N. GROSSE

Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

GEARTY, PATRICK W. *The Economic Thought of Monsignor John A. Ryan*. Pp. viii, 341. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1953. \$4.00.

John A. Ryan believed that economics is primarily a positive science but that it is also largely a normative science; further, that its main usefulness is to promote the common good and social justice. Within this framework, he dedicated his life to the eminently practical task of providing his fellowmen with a multitude of carefully thought out moral judgments conditioned by economic facts. He rejected the "orthodox" economics of his time as inadequate and embraced the economic "heresy" of John A. Hobson for analyzing the equilibrium of the economy as a whole. In his ethics, he rejected time-worn theoretical illustrations in favor of practical applications to the everyday problems facing the worker, the industrialist, the politician, the internationalist.

A measure of the wisdom and foresight of the man is found in the *Bishop's Program of Social Reconstruction* of 1919. Written by Ryan, it gave official status to what he had advocated as early as 1909. Among its recommendations were: a 16-year-old age minimum on child labor; a legal minimum wage; legal protection for the right of workers to organize; provision for settling labor disputes; a federal employment service; social insurance against unemployment, illness, invalidity, and old age; slum clearance and municipal housing projects; regulation of monopoly; and the "heavy taxation" of incomes, excess profits, and inheritances. As the roaring twenties were succeeded by the depressed thirties, and many of these proposals became the law of the land, one can readily see why

Ryan, when he was accused of merely following after everything Roosevelt and the New Deal did, could say: "It's not so. Before the New Deal was, I am."

Current history was his driving force as he faced up to the economic facts and moral implications of the sit-down strike, the secondary boycott, the closed shop, unions' limitations of output and apprentices, co-operatives, racial discrimination, international economic relations, industrial democracy, and the occupational group system or Industry Council Plan. And so he continued with his careful economic analyses and ethical interpretations until almost the day of his death. His last article appeared in July 1945; he died the following September 16.

Patrick W. Gearty has done an invaluable service in portraying the inspiring life and works of this dynamic thinker. His painstaking documentation reveals careful combing not only of published works but also of unpublished manuscripts, lecture notes, marginal notations, and other evidence that the prolific Ryan left in his wake. Besides this major contribution, Gearty has also produced a valuable handbook of social teaching. And, he has provided scholars with many guideposts to fruitful inquiry as well as warning signs over pitfalls where Ryan erred.

In his review for *The Annals* (January 1907) of Ryan's first serious work—*A Living Wage*—David Y. Thomas found it "refreshing" to read a book that proposed to accomplish social reform "with a real human being at the starting point and the end." If Thomas could read Gearty's book today, he would be still more refreshed at the discovery that many "real human beings" the country over have benefited from the translation of Ryan's proposals into action.

GERALD J. SCHNEPP

Saint Louis University

TAX INSTITUTE. *Excess Profits Taxation* (A symposium). Pp. viii, 183. Princeton, N. J., 1953. \$5.00.

Increased revenues for United States defense were called for by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950. The Tax In-

stitute conducted a symposium in Philadelphia on Excess Profits Taxation, December 8 and 9. There were twenty participants, among them Professors A. G. Buehler, Louis Shere, D. T. Smith, Clarence Heer, and E. G. Keith; also Messrs. Beardsley Ruml, Ralph Flanders (U. S. Senator), Leon Henderson, and others representing the tax views of lawyers, accountants, business managers, and taxpayers.

The discussions of this symposium include most of the main points usually urged against excess profits taxation: for example, the difficulties of determining equitable tax credits, bases, and rates; the difficulties of preventing tax considerations from causing too much distortion of business management; and the difficulties of administration. These main topics were discussed under numerous subheads.

Messrs. Ruml and Henderson, especially, emphasized rather dramatically how high marginal excess profits taxes differentiate between "cheap dollars" and "expensive dollars."

"The creation by law of cheap dollars has resulted and will result again, in carelessness, waste and extravagance. The cheap dollar is demoralizing and breeds waste at every level of management. . . . If a competitor is not in excess profits, if it is weak in earnings, or young, or with inadequate capital—in other words, if it has only expensive dollars in its arsenal, it is at a double disadvantage as against its entrenched rival with tax-created cheap dollars at its disposal"—Ruml.

Little was said in the symposium favorable to excess profits taxes; more or less was said to the effect that it would be better to raise extra revenue needed by increasing the rates of the regular corporation income tax, instead of by a new excess profits tax.

A number of speakers held that many citizens favored an excess profits tax because they thought it put more of the cost of war upon those who benefited from war but failed to understand its relation to business incentives and other effects mentioned above.

Congress, however, later adopted a more or less complicated excess profits tax to run until June 30, 1953.

Unfortunately, the papers of the symposium were not published until May 11, 1953, when Congress was debating the extension of the excess profits tax due to expire soon. The tax was later extended until Dec. 31, 1953, and the Eisenhower administration's intention to hold to that date has since been announced by the press, despite the fact that it now appears unlikely that the budget will be balanced next year unless sales taxes or other substitute taxes are adopted.

At this moment, Mr. Eisenhower's party does not appear to be unified on tax policy, however, and, if the business or the foreign situation should change radically and quickly, anything might happen.

ROY G. BLAKEY

University of Ankara, Turkey

BLUM, WALTER J. and HARRY KALVEN, JR. *The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation*. Pp. viii, 107. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. \$2.50.

Surveying what they describe as "The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation," the authors canvass the literature of the subject and find there mainly an unconvincing analysis of marginal utility and sacrifice. This analysis starts with the assumption that the importance of the marginal dollar of income falls off as more is acquired and does so consistently for different taxpayers. But to say the least no one knows how fast the utility curve drops and there is a conflict of counsel as to what pattern of sacrifice satisfies equity. No sacrifice theory or any other support for progression gives us a precise standard for measuring its degree. Supporting progression on a frank preference for equality does not escape these difficulties. Sounder ground for the institution is found in its implications for equality of opportunity—especially as regards children.

Turning to the legal record, the authors find even less support for progression. The Supreme Court simply swallowed the idea whole when popular opinion was ripe for the innovation.

In terms of effects, consideration is given to the argument that progressive taxation is needed to absorb redundant savings. This approach has lost following since the De-

pression, and at any event has to be balanced against the adverse effects of progression on incentives. Progressive taxation introduces major difficulties of timing and definition in income taxation—witness the troublesome problem of splitting. The authors consider and reject the idea that a conservative allowance for subsistence leads logically to general support for progression.

Progressive-tax theory has been due for an overhauling, and the authors do a highly competent job in exposing the vulnerable spots in its utility and sacrifice supports. Progressive taxation like most other social phenomena must rest for its ultimate justification on its social, political, and economic consequences. The authors' analysis in this latter area is (perhaps necessarily) far short of exhaustive, and the reviewer takes exception to many of its conclusions. He also doubts the validity of the view that exemption of a minimum is thoroughly consistent with a negative view of further progression.

But the work is distinguished by penetrating analysis, comprehensive coverage of sources, and excellent documentation. It should do for this generation what Seligman's work did for the last. And on the score of rigorous and circumspect analysis this new contribution rates high honors in the field.

HAROLD M. GROVES

University of Wisconsin

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

FRUMKIN, GREGORY. *Population Changes in Europe Since 1939*. Pp. 191. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1951. No price.

Censuses taken in most European countries after the end of the war reveal insufficiently the changes which the population underwent in the course of war and postwar years. Two years after the end of the war the population of Europe outside the Soviet Union was already slightly larger than on the eve of war. This was, however, the result of various conflicting factors, such as: continuing (although somewhat reduced) excess of birth over

"normal" deaths; military and civilian war losses; population transfers; and a reversal of the birth trend which, contrary to projections and predictions, showed an unexpected increase of fertility.

So it was an important contribution to the understanding of Europe's demographic situation when Mr. Frumkin (former editor of the League of Nations Statistical Year Book, now a member of the United Nations Secretariat) undertook the arduous task of analyzing the various components of population changes which took place since 1939 in Europe outside the Soviet Union (a note on the USSR given "for reference purposes" contains only the estimates of several authors). His work resulted in "balance sheets" of 24 European countries, presenting the population changes which took place in the war years (1939-45) and in the postwar years (1946-47). A balance sheet starts with the population at the beginning of the period; adjustments are then made for territorial changes. The numbers of births and "normal" deaths are given. There follows (of course, only for the war years) a detailed analysis of war losses under the main headings of (1) military and (2) civilian losses, separately listing (3) deaths due to racial persecution. With the same care are analyzed the various population shifts of transferees, refugees, displaced persons, and others. Each balance sheet results in a population figure calculated for the end of the period, which is confronted with information derived from census or other enumeration. Data for single countries are also combined into a population balance sheet for total Europe (outside USSR), which shows, for example, 5.8 million military losses, 4.9 million civilians (excluding Jews) who perished from bombardments, land fighting, executions, or having been deported, and 4.4 million Jews killed by the Germans.

Everybody who has handled such statistics knows the amount of work involved in the computation of Mr. Frumkin's balance sheets. His data were taken primarily from official national sources and only additionally were information and estimates of authoritative experts used. However, no figure was accepted at its face value; all data—whatever their source—were scru-

tinized, crosschecked, and adjusted. The result is not only a mass of critically analyzed information (which by itself would be achievement), it is a demographic picture of Europe in the period of the Second World War.

EUGENE M. KULISCHER

Library of Congress
Washington, D. C.

BEAUVOIR, SIMONE DE. *The Second Sex*. Translated and edited by H. M. Parshley. Pp. xxx, 732, xiv. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953. \$10.00.

Mme. de Beauvoir's thesis is that women are forced into a degrading position in society in comparison to men by virtue of their physiological natures and that this position has been enforced by the deliberate and hostile contrivance of men. To prove this she has assembled a formidable array of historical data about women along with insights derived from various disciplines such as biology, psychoanalysis, dialectic materialism, mythology, and fiction. All of this is presented in existentialist terms: women are "the other," not the "existent" in contrast to men who are the "absolute." This results in women's inability to experience "transcendence" and their permanent relegation to a state of "immanence." Transcendence is the supreme state to which human beings may aspire; the loftiest expression of free individual power—equated to the penis.

Mme. de Beauvoir presents her theme with force and eloquence, often with poetic beauty. She is, however, not averse to twisting, tormenting, and omitting wherever her data are at variance with her doctrine. The psychoanalytic point of view is given some attention, but the light and shadow is so delicately arranged as to distort most of the telling aspects of the insight psychoanalysis has brought to the understanding of women. This book reads like a combination of invective and lamentation. All the elements of women's lives are presented with a mixture of horror and rage, even love itself. She opens her chapter, "The Mother," with a long, rather naïve and extremely biased disquisition on the iniquity of making abortion illegal.

She repeatedly alludes to the biological situation of women as "draw-backs," citing as her evidence for this the function of menstruation. Mme. de Beauvoir cannot discover any possible satisfactions in femininity. She cites abnormalities and disturbances of feminine function and underscores her argument that pregnancy is a burden upon women, constitutes their degradation and prevents their successful function as "transcendents." Mme. de Beauvoir is particularly disturbed and angry at the dependency she finds in the position of women vis-à-vis men and society as a whole. Some of her most positive statements are made in connection with lesbianism. She says "The system is considered normal or 'natural' which, abandoning her (woman) as prey to some male, restores her sovereignty by putting a child in her arms: but this supposed 'normality' is enjoined by a more or less clearly comprehended social interest."

When we come to the solutions or "justification" which are offered here, we find very little except the exhortation of women to seek their freedom. This independence presumably will lead to the exquisite even-tuality which will make it possible for women to live in a state of "equality with men." In the meantime, "love represents in its most touching form the curse that lies heavily upon woman confined in the feminine universe, woman mutilated, insufficient unto herself." It hardly seems necessary to elaborate upon such a statement with its extraordinary lack of insight. In spite of its erudition, this book does not provide an objective evaluation of the position and problems of women in today's social organization. It is rather an intensely personal document: one woman's outcry against her nature, the exposure of her unregenerate rebellion against her femininity.

MARYNIA F. FARNHAM, M.D.

New York City

COLEMAN, MILES L. *Renewing Our Cities*. Pp. x, 181. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953. \$2.50.

Here is a book that is really written for "the general reader." It is based on the

most careful fact finding. It is brief and clear and inexpensive. What it presents can hardly fail to challenge any one who is concerned about our cities. The interests of tenants and landlords, of industrialists and strap-hangers, of tax-payers and city officials are all considered.

Perhaps we do not need to be reminded that our cities are constantly changing. Neither is it any surprise to be told that the typical pattern is one of a badly congested center, surrounded by a zone of declining utility, outside of which is a ring of more or less flourishing suburbs. But we often fail to realize that growth implies renewal as well as expansion; that failure to replace worn-out parts interrupts the cycle of growth and threatens the city's future. Evidence of break-down in the life cycle appears when there are many cases of structures no longer in demand, in their localities, for the uses for which they were designed; or they have deteriorated; and conversion or restoration would cost more than prospective use would justify. Renewal means the rebuilding of an area to bring it to its maximum financial and social utility for the whole city.

Renewal or redevelopment is more than slum clearance. The latter is a matter of housekeeping, individual and municipal. It means cleaning up, protecting against accident, fire, and disease, and restoring minimum standards of decency for the occupants of an old area. Renewal may involve slum clearance, but also the replacement or adaptation of buildings and facilities that are not so far gone and that are not residential. It may require correction of real estate values, reassignment of land uses, elimination of smoke and noise, new facilities for transportation, education, recreation, and public health.

Mr. Coleman believes that people can make their cities what they want. But he points out there is usually no agreement about goals, inadequate machinery for reaching agreement, and hence lack of devices for carrying out plans that have never been made or accepted.

STUART A. QUEEN

Washington University

STETLER, HENRY G. *Minority Group Integration by Labor and Management*. Pp. viii, 67. Hartford: Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights, 1953. No price.

The original purposes of this study, made in 1951, were (1) to ascertain the extent of discrimination by employers and labor unions against members of the chief minority groups in the state, and (2) to determine what educational measures are best suited to the elimination of undemocratic employment practices. The published study deals chiefly with discrimination against Negroes, with some attention to the Jewish, and still less to the Italian population, which is the largest nationality minority in Connecticut. The five metropolitan regions in the state were the areas of investigation because they include 89 per cent of the Negroes, 83 per cent of the Jewish, and 85 per cent of the Italian inhabitants. Concerns and labor unions employing or having a membership of more than 1,000 persons were selected for study. Ninety per cent of the state's larger employers and 77 unions were within the scope of the investigation; 69 per cent of the employers and 60 per cent of the unions were covered by interviewing personnel directors and union officials. The employment of Negroes by the State government was studied to secure data on the extent that professional and supervisory positions were held by them. In addition, 1,600 persons, Negro, Jewish, and white non-Jewish of approximately equal economic status were interviewed in Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, and Stamford, which with Waterbury comprise the five metropolitan regions.

The data yielded the following general conclusions:

1. There is wide variation in employment of Negroes: 10 per cent employ none, while 90 per cent range from employing Negroes only in unskilled work to full integration in all levels, including white collar jobs.

2. Comparing placement of Negroes in professional and supervisory work in government and private employment, the data suggests underemployment of Negroes in the latter.

3. The low clerical employment rate of Negro workers is impressive.

4. Negroes belong to industrial unions, to unskilled American Federation of Labor unions, but in very small numbers to craft unions.

5. The data reveal a considerable gap between education of Negroes and the white-non-Jewish group. The reports ends asking if Negroes may be "advised" against securing education because their job opportunities are so limited. There is much more than deliberate advice to discourage them!

For its future educational program the Commission might well investigate two assertions in this study, namely, that white women oppose integration more than men, and that unions are restricted in potential membership by the employment patterns of management.

MARTIN P. CHWOROWSKY

University of Pennsylvania

CRESSEY, DONALD R. *Other People's Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement*. Pp. 191. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953. \$3.00.

Dr. Cressey's study of the social psychology of violation of financial trust and the general theory which he proposes to explain it should be of considerable interest to criminologists and to social scientists generally. The investigation is based primarily on materials secured by interviewing inmates in three prisons—namely, those at Chino, California, Terre Haute, Indiana, and Joliet, Illinois. Aside from the admirably systematic manner in which the author proceeds to construct and support his theory, the case materials which are inserted when they are relevant to his argument make interesting reading in themselves.

The theory that is finally proposed, after having undergone several revisions in the course of the study, is that "Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having a financial problem which is non shareable, are aware that this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation ver-

balizations (rationalizations) which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property" (p. 30). This is formulated as a tentative proposition subject to future revision in the light of negative evidence. The author's methodological assumptions which lead him to this formulation may be briefly summarized: theories must be stated in universal form; a single negative case disproves such a theory; definitions and hypothesis must be continuously adapted to contradictory evidence as it appears.

Among the interesting features of Dr. Cressey's findings may be mentioned the fact that married embezzlers invariably fail to confide in their wives concerning the financial problem which prompts the embezzlement even when that problem is merely one like maintaining a certain standard of living. Another significant aspect of the author's treatment is the way in which he views rationalizations as an integral part of the causal process. The offender, he maintains, must find some sort of rationalization which is at least temporarily acceptable before he can reconcile himself to using "other people's money."

Certain questions may be raised concerning the conclusion stated. For example, the author suggests but does not elaborate on the idea that sharing a problem may be a matter of degree and that the effects of sharing may depend in part upon with whom it is shared. One case is cited in which an embezzler apparently did share his problem with his brother before violating the law (pp. 45-6, Case No. 303). In the case of absconders it is pointed out that the culprit in this case usually recognizes the criminality of his act from the beginning but simply says, "To hell with it!" One may argue that this represents impulsive behavior and failure to find an acceptable rationalization.

The systematic and original way in which Dr. Cressey has treated his subject make this work a significant contribution and one that should serve as a challenge to future research.

ALFRED R. LINDESMITH

Indiana University

BOSSARD, JAMES H. S. *Parent and Child*. Pp. 308. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953. \$5.00.

This study by Bossard, one of our most prolific writers on the family, is his thirty-first book. It conforms with most of his recent publications in stressing the commonplace but often neglected aspects of family behavior: the relationship of the immediate family to the kinship group, the contrasting effects of the small family system and the large family system, the influence of household space on family interaction, and the effect on children of such factors as childhood visiting, over-age parents, the remarriage of parents, interclass marriage, and parents' occupations. This is a highly diversified list of topics. All are interesting, although probably not of equal significance. The influence of childhood visiting on the personality of the child would offhand seem to be of much less consequence in most instances than the occupations of parents. Nor are all of the topics treated by Bossard equally amenable to scientific research. He has some discussion of the role of deceased family members in child development, but it would probably be quite difficult to isolate the influences of this factor.

The method used in this book is the case study, consisting of a segment of a life history centering around a particular question or aspect of experience. This might be called the focused case study, and is supplemented here and there by focused interviews. The number of cases utilized varies by topic, being 17 in the study of over-age parents, 25 in the analysis of the large family system, and 81 in the study of parents' occupations and child development. The materials are supplied by college students in the Northeastern United States.

Case studies are more useful for originating hypotheses and suggesting causal relationships than they are for establishing generalizations or determining degrees of relationship between social phenomena. Hence Bossard refers to his studies as pilot studies which afford suggestions for further study and are not definitive. In some instances it might even be more accurate to refer to these chapters as suggestions on

the basis of which pilot studies might be made. For instance, in the chapter on "The Family Background of the Child" 40 types of household are listed, as revealed in the case studies. There is no claim that the list is all-inclusive. There is no frequency distribution, therefore no indication of the relative significance of the various types.

Bossard writes in a clear and easy style, which also bears the marks of maturity. There is a useful brief summary at the close of each chapter. This book should appeal to the sophisticated general reader who is interested in child development.

M. F. NIMKOFF

The Florida State University

SIRJAMAKI, JOHN. *The American Family in the Twentieth Century*. Pp. x, 227. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$4.25.

The purpose of this book is to interpret the findings of the social sciences on the American family for general rather than specialized readers. Only limited technical material is presented to support the conclusions from the different studies.

The first quarter of the book gives a history of the European background of the American family and its historical development in the United States. The following chapters, for the most part, deal with the family cycle: courting and dating experiences, husband-wife relationships, children, parent-child relationships with variations in the different social classes, the dissolving of families by divorce, and remarriage of divorced persons. The final chapter is a summary description of the American family today and an appraisal of its future.

The references (pp. 203-18) indicate that most of the important studies of the family were covered—the historical, legal, structural, and anthropological studies, as well as studies of the family in the depression, mate selection, and marital adjustment.

The general reader will secure a fairly accurate picture of what social science knows about the American family.

HARVEY J. LOCKE

University of Southern California

ALEXANDER, FRANZ, and HELEN ROSS (Eds.). *Twenty Years of Psychoanalysis*. Pp. 309. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953. \$3.75.

This volume which was published to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis goes far beyond the character of a commemorative book. It presents rather a survey of the development of psychoanalysis during the past two decades. The contributors to the volume are members of the staff of the Chicago Institute, and most of them are representative psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. I do not know any other country in America or in any other country in which such excellent work of training and research is done. The flowering state of the Chicago Institute owes most of its prominence to the devotion and enthusiasm of Dr. Franz Alexander who understood the importance of educating his co-workers. Research is, of course, the primary objective of the Institute, but beside and beyond individual and collective research excellent teamwork is directed to the teaching and training of psychoanalysts and psychiatrists.

The reviews of the contributors deal mostly with the influence of the basic concepts of psychoanalysis on medicine and medical teaching in general, on psychiatry in particular, and on the social sciences. The two major aspects of the volume are the presentation of pictures of the advancement of psychoanalysis first as a science and second as a profession. The individual papers, although different in their character and scope, fulfill together the task of showing the history of psychoanalysis in this country during the last twenty years. The discussions following each contribution do not conceal the differences of viewpoints which are represented among the members of the staff, nor do they try to smooth over the difficulties and uncertainties of the problems, but they all move on an elevated level. The members of the staff are united in the wish to share their experiences and to broaden their knowledge.

The book is introduced by a review in which Dr. Alexander shows the transition of psychoanalysis from the era of the pioneers to that of the colonials and the re-

orientation necessitated by the fact that the new science came of age. The new phase brought with it not only added responsibilities, but also new problems, especially the task of checking the validity of each approach. The very change proves that psychoanalysis is not a static body of knowledge, but a discipline in development. This science in the making has unforeseen vicissitudes as well as the potentiality of a decisive role in the re-evaluation of many values of our civilization. The wide scope and the elevated point of view give Dr. Alexander's contribution a prominent place among the papers here collected.

Dr. Alan Gregg discusses the place of psychoanalysis in medicine; Dr. Martin Grotjahn writes on new trends in psychoanalytic training; Dr. Lawrence Kubie treats psychoanalysis as a basic science; Dr. Arthur Mirsky shows its connections with the biological sciences; and Dr. Talcott Parsons examines the relations between psychoanalysis and sociology. The interesting, and in its implications stimulating, second part of the book deals with the many problems of training and research as they appeared in the discussions of the staff of the Chicago Institute. We welcome the important volume which will interest all who are attracted by the psychoanalytic ramifications and their connections with the social sciences.

THEODOR REIK, M.D.

New York City

RÓHEIM, GÉZA. *The Gates of the Dream*. Pp. x, 554. New York: International Universities Press, 1953. \$10.00.

The late Géza Róheim was one of the first to apply insight derived from psychoanalytic theory to the data of anthropology. This last ambitious work is an attempt to make anthropology contribute to psychoanalysis, and to the validating of a particular psychoanalytic theory proposed by the author.

The first 154 pages are used in clarifying what Róheim means by his theory of the basic dream and how he differs from other psychoanalysts. The remainder of the book is essentially a new presentation, in the light of this theory, of material al-

ready published in the author's earlier extensive writings on anthropology. It deals particularly with the mythology of animism, shamanism, and the nightmare, and attempts to elucidate these by interpreting the symbolism of dreams. The author draws freely on his own Australian field studies and also reviews others' accounts of American Indian mythology and European folklore. These are all examined for evidence to support the theory. Unfortunately, the tendency throughout this book is to revert to the trend of the earlier studies and interpret the anthropology according to the theory—with symbol-translocation playing the principal part.

The hypothesis offered by Róheim assumes that the dream is primarily a reaction to the fact we are asleep, and that it originates in anxiety; that there is a basic dream valid for mankind in general which represents this reaction. This basic dream is seen in the moment of falling asleep, in the typical hypnagogic sensation of falling or sinking. "One feels as if one were sinking into oneself." This hypnagogic fantasy becomes a dream if not interrupted (by repression or by waking)—a dream, that is, in which other layers are added from waking life.

The source of the anxiety is described according to a conception derived from Ferenczi: The sleeper turns into himself and falls back into the womb, his own body being the material substratum of the dream womb. Sleep is interpreted (from the point of view of the unconscious) as being in utero (Freud). Róheim sees this regression, this withdrawal from the environment as causing anxiety; and this anxiety about regression (uterine regression = death) as causing the dream as an attempt to regain contact with the environment. "As the world is destroyed" with this withdrawal into the dreamer's own body (and maternal womb), there is at the same time an attempt to counteract the anxiety, ward off the regression by the building up of a new environment—on a libidinal basis. Thus, citing typical dreams which are commonly accepted as symbolizing coitus, he asks: "Does it mean anything that the phallus is represented by the whole body of the dreamer?" (for ex-

ample, going into a room or passageway). This is the view of the body as phallus which leads to the emphasis on erotic tension wishes to counteract anxiety in relinquishing the object world. The author is easily able to cite dreams with a regressive tendency but in which the dream may also represent coitus. Throughout the book there is frequent citation of dreams as proof of the theory. These, of course, are selected samples with no advertence to the usefulness of controls in a scientific study.

Freud repeatedly stressed that symbols must be used only with careful discrimination and as a supplement to the basic technique of obtaining the dreamer's associations to the dream elements. Otherwise one falls into an arbitrariness of interpretation such as the author illustrates. Thus, when he takes up a dream reported by Fodor, he rejects the latter's interpretation as "blocked by preconceived theory" in favor of an interpretation supporting his own theory.

WILLIAM A. HARVEY, M.D.

Institute of the Pennsylvania Hospital
Philadelphia

OSTHEIMER, RICHARD H. *Student Charges and Financing Higher Education*. Pp. xx, 217. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. \$3.50.

Late in 1947 the President's Commission on Higher Education produced its six-volume report entitled *Higher Education in American Democracy* which among other things proposed that tuition should be free in public colleges and universities through the sophomore year and that it be reduced in the years beyond. The Commission barely touched upon the question of the tuition charges of private institutions but gingerly implied that they should be lowered rather than raised. This volume makes no reference to the President's Commission, but it explores the economic soundness of its proposals concerning tuition charges.

The book constitutes one of the series of eleven which reports the studies undertaken by the Commission on Financing Higher Education established in 1949 with funds provided by the Rockefeller Founda-

tion (\$400,000) and the Carnegie Corporation (\$50,000). The author, a member of the staff of the Commission, has brought to the topic assigned him the tools of a statistically trained economist. Readers need much the same tools to follow his analysis. The volume, in short, has been written for economists and educational statisticians rather than for work-a-day administrators who, it seems, must read as they run from committee meeting to committee meeting.

In his opening paragraph the author lists the three questions to be studied, and in the last chapter he summarizes his answers:

(1) Would "higher charges . . . in fact yield larger revenues"? Answer: Yes: "higher charges would increase total revenues and thus permit sorely needed salary raises and a general improvement of educational excellence."

(2) ". . . what would be the effect on society's goal of equality of educational opportunity?" Answer: it would be "adversely affected" but not nearly so much as some seem to believe because the degree of present inequalities "has been considerably exaggerated by [unsound] inferences from the income distributions of all families" and because "to maintain tuitions at their present levels, or even to lower them, is but to scratch the surface in the attempt to effect equality of opportunity."

(3) What would be "the possible effect on the quality of higher education" of increased tuition fees? Answer: ". . . the alternative may be inadequate financial support and hence the inability of higher education to achieve its high purposes."

In sum, Mr. Ostheimer—and hence the Commission on Financing Higher Education—repudiates the recommendations of the President's Commission on the topic of tuition charges and concludes that the economy can sustain higher charges without serious damage to the ideal of equality of educational opportunity. Further, it cautiously suggests that the quality of educational opportunity provided by colleges and universities cannot wisely be sacrificed by overweighting the emphasis upon its equality.

W. H. COWLEY

Stanford University

KEARNEY, NOLAN C. *Elementary School Objectives*. Pp. 189. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1953. \$3.00.

This small volume is a report prepared for The Mid-Century Committee on Outcomes in Elementary Education by Dr. Kearney while on leave of absence from his position as Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum and Research, Public Schools of St. Paul, Minnesota.

The primary concern of this study and the report was the identification of objectives or desired outcomes in elementary education upon which there would be considerable agreement by a selected group of consultants, critics, and other leaders in elementary education in the United States. The names and positions of those leaders are given at the beginning of the report. In addition there is an excellent chapter on implementation and implications of the selection of these goals for educational practice, research, and measurement.

For each of these goals there are questions posed by the report which indicate the types of outcomes and therefore have important implications for educational materials, methods, and measurement.

In Part Two of the report a chapter is devoted to each of these goals and to each of the types of outcomes that must result if these goals are to be obtained—for example, knowledge and understanding, skill and competence, attitude and interest, action pattern, and determining conditions. Furthermore, in the discussion of each of these types of outcomes there are sections devoted to the primary grades in the school, the intermediate grades and the upper grades.

While the committee emphasizes the development of skills in writing, reading, and arithmetic, factual knowledge in science, the various social studies, and other fields, it sets forth the views that clearly these are not enough and that children must be active in finding out the answers to many questions in these areas and that understanding must be emphasized as much as or more than factual knowledge. In discussing the importance of adapting educational materials and experiences to each individual child the report makes much of the fact of the wide variation now existing

in children of various grades. For example, in the typical fourth grade reading ability varies as much as six years and among the typical sixth graders as much as eight years. The committee concluded that therefore it is impractical to set the same learning goals, at least in specific requirements, for all pupils. The specific aspects of the goals must be set in terms of each pupil in himself, his capacity, his ability, his previous background, and indeed his interests.

Among other important things recommended by the committee is increased attention to social and emotional development, ethical behavior, standards, and values, social relations, and aesthetic development; in other words they believe in assisting in the development of the well-rounded personality.

Another important aspect of the report is the Committee's insistence on democratic procedure and democratic understanding in the classroom involving respect for the rights of each individual. It also contains commendable recommendations with respect to recognition of the value of all people regardless of race, religion, or national origin and recognition of what is involved in interhuman relations, the American way of life, and fundamental concepts of honesty and fairplay, of brotherhood, and of concern for one's family and community resources.

HARL R. DOUGLASS

University of Colorado

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

SARTON, GEORGE. *A Guide to the History of Science*. Pp. xviii, 316. Waltham, Mass.: Chronica Botanica, 1952. \$7.50.

In the twentieth century no scholar better recalls by his own performance that type of monumental achievement in historical-bibliographical learning which earned world renown for such masters of books and ideas as a Scaliger, Bayle, Boeckh, or Steinschneider, than Professor Sarton. His learning is, moreover, unequivocally sustained by the moral conviction that science is irreplaceable by any other less rational tradition in the slow, heroic labor required

to liberate humanity from evitable suffering, ignorance, and superstition. Under his guidance one commemorates the marvel—and it is no less—that mere humanity has been able to discern some impartial truths by the renunciation of willful, provincial, and hasty thinking.

We may state at once our judgment that the work here noticed is a characteristic product of Sarton's critical and bibliographical prowess; it is an absolutely indispensable reference book for every serious library, scientist, humanist. As if the choice bibliography pertaining to the history of nearly half a hundred sciences and three thoughtful introductory lectures were not sufficient accurate and generous information, Dr. Sarton, with the assistance of Dr. C. F. Mayer adds wonderfully rich additional indications concerning pertinent journals, museums, congresses and proceedings of learned societies, editions of sources, and the like.

Some of the bibliographies inevitably show, we believe, serious errors of choice. How was it possible to list Lord Russell as a historian of philosophy and exclude Windelband? Why choose Joad in the philosophy of science and omit Cassirer? Granet's studies in the style of Chinese science and thought cannot be passed over; H. Balss's source book on ancient astronomy is richer than Heath's familiar anthology. The series, "Orbis Academicus," a very impressive recent venture in German scholarship which presents the history of a discipline together with basic source documents in one volume was or could not be noticed. Linguistics and economics are completely overlooked in Sarton's bibliographies; sociology is imperfectly reported upon. Langer's recasting of Ploetz is apparently preferred to Delorme's culturally sensitive *Chronologie des Civilisations*. The references under science and society seem to avert one's gaze from the strong, suggestive studies of Mannheim, Ogburn, and Scheler. One of the best quarterlies summarizing scientific progress, the English *Science Progress*, is not mentioned.

Insufficient acknowledgment is made to the great earlier classics in the history of science, as if it were necessary to maintain a recently established professional point of

view; for example, there is no reference to the charming and wise scientific biographies written by Fontenelle. The general reader could scarcely realize from the guide that creative men of science in looking back over the past are very far indeed from being dilettantes in history; if space permitted, one might cite the achievements of a Bernard, a Freud, a de Broglie, or a Larmor, or a Hankel to prove that a great deal of the very best history of science occurs only in such retrospective glances. Although Sarton deeply appreciates statistical science and even its moral significance, he does not, for example, list the excellent papers in which R. A. Fisher explains the content and setting of his masterly innovations.

As a philosopher of science Dr. Sarton deals more often than not in attractive generalities, but without presenting an articulated conception of scientific inquiry or progress. One therefore finds expressions of rather quaint views in his lectures such as a strong fear of "extrapolation," "a priori" thinking, and the like which indicate that philosophy of science is not his main concern and which go a long way toward explaining the not very penetrating remarks which he hazards concerning Kant, Hegel, and Shewell. We think it is instructive to observe, for instance, that to have forbidden "extrapolation" would have made it impossible for Copernicus to be a hero in the history of science!

Several cultural historical generalizations seem to us to be unwarranted. It is hardly the case that the influence of "scientific thinking" on the causation of the French revolution is not widely appreciated; Hegel knew all about it, as does every conservative French novelist. That science was carried "on the wings of religion" in Moslem culture (or in any culture) is a myth long ago seen through, we are convinced, by Renan. A somewhat testy emphasis on contemporary "barbarians" and "barbarous" technology is occasionally noticeable, which is not to be expected from a historian who is acquainted with the dreadful record of moral deficiencies in other ages, even those alleged to be ages of order and faith.

On the whole, however, no single writer could at present have done so very well.

Professor Sarton is truly in our time one of the prodigious, indispensable servants of the human mind.

HENRY A. FINCH

Pennsylvania State University

FRETZ, JOSEPH WINFIELD. *Pilgrims in Paraguay: The Story of Mennonite Colonization in South America*. Pp. xvi, 247. Scottsdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1953. \$2.75.

This is an absorbingly interesting account of Mennonite colonization efforts in South America since 1920, which by 1950 had built up there a total Mennonite population of 16,000. Three-fourths of these are concentrated in landlocked but hospitable Paraguay, where they form several closed communities and have their largest town, Filadelfia (pop. 546 in 1950). The rest, more loosely organized, are unevenly distributed among Brazil (2500), Uruguay (1200), Argentina (500), and Colombia (90).

The author properly describes his book as not a history but a sociological report. Nevertheless, these pilgrimages and their fruits recall and recapitulate so much of the history of the past four centuries that this aspect of the story cannot fail to fascinate any historically minded reader.

They were obviously a product of conditions peculiar to the twentieth century; for example, the first and most numerous groups of pilgrims were refugees from Canada and Russia, and in both cases the forces that uprooted them were set in motion by World War I. Yet in certain respects this modern phenomenon has strong, though imperfect, analogies in earlier centuries, such as those with the Pilgrim Fathers of 1620, the Mormon migration of the 1840's, and the Jesuit missions established in the colonial period in this same Paraguay.

The everyday life of the major communities, those in Paraguay, also bears the imprint of many centuries, but that of the eighteenth seems strongest. Socially, this is largely a matter of choice, for these colonists are conservative; but economically it is one of necessity arising out of their isolated location and the lack of markets. Thus, in explaining why tractors

could not be used even when they were provided free of charge, the author states that "the cost of operating them was . . . out of all proportion to the farmers' earning power"; they found it more economical to revert to the use of horses, oxen, and man power. Politically, however, they have developed democratic practices that strongly modify the theocratic character of their governments; and co-operatives, a nineteenth-century product, are a vital feature of their economic life.

Every aspect of life in these colonies, including their relations with the native South American peoples surrounding them, is discussed clearly and interestingly, and the text is supported by abundant statistical tables, maps, and documentation. Both the author and the institutions which aided him—the Mennonite Central Committee and the Social Science Research Council—are to be congratulated on the results of this study.

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania

CULVER, DWIGHT W. *Negro Segregation in the Methodist Church*. Pp. xii, 218. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. \$3.00.

Since there are more Negro Methodists than there are Negroes in all the other "white" denominations in the United States combined, a study of the attitude of American Methodism toward segregation is an important contribution to the literature of the American race problem. Materials for this study were secured through the widespread use of questionnaires circulated among white and colored superintendents, clergymen, and laymen.

In 1844 the Methodist Church split on the question of whether a Methodist bishop might own slaves, and Methodism was divided into a Methodist Episcopal Church and a Methodist Episcopal Church, South. During the negotiations for reunion (1924-36) there were three shades of opinion on the question of segregation: (1) a Southern group did not want the Negroes to remain within the reunited denomination and spoke of the "opportunity" for development which a separate religious organiza-

tion would furnish them; (2) a Northern group was anxious for reunion but unwilling to sacrifice the privileges of the Negro minority; and (3) some Negro leaders, believing that their opportunities for fellowship with whites would be limited, favored a separate jurisdiction within the reunited church. A separate jurisdictional conference, it was said, was not discrimination but an effort to provide the minority group with enlarged opportunity. The consequence was the "Central Jurisdiction," an all-Negro administrative unit, created in 1939. It has not been satisfactory since a segregated church tends to deny that God is the father of all races and that therefore all men are brothers. Catholics and other unsegregated religious organizations have made extensive inroads on Negro Methodism.

This is not the end of the story. Discrimination in employment in the Methodist Publishing House, in service at the cafeteria of the Methodist Building at Washington, D. C., and in restaurants and hotels where the General Conference and other church meetings are held is noted. The Methodist Church maintains many colleges, medical schools, theological seminaries, homes, and hospitals. Those which are located at the South are segregated as required by law. Most of the non-Southern educational institutions practice a large degree of integration. Some of the non-Southern "homes" will not admit Negroes, and some of the hospitals will do so only in segregated wards; some will not admit them at all. "Employment opportunities are theoretically open to Negroes in all but six Methodist hospitals, but less than half now have Negroes employed" (p. 139). Professional opportunities for Negro doctors, nurses, and interns are still more limited.

The book is a mine of valuable information on contemporary mores, and it is interestingly written. A careful perusal will be worthwhile in the opinion of this reviewer.

JOHN G. VAN DEUSEN

Hobart College

ROEMER, LAWRENCE. *Brownson on Democracy and the Trend Toward Social-*

ism. Pp. xvi, 173. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. \$3.75.

At the age of 41 Orestes Brownson (1803-76), a self-educated polemicist who prided himself on his powers of "logical" analysis, joined the Roman Catholic Church. His conversion brought to an end a series of misadventures with various Protestant denominations in which as a preacher he had sought unsuccessfully for an infallible source of moral authority. Satisfied at last, he spent the rest of his life writing for Catholic journals and adumbrating such propositions as "no one can be a good American citizen unless he is a Catholic."

This singular notion and others no less curious are laid admiringly before the reader in the book under review. Its author Mr. Roemer, an uncritical latter-day disciple of Brownson's, attempts to distill the essence of the latter's political speculations from the hundreds of essays and book reviews he wrote during his Catholic period rather than from his *American Republican* which has chiefly interested previous critics and biographers.

According to Mr. Roemer, Brownson's "failure to arouse the interest of individuals, particularly Catholics, in the [United States] constitution and its relation to the moral law was rather distressing to him." However distressing, his failure is scarcely surprising on the evidence unconsciously brought forward by Mr. Roemer. The fact is that Brownson's views on the Constitution, federalism, democracy, socialism, and a dozen other topics were so remote from reality that they would have been more plausible if alleged to apply to another planet.

A few examples will suffice. Brownson defends the United States Constitution on two grounds: first and less exceptionably, that its division of powers between the central government and the states protects the society from the tyranny of centralized popular rule; and second, that its "unity and diversity" resembles more closely than any other system the Holy Trinity, which is the "principle and prototype of all society." Hence the Catholic Church is in harmony with the American system, whereas "all false religions being one-sided, sophistical, uncatholic, are opposed by the

principles of the state, which tend, by their silent but effective workings, to eliminate them."

He violently opposes democracy, which in keeping with his dogmatic temper he chooses to equate with absolute majority rule. Democracy, he declares, "generates a habit of appealing on nearly all occasions, from truth and justice, wisdom and virtue, to the force of numbers, and virtually sinks the man in the brute." Relying on "logic" and imperious assertion rather than on evidence, he condemns the democratic emphasis on political equality because it leads "inevitably" to a demand for social equality, which in turn begets "socialism," the worst of all evils because it culminates in atheism and annihilates religion.

Mr. Roemer never boggles at any of this. On the contrary he goes Brownson one better, for in his last chapter we find him applying Brownsonian principles to contemporary problems with the following results: opposition to the United Nations, objection to the federal income tax, and criticism of the "neutrality" of the public schools in religious matters. On this last point, he would close up the public schools and "distribute public funds equally on the basis of enrollment to any organization willing to undertake the task of educating children without depriving them of religious instruction. . . . As a matter of fact there would be only three kinds of institutions—Jewish, Protestant and Catholic."

Is it uncharitable to predict that Mr. Roemer will find the response to his own views "distressing"?

HENRY WELLS

University of Puerto Rico

PFEFFER, LEO. *Church, State, and Freedom*. Pp. xvi, 675. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. \$10.00.

In his *American Commonwealth* James Bryce cites our separation of church and state as being one of our most distinguished and successful achievements. It has delivered us from the strife that plagued Europe for fifteen hundred years. It has been our custom and convention to concur in this judgment. Thus a great American

jurist says that "the greatest achievement ever made in the cause of human progress is the total and final separation of church and state."

This book is one of an increasing number of such works dealing primarily with the present situation. It accepts the fact that "America has not solved the controversy." The interest and importance of this volume lie in the person of its author. Dr. Pfeffer is a constitutional lawyer who has appeared before our courts in cases where the issue has been tried—in particular the Supreme Court of the United States. His work is heavily documented, and fortunately we may trust him to have cited the relevant and most important sources. To this extent the book may be accepted as probably more definite than any of its many predecessors.

It is important to remember that the phrase "separation of church and state" is no part of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. It is at best a later description of the situation presumably intended by these originals. The stubborn and still unresolved problems which persist arise from the fact that, though some institutional issues may be solved in this way, it is impossible to divorce religion and citizenship.

The first two-thirds of the book cover familiar ground: the European and colonial background and the present areas of conflict, mainly in the field of tax-supported educational institutions. The *Everson* and *McCollum* cases are reviewed with meticulous care. It is interesting to see how ambiguous and equivocal our constitutions and laws must be when faced with concrete dilemmas. Thus, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the *Everson* case was a five to four decision.

The last part of the book on the general problem of religious freedom is in some ways the most interesting in that it explores types of problems not anticipated by our constitutions and laws. What about the snake worshiper who allows himself, in the course of his devotions, to be bitten by a rattler? What about the Jehovah's Witness who withholds blood transfusions from his dying child on the ground that this would be a prohibited form of drinking the blood? The author has a genuine

concern for religious liberty, and thus, for the eccentricities of the individual conscience, but he feels bound to defend the public welfare against the lunatic fringe which lies in the far side of a theoretically defensible religious fanaticism.

WILLARD L. SPERRY

Harvard University

DONIGER, SIMON (Ed.). *Sex and Religion Today*. Pp. xii, 238. New York: Association Press, 1953. \$3.00.

Sex and Religion Today is a compilation of articles written by experts in their specialized fields concerning religious attitude toward sex today.

All of the contributors to this work, edited by Simon Doniger, consider sex not in the physical only, but also in an understanding of love. The studies of Kinsey and others have presented sex only on the lowest possible plane, the instinct of man, the animal.

There are three basic chapters in this book: "Sex—Sin or Salvation?" by Seward Hiltner, "Christianity and Sex" by Roland H. Bainton, and "The Meaning of Sex" by Gotthard Booth. The other chapters add very little to the principles set forth in these three chapters but, in a sense, restate the same truths.

"Sex—Sin or Salvation?" presents sex as salvation, in that man, distinct from other animals, is not merely a rutting animal, but can engage in sexual activities throughout the year. This caused man to provide a domicile where babies could be born and cared for and to create conditions suitable to life. He also suggests that a sane healthy approach to sex leads to the salvation of the personality. Of course, it would be interesting to define his use of salvation. If he means it in the theological sense, as the salvation offered in the Gospel, I would disagree, but in the terms of the physical, I can accept it. He also points out the sin-element in sex which is important.

"Christianity and Sex" presents the various views held by religious leaders down through the years. The wide range of ideas of Jerome, Luther, Church leaders, and the Catholic Church are presented,

making an interesting study. No matter how far apart these personalities may have been on the question of sex behavior, the leaders of all ages agree that the Christian's attitude toward sex should not be considered apart from love, marriage, and family.

"The Meaning of Sex" presents the biology of sex and explains the urge toward sex to the nature of the sex cells which divide before copulation into two separate cells or chromosomes. The very nature of sex in its incompleteness is the drive which demands physical sexual union.

Sex is given an entirely too important role in life, yet due to the importance assigned it today, we need a careful, wholesome study of it. This book is a contribution toward the healthy understanding of sex.

MELVIN M. FORNEY
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

KARUNAKARAN, K. P. *India in World Affairs, August 1947-January 1950: A Review of India's Foreign Relations from Independence Day to Republic Day.* Pp. xi, 407. Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1952. Rs. 15.

India has assumed a role of importance in international affairs out of all proportion to her ability to fulfill commitments in the furtherance of these views. The opinions of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Jawaharlal Nehru may not be the "voice of Asia," as some would assert. But few will deny the impact that Nehru has made in assuring Asia a place of honor and respect in international councils. The pressing needs of the economically less favored sectors of the world sustain the Indian insistence that the poor, diseased, and underprivileged not be by-passed because of an engrossment over the Communist issue. Without significant military power and in a situation of severe internal economic stress, India has taken a stand that ties her future to the ultimate solution of the multiple interrelated social and economic problems that are international in scope. Thus India, while struggling with

domestic concerns, looks outward for the creation of an international environment favorable for general peace, prosperity, and joint attacks upon common problems. It is this theme of the close relations between Indian domestic and external relations that K. P. Karunakaran has surveyed.

The Indian Council of World Affairs has initiated a program of research and publication that will make available the details of India's interest and participation in foreign affairs. This first volume in the general series attempts the difficult task of summarizing the background of Indian foreign policy and giving an assessment of the working out of that policy to the time of the coming into force of the Constitution of the Republic of India in January of 1950. On the whole, the results of the author are impressive. Sections on India's relations with Pakistan and India's participation in the United Nations are outstanding statements of a particular point of view. On the other hand, the many pages devoted to political developments in other Asian countries are not of the same quality and thus tend to detract from the concentration of the main thesis.

It is surprising that the author did not give more attention to the dominance of Prime Minister Nehru in the building of India's foreign policy. The political education of Nehru runs a close parallel first with the foreign policy resolves of the Indian National Congress and later with the policy of the Government of India (ruled by the Congress Party). Nehru's preoccupation with nationalism, anti-colonialism, the subtleties of economic domination, the status of Asia and the ills of fascism do not in this process find a similar recognition of the totalitarian, expanding nature of organized communism. A study of Congress resolutions on foreign policy is revealing in this respect. India's policy of "independence" in world affairs has involved a logical de-emphasis of Indian democratic national aspirations and ideological values both of which have their international implications. This aspect of Indian foreign policy is not explored fully by the author.

Only a few errors have been noticed. The full index and bibliography are helpful additions to a book that is a credit to it

author and to its sponsor, the Indian Council of World Affairs.

RICHARD L. PARK

University of California
Berkeley, California

ROOSEVELT, ELEANOR. *India and the Awakening East.* Pp. xvi, 237. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. \$3.00.

In the charming and lucid style of *My Day*, Mrs. Roosevelt has written a diary of her travels in India and Pakistan, Nepal, Indonesia, the Philippines, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. She is at her best when describing her experiences with the students of Allahabad University. Their questions indicated the natural student interest in world politics and a keen desire to be informed about conditions in the United States. A contrast is drawn between the effectiveness of Communist propaganda which merely promises the people of India the "Freedom to Eat," something easily comprehended, and the relative ineffectiveness of the Western goal of prosperity, and the need to progress as far and as rapidly as possible. To the vast majority of the underprivileged population, these ideas sound fantastic and are far removed from anything within their experience and knowledge, and the spiritual motivations of the Occident are not understood.

The penetrating criticism is made that the Indian belief in the virtue of renunciation is not an incentive to hard work for material gain. Consequently, since only hard work will bring a betterment in Indian living conditions, Mrs. Roosevelt believes that a spiritual incentive, as a substitute for renunciation, will have to be found to spark the conviction that the modern struggle for a highly technologically developed state is worthwhile. Equally strange to her as a Westerner, believing in the separation of church and state, is the fact that in Pakistan religion plays such a controlling part both in the citizen's daily life and in the affairs of Government. Because geographically and economically Pakistan and India are a natural unit, the conclusion is reached that the subcontinent is paying a terrible price for partition, which has resulted in spending for defense huge sums badly needed for health, hous-

ing, education, and other programs that would better the living standards of the people.

With reference to the Near East, Mrs. Roosevelt's principal comment is that the spirit and resolve exhibited in Israel cannot possibly be without result and sooner or later must make this experiment a success. In regard to the Arab refugee problem, her observation is that one is surprised that the Arabs would have left places that were fairly safe unless from panic and hysteria spread through authoritative channels, particularly since 170,000 Moslems are still living peacefully and unharmed in Israel. Arab responsibility for the present situation, she declares, must be shared by the British who furnished the refugees with transportation, and by no stretch of the imagination can there be envisaged the return to Israel of 800,000 destitute refugees now in Arab lands.

While entertaining, and of definite interest to those not acquainted with the countries described, the book does not attempt to offer anything new to students of these areas.

ALBERT E. KANE

Washington, D. C.

MARTIN, KINGSLEY. *Harold Laski (1893-1950): A Biographical Memoir.* Pp. x, 278. New York: The Viking Press, 1953. \$4.00. (Previously published in London by Victor Gollancz.)

In this brief, admiring biography, Kingsley Martin gives the kind of highly personal account of Laski which one might expect from a strong and devoted friend. It is very readable, and to one who knew and liked Laski it is quite sympathetic. It is likely to prove irritating to readers who did not know or like Laski. Whether discussing "the crisis in democracy," fascism, communism, the Jewish question, or American democracy, Martin is decidedly sympathetic to Laski's ideas, quoting critics in order to refute them. How one would love to argue these issues with him!

It is difficult to read this eulogy without checking it against the Holmes-Laski correspondence published earlier this year. The portrait which emerged from this correspondence shocked many. I have time and

again participated as counsel for the defense in pointed arguments over the Laski of the correspondence. Kingsley Martin offers an urbane apology for Laski's love of boasting about his acquaintances and his faiblesse for telling tall stories. It was, after all, a minor flaw. More serious (in a scholar) would seem the tendency to be less than accurate about what he had read, including the quoting of scholarly writings from memory. But it, too, can be defended by the boundless enthusiasm which was one of Laski's portrait assets.

But the crucial problem in the biography, styled a "memoir," of a scholar and writer of learned books, is the evaluation of his works. I feel sure that Laski would want to be remembered for them. It is therefore disappointing to find Martin often offering only uncritical and indiscriminating praise. Surely works like the *Grammar of Politics* deserved something more incisive than the kind of comment which might be found in a brief review by a man who had only skimmed through the book. I feel certain that a man of Kingsley Martin's penetration could have done better than characterize the Pluralist position in terms which would make Hegel a pluralist. In the same vein might be questioned Martin's hesitation to put into perspective Laski's conversion to Marxism, and Laski's consequent failure to assess the Soviet Union's position with candor. It may be a matter of opinion whether Laski's book on *The American Presidency* was one of his best achievements, but surely its intense partisanship need not be described as "objective in approach," immediately to be followed by the contradictory remark that the work was calculated "to give support to a great liberal president." It is an open secret that Laski was not only no admirer of the American system but a bitter and doctrinaire critic, as the Laski-Price debate showed later. More discriminating is Kingsley Martin's elaborate discussion of Laski's *The American Democracy* which culminates in a moving indictment of the present academic hysteria. A critique would involve all of Marxism's complex inconclusiveness in matters of political theory, and Martin may be pardoned for not entering upon it.

It was a happy inspiration to conclude the volume with a small piece of Laski's which shows him as the warm-hearted, valuable human being he was, who possessed a superb gift of expression. The piece is a gem, and confirms me in the suspicion that Laski will live as a writer of prose in the manner of Burke—a man he disliked and whom he resembled in so many ways. This piece alone is worth the price of the book. And in spite of its shortcomings, the Kingsley Martin portrait has the one quality most important in a biography—Harold Laski comes to life in his pages—and our gratitude to him for that achievement is a great and lasting one.

CARL J. FRIEDRICH

Harvard University

SIMPSON, COLIN. *Adam in Ochre: Inside Aboriginal Australia*. Pp. 221. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. \$5.00.

This is a splendidly produced book. The colored and black and white plates, the delightful line drawings, and the clear type make it a thing of joy to possess and handle. The book arose out of the author's visit to the Darwin region of the Northern Territory of Australia to report and make recordings for the Australian Broadcasting Commission. He visited the camp of the American-Australian scientific expedition at Oenpelli, about one hundred miles by air east of Darwin, and also the Government Settlements on Melville Island, fifty miles north of Darwin, and those at Delissaville across the harbor from that town.

Mr. Simpson, an experienced reporter and observer, describes clearly what he saw and transcribes what he was told, so that the book has the virtue of first-hand observation. In addition, he has incorporated the results of general and anthropological reading so that he gives us more than a travel book. He regards himself as something of a middleman in making available to the ordinary readers results of anthropological research which they would not otherwise see.

Adam in Ochre, however, is not and does not claim to be a systematic work on the three tribes visited by the author. It consists rather of series of sketches on the three districts and the people, black and

white, in them. The first part is about the scientific expedition, its members, and some aboriginal and other incidents which Mr. Simpson witnessed. For Melville Island and Delissaville we are given brief descriptions of the conditions on the Government Settlements and of some native customs and ceremonies.

In addition, Mr. Simpson includes a 50-page novel, "Kakadu Naked," based on Baldwin Spencer's account of the Kakadu tribe which formerly lived in the Oenpelli district, and also on the theme of the contact of black and white, of white man and black woman in particular. In this story, the author makes good use of his all too short visit to Oenpelli.

Finally, Mr. Simpson adds a chapter, "White Delusion," in which he predicts that in a few years the Aborigines will start to increase in numbers. The somewhat haphazard material provided in the chapter is not convincing, but I think he is correct. The Aborigines in the center and north of Australia have had time to readjust themselves, while improved health, education, and social services and better employment conditions are helping them in this process.

All interested in the condition and progress of peoples of primitive culture in contact with ourselves will appreciate this layman's book on the subject.

A. P. ELKIN

University of Sydney
Sydney, Australia

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

SLUSSER, ROBERT (Ed.). *Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany*. Pp. xx, 184. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1953. \$2.25.

In our present need for thorough knowledge of the Soviet system, we can obtain valuable aid from the many talented Soviet citizens who have fled to the West. Some of them were officials with direct operating experience in the myriad institutions of a totalitarian state. Their accounts, if sometimes tinged with understandable bitterness, are nevertheless far more informative than the scanty, doubt-

ful, or purely formal materials released by agencies of the system itself.

The present symposium contains eight essays by seven such officials, dealing with Soviet theory and practice in Eastern Germany from 1945 to 1950. It is an early fruit of the venture in scholarly replanting known as the Research Program on the USSR, a subsidiary of the East European Fund, Incorporated. Former Soviet scholars and administrators, now in this country, who wish to enter professional life in the United States, are given a chance to demonstrate their ability. At the same time, first-hand observations on Soviet reality are recorded and made available for Western analysts. Clearly both sides gain substantially, and the East European Fund is to be congratulated on its program. The editor, Robert Slusser, has produced a uniform English text and added a revealing introduction; the result is a lucid monograph for which we can all be grateful.

The study covers four aspects of Soviet policy in Germany: the early stripping of the German economy; the administrative organization of Soviet controls; issues and practices in dealing with German agriculture; and, finally, a detailed account of uranium mining in Saxony under Soviet auspices. It includes also a good bibliography, a chronology of events, a map of eastern Germany, and a comprehensive index. Offered at \$2.25 with a paper cover, it seems an excellent buy for all who are curious about Russian activities in post-war Germany.

In particular, political scientists concerned with the anatomy of dictatorship and with bureaucratic rivalries behind a unified façade will find here much revealing material. Portions of the study constitute a detailed manual of public administration at this time and place. Economists and historians will appreciate the discussion of alternative Soviet economic policies for draining off tribute from Germany. Clearly an appreciation of the factors at work and the consequences involved is fundamental to any evaluation of present or future prospects in Soviet-German relations.

For this reviewer, the most interesting findings suggested by the study relate to

planning, Sovietization, and collectivization. A really astounding competition among Soviet industrial organizations for German plant and equipment, combined with grossly stupid dismantling practices, indicates that the Soviet myth of a "planned" economy is still far from actuality. Secondly, economic exploitation of the German economy, which took precedence over the Soviet objective of gaining German allegiance to the Soviet system, may have permanently impaired the prospects for attaining this goal. Finally, it is clear that Soviet methods in agriculture had little technological or political appeal for the East German peasant, which provides one more confirmation of the thesis that Soviet collective farming is in fact a primitive, rather than advanced, agricultural system.

HOLLAND HUNTER

Haverford College

BERGSON, ABRAM (Ed.). *Soviet Economic Growth: Conditions and Perspectives*. Pp. viii, 376. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1953. \$6.00.

The free world is heavily in debt to the simple frontiersman's spirit and the large bank balances of American research, especially the RAND Corporation. What Soviet studies require is not brilliant and novel interpretations but quantification. Defectors must be interviewed and technical journals combed, production indexes and public opinion surveys compiled. These tasks have called forth a thoroughly expert and objective body of men who are as great a credit to American learning as the China experts of the State Department. May they never suffer a similar fate; for here again there is no substitute in Western Europe.

We have here solid and original research, based usually upon a thorough knowledge of modern economic theory, into the statistics of most aspects of Soviet economic growth: population, natural resources, transport, industry, agriculture, foreign trade, investment, national income. Omitted are forced labor and the standard of living. These omissions are particularly serious as they make the successes of the Soviet economy seem even greater than

they are. This is, then, a source-book, only readable by specialists. The statistics are compiled rather than used; though at least the indispensable minimum of comparisons with Western performance is provided. This task sets the most exacting standards of accuracy and conscientiousness. Your reviewer is only competent to pass upon Mr. Eason's population figures: they certainly achieve these standards. My confidence in the rest of the work is raised by the inclusion of critical comments after each paper by other experts. These are on the whole very favorable to the papers presented.

From the most cursory study of these materials—and especially from Mr. Kaplan's paper which is in more senses than one the *pièce de résistance*—there emerges a comparison with the West that is extremely alarming. Briefly, no "capitalist" country has achieved for long the rate of economic growth, whether absolutely or per capita, which has persisted in the Soviet Union since 1929; and most fall very far short of it all the time. Our only serious consolations are: (1) various factors which must reduce but not by any means abolish this superiority; (2) the long start possessed by the developed Western nations; and (3) the fact that the general Soviet superiority masks an undoubted inferiority in agriculture, the most basic activity of all.

The two papers on international trade are notably the weakest. They add little to the knowledge derived from Soviet publications and inexcusably fail to collate the admirable work of the United Nations and its Economic Commission for Europe in this field. Also at this point at least some reference to finance was required—a subject that has otherwise rightly been avoided.

P. J. D. WILES

New College, Oxford University

Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the 19th Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization after Stalin's Death. From the translations of *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. Edited with an introduction by Leo Gruliov. Pp. vi, 268. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. \$6.00.

This book is a compilation of translations from the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* prepared under the direction of the distinguished Joint Committee on Slavic Studies. Leo Gruliov has written a valuable introduction and prepared an excellent index and glossary. These documents include Stalin's economic problems of socialism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the important discussions preceding the Congress and the reports from the congresses in the Republics and in Moscow Province, the directives of the Fifth Five Year Plan, and the pronouncements, speeches, and directives relating to Stalin's death and the subsequent reorganization of the inner cabinet and governmental and party administrations.

The Congress opened October 5, 1952, in the Great Hall of the Kremlin Palace. Three days before, it was announced that Georgy Malenkov would deliver the report of the Central Committee. Stalin, however, published in *Bolshevik*, No. 18, letters which he had written on socio-economic theory, the prerequisites for communism, and the inevitability of wars among the capitalist states. In them he told the comrades that it would be a long time before they would have communism in the U.S.S.R., a statement which may now be regarded as his political testament.

Malenkov's major report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party to the Congress covered the international situation, and the internal problems of the Soviet Union and the party. He harangued the comrades at length on "the further weakening of the world capitalist system," the rise of two world markets, the advent of American imperialism, the United States attack on the Korean Peoples' Democratic Republic, and the coming triumph of the socialist economic system over capitalism. The comrades were warned against "the external appearances of free world unity which glitter on the surface." "There is every reason to believe," concluded Malenkov in his advocacy of Soviet preparedness, "that a third world war would cause the collapse of the world capitalistic system."

Malenkov was not equal to the task of speaking for five hours on such momentous

subjects without revealing considerable shallowness of thought, or at best misinformation, as well as a vulgarization of the techniques of international propaganda, incompatible with his future role as chief of state. On the other hand, his presentation of the internal economic and political situations was masterful, realistic, and praiseworthy. At this congress the memory of the opposition to Stalin had faded, three-fifths of the delegates had joined the Party since 1930, and "the normalizing of party life" after the purges had profoundly affected the delegates of almost seven million Party members.

Unfortunately, this book does not emphasize the completely arbitrary but historic changes in Party administration after Stalin's death, which nullified decisions of the 19th Congress and established trends toward a greater concentration of power in the inner cabinet and party presidium, as well as in the economic and cultural administrations. Even more marked were the emergency measures "to insure the uninterrupted and correct leadership of the whole life of the country" in order to prevent "any kind of disarray and panic" during the irrepressible struggle for power which followed the proclamation of a new personal dictatorship.

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ

Stanford University

SETON-WATSON, HUGH. *From Lenin to Malenkov: The History of World Communism*. Pp. xv, 377. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. \$6.00.

Professor Seton-Watson describes and analyzes Communism throughout the world except in the United States. His book is packed with useful information and a fresh point of view. His best chapters deal with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He is weaker on China and on southern Europe.

Although most of his book is strictly objective and written from a detached point of view, his final chapter includes some valuable personal admonitions: "Western intellectuals must stop being ashamed of their own civilization, and become aware of the difference in quality between it and totalitarianism . . . in the last resort the

classes and political groups within western society—excepting . . . the Stalinist fifth column—belong to each other. . . . If western men and women insist that they hate each other more than they hate Stalinism, they have it in their power to hand themselves over, bound hand and foot, to the Stalinists." He also takes to task the "small but influential intelligentsia" in Britain "that clings to the slogan *pas d'ennemis à gauche*." Describing its essential feature as a "guilt complex," Seton-Watson points out that this group refuses to resist Communist aggression so long as a slum exists in the British Empire. Comparing them with another earlier British group which argued that since Versailles was an imperfect settlement Britain had no right to oppose Hitler, the author stresses their curious double standard which at no time expresses concern for inmates of Soviet slave labor camps and victims of Soviet aggression.

Seton-Watson rightly states that "every democratic statesman who wishes his country to remain free from Soviet imperialism must regard the United States as his friend. 'Third force' manoeuvring and 'neutrality' invite disaster." Proceeding to declare that "The aim of western policy must be the liberation of the peoples of the Soviet empire," he nevertheless offers nothing better than this: "The only policy that will save the free world is to be patient and strong, to search for every opportunity and to keep an open mind." Just what this pious statement will do for the impatient east German workers and for the peasants of eastern Europe, China, and north Korea is not clear.

This book effectively demolishes lingering sentiment which made such claims as that the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. have been well treated, that there was some justification for the purge trials, and that the kulaks existed as a class. The author also exposes as a sham the long-held thesis that Western imperialists invaded Russia after World War I. Seton-Watson does an admirable debunking job which will dismay the followers of Bernard Pares and Frederick Schuman. He draws an apt parallel between Hindenburg in 1932 and Benes in 1948, and shows how "old China hands"

were fooled by the "agrarian democrats" in China.

On the other hand one finds the amazing question "Whether or not the Soviet leaders engineered the Korean war. . . ." One wonders who Seton-Watson thinks did start that war? The author seems to have relied solely on the American White Paper on China for the modern China section, and ignored such sources as Dallin (on China and U.S.S.R.), MacNeill (on Greece), and De Madariaga on Spain. For example, to state that the Popular Front won a "plurality" in the 1936 Spanish elections is to fly in face of the facts. The author also slights the role of the Agrarians and Christian Democrats in east European resistance, while falsely making it appear that the Socialists carried the brunt of the fight.

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

University of San Francisco

EBON, MARTIN. *Malenkov: Stalin's Successor*. Introduction by Harry Schwartz. Pp. xv, 284. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1953. \$3.75.

Recent events have added a postscript to this book and pointed up the "wide and bitter struggles for power which took place in Moscow between the Nineteenth Party Congress and the announcement of Stalin's death." Writing in the general fog of uncertainty that hung over that event, the author was groping after the vital factors in the picture which were then obscure but have gradually begun to stand out with greater clarity.

Mr. Ebon makes no claim to dogmatic certainty or to any degree of finality in his estimate of Malenkov's life or character. He has naturally had to rely largely on the work of other writers and on Soviet documents, especially on those which feature the utterances of the Soviet Prime Minister. The speeches of Malenkov printed in the appendix impress one with their voluble repetition of Soviet jargon, their turgid rhetoric, their inconsistencies and contradictions, which would indicate that Malenkov is less at home in the fields of Communist theory and Soviet policy than in that of intrigue and the desperate game of "Russian roulette" in which the stakes are

either supreme power or political extinction.

Working within the limits imposed by scarcity of material, and basing his estimate of Malenkov on such facts in his career as are well known, Mr. Ebon has drawn a picture of a calculating, cruel, unscrupulous, crafty, yet bold player in this game of Communist politics. Having joined the Party only in 1920, Malenkov accepted without question the great decisions reached prior to then and shows no likelihood of departing from them. With his indifference to, and even contempt for, theory, what he has contributed has been in the field of their application to existing conditions. As in all Communist practice deviations are no more than temporary expedients.

The book gives signs of having been written in some haste to take advantage of the demand created by Stalin's death, and errors have been allowed to creep in. Two of these are fairly serious. On page 139 it is stated that "Joseph Stalin in all his seventy-three years never ventured further away from Soviet borders than Teheran." If this is intended to imply that he had never before left Russia, this is wrong since Stalin is known to have traveled abroad at least twice, in 1906 to Stockholm and in 1912 to Krakow. If on the other hand the author has not forgotten these previous journeys, he has at least underestimated these distances from the Russian frontier. The statement on page 149, "the Czechoslovak coup d'etat [February, 1948] prompted the Marshall plan" is hardly in accord with the facts since the Marshall plan had already taken shape in the autumn of 1947.

STUART R. TOMPKINS

University of Oklahoma

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*. Pp. ix, 614. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$6.00.

This is the third and final volume in a series covering the history of the Bolshevik Revolution from 1917 to 1923. The first dealt with internal politics, the second with economic questions and the third with "Soviet Russia and the World," covering Eu-

rope, Asia, Germany, and the Far East.

This series is undoubtedly the best and most objective history of the Russian Revolution which has been written by a Western historian.

Professor Carr writes in retrospect and can thus make trenchant criticisms in the light of events which have long since passed. It would be interesting to read a history of the Western World written with the same objectivity by, let us say, a Czech professor of history. Then perhaps we would be better able to compare the actions of the Soviet bloc with those of the Western bloc.

The author has done the best he could with the sources at his disposal, but truth is always difficult to establish. For example, Sun Yat-sen in China offered the Communists individual membership in the Kuomintang. What was the position of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on this offer? The President of the Central Committee declared that the proposal was vigorously opposed by all the leading members of the committee and was finally forced through by invoking the authority of the Comintern. Maring, on the other hand, who made the proposal to the Party, said he had "no specific instructions from the Comintern."

We see in this history that the Communists had a zeal for their cause somewhat similar to that which Christian missionaries have had when they proposed "the evangelization of the world in this generation." The Communists wanted a communistic world in this generation!

This book gives a carefully documented picture of the difficulties faced by the Communist leaders in trying to promote their cause throughout the world while at the same time safeguarding the newly formed government of the Soviet Union. Here we see how overoptimistic Lenin was about revolution in Europe, Germany, and the Far East.

A special supplement of the book deals with "The Marxist Attitude to War." It is clear that while Communists are ostensibly opposed to war they believe in taking advantage of an international war created by "a crisis in the capitalistic system" to bring about revolutions everywhere.

The witch hunters in America today, who are trying to intimidate all sections of American society, should take to heart the statement that Communism is inconsequential in the United States. The exact words of Professor Carr are, "But neither the legal nor the illegal party exercised any influence in American political life; nor do they appear to have received any serious attention in Moscow, so that the role of the American party in the international communist movement remained unimportant as well as anomalous."

The author believes that the Soviet Union was interested in establishing and encouraging national states free from colonial domination, and this was in no small part the reason for Soviet success, whereas the Western powers favored weak rulers, colonialism, and landlordism.

American policy makers would do well to note that the split between North and South Korea had its seeds back in 1919 when two Korean National Movements were started, one trying to get the backing of the United States and the other of the Soviet Union. As long ago as 1926 some 160,000 Koreans had fled to the Soviet Union for refuge from oppression.

These three volumes will be invaluable to all students of the Russian Revolution. It is greatly to be hoped that Professor Carr will continue his historical treatment of Soviet Russia, bringing it down to 1953. Then we will be in a better position to get a picture of current events in their true perspective.

JEROME DAVIS

Fisk University

MANNING, CLARENCE A. *Ukraine Under the Soviets*. Pp. 223. New York: Bookman Associates, 1953. \$3.50.

This brief general survey of Soviet rule in Ukraine has emerged from a series of specialized studies which were prepared by a number of prominent Ukrainian scholars who are now in the West. Many of these scholars had established reputations in the Soviet Union prior to World War II. A fundamental thesis of this study is that the pattern of rule which has been imposed upon the satellite states was tested and

developed in Ukraine and in the other non-Russian Soviet republics.

The brief but informative chapters deal first with the revolutionary period and the relatively relaxed early phase of Soviet rule in the 1920's when Ukraine was nominally independent. Other chapters are devoted to the Ukrainization period which, in many cases, meant derussification and which prompted much debate. The scholarly revival and the Ukrainian cultural renaissance are given special treatment as are the various literary schools and the very colorful and tragic figure of the writer Mykola Khvylovy who dared to challenge Stalin's centralism. The collectivization and famine in Ukraine are given attention and the unfortunate reticence of most of the non-Soviet world is justifiably criticized. A most interesting aspect of the volume is the attention which is given to the fate of the original Ukrainian Communists and fellow-travelers who paid with their lives during the Stalinist *gleichschaltung* which subordinated all Ukrainian cultural life to the Muscovite model. Several chapters are devoted to the war-time period and to the large-scale defections of Ukrainians as well as to the stupid policies of the Nazis. The study concludes with chapters on Soviet cultural and religious policies since the war.

Several serious typographical errors detract from the volume; for example, the name of the writer Andry Zalyvchy is misspelled on page 67 and in the index. It is unfortunate that the study lacks documentation although it should be borne in mind that most of the scholars responsible for the research on which it is based themselves experienced the events discussed by Professor Manning. It would have been desirable to include more detail on such matters as the Vinnytsya Massacre of 1937, the break in the OUN in 1940-1941, and Stepan Bandera and his relations with the German occupation authorities.

While the definitive and fully documented study of Communist rule in Ukraine has yet to be written, Professor Manning's volume is important because it provides valuable data on an area in which neglect can be very dangerous.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.
Princeton University

Sovietization of Culture in Poland, The. A Collective Work. Pp. xv, 207. Paris: Mid-European Research and Planning Centre, 1953. No price.

In a doctoral dissertation issued not long ago under the aegis of the Slavic department of one of our American universities we find reference made more than once to what the author calls "peasant writing." The implication is that there are two kinds of writing: (1) peasant and (2) other.

To us who have been schooled to see writing as simply (1) good and (2) bad, the new categories come as a shock. Apparently, however, we are going to have to get used to them, and to others even more shocking in other fields, if the sovietization of the world continues at its present rate of advance. Already whole nations have experienced the new dispensation, none, be it said, with greater violence to its past habits and practices than the one which is the subject of the present study—Poland.

The Sovietization of Culture in Poland is in the way of an adaptation of studies which appeared earlier in a special "krajowy" (homeland) number of the Polish review *Kultura* (Paris, December 1952). Earlier this year I received a copy of this from one of the authors, Marja Danilewicz, Librarian of the Polish University Library in London. As I read it, my one thought was that it should be made available to a wider public than the strictly Polish. For here was a case study, clear and scholarly and brief, of what may with truth be called The Great Phenomenon of our time. I am glad this has now been done.

This phenomenon is the remaking of national cultures in images totally foreign to the native pattern and tradition. It is going on in Europe, in Asia, everywhere the Kremlin has been able to win a position of control. The very concept of such a remaking process is indeed the Great Idea of our era.

Many of the national groups in the Soviet orbit, especially in Central Asia, have cultures of their own that are but vague and half-coalesced. Poland, however, has a clearly defined and very old culture, firmly rooted in the western tradition. Her experience as an object of Soviet re-

making offers, therefore, peculiarly instructive reading for ourselves.

Reduced to its essence, the object of the remaking process is complete despiritualization. To accomplish this end in Poland, where idealism has been a national trait and a proud boast, the Soviets have had to make over the whole Polish past. Historians and other writers, "engineers of the soul," as Stalin called them, have been recruited to do this, their own spiritual citadels having first been taken by the weapons of gold and fame. New heroes have been created, and old heroes, even the most beloved, like the Romantic poets, have been fitted with new faces and transformed into "class warriors." The wider access to the written word, by way of pamphlets and dramas and books, which seemed to be one of the good things about post-1945 life in Poland, thus becomes for the people but a means of betrayal into the hands of cynical and opportunistic hirelings.

The present study explores the Soviet tactic in every field of the national life. The picture it offers is frightening, the more so for its sobriety and lack of color. It bears out the pessimistic view to be found in other reports of what is happening behind the Curtain such as the recently published *Captive Mind*, and gives the West little ground for hope.

A. P. COLEMAN

Alliance College

SIMMONS, ERNEST J. (Ed.). *Through the Glass of Soviet Literature: Views of Russian Society*. Pp. ix, 301. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. \$4.50.

This is a series of five interesting and valuable studies on some significant aspects of Soviet society, as reflected in its literature. The book deals with the position of women in Soviet society (Louise E. Luke), the position of Jews (Bernard J. Choseed), the role of the children's theater and drama in Soviet education and propaganda (Gene Sosin), and the impact of postwar Bolshevik ideology on literary scholarship (Robert M. Hankin). The book also includes the case studies of a nonconformist, satirist

Zoshchenko, and an introduction by E. J. Simmons.

This work gives evidence that literature can be used as a source material in studying Russia and other Communist societies of Bolshevik type. There are, however, limitations to the use of such materials. It seems that the best way the literature of such a totalitarian society can be used as source material is for the study of ideological aspects of Communism, since such a literature tends to portray faithfully the ideology of the ruling faction. It gives a good idea of changes in this ideology, often dramatized when the same work of an author is republished during various phases of the development of Communist society. In such a case, the statements or images in earlier editions which conflict with current ideological thought are deleted and often supplemented by new statements and images which correspond to the new trends. In other words, Soviet literature shows how the Party line changes in respect to various aspects of Soviet policies.

It would be difficult to find in such a literature materials which would faithfully portray the extent of opposition and dissatisfaction, or all the negative reactions to the official Party line. We know, for instance, by reading Soviet literature what has been the official image of Soviet woman in various periods of development of Soviet society. But we would hardly get a good idea of the reaction of the women to their position in the Soviet society in various periods and phases of its development. We know, on the basis of such a literature, what is the image of a Party member with a high degree of *Partiinost* and *ideinost* (Party spirit and indoctrination), but it would be very difficult to get any idea about how many Party members deviate from this model and in which direction, though we do find material which indicates the degree of deviation which leads to expulsion and liquidation.

Sometimes the literature of a totalitarian society might be significant by what it omits, not only by what it tells, and, if combined with other studies and other source materials, it can certainly give a very useful contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of communism of

Bolshevik type. The material found in such literature might be very helpful in the development of tentative hypotheses which can then be checked by additional studies and other sources. For instance, the following hypothesis is suggested by the material presented in this book: contrary to the general opinion according to which consolidation of Bolshevik power was to bring relaxation in total controls and a trend toward democratization, the strengthening of the Soviet system which followed the victorious war brought about more regimentation, not less, and increasing totalitarian controls. As a result, art and education are now more directed than before the war.

It is hoped that such valuable studies will be continued, and that the new volumes will bring additional material concerning other significant aspects of Soviet society.

D. A. TOMASIC

Indiana University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

BRINTON, CRANE. *The Temper of Western Europe*. Pp. ix, 118. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$2.50.

Probably the best recent eulogy of what is left of the grandeur and glory of the Western European civilization, this small volume emphasizes that Western Europe is today, as a whole, richer than ever before in spite of the last war; that there has been a substantial rebuilding of the various countries, an over-all increase in industrial production, national income, and per capita food supplies in calories, and a rise in the birth rate. It notes an abundance of vigor, a willingness of Western Europe to face the facts of the postwar world, and a general desire to build, a step at a time, a European Union; it concludes that Western Europe has power to solve its problems.

Brinton writes in his well-known easy-flowing style and will appeal to those who believe that optimism is the way of salvaging the debris of European backgrounds; they will also enjoy the digs he gives to

such "pessimists" as Lewis Mumford, Arthur Koestler, Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler—and particularly to William Shirer (as if he deserved so much attention!). Those more realistically inclined will take Brinton's enthusiasm, and even the facts he quotes, with a grain of salt. Although Brinton likes to use the sociological jargon (referring several times to the "sociology of knowledge"), he does not go far enough sociologically in his interpretation of facts. He talks about Europe being "richer," for instance; if he were to apply the theories of the Veblen school, he would have to point out also that Europe is, in the eyes of the Europeans, actually poorer, since the standards displayed by the United States are those of Hollywood with its Cadillacs and yachts. And if Europe is doing so well, why so much pressure to allow more and more immigrants and refugees into this country, under one guise or another? The United Nations is a pretty good institution, propounds Brinton; but how about the voices of the critics pointing out that it is also a powerful propaganda weapon of the Soviet bloc which, in addition, shelters all kinds of "fifth columnists"?

The weakest link in Brinton's argument is his tendency to ignore the geopolitical relationship of Western Europe to the worldwide situation. The picture he presents is somewhat out of focus since it does not refer to those who show that Europe has been skidding, not only politically, but also culturally. The rise of Soviet Russia and that of Communist China are factors which could have been properly related to Europe's problems, as could such incidental factors as the steady migration of many cultural values from Western Europe to America. And, if Brinton wants to claim that "the peoples of Western Europe have displayed since the war a very great ability to come back," what about the injections given to that ability by such devices as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Marshall plan, and others?

Brinton is good, but too eloquent; and his eloquence must be carefully checked against "other" facts. To use Brinton's own words, his main contribution has been

"merely skirting the philosophy of history" (p. 99).

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

University of Bridgeport

HAZARD, PAUL. *The European Mind: The Critical Years (1680-1715)*. Translated by J. Lewis May. Pp. xx, 454. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. \$5.50.

Paul Hazard wrote with the sparkle and assurance of a French intellectual, a Member of the Academy. His subject was that period in-between, the epoch that got lost. He thought that scholars had concentrated too much on the period of fruition in the eighteenth century, or on the period of beginnings in the Renaissance. Here is the story of the age between youth and maturity; in this "critical period," 1680-1715, the character of the future was being shaped. By 1680 the ideas of 1760-1789 were already current; men were trying to substitute for "a civilization founded on Duty . . . a civilization founded on the idea of rights" (p. xviii).

The opening chapter announces the challenging idea that Europe was being reoriented and revitalized by a world beyond, a world recently revealed to European consciousness. New conceptions were required because of "discoveries that have destroyed many of the data on which ancient philosophy reposed" (p. 8). Knowledge of the Happy Savage and the Wise Egyptian roused curiosity and whetted appetites. Comparisons of customs and philosophies led to discussion and doubt and confusion. When a traveller returned to Europe from overseas and announced an idea, even though he had it in his baggage when he went, the "sea-change" had made it a more imposing thing" (p. 10).

The bulk of the book analyzes intellectual activity within Europe. The reader will find sharply etched digests of the thought of critics such as Pierre Bayle, Arnauld, and Richard Simon, of constructive philosophers such as John Locke, of defenders of the faith like Bossuet, and of the great reconciler Leibniz. Personalities as well as arguments come vividly to life, and one senses the full drama of conflict. It is a study of ideas and men in the vi-

brant intensity of rethinking the bases of their society. Mathematics and science, religion and politics, and the idea of Happiness on Earth are discussed with freshness and insight. The meagerness of poetry is regretted, and the fad for opera is belittled: "Opera!—What an insult to human intelligence! Please the eye, please the ear, and revolt the reason" (p. 380).

The work covers a surprisingly large scope, though some things, such as economic thought, are neglected. It is description rather than criticism. The interaction of European minds is well treated, but the promise of the first chapter is not fulfilled. The non-European world may indeed have set Europe in gestating turmoil, but as the text sweeps on it all but forgets this wider setting, and the conclusion cannot clinch the thesis. The translation from the French edition of 1935 is delightfully readable.

FRANKLIN SCOTT
Northwestern University

BUTTINGER, JOSEPH. *In the Twilight of Socialism: A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria*. Pp. xi, 577. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. \$6.00.

In February 1934, Chancellor Dollfuss undertook to liquidate the Social Democrats, and within a few days this exceedingly well-disciplined, wealthy, and powerful party was completely disorganized. All the seized assets were labeled for the "reconstruction of the state," but the soul and spirit of thousands of party members remained beyond the reach of the Austrian dictator.

For the Socialists the pressing need was to establish some sort of underground organization in order to channel aid to the victims of the new regime, and also to show the rank and file that the party had not perished and was preparing for a future day. A small group of former Socialist editors constituted themselves an advisory committee and named five men to act as a central committee. To get the authority of this committee recognized was a difficult matter, for within a few weeks countless underground organizations had

sprung up, and there was always the competition of the Communists, who were busily attempting to enlist the Socialists under their banner. Otto Bauer, the head of the party, had fled to Czechoslovakia and established a Foreign Bureau there. He and his group controlled the vital foreign funds of the party, and they also soon began to turn out the *Arbeiterzeitung* and the flood of pamphlets which were the life-blood of the Socialist party. Bauer, who realized that the leadership of the underground could not be exercised by exiles, threw his prestige into the balance in favor of the Central Committee.

There was much criticism of the passive policy of the party in the past, and much of it was directed at the Jewish intellectuals who had held prominent positions within it. The times called for action, and to show the new character of the party the underground leaders decided to adopt the name of Revolutionary Socialists. This was not to the liking of Bauer, who felt it was a disavowal of the great tradition and services of the Social Democratic Party. A wave of arrests in January 1935, and the necessity of bringing men from the provinces into the directing group, brought about a reconstitution of the Central Committee, and these new men henceforth controlled the party, albeit with Bauer's approval. Gustav Richter now came to leadership. After Schuschnigg's agreement with Hitler in 1936, these new leaders considered the eventual victory of Hitler to be certain. They were labeled pessimists by the Old Guard leaders, who, true to socialist theory, believed that inevitably the Socialists would triumph.

One of the best sections of the book describes the rapid emergence of Austrian Nazis in the weeks between Schuschnigg's visit to Berchtesgaden in 1938 and Hitler's triumphant entry into Vienna. While the Austrian police had constantly harassed the underground, they were as nothing to the Gestapo who inherited complete files on most of the important Socialist leaders. Some of these escaped, thanks to many forged Czech passports made available by Czech Socialists.

The book is not easy reading. It is filled with excessive detail and is not well organ-

ized. The author constantly gets ahead of himself, using a sort of flash-back technique, and it is difficult to keep chronology straight. Yet he graphically portrays the difficulty of establishing an underground organization and how little can actually be accomplished by it. The dilemma remains that the movement has to be made known to the masses, while being kept secret from the police. The book also gives considerable information on the underground labor movement which was related to but separate from the party organization. The account rings true, although no sources are listed. It is clear that much of the book is autobiographical, and internal evidence indicates that the author, Joseph Buttinger, is the Gustav Richter who headed the underground organization from 1935 on.

E. C. HELMREICH

Bowdoin College

FRISCHAUER, WILLI. *Himmler: The Evil Genius of the Third Reich*. Pp. 270. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. \$3.75.

It is remarkable that the political police, one of the key institutions of totalitarian states, has received relatively little attention from political scientists and sociologists—perhaps because it does not quite fit into the traditional conceptual pattern of the state. The experience of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia shows that terror, extermination camps, and slave labor are not an incidental aspect of modern totalitarianism, but constitute its very core. For the purpose of such terror and brutality is not so much to destroy real or alleged enemies of the totalitarian regime, but to provide for the whole population a permanent demonstration of total domination, which utterly annihilates the human personality in its moral, legal, and political roots.

Mr. Frischauer's biography of Heinrich Himmler will be read with considerable interest by all students of Nazi Germany in particular and of modern totalitarianism in general. The author's forte lies in the skill, color, and verve with which he portrays his subject rather than in penetrating analysis. Thus, Mr. Frischauer rightly points out in the beginning that Himmler

was born and brought up in the "calm and cultured atmosphere" (p. 16) of the home of a respected secondary school teacher in Bavaria, yet he fails to explain satisfactorily how a product of his environment could later turn into the most sadistic monster of modern times, perhaps of all time. As one of the early Nazis, Himmler's career in the Nazi Party was rapid from the start, and the success of distorted personalities like himself should have indicated to the Germans as well as to foreign nations what the Nazi movement was up to.

Yet the brutalities committed by the Nazis at home in the years 1933–1939 were relatively small compared with what was to come during World War II, when Germany had most of continental Europe under her control. It is remarkable how quickly the Germans are forgetting that they slaughtered over six million Jews during World War II, not to speak of millions of Russians, Poles, Czechs, Frenchmen, Norwegians, and others. Chapters XIII and XIV of *Himmler* deal with the organized mass murder of the Germans during World War II, while chapter XV analyzes "Thanatology—the Science of Killing" (pp. 175–187). Being devotees of science, the Germans developed murder as a complete science, and these three chapters alone make the work a valuable record.

Though not interested primarily in systematic analysis, Mr. Frischauer has spared no effort to obtain his material, not only having recourse to the printed documents and source materials, but also obtaining firsthand information from Himmler's widow, his brother, and members of his entourage who were lucky enough to survive their boss. A number of illustrations enrich the value of the book.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN

Princeton University

GOERLITZ, WALTER. *History of the German General Staff, 1657–1945*. Translated by Brian Battershaw. Preface by Walter Millis. Pp. xviii, xvi, 508. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. \$7.50.

It is unfortunate that this volume, which has substantial merit, should bear the title, *History of the German General Staff*. In

fact it is concerned more with military personalities and high policies than with institutions. The German General Staff and General Staff Corps embraced the group of officers carefully selected for their ability and estimated suitability for staff positions. The preparatory training, the War Academy course, and the probationary period, normally composed a five-year program. Those who survived the repeated screenings were posted to the General Staff Corps, which was commanded by the Chief of the General Staff. The successful candidates were assigned to staff positions with the field units and to the General Staff of the Army High Command. Products of a uniform system of training and moulded in a great tradition, these officers were the elite of the German Army. They manned not only the General Staff of the High Command, but they were the principal advisers and staff officers to the field commanders. The historical origins and evolution of this unique military institution are worthy of detailed treatment.

However, less than a third of Goerlitz's work is devoted to the history of the General Staff down to 1914. Here the story is told in brief biographical sketches—Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Moltke, Waldersee, Schlieffen, and the younger Moltke. The remaining two-thirds of the volume deals with the period since 1918. Here the scope is further broadened and the theme of the General Staff becomes incidental to the narrative of the political role of the Reichswehr and Army High Command during the Weimar and Nazi periods. The opposition role of the Army leaders under Hitler, culminating in the revolt of July 20, is emphasized, perhaps overemphasized. This was not a General Staff plot, but the number of General Staff officers involved was considerable, and the subsequent executions and dismissals took a heavy toll. The last Chief of the General Staff was a General of Infantry, Hans Krebs, whose principal qualification for the post once held by Scharnhorst, Moltke, and Schlieffen was his unshakeable belief in the military genius of Hitler.

The tone of Goerlitz's study is moderate and objective, anti-Nazi and pro-army. The translation is adequate although the

book has suffered some from abridgment. Unfortunately the bibliography and organization charts were omitted from the English edition.

ORON J. HALE

University of Virginia

LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, JEAN DE. *The History of the French First Army*. Translated by Malcolm Barnes. Pp. 532. London: George Allen & Unwin (distributed in the U. S. by The Macmillan Company), 1953. \$9.50.

This is the story of the landing of the French First Army, the bulk of French forces, in Provence in the summer of 1944, the liberation of Marseilles and Toulon, the pursuit of the Germans up the Rhône and their eventual capitulation in the Austrian Alps. But it is much more than a recitation of battles and an analysis of strategy and tactics; for it is also the warmly human autobiography of a man, admittedly one of the greatest of French marshals, as well as the story of the rendezvous of the true French spirit with France.

It can be said of few books, as it can of this, that it is at one and the same time a textbook for students of military science and a fascinating story for the general reader. For the person who has himself traveled in southern France or who knows the Valley of the Rhône and Alsace, the book is almost a must. This reviewer, himself no military technician, soon found that the task of reading what appeared to be a military history was transformed into a pleasant duty.

The reader soon learns that the history of this army and its battles is also the story of the common soldier and his leaders, of the fusion of the Free French with the Resistance, and of the restoration of France to a leading position in the free world. One is also made aware that Allied generals had many differences of opinion as to the best policy or strategy to follow, and that personal rivalries and the ever-present desire for prestige and power often influence military decisions. The position of the French was throughout not an easy one, as shown in North Africa when they

were forced to adopt the "industrial" plan used by the American Army, or, much later, at the surrender celebration in Berlin when all the toastmakers seemed to forget the part played by France.

When one is through, it is clear why this book is both a treatise on military strategy and a fascinating story. The author himself combined military expertness with dynamic and dramatic leadership qualities. The reader will agree that his recent death was a tragedy for troubled France.

RALPH F. BISCHOFF

New York University

PICKLES, DOROTHY. *French Politics: The First Years of the Fourth Republic*. Pp. xii, 302. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953. \$5.00.

For France, constitutional reform is an old story. Many persons have been wondering what progress toward stable parliamentary government the French have been making since liberation. The purpose of the present volume is to help with the answer to this question.

Miss Pickles is a competent observer of French politics. Her writing is analytical, scholarly of statement, and satisfying to the serious reader. It is not easy reading because the author takes for granted a considerable knowledge of French political life.

The first section of the book is a review of the decline of the resistance movement, the evolution of the Socialist-Communist unity, the drafting of the new (1946) constitution, and the study of economic problems that culminated in the Monnet Plan. To have read such a book as Gordon Wright's *The Reshaping of French Democracy* is to have a basis for reading Miss Pickles's condensed introduction.

Then follows the story of the Gaullist Right in bitter contest with the disruptive Communist Left and of the attempt of the democratic center groups to carry on as a Third Force. The author shows the dilemmas of the Socialists with their anticlerical commitment on the one hand and their desire to work with the Catholic MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) on the other; of the MRP which was torn between the desire for Socialist help and for Catho-

lic trade union support simultaneously; and of the Radicals who were anticlerical enough to be allies of the Marxists but anticommunistic enough to be economic liberals. Little wonder the Third Force failed! As for inflation, on what grounds could it be controlled? The Monnet, the Mayer, and the Reynaud Plans all failed to stabilize the economy. Parties joined for mutual security but were divided on basic economic and social issues. Electoral reform was attempted, but the second parliament began its term in 1951 with worse problems than the first parliament had faced five years earlier. The very quantity of legislative work was in itself an unsolved problem.

The account of France in her external relationships is a little more encouraging. The change from the empire to the French Union was in line with gradual recognition of dependent peoples elsewhere. The constitutional statements giving equal rights to all citizens of the Union in Europe, Africa, and overseas are brave, but somewhat empty.

As to France in Europe, Miss Pickles thinks that while there is much interest in the Schuman Plan for a coal and steel community and in the Pleven Plan for a European army, the main French desire is to build European strength in order to withstand involvement in the Atlantic Community. And while European unity will bring strength to France, her main help will have to come from within herself—a matter difficult to outline in advance so long as prewar leadership combines with old political and legislative methods to make politics under the Fourth Republic look strangely like those of the Third. A little more revolution in the direction of efficiency irrespective of general principles seems to be the author's recipe for French parliamentary life.

W. HENRY COOKE

Claremont, California

OTHERS

FEI, HSIAO-TUNG. *China's Gentry: Essays in Rural-Urban Relations*. Revised and

edited by Margaret Park Redfield, with six life-histories of Chinese gentry families collected by Yung-Teh Chow, and an introduction by Robert Redfield. Pp. v, 288. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. \$5.75.

Hsiao-Tung Fei is one of the less well appreciated losses of the Communist victory in China. Fei stood out as one of the best trained and most brilliant social scientists produced by co-operation between China and the West. His studies had many faults, but they stood out well above the ruck of literature on Chinese social conditions. They frequently lacked system and precision, but without exception they focused on problems that are strategic for understanding Chinese social structure and strategic for the development of general social analysis. One did not count on Fei as a direct contributor to general theory, but the work that was to be expected from him and that he had already produced would furnish valuable materials for the comparative analyses on which the more general developments would have to rest.

Since the Communist victory he has presumably been brain-washed, for there issued, reputedly from him, a statement of all his previous errors. The statement read like all such statements betraying the robot-like qualities of those who extract such statements and not a hint of what the mind of the previous Fei was like. In any case, for the time at least, modern social science has little to expect from Fei whose serious critical scientific writing has been summarily cut off in its most productive years.

Margaret Redfield has salvaged Fei's last output before that tragedy. He had at that time launched a general study of the Chinese gentry and in connection with that (since the gentry characteristically were town dwellers) a study of one of the most neglected areas in modern Sinology, the relation between towns and villages in China. At the time he had not gotten very far with this work. He had gotten far enough to produce a series of articles intended for lay Chinese consumption.

Under ordinary circumstances it would have been a mistake to translate and pub-

lish these as the work of a social scientist, for they are anecdotal, impressionistic, and unsystematic rather than careful, precise, and analytical. But as both of the Redfields point out, a special case can be made for their translation and publication. Fei was much interested in the progress and development of his country. He hoped to contribute to this by his findings as well as to find out more. He regarded a deeper understanding of the role of the gentry and the relations between towns and villages as crucial for this development.

Perhaps, as the Redfields point out, the greatest lesson we have to learn from this volume is the manner in which Fei thought these questions would have to be presented to a literate Chinese audience if they were to make any impression. We see in each of these essays, for example, a tracing of an authentic pedigree for the idea presented through the Chinese classical texts. Fei was not and is not a specialist in the use of these texts. The notes added to this volume show the Redfields' awareness of this problem. Many specialists on the texts would undoubtedly quarrel with Fei's uses and interpretations of some of this material, but that is really beside the point. The point here is that Fei felt, rightly or wrongly, that only by means of the respectable Chinese method of statement by fable and by historical anecdote rather than by straightforward analysis could the attention and respect of his audience be caught.

On the subjects of the essays themselves, the social scientist will have to look for the bits of insight and analysis tucked here and there amidst the illustrative material with the "proper pedigree." There is quite a bit of it, and it foreshadowed a book of some importance that we are not now likely to see. Further aid in these respects may come from the use of the life history material presented at the end. Here the non-specialist should proceed with special care. The life histories are selected presumably for their typification of strategic roles. It is not always easy in such cases to separate the idiosyncratic from the general. Like literary sources they are to be used with caution, but used with caution they are valuable.

The book is well worth reading, but it is sad reading, for in it we can see what is lost.

MARION J. LEVY, JR.

Princeton University

LAMBTON, ANN K. S. *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*. Pp. xxxi, 459. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$9.00.

One of the fundamental maladjustments and problems of contemporary Iran is that of land tenure and ownership. It directly affects politics, economics, and general social life. Land reform is currently much discussed, but little has been accomplished aside from the present Shah's efforts to distribute the rural holdings inherited from his father among his peasant tenants. His Majesty frankly admits that his program is aimed at pressure upon other large landlords to follow his example, and for this reason it is resented and resisted by many.

As the Royal Commission appointed to implement this program has discovered, reform of the pattern of land ownership and cultivation in Iran is not as simple as it may at first appear. Peculiar circumstances of physical and social environment condition any sound and fruitful approach to this problem. It is as a contribution to this fundamental problem that Miss Lambton's book—one of the best on Iran to appear in English in many years—is significant.

The study is not exhaustive nor completely comprehensive, either in description or analysis. For example, the author contents herself with description of only those parts of the country with which she is personally familiar; these, however, are considerable and varied. Moreover, she can scarcely be expected to treat the economics of the subject because of the paucity of material, especially statistics; it is enough, for the present, to have these widely observed facts discussed in their social and political context. Although only meant as an introduction to the subject, this study is so soundly conceived and executed that future scholars and practitioners—Persian and Western—will stand in her debt, and do well to emulate her scholarship and care.

Part I of the study (over 40 per cent of the whole) is devoted to the history of the subject, beginning with the Arab conquest of Iran in the seventh century. Until the arrival of the Mongols and their break with tradition, most of the facts are inferred from sources dealing with the state revenue system. Subsequent Safavid absolutism gave way to eighteenth century chaos, only to be followed by Qajar "decay, maladministration, oppression, and insecurity." The latter part of the period showed "a growing discontent and demand for reform," issuing in the Constitutional movement and later the Reza Shah social and legal reforms.

Part II is devoted to the description and discussion of such subjects as the Civil Code, irrigation, religious endowments, crown lands, large and small proprietors, tribal practices, the share-cropper, agricultural methods, and standards of living. Several relevant appendixes, a glossary of Persian terms, an excellent bibliography, and a reasonably adequate index add to the value of the book, which is a mine of well-organized information and which is bound to be an indispensable reference work for any student of, or participant in, modern Persian affairs.

T. CUYLER YOUNG

Princeton University

REISCHAUER, EDWIN O., et al. *Japan and America Today*. Pp. ix, 166. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953. \$3.00.

Between January 17 and 20, 1953, a Japanese-American Conference was held by the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu. This was much more than a routine conference because it was the first time since the end of the war that nonofficial Japanese and Americans were able to confront each other in direct and frank discussion of problems at issue in the relations of the two countries. It was felt, and quite correctly, by the sponsors of the meeting that a nonofficial gathering would lay problems on the line much more frankly than would be possible in an official atmosphere, with its complex etiquette of face, presentation, and protocol.

The principal weakness of the conference, as far as its authority and representative-

ness are concerned, was the absence of an outstanding leftist figure. This does not mean that the leftist position was not fairly presented, and even ably argued—for it was—but rather that one is left with a more optimistic feeling of agreement over what Dr. Reischauer, in his brilliant opening article, has identified as “common objectives” than is perhaps warranted by the present atmosphere of intellectual circles in Japan. While all Japanese intellectuals will perhaps agree on such objectives as “national security,” “world peace,” “orderly international relations,” and an “independent Japan,” it is much less likely that they will agree that the United States should “continue its cooperation with Japan and other nations of the free world” and “achieve a position of strength which will enable free nations to resist effectively direct and indirect aggression” (p. 136, “Basic Aims of the Two Countries”). Even if these words were perchance acceptable to most Japanese intellectuals, the intended meaning would be open to the same ambiguities as words like “democracy” in pro-Soviet circles.

But if there is somewhat more doubt about the extent of agreement in basic objectives than the participants would like to acknowledge, they are all agreed in identifying the main problems of postwar Japan and the main problems at issue between Japan and the United States: the presence of American bases and troops in Japan, the China market, American economic aid, overpopulation, shortage of raw materials. The conference materials presented in this volume illuminate many aspects of these problems and in this way serve to narrow somewhat the gap between the American and the Japanese point of view.

And yet if one compares the article by Shogo Yamaguchi, the only extended Japanese paper incorporated in the volume, with observations by the Americans, it is evident that there is a considerable difference in emphasis and perception of the present situation. While the State Department summary of Japanese-American relations speaks of Japan as having a “high rate of capital formation” (p. 71), Yamaguchi speaks of her “low domestic capital accumulation” (p. 115). Again, while

Cohen, in criticizing the “overestimation” of the importance of the China trade to Japan, says that “Even in 1935 Japan obtained only 10.8 percent of its imports from what is now Red China, which absorbed only 10.7 percent of Japanese exports” (p. 128), Yamaguchi’s tables for the same year yield figures of 23 and 14 per cent respectively (pp. 109–110).

As in any symposium, there is a good deal of unevenness in the materials. Reischauer’s coolheaded analysis of potential sources of conflict between Japan and America—an essay which reveals the historian at his best—should be read by all serious people, not only by specialists. Cohen’s analysis of Japan’s economic position is a straightforward exposition of the technical aspects of the problem, without reference to the political and psychological issues that seem inextricably associated with it in Japan. But this is more than made up for by the principal Japanese contribution, which is polemical and tendentious and illustrates in its own body the extensive penetration of Marxism in the thinking even of nonleftist Japanese intellectuals, a subject which is touched on briefly in the summary of the discussion (p. 138). It is unfortunate that the translation fails to do full justice to Yamaguchi’s argument, although it does succeed in conveying the tone and temper of much of current Japanese thinking. Perhaps the most interesting section of the book is the “Summary of the Discussion,” in which the sense of the conference is conveyed without specific attribution of views and statements to individual participants.

HERBERT PASSIN

Chicago, Illinois

SCALAPINO, ROBERT A. *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt*. Pp. xii, 471. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. \$6.50.

With the end of the Second World War a new generation of scholars brought fresh interests and approaches to the field of Far Eastern studies. Professor Scalapino of the University of California at Berkeley is one of them, and his new book offers impressive testimony to the high achieve-

ments of which the best among them are capable.

The book focuses primarily upon the reasons for which Japan failed during the years since the Restoration of 1868 to develop a “democratic, liberal and responsible” system of government. In so doing it also casts a great deal of light upon the more positive problem of why it was that “oligarchic, illiberal and semi-totalitarian” political institutions have prevailed without really serious or sustained challenge. Mr. Scalapino’s searching scrutiny of these questions leads him from an excellent analysis of the impact of Tokugawa culture and institutions on the political attitudes and practices of modern Japan to an equally keen exposition of the brief and dismal record of left-wing parties and the concomitant rise to power of the military oligarchy in the two decades immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

Between these terminal points he devotes considerable space to a most perceptive history of the organization, finance, development, and practice of the major parties; an examination of their social, economic, and intellectual affiliations, their programs and tactics; and finally a stimulating exposition of the very important consequences for the parties of the unusual patterns of development which have characterized Japanese capitalism. His findings are based almost exclusively on the best and most recent research by Japanese scholars and are impressively documented.

The work’s quality resides as much, however, in matters of approach, style, and methodology as in those of substance. The author seldom loses sight of the larger significance of his subject. Fundamentally he is concerned with the problems presented by attempts to establish democratic institutions in “late-developing” nations. The Japanese pattern contains much of consequence to an understanding of contemporary developments in similar cultures throughout Asia and the world. The book is topical and problem-oriented throughout. Mr. Scalapino’s gift for illuminating political institutions and developments in terms of their wide array of social, economic, and intellectual antecedents cannot help commanding ad-

miration. The work should be read with pleasure and great profit by those of all disciplines interested in the problems of contemporary Asia.

ROBERT E. WARD

University of Michigan

GALBRAITH, W. O. *Colombia: A General Survey*. Pp. vii, 140. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953. \$2.50.

Written primarily for foreigners rather than for Latin Americans, this publication is an exceedingly useful handbook on Colombia. The author has drawn heavily on the Currie Report issued by the International Bank in 1950.

Colombia’s population of 11,259,739 represents an increase of 186 per cent since 1900, birth and death rates being about the same as Mexico’s and double those of the United States. Although urbanization has gone on at an increasing rate, three-fourths of the population is still employed in agriculture, pastoral and forestal industries, hunting, and fishing. The unmixed aborigines have virtually disappeared, constituting today only 1.6 per cent of the total population. Estimates of the other racial groups are: Mestizos, 46 per cent; Negroes, 4.4 per cent; Mulattoes, 22 per cent; and Whites, 26 per cent. Colombia has no color bar, and while miscegenation is producing a tri-ethnic type, this process has been retarded because of geographical barriers.

Attention is given to taxation, government expenditures, the public debt, banking, and the various types of transportation; special consideration is given to farming. The principal cash crop, coffee, and other crops are grown on small farms. Farmers are handicapped by inadequate credit, transportation difficulties, lack of storage and packing facilities, lack of information about markets and prices, and uneconomical exploitation of resources. The quality of the agricultural worker himself is not high, owing to the shortage of educational facilities, prevailing living conditions, and low health standards. Attempts have been made by the government since 1940 to encourage agriculture, but the Colombian peasant, unlike the small

farmer in some Latin American countries, tends to abandon the land whenever he has a chance to shift to an urban activity. Industrialization, almost nonexistent in Colombia prior to 1930, has increased rapidly since that time.

The growth and modernization of the educational system were retarded by policies followed from 1888 to 1936; consequently the country's whole educational program needs overhauling and new life. Social legislation, enacted on a large scale since 1934, may prove too complicated for Colombia to support.

The political history of Colombia during the past century and a half has been a struggle between Conservatives, who have favored centralism and clericalism, and Liberals, supporters of decentralization and anticlericalism. The Liberal group has been weakened in recent years by a split between leftists and moderates.

Galbraith concludes: "The political future is difficult to foretell. The last few years have seen the bankruptcy of Liberalism in Colombia, and a return to a system of Government which more closely conforms to that of so many Latin American countries today, where legislation alone has signally failed to bring about the exercise of democratic principles. The vast majority of the voters are either illiterate or totally uneducated, and the social system itself is unstable; the masses are subjected to emotional, impractical, and self-interested propaganda, and now that they have tasted blood, it is going to be a hard task for any Government to correct and control the political errors and exaggerations of the last thirty years." Nevertheless, this author optimistically believes that "the task will be faced and that the many other problems . . . will be solved" in the next 50 years or so.

GEORGE E. SIMPSON

Oberlin College

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

In the July 1953 issue of *THE ANNALS*, there appears an error which causes me concern. Reviewing Arthur Koestler's new

book, "Arrow in the Blue . . .," just below the middle of the first column on page 217, Mr. Eliasberg says, "Why did . . . career diplomats such as Alger Hiss, Guy Burgess, and Donald MacLean, fall for this type of propaganda?" Alger Hiss was not a career diplomat. He was an official of the Department of State, never a member of the career Foreign Service. To date, no American career Foreign Service Officer has been found guilty of disloyalty by any impartial body.

In these days of smear-by-association, and when there is so much uninformed criticism of the Department of State and its personnel, it is particularly disturbing to find such confusion of terms in so serious and scholarly a journal.

WILLIAM P. COCHRAN, JR.

Foreign Service Officer

Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Dear Sir:

In my review in the July issue of *THE ANNALS*, of Arthur Koestler's *Arrow in the Blue, An Autobiography*, I had no intention of casting any slur on the Foreign Service. This said, there is, on the other hand, no doubt that Alger Hiss was used by the State Department for highly important assignments.

My review is, as far as the name of Hiss goes, a literal quotation from page 263 of Koestler's book: "The astonishing conversions of cool-headed State Department careerists like Alger Hiss. . . ." I saw no reason, at the time of writing my review, to check on Koestler's source, and I want to stress again that, in my opinion, the important psycho-dynamic factor has been brought out masterfully by Koestler.

The emphasis in my review and in Koestler's book was on a general understanding of the psychology of bright young men, who, in the early thirties, were falling for totalitarian propaganda.

W. ELIASBERG

New York City

Dear Sir:

Professor Brady's review of *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government, 1945-1951* (*ANNALS*, July 1953) presents

a serious misinterpretation of the book. This inexplicable misunderstanding provides the basis for a general condemnation of the author's reactionary soul (an irrelevant and untrue criticism) and for specific criticisms which are either wrong or singularly questionable.

The reviewer sees the book, not, as I designed it, as an essay on contemporary history, but as a pro-Churchillian tract with a surly dirge for imperial positions lost and jubilee for those kept under the lion's paw. This distortion is supported by a quotation taken out of the context of page 2 of my book. The quotation merely noted the flexibility and moderation of earlier British foreign policy and suggests nothing at all about my present views on Britain and the Empire.

The burden of Professor Brady's attack is reserved for one of my conclusions, that the question of a Socialist foreign policy arose only to become absurd. This conclusion emerges from pages of argument, supported by considerable documentation. The author's silence about this nicely suggests that I am an intemperate antisocialist.

Where the author criticizes something I actually wrote, he is either misleading or, at best, questionable. For example, he argues that abandoning the nationalization of German heavy industry, which he calls "a concession to the Churchill point of view," ruined the American decartelization program. But this is disingenuous. After late 1946 the United States called the tune in Germany and the American decartelization program was ruined by another American policy. Where I observe that the great wrong of British imperialism was not economic exploitation but the creation of an irresponsible temper among the victims of imperialism, Professor Brady says that I misread the facts of the separatist movements of the last 200 years. Surely, this is comparing the incomparable. The American colonists had a substantial share of self-government. I do not see the practical basis for a comparison of their movement with the struggle of the agrarian and tribal society of the Kikuyu. Did Professor Brady never listen to the irresponsible talk of Congress Indians about the Muslims, or Jews or Arabs about each other, in the

days before an independent India and Israel? A reading of the Egyptian press, though wearing, would also be broadening. How would he answer John Morley's Glasgow speech (November 6, 1896), "You cannot create in Irishmen the sense of political responsibility unless you give them what is the correlative of responsibility—power"?

Finally, the reviewer complains about the book's undercurrent of innuendo against every policy "which even smacks of liberalism, let alone 'Socialism.'" This charge surprises me most. Professor Brady apparently resents the unwillingness of a historian to become the public relations man for the world's nationalist and liberation movements. At any rate, he should particularize, and, I hope, scrupulously.

MATTHEW A. FITZSIMONS

University of Notre Dame

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- ABBOTT, CHARLES C. *The International Position and Commitments of the United States*. ("National Economic Problems," No. 449.) Pp. 36. New York: American Enterprise Association, July 1953. 50 cents.
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- II: BIGGER, RICHARD, and JAMES D. KITCHEN. *How the Cities Grew—A Century of Municipal Independence and Expansion in Metropolitan Los Angeles*. Pp. xii, 259. 1952. \$2.50 paper; \$3.00 cloth.
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- IV: WILCOX, ROBERT F. *Law Enforcement*. Pp. vii, 211. 1952. \$3.00 paper; \$3.50 cloth.
- V: CROUCH, WINSTON W., WENDELL MACCOBY, MARGARET G. MORDEN, and RICHARD BIGGER. *Sanitation and Health*. Pp. ix, 163. 1952. \$2.25 paper; \$2.75 cloth.
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- DICKS, RUSSELL L., and THOMAS S. KEPLER. *And Peace at the Last: A Study of Death, the Unreconciled Subject of Our Times*. Pp. 94. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953. \$1.50.
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RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*



BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

Edited by

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH, Ph.D.

Professor of Political Science

University of Pennsylvania

President, The American Academy of

Political and Social Science

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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How Bureaucracies Develop and Function

By ARNOLD BRECHT

IS it necessary to define bureaucracy? Everybody seems to know what the term implies. "Bureaucracy is a state of affairs where too much power is in the hands of appointed employees." This is twice ambiguous, however, because power has several meanings, and what type or amount of it is "too much"? Closer analysis will spare us a great deal of confusion.

Power may designate the constitutional or legal right to give or to enforce orders, as when the Constitution says, "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes." For this sort of power I shall use the symbol P hereafter. Or power may mean the actual power to get things done or to prevent their being done. This will be designated by the symbol II, the Greek equivalent of P.

"P-powers" and "II-powers" may coincide, or overlap, or be entirely separate. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR has the P-power to pass laws, but not the II-power to determine what laws will be passed; that power lies entirely with the party leadership. The same situation existed with Hitler's one-party Reichstag in Germany. The United States Congress had the P-power, together with the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, to forbid the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, but not the II-power to carry the prohibition through. The people in a democracy have the P-power to elect their representatives, but bosses may have the II-power to "deliver the vote." Likewise, party juntas, pressure groups, or the press may, or may not, have the II-power to make Congress use its P-powers in some specific manner.

DEFINITIONS OF BUREAUCRACY

Applying these distinctions, we find that appointed employees may wield either P-powers or II-powers, or both, and that their powers may extend either to the entire sphere of public business or only to sections of it. It follows that we must distinguish at least four possible definitions, or types, of bureaucracy, namely:

B-1, where appointed employees hold all the P-powers of government;

B-2, where they hold some P-powers, though not all;

B-3, where they wield II-powers over the entire sphere of government;

B-4, where they do so only over some sections of governmental activities.

In each of these four social patterns we may speak of "government by officials," and therefore of a bureaucracy, irrespective of the good or bad use made by the officials of their powers. We may, however, use the term bureaucracy also in a more limited sense, namely:

B-5 to B-8, only in such cases of the types B-1 to B-4 where the powers are exercised "improperly."

Yet what is an "improper" use? Are officials acting improperly (a) only when in excess of legal powers; or (b) also when, though staying within these powers, they act in conflict with the general welfare; or (c) even when their action is both legitimate and objectively sound, if it antagonizes the momentary desires of the people, or of some people, or of the people's representatives? Different answers are possible in different situations.

In view of the elusive vagueness of the criterion "improper" it is advisable

to start out from the definitions B-1 to B-4. They are not only clearer; they are also realistic and in line with related concepts. For wherever human beings have power, they may abuse it. A dictatorship or an aristocracy remains one even when its powers are used benevolently in the interest of the people. Likewise, we can logically say, a government by appointed officials remains a bureaucracy even when it operates benevolently.

Actually, wherever we live in the modern world, whether under the most totalitarian kind of despotism or in the most liberal of democracies, we are being governed to a considerable, though varied, extent by appointed officials—officials who exercise both P- and Π-powers over us. Everywhere, then, we live under a bureaucracy of some kind. This we must realize at the outset.

P-BUREAUCRACIES

Bureaucracies of the B-1 type are obsolete today, it is true, at least in the public sphere. They were rare phenomena even in the past (see below). If one considers the cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church as appointed officials—since they are not elected by the people but appointed by the Pontiff—then it might be said that the hierarchy of the Catholic Church still today approximates the B-1 type of a bureaucracy, because the college of the appointed cardinals has the official P-power within the church not only to make governmental decisions but also to select the Pope, who in turn selects them. This rather extraneous example we may disregard here.

The B-2 type of bureaucracy, on the other hand, is found everywhere, because everywhere, at least in all major countries, appointed officials are granted extensive P-powers. Sometimes they are authorized to use their powers independently, as in law courts, or in ad-

ministrative courts, or in quasi-independent boards and commissions. A voluminous body of law, frequently (though rather incorrectly) called "administrative law,"¹ originates in the P-powers of appointed employees. Sometimes their lawmaking P-powers extend even to regular legislation, as they did for example in the Federal Council (*Reichsrat*) of the German Empire and of the Weimar Republic, where as a rule appointed civil servants represented the constituent states and, while bound by instructions, were permitted to act according to their own judgment in the absence of instructions.

But we need not refer to such particular cases only. Any delegation, by the legislature or by the chief executive, of P-powers to department heads, and through them or directly to their deputies, division chiefs, bureau chiefs, or field services, provides appointed employees with P-powers which are often of considerable importance. On the basis of P-powers delegated to them directors of internal revenue and their employees make decisions on tax returns, policemen interfere with disorderly conduct, consular officers grant or deny immigration visas—and so in almost every branch of public administration. While the employees are not independent in the use of these powers, but subject to instructions and to corrections after appeal, there is generally a wide margin of power left to their individual judgment and discretion. Appeals affect only a small minority of decisions and rarely question the fact that the subordinate official had the P-power to make the primary decision.

As it is considered one of the first virtues of a good administrator that he makes wide use of delegation of P-pow-

¹ This term is better reserved for law whose subject matter is administration, irrespective of its source, i.e. the law for administration, not the law by administrators.

ers in order that he himself may be able to concentrate on the most important problems, well-administered countries offer at least as good illustrations of bureaucracies of the B-2 type as do countries with political leaders who jealously try to keep all decisions in their own hands.

II-BUREAUCRACIES

Just as in the case of P-powers, there is nothing necessarily wrong with the wielding of Π-powers by appointed employees. It is, to a considerable degree, their very function to exercise such powers. Employees are hired for the purpose of influencing both the making and the execution of laws by their expert knowledge and practical experience, won in or out of office. Their knowledge, their good judgment, prudence, and poise, are intentionally placed at the service of the government. When in the exercise of their official functions they try to make knowledge prevail over ignorance, the expert over the amateur, prudence over indiscretion, poise over imbalance, they are basically within their legitimate rights and may use them so as to deserve praise rather than blame. If the appointed employees failed to exercise such influence, a great deal of every country's legislation and an even bigger slice of its administration would only be the worse for it.

And yet, Π-powers contribute to the improper bureaucratic character of governments no less than do P-powers. More than a hundred years ago a critic of the British colonial administration wrote a classical description of how this happens. He charged that what the colonies far away received with awe as the decisions of the mother country on their complaints actually were decisions made by an anonymous official, satirically called Mr. Mothercountry. Although this story is well known to students of government because of Lowell's

reference to it in his *Government of England*, I may be permitted to point out some details because they are still valid today as a competent analysis of thousands of similar situations. Mr. Mothercountry, so Charles Butler wrote in 1840,

is familiar with every detail of his business and handles with unfaltering hands the piles of papers at which his superiors quail. He knows the policy which previous actions render necessary, but he never appears to dictate. A new Secretary . . . intends to be independent, but something turns up that obliges him to consult Mr. Mothercountry. He is pleased with the ready and unobtrusive advice which takes a great deal of trouble off his hands. If things go well, his confidence in Mr. Mothercountry rises. If badly, that official alone can get him out of the colonial or parliamentary scrape; and the more independent he is the more scrapes he falls into.²

Every word in this description is significant and to the point. It is a *legitimate* right, even a duty, of the employee that is exercised when he uses his Π-power as adviser; it is exercised unobtrusively and without the will to dictate; it may be exercised well in most cases. And still, we have here a situation where the Π-power of an official has grown to such proportions that the stage of bureaucracy as an objectionable form of government is reached.

Naturally, Π-powers are not always used legitimately and in good faith for the general welfare. They are at times abused for selfish purposes, as when the officials of Russia's Peter the Great, or of Prussia's Frederick the Great, blocked the execution of laws that were in conflict with the interests of the class from which they hailed, or when modern civil servants have tried to influence the con-

² Charles Butler, *Responsible Government for Colonies*, London, 1840. See A. Lawrence Lowell, *The Government of England*, 2d ed. (New York, 1912), Vol. 1, p. 178.

tents of civil service acts, the regulation of salaries, and the like in their own favor.³ Yet these are exceptions rather than the rule. The situation most typical for modern democracies is one where the officials act in good faith and within the powers that they legitimately hold.

HISTORICAL EXTREMES

The most familiar illustrations of strong bureaucracies are ancient Egypt, the later stages of the Roman Empire, and China. It was characteristic of all three that, at least outside of the respective capitals, the P-powers of appointed officials came to approximate B-1 proportions, that is, to encompass almost the entire governmental power within their administrative districts; and, secondly, that the use of their powers was not subject to any outside check based on freedom of speech, on a free press, on independent courts, or on parliamentary control. The only check was that exercised from the inside by superiors, or as we should say "through channels." The limited human "span of control" made it impossible for the despotic rulers themselves, even when they had the best of will, personally to control the use of the P-powers they had delegated to their field officials, such as *praefecti*, *vicarii*, *rectores*, and *curiales* in the Roman Empire. Sometimes they sent a second bureaucracy of secret agents to supervise the regular officials and to inform the emperor of their misdeeds, and a

³ For illustrations see my article "Bureaucratic Sabotage," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 189, January 1937 (pressure against the heavy cuts in salaries in Germany in 1930, in Great Britain in 1931, in France in 1934, and somewhat less in the United States in 1933; pressure for increases in Germany and France in the late twenties); and my paper, "Personnel Management," in E. H. Litchfield and associates, *Governing Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1953), p. 278 (pressure in favor of a conservative civil service act).

third one to supervise the second. When local officials tried to quit, because of the squeeze in which they found themselves between popular discontent and pressure from above, they were forced to stay, and their offices were even made hereditary. It has been said that people within the Roman Empire were better off under bad and selfish rulers who thought only of their personal pleasures than under well-intentioned emperors with a passion for good administration, because it was the latter who extended and intensified the centralized public administration to fantastic proportions according to uniform patterns imposed on the most divergent sections of the Empire.

Slave bureaucracies

Less well known, but no less extreme, is the historical illustration offered by slave bureaucracies which in the early Middle Ages arose in the southwestern parts of Asia under the Abbasides, the Samanids and the Ayubites (Saladin), in Egypt under the Mamelukes, and later in Turkey under the Ottoman Empire. Veritable slaves held great bureaucratic powers under all these regimes. The Samanids were finally overthrown by one of their slave administrators (about A.D. 1000), who took over, and whose successors, or imitators, later ruled as "slave kings" from Delhi in the thirteenth century, establishing a bureaucracy of the B-1 type. The Mamelukes, too, though originally slave administrators of the Ayubites—their very name being derived from a word meaning property—became actual rulers of Egypt under a nominal, far-away caliph. Hence they also can be said to have established a full-fledged B-1 bureaucracy. The governing positions were passed on, not from father to son but from slave to slave.⁴ Closer

⁴ Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1934), Vol. 3, pp. 22 ff.

to our time is the slave bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire, as it was run from about A.D. 1400 to 1800 by the Osmanlis, whose ancestors had been nomads invading from the Asian steppes. The Osmanli padishahs, as Toynbee aptly puts it in his graphic description of the regime, "maintained their empire by training slaves as human auxiliaries to assist them in keeping order among their 'human cattle.'"⁵

The Prusso-German bureaucracy

The Prusso-German bureaucracy, which arose after the end of the feudal age to become hardly less proverbial than that of the Roman Empire, had a very different character. Although the P-powers of a Prussian *Landrat* (county executive), *Regierungspräsident* (district president), or *Oberpräsident* (provincial president) were likewise very strong, the use of these powers was not left unchecked from the outside, as it had been in the Roman Empire and in the slave bureaucracies. It was progressively subjected to public criticism by the free use of speech and of the press, to the review of the legitimacy of decisions by regular or administrative courts, and finally to parliamentary criticism as well. These outside controls facilitated a proper control from the inside, because the Prussian king did not have to rely only on complaints forwarded to him through official channels. But there was no guarantee that the king would respond to popular demands. The P-powers of the officials were thus enhanced by the authoritarian character of the regime. In addition to their P-powers, the Prusso-German officials wielded also very substantial II-powers, as illustrated by the

⁵ *Loc. cit.* Toynbee's description of the Osmanlis relies primarily on A. H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Cambridge, Mass., 1913.

influence the *Geheimrat* Friedrich August von Holstein, of the German Foreign Office around 1900, exercised in the rejection of British feelers in favor of an understanding. But this was, as the story of Mr. Mothercountry shows, in principle no peculiarity of the German bureaucracy.

Soviet bureaucracy

The most formidable phenomenon of bureaucratic rule today is the Soviet Union, where three bureaucracies exert themselves side by side: one under the regular departments of the government; the second, the secret police, under the Minister of the Interior; and the third, the party bureaucracy, under the party leadership. The second and third control the first, but all three are controlled from the inside only, just as in the Roman Empire, without the outside help of freedom of speech, of freedom of the press, of independent courts, and of freely elected and freely operating parliaments. The size of these bureaucracies outdoes that of any previously known in history. This is chiefly due to the fact that all industrial activities within the Soviet Union are being operated by governmental officials or government corporations. With more than fifty federal ministries the problem of co-ordination must have assumed inconceivable proportions. It is almost a miracle that this threefold bureaucracy has not yet collapsed under its own weight. But that it is cracking under the bureaucratic stress is not an unreasonable thought. Once the records of this totalitarian enterprise are thrown open to an independent examination, we may learn unparalleled stories about bureaucracies of both the B-2 and B-4 types.

The use of appointed officials in the Soviet Union surpasses even that under the Hitler regime in Germany. There the number of government employees

and other government workers on all levels soared to over four and one-half million, or about one out of twenty of the population, not counting the party bureaucracy.⁶ But the economic sector, though closely controlled, was primarily left to private ownership and administration.

ARE THERE NO COUNTRIES WITHOUT BUREAUCRACIES?

Bureaucracy was at its minimum in the feudal world of the Middle Ages. Countries were then governed through what may be called "feudal channels" rather than through large centralized bureaucracies. The rights of the overlords—such as the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire or the kings of England and France—and the duties of their vassals (the barons and the territorial princes) and of the latter's subvassals were strictly limited. The vassals and subvassals took care of the public interests—in the major Germanic principalities even of judicial matters—within their respective fiefs. Consequently, the emperor and the English and French kings had only relatively small bodies of public employees under them.

It has, therefore, sometimes been said that the feudal world was free from bureaucracy, as, for example, Max Weber has contended regarding the Holy Roman Empire.⁷ But this is not

⁶ Figures of 1942; see my *The German Civil Service Today*, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1950 (mimeographed). They include no soldiers.

⁷ See Max Weber, "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft" in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, 2nd ed., Vol. 3 (Tübingen, 1925), chapter on "Bureaucratie," pp. 650 ff., one of the pioneer studies on bureaucracy in the entire international literature.

entirely correct. In Ranke's history of the Reformation we are told that in the fifteenth century the German princes, nominal vassals of the emperor, repeat-

edly remonstrated to their overlord, Frederick III (1440-1493, great-grandfather of Charles V), against the influence he allowed his counselor, a man by the name of Prüschenk, to wield. The Emperor answered that he supposed "each of them also had his own Prüschenk at home" (*ein jeder von ihnen werde auch seinen Prüschenk zu Hause haben*).⁸ Indeed, bureaucracies of both the B-2 and B-4 types may flourish within the smallest body of public employees. One single clerk may make a bureaucracy out of a government.

This is shown also by the postfeudal British administration, which until late into the nineteenth century remained one of amateurs aided by clerks, especially on the county level. Such a government might appear a nonbureaucratic paradise. Yet actually every clerk became a sort of Prüschenk, whose bureaucratic power of influencing the decisions of the gentleman-administrator was considerable, and was felt by the public to be so. As always, this was not entirely unfavorable, since it served to maintain consistency in procedure and policy and to avoid whimsical, *cadi*-like decisions.

Even more effective than England in avoiding bureaucracy was the United States up to the Civil War, because of the deep-seated aversion against any type of government, whether bureaucratic or unbureaucratic, which has been so singularly characteristic of this country's history. The ensuing tendency to deal with matters of common concern through voluntary *ad hoc* associations rather than by setting up governmental agencies is one of the most effective antibureaucratic devices ever invented. Yet it has been actually a dispersion rather than an elimi-

⁸ Leopold von Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation* (Munich and Leipzig, 1914), Vol. 1, p. 95.

nation of bureaucracy, since the individual associations often got their own, male or female, Prüschenks, who did gradually come to hold the reins tight in their secretarial hands. At any rate, to implement community undertakings in the old style has proved impossible under modern conditions. Thus the number of government employees has grown constantly. The absence of parliamentary control over them under the American system of separation of powers stirred Woodrow Wilson in the 1880's to write his *Congressional Government*, in which he suggested such control, without any tangible success. There were some hundred thousand federal employees then. There now are twenty to thirty times more, and with their numbers grew their powers, both P and II.

MULTIPLIERS OF BUREAUCRACY

We have seen that it does not require many employees to produce a bureaucracy. A single clerk who serves an amateurish administrator may well gather considerable powers. But bigness surely has a multiplying effect. There is, first, the arithmetic impact of numbers; secondly, the increasing difficulty of reaching the head of the department owing to the jam in the bottleneck that leads up to him; and thirdly, the growing number of conflicts, both positive and negative, among officials whose numbers grow. As one European cabinet minister joked, a departmental headquarters that contains a thousand employees needs no outside world to be busy; they can keep busy all alone in intra-agency quarrels.⁹

Regulations

But the most pernicious effect of sheer bigness is the increasing need for regulations. The mere number of em-

⁹ Repeated from the article "Bureaucratic Sabotage," *supra* note 3.

ployees makes it necessary for the responsible chief to resort to written regulations, which are intended to assure equality of treatment. Designed to make provision for all possible cases, they often fit none perfectly. For simple and clear situations they are too complicated because of their insistence on details that are obviously irrelevant; in the unusual case they rarely meet the situation accurately.

Regulations crush initiative and engender red tape, the ubiquitous disease of all big bureaucracies. They tend to transform all living, spirited, and flexible human impulse at the top into formal, dull, inflexible paper work at the bottom, and by this transfiguration may substantially impair the original plans.¹⁰ The gravest shortcoming of "administration through regulations" is that, once established, regulations are hard to change. Therefore, they often remain in force long after they reach the peak of their usefulness, even though they may have become clearly inadequate and out of date.¹¹ The bigger the administration the greater the difficulty of getting regulations changed. If several departments have agreed on them and consequently have to consent to the change, the difficulties can become unsurmountable in controversial matters, even those of little importance—yes, particularly in minor matters, because department heads cannot give

¹⁰ This implication often makes red tape appear as a kind of bureaucratic "sabotage" of good legislative intentions; but the sabotage is, as a rule, unwitting. See *ibid*.

¹¹ The famous directive JCS 1067, regarding the attitude expected of the occupation forces in Germany, presents an almost classical illustration on the highest level. Issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in agreement with the Department of State in April 1945, it was soon hopelessly out of date and definitely harmful to the execution of our changing policy; but it was not replaced until July 1947. See Litchfield and associates, *op. cit.* note 3, p. 7, for details.

their valuable time to little things, and much time is required merely to understand the issues. If the President himself approved the old regulations, how can he be incommoded with questions of minor changes on which the department heads fail to agree?

Poor organization

Poor organization stands out as another multiplying factor of bureaucratic defects, second in importance only to bigness. It increases the number and intensity of log jams. It fails to provide for co-ordination within bureaus or divisions, or between them, or between departments.¹² These defects may be made worse through overdepartmentalization. In addition, absence of regional co-ordination may unduly increase the number of matters that must be referred to headquarters.¹³

Other factors

These two, bigness and poor organization, are the most general multipliers of bureaucratic defects today. Other multiplying factors, quite different in nature, are fortunately no longer so generally present. Where public employees enjoy particular privileges and prestige and where their enhanced position is associated with an authoritarian spirit, the bureaucratic character of the powers wielded by them will be the more marked. When, in addition, they are recruited exclusively from one class and when their *esprit de corps* welds them together into a kind of caste, then bureaucracy may stare everyone in the face. Such factors have

¹² See my article "Smaller Departments" in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 1 (1941), pp. 363-73, and the ensuing correspondence with Paul Appleby, *ibid.*, Vol. 2 (1942), pp. 61-66.

¹³ See the report of the Special Committee on Comparative Administration (organized under the Social Science Research Council) on *Regional Coordination*, 1943 (mimeographed).

played a considerable role in countries other than the United States, as they did for example in old Prussia, with many residues still perceptible in Weimar Germany, and some even today in the Bonn Republic.¹⁴ However, it would be wrong to look only to such features in the search for bureaucracies. Bigness and poor organization operate as multipliers of bureaucratic shortcomings quite independent of authoritarian and caste factors.

AMERICAN FREEDOM NO ESCAPE FROM BUREAUCRACY

Bureaucracy, then, is not the same everywhere in every respect. There is a particular Prusso-German way of being bureaucratic, a particular English, French, or Soviet way; yet there is also a peculiar American way. Different as the American brand is from all others, it is bureaucracy all right, of proportions not to be belittled, with both bigness and imperfect organization operating as powerful multipliers.

Many Americans seem to be satisfied that the differences between the United States public service and that of countries with an older bureaucratic record are acting as a counterweight against any kind of bureaucratic pull. Such antibureaucratic factors are seen in (1) the absence of a rigid scheme of organization, especially at departmental headquarters; (2) the absence of a static career officialdom, at least in services other than the foreign service, the armed forces, and the police; (3) the practice of a thorough change in the leading personnel after a change of the party in power; (4) the continual high turnover of public employees on all levels.

Closer analysis reveals, however, that this greater "looseness," flexibility, and

¹⁴ See my chapter on "Personnel Management" in Litchfield and associates, *op. cit.* note 3, p. 263.

freedom of American administration is highly paid for by a number of bureaucratic evils that are peculiar to the American scene.

When after every change of the party in power all the top officials within a big administration are replaced, that does not necessarily produce an unbureaucratic type of government. The first result obviously is the lack of up-to-date departmental knowledge and experience at the top. Departments where all top officials have recently been replaced are like men without a memory. The new officials must either start anew from scratch or rely on subordinates to a far higher extent than old-timers had need to. This implies that it is now the departmental officials in the middle and lower brackets who gain a considerable influence (II-power) in briefing their new superiors. Such lowering of the level in the bureaucratic reservoir is not altogether wholesome. There is likely to be more bureaucratic narrowness on the lower level than there was on the higher, and the memory of officials on the lower level is restricted to what has come to their knowledge. Public-minded citizens who had established fruitful relations with top officials have to begin anew. Whatever they did before, if still in the preparatory stage, is lost labor; the new man knows neither them nor the arguments and outcome of previous discussions. This is regrettable even when only one of the top officials has had to be replaced; where all have been, it implies a great deal of waste.

The one departmental memory that keeps going through all changes is that embodied in regulations—until they, too, are altered. Lack of a homogeneous civil service body and rapid turnover in personnel compel the American public administration to rely on written regulations rather extensively, more than countries with a less fluctuating

personnel. Loose over-all organization makes co-ordination and control more difficult and tends to lead to overstaffing. It also hinders the ready change of defective and outmoded regulations. For all these and some other reasons poor organization, while looking pleasantly unbureaucratic, is likely to be a potent source of bureaucratic defects all over the field. As a result, no other western nation is so much in danger of seeing its public administration ruled by overdetailed, inadequate, and outmoded regulations as is the United States.

There is little to attract brilliant young men and women into services ruled by such regulations, and where the most attractive positions, that is, all those that permit the display of individual initiative, are exempt from the civil service and given to outsiders.

REMEDIES

The dream that one could have a public service in modern countries without a bureaucracy of the B-2 and B-4 types should be abandoned. We cannot improve the world by pursuing pipe dreams. Bureaucracy is here to stay. It may not be precisely endemic in human nature as such, but it certainly is so in large numbers of employees bound by detailed regulations. The problem is not how to govern without a bureaucracy but how to minimize its defects under democratic control.

As bigness is the number one multiplier of bureaucratic shortcomings great ingenuity should be employed to keep the number of public employees as small as possible. Restraint in the assumption of large-scale governmental functions and economical organization of all those services that must be run by the government are, therefore, the first postulates of an antibureaucratic campaign. Because of the multiplying effect of bigness it is also generally better to have several small bureaucracies

than one big one. Dispersion of administrative functions among various units—such as states, municipalities, special authorities, government corporations, and private organizations—is, therefore, often healthier than centralization in one giant administrative machinery, provided that there is a clear distribution of functions and provided, further, that the dispersion does not lead to an increase in numbers. The American tradition of action through private associations rather than through government should not be allowed to die; it should be fostered wherever it can alleviate the burden of government and reduce its machinery. We should even take a new look at the use of trade associations for self-administration in appropriate areas under the ultimate control of democratic government.

But public administration in large countries will never again be reduced to proportions so small that the number of employees ceases to be a source of bureaucratic shortcomings. Next in importance, therefore, as a remedy for unnecessary bureaucracy is an organization so devised that it is able to control the bureaucrats and still to avoid the dangers of government by over-detailed, inadequate, or outmoded regulations. It follows that the best remedy for bureaucratic shortcomings in large administrations is not inefficiency, as the American myth has it, but efficiency; not poor organization but good

organization, especially at the top, so that advisable changes can be brought about promptly. Efficiency in a democracy must include responsiveness, of course. But no big administration can be responsive unless it is efficiently organized and run.¹⁵

When we are annoyed by excessive bureaucracy the fault lies generally not with the employees but with the men at the top, who fail to give directives in clear and definite language or, worse, are not certain of what they themselves want the officials to do. If they know what they want and are able to issue clear instructions, they can generally make the appointed employees work satisfactorily, without undue bureaucratic shortcomings. Cases of conscious sabotage are very rare and can, as a rule, easily be taken care of where they occur. In particular, it is not the fault of the mass of employees but of their superiors if general regulations contain too many details or are impracticable or out of date, and if such faulty regulations cannot be changed readily.

Initiative, responsiveness, and friendly human relations should be cultivated on all levels of the public service by all suitable means.

¹⁵ For the postal service to be responsive means first of all to deliver mail promptly and frequently at low cost. This cannot be done unless the entire postal service is efficiently organized and operated. So it is with all services.

Arnold Brecht, Dr. Jur. (Leipzig), New York City, has been professor of political science, jurisprudence and public finance in the Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, since 1933. Prior to that time he had been in ministerial positions in Germany, last (1927-33) as the representative of democratic Prussia, and rapporteur on the federal budgets, in the Federal Council. He defended the democratic constitution after the 1932 Papen putsch before the Leipzig Supreme Court, and was head of the public law department in the Hochschule für Politik, Berlin. He is the author of several books in English and German and of many articles on political theory and practice.

The Size and Cost of Our Government

By HARRY FLOOD BYRD

PUBLIC affairs in the United States are conducted through governmental structures in upwards of 100,000 local districts, 17,000 cities, 3,000 counties, and 48 states, and through the vast federal bureaucracy which influences action from county seats to world capitals and affects the lives of people everywhere.

The size, scope, and cost of the federal government alone are beyond comprehension. Federal, state, and local governments together collect more taxes, spend more money, and carry more debt than all the governments of the rest of the free world combined.

Along with operations of state and local governments throughout the nation, activities of federal agencies are to be found in every state capital—in fact in every city—and in every county of the country. Beyond the national borders federal agencies have extended their operations to 94 foreign nations and overseas regions.

Federal agencies own or occupy real estate amounting to hundreds of millions of acres in continental United States, not counting property around the world; they use space in tens of thousands of buildings. State and local requirements and holdings have not been estimated.

Reported direct employment of civilians by federal agencies totals 2.4 million, 2.25 million inside the country and upwards of 200,000 overseas. A congressional check showed federal employees in every county of the country except Armstrong County, South Dakota.

Reported direct employment by state and local governments totals 4.5 million, more than 1.1 million by state

governments and nearly 3.4 million by local governments.

Combined, reported direct civilian employment by all the governments totals 6.9 million, or more than one in every twenty-five persons. If undisclosed employment, such as personal service procured under contract by federal agencies, and military personnel in the armed services were added, the ratio would rise to about one in sixteen.

PATTERN AND PERSPECTIVE

Functions and services of state and local governments have remained far more constant in pattern, over the years, than those of federal agencies. They still concern themselves mostly with education, public safety, maintenance and construction of highways and streets, and public health and welfare. Where they have been extended, it has been largely under pressure of federal programs in such fields as social security, unemployment insurance, and housing.

The federal government is still administering its traditional functions, such as national defense, control of money, and regulation of interstate commerce. But its expansion into foreign military and economic programs, and into education, health, social welfare, power, scientific research, business and agricultural subsidies, housing, banking, et cetera, is indicated by the total of 1,400 budgeted projects and programs into which federal funds are pumped through most of the 2,800 Treasury accounts.

For administration of all these programs, there are 70 principal agencies with 2,117 component units in the federal government. Virtually all state

and local governments are characterized by bureau organization, and where they are not, they are capable of it. While the actual number of bureaus, or their counterparts, in these governments is undetermined, more than a quarter of a million would be a conservative estimate.

For those who adhere to the theory that the least governed are the best governed, there may be consolation in comparison with modern dictatorships, but, even with the decline in the value of the dollar considered, there is reason to pause over the following facts:

1. All governments in the United States annually are collecting revenue totaling eighty-five billion dollars; spending more than one hundred billion dollars; running deficits of more than fifteen billion dollars; and, at present, operating under a public debt burden of more than three hundred billion dollars.

2. As compared with twenty-five years ago they have increased revenue collections 700 per cent, expenditures 900 per cent, deficits 1,400 per cent, and public debt 900 per cent.

3. In the same twenty-five years the nation's population has increased 30 per cent; personal income has increased about 235 per cent; gross national product has increased about 260 per cent; and production, in index points, has increased from 110 to 241.

4. As between federal and state and local governments, compared with twenty-five years ago: state and local revenue collections have been increased more than 200 per cent, while federal revenue collections have been increased more than 1,500 per cent. State and local expenditures have been increased about 250 per cent, while federal expenditures have been increased by about 2,200 per cent. State and local deficit financing in the last twenty-five years has been increased by some 300 per cent. The federal government twenty-

five years ago was operating with an 18 per cent surplus; now it is operating with a deficit equal to almost 15 per cent of revenue collections. State and local debt has been increased 75 per cent; federal debt has been increased 1,500 per cent.

Among other things, these figures show that revenue collections by governments in the United States are equal to more than one-fourth of our national income; that government expenditures are equal to one-third of our national income; and that the public debt exceeds our national income.

There are those who persist in emphasizing the fact that much of the vast expansion of government in the past quarter of a century, the cost of it, and the public debt, particularly in the federal government, are due to war and depression. Even if there is reason to regard this explanation with the interest which may be attached to a historical fact, it does not solve any of the problems created by the expansion, or pay any of the cost, reduce the taxes or deficit financing necessary to maintain the expanded government, or discharge any of the debt incurred.

It is true that in the past twenty-five years the federal government has acted in depression, war, and postwar conditions, with a sweeping series of "temporary emergency" programs for each. But invariably the emergencies have passed more quickly than the programs, which in many instances have been perpetuated.

EXPANSION IN REVIEW

Anyone reviewing federal agencies, functions, programs, and projects originated, resurrected, or reorganized in the past twenty years will find that merely listing them with thumbnail descriptions requires forty pages of small print. Some have come and gone completely. Others remain wholly or par-

tially, in one form or another, and in one place or another.

It is difficult to generalize or summarize the federal expansion and to determine what part of it may have been directly attributable to emergencies, what part may have been attributable to normal progress, what part may have been a result of a combination of these developments, and what part has been due to the multiply-by-division characteristics of bureaucracy.

In some cases expansion has not been continuous, but instances of net retrenchment have been comparatively rare. In any event, expansion has progressed under various circumstances, in different degrees, and in assorted forms.

In addition to new bureaucracy generated by emergency, there has also been some expansion in so-called old-line agencies, functions, and activities, as the indirect result of emergency programs. It is equally true that in every emergency virtually all agencies, whether they are involved or not, have tried to justify expansion in the name of the emergency. And most often they have been successful.

Those who emphasize the emergency expansion overlook a large area in the federal government where with a minimum of emergency justification the spread of bureaucracy has kept the pace. A few samples are: the federal Office of Education, which in 1929 was spending 31½ million dollars a year and now is spending 200 million; the Forest Service, which in 1929 was spending 16½ million dollars and now is spending 94 million; the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which in 1929 was costing 37¼ million dollars and now is costing 103½ million; the Public Health Service and the Bureau of Reclamation, which in 1929 were spending little more than 10 million dollars a year each and now are spending a quarter of a billion a year respectively.

Emergency expansion

Examples of agencies and programs in which some degree of expansion may have occurred as the indirect result of emergencies could include: Public Roads Administration, for which in 1929 the federal government was spending \$418,000 a year as compared with more than a half-billion a year now; promotion of civilian aeronautics for which in 1929 the federal government was spending 5 million dollars a year as compared with 175 million now; and the United States Civil Service Commission which in 1929 was spending 1¼ million dollars as compared with 20 million now.

There are a few cases of agencies originated in emergencies which have continued more or less intact, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Most cases in this category represent constructive expansion at relatively small expense.

In other cases, such as the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, agencies have hung on almost indefinitely pending slow liquidation.

There are other instances where agencies have continued without change of name but with continual changes in functions and programs. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is an example. Although it got into trouble when it did not have a job to do, this depression-emergency agency lived to the full maturity of twenty-one years, and this year it has been replaced by a permanent successor.

In another type of expansion temporary emergency programs have remained as permanent additions after their original parent agency has departed. Many of the activities which originated in the old "Triple A" are among the examples. We still have some of the functions of the Resettle-

ment Administration which, in continually modified form, found their way to survival through the Farm Security Administration and now reside in another successor, the present Farmers Home Administration.

The myriad housing programs represent another category of expansion. Started for the most part near the end of the depression, they found the war emergency convenient as a justification. They are still with us.

Without arguing the merits of the Tennessee Valley Authority power program or its contribution to defense efforts, for purposes of this discussion we may simply list it as an example of a federal agency activity which has completed the expansion cycle. At first, production of hydroelectric power was promoted as one of the multipurposes of river valley development. Now the emphasis is on steam plants to supplement the hydrocapacity.

Still another type of federal expansion is represented by the so-called public assistance programs, as distinguished from the contributory Social Security System. At the time the contributory system was established, it contemplated a policy of public assistance retrenchment as the Social Security program expanded. Actually, the public assistance programs were increased before the Social Security programs were expanded.

The Selective Service System is an example of a war emergency agency which was reactivated for a new emergency before its previous emergency activities could be fully liquidated. A similar, but not identical, example may be found in the present Federal Civil Defense Administration, which quickly followed the dismantling of the World War II Office of Civilian Defense.

The military establishment

Proper measurement of what has happened in the military establishment in

terms of size, cost, activities, and use of civilian and military manpower is difficult, because it was thrown into the Korean War before its post-World-War-II peacetime adjustment was completed and before unification was accomplished. There can be no question about its tremendous cost or its world-wide activities—civilian and military. In both its civilian and military aspects a maze of bureaucracy exists. Perhaps in passing we should note that whereas it previously was headed by two Cabinet-level secretaries there is now one superdepartment with three subdepartments.

New things to come

Atomic energy is another field where expansion is difficult to measure, but in eight years the Atomic Energy Commission has been given nearly 11 billion dollars to spend. It actually has spent less than half of this amount, but billions are obligated under its outstanding contracts. Its practice of operating under huge management contracts and its largely undeveloped domestic-civilian potentialities may indicate new things to come in the realm of bureaucracy.

Foreign aid programs, projects, and activities are other phenomena recent in federal bureaucracy. Since World War II there have been thirty-two programs which have been identified with eight agencies for outright foreign assistance. Postwar authorizations have totaled 54 billion dollars for expenditure through these programs. To date 40 billion dollars has been actually spent in the administration of them. It is difficult at this time to determine whether the emergency is sustaining the bureaucracy involved or vice versa.

BUREAUCRACY AND REORGANIZATIONS

These are not all of the categories in which federal agencies, functions, programs, projects, and activities have been

expanded in civilian, military, defense-related, and foreign assistance fields, nor should the examples referred to be regarded as a complete listing. The references should not be interpreted, necessarily, as appraisals. The categories and examples which have been mentioned are only samplings to indicate the vast expansion within the federal government. From them the growth of federal bureaucracy is obvious.

They lead also to the observation that the results of authorizations over the past twenty years to reorganize the federal government have not been spectacular. Abolition of functions, programs, projects, and activities has not been characteristic of the reorganization authority. Too frequently these reorganizations have simply piled bureaucratic superstructures on top of previously existing bureaucracy. For example, out of one reorganization came the Federal Security Agency, and out of another came a whole new department with Cabinet status. And where bureaucracy was reduced in one place, as in the Department of Labor, the bureaus or their functions too often were merely moved to another.

Actually, bureaucracy has been making net gains. In November 1944, when the first more recent survey of its kind was made, there were 64 principal agencies with 1,141 component units (including 23 emergency war agencies with 364 component units). In the nine years since then the number of principal agencies has been increased by 6, and the number of component units has been increased by 976. There are now more principal departments and agencies and more component units in the federal government than existed at the peak of World War II.

AREAS FOR RETRENCHMENT

Analysis of the programs and projects under federal agencies and units shows

there is widespread overlapping in their various fields of activities. The following general references to duplication do not necessarily represent complete overlapping, but they do indicate areas in which continuing scrutiny might be profitable.

There are 25 component units in 5 principal agencies and departments concerned with foreign relations and trade.

There are 17 component units in 10 principal agencies and departments concerned with labor relations.

There are 12 component units in 9 departments and principal agencies concerned with government insurance, exclusive of pensions and retirement.

There are 72 component units in 16 departments and principal agencies concerned with loans guaranteed, insured, or made directly by the federal government.

There are 14 component units in 5 departments and principal agencies concerned with power and water power.

There are 26 component units in 15 departments and principal agencies concerned with housing.

There are 12 component units in 9 departments and principal agencies concerned with safety.

There are 20 component units in 9 departments and principal agencies concerned with education.

Indications have been given of how, in the expansion of federal agencies, programs, and projects, overlapping federal activities have developed within the federal government. But in the course of expansion by federal agencies, their programs, projects, and activities have also overlapped those of state and local governments. This, of course, refers largely to domestic-civilian agencies and activities, but some overlapping is present in defense-related programs such as civilian defense.

Within twenty years federal payments

to state and local governments have been increased from 126 million dollars a year to 3,000 million. Twenty years ago, in the midst of the depression, payments to individuals through federal programs, including those through such relief activities as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, totaled 1½ billion dollars. Now with virtually full employment federal payments to individuals are at approximately the same total.

These federal payments to state and local governments are being made through more than fifty federal programs, and in most instances they are going into fields where state and local governments have their own activities, such as agriculture, aviation development, streets and highways, conservation, natural resources, labor, employment and unemployment, vocational assistance, public assistance, housing, health, welfare, and higher and public school education. The federal payments to individuals flow out to them through nearly two score additional programs and activities.

Virtually all of these federal payments are tied to federal formulae, requirements, regulations, and supervision. So, as federal money goes out under these and other items of federal expenditure, centralized authority, control, and domination come in.

Expansion of bureaucracy not only breeds more expansion in kind, it breeds overlapping all along the line and centralization of authority and control at the expense of state, local, and self-determination. And this is not all of the expense of big bureaucracy. It has been estimated that the federal overhead involved in collecting tax dollars from individuals in states and localities, bringing it into the federal treasury via federal bureaucracy, and pumping it out again via federal programs costs at least 15 per cent of every dollar collected.

BUREAUCRACY AND TAXES

Even this is not all of the expense of bureaucracy to taxpayers. They are hit hard by overlapping assessments. Federal and state taxes now overlap on virtually every major source of public revenue. In some cases the overlapping extends even to local assessments.

During the past twenty-five years the position of state and local governments as compared with the federal government in revenue collection has been reversed. Now the federal government is the heavy-handed tax collector.

In 1932 the federal government collected 22 per cent of the total public take from the American pocketbook, and state and local governments collected 78 per cent. In the fiscal year 1952 (the latest year for which complete returns are available) total revenue collected by all governments in the United States was 85.4 billion dollars, with the federal government taking 73 per cent and state and local governments collecting 27 per cent.

In the fiscal year 1952, the total revenue figure included 83.2 billion dollars collected by all governments in the United States from tax assessments, as distinguished from other sources of revenue. Of the total tax collection 69.1 billion dollars or 83 per cent came from sources which were subjected to overlapping taxation.

The federal revenue in the fiscal year 1952 included upwards of 63½ billion dollars in tax collections. Approximately 92 per cent of the federal taxes came from sources which were subject to overlapping taxation. And of some twenty billion dollars in state and local tax revenue, approximately 53 per cent came from sources which were subject to overlapping taxation.

There are areas in the United States where sources of public revenue are subject to layer upon layer of taxes. For

instance, in some communities individual income, admissions, and certain selected commodities such as tobacco, alcoholic beverages, and gasoline are subjected to federal, state, and local taxes. In addition, the federal government and state governments frequently overlap each other's tax assessments on corporation income, stock transfers, inheritances, et cetera. Beyond this, property frequently is subjected to both state and local taxes. In many areas still another overlapping layer of taxes is piled on by states in the form of general sales and gross receipts taxes. In some localities where local sales taxes are imposed there is still an additional layer.

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to calculate or estimate how much of the necessity for this burdensome and annoying overlapping of taxation should be attributed to needed, well-organized domestic-civilian, military, and foreign assistance activities within the federal government; how much to overlapping, nonessential, and inefficient agencies, programs, projects, and activities within the federal government; how much to federal programs and activities which overlap state and local programs and activities, or require state and local expenditures; and how much to state and local programs and activities which overlap in activity or requirements.

THE HARD FACTS

Those who will may emphasize occasions, argue reasons, or debate necessity for expansion of government in the United States—federal, state, and local—but these hard facts confront us now: for nearly a quarter of a century, with only temporary cutbacks here and there such as in state and local governments during World War II and in the federal government at its end, there has been

continual increase in the size, scope, and cost of government, tax assessment, deficit financing, and debt.

In this period the federal government has been on a deficit financing basis for twenty of the last twenty-three years, through depression, postdepression, World War, postwar, Korean War, and now post-Korea. And the end is not in sight. State and local governments are following suit.

No one can foretell precisely where the breaking point lies, but today there are signs of the stress and the strain which have been caused by unrelenting government expansion. The most obvious sign is the federal government's present difficulty in finding any more sources of tax revenue. It is doubtful whether present sources can stand higher rates without diminishing returns.

Long-term commitments in advance for huge multiyear programs and projects have placed the rate of annual expenditure by the federal government virtually beyond control. Here again states and localities appear to be following suit.

The federal statutory debt limit has been reached.

In this impasse the federal government is talking about returning functions to states and localities. The states and localities are saying they cannot meet the additional expense until the federal government relieves their tax sources of dual assessment. Those who would hide from the reality of the situation are proposing budgetary legerdemain which they call "cash budget," "Ruml plan," et cetera.

If we have more government than we can pay for, or if we have more than we are willing to pay for, there is only one way to reduce it. That is to reduce it, not shift it.

Harry Flood Byrd, Washington, D. C., has been United States Senator from Virginia since 1933. Prior to that time he was Governor of Virginia for four years and a member of the Virginia State Senate for eleven years.

Toward a Responsible Bureaucracy

By PETER H. ODEGARD

A GOVERNMENT without bureaucrats is like a centipede without legs, unable to move—even to save itself—and powerless to accomplish any of the goals for which governments are instituted among men. For it is upon the bureaucrats that we depend to see that these goals—or policies—are realized in practice. Without administrative officers—that is, without a bureaucracy to carry them into effect—the most fine-spun schemes for promoting the common defense, insuring domestic tranquillity, promoting the general welfare, and preserving the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity would be stillborn.

Yet there is a widely current notion that bureaucracy and democracy are somehow incompatible—that the bureaucrat and the democrat must forever be at odds. This popular antithesis between bureaucracy and democracy is, as Professor Friedrich says, “an oratorical slogan which endangers the future of democracy. For a constitutional system which cannot function effectively, which cannot act with dispatch and strength, cannot live.”¹

Nevertheless, the fears expressed by the demagogues pose problems which cannot be denied for those who want government to be *both* effective and democratic. Not the least of these is the problem of enforcing responsibility upon the bureaucracy. For among the so-called immutable principles of democratic theory is the assumption that power and responsibility must go hand in hand. Power without responsibility is the very definition of tyranny, and

the transition from arbitrary to responsible government involves more than popular control of the legislature, the so-called policy-making branch of the government. It involves also popular control of the executive establishment and the bureaucracy through which public policies are translated from law into life.

As the functions of the state expand and the size and complexity of the bureaucracy increase, the search for ways and means to make these minions of Leviathan more responsible becomes both more important and more intense. But if bureaucratic accountability is to be real and equitable, the bureaucrat must know for what and to whom he is responsible. The Hoover Commission says:

The President, and under him his chief lieutenants, the department heads, must be held responsible and accountable to the people and the Congress for the conduct of the executive branch. [But] responsibility and accountability are impossible without authority—the power to direct. The exercise of authority is impossible without a clear line of command from the top to the bottom, and a return line of responsibility and accountability from the bottom to the top.

IMPLICATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY

But “responsibility” implies more than mere accountability for what is or is not done, and more too than a strict adherence to policy mandates as they come from the legislature and/or one’s administrative superiors and associates. It implies also a high level of technical competence for the job one is called upon to do, a personal character that is loyal, honest, and reliable, a dedication to duty, and faith in the basic values

of the society one serves. These values in turn will in final analysis determine the quality of the public service and the character and conduct of its servants.

A truly responsible bureaucrat is, then, a man of not one but many responsibilities. He owes a *political* responsibility to those who have final say as to policy and ultimately to the people who make and unmake them. He owes both a “political” and an *administrative* responsibility to his superior officers. He owes a *legal* responsibility to the courts (both administrative and judicial), lest he transgress the rights of citizens by abusing or exceeding his powers. He owes a *professional* responsibility to his fellow bureaucrats to maintain high standards of integrity and competence, lest he bring dishonor or disgrace to the “guild” of which all are members. He owes a *moral* responsibility to the highest ethical and moral principles of the state and society in which he lives and to which he professes allegiance. And finally he owes a responsibility to his own soul—to the honor and integrity of his own person—for without self-respect he can scarcely be expected to have respect for others or to deserve their respect in turn.

To explore fully these multiple loyalties and responsibilities is beyond the scope of this brief essay. It may, nevertheless, be useful to suggest some of the problems and perplexities that occur in thinking about a responsible bureaucracy in the modern state.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBORDINATES

As far as the mass of bureaucrats have any *political* responsibility, it must be vicarious and not direct. A President, a Prime Minister, and the chief executive officers appointed to serve with them must, above all things, be politicians (and partisans, at that) and, as such, politically responsible not alone for their own acts but for those of their

subordinates, however numerous and widespread.

As the leader of the government, and under the principle of collective responsibility as it operates in Great Britain, the Prime Minister is the center and focus of political responsibility. If the deeds of wayward and incompetent civil servants in the Home Office are attributable to the Home Secretary, so in like succession are they—through the Home Secretary—attributable to Her Majesty’s Prime Minister. And all together the ministers of the Crown must assume collective political responsibility not only for major lines of policy but also for administrative acts of thousands of civil servants of whose very existence they may be but dimly aware. It is in this combination of individual and collective responsibility to Parliament that the great strength of British democracy is to be found.

Political responsibility for the mass of bureaucrats in the American government is much less clearly defined. The President, to be sure, in final analysis must “take the rap” for what is or is not done. The heads of the major departments are political officers appointed by and accountable to him; and as they must answer for the acts of their subordinates, so the President in turn must answer for them. But the locus of responsibility is by no means as clear as in Great Britain. James Burns says:

The Founding Fathers did not clearly distinguish between the President’s executive authority and the supervisory powers of Congress over administration. On the contrary, they deliberately divided administrative power between the two branches as part of the system of checks and balances.²

THE ISSUE CONFUSED

The President’s power to control the bureaucrats derives mainly from his

² *Congress on Trial* (New York, 1949), p. 99.

¹ Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1941), p. 57.

powers to appoint (and presumably by inference to dismiss) "officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for" and to "require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments." But these powers are by no means unlimited or exclusive, and at a hundred points Congress has, from the beginning, pared them down and impaired their effectiveness. The organic act establishing the Treasury Department, to cite one example, requires the Secretary "to make report and give information to either branch of the legislature, in person or in writing, respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives or which may appertain to his office." And, although the Secretary was described in a subsequent law of September 11, 1789, as an "Executive Officer," he and the Treasurer of the United States were nevertheless required to make annual reports to Congress.³

Legislation setting up other major departments or executive agencies has not followed this pattern, but Congress has nevertheless found ways and means for interposing itself between the President and his executive subordinates and thus confusing the clear line of bureaucratic responsibility. The creation within major departments of numerous bureaus over which particular committees of Congress and even particular Congressmen exercise more control than

³ This dual responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury has on occasion been a source of acute embarrassment to the President. For example, in 1833 Jackson ordered Secretary Duane to remove federal deposits from the Bank of the United States, on the ground that that institution was unsafe. This order seemed in sharp conflict with an equally strong resolution of the House of Representatives expressing confidence in the bank. When Duane chose to follow Congress rather than the President on this issue, he was removed by Jackson and replaced by Taney, who proceeded to carry out the President's order.

the department chief is but one of several such devices.

Nor is this confusion confined to the central corps of executive departments and agencies. It has been confounded by the creation of "independent" boards, commissions, corporations, and authorities, responsible (if they may be so described) not to the President, but to Congress. This so-called "headless fourth branch of government" has posed problems of administrative organization, management, and responsibility for which no one seems to have found satisfactory solutions.

The mixture of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in these bodies has caused no end of confusion among experts accustomed to a neat tripartite division of political powers. But the Brownlow and the Hoover-Acheson Commissions struggled vainly with the problem of making these agencies "responsible" without at the same time sacrificing their "independence."

CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF POWERS

The problem of the "independent agency" is obviously too complex and too important to be resolved by mere structural or procedural reform. It involves a restudy of at least one basic principle of American constitutional law—the principle of separation of powers. Although not expressly spelled out in the United States Constitution, the principle has always been implied from the language of Articles I, II, and III, vesting the legislative, executive, and judicial powers in three distinct branches of the government. But there is scarcely an agency or official of the government that does not in one way or another exercise two or more of these "distinct" powers.

Wherever an official has discretion to decide controversies among persons or between private persons and the govern-

ment, he may be said to exercise judicial power; wherever he has power to issue rules or regulations to which penalties for violation are attached, he exercises legislative power; and wherever he has power to direct, or control, conduct in terms of these decisions or rules, he may be said to have executive power. Mean is the official, and humble indeed is his station, who does not in some measure combine these powers in the performance of his duties. To call them *quasi-judicial* and *quasi-legislative* may help the judicial conscience to rationalize departure from fundamental doctrine, but to justify the "independence" and hence the practical "irresponsibility" of an agency of government because it exercises quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative power may be to establish a principle which, if extended to all officials or agencies whose powers may be similarly described, can undermine the democratic principle that public officials—including bureaucrats called commissioners—must be politically responsible to the people through their elected representatives.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE

It is too often forgotten that the President—no less than the Congress—represents the people, and that it is through him, perhaps more effectively than through Congress, that bureaucrats can be held responsible. Although the political responsibility of bureaucrats is a vicarious responsibility in either case, in the Presidency it comes to fairly clear focus at one time and in a single office, whereas in Congress it appears in fragments and at uneven intervals. And whereas through Congress the bureaucrat's responsibility to his state or local "clients" is emphasized, it is through the President that the bureaucracy can be most effectively held to account for promoting the "general welfare" of all the people. Fortu-

nately it is not necessary to choose between Congress and the President in our search for a responsible bureaucracy. Both are essential, provided we understand what it is we are striving to accomplish.

Not the least of the heavy burdens the President must bear is political responsibility for the conduct and misconduct of the executive establishment. Insolence, inefficiency, incompetence, and corruption in any executive official or agency are properly chargeable to him. He ought not to escape this responsibility, as Grant and Harding, and others too, have sought to escape, by talk of "betrayal" by "faithless men in high places." These men are his agents and for better or worse their deeds are his.

PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

And the President's responsibility is the responsibility of his party. Yet how often have we seen not only the President, but the party whose leader he is, seek (often successfully) to escape responsibility for the "evil deeds of evil men"—forgetting that these same "evil men" were his agents and those of his party! In final analysis political responsibility in a big democracy can be effectively enforced only through well-organized political parties. Hence it is that the search for a more responsible bureaucracy must be sought not merely in administrative reorganization or the redefinition and reallocation of powers and responsibilities, but also through a more responsible party system.

And if this is true of the President, it is equally true of the Congress. Congressmen no less than the President owe their election to the party in whose principles presumably they believe. Without responsible parties to organize and discipline Congressmen in terms of policies upon which as partisans they

agree—the Congress itself becomes an undisciplined, irresponsible body of “freewheelers,” each seeking his own exaltation and each owing allegiance to state and local pressure groups upon which—rather than the party—his political future comes to depend.

We need to inquire, then, whether party responsibility is more direct and meaningful when applied to Congress or to the President. There is reason to believe that our major political parties—as far at least as concerns the general welfare of the nation—are less responsible at the congressional than at the Presidential level. Although it is true that our major parties may be described as loose federations of state and local parties, it is also true that they function more effectively in Presidential years than at any other time in presenting to the voter meaningful alternatives as to candidates and policies. The higher ratio of actual to eligible voters at Presidential elections is one evidence of this. Another is the identification of the President by the voters as the responsible leader of his party in the nation. It is also true that—for a variety of reasons—party labels mean less at state and local levels than at the national level; and party organization is less efficient and less disciplined at off-year than at Presidential elections.

The relative weakness of the parties at the state and local levels is reflected, as both cause and effect, in the greater power and influence of special interest groups. Many Congressmen, and some Senators, owe more to powerful pressure groups within their states or districts than they owe to the party under whose label they aspire to office. In any case the issues over which congressional campaigns are fought in off years are more likely to reflect state and local interests than the issues over which Presidential campaigns are fought.

What is said here of the relative effec-

tiveness of political parties in enforcing political responsibility in national affairs as between the President and Congress applies, with even greater force, to state and local governments and as between the governor and the legislature. The situation is of course complicated in the states by hydra-headed elective executives and in local governments by the widespread tradition of nonpartisanship.

GENERAL WELFARE VERSUS SPECIAL INTEREST

If this analysis has any validity, it follows that a bureaucracy responsible to the legislature will be more responsive and more responsible to local and special interests than a bureaucracy responsible to an elective chief executive.

It is to be expected that a Congressman quite properly answerable and responsive to the cattle growers of his district should seek to “liberalize” grazing regulations in federal forest reserves or on other federally owned lands within his state. If the bureaucrats responsible for the making and enforcement of these regulations are answerable to the Congressmen, they will find it difficult to resist such demands for “liberalization” even though they conflict with general policies of the nation concerning the conservation and use of our natural resources. And what is true of grazing regulations is likewise true of countless other policies.

This is not to argue that Congressmen (taken together) are less concerned about the “general welfare” of the nation than is the President. Nor is it to lose sight of the intense pressures from special interests that are felt in the White House. It is, however, to say that the President, because his constituency is the nation, because he has at his beck and call mass communications facilities beyond the reach of any other person, because he is the domi-

nant figure in his party, because of the power and prestige of his office, is less vulnerable to such special or regional pressures than is the average Congressman. Moreover, it is his responsibility to see that the general welfare is *not* sacrificed to special or parochial interests, and where he finds faithless bureaucrats who betray this trust, he has or should have power to discipline, expose, and if necessary remove them.

THE LEGISLATURE AS A SAFEGUARD

But, as I have said, the choice between a bureaucracy responsible to the executive (President, governor, mayor) and one responsible to the legislature (Congress, state legislature, city council) is not to be made in *either or* terms—nor under our system is such a choice open to us.

For, although the weight of constitutional authority, the dictates of practicality, and considerations of democratic theory point to the elected executive as the channel through which the bureaucracy is made responsible to the people, the legislature will continue to challenge this solution and to claim its share of control. And within proper limits it is a legitimate claim. For surely one of the basic functions of a representative legislative body is to maintain eternal vigilance over the bureaucracy to the end that the spirit as well as the letter of the law be observed in its execution and that the liberty of the citizen and the due processes of law be not sacrificed to the insolence of office masquerading under “reasons of state.”

Legislative bodies discharge this function through the enactment of laws which define the goals and standards of administrative action and the limits of administrative discretion; through the appropriation or denial of funds to administrative agencies, and the examination and evaluation of administrative policies and procedures when budget re-

quests are under review; through more or less continuous inquiries of appropriate legislative committees, and special investigations launched in response to demands for more searching examination of particular agencies; and through the virtually continuous and informal contacts that individual legislators maintain—usually in response to requests from their constituents—with administrative agencies.

All these are legitimate and, under our system of government, inevitable devices available to legislative bodies for enforcing political responsibility upon bureaucrats.

Nevertheless, under present circumstances, it is not easy for the legislature to maintain effective surveillance and control over the vast and far-flung bureaucracy of the modern state. Even in the determination of the basic structure and powers of administrative agencies, the legislature is severely handicapped. To an ever increasing extent it has lost the initiative in the formulation of policy. Moreover, the scope and complexity of the problems with which legislation must now deal require that legislative standards be more general—not to say vague—leaving to the executive great discretion in the development of supplementary legislation (rules and regulations) to meet particular situations.

Nor can the modern legislative body hope to have access to information necessary to effective control of the bureaucracy, except through the bureaucracy itself. Even the power of special investigation may be limited by considerations of national security. The ever expanding scope of governmental activities shrouded in secrecy—if not mystery—makes effective control by a numerous legislative body difficult if not impossible. Congress, for example, is in these days called upon to authorize expenditures of fantastic dimensions for

the development of atomic energy, for national defense, for foreign policy, often without the benefit of more than the most sketchy and elementary information. Such information as there is, is in the hands of the executive and subject to his control.

Under these circumstances, a responsible bureaucracy is possible only through a partnership of the legislature and the executive, based on mutual respect, trust, and confidence.

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

Certainly no one observing the American scene in these latter days would argue that such a partnership has characterized executive-legislative relations at the national level. Hearings before committees of Congress take on the appearance of adversary proceedings, with Congressmen as prosecutors and executive officers as defendants. Loose, exaggerated, and often unsupported charges of corruption, incompetence, moral depravity, and disloyalty have been hurled at administrative officers and at entire agencies by presumably responsible chairmen of committees. Observers watching the cold war between the White House and the Hill, even when both are controlled by the same party, might well conclude that the American government had indeed fallen on evil days. The very term bureaucracy has become a "snarl" word, symbol not of loyal and devoted public servants, but of functionless hangers-on—of doubtful honesty, morality, and loyalty. Obviously this is the way to ensure not a responsible, but a bitterly resentful, bureaucracy, crippled by fear, internal disunity, and dissension. Vigilance is indeed the price of liberty under law, but the line between the vigilant and the lawless *vigilante* must be maintained lest we betray the very freedom we seek to defend.

So much has been written about the

dangers of executive usurpation and abuse of power that we have become less alert to threats of legislative usurpation. "The legislature," warned James Madison, "is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex," and "... it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions."⁴

Madison's warning has a peculiar timeliness today, when some congressional committees have presumed to exercise not only powers of investigation and legislation normally associated with the legislative branch, but also executive and even judicial powers. Legislative intervention in the appointing power of the President has recently gone far beyond the so-called custom of senatorial courtesy. Attacks on prospective appointees as "security risks," loudly expressed doubts as to the loyalty of incumbents, and riders on appropriation bills forbidding the payment of public funds to named individuals are among the more recent devices of legislative usurpation, although the Supreme Court has branded this latter maneuver as being in effect a bill of attainder and hence invalid.

Illustrations of legislative intervention in administrative management are numerous and occur in virtually every major department of the government. And Senator McCarthy's "negotiations" with Greek shipowners concerning trade with Communist China mark a new level of legislative impertinence and usurpation. Only the so-called Bricker amendment, which would cripple Presidential control of foreign policy, compares with McCarthy's conduct as an example of congressional arrogance.

No better formula for producing a

⁴ *The Federalist, or The New Constitution* (New York: Heritage Press, 1945 ed.), No. 48, pp. 331, 332.

confused, timid, ineffective, and irresponsible bureaucracy could be imagined than this tug of war between the executive and the legislature for control. James Burns says:

Responsibility for policy and administration becomes shrouded in a fantastically complicated network of ever shifting relationships among President, administrators, staff agencies, Senate, House of Representatives, committees, sub-committees, chairmen, individual legislators and among infinite combinations and permutations thereof.⁵

There is no easy escape from this situation. No reforms of structure or procedure, and no admonitions concerning good behavior will suffice without strong leadership on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

If the major burden of enforcing bureaucratic responsibility should fall to the elected executive, it is imperative that the executive establishment be adequate, in terms of both the scope and structure of power, to make its control effective. The diffusion and confusion of power in a plural executive (as in the states), the intervention of the legislature in strictly executive functions, and the denial to the executive of power commensurate with his responsibility, all militate against a responsible bureaucracy.

In the far-flung, complex structure of the modern administrative state it is difficult at best for the executive to see or to know more than a tiny fraction of those for whose acts he is responsible. He becomes a prisoner of his top advisers and administrators. And with the multiplication of agencies and functions it becomes increasingly difficult for him to keep in very close touch with more than a handful of these.

The President is not only harassed by congressional interference and usurpation. He is denied many of the powers essential to effective executive control of the administrative machine. He lacks, for example, real authority to determine the organization and structure of the executive branch, and a large number of important executive functions in the so-called "headless fourth branch of the government"—the "independent" agencies—are outside his control. He lacks effective control over the federal budget, is "handcuffed and hog-tied" with line-by-line appropriations, and is denied the item veto. And he has only a limited control over personnel policy and administration, even within the regular executive departments and agencies.⁶

POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY VERSUS PARTISAN LOYALTY

How far up or down the hierarchy of administrative authority the principle of political responsibility should extend has been a subject of prolonged and intense debate. The issue has been confused by failure to distinguish between political responsibility and partisan loyalty. The former is a salutary and indispensable characteristic of democratic government and should extend from the outermost reaches of the bureaucracy to the White House. The latter, unless carefully confined to top administrative posts which share with the President in the determination of high policy, can become a mask for the place seeker and the spoilsman.

This is not to imply that administrative policy-making is or can be confined to a narrow circle of partisan officials at the top. Policy and administration are the Siamese twins of politics

⁶ See Herman Miles Somers, "The President as Administrator," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September 1952.

⁵ *Congress on Trial* (New York, 1949), p. 115.

and are associated at virtually all levels of the administrative structure—indeed wherever discretionary power is found. But this is a far cry from saying that *partisan* responsibility for policy should embrace the entire civil service. For the partisan neutrality of the civil service is a cardinal principle of the merit system upon which any sound personnel policy must rest. The tradition, now embedded in law, which bars civil servants from active participation in party politics is based on this assumption. How far this denial of an important civil right should extend, it is not easy to say. Certainly it should include professional, scientific, and technical workers upon whom we depend for continuity and competence in the public service. Whether it should also include the lower ranks of laborers and purely manipulative employees is not so clear.

To say that civil servants should not be held to any partisan loyalty or responsibility is not to say that they should also be exempt from political responsibility. Political responsibility in this sense implies that the civil servant carry out faithfully and to the best of his ability the policies of the administration, or government, of whatever party, in which the people have placed their trust. As former Prime Minister Attlee once observed, "We always demand from our civil servants a loyalty to the State, and that they should serve the government of the day, whatever its political colour."⁷ Anyone who cannot give this elementary loyalty to the state he serves cannot justly claim the security and immunity from partisan responsibility that characterizes membership in the permanent civil service.

⁷ Hansard, March 25, 1948, quoted in T. A. Critchley, *The Civil Service Today* (London, 1951), p. 60.

LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

A responsible bureaucracy implies not only political but legal responsibility as well. The legal definition of bureaucratic powers and responsibilities is the heart of administrative law and an important part of the criminal code. Laws against bribery and corruption, fraud and deceit, misfeasance and malfeasance, are, of course, part of the machinery for enforcing this legal responsibility.

In his classic study of the *Law of the Constitution*, A. V. Dicey argued strongly against the importation or infiltration into English law of the so-called *Droit administratif* of France, which (according to Dicey) was designed to give civil servants a preferred status under the law, or at least a status different from that which ordinary citizens enjoyed. Under the French practice, said Dicey, the ordinary courts are incompetent to pass judgment on administrative or official conduct. Redress for wrongful acts by government officials or civil servants must be sought not in the ordinary civil courts but in special administrative tribunals. Moreover, in France, he said, responsibility for such wrongful acts, once established, was assumed not by the individual but by the state.

All this, argued Dicey, was in derogation of the sound English view that responsibility for wrongful acts rests with the individual, without distinction as to his status, whether as private citizen or as civil servant. In England, he wrote, "every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification, as any other citizen."⁸ The public official can no more

⁸ *The Law of the Constitution* (4th ed., London, 1893), p. 183.

escape by casting his liability upon the state than can the private citizen. Indeed, the doctrine of state immunity from liability for the tortious acts of its servants ("The King can do no wrong") was a cardinal principle of English law.

American legal theory and practice have followed the English rather than the French tradition. Legal responsibility of the bureaucracy has been enforced through the ordinary courts, and liability for wrongful acts by civil servants has attached to the individual and not to the state. Responsibility of the government for breaches of contract has long been recognized, but a similar responsibility for the torts of its agents has had but a recent and reluctant recognition. Civil and criminal suits against public officials as individuals, plus resort to the great writs—quo warrant, mandamus, injunction, prohibition, habeas corpus—have been the usual remedies for bureaucratic wrongdoing. Proposals to establish a system of administrative tribunals on the French model have been made, but so far without success.

CHANGING LEGAL PATTERNS

Nevertheless there have been significant changes in traditional Anglo-American practice. The theory that a public officer was individually responsible for damages resulting from his wrongful acts may have helped to inspire caution and respect for the rights of others, but it was cold comfort to those actually damaged to know that their only redress was a damage suit against impecunious bureaucrats. So the fiction of individual responsibility has been maintained as the practice of publicly reimbursing officials in the amount of the judgments against them has grown.

Moreover, a distinction between *governmental* and *proprietary* functions has been made, according to which liability

attaches to the government for the wrongful acts of its agents when pursuing the latter but not when engaged in the former. This distinction is grounded on the theory that the state derives no pecuniary benefit from its governmental activities—hence no liability—but does from its proprietary activities. However faulty in logic this theory may be, it has helped to extend the area within which government assumes liability for the wrongful acts of its servants.

Significant of the new trend is the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, which radically modifies the rule of immunity formerly applied to the federal government. Under this act the United States is made liable "for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment."⁹ There are exceptions, however, including (1) cases where the employees have exercised due care in the execution of a statute whether valid or invalid, (2) discretionary acts, and (3) intentional torts such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Where liability attaches, it is declared to be the same as that imposed on a private individual "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."

Reflecting a similar trend in England was the enactment in 1947 of the Crown Proceedings Bill. With minor exceptions this act admits state liability for the wrongful acts of public servants. "A person can enforce any claim as of right regarding contracts and torts. The state will admit liability for the wrongs committed by its servants or agents as any private citizen or public corporation does."¹⁰

Although we are a long way from the

⁹ 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2672, 2674.

¹⁰ H. Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (New York, 1949), p. 921.

French system of administrative courts, it is possible to point to examples of some roughly analogous institutions in the United States, such as the Court of Claims, the Tax Court of the United States, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Moreover, quasi-judicial bodies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, together with a considerable number of agencies serving the needs of intradepartmental adjudication, might be transformed into something closely resembling administrative courts. But however logical such a plan might be, we are far from adopting it in this country. Moreover, the arguments for the French system, while impressive, are far from conclusive in a country like the United States with a federal system, a strong tradition of local autonomy, and an equally deep-rooted distrust of government in general. For some time to come we shall continue to rely mainly on the ordinary courts to ensure legal responsibility of the bureaucrats.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

But a truly responsible bureaucracy will depend as much—perhaps more—upon its own code of professional and civic ethics as upon external controls. Excessive regulation may hinder rather than help in the development of such a code, by cultivating “timidity” and government by rule book at the sacrifice of imagination and initiative. “Infinitely more important than compelling administrative officials to live up to minutely defined requirements of control is their acceptance of an ethical obligation to account to themselves and to the public for the *public* character of their actions.”¹¹

The growth of professional pride and *esprit* among civil servants, without

¹¹ Fritz Morstein Marx, in *American Political Science Review*, December 1949, p. 1134.

which no professional code of ethics can have much meaning or effect, has had to wait upon victory over the spoilsman. Although the final battles in that war have yet to be won, it is not too early to make some conscious and concerted effort to create among public servants a greater sense of professional loyalty, discipline, and responsibility. Indeed, signs are not lacking that, in some sectors at least, this new professional spirit has already begun to emerge. Numerous organizations of public servants already exist through which higher standards of competence, integrity, and responsibility can develop.

The experience of other professions—medicine, law, and teaching, for example—can offer stimulus but also a warning to bureaucrats. For too often such associations become primarily concerned not with their responsibility for higher standards and better public service, but with the promotion of narrower and more selfish ends. Associations of civil servants have a special obligation to avoid these pitfalls and to cultivate at all times an intense and pervasive sense of public service and responsibility.

Loyalty to high standards of honesty, “scientific management,” and technical competence are, of course, of transcendent importance. But equally important is the bureaucrat’s responsibility to know and respect the wishes, values, and goals of the community he serves, not in supine response to the pressures of special interest groups, but through a dogged devotion to the basic policies of the state—even though this means resistance to these same special or parochial groups.

Although we have far to go in this country in achieving a truly responsible bureaucracy, we can take comfort in the progress that has been made. “No longer has the patronage peddler or the

spoilsman the hold he once had on the federal service. No longer can it be fairly said that American city government is a failure, conspicuous or otherwise. No longer can it accurately be said, as George S. Taylor once said of Britain in the eighteenth century, that politics is “the trade of managing the state in the interests of the men in possession and their friends.” Standards of character and competence, of integrity and industry, in the public service will stand comparison with those in other walks of life. But it is not enough that they be “just as good”—they should be better. Just as government should be a model employer, so the public service and the public servant should be models for the community, as I believe they are even now.

It is fitting and proper for the community to expect higher standards among its public servants than in private life. But in the end administrative morality will reflect the morality of the community it serves. A society in which “caveat emptor” is still a basic principle of business, in which the clever man who can make a “fast buck” is eulogized, and in which private speculation is often concealed in acts of so-called public policy, ought not to be surprised if an occasional bureaucrat strays from the straight and narrow path.¹² The ancient English jingle has

¹² See “Ethical Standards in Government,” Report of a Sub-Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 10.

relevance even to our own times when it says:

The law locks up both man and woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
But lets the greater felon loose
Who steals the common from the goose.

The old aphorism that “every people gets the kind of government it deserves” is at best a half-truth, for the American people probably gets better government than it deserves. In a country where the “politician” is a symbol of corruption and dishonesty, if not dishonor, where a large majority of parents, as reported by the Gallup poll, prefer *not* to have their children enter the public service, where the bureaucracy is regarded as a legitimate object of ridicule and even revulsion and the term “bureaucrat” is a nasty name, how can one expect high standards of public service and responsibility? The wonder is not that we have *not* achieved a competent, devoted, and responsible bureaucracy, but that we have come so close to doing so.

Irresponsible attacks upon public servants are a luxury we can no longer afford—when our prosperity, our freedom, and even our survival may depend upon them. A responsible bureaucracy requires a responsible democracy—and a responsible citizenry. To create the one we must also create the other. To do so will require the best efforts of all who value our democratic institutions, whether they be in education, business, labor, or the professions.

Peter H. Odegard, Ph.D., Berkeley, California, is professor and chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of California. He has also taught in the departments of political science and government at Columbia University, Williams College, Ohio State University, Amherst College, and Stanford University, and was president of Reed College. He is consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission and has served in various capacities in numerous civic and governmental agencies. Among his latest published works are *Political Science and Politics* (1948), *Frontiers of Freedom* (1948), and *Physics and Politics* (1949). He is associate editor of *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

Responsiveness Versus Efficiency in Public Service

By JAMES L. MCCAMY

TO be responsive, in the context of our title, means that executive agents of government must satisfy, in so far as is consistent with the public interest as defined in each case, the needs and desires of citizens in a democratic society. Efficiency means that public agents should accomplish maximum results at lowest cost. The conflict between responsiveness and efficiency can be approached in a number of ways, but, since administration is essentially the behavior of people, I shall approach it here as a problem of public personnel. Most of the reference is to the federal government.

If you ask a federal civil servant these days how he feels about responsiveness versus efficiency, he replies that he has never felt so beset by partisans who are hampering efficiency.

If you ask a thoughtful citizen, he replies that he never felt so helpless to judge the performance of a large and complex bureaucracy, and the only way he can measure its responsiveness is in the small area that comes to his notice.

Civil servants in the federal government have had a rough time during the past seven years. From the high purpose of winning the war, which followed straight upon the high purpose of conquering the depression, they awoke to the sequel of the early postwar Truman administration in 1946-48. A President who had not yet gained poise as a partisan or self-confidence as a national leader was flanked by a Republican Congress many of whose members seemed to hate government. Some Congressmen then and later appeared to long for a day when a tax collector

and a constable would be the only executive employees needed.

HAZARDS TO MORALE—TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

The result in those days of 1946-48 was a threefold shock for the career civil servant. First came a new kind of political intervention. Because the President was not yet sophisticated about his elevated role in party politics, civil servants discovered that party henchmen asked improper favors, held strategic posts, and generally dulled the high luster of the shield of public service. The atmosphere that was revealed in later dismissals and indictments was felt and discussed by the journeymen months before it became obvious in congressional committee action.

A second part of the threefold shock was the drastic cutback in spending and personnel after the war. Much of this should have been expected, of course, but no matter how surely one knows that the ax is going to fall, the actual impact is always a shock. In the post-war years the reduction in force, as it was conducted, gave weight to seniority and veteran's preference. It looked to many like a blow aimed especially at the efficient public servant. He could not possibly think that he was appreciated.

The third portion of shock appeared in the Truman loyalty program. Whatever his motive, whether it was anxiety over possible subversion or a hope to beat Congress to the cleanup and protect his administration from attack, Mr. Truman must go into history as the man who began, in 1947, the whole procedure

based upon a premise that government workers were possibly disloyal. They had to prove their loyalty, often against odds. They had to answer questions about their affairs that no other group in society at that time had to answer. If their answers were not satisfactory, or if unnamed informants reported that they might be tainted, federal employees were caught in a nightmare. They were badgered worse than decent people should ever be by their fellow men.

Long before the more recent use of accusation and innuendo to make partisan news, Mr. Truman's loyalty boards were in private conducting hearings that lacked some of the essentials of due process in matters of procedure. One of Mr. Truman's Cabinet members, the Honorable Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, refused to accept the resignation of a man who had been denounced by Senator George W. Malone. A loyalty board failed to prove him guilty of disloyalty. As soon as the board found him loyal, the man resigned. Mr. Sawyer announced to the press that he was fired as a security risk. The Department of Commerce was one of a few agencies then permitted to dismiss employees as security risks without benefit of hearing. This episode was taken very seriously by government workers. It appeared to be a dismissal under the security program for reasons of political caution.¹

¹ The blow to the morale of civil servants of the action of Secretary Sawyer was summarized by Jay Walz in the editorial feature section of the Sunday *New York Times*, June 4, 1950. Mr. Sawyer was quoted as having told reporters he would ask Congress to change the laws to allow him to dismiss employees who were troublesome.

Adverse comment in these times always raises a doubt that the observer is tasting sour grapes, hence this personal note. I had accepted a job at the University of Wisconsin in the late summer of 1946 but stayed in the Department of Commerce until January 1947, when a succession had been arranged. W.

RESULTS OF LOYALTY PROGRAM

Responsible civil servants were, of course, opposed to Communists and disloyal persons whether in government service or outside it. They did not need to be advocates of disloyalty in order to object to the loyalty program. The program was objectionable to people of honor and dignity because it was founded on a premise of possible guilt that had to be expunged rather than upon the usual Anglo-American premise of innocence with guilt to be proved. It was also thought by some to be a costly way to catch a few questionable employees. The really serious spies were caught during the years of the loyalty program through typically quiet and thorough police work by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and were tried in court.²

Averell Harriman was still Secretary of Commerce when I left. I did not serve under Mr. Sawyer and have, in fact, never seen him. Since this concerns loyalty, perhaps I had better add that I left the government of my own free will before the loyalty program had started, but not because it was going to start. So far as I know, neither my loyalty nor my safeness as a security risk was ever questioned.

² For example see Oliver Pilat, *The Atom Spies* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1952) for an account of the Greenglass-Gold-Rosenberg ring and Alistair Cooke, *Generation on Trial, U.S.A. v. Alger Hiss* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950). Newspapers of the time cover the Judith Coplon trial. The British side of the early postwar captures of spies, notably Klaus Fuchs, is retold in Alan Moorehead, *The Traitors* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952). British atomic spies were related to the American cases. Neither loyalty investigation nor congressional committee investigation developed the telling evidence for court in these cases. Even the documents that were crucial in the Hiss trial came to light in a pretrial hearing in a defamation suit filed by Hiss against Whittaker Chambers, who had failed to produce them while testifying earlier before a congressional committee but later produced them for the committee, some two weeks after Hiss's attorneys

Returns from the loyalty program showed that the federal service was overwhelmingly loyal by the measurements of the program and according to the use made of the results of the investigations. The facts were reported by the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as follows:

By the close of business on June 30, 1951, 3,674,649 loyalty forms had been processed; 17,050 full field investigations and 19,410 preliminary inquiries had been initiated since the Loyalty Program became operative on August 1, 1947.

On the basis of loyalty investigations, the Civil Service Commission has advised, 330 incumbents and appointees had been removed from or denied Federal employment by their respective agencies; 8,688 had been retained or accepted after investigation. Other cases included those terminated for miscellaneous reasons such as withdrawal from consideration because of resignation. In this connection, Civil Service Commission records disclose that 1,837 persons resigned during Loyalty investigations and also that 1,503 additional persons resigned prior to adjudication of their cases.³

If you take only the 330 fired or refused employment, you get a percentage of about .00009 of the total number of employees who had been screened. If you add to them the 1,837 who resigned during investigation and the 1,503 who resigned prior to adjudication of their cases, and assume—although not with justice—that they were

had given them to the Department of Justice. As for the absurdity of expecting to catch subversive employees by asking them if they are subversive, one should read Edwin A. Rothschild's satirical proposal for "Ending the Horse-Thief Menace," *The Saturday Review*, November 28, 1953, p. 28. Horse thieves, he says, will always answer truthfully, if asked, that they are indeed horse thieves.

³ Report of John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fiscal Year 1951 (mimeographed), p. 8.

of dubious loyalty, you get roughly .001 per cent. This hardly justified references to a Communist-ridden administration. Perhaps history will have to weigh the loyalty program in calmer times. It did search out a few subversive people and it gave the public, perhaps, a sense of assurance that something was being done. It brought emphasis to the whole subject of loyalty among federal employees and made them more conscious of the seriousness of their role. On the other hand, there is no question that it depressed morale among loyal employees, who felt that they had been singled out of society as suspect, and it may have lowered the prestige of public service in the minds of citizens.

NEW THREATS—EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

But the postwar shock to the morale of federal civil servants was to be followed by further blows. The Eisenhower administration found new ways to discourage the career civil servant. First, it made universal throughout the federal service possible dismissal as a security risk. Until then only a few agencies engaged in especially sensitive work could dismiss employees as poor security risks solely at the discretion of their chief executives. Under the Eisenhower order it was all one whether a man worked as an atomic scientist or as a gravedigger. If he was accused of questionable political associations, he could be fired. If he talked too much, drank too much, deviated from the norms of sexual behavior, showed other signs of moral turpitude, or held any other thoughts and acts in his heart or in his past that appeared to a security officer, a board, and his chief executive as questionable, he could be fired as a security risk.

Secondly, the economy ax cut again, this time into the higher total number

of employees that was the result of postwar foreign policies, including the use of arms in Korea. Civil and military budgets felt the relentless push for savings. Reduction in force again haunted the sleep of civil servants.

Thirdly, the new administration set up a new category of the civil service to include confidential and policy-making positions. This was a substitute for the use of excepted positions to allow executives to hire their own choices for positions where they wanted loyalty to persons and policies. To the career civil servant, however, it meant that he could probably never reach a confidential or policy-making position without losing his tenure in a career. Philip Young, chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, gave this reasoning for the new category:

[It is] a much needed clarification of the proper limitations of the civil service, giving agency heads the discretion that is absolutely necessary for good administration. Policy jobs should never be in the career service, and the career man should not be asked to develop, express, defend—and inevitably stake his working future on—a partisan political viewpoint. . . . We have limited to persons in the competitive service the legal protection against summary removal. . . . If an agency head is given, for sound administrative reasons, complete freedom to make appointments to certain positions, he should have exactly the same freedom to make removals from these positions. Hereafter anyone who chooses to leave the competitive service to take an excepted position will do so with the clear understanding that he is getting out of the career stream.⁴

Fourthly, the winds of attack upon individual civil servants for alleged sins of past commission did not abate under the Republicans. Members of Con-

⁴ From a speech, August 20, 1953, to the Denver Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration, reported in *ASPA News Letter*, November 1953.

gress who subscribed to this practice continued in the course they had developed over the years since 1938.

More was added when the Jenner committee of the Senate held televised hearings in which a summary of an FBI file concerning suspected espionage in the past was made public by the Attorney General, and in which the Director of the FBI testified in support of partisan testimony. This appeared to mean, at least at the time, that in the future the opposition party would have to run against what was in the secret files about personnel.

What could a civil servant think? He was doomed to fear. If his every act had to be analyzed to make sure that it could not be used against him for partisan gain, he was hardly a free man. His first concern had to be to stay out of the files!

This is no time, then, to ask the civil servant if he values efficiency above responsiveness. He has been responsive by demand and bedamned ever since 1946. Partisan administration has smothered him.

Far from being a threat of dominant bureaucracy, executive officials since World War II have been watched so closely, have been so sought out for past deeds, that they are timid if not frightened. This has been no period for civil servants to take initiative in any direction, including the direction of more efficiency that might mean less responsiveness. The best policy now for civil servants is to be as inconspicuous as possible.

PUBLIC REACTION TO RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

Citizens, nevertheless, still have reason to ask whether responsiveness or efficiency or both guide public servants. For citizens can see that government enters more and more into all our affairs, that it becomes larger through the

years regardless of which parties are in power, that it becomes more and more remote from daily scrutiny by ordinary citizens because it is more and more technical and varied. For the period 1900-49, as Solomon Fabricant found, total employment in the United States increased about 120 per cent; government employment increased 500 per cent. In 1900 one out of twenty-four workers was on a government payroll; in 1949, one out of eight.⁵

Then how do we judge the efficiency of such technical operations as those performed by so many bureaucrats today? Does the Air Force have enough planes? Should we build more aircraft carriers for the Navy? Does the Army have the most advanced guided missiles? Who knows? Is the Treasury's handling of the interest rate on government bonds wise? Has Interior protected the public interest in its reclamation policy? Should Agriculture support prices at 90 or 100 per cent of parity or not at all? Is the cost of living index used by the Department of Labor based upon appropriate items? Does the Federal Trade Commission really protect us against false advertising of cures for disease? Do the budget and other staffs that were set up to get more efficiency really achieve it? Or do they think up forms, questions, and procedures that are more ritual than economical? Who knows? A few members of Congress who specialize can evaluate critically the executive performance in their fields. Some pressure group officials know the answers in some of the fields of government's incessant activity.

How can the rest of us judge when we do not know much about what gov-

⁵ Solomon Fabricant, assisted by Robert E. Lipsey, *The Trend of Government Activity in the United States Since 1900* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), pp. 13-14.

ernment does? The answer is that we are more and more dependent upon the *responsiveness* of executive officials to public desires and needs. And if we get the most for our tax dollar, we are also dependent upon public officials to be as *efficient* as they can without failing to be responsive. For I take it that we Americans still prefer responsiveness to efficiency. We want government to do what we need and want it to do. We count the cost second.

THE ABIDING CONFLICT

There is an inevitable, a deep and abiding conflict between efficiency and responsiveness. Human nature is wasteful. Efficiency is the antithesis of wastefulness. Yet human nature enters all organized endeavor and government most of all in a representative republic.

The purpose of government in a democratic society is to serve human beings as efficiently as possible without denying responsiveness to human needs and desires.

We see this in many of the programs of government. Maximum efficiency in a farm program, for example, assuming that we do not want farmers simply to go bankrupt, might well be to purchase surplus acreage and convert it to hunting grounds. City people are now in a majority and millions of them seem to share a primordial, nostalgic urge to slay wild beasts. They do this at great trouble and expense. Charge them a fee for hunting on the new public domain and it is conceivable that they would pay back the purchase price with interest. The trouble with this solution is that many farmers want to continue to live on their own farms, and the rest of us agree to support their way of life as a good thing for the nation.

Or take military administration. We go to great pains to provide the utmost safety and comfort for individuals. We

emphasize the saving of life and limb and giving the boys good, warm clothing and shelter so far as possible. Cigarettes and Coca-Cola are as much a part of supply as ammunition. We could save much money if we stripped fighting to its essentials and applied the standards of strict efficiency in military and many other government programs. So long as we remain human, in our culture, and retain democratic control of public affairs, we never will.

PUBLIC OVERSIGHT OF THE PUBLIC SERVANT

To assure responsiveness public servants must be watched at all levels of their hierarchy. They are. Some would argue that they are so closely watched that they can never devote themselves to the efficiency that is also a part of their work.

At the top they are subject to periodic election. Below the top they are subject to the leadership of those who are elected, in so far as decisions and actions come to the attention of or originate with political leaders. The interests of contentious parties are always in mind whenever political executives work. Unpopular decisions are avoided if possible, and if they have to be made in the public interest, they are made only after searching for all other ways that might serve the purpose and also hold or gain votes. If anyone doubts the power of periodic elections, let him watch intimately a sophisticated political executive (not a disinterested novice who was appointed for other skills than politics). Voters are Very Important People to politicians.

At all levels civil servants are watched, as others in this journal discuss at more length, by the courts, by the legislature, by staff units, by interest groups, and by citizens' organizations. We need add only that they are also watched by a free press, which is often a hostile press.

In this sense the press is not merely the metropolitan dailies and the wire services. It is also hundreds of trade journals that keep an eye on the officials who handle the small matters of most interest to their readers.

The same thing is true of pressure groups. For every imposing national association, there are hundreds of small specialized groups that watch over the shoulders of chiefs of small sections and even of individual bureaucrats who work on matters of their concern. We may hear more about the National Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Medical Association, the American Farm Bureau Federation and the Farmers' Union, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, but in their own fields and reporting through their own trade press the small interest groups are always busy too. Watch manufacturers and assemblers of imported Swiss watch parts fight for the ear of the Trade Agreements Committee. California nut growers oppose imports, but candy makers and bakers like Mediterranean almonds, and the public servants who hear from both factions are those who recommend tariffs on nuts. The industrial consumers of fats and oils keep a vigilant eye upon officials who have anything to say about the sensitive web of lard, butter, and cottonseed, soybean, coconut, and palm oils.

It is important to conceive of oversight of the executive as something that has to occur in depth, for many decisions are made by executive officials located low in the echelons and far from the headquarters. Oversight of the President and heads of departments is not enough.

INESCAPABLE HUMAN NATURE

In the end, however, to get the desirable responsiveness of public executive

agents combined with maximum efficiency, we are dependent upon the human beings within the public service. There is no substitute for human nature, and no way to escape it. If the public servants at all levels, both civilian and military, recognize their duty to both responsiveness and efficiency, we are safe from obeisance to a bureaucracy that puts efficiency first.

Our concern as a nation should be to keep the bureaucracy filled with the kind of human beings who want to be responsive as well as efficient. A chemical engineer in charge of water purification should have the ingrained attitude of responsiveness just as a commanding general should have it. The engineer can protect lives perhaps more efficiently with some foul tasting chemical, but he should not even want to.

The ways of securing and maintaining bureaucrats who are responsive and efficient are familiar to most of us. They include an open door for the qualified to enter public service, entrance by competitive examination, supervision to keep public servants aware of the responsibilities of public service, job security so that public servants will not have to compromise their integrity, a chance to rise to relatively high positions, and administration that will give them high morale. Also essential is a public attitude that will allow a public servant to feel that he is a respected member of society. Indeed perhaps the greatest threat to the nation from wanton accusations of disloyalty is that a public attitude of suspicion toward public service will develop. If this happens, good people will not enter and those who are already in it will feel ashamed of their vocation.

If we are dependent upon human nature for responsiveness and efficiency, we need, of course, to examine traits of personality and attitude, as well as traits of technical competence, to admit

people to the bureaucracy and to measure them while in service. I have often thought that we need a layman's catalogue of personality types so that we could sum up a person quickly by placing him in one of the categories that all of us recognize as common. (Think what a saving of time this would mean in writing letters of recommendation! "Mr. Smith is Type 325. Sincerely yours.")

TYPES TO AVOID

For the public service, where we want personality types who will practice responsiveness as efficiently as possible, I suggest as a beginning the following to avoid:

The Adept Dodger

This type is always busy somewhere else when the mistake is made, or he creates a new flurry to draw attention from the mistake. In the lower ranks he is a policeman who was having a drink in his favorite saloon when the drugstore down the street was hijacked; then to provide an excuse he starts a fight in the saloon so that he can report that he was busy restoring order. In the higher ranks he is a general whose armies suffer defeat, whose intelligence system appears to be incompetent, but who covers his failure by bold proposals to start a bigger war and thus diverts attention so that he can remain a hero. All occupants of this category are skilled in publicity.

The Hearty Greeter

This fellow is all responsiveness to the influential and no efficiency at all. He spends his time making contacts. Anyone who might be in a position to help him or to criticize him gets the big hello, the effusive greeting, hearty laughter, and intimate address. At the top, he favors the Mayflower Hotel, especially for lunch, which he never

eats alone. In the lower ranks, he never fails to remind a citizen when he has done a favor for him; he uses the telephone a lot to "keep in touch"; and he does his best to get to his boss and his Congressman with praise for them and affable fiction about how well he is doing his own job. He is more concerned with his own position, of course, than in responding to public need and desire. Efficiency? It's another joke. The fellows will be glad to hear about that one.

The Man Who Hates People

In the public service this type will always denounce citizens before he serves them. He thinks of the sins of people who, let us say, litter up public places before accepting the fact that Americans are fantastic litterers and that it is government's job to clean up after them. If he is a policeman, he denounces as criminals children who act like children, but illicitly. It never occurs to him to suggest that boys throw green apples at a harmless target instead of at Mrs. O'Leary's cow. He prefers to make arrests.

The Prothonotarial Keeper of Inflexible Rules

This one is dangerous. He thinks first of regulations and he always knows what they are. When democratic responsiveness is called for, he can always cite a rule and will insist that it remain unbent. He is, at heart, the cartoon figure of the notary or clerk, the prothonotary pure. It is more important to him that the rules are obeyed in the old folks' home than that the old folks are comfortable and happy. He will order a soldier who has just been through combat to court martial for taking cameras from the conquered foe, if the rule is against taking cameras. As a tax collector he will treat a poor widow who cannot pay exactly the same as a rich man who refuses to pay, for the rule

says that all who fail to pay shall be prosecuted. This man's veins are filled with ink, his spirit with statutes.

In a democratic society where everyone is an individual and rules must be flexed within reason to fit individual cases, this type is a too common threat and always difficult to defeat, because he has the rule on his side and can always give a good reason behind the rule. He still appears in too many places. Unfortunately, he often deals with citizens who have no influence with higher-ups and therefore cannot evade him. He is a sinister threat to responsiveness in all bureaucracies in all lands.

The Man Who Never Questions a Client

This category is for all those who conceive of their jobs as doing without question whatever a client wants. They lead not, neither do they push. They ape the views of the publics with which they deal, never questioning, never explaining. Here you find a county agent who never thinks for himself, finds all his answers in the opinions of his farmers, no matter whether the farmers are wise or misinformed, and discredits the material sent to him from headquarters if it does not conform to what his farmers already think. Here also you find any Secretary of the Treasury who believes that all bankers are well informed, wise, and the best and only possible advisers the government could have on interest rates.

The Damn Fool

This category is so broad, of course, that it is impossible to describe it comprehensively in a journal of limited space. It includes the quartermaster who sends nothing but turkey up front to feed the boys, on the theory that if they like turkey for Thanksgiving and Christmas they will be lifted infinitely in their spirits if they have turkey every day. It includes the school ad-

ministrator who runs for cover because he receives one disapproving letter when there may be a thousand clients who approve but who do not write letters. The federal department head who retreats when attacked without reason by a single member of Congress is also in this category. So is the executive who refuses to look ahead or meet the present but assumes that he may always just rely upon the past, until he is caught short by inevitable change. So is the staff aide who shows no discrimination in what should be brought to the attention of his boss, and the subordinate who unintentionally fails to show his boss the significance of an action about to be taken. This little list can grow almost indefinitely. The trouble with the damn fool is that he cannot be trusted to recognize when and how to be either responsive or efficient.

TOWARD RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

All these personality types should be kept out of public service, and if they slip in through some loophole of the entrance examination, they should be dismissed when discovered. Fortunately, they do not dominate our public service. On the contrary, in the main we are blessed with public servants of a very

different sort. But for the perfect combination of responsiveness with efficiency all public servants should be at opposite poles from the unfortunate creatures who live within the categories listed above.

We can get them if we are careful in our selection. We can keep them if we treat them right. We have not been treating them right in the federal service since 1946. Instead, we have singled them out from the rest of society to suspect them of disloyalty until they prove their innocence. We have tormented them with fears of anonymous denunciation and costly preparation of evidence for hearings. Personnel actions may easily require legal counsel! We have made public servants live in fear of the files. They can hardly be either responsive or efficient when they must be afraid to do anything at all.

It was never the safest course in any bureaucracy to stick one's neck out; under recent circumstances it is the height of folly. But we need public servants who will stick their necks out both for responsiveness and for efficiency. God help us if we leave our public service to the prothonotarial keeper of inflexible rules. He is the best equipped to survive under a regime of threat, for he seldom if ever makes a mistake.

James L. McCamy, Ph.D., Madison, Wisconsin, is professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin. For two years (1939-41), he was an assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture. From 1942 until 1947 he worked in economic foreign relations, including a year and a half as chief of the bureau that handled lend lease, economic warfare, and missions abroad for the Foreign Economic Administration and a year as director of the world trade policy staff in the Department of Commerce.

The Recruitment and Training of Bureaucrats in the United States

By WALLACE S. SAYRE

THERE is a wide gap between the established patterns of recruitment and training of civil servants in the United States and the actual composition and organization of the bureaucracies. The doctrine and practices of the civil service personnel systems are designed, in large part, to deal with a kind of bureaucracy which no longer exists.

Certain characteristics of the bureaucracy in the United States determine the metes and bounds within which its recruitment and training ought to be conducted. To the extent that the civil service personnel systems, in their recruitment and training procedures, fail to take these characteristics of the bureaucracy into account, the formal personnel systems become mere ritual and red tape.

The controlling characteristics of the bureaucracy in the United States most closely related to its recruitment and training are that it is (1) highly federalized, (2) highly decentralized within the federalized jurisdictions, (3) highly specialized in its training and its work, (4) highly fragmented in its loyalties, and (5) in our society, neither a first-choice career nor an exclusive career. In short, the American bureaucracy taken as a whole is markedly pluralistic in its organization and composition; it is diverse in its attachments and its loyalties; and, for many of its members, it provides an episode rather than a career.

A BUREAUCRACY HIGHLY FEDERALIZED

The federal character of the American bureaucracy can hardly be exaggerated.

In terms of recruitment and training procedures there is almost no connective tissue between the members of the national bureaucracy and the forty-eight state bureaucracies, between a particular state government bureaucracy and the hundreds of city, county, village, and town bureaucracies within the state. There may be, in some states, the umbrella of a state civil service statute over all these separate bureaucracies, seeming to establish an integration of all the civil servants in the state under uniform general rules. But the integration is formal rather than real, and it does not touch the most significant aspects of the civil servant's work and life.

There is, for example, very little circulation between these bureaucracies by way of transfer or promotion. The bureaucratic career ladder rarely spans the gulfs between the hundreds of separate governmental jurisdictions. The rules and statutes, indeed, usually attach penalties to or prohibitions against circulation—such as local residence requirements, promotion barriers, cumbersome transfer procedures, the loss of pension and retirement benefits. The rules are set heavily against circulation, a fact which is emphasized not only by the presence of these barriers but also by the absence of personnel procedures to overcome them. To these conditions, adverse to mobility between bureaucracies, must be added a stronger version of the seemingly universal habit of organized groups to prefer promotion from within rather than the recruitment of "new blood" at the intermediate and higher levels. A bureaucrat from

another governmental jurisdiction is as much "a stranger" to a civil service group as is a nonbureaucrat.

These narrow, compartmentalized worlds of the bureaucrats in the United States provide an interesting contrast to the career ladders of the politicians, who may realistically aspire to move upward from city or county posts to state and national offices. The barriers to movement between the bureaucracies are in sharp contrast, also, to the mobility which characterizes most nongovernmental careers in the United States.

HIGHLY DECENTRALIZED

Within a particular governmental jurisdiction the typical bureaucrat in the United States is less a member of an integrated city, county, state, or national government bureaucracy than he is a member of an organization called an agency, a department, or a bureau. While there will be some circulation of membership between these organizations (especially for a few categories of bureaucrats in the national government), the strongest identifications throughout a bureaucratic career are likely to be with a particular organizational unit of the executive branch.

To a considerable extent this fragmentation of the bureaucracy finds expression in statutory provisions for separate personnel systems, including separate systems of recruitment, tenure, compensation, and retirement. Even where the decentralization is not emphasized by statutory differences, it is deeply imbedded in personnel rules and practices. The result is that the conditions of membership in the bureaucracy vary widely within a particular government.

HIGHLY SPECIALIZED

The bureaucracies in the United States mirror a specialized society. The bureaucrat thinks of himself, and tends

to be regarded by others, as a lawyer, a doctor, an engineer, a physicist, an economist, a forester, an agricultural scientist, a welder, or a bricklayer. His status and his behavior are associated with his specialization as much as, or frequently more than, it is with the "civil service." Those occupations in which specialization is least pronounced (or least recognized) are exceptions to this generalization, but all signs seem to indicate that the trend toward greater specialization is continuing upward rather than declining.

Specialization in the ranks of the bureaucracies is accompanied by increased professionalization of large groups in the bureaucracies. That is, corporate attachments are developed with other persons of like training and interests, across the jurisdictional and organizational lines of the bureaucracies. An economist, for example, identifies himself and his career with other economists, inside and outside the bureaucracies. This is true, in large part, of all those within the bureaucracies who are members of the established and organized professions and similar groups of specialists. The fraternity of profession in the United States is stronger than the fraternity of bureaucracy.

LINKED TO CLIENTELE GROUPS

Particular bureaucracies have strong alliances with the organizations representing the clientele served by these bureaucracies. Thus, the several bureaucracies within the United States Department of Agriculture are more closely identified with the national farm organizations than with the other parts of the national government bureaucracy. Similarly, the bureaucracy in the Veterans Administration is closely related to the veterans' organizations. Similar clientele relationships are to be found also at the state and local government levels.

These links with clientele groups are a significant characteristic of the American bureaucracy. They emphasize its pluralistic loyalties as well as its diverse sources of recruitment and training.

NOT A FIRST-CHOICE CAREER

The civil service in the United States provides for many of its members not a career but a strategic rung on a non-governmental career ladder. Many civil servants find that the public service offers, either at the beginning or at an intermediate stage of their careers, a kind of experience or training for a few years which promises to accelerate or ensure their subsequent advancement in a private profession or occupation. This seems to be especially true among lawyers, accountants, engineers, architects, doctors of medicine, teachers and professors, and young women, but it is a widespread practice among many other occupational groups.

The civil service in the United States is unusual in the extent of this steady flow into and out of the public service. As one of the most distinctive features of the American bureaucracy, this cross-flow presents problems to the personnel managers but net benefits to a democratic society.

Although the number of young Americans who decide upon the public service as a first-choice career has apparently increased significantly during this generation, the bureaucracy remains on the whole a second-choice occupation. This condition is especially emphasized in a period of full employment.

Many elements enter into making the civil service a poor competitor for talent in the United States labor market. A long tradition that the public service does not offer satisfactory careers accounts for much of the problem, since this tradition is translated into low prestige. Compensation levels in the public service are not usually favorable

in comparison with other opportunities for talent. And the invasion of privacy which is recurrently the lot of the civil servant in the United States detracts further from its attraction for those who have other choices for their careers.

RECRUITMENT METHODS

The recruitment of the civil service in the United States has not adjusted its premises and its practices to these important characteristics of the American bureaucracy. Instead, the civil service personnel systems have been preoccupied with the preservation of their own traditional orthodoxy: uniformity of method in recruitment, the frustration of patronage aspirations on the part of the politicians, and the maintenance of meticulous objectivity toward the candidates for the public service. The result is that if a civil service candidate of 1890 could somehow become again a candidate in 1954 he would be more at home with the process than he would in any other aspect of contemporary American life.

The American bureaucracies, characterized by their fragmentation and variety, are recruited by formal personnel procedures which are singularly uniform. It is true that the *actual* recruiting process may in some instances be quite different, and in fewer instances the formal process may itself display innovations intended to recognize the variety of the bureaucracy. But, on the whole, recruitment is typically accomplished by (1) an official announcement that an examination will soon be given for a particular type of position and that applicants with certain specified qualifications may take the examination, (2) an examination (usually including a written test and often no other test) which is held on a specified date, and (3) the construction of a list of eligibles, ranked competitively, from which the names of candidates ranking highest are

then certified to agencies for appointment. This procedure represents a valiant effort to impose a rigid uniformity upon a civil service which steadily grows more specialized and differentiated in its composition.

It is possible, although not probable, that the civil service personnel systems in the United States could have successfully imposed such a uniformity upon the recruitment process if their leadership had been bold enough, a half century ago, to adopt the British idea of three or four levels of general civil service examinations, each geared closely to a level of the educational system. This choice (if, indeed, it were ever a real choice) has long since been forfeited, at least as a general solution. Necessity would now seem to require the development of a system of recruitment which accepts the variety and fragmentation of the civil services as demanding a corresponding variety in the methods of recruitment. The past three decades have seen substantial instances of recognition of this necessity—the most notable being the practices developed by the Tennessee Valley Authority. But the main structure of the formal recruitment system remains largely unchanged. Alongside this formal procedure there has meanwhile grown up a counterpart system, informal and unpublicized, through which the governmental agencies recruit a considerable part of their staffs, observing the etiquette of the civil service rules while recruiting more nearly after the pattern of private employers. Other agencies have found it desirable to build their recruitment systems upon close relationships with special parts of the educational system (for example, the public schools with the teachers colleges, the forestry services with the schools of forestry).

The past decade has also seen a sustained effort to persuade the United

States Civil Service Commission to delegate recruitment authority and responsibility to the executive agencies. This has now been agreed upon as a policy, and important initial delegations have been made. The actual operation of the new system—its advantages and its limitations—has not yet emerged into public view.

THE FALLACY OF SURPLUS CANDIDATES

A major (although perhaps inarticulate) premise underlying civil service recruitment methods in the United States is that there are in the labor market many more qualified candidates for the public service than there are jobs. It is this premise which supports the structure of recruitment practice, ranging from the minimum publicity of forthcoming examinations through all the intricate procedural steps between candidacy and appointment.

This premise of a surplus of highly qualified candidates, all of them eager and persevering in their determination to enter the public service, is obviously unrealistic in a full employment economy. It is difficult to understand how the premise ever became imbedded in civil service recruitment doctrine in the United States, especially since it has never been valid here except in a few situations on limited occasions in our history. Perhaps the premise had its origin in the excess of patronage applicants over available patronage jobs. If so, the fallacy lies in the equation of marginally qualified (or unqualified) patronage seekers with highly qualified career aspirants for the public service. The premise also perhaps gained accidental but temporary support from the depression decade of the 1930's, when a deficit in private employment opportunities coincided with the attractions of meaningful careers in an expanding and dynamic government.

Whatever its origins, it is clear that the premise is not a realistic one for the recruitment problems of the public service, as a whole and most of the time, in the United States. A more realistic premise would be that civil service recruitment processes must be shaped to meet the problems of a scarcity of highly qualified candidates for the public service, in a competitive labor market where the public service is rarely the most favored employer. Such a premise would require drastic revision of established civil service recruitment practices.

AN ENDURANCE CONTEST

Civil service recruitment processes now represent an endurance contest for the candidate. With few exceptions, the candidate for the public service, no matter how highly qualified, is confronted with barriers of delay and uncertainties from the moment he decides to become a candidate. In fact, his difficulties begin earlier, for he cannot easily obtain the facts upon which to decide whether he should become a candidate.

As an entrant in an endurance contest, the candidate for a civil service position needs to possess certain qualities if he is to emerge as a winner: he needs to have time to spare, patience to comply with a long series of procedural requirements (lengthy application forms, tests to be taken at fixed times at not always convenient locations, additional forms as he nears the end of the procedure, investigations with further questionnaires), and an absence of alternative opportunities. The most highly qualified candidates usually have alternative opportunities which cost less in time and in loss of personal dignity.

In this endurance contest, accordingly, the mortality rate is probably much higher among the highly qualified candidates, who abandon the process,

than among those less qualified entrants who have a scarcity of choice in the labor market. But the loss to the public service is probably still greater because of the number of highly qualified prospects who, coolly appraising the civil service recruitment process, decline to become candidates at all.

This characteristic of the recruitment process no doubt has its roots in the traditional safeguards against patronage influences as well as in the premise that there is always a surplus of highly qualified candidates so anxious to enter the public service that no barriers of time or inconvenience will discourage them. It is further explained by the desire to follow a procedure which will provide elaborate evidence of equitable treatment of all candidates, a requirement which increases the formality and impersonality of the recruitment process, reducing much of it to unreal and unconvincing quantitative measurement of each candidate's qualifications. These explanations, however, do not improve the status of public service recruitment in a labor market where other employers use more realistic and less cumbersome methods.

TRAINING

There is no coherent theory of training for the public service in the United States, nor has there been developed any widely accepted concept of training civil servants after their initial appointment. Training was not among the concerns of the original civil service statutes, and it has not yet won statutory recognition except in rare instances and in limited form. The fact that recruitment of the civil service has been developed separately and in forms unrelated to the educational system has erected a high barrier against any broad or systematic program of training for the public service. A further consequence has been the

inhibitions against assigning high priority to training programs as a responsibility of civil service personnel agencies.

Training for the public service in the United States is a by-product of the training developed for nongovernmental occupations and professions, the notable exception to this rule being the teaching profession. Several small and specialized areas provide additional significant exceptions: public administration, city management, forestry, public health, and, to some degree, the foreign service. The main body of public servants, however, is recruited in an employment market whose members have been trained for and have acquired their initial experience in private occupations. The training of civil servants in the United States, therefore, reflects the specialization and variety of American occupational life. Neither the national bureaucracies nor the state and municipal bureaucracies are the product of any uniform pattern of training and experience; instead, they each are built upon elements which civil service recruitment

methods can extract from the prevailing market of talents in the local or national area of competition.

Within the past three decades there has been a steady growth of efforts to provide systematic training within the civil service. The national government especially has developed such programs, mainly through the work of particular agencies concerned with the in-service training of specialized groups of their own employees. These training programs, ranging from brief orientation courses for new employees to intensive seminars for executives and senior specialists, were accelerated in their development by the personnel needs of the wartime agencies, and the value of such programs to the agencies has been confirmed by postwar experience. Some states and a few cities have developed similar, although hardly comparable, programs of in-service training. By and large, however, in-service training remains a peripheral rather than a central emphasis of civil service personnel administration.

*Wallace S. Sayre, Ph.D., is director of research for the Temporary State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York and professor of government at the City College of New York. He served on the New York City Civil Service Commission as secretary and commissioner (1937-42), held various positions in the Office of Price Administration (1942-46), and was professor of administration in Cornell University (1946-49). He is the author of *Your Government* (1932) and *Outline of American Government* (1933), and coauthor, among other books, of *Training for Specialized Mission Personnel* (1952).*

Security of Tenure—Career or Sinecure?

By O. GLENN STAHL *

TO the financier, security means a fiscal investment; to the international affairs expert, it means military or political protection against an enemy; to the custodian of secret documents, it means a strong safe and guarding against spies; to the psychologist, it means peace of mind and a kind of ability to know where one stands; to the social welfare specialist, it means insurance against economic misfortune; and to the civil servant, it means assurance that continuation of his employment will not rest on his politics or on other prejudicial considerations unrelated to his efficiency or to good administration.

At first blush these appear to be widely varying uses of the same term. Actually, there is a common denominator. There is a concept of stability, of inviolability, of protection, of insurance that runs through all these meanings.

In fact, this inherent, pervasive meaning of security is universal; for the quest for security is found in all stages and walks of life. Is it not being sought by the primitive hunter, stalking game and storing provisions? by the entrepreneur, inaugurating and consolidating a new enterprise? by employee unions, seeking an annual wage or stability of employment? by big business, promoting diversity of markets and adequate volume to assure continuity? by a nation, legislating in behalf of the aged, war veterans, and the physically handicapped, or negotiating for international understanding and mutual aid, or train-

ing a military force? by the politician, "mending his fences"? by the worker, probing the work plans and intentions of his boss?

The desire to be sure, to be protected, to find equanimity, to fulfill one's desires—in short, to be secure—is not the peculiar malaise of those who work for public authorities and draw their income from tax revenues. It is a basic human instinct so to organize one's life as to reduce to a minimum the conflicts, the stresses, the risks, the uncertainties that create threats or do harm to our mental, spiritual, or physical welfare. Indeed, we continually strive to organize ourselves so that life contributes *positively* to these needs. The only difference between the civil servant and the businessman in this respect is his standard of values—the goals he sets for himself and therefore the method necessary to achieve them. Both seek security in one form or another.

Security of tenure in the public service must be viewed in the context of this universal quest for security. If we narrow our application of the term to employment, the problem of security in the public service is seen to differ from that in private industry only in the need to deal with the peculiar threats to security in governmental organizations—principally the danger of making employment contingent upon factors other than the performance of the worker.

Meeting this danger was precisely the aim of the "security of tenure" espoused by the early civil service reformers and implied in the tradition of "merit system" laws. Its counterparts in private employment are such practices as an un-

* The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the United States Civil Service Commission, with which he is connected.

derstanding between worker and owner in small organizations; closed shop or union shop clauses in union contracts; other negotiated agreements between management and labor; or even the social pressure on employers (especially in smaller communities) against capricious "firings." Its counterparts in general economic affairs are found in price supports on agricultural products, in the "fair rate of return" concept for public utility regulation, in various tax exemptions or adjustments geared to corporate health, and, anomalously, both in protective tariffs and in reciprocal trade agreements.

THE NATURE OF TENURE

Before discussing the effects of security of tenure in modern bureaucracy, it is well to review briefly what the so-called tenure provisions are like in the public service. A fair picture may be obtained by examining the federal situation, some of the larger and older state merit systems, and the teacher tenure laws.

A. Federal tenure

The emphasis in the federal merit system is much heavier on the selection process than on the dismissal process. The only provision of the federal Civil Service Act of January 16, 1883 relating to removals is the following injunction:

that no person in the public service is . . . under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so.¹

More detailed but still very broad is the basic removal provision of the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912,² which limits removals to causes that "promote the

efficiency of the service" and requires reasons given in writing.

Executive Order 9830 and the Civil Service Regulations both stipulate a positive requirement that federal agencies

shall remove, demote, or reassign to another position any employee in the competitive service whose conduct or capacity is such that his removal, demotion, or reassignment will promote the efficiency of the service.³

The regulation on removals goes on to require special notice of reasons and consideration of the employee's reply, as well as the following:

Discrimination shall not be exercised in removals, suspensions or demotions because of an employee's religious opinions or affiliations, or because of his marital status or race, except as may be required by law because of his political opinions or affiliations.⁴

The United States courts have, with minor exceptions, sustained the authority of the executive branch to remove career civil servants without judicial review.

Apart from the details of removal procedure and the stronger protection afforded veterans in the way of special appeal rights to the Civil Service Commission,⁵ the foregoing constitute the essence of tenure provisions in the federal civil service.

Additional light on the federal tenure situation is shed by data on removals and layoffs, or "reductions in force" as

³ E. O. 9830, February 24, 1947; *Civil Service Rules and Regulations*, § 9.101(a).

⁴ §§ 9.102 and 9.101(b)(2).

⁵ Veterans' Preference Act of June 27, 1944, 58 U. S. Stat. 387. This act requires thirty days advance notice of removal to any career veteran (except in criminal cases) and gives him the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, which has authority to compel corrective action by the agency if it sustains his appeal.

the latter are called in the federal service. During the fiscal year 1953⁶ there was an annual turnover of over 27 per cent (twenty-seven separations for every hundred persons in average full-time employment). Over 1 per cent of these separations were discharges for cause, and nearly 6 per cent were due to layoffs. The remainder were for the most part voluntary.⁷ This was a more or less typical year.

The discharge and layoff rates for this period, as well as the total turnover, were substantially higher (almost double) in manufacturing industries, which employ larger proportions of blue-collar workers. Although additional data does not seem to be available, there is every reason to believe that the difference (if there is any at all) would not be so marked between government and predominantly white-collar enterprises such as banks, utilities, insurance companies, and retail stores.

Any organization in which a fourth to a third of its employees change during a year and in which 7 per cent are involuntarily separated is hardly a stagnant one. This experience, along with the rather general and flexible provisions of federal law and regulation, indicates that many of the popular notions about the inviolability of the federal civil servant's retention in the government are invalid. At the same time, we would not advocate emulation of the extraordinarily high turnover rate in manufacturing industries (50 per cent last fiscal year), since it is unquestionably the reflection of many economic and management conditions other than efficiency.

In this connection it should be noted that only a small proportion of the federal service is not covered by some

⁶ July 1, 1952—June 30, 1953.

⁷ Data supplied by the Employment Statistics Staff, United States Civil Service Commission, under the direction of Mr. Calvin Deal.

merit system. Out of 2,486,600 employees on June 30, 1953, there were 2,130,900 subject to the coverage of the competitive service under the Civil Service Act and another 105,300 under special merit systems such as those of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Foreign Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Medicine and Surgery of the Veterans Administration. The great bulk of the remaining numbers are in such excepted assignments as overseas civilian jobs other than the Foreign Service and jobs of attorneys (the latter excepted by appropriation law riders). The "policy-determining and confidential" category, which is the principal locus of political appointment, numbers only in the hundreds.

B. State civil service tenure

Although veterans alone enjoy statutory appeal rights in the federal service, hearings are commonly provided by law for merit system employees in state jurisdictions who are threatened with dismissal. For example, among five of the states that have had strong and well-administered merit laws for almost as long a time as the federal government—New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Illinois, and California—each one has in its basic statute a guarantee of a hearing before its civil service commission or board in the case of removals.

The basis for removal, however, is usually as broad in the states as it is in the federal civil service. The Massachusetts law carries the usual limitation of no removal of a career employee "except for just cause and for reasons specifically given him in writing."⁸ New York is somewhat more specific, defining the conditions of removal as "in-

⁸ General Laws of Massachusetts, c. 31, § 43(a), as amended (1949).

¹ 22 U. S. Stat. 403, § 2.

² 5 U. S. Code 652, August 24, 1912, as amended by Public Law 623, 80th Congress.

competency or misconduct.”⁹ Illinois has the most general provision, using only the phrase “except for cause” in its limitation on removal.¹⁰ Wisconsin elaborates to the extent of requiring “just cause, which shall not be religious or political.”¹¹ California’s law simply provides: “The tenure of every permanent employee holding a position is during good behavior.”¹² This statute and that of Massachusetts are the only ones among these five outstanding states that use the word “tenure.” The Massachusetts and New York provisions on removal extend to counties and cities in those states as well as to the respective state services.

It is evident from this significant sampling that any difficulty in separating inefficient employees from civil service jurisdictions is not likely to be due to the basic statutes establishing the principle of security of tenure for employees selected on merit. It is difficult to conceive how the laws might have been worded more broadly or have left more discretion to administrative authorities and still have provided some reasonable assurance that dismissals could not take place arbitrarily or for prejudicial or capricious reasons.

It should be borne in mind that only nineteen states have genuine state-wide merit systems functioning with some degree of effectiveness, although several others have limited or abortive laws on the books. All states, of course, have certain portions of their services covered by the merit principle as required by the grant-in-aid provisions of the national Social Security Act. As for the cities, two-thirds of those with over

⁹ State of New York, Laws of 1909, c. 15, § 22(2), as amended (1950).

¹⁰ Illinois Revised Statutes, c. 24½, § 12 (1951).

¹¹ State of Wisconsin, Civil Service Law, § 16.24 (1950).

¹² California, Statutes of 1945, c. 123, tit. 2, pt. 2, c. 8, art. 1, § 19500.

10,000 population have merit systems, but only one-third of these cover all city employees. Only a small number of the 3,000 counties in the nation have merit systems.

Any unfavorable impressions of state and local governments and of their employees are more likely occasioned by the jurisdictions or parts of jurisdictions that are *not* under merit systems rather than by those that are.

C. Teacher tenure

An area of public service in which tenure has asserted itself strongly is in the public schools. Over the long road to recognition of their occupation as a profession, and as protection against favoritism and patronage, organized teachers have succeeded in promoting tenure laws in most states, many of them being very restrictive in the conditions under which termination of employment may occur.

In 1930 only five states had tenure laws of general application and seven had state or local laws in limited areas. By 1950 there were general state-wide tenure laws in thirty-three states, with five others having state or local laws of limited application.

Under most tenure laws a school board is required to consider the competence of teachers very carefully during a probationary period, usually three years in length, and to grant tenure status only where justified by their performance. The degree to which this probationary scrutiny is conscientiously handled by school administrators is the degree to which the restrictions on dismissals make sense. Loose entry via the probationary process makes a tight tenure law an anomaly by protecting the incompetent along with the competent.

Teacher tenure laws differ from general civil service laws principally in that their procedure on dismissal is

more specific and usually more restrictive. The most common dismissal provision of civil service laws, as we have seen, is that the merit employee may not be removed without notice or for political or religious reasons, and that he is entitled to a hearing by the merit system agency. The National Education Association states as an *essential* of a good teacher tenure law, not only sufficient notice and a right to a hearing (commonly provided by regulation where not by statute so far as general public servants are concerned) but also, as the really distinguishing feature, “the right to appeal from the decision of the schoolboard to a tenure board, a higher educational authority, or the courts.”¹³

As a former school board member and as a citizen dealing with school boards, this writer is well aware of the hazards of leaving final dismissal authority in the hands of local school boards. The caliber of school board members in many jurisdictions leaves much to be desired. However, appeal to a higher level in the state school system should provide adequate recourse for the aggrieved teacher. Appeal to the courts is out of place in the making of such essentially administrative decisions as those affecting personnel, and it seems to me undesirable for a professional organization to be recommending it even as an alternative procedure.

On the whole, however, there is more similarity than difference between civil service and teacher tenure laws, so that for our purpose we probably do not need to make a sharp distinction in their effects.

THE EFFECTS OF TENURE

A. On turnover and removal

As implied by the opening discussion in this paper, there is a danger of over-

emphasis on laws relating to tenure as compared with the realities of life. Many branches of private employment have a tenure system, formal or informal, of some kind. The point may be reinforced by the further observation that there are certain common elements affecting tenure in all employment that are more important in governing retention of employees than any arbitrary controls required by law or rule.

Layoffs

One of these natural factors affecting stability of any employment is the degree to which there are fluctuations or contractions in the activity concerned. Layoffs in the manufacturing industry are at a higher rate than those in the federal civil service, for example, because there is a higher proportion of blue-collar workers in this branch of industry than there is in the government. These craftsmen and laborers bear the brunt of industrial production shifts and technological changes.

There is a similar disparity in separations due to layoffs between the manufacturing industry and white-collar enterprises, such as insurance companies. Even within government, there are as sharp contrasts between different agencies or different activities within an agency as there are between certain kinds of government activity and certain kinds of business.

As a matter of fact, from the viewpoint of one inside the federal civil service, the difficulties faced because career employees have certain tenure rights do not loom nearly as large as the problem of instability due to frequent and significant changes in organization and program. The years since 1933 have not been quiet ones, and it is doubtful if there was as much normalcy as was commonly supposed in the “roaring” interval between World War I and the great depression. The morale-

¹³ *Teacher Tenure*. Discussion Pamphlet No. 1. Washington: National Education Association, May 1950.

shattering effects of annual budget reviews and of appropriation cuts and threats of cuts come closer to creating administrative chaos than any other characteristic of the governmental process. It is amazing that so many civil servants maintain the equanimity that they do during the hectic spring and early summer of each year.

Dismissals for unsatisfactory performance

A second element of the employment situation common to most enterprises relates to dismissals for unsatisfactory performance or conduct. In practically all fields of work it is customary to expect summary action in the case of flagrant misconduct, such as drunkenness or theft. And this swift and definite action is just as likely in a governmental jurisdiction under a merit system as it is in private organizations or in public units not under a merit law.

The more usual phenomenon, however, is the similarity of action or inaction in cases where unsatisfactory performance is not dramatic or flagrant. There is a natural human reluctance to "fire" an employee, no matter what the enterprise or the degree of "tenure."

General statistics on "firings" in private business are not available, but there is every reason to believe that the 1.1 per cent annual proportion of separations for adverse cause in the federal service (20,299 in the fiscal year 1953)¹⁴ is probably exceeded only in certain categories of private employment such as manufacturing. Bear in mind, too, the more exacting methods of initial selection in public service, which should reduce expectancy for removal.

The popular notion that "civil service" rules mitigate seriously against dismissals of the incompetent in the government is one of the political myths of

¹⁴ It was slightly higher in the calendar year 1952, numbering 23,606.

our time. The fact is that, where removals that should take place do not occur, the cause is primarily the same as that in business—the natural reluctance of supervisors and executives to take positive and drastic action, especially when there may be some dispute over its justification.

Firing is a very distasteful business in any organization. Even seasoned executives, with conspicuous exceptions to be sure, shrink from it and try every device possible to avoid it. It has been the author's experience that the public service has no monopoly on this reluctance. Such practices as "kicking a man upstairs," "palming off" a poor employee to another division, and overlooking the faults of a long-time worker are quite common in industry.

Reluctance to fire grows partially from unwillingness to hurt people severely for what may be easily rationalized as minor human failings, and partially from unwillingness to face up to the consequences of drastic action whether it be facing a protesting union official, an irate Congressman, or the requirements of a merit system.

In summary, the tenure features of most merit laws do not account for a lower layoff rate or for failure to eliminate unsatisfactory workers. Layoffs vary more as between occupations and activities than as between public service and private business as a whole. To whatever degree failure to "fire" exists, it is no different in government than in business and it springs from the same causes.

B. On employee behavior and performance

In addition to having little effect on turnover for overriding causes—such as removal for poor performance or reduction in appropriations—security of tenure has far less to do with other alleged negative attributes of "bureaucracy"

than is commonly supposed. It has been widely assumed that protection against arbitrary dismissal breeds an attitude of indifference, with its attendant evils of timeserving, stifling of initiative, loafing, red tape, and uninquiring conformity.

This assumption deserves examination from two angles. The first is whether public employees, as a whole, exemplify these negative qualities in actual fact. The second is whether such conditions and attitudes, to whatever degree they do exist (no large organizations are without them to at least some minor extent), stem from the tenure aspects of civil service employment.

Facts about public employees

There is not space to include here a detailed analysis of the facts on the characteristics, behavior, and ability of public employees. These facts as far as the federal service is concerned may be readily gleaned from such documents as the United States Civil Service Commission publication, *Facts About Government Work and Workers*, April 1952; from the speeches and articles of Robert Ramspeck, former chairman of the Commission; and from the statement of the present chairman of the Commission, Philip Young, that "the people who work for government have even greater loyalty, more idealism, a stronger desire to get a job done and get it well done than employees of private industry."¹⁵ In fact, wherever comparisons are made—as in the case of scientific and professional awards, employee suggestion contests, and the testimony of prominent businessmen who have served in government—the public employee comes off best out of proportion to his numbers. We not only do not need to accept the prevailing myths that laziness and indifference

¹⁵ "Meet Philip Young," *Good Government*, March-April 1953, p. 10.

are characteristic of public employment; we must do more positively to correct the erroneous impression about the civil service created by yellow journalism and political demagoguery.

Devastating, despairing, and ignorant criticism of public servants and of their effectiveness is in deadly contradiction to our vital need to attract and to hold outstanding qualified people in the public service. It has in it the germs of destruction of all government. No more subtle method of subversion exists and none plays more into the hands of the Communists than the recurrent campaigns of insidious, blanket derogation of public employees as a class. Nor is the situation helped by periodic forays into employee activities by demagogues, whether disguised in the name of national security or in the name of efficiency. It is high time that public servants were taken off the defensive and given recognition for their genuine achievements rather than notoriety for the misdeeds of a few. There will be problems of "bad apples" in every bureaucratic barrel, but civil servants and fair-minded citizens must join hands to combat the immoral and senseless mass-condemnation approach to the management problems of government. These problems not only are normal but are the same as those for all large organizations.

Tenure and inefficiency

There remains the question of whether such ineffectiveness as does exist (which is less in my judgment in government than in private employment) is due to the security aspects of civil service systems. On this point there are few facts to draw upon, so that we must rely more heavily on judgment.

The principal fact that is pertinent is this: if it is established that government workers are in truth *at least* as efficient and enterprising as those in

other fields of endeavor, then we are more justified in crediting the merit system with that result than blaming it with the opposite. Furthermore, it goes without saying that where security of tenure does *not* exist—for example, in certain state and local jurisdictions—we see far more evidence of inefficiency, stagnation, and decrepitude than we do under merit systems.

The point to be made here is not that there is no room for improvement in the public service but that the problem is a matter of relativity. Personnel and management improvement needs are no greater in government than they are in business, in universities, or in other enterprises; perhaps not as great. We should continue to press for improvement in the public service above all places and to do it in part by positive recognition of the virtues of public service and public servants. In accepting the notion that security of tenure or any similar condition of employment breeds red tape or "bureaucratic" behavior, we are attributing a false charge to a wrong cause. Wherever there is bad management to overcome, poor practices to be corrected, or weak personnel to be disposed of, the conditions are more likely than not to have developed from human or organizational or fiscal frailties that are universal in our society and not peculiar to public organizations.

TENURE IN HIGHER POSTS

Tenure in the upper levels of the civil service cannot be disposed of in the same breath as that among the rank and file. Here we have some very special problems. When a career public servant reaches higher posts he is more likely to get public attention, to receive press notices, to be accepted as an "authority." When he works immediately under the political heads of his department, these conditions are accentuated and take on new meaning. It is diffi-

cult often to disassociate what the career man does and what he says from the "policy" of his chiefs. However, there appears to be general agreement that a career service worthy of the name must embrace positions of sufficiently high level to attract and hold men and women of high caliber, persons with the intelligence, the education, the imagination, and the other personal qualities that are essential to dynamic administration.

Since the opportunity for careers in the upper civil service is so much a part of the concept of tenure, it is worth some attention here. Although considerable question has been raised about the effects of the determination of the Eisenhower administration to make a clear distinction between career jobs and "policy-determining and confidential" jobs, not many will quarrel with the quantitative results *per se*. By the first of December 1953, less than eight hundred and fifty positions had been placed in the new Schedule C, exempt from the competitive examination and tenure provisions of the merit system.¹⁶ There is undoubtedly disagreement among impartial observers over the wisdom of exempting certain specific jobs, but these are details over which reasonable men may be expected to differ. The fact is that among the 827 jobs at that time placed in Schedule C only 216 had previously been in the competitive service and 176 were new jobs, the remainder having already been in excepted categories.

Policy determination as a criterion

A few observers, however, have expressed some doubt about the long-range utility of "policy determination" as the principal criterion for distinction between career and political posts. It has been suggested that degree of "pub-

¹⁶ Based on Executive Order 10440, March 31, 1953.

lic accountability" may afford a more practical concept, even though "policy determination" has been the traditional demarcation point in the reconciliation of the merit system idea with the need for responsiveness of the bureaucracy to the public will.

As the modern bureaucracy has expanded into new fields and drawn more and more upon specialized knowledge in the manning of its technical bureaus, it is more and more difficult to tell where policy leaves off and execution begins. The questions will always arise: what kind of policy—just that on public issues or also that on methods of administration? What level of policy—recommending, final decision-making, or something in between?

Some uses of the word "policy" in normal administrative practice would embrace the actions of minor employees, since decision-making of some order goes on at all levels in an organization. Coupled with this situation is the modern concept of delegation of authority, with its pressure, borrowed from the experience of private industry, to push decision-making as far down the line as possible. Does this open the door to an ever widening field for excepted jobs in our civil services and an ever narrowing area for the career service? Or does it merely show that our timeworn distinguishing concept will have to be sharpened or revised?

Interpreting "policy-determining" too narrowly would deprive political heads of the right to select immediate assistants and of the tools for control of the fact-gathering and law enforcement functions of the executive branch, leading to the danger of an entrenched bureaucracy unresponsive to the will of the people. Some students of public administration have long advocated a more generous allotment of exempt jobs to be put at the disposal of the heads of federal departments in order to avoid

the onus of political involvement and responsibility infiltrating into the top of the career staffs.¹⁷

Interpreting "policy-determining" too broadly, however, can lead us into many areas where professional competence becomes at least as important as political sagacity. This creates the danger of adulterating the merit system or of requiring higher civil servants to be political eunuchs, either having no opinions or expressing none, which is stultifying to a good mind. Such a condition is not conducive to maintaining the kind of capacity, courage, and imagination that we need in the upper civil service.

Acts, not agreement, as the test

In any change in political leadership there will always be a few who mistakenly take the views or the alleged views of civil servants as the measure of their policy-determining responsibility. The answer to this is to put more emphasis on *acts*, not *agreement*. In fact, new political leadership might well encourage career employees to express themselves freely without fear of reprisal. After all, they may have been chafing under their previous leaders and may be bubbling over with ideas for reform.

There is ample authority to dismiss people who fail to implement policy decisions, whether for lack of sympathy or for incompetence. No subordinate can be expected always to "agree" with his bosses. And good bosses want and expect honest disagreement. Civil servants in particular have been in the habit of carrying out laws which in some instances they may find distasteful. If they can apply laws they object to, they can be expected to carry out the policies of the political heads of their

¹⁷ For example, see Paul Appleby's comments in *Big Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 148.

departments, even if they object to those policies. Should there be evidence of failure in this regard, the remedy lies in removal of the individual for insubordination, not placement of his job in the political category.

Actually the policy differences between political leaders in the quasi-legislative decisions necessary to carry out most laws are often no greater between men of different parties than they are between men of the same party. There is some exaggeration in the classic commentary on the British civil servants that they serve a series of political ministers "with equal fidelity and equal contempt." But in this country there is more fidelity involved than is commonly recognized by the general public or by new political leaders.¹⁸

Mobility for career executives

A problem subsidiary to this general issue is that of reconciliation of the career concept for higher civil service posts with the desirability of matching personalities and so placing career men in juxtaposition to political heads as to facilitate happy personal relationships.

¹⁸ The following comments on the British situation by Sir Ernest Gowers, one of Britain's distinguished career civil servants, are illuminating:

If a civil servant "thinks that a proposal by his Minister is misconceived, it is his duty to say so, and why. But if he is overruled it is his duty to devise workable means of carrying it out, and he may find a craftsman's pleasure in doing so.

"Nor are civil servants often tried in this way.

"The few issues on which party feeling runs high assume at election time an importance altogether disproportionate to their bulk in the administrative routine which is the daily task of the civil servant. Of the multitude of decisions that have to be taken every day in every department, the vast majority would be decided the same way whatever party was in power."—*Government Standard* (American Federation of Government Employees, Washington, D. C.), October 16, 1953, p. 3.

The solution to this in the federal government seems to me to lie in greater mobility of executives in the career service. This might well be achieved by borrowing some features of the system used in assigning, compensating, and advancing military officers. If men now in the three or four highest civil service grades did not have their rank and status so tied down to an individual assignment and if it were part of the pattern for them to be moved about from one executive position to another from time to time without loss of rank, it would not only provide the government with broader-gauged executives and reduce the risks currently involved in movement from agency to agency, but would also provide the machinery that would facilitate reshuffling of executives where necessary at times of change in administration. Such a plan would obviously entail some kind of pool or corps concept. Career people above a certain level would be placed in a special category automatically, or selectively as the result of meeting certain criteria as to training and personal qualifications. They would be compensated on the basis of rank rather than current duties, available for reassignment where needed, and protected from loss of job or status under the vicissitudes of program or organization and under changes in political leadership.¹⁹

This is not the place to elaborate on the details, but the idea has interesting possibilities in providing a way to preserve tenure at high levels and yet make available to agency heads a more flexible means of utilization of career-executive manpower.

¹⁹ See, for example, the plans proposed in John J. Corson, *Executives for the Federal Service* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 78-85; and G. Lyle Belsley, *Federal Personnel Management and the Transition* (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1953), pp. 36-45.

CONCLUSION

If there are some basic observations to be gleaned from this paper, they are probably these:

1. Security is a condition sought after not only in all employment but in all aspects of life.

2. The tenure features implicit in merit systems in the public service are not so overprotective and restrictive as is popularly assumed.

3. Teacher tenure may be viewed as overprotective only to the extent that it promotes judicial review of what should be purely administrative determinations.

4. Turnover in the public service is affected more by the nature of the work and the fluctuations in appropriation, organization, and program than by tenure.

5. Removal of inefficient employees in the public service takes place at a reasonable rate but is affected by natural, human reluctance to "fire," just as in private employment.

6. Popular notions that deprecate public employees are not based on fact. Poor performance on the part of some cannot ordinarily be traced to security of tenure under merit systems but is more likely to be found outside merit system coverage.

7. The problems and deficiencies of the public service are basically no different from those in the management of all enterprise—public or private—and they are certainly no worse, if as bad.

8. Tenure in higher civil service posts should not be treated too lightly for the long-range good of public administration, but some easing of the problem of balancing career service requisites in the federal government with political responsibility would be provided by the "executive pool" idea, which also has several other virtues to recommend it as a forward step in government management.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

A few additional points deserve attention in closing.

1. The public service at all levels could be improved and the strains on and doubts about merit system tenure greatly relieved if there were a stricter use of the probationary period in initial employment. This is the point where "reluctance to fire" should be most abhorred. It is the continuation of incompetency beyond the trial period that makes it harder and harder as time goes on for an administrator to bring himself to the unhappy effort of dismissal of an inefficient subordinate.

2. Criteria for removal of the genuinely incompetent would be clearer if there were less emphasis on so-called *ratings* of performance and more on requiring a certain minimum productivity and quality of work, commonly referred to as performance standards. The comparison of man to man bred by the rating concept (both in government and in industry) has probably led to more evil than good. Good management would be better fostered by examination of work goals and more research on optimum productivity.

3. Perhaps the most important element in assuring good administration, apart from initial selection of able people, is the climate of the management itself. Lack of a good program for selecting and training supervisors, absence of interest by top management in progressive methods and in adequate staff services, overcentralization of authority, lack of concern with human relations, just plain incompetent top management—these are more likely to produce indifference and "bureaucratic" behavior on the part of employees of any organization than is any overdeveloped sense of security created by tenure. In fact, such conditions cause poor administration precisely because they contribute

to employee *insecurity*, using the term in the psychological sense.

With increasing consciousness in government that there is a body of knowledge and a set of aptitudes and skills that contribute to good management, we need have no fears for the future of public administration. The dangers to maintaining an efficient and responsible

bureaucracy will lie in acceptance of quack nostrums or glib panaceas and in misguided attacks on the career concept cloaked under the guise of fostering efficiency or democracy. The vision of the founders of our merit systems has proved to be practical; their concept of the career public servant is still sound.

O. Glenn Stahl, Ph.D., Arlington, Virginia, is executive vice-chairman, Interagency Advisory Group, United States Civil Service Commission; member of the Executive Council of the Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada; adjunct professor at the American University; and editor of Personnel Administration. For ten years, he was associated with the Federal Security Agency, from 1948 to 1951 as director of personnel, and later was executive vice-chairman of the Federal Personnel Council. He is the author of Training Career Public Servants for the City of New York (1936), coauthor of Public Personnel Administration (third edition, 1950), and contributor to various journals in the fields of political science, education, and personnel administration.



Administrative Law and Bureaucracy

By MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

THE relationship we are about to consider deals with matters of high policy arising on the borderline between business and government, and as such it deserves to be treated as objectively and as realistically as possible. Administrative law, now a large and important field of study, is best known for its concern with problems of public control, such as the regulation of labor relations or of electrical utilities. When the subject of public control arises in any discussion, the two questions that most frequently appear are, first, whether to control at all and, second, whether to control primarily through administrative tribunals or through the regular courts of law. Further, those who oppose control at all or the method of achieving it frequently use the word "bureaucracy" as a term of general condemnation.¹

This double usage of the term bureaucracy makes it a difficult theme to deal with in the present context, for if we were to consider public control as a policy, the discussion would be endless.

¹ The relation between administrative law and bureaucracy has frequently been commented on, but never, so far as I know, has it been consistently developed. According to James M. Landis in his book, *The Administrative Process* (New Haven, 1938, p. 4), to the English mind, the term administrative law "bespeaks bureaucracy." More intemperately, J. O. Boyd, in an article entitled "The Court System Contrasted with the Bureau System" (5 *Iowa Bar Rev.* 25, 28-29 [1938-39]), has said that "government by bureaucracies has all of the weaknesses of autocracy and few of its advantages. Continued growth of bureaucracy will mean the doom of democracy, the destruction of all progress, the complete bankruptcy of free government, and eventually will lead to fascism or some form of totalitarianism."

Because of this practical limitation, therefore, and because bureaucracy is more often associated with method rather than with policy, the present discussion will be confined largely to method rather than to the substance of controversial policies. To me, bureaucracy, in the popular sense, means a formal, rule-ridden procedure which interferes with managerial freedoms and individual initiative. The question, therefore, is whether administrative law, which protects as well as regulates, necessarily has a seriously deleterious effect on the efficiency of administration, the accomplishment of social purposes, and the safeguarding and reconciliation of conflicting interests. But even when so narrowed, the question is much too vast to be dealt with briefly; hence we shall do well if we merely open it up and focus on some of the issues involved.

BROAD AND NARROW VIEWS

In attempting to clarify our thinking in this controversial field, the first point to catch hold of is that administrative law, both historically and currently viewed, is more than the public control of important segments of the economy. Administrative law is concerned with individual rights as well as with public duties, with the nonregulatory programs of government as well as the regulatory, and with departments and bureaus as well as with regulatory commissions. Administrative law relates to the executive-administrative branch of government as a whole, where 95 per cent of government's civilian personnel is employed and where the

citizen makes most of his firsthand contacts with government.

Administrative law is that body of decisions, rules, and regulations emanating from all three branches of government and from the Constitution itself and dealing with the powers and organization of the executive-administrative services of government, the procedural rules to be followed, and the rights and duties of the individual in his official dealings with these public agencies.

The administrative tribunals (the so-called fourth branch) are important, to be sure, principally because so much of public control legislation is vested in them, but it is all too easy to overemphasize their importance in relation to the whole of governmental administration. These regulatory tribunals are found at both the federal and the state levels and frequently they deal with concurrent problems, such as public utilities or industrial relations. The Hoover Commission reported in 1949 that for the federal government alone there were nine major commissions, employing about 12,000 persons, and costing some fifty-seven million dollars annually; further, these agencies in the fourth branch of government deal with a vast segment of the national economy, including labor, transportation, communications, electrical power, securities, and trade practices. But if anyone is inclined to think that these nine major regulatory commissions constitute the bulk of the problem, as far as administrative law is concerned, he need only look at the *Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure* (1941) to learn that the regular departments of government annually dispense far more "administrative justice" than all the administrative tribunals combined. Examples are the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the Department of the

Treasury, Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Animal Industry in the Department of Agriculture, the Civil Aeronautics Administration in the Department of Commerce, the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions in the Department of Labor, the Bureau of Management in the Department of the Interior, or the Passport Division in the Department of State.

All of these programs have certain things in common: their administrators are empowered to adjudicate in individual cases; they exercise the delegated power to legislate by rules and regulations; and they have varying degrees of power to review their own primary determinations or to have them considered by courts of law. These, then, are three of the chief reasons why the relationship here being considered has come to occupy the importance in the public mind that it now enjoys.

Administrators help make law

The executive-administrative agencies of government not only execute the law, they also help to make it, which is an additional reason for the importance of administrative law and the complaint against bureaucracy in this area. Administrators help to make the law when they advise interest groups and legislatures, when they draft bills for consideration by the legislature, when they determine policies needed to give effect to major policies determined by the legislature, when they issue rules and establish standards that must be followed quite as much as the statutes themselves, when they promulgate policies and give meaning to ambiguous words in the process of applying general laws to specific situations, when they formulate procedural rules and review procedures that may be as important as the substantive provisions themselves, and when they hold hearings, either

formal or informal, and hand down decisions that are binding unless upset by the courts. So regarded—and this has long been true in both the United States and Great Britain—more law, quantitatively speaking, is made by the administrative branch than by the legislatures and the courts combined.

There are, then, three good reasons why bureaucracy has rapidly surged to the forefront of men's consideration in the area we are discussing: first, government is now active in many fields, and this complexity is mirrored in public organization and in budgets; second, the growth of administrative tribunals has been rapid since the Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887; and third, administrative action often impinges upon the other two branches, requiring a redefinition of function that disturbs the traditional.

THE UNDERLYING PARADOX

Much of the complaint against bureaucracy is due to a failure to differentiate clearly between the control and the protective aspects of administrative law, because, as has already been said, while administrative law attempts to safeguard and promote the public interest through control procedures when monopoly, situations of social conflict, or similar issues are involved, it also protects the individual in his substantive and procedural rights in his dealings with the government. Hence the paradox: if we attack all of administrative law on the ground that it is burdensomely bureaucratic, when we seek to curtail government's activities in our own group interest, we risk the danger of weakening the protection of individual rights. Under modern conditions, administrative agencies no less than the courts must be relied upon for both public control and the safeguarding of individual rights.

A close look at administrative law

shows that the three large areas which the citizen is especially concerned with are the powers, the procedures, and the protections that operate when administrative agencies touch private interests. The powers stem from constitutional provisions, legislative statutes, the rules made by administrative agencies and having legal effect, the decisions of these agencies having legal force, and court decisions relating to the whole of this matter. The procedures are the rules that must be followed either because the Constitution, a legislative statute, the precedents of the courts, or the decisions of the administrative agencies require it. Procedures also include the practices that are customary in the agency, even though no rules require them; actually such nonformalized proceedings are more numerous than the formal rules, constituting a safeguard against red tape and formalism. Finally, the protections are the provisions of constitutions, statutes, decided cases, or the rules of the agencies themselves that guarantee the citizen due process of law, a hearing in eminent domain proceedings, and the like, plus the remedies provided by the courts to afford the citizen legal relief. These remedies are the means by which a case gets into court or before a higher reviewing authority of administration or before the administrative agency itself, in order to secure relief when an individual's rights are invaded.

If we were to clear away the paradox and think clearly about what is involved in each of these three areas of citizen interest, it seems obvious that we should have to invent a term more descriptive than the catchall, bureaucracy.

Powers

When the effect of extended power is to limit the freedom of groups and to threaten their financial or other sub-

stantive interests, the resulting dissatisfaction is vented not only against the policy itself but also against the symbol which is the vehicle for the policy. And hence without necessarily attempting to deceive the public, the tactic of those who resist new authority is to belittle the instrument as the visible embodiment of the obnoxious policy. Similarly, when individuals and groups support an attempted extension of power, because they believe that either they personally or the country as a whole will benefit in consequence thereof, they attach a favorable connotation to the symbol which they hope will advance the interests they wish to further. Thus the same person may regard the same symbol as "good" or "bad" according to the effect it has on his interests.

Procedure

Considerations respecting administrative procedure are a little more complicated but no less realistic and bitterly fought over. The paradox is this: to make a procedure more complicated and rule-ridden will doubtless create more red tape and slow down the particular administrative process; this is manifestly bad if one opposes bureaucracy on general principle, but it is not necessarily bad, or at least is not thought to be bad as a temporary expedient, if the effect is also to pull some of the teeth from a law that is adversely affecting one's interest. Hence, under the guise of remolding administrative procedure in order to bring it more nearly in line with that of courts of law, there sometimes lurks a desire actually to increase red tape and bureaucracy in order to derive some immediate benefit therefrom. Red tape and bureaucracy may be and often are violently objected to in political polemic but they are nonetheless often consciously or unconsciously favored in significant areas of

public control in the expectation that dissatisfaction with the administrative process may eventually undermine respect for and confidence in a particular policy that an agency is attempting to administer but which is opposed by a certain interest or group. Hence the paradox: bureaucracy in the sense of red tape, cumbersomeness, and delay is actually encouraged in some instances because that tactic is considered one of the surest ways of preventing certain policies from becoming law. In other words, those who talk most loudly about the evils of bureaucracy sometimes find themselves encouraging the very thing they claim most heartily to dislike.

Protections

About the third area of our investigation—the legal remedies available to the citizen—much has been written but little need be said here to point up the issues of public policy involved in the relation of bureaucracy and administrative law. No one with democratic inclinations will doubt that, consistent with safeguarding the reciprocal interests of society itself, individual rights should be surrounded with all possible safeguards for justice and equal treatment. Our American form of government is rightly praised because through written provision and by court decision it does this so well. Over against this socially desirable objective, however, stands the fact that long-drawn-out legal proceedings, often involving large expenditures of time and money, themselves contribute to this thing the public calls bureaucracy, namely, protracted, highly legalized, formal proceedings. Whether it be a public utility case starting with a state regulatory commission, being heard over a period of many months and involving issues that may bring the case to the state and federal courts and even to the Supreme Court of the United States, or

whether it be a labor case starting with a hearing before a hearing officer, involving the taking of evidence, later proceeding to a national board sitting very much like a court of law, and eventually for final decision continuing through the hierarchy of courts already mentioned, the inescapable fact is that all the trappings of bureaucracy are present. There is hierarchy, professionalization, specialization, the recruitment of skilled personnel, a plethora of complicated rules and procedures, and protracted administrative and legal proceedings in which only the initiated of the legal fraternity can hope to have a chance of succeeding.

But what is the alternative? Surely not arbitrary action. This suggests that bureaucracy (meaning in this connection, formalized procedures) may be a price we may have to pay over an extended period of time for the safeguarding of group and individual interests. Under such circumstances the constructive policy would seem to be to improve internal procedures by humanizing and accelerating them, not by creating an atmosphere in which the opposite set of conditions will prevail.

THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS

In all three types of situation, therefore—in the struggle over power and its limits, in the rules of procedure devised to assure fairness, and in the remedies provided the citizen and his interest group to secure the full protection of substantive rights—there is inevitably involved a balancing of interests and requirements. In one set of scales private interest is weighed against the public interest. In another, sufficient procedural thoroughness and decorum to assure the individual his just deserts must be set against the need for administrative dispatch, lest the whole

machinery of government break down of its own weight or stagger to a virtual halt.

Only by such a balancing of interests, moreover, does it seem possible to accomplish the things free governments are intent on doing. If governments did not regulate, some other method of settling conflicting interests and keeping special privilege in check would have to be substituted—for example, to deal with public utility enterprises. The alternatives are not numerous and they are surrounded with difficulties that to most people make them less acceptable than regulation, with all its faults. One alternative is arbitrary action, which is not to be considered. Another is to allow power groups to hold sway without hindrance, but this would prove as objectionable, judged by experience, as too much arbitrary power on the part of government. Still a third possibility is to vest the power formerly exercised by voluntary associations in the government itself, substituting public management for private management; but in addition to objections so well known as to require no repetition, this course would still further add to the bureaucratic difficulties of government and effect the opposite of the formula we are seeking.

It may be concluded, therefore, that there are areas of public policy in which major regulation seems to be the only method compatible with our democratic notions of government and of political economy. Hence there is no escaping the problem of trying to mitigate the difficulties inherent in the regulatory approach.

That much can be done along this line is hardly to be doubted. Experience shows, for example, that most of the proceedings before administrative agencies, where opposing interests are weighed and decided, may be and are

in fact disposed of through informal proceedings rather than through formal ones, thus reducing the bureaucratic factors inherent in the administrative process.² Informal proceedings economize time, create an atmosphere of compromise, and save the money of governments and of individuals. Were it not for the fact that nine-tenths of all problems coming before public agencies can be disposed of by this informal method, with equal satisfaction to the private interests concerned, the machinery of government would almost certainly break down and our whole society would become so bureaucratized as to approach a state of *rigor mortis*.

To paraphrase the words of Walter Gellhorn in his Johns Hopkins lectures, the only hope of making major regulation work and of avoiding an excess of bureaucracy is to assure a cheap and speedy forum through informal administrative proceedings to those whose circumstances and immediate needs might be ill-served by extensive litigation of the traditional type.³ If the members of the legal profession were to insist upon formal proceedings in every case, thinking perhaps that this would increase their collective employment opportunities, the unwanted consequence might well be the breakdown of regulation and the substitution of large draughts of public ownership.

MANAGERIAL CONSIDERATIONS

It will also take a great deal of forbearance and understanding on the part of the legal profession if the adminis-

² On this interesting and important subject, see Kenneth Culp Davis, *Administrative Law* (St. Paul, Minn., 1951), pp. 178-83, or Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, *Final Report* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), Chap. III.

³ Walter Gellhorn, *Federal Administrative Proceedings* (Baltimore, 1941), p. 14.

trative process is to be kept intact instead of being cut up into little pieces and rendered ineffectual. This issue is at the heart of the proposal that regulatory tribunals be deprived of all so-called administrative functions and that their role be confined to hearing and deciding cases. Here the analogy to courts of law on the one hand and to the operation of routine government departments on the other is almost certainly wrong.

Dean Landis has grasped this constructive concept of what the administrative process ought to accomplish in major areas of regulation such as utilities, securities, and labor relations. The administrative process, says Landis, is not simply an extension of executive power. It is more. It is the grant of all that full ambit of authority needed to plan, to promote, and to police—it is a rounded, statesmanlike view.⁴ Whether all administrative tribunals are actually succeeding in doing all the things that Dean Landis says they ought to do is, of course, an open question, and this subject urgently needs study. But that such tribunals should try to take a statesmanlike view of their functions seems clear beyond a doubt, and also that they are more likely to succeed if their functions are integrated rather than dispersed.

Gellhorn reminds us that procedural forms are not fetishes, they are merely means to an end; that no matter how embroidered the procedure may become, "qualified administrators must remain the very heart of the administrative process."⁵ Only as lawyers learn to respect the special skills of administrators, he concludes, is the administrative process likely to improve, for then the responsibility for producing results will be placed where it belongs. It is refreshing to hear a lawyer say:

⁴ Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁵ Gellhorn, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

There is no reason to suppose that public administration through official agencies is incapable of developing professional traditions and standards comparable to those developed by public administration through the courts.⁶

The main reason so many cases before administrative agencies can be settled by informal proceedings instead of by formal hearing is that administrators are steeped in their subject matter and often develop a kind of sixth sense enabling them to go to the heart of matters with speed and expertness.

What has been said about the need of due attention to managerial considerations in the administrative process applies equally to the forbearance and understanding that regulators should exercise in their dealings with the regulated. If more were known about considerations of public policy and the requirements of good administration in the various areas of public control where major regulation is involved, it would be possible to draw a firmer line of demarcation between what public authority should and should not interfere with in the internal management of concerns being regulated. All too often the pragmatic test is overlooked and regulation is judged by its extensiveness and its weight rather than by its practical results for public interest and public policy. As regulatory agencies become old and bureaucratized, we shall do well to remember the pragmatic test advanced by Gellhorn: "New agencies have been created or old ones expanded not to satisfy an abstract governmental theory, but to cope with problems of recognized public concern."⁷

In the last analysis, much depends on whether administration is heavy-handed and burdensomely bureaucratic

or whether it is flexible and imaginative. Conditions of size and complexity create the conditions in which bureaucracy in its objectionable guises is likely to be found. On the other hand, if those who are responsible for administrative policy are sufficiently aware of these dangers and do enough to counteract them, administration can be kept democratic and responsive.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

With these considerations in mind, a wary eye should be focused on the developments of recent years when acts of so-called administrative procedure have been widely adopted in federal and state governments. The warnings found in the concluding chapter of Ferrel Heady's study of state experience should be noted. Statutes, says Heady, can set minimum standards which must be observed, thus making a kind of negative contribution to the improvement of regulatory procedure; nevertheless, legislation cannot provide a positive incentive for continual improvement in procedure. Such incentive must come from agency initiative, aided by advice and encouragement from the outside.⁸

This is good counsel. As we have seen, it is the procedural requirements of administrative law that give rise to the greatest dangers of bureaucratization. If we are to solve the dilemma of making democratic administration sufficiently effective to satisfy public aspiration and at the same time reasonably free from red tape, formalized procedure, costliness, and delay—all associated with bureaucracy in the public mind—we must either prevent the legal profession from dominating the admin-

⁸ Ferrel Heady, *Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States* (Ann Arbor, 1952), p. 120.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

istrative process or educate it to a better understanding of what is involved in the workaday aspects of practical administration and the higher ranges of public policy. The latter seems the more worthwhile effort.

Marshall E. Dimock, Ph.D., Bethel, Vermont, is currently codirector of the *Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East*. He has held a number of public offices, including those of Assistant Secretary of Labor (1938-40) and member of the Vermont legislature (1948-50), and was formerly on the faculties of Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, and the University of California (Los Angeles). He is the author of *Business and Government*, *Public Administration* (with Gladys Ogden Dimock), and several other books relating to government and the economy.

Lessons from Recent European Experience

By TAYLOR COLE

SINCE the outbreak of World War II American influences have been felt in the organization and functioning of the bureaucracies of European states. Some of these influences have been the results of efforts of American officials abroad, notably those stationed in the occupied countries; others have come from American research and writing in the field of public personnel administration which have become better known abroad through the postwar visitation and educational programs sponsored by public and private agencies in the United States; and still others have been a by-product of the joint experiences in international agencies in which the United States has been represented. At the same time developments in European countries have been given serious attention in the United States. It is these developments, confined to the experiences of Britain, Western Germany, France, and Italy, with which this paper will deal.

By way of definition, we shall speak of bureaucracy as the whole body of civil servants and other public employees of a government and shall assume that a fully developed bureaucracy possesses certain known functional and behavioral characteristics.¹ In this connection European literature presents some of the same definitions and characterizations as are found in writing in the United States. The term "bureaucracy" often carries with it in Britain the invidious connotations which are associated with it in much of the American literature. Whether in Harold

Laski's reference to it as a "system of government, the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials that their power jeopardizes the liberty of ordinary citizens," or Lord Hewart's conception of it as administrative lawlessness, or J. Ramsay Muir's emphasis upon "uncontrolled officialism," bureaucracy in Britain has often signified either services inefficiently performed, or not performed at all, or performed in such a way as to endanger individual liberties. Though bureaucracy has carried similar connotations in other European states,² different parentage can also be claimed for the term on the Continent. Max Weber's analysis of *Bureaukratie* furnished a conceptual approach which has had wide influence not alone in Germany. Indeed, Weber has been credited with being "the founder of the systematic study of bureaucracy." The International Political Science Association introduced its three-day session on bureaucracy in Paris during the summer of 1953 with discussions of Max Weber and Robert Michels which would have been approved by those responsible for the selection and ordering of the materials in the American compilation, *Reader in Bureaucracy*.³ *Burocrazia*, a monthly journal in Italy devoted to a study of problems of public employment in Italy and abroad, refers to the "reform of the bureaucracy" in the sense of the reform

² Walter Sharp, *The French Civil Service: Bureaucracy in Transition* (New York, 1931), Chap. XIV.

³ Edited by Robert K. Merton et al. (Glencoe, Ill., 1952). The proceedings of the International Political Science Association meeting will be published in English and French editions early in 1954.

¹ See Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (New York, 1950), Chap. II.

of the administration. In short, any examination of the European literature on bureaucracy must be done with an eye to the semantic difficulties.

European and American differences

Mention should also be made of certain differences between the European and American bureaucracies, for these have considerable bearing on the "relevance of foreign experience."⁴ In the first place political patronage is still much more limited in Europe than in the United States. The requirements of the Pendleton Act that examinations be "practical in their character" have been broadly interpreted in the United States in recent years, but there is less emphasis upon the general cultural examination than in Britain. The European conception of the public service as a distinctive career gives the bureaucracies a more closed character than in the United States.⁵ The tie-up between the educational institutions and the public services, evidenced in the requirements for entry into these services, is much closer in Europe than in the United States. Furthermore the maximum age limit for entry into the public service in Europe is normally lower than in this country. Such differences, when considered in the light of their historical explanations, cannot be ignored.

WARTIME TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

During wartime the differences between all bureaucracies are minimized

⁴ Arnold Brecht, "The Relevance of Foreign Experience," in Fritz Morstein Marx (Ed.), *Public Management in the New Democracy* (New York, 1940), Chap. VIII; "Personnel Management," in Edward H. Litchfield and associates, *Governing Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1953), Chap. X.

⁵ Note the interesting comments by Roger Grégoire, "The American Public Service: A French View," *Public Personnel Review*, Vol. 13 (April 1952), pp. 53-59.

by emergency pressures. In this connection Leonard D. White some years ago commented as follows:

The behavior of any public service is remarkably similar under emergency conditions. . . . The peacetime forms of all great public services are fundamentally alike, and it is not surprising that under similar conditions of stress and strain their adaptations should resemble one another.⁶

The crisis situation in the European states, as in the United States, was characterized by the overriding considerations of urgency and emergency demands; by the factor of scarcity and the necessity to seek an increasing number of skilled persons in a contracting labor market; and by the factor of expansion which was a resultant of the needs of the military machine. The consequences of the operation of these factors were several. There was a dilution of the bureaucracies by partially trained and untrained personnel. The sharp competition for manpower which developed continued after the end of hostilities. The need for speedy action favored those who could secure results, often at the expense of orderly procedures. The net result was a general deterioration of standards and a decline in the quality of individual performance, whether in Fascist Italy, France, or Britain.

The wartime necessities focused attention sharply upon new types of public employees in the public services. The most conspicuous were the rapidly expanded groups of professional and scientific employees—the chemists, engineers, statisticians, lawyers, and doctors. In Britain, as a result of the conditions which were criticized by the Barlow Committee in 1943, the Scientific Civil Service was the subject of a

⁶ *Civil Service in Wartime* (Chicago, 1945), pp. 2-3.

special report in 1945.⁷ Its recommendations, followed by a reorganization, were based upon a recognition of the role of the Scientific Service and of the necessity for improving the methods of recruitment and the conditions of employment. The problems raised by the professional and technical classes and their relationships to the administrative class for salary purposes were given attention in the Report of the Committee on Higher Civil Service Remuneration in 1949.⁸ New agencies such as the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research attest to the administrative arrangements devised to handle some of the scientific work in Britain. In 1949 there were, according to one estimate, some 47,663 civil servants who held professional, technical, and scientific classifications, a figure which represented a great increase over the prewar number.⁹

A second conspicuous type of new public employee has been the employee of the public corporation, the nationalized industry, the government monopoly, and the myriad of other public and quasi-public enterprises which have been instituted or expanded in recent years. Generalizations which would apply beyond national boundaries are difficult to make, but there is agreement that the existence of many of these enterprises has shifted some of the conflicts between the interests of the consumer and those of the proprietor or shareholder to conflicts between the interests of the consumer and those of the employees.¹⁰ Many of these employees are united in trade union organizations which include

⁷ Cmd. 6679.

⁸ Cmd. 7635.

⁹ T. A. Critchley, *The Civil Service Today* (London, 1951), p. 16; cf. Bosworth Monck, *How the Civil Service Works* (London, 1952), p. 38.

¹⁰ W. A. Robson (Ed.), *Problems of Nationalized Industry* (London, 1952), Chaps. VI, VII, and especially pp. 338 ff.

important percentages of the lower paid and unskilled workers of the regular governmental departments and which are able to exert considerable economic and political pressure. While the employer-employee relationships of these enterprises are normally governed by the same laws and regulations which apply to private industry, there has been a noticeable tendency in certain countries for these public employees to demand more and more of the rights and privileges of civil servants. The result is the emergence of new categories of public-legal relationships occupying a twilight zone between those of the government with private citizens, on the one hand, and those of the government with legally recognized civil servants, on the other hand.

POSTWAR LEGISLATION

In France, many years of discussion of a civil servant *statut*, spearheaded by the agitation of the civil servant associations, finally had their sequel in the enactment of the Law on Civil Servants of 1946. Western Germany, despite strong pressure from the occupying authorities to make a break with the past in many significant respects, relied heavily on her past experience in enacting the controversial National Civil Service Law of 1953. The traditional character of the German legislation, passed eight years after the Nazi military collapse, contrasts with the more pioneering character of the French legislation, which was passed during the early period after the end of hostilities. Serious discussion of civil service legislation has taken place in Italy, though it is doubtful if present party alignments will permit any substantial changes via the medium of a comprehensive statute on the *impiegato pubblico*. But all of the continental countries, in contrast with Britain, have felt the impacts of the traditional and the

current pressures for new civil service legislation.

New administrative adjustments to provide greater uniformity and co-ordination, especially in recruitment, have been made. Although none of the four states here under review has followed American precedent in establishing an agency comparable in functions to our United States Civil Service Commission, the Civil Service Office directly under the Prime Minister in France and the Personnel Committee in Western Germany are examples of new agencies at the center with certain general jurisdiction. Despite some counter moves, the extension of Treasury control has continued in Britain.¹¹ The Office for Reform, under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in Italy, has been primarily a research agency to the present, but it could be endowed with the power to implement some of its recommendations. In contrast to the trend in the United States, where certain of the traditional functions of the Civil Service Commission have within recent years been delegated to the departments, the trend in Europe has been towards more unified control by some organ or organs at the center. One objective has been to provide the greater uniformity by reducing the amount of departmental freewheeling. At the same time there appears little evidence that the constitutional injunctions in both France and Italy to provide some form of federal or regional decentralization will be implemented in any serious fashion. Nor have the related efforts toward what the Italians call bureaucratic decentralization been more fruitful. In short, the controls of the bureaucracies still run directly from Paris and Rome.

¹¹ Dorothy Johnstone, "Developments in the British Service 1945-1951," *Public Administration*, Vol. 30 (Spring 1952), pp. 49-59; Hiram M. Stout, *British Government* (New York, 1953), pp. 262-64.

Limited foreign influence

On the enactment of this new legislation and the establishment of these administrative organs foreign influences have played only a limited role.¹² Allied pressures in postwar Italy were largely directed toward the purge from the public service rolls of those tainted with fascism or collaboration with the enemy. A casual comparison of the seniority rolls of several Italian ministries in 1943 and 1948 will indicate the limited extent of the purge, which began in 1944 and practically ceased with the legislative decree of February 7, 1948, which provided for the dropping of all proceedings against accused persons below a certain rank. No attempt was made to interfere with the continued application of the two most basic decrees dealing with the bureaucracy, No. 2395 of November 11, 1923, on the "hierarchical organization of the state administrations" and No. 2960 of December 30, 1923, covering such matters as appointments, promotions, disciplinary punishments, etc. Both decrees, it is to be noted, date from the early days of the Fascist regime and were based upon a broad delegation of legislative powers in December 1922 to the Mussolini government.

More direct pressure was brought in Germany to denazify and democratize the bureaucracy. But in the end, according to Arnold Brecht, only a few more than one thousand of the approximately fifty-three thousand civil servants removed or suspended in Western Germany because of former Nazi affiliations were finally excluded by judicial action. The Reinstatement Act of May

¹² See the author's "The Democratization of the German Civil Service," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. XIV (February 1952), pp. 3-18; and "Reform of the Italian Bureaucracy," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 13 (Autumn 1953), pp. 247-56.

11, 1951, enacted to carry out the broad objectives of Article 131 of the Basic Law, has incidentally served to facilitate this process of reinstatement of former Nazis. Some faint reminders of the demands of occupation officials for legislative guarantees can be seen in those provisions of the Act of 1953 dealing with the Personnel Committee and those requiring officials to show continued evidences of loyalty to the Federal Republic. But with the exception of these and sundry other minor changes, the National Civil Service Law of 1953 is in the main a re-enactment of the provisions of the National Civil Service Code of 1937 with the specific Nazi features of the code carefully eliminated.

The lesson from this experience is that these reforms in the bureaucracies of European countries must come primarily from within, particularly in the case of countries which have suffered defeat and foreign occupation. Indeed, the chief contribution of the Allied occupation authorities to these reforms may have been their removal of certain of the impediments to the expression of the latent democratic forces in both countries.

POLITICAL RIGHTS OF CIVIL SERVANTS

The continuing controversy regarding the political rights which should be accorded civil servants has brought out sharply conflicting arguments. On the one hand, there is the traditional case for according to civil servants the same rights possessed by ordinary citizens of voting, of political activity, of candidacy for public office, and of holding parliamentary seats without loss of civil service status. The central principle, strongly defended by most civil servants, is that they are entitled as citizens to the same rights as any other persons, and that they constitute an important and informed segment of the

electorate which should be "represented" at the polls, in political party gatherings, and, above all, in the legislative chambers. To quote the Masterman Committee in Britain, it is desirable in a democratic society "for all citizens to have a voice in the affairs of State and for as many as possible to play an active part in public life." On the other hand, there is the contention that the civil servants occupy a special position in the state which requires and justifies limitations on their political rights; otherwise there would be grave dangers from the organized pressures of a special interest group or caste, and the "neutrality" or "impartiality" of the civil servant would be jeopardized under a system where he could be at one and the same time voter, party activist, administrator, and legislator. There is nothing new in these arguments, except possibly the intensity of the clash of points of view in the postwar period and the novelty of certain solutions which have been recommended.

Two illustrations, centered on the crucial differences regarding the civil servant's right of candidacy for parliamentary office and the right to sit in the national parliament after election, will suffice.

Great Britain

In Great Britain, nonindustrial civil servants had not been permitted since 1927 to become candidates for Parliament. Industrial civil servants, at least in certain departments, were free to accept candidacy. In June 1949, the government published with approval the report of the Masterman Committee¹³ which recommended the division of the civil servants into two groups, the one to be composed of grades which would not be subject to any restraints on their political activities and the other to be composed of grades which would be sub-

¹³ Cmd. 7718.

ject to certain restraints. Parliamentary candidature was one of the types of political activities to be restrained. "The effect of this proposal," it was officially concluded, "was to give complete freedom to some 650,000" of the approximately one million civil servants, or "450,000 more than previously." These recommendations were later subjected to the scrutiny and criticism of a committee of the National Whitley Council, before which the differences between the Staff Side and the Official Side were presented and partially reconciled. The recommendations of this committee were to divide the nonindustrial civil servants into three categories. In effect, these recommendations, as they are being implemented by the government, will provide an intermediate category between the completely free and the restricted ones, as proposed by the Masterman Committee. The effects of this future governmental action have been summarized as follows:

When these present decisions are put into effect the position will be that, out of a Civil Service of some 1,000,000 individuals, about 62 per cent will be completely free; something like another 22 per cent will, subject to the acceptance of the need for discretion, be free to take part in all activities except Parliamentary candidature; while only some 16 per cent will be barred from taking part in national political activities. . . .¹⁴

Federal Republic of Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany provides a somewhat different type of case history. In the face of the precedents provided by certain provisions of the Weimar Constitution, Allied occupation officials either prohibited or placed restrictions on the right of civil servants to serve in legislative bodies. The position of the United States and

¹⁴ "Political Activities of Civil Servants," Cmd. 8783, March 1953, pp. 5-6.

British Military Governments was reflected in Article 26 of the Bizonal Law No. 15 of February 23, 1949, which provided:

An official may not be a candidate for election to public office or engage in public political activities in support of a particular party or political program. An official shall resign his employment before accepting nomination as a candidate in an election to a legislative body.

The period between the enactment of Bizonal Law No. 15 and the final passage on July 17, 1953, of the National Civil Service Law was marked by persistent efforts of the Allied officials to secure the incorporation of similar limitations in the Bonn Basic Law and later in the German legislation.¹⁵ The language of Article 57 of the new act which requires "separation from office" of an official chosen as a member of the Bundestag is vague and stipulates that subsequent legislation will regulate the matter in detail. But it appears that the stage is set to permit the candidacy of civil servants and leaves of absence from the service for those elected to Parliament, less generous provisions than had been included in the Weimar Constitution and more generous than the occupation authorities had desired.

Subversive political affiliations

The problem of political rights raises in an acute form the policy of governments toward their employees who are members of political parties considered dangerous to the state. In 1948 the British government announced a policy for dealing with employees suspected of close affiliations with fascist or communist organizations while engaged in handling matters requiring secrecy. After various discussions, a policy was an-

¹⁵ Elmer Plischke, *Allied High Commission Relations with the West German Government* (HICOG, 1952), pp. 17-34.

nounced to apply to persons "employed in connection with work the nature of which is vital to the security of the state." Guilt was to be based on present as distinguished from previous membership in communist or fascist organizations. The individual minister would be permitted to judge whether security considerations justified disciplinary action. Provisions were made for replies to charges and for hearings before an Advisory Board. If circumstances permitted, the employee in lieu of reinstatement might be transferred to another position which would be less sensitive than the former one from a security point of view. Otherwise he would either be permitted to resign or be dismissed. Despite criticisms directed at the procedures, the safeguards provided by the Advisory Board and by the intervention of the civil servant unions have generally been recognized as offering effective protection against action which violates British tradition.¹⁶ Up to 1950, it was estimated that approximately fifty civil servants had received notice, of which number only a very small percentage had been dismissed or compelled to resign.

In Germany, memories of subversion by civil servants during the Weimar period were kept alive by those Allied and German officials who were desirous of providing safeguards against a repetition in the present Federal Republic. The result was the insertion in the Federal Civil Service Law of 1953 of Article 52, which obligates the civil servant to accept and be faithful to the democratic principles of the Basic Law during his entire official connection with the state (including the period while he is pensioned). Despite expressed doubts as to the value of such legisla-

¹⁶ Eleanor Bontecou, "The English Policy as to Communists and Fascists in the Civil Service," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 51 (May 1951), pp. 564 ff.

tive provisions, the writer's personal experience convinces him that both outside prodemocratic organizations and the legalistically oriented German civil servant attach weight to this Article in the new act. The result will be to furnish a legal basis for the exclusion of both Communists and Fascists from the public service in the future.

Thus, both Britain and Germany have given serious attention to the political rights of the civil servants, and each country has extended the rights of political candidature over those previously in existence. At the same time some cautious steps have been taken to discipline or to eliminate the politically subversive official.

ASSOCIATIONS AND REPRESENTATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

The rights of association of the public employees in Western European states have been either extended or more clearly recognized since the end of World War II. In Britain today, around 80 per cent of the nonindustrial civil servants are organized in at least three hundred staff associations or unions. The repeal in 1946 of Section V of the Trades Disputes and Trade Unions Act has broadened their right of outside affiliation with the industrial unions. In France, as well as in Germany and Italy where these rights had fallen victim to the prohibitions of previous regimes, the postwar constitutions have recognized broadly the right of association.

On the basis of these constitutional guarantees, a variety of public employee federations have functioned. In Germany, public employees are organized chiefly in the Civil Servant Federation, in affiliates of the German Trade Union Federation, or in the independent German Salaried Employees Federation. All of these federations accept the basic principles upon which the Federal Re-

public is based. In Italy—and the divisions in France follow somewhat the same ideological pattern—the public employees are organized primarily either in affiliates of the Communist-dominated trade union federation (CGIL, “Italian General Confederation of Labor”), of the Christian-Democratic-dominated federation (CISL, “Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions”), or of the Socialist-Republican federation (UIL, “Italian Workers’ Unions”) or in independent associations.

Strikes

Whether legally permissible or not,¹⁷ frequent strikes have occurred among these organizations of public employees in both Italy and France. The most determined of these strikes broke out in France in August 1953, when both Catholic- and Communist-dominated unions supported the Socialist Workers Force and largely immobilized the French communication systems, the postal services, and other branches of the economy for a sixteen-day period. The resort to the strike has been occasioned by a number of factors, but the presence of large blocks of public employees in federations manipulated for political purposes by the Communist parties in both France and Italy has been especially significant. The pre-World-War-I problem of the relations of *l'État et ses fonctionnaires* has thus assumed the new contours which the post-World-War-II ideological differences have provided, and the recent developments provide no easy answer as to the most appropriate ways for dealing with the issues involved. But to the present, none of the European states have resorted to prohibitions and sanctions as extreme as those found in the Taft-Hartley Act in the United States.

¹⁷ See *Report of the United Nations Seminar on Public Personnel Management* (U. N. Secretariat, 1952), pp. 112–14.

Representative councils

One outlet for the complaints of public employees has been provided by the different types of employee representative councils which have either been created in their present forms in the post-war period, as in Germany and France, or have functioned in a state of renewed vigor, as in Britain. In the latter country, the Whitley Councils have undergone the transformation during the past fifteen years which a growing sense of mutual responsibility and a new generation of negotiators have stimulated.¹⁸ In particular, the emphasis has been shifted from formal to informal meetings, with a resultant speeding up of the process of making decisions and with the removal of some of the causes of friction in evidence in the formal meetings. Matters recently considered by the Whitley Councils which have not resulted in amicable discussion include the action by the government on the Masterman Report, the government's wage negotiations with higher grade civil servants, and the handling of the wage freeze. But mutual respect on both sides has served to strengthen the Whitley system, and the most recent evidence supports the appraisal of Herman Finer, who observed in 1949 that the National Council played an effective role during the reconstruction period after World War II and that the departmental councils “produced an invaluable and indispensable atmosphere of good and easy relationship between superiors and subordinates. . . .”¹⁹

The Fourth Republic in France has seen provision made in 1946 for repre-

¹⁸ Leo D. Cagan, “Recent Transformation in Civil Service Whitleyism,” *Public Personnel Review*, Vol. 12 (1951), pp. 25–30; cf. Stout, *op. cit.* *supra* note 11, pp. 275–76.

¹⁹ *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (New York, 1949), pp. 909–10.

sentative councils. These include the creation of a Superior Council of Public Service at the general level and both administrative commissions and technical committees in the departments, all of which are organized on some parity basis. Experience with these is more limited than with the Whitley Councils, but favorable reports are not lacking as to their work on classification and other matters.²⁰ In Germany the works councils in the federal public service still rest upon voluntary agreement or on the uncertain basis of Control Council Law No. 22, pending the passage of a Personnel Representation Law.²¹ Representative councils are almost completely lacking in Italy.

In sum, Europe has provided us with a panorama of broad freedom of association, of serious strikes in the public services, and of effective experimentation with representative councils.

RECRUITMENT AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE BUREAUCRACIES

The social composition of European bureaucracies has been undergoing some changes, to which new recruitment methods have contributed. In Britain, wartime steps were taken to improve the opportunities of those with ability, regardless of social or financial status, and to make allowances for the sacrifices of veterans. Besides the use of the modified prewar methods of recruiting the administrative class, reconstruction examinations which included a series of “country house” or “CISSE” (Civil Service Selection

²⁰ Note, however, the point of view of Gordon Wright, “France,” in Taylor Cole (Ed.), *European Political Systems* (New York, 1953), pp. 630–31.

²¹ See the 1952 *Regierungsentwurf eines Gesetzes über die Personalvertretung in öffentlichen Verwaltungen und Betrieben*, together with the *Vorschlag des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes* and the *Stellungnahme des Deutschen Beamtenbundes*.

Board) tests were introduced for those whose war service had interfered with their education. An adapted version of these reconstruction examinations is in use today. In addition, limited competitions have been arranged for the increased percentage of positions reserved for civil servants seeking to enter the administrative class from the lower classes. The effect of these innovations must be considered in the light of substantial changes in the educational system, particularly reflected in the growth in the number of state scholarships. But it appears that both the reconstruction examinations and the increased opportunities to enter the administrative class from below have made for some greater equalization of opportunity. In a curious sort of way the declining prestige and appeal of the administrative class²² may also have resulted in more egalitarianism and have contributed to pressures to broaden the field of selection. In any event, the British administrative class today is probably less of a preserve of a particular social stratum than in former times,²³ though the changes in the social composition have not been revolutionary.

France

The reforms of the higher civil service and of the higher educational system in postwar France have been inextricably related. Along with the establishment of the Institutes of Political Studies to serve as feeders for the National School of Administration, attention was directed toward the provision of scholarships for those with special abilities who lacked financial resources. The opportunity to attend the

²² E. N. Gladden, “The British Civil Service in Transition,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 43 (1949), p. 341.

²³ Arthur H. M. Hillis, “The British Civil Servant of Tomorrow,” *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 11 (Summer 1951), p. 177.

National School of Administration offered to civil servants who fall in the age brackets of twenty-six to thirty and who have spent five years in the public service has helped to open the higher positions to competent persons of experience from the lower ranks. Salaries, it should be noted, are paid to the participants in the three-year program of studies. Social and economic changes in France have been operating for several decades, as Walter Sharp noted in 1931, to alter the social base from which the higher civil servants are recruited.²⁴ One of the several effects of the post-war changes has been to accelerate these trends by broadening the opportunities of those from the lower social strata.

Italy and Germany

Neither Italy nor Germany has witnessed since the war any significant formal change in the regulations governing recruitment or in the legally prescribed qualifications of officials in the higher grades, that is, in Group A in Italy and in the Higher Service in Germany. The traditional legal training in the universities has been changed little since 1939 and, despite some slight concessions to the other social sciences in Germany, is still the usual door for entry. Studies of the social and class background of the student bodies in the universities would evidence the effects of the economic and political heritage of the previous decades. Some widening

²⁴ *Op. cit. supra* note 2, Chap. IV; cf. Herman Finer, "The French Higher Civil Service," *Public Personnel Review*, Vol. 9 (1948), pp. 167-76. Little empirical investigation has been made of these trends or of the effects of social stratification and mobility on the composition of the higher administrative ranks. See, however, passing comments by Raymond Aron and Natalie Rogoff in their respective articles reprinted in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Eds.), *Class, Status and Power* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), at pp. 574 and 586-88.

of the fields for recruitment has taken place in both countries. But there is a continued conviction by important groups, especially the trade unions, that the educational prerequisites still effectively exclude their members from entry into the higher positions in the public services.

The limited data available indicate that there has been a broadening of the social base from which the higher civil servants are recruited. In this sense, it is permissible to speak of some democratization of the bureaucracies.

CONCLUSION

Recent European developments have been of special interest to students of American bureaucracy. These have included the growing significance of new types and groups of public employees; experimentation in personnel management aimed to secure greater unity of control and co-ordination at the top; the extension of the political rights of nonindustrial civil servants and introduction of devices for guaranteeing political reliability; experience with old and recently introduced schemes of employee representation; and the broadening of the social base from which the higher civil servants are recruited.

If space permitted, there would be strong temptation to discuss some general theoretical problems to which the European experience is relevant. A few conclusions must suffice. Postwar British experience under the Labor Government did not justify the prewar concern and doubts of a Harold Laski regarding the "neutrality" or "impartiality" of the bureaucracy under such a government; experience under the Nazi regime in Germany requires modification of Max Weber's hypotheses regarding the political significance of the technical knowledge of the bureaucrat and regarding the normal functioning of

the bureaucracy "even in the case of revolution";²⁵ and responsible bureaucracy, at least as we have defined it, has not been inconsistent with the continua-

²⁵ Cf. Frederic S. Burin, "Bureaucracy and National Socialism: A Reconsideration of Weberian Theory," in Robert K. Merton *et al.*, *op. cit. supra* note 3, pp. 33 ff.

tion of democratic, constitutional government but has, rather, been indispensable to its functioning in Europe. However, these conclusions will merely serve as a final reminder that Europe still provides us in the United States with an essential laboratory for the study of our own bureaucracy.

Taylor Cole, Ph.D., is professor of political science at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. His several writings on bureaucracy include The Canadian Bureaucracy (1949). He has served in the past as editor of the Journal of Politics and as managing editor of the American Political Science Review, and is at present a vice-president of the American Political Science Association. He spent the academic year 1952-53 in Italy.

Legislative Control of the Bureaucracy

By CHARLES E. GILBERT and MAX M. KAMPELMAN

A SALIENT feature of the American pattern of government has long been the crucial authority of Congress to determine the objectives, and many of the methods, of administrators. In recent years, however, a number of thoughtful observers have urged that legislative control of the bureaucracy be restricted. Generally these observers assert that restrictions on effective legislative control exist in fact and had therefore best be recognized, and that other forms of administrative responsibility should be developed.

Several alternatives or supplements to congressional control have been suggested. The chief ones are: (1) the sharpening of Presidential control and the exclusion of congressional control from all levels of the bureaucracy except over the President himself; (2) reliance on a sense of responsibility "built into" the civil servant through representative recruitment and professional training; (3) further institutionalization of administrative responsibility to the groups in society and the economy which the agencies of administration regulate and service, through various forms of private participation in governmental regulation.

These devices are not usually proposed as total substitutions for congressional control. They are proposed to fill in the gaps in congressional control and to substitute for congressional control in those areas where congressional supervision is said to promote discord and misunderstanding rather than more efficient administrative prosecution of the ends set by Congress.

THE CASE AGAINST CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL

What are the major complaints concerning Congress and the capacity of Congress for controlling bureaucrats?

1. A chief argument is that in a day of problems largely technical in nature Congress does not have the knowledge and *expertise* to legislate adequately on many subjects. Nor does Congress have the knowledge adequately to control bureaucrats after it has set them in motion on any particular problem. Bureaucrats, because of their specialized knowledge of particular problems, will have to take over the formulation of administrative policies governing these problems, and will even have to take the initiative in much fundamental legislation on these problems. The superior *expertise* of administrators, it is said, will put them beyond the competence of Congress to control; and, should Congress attempt control willy-nilly, it will only defeat its own purposes by crudely disrupting expert administrative activities and procedures. Congress, it follows, should confine itself simply to broad statutory declarations of purposes.

2. Congress, it is said, is not adequately organized to perform the function of control. The will of Congress is seldom a concerted one. It is the will of individual Congressmen who generally derive their power from (a) individual committees of Congress, (b) seniority, or (c) individual constituents with power and influence. Congress' knowledge is inadequate to write mean-

ingful statutory directions for administrators. And all subsequent interpretations of basic statutes are the interpretations of individual Congressmen, or of congressional committees which are (a) "producer minded" and thus not representative of the whole will of Congress, or (b) acting at the behest of individual, "constituency minded" Congressmen, because Congressmen stick together on these things. Congressional committees, it is asserted, are never disciplined by Congress, and they often disagree with one another (further confusing the administrative process). Congress will often disagree with the President, thus still further confusing administrators. Finally, the time of Congressmen is limited—hence the specialized committees—so that Congress cannot regularly or periodically review administrative activity and experience. Therefore, individual Congressmen perform this function spasmodically and on the basis of individual administrative actions which are displeasing to the Congressmen or their particular constituents.

3. It follows, continues the argument, that Congress, in its present undisciplined form, is not really a very representative institution. Its actions are those of individual Congressmen, often at the behest of certain powerful constituents. The President, who represents all of the American people, is far more representative. His leadership of the bureaucracy should not, then, be subjected to disruptions at lower levels of the bureaucracy by unrepresentative segments of Congress. The bureaucracy itself may better represent the American people than does Congress. Civil servants are drawn from many areas of the land, they are educated in terms of the public interest (and do not face elections in particular constituencies), and they are inclined to the "public interest."

All of these criticisms of Congress stem from altered social-economic conditions which, it is held, present the need for altering our political institutions. The increased influence of large producer groups, the elevation of many erstwhile local problems to national importance, are held to have outmoded our electoral system, in some measure, and to lead to the need for minimizing local interests vis-à-vis national interests and maximizing technical proficiency and concerted action in government.

INSTITUTIONALIZING RESPONSIBILITY

Chief problems, then, are the feasibility of legislative control and the desirability of legislative control. The two problems are not really separate.

We do not believe that a sufficiently convincing case has yet been made for either the feasibility or the desirability of any or all of the proposed alternatives to congressional control at the expense of curtailing it. There is not space here to argue the many questions involved, but we may say that, in our view, the crucial question concerns the representativeness and responsiveness of the various agencies of our government and that we feel no other branches of our government are superior to Congress in these respects.

Congress is admittedly an institution with many faults. The bulk of the case for thoroughgoing congressional control of administration must rest upon a detailed and realistic assessment of the alternatives to Congress in this field.

The positive case for congressional control rests upon three grounds.

1. Responsibility should be "institutionalized." It should be placed in institutions which are clearly "political"—meaning that government must derive its authority from a broader social area than that of immediate controversy or regulation, and that governmental authority is accepted by public opinion as

dispositive of controversy. This seems to us to exclude reliance on interest-group participation in administration.

2. It follows that the institutions in which responsibility is located should rest on firm bases of political support and should, for the sake of their own stability, be responsive to the many and variegated concerns of a large nation. They ought also to minimize purely "personal" leadership and direction.

3. There is this further value in legislative control—that changes in administrative purposes brought about by organizational factors within the administration itself face institutionalized criticism from outside the administration.

The remainder of this paper is concerned with specific methods of congressional control. It has been said that "the dangers [to democratic purposes] arise, not from lack of congressional zeal, but from an excess of it, with a resulting demoralization of administration."¹ We will, therefore, concern ourselves not only with the adequacy of Congress' weapons for control but with the problem of the proper use of these weapons so as not to defeat the broad ends of Congress.

METHODS OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL

Congress is involved in two functions vis-à-vis the bureaucracy—functions which Charles S. Hyneman² has called "direction" and "control." On the one hand, Congress, by statute, creates jobs for the bureaucracy to do, creates the bureaucracy itself to take care of the jobs, and lays down standards according to which the jobs will be performed. All of this is direction; it stems from the doctrine of the "rule of law"—that the government, like ev-

eryone else, is under the law, and must act in accordance with the law. Congress (with the concurrence of the President) makes the law. It is the people's agent for directing the bureaucracy as to what it is to do, how much it is to do, and how it is to do it.

It is, of course, not enough for Congress simply to tell the bureaucracy what to do. As the people's board of directors, it is also Congress' responsibility to see that its directions are in fact followed. It must in some way *control* the bureaucracy. This it does through regulating the financial resources of the bureaucracy, through some measure of review of the work of the bureaucracy, and through informing the bureaucracy in ways statutory and short of statutory what is its pleasure.

Direction and control are logically distinct, but closely related in fact. The appropriations process, for example, illustrates important aspects of direction and control. Delegation of certain lawmaking functions to the bureaucracy is generally essential if Congress is to attain the statutory ends it seeks. Yet excessive delegation may put the bureaucracy in a position beyond effective control, or throw control into the courts. Therefore, in discussing the various points of congressional power over the bureaucracy, it will be found that both direction and control center at many of these points.

Creating functions

To begin with, Congress decides what the bureaucracy shall do—it defines the job of the bureaucracy. Generally it does this in the broadest of terms, leaving much to administrative interpretation. Are the terms of the congressional grant of power too broad? And do they lead to administrative waywardness or confusion? The problem here is that it is difficult for Congress, at first, to know

enough about the function it deeds to the bureaucracy to define it in very sharp terms. Moreover, too detailed definition of the function may defeat the purposes of Congress—it may so tie the hands of administrators that they cannot meet the conditions with which they have to deal. The most sensible procedure would seem to be for Congress to lay out the job it wants done in broad outline and progressively to fill in statutory gaps as administrative experience with the job becomes clear.

Such a procedure implies, of course, continuing congressional attention to the work of the administration. Generally, Congress has not adequately operated in this fashion. Instead of reviewing, in concert and with regularity, administrative experience on a particular job, it has usually left to individual Congressmen—reacting to particular constituents—to complain at administrative abuse of congressional intent. Review is thus spasmodic rather than regular, individual rather than concerted, related to particular cases rather than general experience, and from time to time it has taken the form of a congressional vendetta instead of a more refined directive. Congress will provide better direction as it focuses with more regularity upon review, through its established committees, and as it better organizes itself for concerted expression of its will.

Establishing organization

Congress not only adumbrates the job of the bureaucracy; it also sets up organizations to perform the job. Clearly, the power to establish the organization which performs the job means that Congress has a lot to say about the kind of job which the bureaucracy turns out, and the procedures by which the work is done. This is an important element of congressional direction. It is also a weapon of control, for Congress

—if it have the will—can at any time effect administrative reorganization, giving and taking away functions and powers. In this instance also it is, of course, possible for Congress to defeat its purposes by tying the hands of top administrators and rendering them unable to determine forms of organization which are congenial to them and with which they can work efficiently. The congressional problem is to strike a balance; to ensure an organization which in turn will ensure that the work is done as Congress wants it done.

The most important congressional choices here concern the headship of the organization (generally the choice is between a single administrator and a collegiate head) and the agency to which any new job shall be given (here the choice lies between the several existing agencies performing related work and the creation of a new agency to devote exclusive attention to the new work). Efficiency in performing the work would seem to dictate that Congress leave it to the head of the agency to determine the internal organization of the agency which actually does the work. There is some danger that when Congress organizes a new function it will not allocate it to the most appropriate administrative agency. On occasion, Congress does this with premeditation. This has been criticized because, it is said, the President is held partly responsible by the public for the proper functioning of the administration. On the other hand, Congress has the responsibility for assuring that the function which it creates receives sympathetic consideration. Thus, it appears desirable that government reorganization come up for periodic consideration.

As part of the legislative machinery, the President can, of course, veto an organizational statute of which he disapproves. For reasons already ad-

¹ Kenneth Culp Davis, *Administrative Law* (St. Paul, 1951), p. 56.

² *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (New York, 1950), Chap. I.

vanced, should Congress override his veto, this should count as an authoritative expression of the popular will on the subject. Under present procedure, the President has considerable initiative in reorganization, since most proposals for new governmental functions and new organizations come from the administrative branch and pass through its central point of control, the Bureau of the Budget.

Appropriations

A third aspect of congressional direction and control is the appropriation of the money which is the fuel of the administrative machine. Congressional authorization of functions and organization is not really meaningful until it gives administration the means to do the job.

Legislative power of the purse has traditionally been regarded as the key point of legislative control. Determinations of financial resources determine the extent of administrative action. Their main purpose is not to determine *what* jobs shall be performed, but the *extent* to which they shall be performed. Yet this often involves a choice of *what* functions shall be performed, and Congress may also—despite the statutory prohibition against substantive legislation in an appropriations bill—attach conditions which determine ways in which the job shall be done. Committees frequently do this orally or in reports. These are occasionally helpful, but also at times difficult for administrators to interpret.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the appropriations process is the opportunity it affords for continuing legislative review of administrative activity. The division between authorization and appropriation is said to "accommodate itself to the technique of planning, for programs may be laid out broadly, to

be implemented annually at a tempo suited to conditions."³ The congressional appropriations committees work almost year round, and their members are generally senior members of Congress who have acquired detailed acquaintanceship with the workings of the bureaucracy. They are an appropriate and convenient organ of review, and they have adequate sanctions.

Appropriations committees, however, sometimes conflict, in their review, with other committees of Congress. It has been suggested that congressional review of the administration be centralized in the appropriations committees, yet it may well be that the appropriations committees are not and cannot be expected to be sufficiently concerned with the substantive aspects of administrative programs. Since these programs were created through the substantive committees, those committees have a vital review role to fulfill, along with the appropriations committees and the committees on government operations.

In recent years, Congress has attempted to co-ordinate and improve its appropriation procedure and intelligence. At one point it adopted and later abandoned a consolidated appropriations act designed to provide it with an over-all fiscal picture rather than a piecemeal appropriation approach. The consolidated appropriation is a good reform, particularly where it can be accompanied by an item veto. In the absence of an item veto, however, the appropriation control is too centrally located in the appropriations committees, and other members of Congress feel their ability to review appropriations is limited where individual items are inundated in the mass.

³ Arthur W. Macmahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 58 (1943), p. 174.

The limited staff of appropriations committees has handicapped congressional intelligence. Proposals are before the Congress to enlarge the staff and make more effective use of the General Accounting Office.

Standards

Congress must delegate rule-making powers to administrators. "Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but futility."⁴ The fact is that it is a key function of Congress to lay down standards to govern the performance of any functions it gives the bureaucracy—whether these functions be substantive or rule-making. These standards provide guidance for administrative officials and for citizens who deal with those officials, and they provide the courts with the bases for review of administrative actions.

Much of the law which is intended to provide standards for officials is out of date today.⁵ Moreover, some of this legislation goes to undesirable and extreme lengths, unduly curbing administrative flexibility. In part, it results from congressional ignorance of administrative conditions on specialized levels, which can be remedied by adequate administrative advice to Congress.

Congress' power to delegate its rule-making function has few restraints today. The question has not come up since the *Schechter* case⁶ and is un-

⁴ *Panama Refining Company v. Ryan*, 293 U. S. 421.

⁵ See, for example, Hyneman, *op. cit.*, Chap. VIII.

⁶ *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S.*, 295 U. S. 495 (1935) declared unconstitutional the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 1933, because "Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the re-

likely to arise again. The danger remains, however, that excessive congressional delegation may give rise to administrative confusion and indirection, and may lead to excessive use of the courts in controlling the bureaucracy. Through the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Congress moved to make administrative rule-making procedures more uniform, more public, and freer of personal bias. A further control has been suggested: that Congress adopt procedures similar to the British Statutory Instruments Act of 1946. Under this procedure, certain administrative rulings would be laid before the Congress and would become operative after a stipulated period unless the Congress vetoed them. This procedure would tend to restrict the role of the courts. It seems to us far more desirable that Congress rather than the courts be the final arbiter in determining the will of Congress.

Appointments and removals

The constitutional basis for senatorial participation in appointments is thoroughgoing—the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" all nonelective governmental officers, though the Congress may vest exclusive appointing power of many of these in the President alone. This, of course, is what Congress has done.

A key problem in this connection is when to require congressional confirmation. Two standards have been used: the position of the office in the administrative hierarchy and the influence of the office on policy formation. At least one Senator has suggested that every job with a salary above \$5,000 require senatorial confirmation. Since Congress frames the broad statutory policy, it seems reasonable that it will insist on habilitation and expansion of trade and industry."—EDITOR'S NOTE.

confirming policy-making administrators. Removal of officials is the prerogative of the President alone. Nevertheless, Congress has frequently displayed more influence in this field than the Constitution and the Myers case⁷ would indicate. Through its other weapons of control and its frequent ability to poison the atmosphere within which administrative officials must operate, Congress has been able to force retirement on officials on many occasions.

The significance of this aspect of congressional control is the fact that Congress may use it to provide that programs instituted by Congress receive "sympathetic" administration. The difficulty here is that Congress may use its power in this field to destroy vigorous and original administrators, and this has certainly happened. It is sometimes said that such administrators should learn to get on with Congress—yet, as we have seen, Congress is not a unit, and it may be impossible to get along with enough of Congress and do an efficient job at the same time. A partial answer to this problem is that the President can stand back of his man, if he feels that the man's position is, program-wise, important to his administration. Many Presidents will not like to do this, for those fights which center themselves on personalities are generally the hottest and the most dramatic fights; and they will often jeopardize other aspects of Presidential programs. But knuckling under to Congress will often have the same effect.

Criticism of senatorial confirmation

Three major complaints are raised against the practice of senatorial confirmation.

⁷ Myers v. U. S., 272 U. S. 52 (1926) declared unconstitutional an act of 1867 denying to the President the right to remove civil officials without consent of the Senate.—
EDITOR'S NOTE.

1. Exclusive vesting of the appointive power in the President is said to be essential to the efficient working of his administration, since the people will hold the President responsible for that administration, and since he must have congenial men to work with. But it may equally be held that the Senate is in large degree representative of the judgment of the people on the President's administration, that very few Presidential nominees are rejected by the Senate, and that the "political" requirements of effective administration mean that the President is generally unfamiliar with the records and personalities of the men whom he appoints. Senatorial advice may actually be helpful to him at this point.

2. It is often said that the hardships and vicissitudes of senatorial confirmation deter many able men from accepting Presidential nominations. Yet we may well wonder how often this actually happens and doubt the capacity of most of the men who are not willing to face political battles.

3. It is argued also that the requirement of senatorial confirmation has tended to overpersonalize issues—that individuals are made the scapegoats for programs unpopular in Congress. A partial answer to this criticism lies in the contention that there has been an educational value in this process—that where executive-legislative fights have centered on men, the programmatic aspects of the fight have generally entered the debate and the American people have been educated in the process. Yet it has happened that the programmatic aspects of debate on nominations have been too greatly minimized and that the issues which have been raised have been tangential. These abuses are rare and are the price we pay for assuring that legislative programs are carried out as intended and that top administrators have the confidence of

Congress, which must continue to support their programs if they are to be effective.

Finally, it should be noted that, while Congress has given up its power to participate in the confirmation of all but a very few executive employees and has yielded up much of its patronage to the merit system over the past seventy years, it still retains some control over the general practices of the executive branch as regards the civil service. Committees of Congress are constantly reviewing the promotion practices and other personnel practices of the various administrative agencies. On the basis of this review, Congress is able to pass laws regulating such practices. Congressional regulation of these practices is important, of course, because of the effect of these practices on the morale and efficiency of government employees and because of Congress' constitutional responsibility for the cost of government.

Review and oversight

Surely congressional "control" implies more than simply setting up the job, the organization, and the standards, and providing the money and helping to provide the men. Review is necessitated, in part, because Congress cannot be absolutely sure of everything it wants administrators to do when it first provides tasks for administrators, and also because changing and highly technical conditions give rise to administrative interpretations of the directives of Congress which Congress wants to be sure are consistent with its own ideas of how the job should be done.

Many believe that Congress goes too far in its reviewing activities—that it should content itself with laying out broad statutory directives, but should not try to settle lesser matters of policy.

Yet it is generally acknowledged that these lesser matters build up into broad policies. It would appear that the objections are not to congressional review per se, but to the unsystematic pattern of it, and to the fact that it is not confined to trying to get knowledge but extends also to trying to give directions. This practice is said to disrupt Presidential control over the bureaucracy and to lead to confusions and conflict within the bureaucracy.

One authority has said:

The fact is that many administrative officials now receive a great deal more guidance from Congressmen than they get from the President. Congressmen are not content only to enact laws which lay down the general policy which shall guide the administrative official in his work. They like to tell him what to do in specific instances.⁸

Note that this quotation speaks of Congressmen, rather than Congress. It is safe to say that most Congressmen feel that they are in Washington partly as plenipotentiaries from their constituents to the administrative branch, and many Congressmen try to wring from administrators as many concessions for constituents as they can. In such cases, congressional "review" certainly has its dangers, for in many of these cases the Congressman is representing only special interest, and not the statutory intent of Congress when it wrote the law governing the administrator.

Techniques of review

The answer to this problem lies, we believe, not in the abdication of congressional review, but in the better organization of Congress for review, so that administrators can take this review as the work of the Congress as a whole. How can Congress best perform its reviewing function? One way is for Con-

⁸ Hyneman, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

gress, on the recommendation of its committees entrusted with review, to write into statute the fruits of administrative experience. Another is for Congress, through joint resolutions, or committee reports, to give voice to its approval or disapproval of general trends of administrative policy. A third is to adapt the procedures used in reorganization plans, which could be extended to provide a congressional veto over administrative measures of which Congress disapproves. Such procedures would still allow the committees of Congress, and individual Congressmen, scope for review and fact finding but would confine direction giving to the whole of Congress. They would make for more consistency in congressional directions.

This is not to say that there is not a legitimate role for the individual legislator in performing his ambassadorial function. Why should he not render service to his constituents in the form of advice on how to deal with government agencies and of aid in dealing with them, so long as he is not asking for special treatment for constituents? Administrators will generally know when Congressmen are seeking special treatment. Congressmen gain valuable experience of the working of the administrative branch through this ambassadorial function. And in doing so they may bring individual abuses to the attention of Congress. It is usually through individual cases that Congress learns of administrative deviation from congressional intent—unless administrators are willing to seek clarification from Congress voluntarily.

How, in fact, does Congress carry out review? It does so through periodic reviews of appropriations committees, through the fact finding of its substantive committees, through personal consultation between Congressmen and administrators, through the efforts of

Congressmen to answer constituent complaints against administration, and through investigations.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 tried to co-ordinate and facilitate congressional review by cleaning up the committee system of Congress, and by assigning the function of review to (a) the substantive committees in each field, (b) the appropriations committees, and (c) the committees on expenditures in the executive branch (now the committees on government operations) in each house of Congress. All of these committees were given enlarged staffs to do the job. Yet so far, according to an outstanding authority in this field, this scheme has met with only "partial success."⁹ The standing committees of Congress have been too heavily burdened with their legislative duties to spend much time on review, save where review occurs in connection with legislative activity.

Administrators' complaints

Many top administrators complain that this plethora of committees subjects them to undue review—that they are forced to spend too much time in testimony (often duplicate testimony) before both houses. Joint committee sittings have been tried, but generally Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, has seemed to feel that this procedure gives the Senate advantages over the House. It has, perhaps, tended toward rivalry rather than co-ordination.

Administrators have also complained that the committees of Congress conflict. This problem arises not only between the two houses, but between committees of the same house, where

⁹ George B. Galloway, "The Operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 45 (March 1951), p. 59.

jurisdictional disputes occur. These disputes may be important policy-wise, since different committees represent, in their membership, different interests. But it may be argued that the disadvantages in this conflict are offset by the main advantages of congressional control and representation. Similar conflict exists in the administrative branch, sometimes created, it is true, by conflict between congressional committees, but often the product of the weakness of our party system as it affects Presidential control of administration.

Investigations

The final and perhaps the most drastic method of congressional control is investigation. There have been numerous examples of intelligent use of investigating power—instances when it had a valuable effect on administrative laxity, when it aroused public opinion and performed the useful function of public education, and when it resulted in bringing before Congress and the public facts which were not previously known or attended to.

There are, however, real problems where these investigations are concerned. They may serve chiefly as avenues of publicity for Congressmen without informing Congress as a whole; they are only important in educating the public where they are used sparingly and on crucial topics; they would generally be better used to sift and evaluate (often in private) information provided from the generally superior sources of the executive branch. Investigating committees have not been sufficiently subject to the discipline of Congress as a whole, and the results have thus not always been legislatively productive of anything save discord. Where they have centered mainly on individuals and personalities, committee procedures have been lax in safe-

guarding the individual: committees have acted as courts while shunning judicial procedure and they have needlessly damaged individual reputations by making public accusations which can rarely be overtaken by disproof and vindication.

Remedies regarding committee procedures have often been proposed, and sentiment has been developing among some Congressmen for their adoption. But remedies for the other vagrancies of investigations are more difficult to find, short of abolishing the useful functions of investigations. Nor are such thoroughgoing remedies possible, since investigation has long been considered, and has been held by the courts to be, a right of Congress incident to legislation. Current judicial doctrine interprets this very broadly.

Investigations are effective congressional weapons in the rivalry of Congress with the chief executive, since they provide publicity which can rival that accorded the President. Moreover, such publicity is a generous source of personal power for certain Congressmen. The attempt to curb investigations would thus be regarded in Congress as a personal attack on these Congressmen, a practice which Congressmen generally eschew.

Not only investigations themselves, but mere threats of investigation are often effective. Many times Congressmen are able to put pressure on administrators by threatening investigations; and administrators have learned that Congressmen stick together in these matters—the man who wants an investigation can often obtain it. The threat of investigation can, of course, be a valuable check on administrators who are out to warp the intent of Congress. But it can also be used to secure special treatment for special constituents, and thus itself warp the intent of Congress.

CONCLUSION

The separation of powers has institutionalized rivalry between the legislative and administrative branches, and has meant that the usual struggle for power between legislatures and administrations is more evident in legislative action in the American system than it is in some other systems. Congress, while not very amenable to discipline on most matters, can sometimes be relied upon to act as a unit when it feels that congressional prerogatives vis-à-vis the executive branch are at stake, for involved in these prerogatives are the personal positions of all Congressmen. Their standing in their constituencies is affected here, since that standing is often not so dependent upon the promotion of programs as it is upon the promotion of services on an individual basis. Where programs are important, Congressmen have found that the necessary delegations of recent years have made surveillance of the administration a continuing necessity which can only be enforced by sticking together on their rights in this matter.

The political status of Congressmen today, then, is often dependent less on the *advocacy* of programs than on the *results* of programs, and these are in the hands of the administration. Yet the function of Congress, in our system, is the advocacy and the legislation of programs. For this purpose congressional control is a *sine qua non*.

It is important, in a democracy, that the public not feel excluded from the operation of government. The growing magnitude of the bureaucracy may produce a popular feeling of helplessness and frustration. This vital problem is being met by competition between Congress and President for public support. Competition between reorganized and more coherent parties may serve as a means to the same end, but such party reform, when coupled with the accept-

ance of Presidential hegemony and minimal congressional supervision, may exclude minority party access to vital information. Such information, and the public education which flows therefrom, can best be guaranteed by the devices of congressional direction and control which we have been discussing.

Congressional control, of course, can defeat congressional purposes where Congress is not organized to keep its purposes in mind. Disparate and disorganized relationships with the bureaucracy will result in a bureaucracy of the same character. We believe, however, that too much emphasis has been placed upon a nicely ordered, symmetrical bureaucracy. There are certain purposes which Congress can realize only by placing certain functions in agencies where Congress will have easy access to them, and where it can be assured that these functions will not be pulled out of line by the force of the full administrative hierarchy.

Congress' main need is to assure that its relationships with these agencies, and with the whole of the bureaucracy, be so organized as to constitute the coherent and consistent will of the legislature. (This will may change from one Congress to another, and Congress must therefore declare itself when its will is modified.) When such a coherent and consistent will is evident, Congress will command more respect from the bureaucracy. Congress will think more in terms of over-all purposes and over-all bureaucratic organization, thus furthering main purposes before subsidiary ones, and Congress will conduct its review of administrative actions with more efficiency and effectiveness and will win more administrative co-operation in this endeavor.

Proposed improvements

Proposals for more effective congressional control within our constitutional system have been debated. They in-

clude reform of the appropriations and budgetary procedure; more adequate congressional staff; the adoption of procedure for legislative vetoes on administrative actions; the institutionalization of better executive-legislative relationships at the top level through some sort of council, thus minimizing prevalent mutual mistrust; and further use of informal consultation at many levels (often more effective than formal devices).

If it is too much to hope for voluntary congressional discipline and restraint in the interests of a unified congressional will on administrative matters, then these steps will have to wait upon reform of the American party system. The strengthening, centralizing, and better disciplining of the party system may be seen as a further and better method of institutionalizing responsibility. But cogent objections have been raised against party reform on the grounds that (1) the American people do not favor the kind of majority rule

it would involve, preferring the less symmetrical but more immediate representation of minorities, and (2) that we cannot be assured that centralization of the party system would promote "political" purpose as against "economic" and sectional purposes, for it might lead to the capture of the parties by the large interest groups.

At present, the institutionalization of responsibility through Congress as it stands, or as it may be revised short of party reform, seems our best bet. For the present we must take Congress as it is—often more representative of many particular purposes than of certain common purposes. The immediate problem is for Congress better to adjust these particular purposes to one another, and to adjust them in large measure *before* Congress conveys its purposes to the bureaucracy, bearing in mind, however, that there are certain areas where the people of this country hold that the promotion of particular purposes is important.

Charles E. Gilbert, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, is lecturing in political science at Swarthmore College and is on the staff of the Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Senator from Minnesota. He was formerly a research fellow of the Social Science Research Council.

Max M. Kampelman, LL.B. and Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is legislative counsel to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. He was formerly on the political science faculties of the University of Minnesota and Bennington College. Articles by him have appeared in the Journal of Politics, Perspective, the American Journal of International Law, and the Minnesota Law Review. He is coauthor of Interpreting the Labor Movement (1953).

Administration and the Courts

By JAMES HART

THE relation of the courts to bureaucracy cuts across every branch of American law: constitutional and statutory law, criminal and civil law, the common law and equity. It is accordingly so complex, and so involved in technical distinctions, that no attempt will here be made to explore its details. The present purpose is rather to capture, if that be possible, a few glimpses of its broad significance.

The clue to that significance is to be sought in the role of the judiciary in our constitutional system. The Constitution is formally the source of a legal order or regime of law; and this regime of law can be made effective in action only if, its application to any particular situation being disputed, there exists an independent third party which is empowered authoritatively to settle the dispute when, but only when, it is appealed to by either of the disputing parties.

Such independent third parties are the courts. Their third-party character is necessary to protect one disputant from having the other impose a settlement by acting as judge in his own cause. It is underlined by the fact that they may not take the initiative, but must sit passively until some plaintiff initiates before them some case against some defendant. Its bulwark is their independence, which is secured by such means as the tenure of judges and their immunity from criminal and tort liability for the manner in which they exercise their judicial powers.

The application of the law to a particular situation includes determining the facts of that situation by following the applicable rules of law. These

rules may prescribe that the facts shall be those agreed upon by the parties to the dispute. They may establish as the facts those well pleaded by one of those parties and admitted upon demurrer by the other. They may provide that the facts shall be those found by judge or jury upon the basis of the evidence offered and allowed, including the testimony of witnesses for both sides, in accordance with the law of evidence. They may also provide that the facts shall be those found, upon the basis of notice and a hearing, by a quasi-judicial tribunal, provided those facts are upon challenge found by the court to be supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited to the court.

THE REPEATED PATTERN

In all branches of the law, and regardless of whether the government or an administrative official or agency is party plaintiff or party defendant, the role of the courts is in essence the same. The central pattern always consists of a plaintiff, a defendant, and a court as the independent third party settling the dispute by applying the law to the legally determined facts.

In a criminal case, the role of the plaintiff falls primarily to the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant is always the accused. But the role of the court is the same, whether the accused is a storekeeper indicted for murdering his wife or an official indicted for a misdemeanor in office.

In a tort case, the plaintiff may be the owner of a horse, and the defendant a neighbor who allegedly has injured

the horse out of spite. The defendant may, however, be a health officer who has killed the horse without notice on the ground that it had the glanders.

In the law of contracts, the plaintiff may be a merchant who is seeking to collect from the defendant on goods delivered. That defendant may be an ordinary customer; but he may be an official who, in ordering registration supplies, acted *ultra vires* because the county was not subject to the registration laws, but who is alleged to have used apt words to bind himself personally. This is not to say that the law is the same for a contracting agent of government as for the agent of a private individual or firm. It is to say that the role of the court is in principle the same in both instances.

In equity, the plaintiff or complainant may be the owner of water-front real property who seeks to have the defendant or respondent enjoined from threatened action which he claims will work him irreparable injury. The defendant may be a boat company whose planned wharf the plaintiff alleges will obstruct entrance to his property; but he may be the Secretary of Defense, whose planned harbor improvements the plaintiff claims are in excess of his statutory authority.

Or take two of the extraordinary common-law writs. The plaintiff or relator may seek a mandamus against a municipal official to compel him to issue a license to engage in the hardware business, on the ground that under a city ordinance the only condition for the issuance of such a license is the payment of a fee which has been tendered and refused, and that it is therefore the ministerial duty of the official to accept the fee and issue the license. Or the plaintiff or applicant may seek to have a writ of habeas corpus issued to the immigration officer who holds him in custody under a warrant for his ar-

rest and deportation as an alien illegally in the United States, when the plaintiff claims to be a foreign-born son of a native-born citizen.

Still again, the parties may be a manufacturing company and the National Labor Relations Board; but either may be plaintiff or defendant. For, the Board having served upon the company an order to cease and desist from specified unfair labor practices, under the statutory review provisions of the governing statute the company may apply to a national Court of Appeals for review, and the Board may apply to the same court for enforcement, of the order.

In the illustration last cited, whichever party moves first, the function of the court is the same: to affirm, modify, or set aside the order according to whether the Board's findings as to the facts are or are not supported by substantial evidence, its procedure has or has not been lawful, and its order is or is not in all respects of a legally permissible scope. The court's duty is no more to throttle the Board than it is to enforce its order without question, no more to curb the Board than to give it free rein. It is rather to adjudicate as between the parties by applying the law to the particular situation without fear or favor, and accordingly to grant enforcement to the Board or relief to the company.

This, moreover, is typical of the duty of every court in every case brought before it, irrespective of all differences in detail.

This responsibility of the courts as independent third parties is a crucial feature of a regime of law. It is admittedly such in the criminal and private law. Administrative law being taken to embrace all parts of the law which govern the relations between administrative agencies and private persons or organizations, it is presently

pertinent to sum up the principal reasons why it is such in this area also.

A FEATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

Judicial review of administrative action is a time-honored feature of our constitutional system. Hence, the importance of continuity with the past as a starting point of orderly improvement establishes a presumption in favor of continuance of the institution. Such review is, moreover, in one form or another, a feature of the constitutional systems of the leading Western nations. Hence, the fact that it is the product of a commonly felt need among countries blessed with popular government and the reign of law strongly reinforces the presumption.

In affirmative support of the presumption, the rationale of the institution is as applicable today as it was in simpler times. Indeed, it is underlined by the administrative expansion of the last two decades. For it affirms that the settlement by a court as an independent third party of a dispute between a private party and an administrative agency is called for in the public interest.

On the one hand, administrators are invested with authority over persons and property; and human beings so invested are apt, whether from overzealous devotion to their task or from less worthy motives, to exceed or abuse their lawful powers. Protection of private interests against such excess or abuse is an indispensable factor in any civilized conception of the public interest. For such protection, however, it is not enough that the law define the scope of such powers and prescribe that they be exercised reasonably in respect alike to substance and to method. It is essential that enforcement of the law be in the hands of the courts as independent third parties.

On the other hand, administrative powers over persons and property are necessary means to reasonable statutory ends of so limiting private freedom as to safeguard vital interests of the community as a whole. If, therefore, the exercise of these powers is found by the courts to be in content and procedure within the law, the public interest requires that the administrative determinations be sanctioned by coercive judicial decrees quite as clearly as in the contrary event it requires that the private interests concerned be protected.

Whichever way the courts decide, moreover, the result obtains from the fact that it is produced by an independent third party a powerful moral sanction. Not least when the stakes are high, this moral sanction is promotive of orderly government, for it greatly facilitates compliance on the part of the losing party and acquiescence on the part of those interests in society which are disappointed at the outcome.

To such reasoning the objection may be raised that the supposed regime of law is illusory, since the law is what the judges say it is, and hence that it is indefensible to vest in men who are not politically responsible the authority in their final discretion to restrict the exercise by administrative commissions of economic controls authorized by representative legislatures.

It is now generally recognized, to be sure, that the courts are far from being mere automatons, mere passive mouthpieces of a pre-existing law which is always unmistakable in its general terms and perfectly clear in its bearing upon all possible situations. This is not to deny that in many parts of the law there is a substantial core of certainty in the application of the law to run-of-the-mine situations. It is to affirm, however, that throughout the law many hypothetical situations can be stated, and actual situations are constantly

arising, to which the application of the law is uncertain, and will remain so until the court of last resort shall have spoken. It is further to affirm that notably in the dynamic field of administrative law there are whole areas of confusion.

Nor is that all. It is the precedents of the courts which have made the common law and equity what they are; and while the courts, in interpreting the written law, are limited by the language used, they fix the meaning of that language for all cases except those which patently come within its intent.

THE SUPREME COURT

Now it may be that the degree of uncertainty in the law is exaggerated by centering attention upon courts of last resort; for theirs is the task of resolving legal uncertainties. This is especially true of the Supreme Court of the United States, to which appeal of right can be taken only in limited classes of cases, and which otherwise selects, by granting or denying petitions for certiorari, the cases which raise new or doubtful questions of law it deems it important to pass upon. Small wonder, then, that this court is often divided.

It is further to be noted in passing that, while a Supreme Court decision which makes new law is retroactive with respect to the given situation, it increases the certainty of the law for the future—a result which is in itself advantageous for all concerned—and that, however wrongheaded such a decision may seem to some informed critics, it is at least a reasoned decision which at the worst overemphasizes principles which judges and other men have long cherished.

In the last analysis, of course, the answer to the objection which has been raised must be that in administrative law, as in the criminal and private law, the independent third-party role of the

courts is too precious to be abandoned even though it involves the fallible judgment of men. If those men are now thought to have "liberal" predilections, the predilections of their predecessors were as consistently "conservative."

ALTERNATIVE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

The best defense of this role of the courts is to contemplate the alternative. In administrative law that alternative would be to allow administrators to determine, subject to political controls, their own powers. Such political controls are new legislation, Presidential direction, and political pressure. New legislation would depend upon the contingencies of politics and the delays of legislative procedure and, once enacted, would have the meaning given it by those it was designed to limit. Presidential direction does not presently apply to several administrative tribunals for the significant reason that, their duties being so analogous to those of courts as to be considered quasi-judicial and their orders being subject to only limited judicial review, Congress has made them plural bodies whose members have overlapping terms and may not be removed by the President because he disagrees with their decisions. So vast has the national bureaucracy become that, even in relation to those agencies which are directly responsible to the President, his span of control stretches very thin; while, in any case, Presidential direction is by nature primarily political rather than remedial. It is notorious that political pressure from Senators and party chiefs spells favoritism rather than the insurance of impartiality. Political control would thus offer no specific or adequate protection to private interests against administrative orders, and might actually cause or aggravate administrative abuses. With administrative authority otherwise unrestrained, two great evils would be

likely to arise. On the one hand, official decisions which were not liable to challenge before an independent third party would lack respect, receive at best reluctant compliance, and often be evaded through political influence and with a clear conscience. On the other hand, removal of the possibility of such challenge would be removal of restraints which that possibility now makes wholesomely operative.

BROADER ISSUES

The objection which has been under examination raises still broader issues when applied to the bearing upon administrative law of a feature of our constitutional system which does not exist in England or France: judicial review of statutes. Our courts may hold an administrative determination invalid not only because it is unauthorized by the governing statute, but also because that statute is itself unconstitutional. This unconstitutionality may of course relate as well to the administrative as to the other provisions of the statute. In order, moreover, to avoid a constitutional issue, the courts may give an exceedingly narrow interpretation of statutory administrative powers. It is thus not possible for American legislatures, as it is for the British Parliament, to define the scope and methods of administrative action, and to narrow or eliminate judicial review thereof, without these enactments being subject to invalidation at the hands of the courts.

Opposition to judicial review of statutes centers upon a ground which has no special reference to administrative law. From democracy conceived as an absolute dogma, and from a formalistic identification with democracy of whatever representative institutions bring forth, there is deduced the conclusion that every enactment of such institutions must be given the force of law.

The subject is too large for treatment in this place; but a few remarks may be ventured, with administrative law especially in mind. The first premise of civilized government is the sacredness of every human personality as having been in some sense made in the image of God. From the conclusion that in the long run government is more apt to conform with this premise if conflicts of interest are resolved only with the consent of a representative assembly chosen by universal suffrage in free elections and with free discussion, rather than by any sort of traditional or self-appointed elite, it by no means follows that the authority to govern, even with the consent of such an assembly, is in any civilized society unlimited.

Government is civilized only if the resolution of conflicts of interest is limited by recognition that all men and all groups and lawful organizations of men have mutual interests in the basic civil liberties, in procedural and substantive fair play for all, and in having disputes arising out of particular situations adjudicated by an independent third party.

Recognition of these limits may of course be provided in more than one manner. It may be so firmly embedded in the habitual moral convictions of a people that the resulting moral restraints are on the whole adequate. If it is not to some extent so embedded, it cannot be secured by any purely artificial means.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES

We Americans stand somewhere between these extremes. The essential restraints have high authority from our past to support them; and there are courageous men in every generation to appeal to that authority. But we also have habits of irresponsibility which enable the passions of the moment to over-

ride civilized restraints. It is probably well, therefore, that the constitutional limitation of due process, or fair play, is embodied, as obligatory even upon representative assemblies, in the fundamental law of the nation, and hence is to be applied as law when a court sits as an independent third party to settle a dispute between an administrator who relies upon a statutory provision and a private party who claims that that provision authorizes a denial of fair play.

Similarly, if judicial review of administrative action is a *sine qua non* of civilized government, should the supreme law of the land not ensure that the independent third party shall have untrammelled authority to exercise it? And how can it ensure this unless it gives that independent third party the last word on the scope of review which constitutionally must be allowed by statute?

THE ROLE OF CRITICISM

To justify judicial review in principle is not, however, to place it beyond criticism. General principles do not decide borderline cases. The choices which the Supreme Court is constantly making are choices of statesmanship, and judicial statesmanship, like political statesmanship, can falter and fail.

The suggestion may be hazarded that, aside from its deplorable stand in the matter of utility rate-making by administrative commissions, the old Court's most grievous failure, which justly brought judicial review into disrepute and almost inevitably led to the crisis of 1937, concerned administrative law less than such subjects as freedom of contract and dual federalism.

The new Court has corrected those errors, whether or not by going too far it is not possible here to inquire. It has also upheld Congress in devolving upon administrative agencies pow-

ers which, in the scope of their discretion, are in sum impressive, and to many alarming. Yet for the Court to refuse to sanction the vesting of such administrative powers, or so to control their exercise as to hamstring administrative action as a means to permissible statutory ends, would be to defeat with one hand policies it declared constitutional with the other. It would be to deny to Congress the "necessary and proper" means of carrying into execution its delegated powers. If our once individualistic democracy has been increasingly socialized, surely the devil is neither Congress nor the Court, but the industrial-technological revolution.

What has been said makes apparent the urgent importance of judges' of all grades being men of sensitive conscience and exceptional wisdom and of their having their minds and consciences advised by the most searching criticism of their work by philosophers as well as lawyers and dissenters from the bench, exponents of the humanities as well as social scientists. It is, however, always to be remembered of and by the critics that theirs too is a fallible human judgment.

Nor is it to be forgotten that judicial statesmanship is of a different order from political statesmanship. The criteria which the Supreme Court and its critics should consciously apply in administrative law are implicit in the rationale of judicial review of administrative action. It is the task of this independent third party to weigh in the scales of judgment conflicting ends which are always represented in the administrative law cases it decides by the parties at its bar. One of these ends is to have specific enforcement in individual cases of the statutory and constitutional limits of administrative powers. The other end is that the governing process be not rendered ineffective by undue judicial interference.

To say this is not to furnish a formula for the ready-made solution of particular problems; but it is the first lesson of wisdom that all such supposed formulas are illusory. It is, in truth, but to state a dilemma; but it is the second lesson of wisdom that the problems of life always appear as dilemmas. Without this realization men are apt to seize one horn without even considering the other, and thus to doom themselves to one-sided judgment.

In conclusion, a word to the layman. Were examination of administration and the courts now to proceed from the

realm of generality to such specific questions as the methods, scope, and timing of judicial review, he would doubtless be surprised by two things. One would be, how many are the forms which the indicated dilemma in fact takes; and the other would be, how difficult the choices often become for anybody who does not focus his attention upon one of the competing ends to the exclusion of the other. The judicial task of maintaining a balance by sustaining administrators here and restraining them there is one of the highest that can be assigned to mortal men.

James Hart, Ph.D., after teaching at the University of Michigan and the Johns Hopkins University, has been since 1936 professor of political science at the University of Virginia. He was a member of the staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management. His publications include An Introduction to Administrative Law with Selected Cases (1940; second edition 1950).

Staff and Management Controls

By HERBERT A. SIMON

AT the outset, it may be well to explain what the word "bureaucracy" means to me. In my vocabulary it does not serve as a swear word—a label for the quintessence of all I dislike about government—but as an approximate synonym for large-scale organization. In this, I think I conform to the original meaning of the term, although hardly to current popular usage. And I assume that the neutral sense of the term is intended in the title of this volume.

Big Government, along with automobiles and the atom bomb, is here to stay. It is conceivable, although not probable, that Big Government may become Slightly Smaller Government by decreasing in scale from hundreds of billions of dollars to tens of billions, but it will not become Small Government. As in the case of other natural phenomena, it needs more to be explained, understood and dealt with, than to be bemoaned. And it can even be strongly argued that a large part of the bemoaning is based on misinformation as to how Big Government operates in our country.

Large-scale organization inevitably creates problems of control. In every organization in our society there is always some person or group of persons whom we regard as having the legitimate right to determine the organization's program and the way the program is carried out. In business concerns, the legitimate right of control rests with the stockholders; in government, with the citizens. The problem of control is the problem of implementing that right. The board of di-

rectors in business concerns and the legislature in governments are formal devices whose main concern is the implementation of the right of control, and these are supplemented by many other devices, formal and informal—political parties are an example.

The problem of control is a serious one in large-scale organization because of two related facts: (1) those who legitimately control it simply cannot cope with its size—they have time neither to find out in detail what is going on nor to decide what should go on; (2) the employees in the bureaucracy may use this absence of accountability to further their own purposes, which may not be the purposes of the legitimate controllers. There is nothing about this situation that is peculiar to government. The executives of any large business spend most of their time dealing with these same problems: securing adequate motivation of manual workers and middle-level executives and supervisors, securing co-ordination of goals and activities, combating the venality of employees who are tempted to steal tools or accept bribes from vendors.

The phenomena we call "corruption," "confusion," and "inefficiency" in large-scale organization are the symptoms of the inadequacies of the control process. And the phenomena we call "red tape" are largely the unintended effects of our attempts to strengthen the controls by formalizing the procedures for co-ordination, communication, and review. "Red tape" is, so to speak, the secondary reaction produced by the sulfa drugs we have prescribed for the primary infection of lack of control.

CONTROLS OVER RESOURCES: THE BUDGET

Every military commander knows that when he has committed his reserves, he has had his say—he retains painfully little control over the subsequent course of the battle. It would be only mild exaggeration to say that, similarly, when the budget has been approved and resources allocated to programs and departments, the top level executives in large organizations have had their say. Control devices can help them ascertain that the resources have been used for the general purposes intended, but can have little detailed effect on the precise way in which they are used.

The budget is essentially an expenditure plan for a specified period of time, usually a year. Two basic kinds of decisions have to be reached in order to establish a budget; and to understand the budget process it is essential that they be distinguished clearly. First, there are decisions as to the objectives to be reached—the kinds of services and the quality of service to be provided. Second, there are decisions as to how much money, if it is spent efficiently, is required to meet these objectives. Much of the confusion that surrounds public discussion of “economy in government” can be traced to a failure to distinguish these two aspects of the problem. When we demand governmental economy do we mean that we want fewer and poorer services, or do we mean that we think the same services we now have, and the same quality of service, can be provided for less money?

A simple analogy with our household budgets will illustrate the distinction. If a husband asks his wife to economize on the food budget, does he mean that meat should be on the menu less frequently or that she should shop for the meat more carefully? The first is

a question of *service levels*, the second a question of *efficiency*. And I am sure that any husband who supposes he can accomplish substantial economies in the food budget by improving efficiency, without affecting quality, will find a very unreceptive audience in his wife.

It is easy to cut a budget, governmental or otherwise, simply by refusing to appropriate more funds. But to cut a budget without reducing service levels—that is, by increasing efficiency—is an extremely difficult feat in a large organization. It is accomplished, if at all, by a painstaking re-examination of specific administrative operations—an examination that can be undertaken only with the help of the members of the bureaucracy whose efficiency is to be improved.

Here, as elsewhere in large-scale organization, control from above and without is a poor substitute for motivation from within. High-level review of budgets is an important tool for determining what services shall be provided, and at what levels. But the road to control of efficiency lies in a different direction: in the direction of a bureaucracy that is professional in its attitude towards its management tasks and that is technically equipped to find efficient ways of doing its work. Such a bureaucracy can be assisted in its search for efficiency by specialized units, but the function of these is more in the nature of “consultation” than in the nature of “control.”

Looking at the budget, then, as an instrument for allocation of resources and the determination of service levels, what can we say of budget practice in the federal government today? We can say, first, that a major advance has been made over the past thirty years in the fact that the federal government has a budget procedure that permits the President and Congress, in a reasonably orderly way, to view the expenditure

program as a whole; and that it has in the Bureau of the Budget a considerable staff of trained personnel who can contribute real strength to the control process by their preliminary review of departmental appropriation requests.

Having noted this major accomplishment, we can ask what remains to be accomplished. Among the lines along which major improvements can be made in present federal budgeting are these: (a) reduction in the practice of making supplemental appropriations; (b) elimination of the confusion between commitments and expenditures; (c) development of techniques for measuring what the dollars buy as well as how many dollars are spent; (d) development of techniques for comparing alternative budget plans.

Supplemental appropriations

It is an all too common practice for federal departments to return to the Congress for supplemental appropriations when they have exhausted the funds appropriated to them for the budget period. The existence of this practice on a large scale is in itself evidence of the failure of controls. But the blame for the practice is not to be laid solely at the doors of the administrative agencies. We must not naïvely suppose that supplemental appropriations are required simply because agencies have failed to reduce service levels or increase efficiency as required by the mandate of Congress and the President—although this may sometimes be the explanation.

Another, and legitimate, reason for supplemental appropriations is the inability of the budget planners to anticipate what expenditures will be required. The fact that there was no budget in June of 1950 to fight the Korean War was not regarded as a reason for not fighting it. Unexpected international and domestic developments undoubt-

edly account in part for the practice. Over and above this, it must be pointed out that the controllers are often as much at fault as the controlled. If Congress enacts legislation that makes certain expenditures mandatory and then refuses to make appropriations adequate to meet these expenditures, a supplemental appropriation is inevitable. Moreover, if administrative agencies learn through this practice that the Congress does not always mean what it says when it reduces appropriations, the controlled cannot be expected to take the controllers too seriously. We have here a serious breakdown in control that has deep roots in the political process.

Commitments and expenditures

It is a common misconception that if Congress appropriates fifty billion dollars to the federal government for the year 1999, then fifty billion dollars, more or less, will be spent in 1999. In reality, a considerable part of the fifty billion dollars may be appropriated for battleships, hospitals, and bombers that will not be completed until the year 2001. And during 1999, the federal government may be spending additional large sums that were appropriated in previous years. In present federal budget practice, it is an extremely difficult accounting feat to deduce the spending rate from the amounts of the appropriations, and Congress encounters a corresponding difficulty in understanding how much it is really spending.

Measuring what the dollars buy

The idea that expenditure proposals should be classified in such a way that they can be related to the services purchased has gained widespread attention as a result of the Hoover Commission's advocacy of “performance budgeting.” The concept of “performance budgeting” goes back, under other names, at

least thirty years, but the progress toward achieving it at any level of government has been less than spectacular. To develop a meaningful performance budget for the federal government is an extremely important task that will require a major research effort costing millions of dollars. What now goes on in the federal government under the label of "performance budgeting" is a pale shadow of the full-bodied idea.

The first step toward a performance budget involves a major reclassification of federal accounts so that we can discover how many dollars are being spent to provide each service. The second, and more difficult, step is to devise techniques for measuring the amount and quality of the services provided by each expenditure.

Some examples of performance budgeting can be found in the Forest Service, which has been employing the technique for more than fifteen years. From the Forest Service budget we can find out how much it costs to protect forests from fire—because the accounts are arranged in a way that brings all these costs together. On the service measurement side, we can also find out how many acres of forest are being protected; and with respect to results, we can find out how many acres are destroyed each year by fire. Other examples of the same kind can be cited; but as an over-all matter, only a small part of the total federal budget can now be analyzed in even these rough terms.

Comparing alternative budgets

None of the improvements discussed thus far solve the sixty-four dollar questions that have to be answered in any budget process: "How much additional service will an additional dollar buy, and how much less service will result from a dollar cut?" and "Could we get the same service for fewer dollars by doing it in a different way?" These

are, of course, the questions of service levels and of efficiency with which we began our discussion of budgeting.

Make no mistake about the difficulties involved. How easy is it to estimate how many acres of forest land will be saved if we increase the fire protection appropriation by a million dollars? And how do we determine whether the million dollars should be spent for tractors, or for lookout towers, or for manpower, or in some other way? And if we can answer this question for fire fighting, how do we answer it for expenditures on tanks and planes?

In raising these problems, I do not mean to imply that they are hopeless of solution. But perhaps in the light of the difficulties that have been enumerated, the earlier estimate of a research effort requiring millions of dollars will now not seem unreasonable.

AGENCIES OF CONTROL: "LINE" AND "STAFF"

We have said that the problem of control in a bureaucracy arises basically because the controllers cannot cope with its size and complexity. The budget reduces this complexity to some sort of order, but hardly to a scale where it can be handled effectively by a President and a Congress. "The President needs help," said the 1937 President's Committee, and cries for help for both President and Congress have been frequent and strident.

Specific proposals for providing this help most often take the form of new agencies—"staff agencies" they are usually called—designed to share with the executive and the legislature the responsibilities of control. In the federal government, for example, we have a Budget Bureau, a Civil Service Commission, a Comptroller General, and a General Services Administration, all of which are involved in one or another aspect of the control process.

But does not this solution contain a fundamental paradox? The federal government is too large and complex to be controlled effectively by the President. We will remedy this by creating a new agency, thus increasing its size and complexity. Instead of having his dozen department heads to deal with, the President will now also have a Director of the Budget.

Are staff agencies "different"?

Those who recommend the proliferation of staff agencies as a solution to the problem of control deny this paradox by arguing that staff agencies are "different"—both in their relation to the controller and in their relation to the controlled. They are "different," it is said, in their relation to the chief executive because they "represent him," they "act for him" or "in his name," they are "a part of him." They are "different," it is said, in their relation to the bureaucracy because, unlike the chief executive himself, they do not "actually exercise authority," they "only advise and inform"; when they give orders, they exercise "the chief executive's authority, and not their own."

I must confess that this kind of language has always baffled me—as it must baffle laymen who have not grown accustomed to its constant use in the literature of administration. The President needs help to control the Department of Agriculture, say, because in the absence of such help he cannot be sure that the Department will accept his purposes, and those of the Congress. The Bureau of the Budget is to give him that help. But what guarantees that the Bureau will not develop its own bureaucratic purposes, will not implement these instead of the President's? The steward guards that the servant serve the master. But who guards that the steward serve the master?

Stripped of its metaphysical clothing, the argument for the staff agency is based on the premise that a relatively small administrative agency not possessed of special responsibilities of its own will be more likely to identify with the President, and less likely to develop its own bureaucratic purposes, than will a large operating agency. Stated thus, the proposition is not without plausibility, and has perhaps even some empirical evidence in its favor—although the evidence has really never been examined in a systematic and scientific way.

But if this is the reason that the staff agency helps in control, we should expect its effectiveness to be in inverse relation to (a) its size and (b) the degree of internal specialization within it. If the staff agency is large (and even the Budget Bureau numbers its employees in the hundreds), it has its own internal problems of bureaucratic control. And if there is much specialization within it, the over-all viewpoint identified with the Presidency will gradually yield to the partial viewpoint of specialized goals and objectives. When the Civil Service Commission has a disagreement with the Secretary of Agriculture—the one preoccupied with the problems of governmental personnel, the other with the problems of agriculture—which one "represents" the President and the will of the Congress?

What about the relations of the staff agency with the bureaucracy it is supposed to control? Again, the idea that "the staff agency does not really exercise authority, but only speaks in the name of the President" must be treated as myth rather than reality. If the President acts on the recommendations of a budget examiner for a reduction in a request from the Department of Commerce, the authority is, in some legal sense, the President's, but the judgment is the examiner's. The Secretary of Commerce,

at least, will be under no illusions as to the authority exercised over him by the Budget Bureau. He will realize that only a small fraction of the disagreements that arise between him and the budget examiners can be appealed to the President—that the function of the Bureau is precisely to relieve the President of this burden of decision.

The price of control

In summary, we see that the processes of control can be strengthened by creating agencies whose primary function is to provide an "independent" review of the action of the administrative departments. But we see also that a price must be paid for these additional controls. The price is made up of several components: (1) the actual salary and other costs of operating the control agency, (2) the development of goals within the control agency that are not identical with the goals of the executive and legislature, and (3) the limits that are placed on the operating departments by the control agencies, which restrict the discretion of the department executives in discharging the responsibilities that are placed on them.

This last category of costs, costs arising from the limits placed on operating departments—leads us to the subject of "red tape." The summary report of the Hoover Commission contained this analysis, full of unintended humor, of the problems of control in the federal government:

Definite authority at the top, a clear line of authority from top to bottom, and adequate staff aids to the exercise of authority do not exist. Authority is diffused, lines of authority are confused, staff services are insufficient. Consequently, responsibility and accountability are impaired.¹

¹ *The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), p. 3.

What the Commission did not point out—or see—was that the staff services, whose "insufficiency" it deplored, were a primary cause for the confusion in lines of authority that the Commission equally deplored. Let us cite a concrete example. One of the important functions of the Department of Commerce is to gather a wide range of statistics about the operation of the American economy. The notion of a "clear line of authority" would imply that the Secretary of Commerce and his subordinates should make the decisions involved in carrying out these statistical functions, and should be judged by the results. But before any federal agency can send a questionnaire to a business firm, the questionnaire must be approved, in its complete detail, by the Division of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of the Budget. The DSS is charged with the responsibility of eliminating duplication in federal questionnaires and ensuring the technical adequacy of statistical studies. Under these organizational arrangements, who is to be held responsible for the quality of the statistical services of the Department of Commerce? And how many review steps, over what period of time, must a questionnaire undergo before it is employed by the Department?

In spite of the delays and the ambiguities in responsibility that are inevitably created when such a review process is established, the advantages of the review may well outweigh its costs. But in assessing its value, it is important that we try to measure the *net* benefits, after all these extra costs have been deducted, and that we not delude ourselves into thinking that we have gained something for nothing. The staff agency can be a valuable device for solving difficult problems of control in large-scale organization, but it is a device that needs to be used sparingly and with discretion. It is a real

question in my mind, and in the minds of other observers of large-scale organization, whether further improvement of control in the federal government calls for a greater, or a more restricted, use of this device.

CONTROL AT THE LOWER LEVELS

Thus far we have viewed the problem of control from the high mountaintops of the Presidency. The problem is of course duplicated at successively lower levels of the government. Most federal departments and bureaus, and many of the lower-level units, are of sufficient size to experience all the difficulties of large-scale organization.

Not only are the problems similar in these lower-level units, but many of the same solutions have been adopted. The budget process is of value not only to the President in weighing the competing claims of departments, but equally to the department head and bureau chief in controlling the allocation of resources within their respective units. Staff units, too, of varying degrees of elaborateness have emerged within the departments and bureaus: personnel units, budget units, organization and methods units, and others. Twenty years ago, the development of such staff units outside the military departments was most rudimentary; today they are a prominent feature of most federal units of any size, and of many state and municipal organizations as well—the appointment of an administrative officer in the City of New York being a recent instance of the general trend.

It is not necessary to repeat here our previous analysis of staff assistance. The same issues as those discussed earlier apply as we move down the administrative ladder to organizations of smaller size and lesser complexity. Units specialized for control functions can make a contribution at all these levels, but generalization is hardly pos-

sible as to how many are desirable or at what specific levels.

But as we move down the structure, mechanisms of control other than specialized units take on increasing importance. In administrative organizations having a fairly cohesive purpose, and drawing their professional staffs from a relatively homogeneous background, "internal" mechanisms take on more and more of the burden of control. The United States Public Health Service, for example, draws the largest part of its professional staff from the medical profession. In so doing, it is able to use the whole structure of controls which that profession impresses on its members. I do not refer to the official pronouncements of the American Medical Association, or to "professional ethics"—although both of these are important—but to the whole set of values, techniques, and standards of professional competence that the members of the profession have in common, and that are enforced through the constant interaction of practitioners and the significance they attach to the approval of their peers.

Professional standards do not guarantee conformity with the values of society or of its political mechanisms. Librarians may want more libraries, public health practitioners more clinics, fire chiefs more equipment, than citizens want or are willing to pay for. Hence, professional standards do little to simplify the resource allocation process that is the central purpose of budgeting. A budget process and top-level political review of budget allocations are still absolutely necessary to mediate the claims of the various professions, each with its own conception of the public welfare.

But if professional standards help little to solve the problem of service levels, they help a great deal to solve the problem of efficiency. Efficiency

must start at the "grass roots" of the bureaucracy; it must permeate each small part of the mass of activities performed by a large-scale organization. And we have seen that the available techniques for control from the top are particularly ineffective for the task of detailed day-to-day supervision. The motivation toward efficient administration must derive primarily from the bureaucracy itself—from the professional standards it imposes on its members and the desire it instills in them to do a good job as judged by their fellows.

Although no careful comparative study has ever been made of the efficiency of government agencies, it appears to the casual observer that there is a high correlation between managerial efficiency and the degree of professionalization of a particular agency. The Forest Service, with its close parallel development of the federal agency and of university programs in forestry, is a case in point.

Government and business compared

Much has been made of the absence of the "profit motive" as an explanation of why government agencies are less efficient than business organizations. Even if we accept the assumption, which seems to me somewhat doubtful, that government agencies *are*, across the board, less efficient, I am not sure that the explanation holds water. In the first place, in any large business concern there are many activities whose contribution to profit cannot, in fact, be assessed in any very accurate way. In the second place, in the absence of a profit criterion, a professional group motivated to do a good job will develop score cards for excellence to take the place of the profit criterion. Much remains to be done, in both government and business, to develop and improve such score cards, and to relate the criteria of the smaller component units to

the over-all goals of the organization. If the work on performance budgeting is carried ahead with sufficient vigor and imagination, it will in time contribute to the development of such criteria.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the problems of control in large-scale organizations can be made to vanish only by doing away with large-scale organizations—something unlikely to occur in the modern world as we know it. Short of making the problems vanish, there are some things we can do to make them manageable, but only after a careful assessment in each case of benefits and costs. One such way is to develop, along the lines already projected, a budget process that would assist in the intelligent allocation of society's resources to the many governmental services that compete for them.

A complementary line of approach is the careful and judicious development at various levels within the bureaucracy of units whose primary function is to assist in the control process. In order to do this intelligently, we shall need to be more realistic than we have been in the past as to just how such units operate, what consequences they have in terms of authority, responsibility, and "red tape," and how far their values outweigh their costs. With the rapid growth of "staff" agencies over the past generation, the immediate need is probably more for reflection and consolidation than for multiplication.

Finally, the control of governmental efficiency will make its progress primarily through the developing professionalization of the bureaucracy itself. Careers in governmental service must become more respectable and respected—an item in which our progress has been mostly backwards since the war.

The examples of the professional corps and the university-profession-agency relationship that characterize some of the most efficient governmental operations need to be extended over a wider range of governmental functions, and over such time-honored municipal activities as fire, police, and public works administration.

In one sense these goals are nonpolitical—they can be accepted by Democrats and Republicans alike. In another sense they are intensely political. The

rate at which they will be attained will depend critically upon public attitudes toward government. If the public accepts the common stereotype of the lazy, venal "bureaucrat," it will not expect efficient, responsible government, and it will not get it. To the extent that the public recognizes that the problems of efficiency in government are as serious as, but no more serious than, these problems in other large-scale organizations, we can expect substantial progress toward these goals.

Herbert A. Simon, Ph.D., is professor of administration and head of the Industrial Management Department in the Graduate School of Industrial Administration of Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh. He has served on the faculty of Illinois Institute of Technology, and the staffs of the Bureau of Public Administration, the University of California, and the International City Managers' Association. He has been consultant on management problems to government agencies, including the Economic Cooperation Administration and the Bureau of the Budget. He is author or coauthor of Measuring Municipal Activities (1938), Administrative Behavior (1947), Public Administration (1950), and other books and articles.

Interest Groups and Bureaucracy

By EDGAR LANE

IT should no longer be necessary to defend the proposition that men's diverse interests define their political existence. While appeals for a common rededication to the convenient ambiguities of "the national welfare" are among the conventions of American campaign oratory, they fly in the face of much that we know (or should know) about ourselves. We are awed, even flattered, by descriptions of government as a distant monolith, greater somehow than the sum of the social parts from which it derives and exigent of the good citizen's total allegiance. But we actually pattern our collective life on the somewhat different principle that government is merely a specialized instrument for the protection or frustration of the various ends that groups of men happen to regard as important. Once grant that men have the right to differ on fundamentals, that they have the right to want more for themselves than for others, that they further have the right to seek by any honest means to impose their wishes on their fellows, and it could not have been otherwise.

Since these concessions lay close to the heart of our national life, there should be nothing startling in the fact that, from colonial times on, men and groups of men have sought both to prompt and to prevent the exercise of governmental power. This involves what Willard Hurst has called "if not the fundamental object of government . . . at least an aspect of government's main purpose," which is simply "that men should come to it, all the more so because what they want may be against

the general welfare."¹ We need not here examine "the general welfare" as an objective reality. It is enough to say that it may at least reflect an operational consensus, and that one measure of a democratic order is the extent to which it protects men's right to assail it.

GROUPS IN POLITICS

A politics based on men's interests, organized to a greater or lesser degree, is not peculiar to the United States, or to constitutional republics, or, for that matter, to systems conforming to broadly democratic values. Even totalitarian states, theoretically enlisted in total service to parahuman ends, exhibit in practice a distinct, if fetal, species of interest politics. Our experience, rather, is distinguished by the unusual degree to which our interests have been organized and by the special conditions under which they have been politically effective.

Constructive analysis of interest politics in America must begin with the multifarious activities of organized groups—"pressure groups," "lobbies," or "interest groups" in the social scientist's more descriptive term. The origins and nature of these groups and their role in the political process have been extensively treated elsewhere, most notably in David Truman's *The Governmental Process*.² It would be redundant to say more here than that

¹ J. Willard Hurst, *The Growth of American Law* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1950), p. 62.

² New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

life is always less simple than it used to be, that we can no longer hope to live it substantially alone (if we ever could), and that the development of meaningful associations with others is the civilized man's response to the otherwise incommensurable bewilderment of the world in which he lives. Groups arise when and because men perceive the interests they hold in common. These interests, in turn, flow naturally and in great quantity from the functional specialization and diffusion of human relationships which largely define social growth. In the United States, a mobile and expanding population, a self-generative technology, an unquenchable regionalism, vast and usable material wealth, a broadly protected tradition of free political association and expression, and highly developed instruments of mass communication have all conduced to the proliferation of organized groups. The structure of our governmental institutions—diffused and accessible—has contributed no less significantly to the process.

And as the substantive jurisdictions of government have, largely under the spur of specialized group efforts, expanded so as to involve the significant shared interests of more and more people, more and more continuously, so have the groups organized around these interests become permanently active in seeking to affect or mitigate what government does. We do not have accurate knowledge of how many groups seek to impose their claims on agencies of government, nor do we know how much human or material expenditure their efforts entail. The Department of Commerce lists more than four thousand national associations alone, to say nothing of local, state, and regional groups. How many of these have been politically active in any significant sense? On the national level, more than five hundred groups have been deeply enough en-

gaged in legislative politics to concede some liability to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act; several hundred others have not complied, although they are represented by hired agents who have. No parallel data are available as to the number of groups substantially engaged in seeking to affect administrative decisions, but there is no reason to assume that the aggregate figure would be any smaller.

Character and cost

If we do not know how many active political interest groups there are, we know even less of the character and cost of their exertions. Group reports filed under the Lobbying Act have recently indicated group legislative expenditures of approximately ten million dollars annually, but it is quite clear that this figure only begins to reflect the realities. In the states, the absence of uniform disclosure laws makes discussion of group activity the more hazardous, although it is plainly extensive. It is equally plain that on no level of government is public policy conceived, enacted, or applied—nor can it be understood—apart from the men whose interests are somehow touched by it.

The growth of political interest groups in America has been of special importance in the growth of public bureaucracies, at least partly because the concomitance of the two processes has been so little perceived. While "lobbying" and other overt manifestations of group political effort have conventionally been regarded as involving only the legislature, interest groups have been under no obligation to bend their activities to the abstract verities of separation of powers. They have been and are active, rather, wherever governmental decisions affecting their membership are made. In an era marked by the rela-

tive decline of legislative prestige and authority, the groups' concern with administrative policy-making is thus as natural as it is intense.

One aspect of the long-standing interrelationship between interest groups and administrative bodies is reflected in the establishment of agencies concerned primarily with clientele and service like the Veterans Administration or the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, and Commerce. Some of these agencies have developed directly out of politically articulate group demands for public subsidies and benefits, or for protection against the demands of other interests. In other cases, the establishment of a public agency serving a more or less unorganized clientele has served as a catalyst for the more effective grouping of the interests concerned, as well as of those interests which might be disadvantaged by the new agency's activities. Of the latter situation, the history of securities regulation in the United States is perhaps the readiest example.

Equally in point is the more recent development of a distinctive administrative process in agencies structured along other than purely clientele lines. Operating under general legislative charters, these bodies have been increasingly charged with the formulation and enforcement of binding rules affecting private persons. It should occasion no surprise that these persons and the groups in which they are organized should seek by every available means to ensure the conformity of the rules to their own interests. Their right so to do, moreover, has been explicitly recognized and procedurally safeguarded in such enactments as the federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. Irrespective of its special origins and purposes, legislation of this kind can be taken as a practical reflection of the depth of group involvement in admin-

istrative politics and as an effort to inject into the latter certain of the expectations of reasonable openness and equality of approach that have at least formally been associated with group-legislative relationships.

Action on various fronts

This does not mean that groups have turned their attention away from the legislatures; they act, rather, on different stages at different times, or on several stages simultaneously. At the risk of considerable oversimplification, one might contrast Collis P. Huntington's single-minded quest for outright congressional gifts with the very much more complex program of the Association of American Railroads, which might at one time be pressing Congress for statutory relaxation of the Sherman Act, petitioning the Interstate Commerce Commission for higher freight tariffs, and "educating" the electorate to the evils of publicly supported highways. These tactics and concerns are not unique; they demonstrate only the extent to which all groups, if they are to be effective, must conform their efforts to changing distributions of political power and changing patterns in its exercise. It is less a question of having so much energy to expend than of somehow finding enough additional energy to participate effectively in an ever widening decision-making process. Groups must constantly attune themselves to the working competence of government, which their own demands tend inevitably to enlarge.

GROUPS AND ADMINISTRATION

To say that groups are as significantly involved in the administrative as in the legislative process suggests the difficulty of precise delineations of group tactics in the two areas; they merge within groups as they may vary among them. For one group, informal personal entree

to decisional centers may be sufficient to ensure a total accommodation of public policy to group objectives. For another, the most massive or determined external public relations campaign may accomplish or prevent nothing. One need think no further than organized labor's unsuccessful effort to head off the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Tactical choices or necessities hinge on such diverse variables as group resources and membership, on the group's prestige and promotional position, on the ease of its contacts with the inner reaches of government, on the nature and probable consequences of the policy at issue, on the innovative or preventive character of group objectives, on the presence or absence of well-entrenched competitive interests, on precedent, public expectations, preference, or simple hunch. The ways of group politics are many, and if they have never been fully catalogued they have been sufficiently described in the literature to obviate the need for further discussion here.

We should note, however, that the common strain in all group political effort is the achievement and exploitation of linkages between group preferences and the behavior of public officials—legislative, administrative, or judicial. Here, in essence, is "the group problem," if such there be. A group's political success depends on its ability to create and use official identifications with itself—to destroy, in effect, the fiction that a man becomes a political eunuch when he takes an oath of office. The problem is not so much that this fiction is one of the fundamental conceptual binders holding the system together as that it is destroyed with such fearful ease. The spark of life for the political interest group is thus its conversion of a phrase like the "public interest"—a deeply meaningful thing in a democratic order—to a self-serving shibboleth.

We are talking, in brief, about what the Douglas Subcommittee on Ethical Standards in Government more or less generically referred to as "involvement." In the simplest sense, this means nothing more than almost every man's penchant for approaching the world from the standpoint of his own inexplicit or inarticulate major premises. More difficult are those situations where the premises are shriekingly articulate, or, to change the figure, where the view is determined by deliberately polarized blinders. Our problem is the role of the interest group as shaper of premises for the bureaucratic mind and hanger of blinders on the bureaucratic nose. And since this is less a problem of "pressure" than of preferences, it is a boundlessly difficult one to analyze, describe, or solve.

THE REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

Much of the current literature centers on the political interest group as a representative phenomenon, as a spontaneous but inevitable growth resulting from the manifest inadequacies of our system of undifferentiated territorial representation. Although it has led some observers to propose extreme institutional reconstruction along functional lines, this emphasis has been both accurate and essentially wholesome. It has, however, served to focus an excess of attention on the relationships of groups and explicitly representative bodies—that is, the legislatures—to the relative neglect of the administrative bureaucracy in its representative aspect. We are only partly right in equating the growth of bureaucracy with the development of *expertise* as the result of complex problems or the assumption by government of broader social responsibilities. For this complexity is seldom easily perceived, the assumption by government of new responsibilities is never a simple mat-

ter, and the view of bureaucracy as expert is often merely a deft piece of institutional public relations. Although operating under different patterns of public expectation, acceptance, and control, bureaucracy in the United States, in its origins, functioning, and ultimate accountability, is as representative as the Congress or the state legislatures.

But whom does bureaucracy represent, and how do interest groups affect its representativeness? We have already referred to the clientele basis of a substantial part of our administrative organization. Here is perhaps the simplest case of representative bureaucracy, exemplified by such agencies as the Departments of Labor and Commerce. Although having somewhat different origins and purposes, many of the "independent" "regulatory" agencies have also come to perform distinct services for the interests whose activities they were ostensibly created to police, a statement of which the pattern of public utilities and transportation regulation in almost all jurisdictions should be obvious and adequate proof. Under these circumstances, a regulatory mission can quite readily become a representative one. Other agencies have explicit representative arrangements worked into their formal structures or operating codes, a tendency of which the National Industrial Recovery Act was the supreme (although by no means the only or most recent) case in point.

This is interest representation within the bureaucracy of a fairly direct sort. More tenuous but even more durable are those group-agency linkages which rest on practice, personality, and tacit understanding. We need only note, for example, the almost universal assumption that certain high offices will be staffed from certain interested sources. Martin P. Durkin's brief travail as Secretary of Labor can be taken as a demonstration of the rigor with which such

conventions are apt to be regarded, even under the most adverse conditions.

Bureaucrats in interest groups

This process, of course, has an even more significant converse; not only have bureaucrats been drawn from an associational milieu, but key figures in interest groups have also not infrequently been drawn from public life, bringing with them, it may be assumed, a web of experience and personal contacts which cannot but secure more hospitable hearings for group claims before their successor bureaucrats. Thus, an assistant chief counsel of the Interstate Commerce Commission becomes vice-president in charge of the Law Department of the Association of American Railroads; an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture becomes president of the United States Beet Sugar Association; an assistant general counsel of the Civil Aeronautics Board becomes general counsel of the Air Transport Association. The situation is familiar beyond the need for further illustration, and in each case it is difficult to withhold the conclusion that the client group is specially advantaged over its competitors.

What does this mean? On one level of analysis, it means that the groups concerned are not only one up on their less privileged counterparts but that they are also deriving the benefit of skills and relationships developed at considerable public expense. For this, the community must assume at least some responsibility, for so long as it persists in suffering its highest officers to subsist on journeyman wages and periodically retiring to private life the most forthright or committed among them, it is making their absorption by more narrowly defined interests inevitable. The fact that they have generally been absorbed with material profit to themselves is not necessarily evi-

dence that they have "sold out" either the public or their own integrity, or that their employers are debauching the commonwealth. Although to a deeper social ethic it might be repugnant, according to the values which prevail in society at the present time there is nothing reprehensible in making unique and valuable experience available to anyone who is willing to meet the price, just as there is nothing reprehensible in meeting the price—or even in setting it irresistibly high. That there are men reluctant to capitalize privately on their public selves does not justify condemnation of those who make a different choice. We might better be grateful that the choice still exists.

Beyond the advantages which it affords the more strategically positioned groups, the constant and easy interchange of personnel between groups and bureaucracy suggests the limited value of the notion of externally applied group "pressures." The truth is that we should be less concerned about group "pressure" than about its absence. We should be concerned about those quietly stabilized group-agency relationships which preclude (or at least render meaningless) the conventional external demonstrations—demonstrations which groups nonetheless persist in making and which people who should know better persist in regarding as important. Interest groups become a real problem when they cease clamoring for attention. Silence accompanies the sure fix rather than the free market.

GROUP POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Some group-agency linkages have apparently become so fixed and complete as to bring in question the basic function of so extensive a public bureaucracy as ours. This function is not easily described, but a few observations

may be in point. In the first place, for all the current and sophisticated derogation of "the public interest" as a standard of reference or achievement, it remains the only one to which we can honestly repair. We may not know what "the public interest" entails in individual situations, but we court disaster in the long run by denying that it is even knowable. This is to say only that a democratic order cannot operate indefinitely in purely segmental terms. No matter how demanding the claims of its special clienteles, a bureaucracy must at very least make a brave show of being responsive—as it is ultimately responsible—to a broader consensus.

There is no good reason to deny that the main impact of groups on the administrative process is disruptive of an orderly and conscientious approach to this fundamental problem. The basis on which much of our administrative apparatus has developed, the close ties between groups and bureaucracy, the differentials in group resources and access to the bureaucracy, the very breadth of the responsibilities to which this bureaucracy is heir—all conduce to the making of decisions on the basis of immediate situations, a tendency against which all but the most heroic reconstruction or programmatic leadership can avail little. No blame attaches to groups which thrive on the proximity and vastness of the administrative state, but it is futile to deny their prosperity.

It would be equally futile to assert that the apparently chaotic tugging and hauling of groups on government must bring the system down in ruins about it. Somehow, as one of the contributors to this volume has noted elsewhere, "the public interest" is observed in the administrative process more often and more faithfully than we might suppose—or than we deserve. We can still point to administrative decisions made squarely counter to the wishes of every

significant group concerned, decisions traceable solely to the vision or stubbornness of dedicated men.

Nor are we entirely without weapons for asserting more strongly the broader consensus on which the system truly rests. Administrative integration offers possibilities which have not yet begun to be explored. The reshaping of the political party into a mature, unified, and responsible force—a development for which there appears to be an increasing ground swell—could contribute no less tellingly to the shaping of rounded and consistent public policy, at least somewhat less subject to the diverse strains of group interests. The general application of the disclosure principle to group-agency relationships would almost certainly further the same end. The present Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act is suggestive of the form such disclosure might take, as well as of its possible results. The redraft-

ing or more stringent enforcement of the present conflict of interest statutes would also have a wholesome influence, although scarcely a conclusive one.

Each of these approaches deserves the most careful consideration. No one of them, nor all of them together, can be expected to alter the underlying realities of which group political effort on the administrative level is merely symptomatic. They are, candidly, tangential in character, but nothing more fundamental is even remotely likely. There is no point in discussing means by which group politics might be curtailed, or by which administrators could be rendered immune from the presumed taint of their interests or experience. Better frankly to work within the limits of the possible. Within these limits, the tools for building a bureaucracy of maximum devotion to the public interest are more than sufficient. It remains only to use them.

Edgar Lane, Ph.D., Syracuse, New York, has taught at the University of Michigan, and Syracuse and Princeton Universities. In 1950 he served as a consultant to the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities (the Buchanan Committee), and from 1950 to 1953 was managing and associate editor of the Public Opinion Quarterly.

Administrative Integration

By EDWIN O. STENE

EVERY large social organization is characterized by the presence of strong centrifugal forces which tend to generate autonomous operation of segments, and counteracting centripetal forces designed to draw the many activities into an integrated unity. In modern American society, with its traditions of political democracy and individual freedom, the centrifugal forces seem to be the more spontaneous and the more readily accepted by participants. The maintenance of a unified outlook and integrated operation, on the other hand, requires constant attention and planning on the part of an organization's executives.

Although the forces of integration in American governmental operations have been strengthened and systematized in recent decades, they have been faced with new and more powerful forces of disunity, and at the same time the enlarged span of governmental activities has increased the difficulties of integration, as well as its importance. Among the most important of these new forces of disunity is that of specialization—both specialization within the bureaucracy and specialization of pressure groups that seek to exert influence upon government.

SPECIALIZATION

America is a land of specialization. Specialization in industry, combined with the development of machines and assembly lines, has become a major contributor to our high productive capacity. But specialization is not limited to industry or even to business enterprises. It also characterizes the learned profes-

sions, the skilled service trades, and many areas of government service.

Skill at specialized work is a contributor to high efficiency, but it is also a disintegrating factor in organized effort, especially when associated with a large-scale organization and with weak counteracting forces of unity. Because specialists devote their time and effort to limited areas of activity, they develop a high degree of skill in the work they perform. But these skills tend to be narrow and intense, and to be accompanied by specialized knowledge and limited interests as well. Skillful performance of specific tasks means high productivity, provided the work is meshed with other parts of the total undertaking. Without effective integration, however, intense specialization among workers and among organization units may become an impediment to efficient and responsive public service.

Specialization tends to produce a concept of rights in the specialty, not infrequently accompanied by a neglect of or disregard for the broader rights of the community. Such narrow interests are reflected in jurisdictional conflicts among labor unions, and in the self-protectiveness often displayed by professional leadership. Small group loyalties tend to develop, together with concepts of "ins" and "outs" and somewhat of a contempt toward the "outs." Specialized groups develop a respect for their own colleagues, and doubts about the outsiders. These in-group loyalties often extend beyond the areas of performance in the specialties, and sometimes result in an inclination to disobey superiors who are not in the same specialty and to frown upon requests for intergroup

co-operation. Loyalties within specialized groups tend to become particularly strong in large organizations where the individuals can easily restrict their primary associations to members of their own specialties and to subordinates of distinctly lower status.

Large-scale industry has probably demonstrated the greatest success in the use of specialized skills. That success, however, is not due merely to the fact of specialization. It is due in some measure to the fact that workers can be trained rather quickly for specific jobs, and also in large part to the fact that industry has developed highly integrated management controls. The authority of management is recognized in industrial operations; unified planning has developed extensively within the management group; and the function of management has emphasized the co-ordination and integration of activities. Moreover, the mechanized assembly line, which is largely a creature of management planning, serves to co-ordinate the specific and repetitive activities of workers. In contrast to the successful use of specialized labor in large industry, the development of specialization among the non-industrial labor crafts has resulted in relatively little increase in productivity, and sometimes in none at all. For example, bricklayers, stonemasons, and other skilled workers who do not make use of assembly line machines often do not produce as much per hour today as they did a half century ago.

In government the benefits of specialization have been relatively limited. The limited degree of achievement in this area is due in large part to the presence of other disintegrating forces that support the separatist tendencies of specialized work. Another reason is a lack of strong integrating forces that would give unity to the operations. Consequently there is need for emphasis upon integrating techniques in governmental

bureaucracies—a need more urgent than is found in many other large-scale enterprises. But before the character of these integrating techniques is discussed, a further word should be said about the other separatist forces present in governmental operations.

OTHER DISINTEGRATING FORCES

To a large extent the forces of disintegration in American public administration arise out of the structural character of government. Some of them result from the mere size of the bureaucracy; others are due more to the structures established by laws and constitutions, and to the parallelism that has developed between the specialized administrative areas and the professional and industrial associations which seek to influence governmental action.

A major force of disintegration in state and local government, especially, is the traditional practice of electing administrative personnel. Historically, city governments were so organized that almost all important officials were elected. In more recent years the governmental structures have been simplified, but divided administrations still persist in many cities, and the multiplicity of elected officers remains almost as before in our state and county governments. These elected officers have autonomous areas of responsibility and interest, and they are not unlikely to resent attempts to integrate their work with that of their colleagues. Moreover, petty officers, whether elected or otherwise independent of a central administration, are poorly equipped to resist the pressures of specialized groups within their own organizations or among the interested professional and vocational associations on the outside.

A second important force of disintegration is the multipurpose character of governmental objectives, as represented by legislative policies. Government does

not make a single product or even a small number of products such as characterize the output of most industrial plants. Its services are many and varied, and the legislative bodies are required to deal with a variety of seemingly unrelated goals. Sometimes those goals are in conflict one with the other, either in appearance or in fact. The legislative acts originate from different sources, and one proposal may be considered and acted upon with little or no concern at the time for its possible relationship to other policies that have been developed at other times for different specific purposes. Moreover, an administrative agency ordinarily carries out a program associated with a particular area of legislative action, and so its own goals seem unified and important, because the legislation with which the agency personnel is familiar expresses that importance clearly and positively.

Multipurpose governmental objectives are naturally associated with many different pressure groups. The most effective pressure groups strive for specific benefits ordinarily associated with specialized professions or industries, and very often they deal with specialized personnel within the governmental bureaucracy. Such special interest groups are seldom concerned about the problem of integration. To them that form of governmental organization is most desirable which will provide efficient and economical service in their own area of interest. Not infrequently they advocate semiautonomous governmental units under the leadership of boards which will represent the interest groups. Over-all integration of the bureaucracy, on the other hand, tends to lessen the importance of the specific objectives which these groups support and to make facilities for communication between the groups and the bureaucracy less convenient.

Another force which often supports disintegration is the political party system. Professional party workers, especially, tend to favor small unit autonomy. They find it more expedient to promote programs that please many specialized interest groups than to promote broad interest programs; and autonomy among small agencies within a bureaucracy makes the conflicts less obvious. Moreover, the problem of satisfying patronage seekers is a little simpler when promoted through many small organizations than when it must be pressed upon a unified bureaucracy. Manipulations for political benefit are not as easily publicized in a decentralized administration, and, like the pressure groups, the parties can more easily overwhelm the less important public agencies.

Local loyalties

In a large bureaucracy such as our national government, the geographical separation of governmental agencies constitutes still another important disintegrating factor. Distance makes communication difficult, and tends to emphasize the informal solidarity of the neighborhood group as against loyalty to the larger organization. The many studies of headquarters-field relationships emphasize the difficulties encountered by central bureaucracies in their attempts to maintain unified policy when working through many widely scattered local offices.

Finally, there is a tendency among group leaders—whether specialists or not and whether located in central headquarters or in isolated field areas—to strive for autonomy and to build loyalties among their own personnel at the expense of the broader loyalties. Informal association, the relative ease of internal communication, and the interest in specific, clear-cut objectives facilitate the building of local loyalties.

On the other hand public service is always an intangible objective difficult to comprehend. Water-plant operation or veterans' rehabilitation is much more easily understood by the workers and is likely to seem more important than the intangible idea called "service to the public."

To summarize in another way, the principal obstacles to an integration of governmental activities are (1) seemingly unrelated or conflicting purposes within the bureaucracy, (2) local loyalties among the subordinate groups, and (3) difficulties of maintaining free communication throughout the entire bureaucracy. These obstacles are especially difficult to combat in a large organization such as our national administration. However, they may also be important in small organizations if accompanied by legal structures that grant status and independent authority to several small divisions within the administration.

NEED FOR INTEGRATING FORCES

In the face of these forces of disintegration, present to a greater or lesser degree in every bureaucracy, there is a widespread demand for strong integrating forces in the governmental operations. Our problem is to achieve the goal of unified operation without destroying the basic democratic character of these operations.

"Service to the people" is a vague and much abused slogan, but it represents an objective that would be almost universally accepted in America as a proper function of government. The term could include many specific and unrelated services; yet a unity is inherent in service to the people even if it involves no more than a need to see that the programs and activities do not neutralize or immobilize one another. There are many areas of possible internal conflict, and so there is need for

an overview that can serve to detect those areas and attempt to make them work in harmony rather than at cross purposes. The unity of purpose tends to be lost sight of especially in large-scale governmental organizations; hence the need for integration is the greater.

Despite some objections that "efficiency is not a goal," economy of operation is a universal need, and every government must seek to avoid unnecessary duplication and waste of effort and to minimize internal conflict. There again the achievement of the vague but important goal requires the presence of integrating forces.

The term "administrative integration," as ordinarily used, relates to the co-ordination and unification of operations within the administrative branch of a single governmental unit, such as the national government, a state government, or a municipality. Integration is essential within the major subdivisions of the bureaucracy as well as for the administration as a whole, and there are times when the activities of different governmental units may be sorely in need of co-ordination. In this discourse, however, attention is given to the integration of services within one unit of government.

BONDS OF INTEGRATION

Before enumerating the particular programs designed to integrate the bureaucracy, a word should be said about the principal forces that tend to bring the many activities and functions into a single unified program of co-operation. These forces, the bonds of integration, will be discussed in the order of the emphasis that they have been given historically in administrative surveys and in literature on administration from the time the subject became a major field of study.

The bonds of integration may be *structural* in character, or they may be

procedural, or they may be *psychological*. Structural bonds relate to the lines of authority and the locations of working groups within the bureaucracy. Procedural bonds concern the ways in which work is performed, the lines of communication, and the flow of papers or other working materials. The psychological bonds arise from the habits, loyalties, and other intellectual and emotional attitudes of the participants as individuals and as groups. These main threads of integration are not independent of one another; often they are bound together or tangled in such ways that it is difficult or impossible to distinguish one from the other. Yet, for the purposes of conceptualization and analysis, they may well be considered separately.

Each of the specific bonds of integration has been emphasized at different periods of our national existence and in different situational areas. The emphasis has been determined in large part by the historical development of our governmental operations, and also by the conceptual scheme in the minds of the planners and leaders of programs. The nature of the counterforces of disintegration necessarily influences the programs of integration, as do the values placed on the different subordinate programs of any particular bureaucracy.

Students of administration have tended to fall into different schools of thought regarding the importance of integration and regarding methods to be applied. Shifts might be explained in terms of the development of administrative thought, but they have also reflected the needs and the lines of strategy designed to deal with problems that have existed at different stages of history. This latter fact is sometimes overlooked by those who criticize the more traditional schools of thought. For example, the early reorganizers emphasized centralization of authority in order to deal with

a virtually complete autonomy that existed among many operative units of the bureaucracy. More recently, along with new developments in sociology and psychology, students of administration and administrators place more emphasis upon the informal aspects of organization. That does not mean that these newly emphasized factors have been proved superior to the old; rather they have supplemented the structural integration and have clarified our understanding of concepts of structure and procedure.

PROGRAMS AND METHODS OF INTEGRATION

No program of integration has achieved so great national significance as that of administrative centralization, represented by the reorganization movement. That movement can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when the strong-mayor plan of city government and the short-ballot proposals came to the forefront. Reorganization of state governments became popular in the second decade of the twentieth century, when the New York Bureau of Municipal Research submitted its report on the New York State government, and when Governor Frank O. Lowden's reorganization program in Illinois and other state reorganizations attracted widespread interest. Leaders of the New York Bureau also participated in President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency, but the Commission's report did not emphasize centralization of power as much as did the state reorganization reports, perhaps because the national government was not in need of basic constitutional centralization.

The conceptual scheme of the reorganization movement was expressed by A. E. Buck, in his reports setting forth standards of administrative organiza-

tion.¹ From the point of view of integration, the standards included (1) centralization of authority in the governor, (2) functional organization of the state bureaucracy into a few departments, and (3) single administrators heading those departments and having full authority over subordinates within their departmental jurisdictions. The Buck theory of administrative integration has been criticized severely, on occasion bitterly, almost from the time it was systematically pronounced; and in recent years it seems to have lost its standing of respectability among political scientists. Yet the basic ideas of integration through centralized control form the heart and driving force of almost every state reorganization program to the present day. Moreover, the same ideas were fully accepted by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937 and by the Hoover Commission in 1949. One of the strongest recent pronouncements of the doctrine of integration by centralization of authority is found in the report of the Hoover Commission, which advocates "a clear line of command from the top to the bottom, and a return line of responsibility and accountability from the bottom to the top."²

At the municipal level the doctrine of integration by centralized control found expression in the strong-mayor plan of government, and even more positively in the council-manager plan. Early rationalizations of these forms of city government emphasized the importance of the power to command and to hire and fire subordinates. The use of those powers—or even their possession in fact—never approached the positive-

¹ *The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1938.

² *The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), p. 3.

ness of the doctrine; and now the forms of government are justified primarily on other grounds. Yet the legal structure of authority remains basically the same, and its exclusion from either form of city government has been found to undermine the pragmatic advantages. Significantly, the commission form of city government, which became popular for a time because of its simplicity of structure and its use of the short ballot, later came to be regarded as a weak form of government. Its weakness lay in the fact that it violated the basic concept of integration by centralized authority, and consequently it fostered the free play of local loyalties and conflicting programs.

Achievements of centralization

The emphasis upon administrative centralization was a natural and reasonable response to the trend that characterized governmental organization throughout much of the nineteenth century. That trend was in the direction of electing numerous administrative officials and even some clerical personnel, toward the use of independent boards in charge of important branches of local and state government, and away from executive leadership. The countertrend of the twentieth century is far from complete, although considerable progress has been made. Yet it has been found that centralization alone does not overcome the separatist tendencies; or if the top control is sufficiently ruthless to achieve those goals, the accomplishment is accompanied by other and less desirable experiences. Nevertheless, centralization has achieved important successes, partly as a direct result of authority but also because it has been associated with other changes. Local loyalties have not been as strong or as inconsiderate of the over-all objectives as they were under decentralized bu-

reaucracies. Conflicting purposes have been more likely to come to light and to be mitigated somewhat; and communication has been facilitated to the extent that the chief administrator or executive officer takes more interest than formerly in all activities of government.

Procedural changes

Integration by means of procedural changes has been emphasized in the organization and management programs of the national budget bureau and within some of the line departments, in studies of organization and methods at state and local levels, and in the development of emphasis upon program budgeting and staff planning. Originally the overhead functions of government—budgeting, personnel, and accounting control—were designed in large part to centralize control and to eliminate specific evils of spoils politics and legislative uncertainties. The more recent organization and management programs have been designed rather to eliminate waste motion at the operating levels and to promote program planning. The results have been an increase in over-all planning and, more important, an integration of procedures within the operating departments and agencies of government.

One weakness of the functional reorganizations under the early state programs was that, even though related agencies might be brought together under common leadership, the subunits too frequently remained as autonomous as before and procedures were virtually unchanged. The establishment of the Kansas Department of Revenue and Taxation in 1939 provided an example of the older tendency as well as the effects of procedural studies. The department was created with a view to consolidating tax collecting agencies of

the state under a single leadership. Most of those agencies had been in two previously existing departments, and they had operated as relatively autonomous units responsible only to the leadership of their respective departments. Legislative action in 1939 laid the groundwork for more unified operating procedures, but that unity did not result from the mere consolidation of agencies. For a short time each division remained a distinct operating unit as before, performing all activities necessary to the collection of income taxes, sales taxes, or other specific revenues of the state. In the particular case, however, the legislature had appropriated funds to finance a survey of operations with a view to installing new procedures. As a result the mail receiving and cashier services were consolidated in a single office, and other common functions of the several tax collecting units were integrated. The integration was not complete, partly because division heads had been appointed before the consolidation could be effected; but it was a marked improvement over a mere unification under a single leadership.

In recent years administrative surveys and procedural changes have perhaps contributed as much or more to the integration of governmental operations as have reorganization acts. However, it must be remembered that the consolidation of procedures would be difficult or impossible except after control over operation had been centralized to a relatively high degree.

Psychological integration

The third, and in many ways the most important, method of integration is the development of common loyalties among employees and officials. This method represents a psychological identification of interests within the governmental unit as a whole, or within

the entire bureaucracy, as distinguished from loyalties to the minor parts only.

In a sense the spoils system of appointment and tenure provided a unity of spirit. Employees of all divisions within the bureaucracy had a sense of indebtedness to a common political organization. But the common bond was the party organization rather than the bureaucracy, and the interests and efforts of government personnel were attached to the incidental objectives of public service. So far as integration of public service was concerned, party loyalty was an obstacle more often than a help.

After the shift from spoils politics to the merit system, emphasis tended to center around control by authority and by specific job assignments, with the results that employees often knew virtually nothing about the governmental operations outside of their own immediate environments, and that they tended to consider the central overhead agencies as little more than nuisances which caused delays and other interferences with the work of their operating units. Although loyalties shifted from party organization to the bureaucracy itself, and to superior personnel within the bureaucracy, there was a trend toward psychological disintegration rather than unity.

Psychological integration is only now beginning to draw the attention of administrators and political scientists. Private corporations are starting to recognize the value of reports to employees, of personnel counseling services, and of other demonstrations of interest in employee satisfactions. Manager governed cities are blossoming forth with investigations of employee attitudes and are engaging in other activities that call to the attention of employees the common interests of the entire city administration, and some of the departments and agencies of state and national govern-

ments are working toward similar objectives. Perhaps the most successful large public agency, so far as psychological integration is concerned, has been the Tennessee Valley Authority, where strong feelings of common interest were developed almost from the beginning.

The process of psychological integration is slow. To give it too much formalism is to destroy its objectives, while, on the other hand, the failure of officials to recognize its importance leads to separatist tendencies regardless of the organization of authority. Unlike centralization of authority, which may be instituted by legislative action or by directives from top management, and unlike procedural integration, which may be instituted by management services or by agency leaders, psychological integration occurs through the interplay of vaguely defined attitudes and behaviors at all levels of participation, including even the general public.

CONCLUSIONS

Forces of administrative integration have made significant progress in recent years, but at the same time they have been faced by increasingly difficult problems. The most important of these problems has been rapid expansion of government, and especially of the bureaucracy, for integration becomes increasingly difficult as the size of the bureaucracy becomes larger. In many ways, the new devices for integration have scarcely kept pace with the growth of our administrative organizations, at the national and state levels especially.

Another obstacle to effective integration has been the pressure of conflicting economic and political interests, many of them basically opposed to integration of the bureaucracy. Special interest groups tend naturally to seek autonomy and prestige for those branches of government with which they feel most

closely associated. The integrating forces within the bureaucracy find, therefore, that their increased efforts are often countered by increased efforts of outside groups to maintain local autonomy and to resist unification.

Sometimes the errors of overcentralization tended to interfere with integration rather than to promote it. An overhead or staff agency which takes on excessive control in its own specialized field may meet resistance in the form of increased local loyalties among line services which it seeks to control. The specialized interest of the staff agency, like the specialized interest of line agencies, may interfere with the broader objectives of government; they may create antagonisms which divide the loyalties of the personnel; and they may serve to complicate the operating machinery. In such cases integration may actually result from a degree of decentralized control combined with new lines of re-

sponsibility and new efforts to promote psychological unity.

Constant attention is required to develop and maintain an integrated bureaucracy. Sometimes the emphasis needs to be upon centralized authority; sometimes it should center around communications; sometimes around operating procedures; and sometimes around the loyalties and motivations of personnel. At times the ends are better achieved by formal decentralization than by formal centralization. Whatever the strategic devices for integration, full achievement is never attained and perhaps not desired. Yet, within the limits of democratic operation, the struggle for integration of the bureaucracy must be a continuous struggle in a changing society where new developments both within and outside of the government tend constantly to foster disintegration and divided loyalties among the governmental personnel.

Edwin O. Stene, Ph.D., is professor of political science, in charge of the training program for city management, in the University of Kansas, Lawrence. He served several summers as research associate and consultant in the research department of the Kansas Legislative Council, and is the author of books and articles on administrative theory, state administrative history, municipal management, and related subjects.

The Problem of Service Levels

By WILLIAM S. CARPENTER

THE problem of service levels has confronted the American people since the foundation of the colonies. The timely adjustment of local services to local government areas troubled the colonists of Virginia no less than those of Massachusetts. Throughout the long experience with local government on this side of the Atlantic the readjustments of areas and services have had to establish a balance among the factors of self-government, effective service areas, and taxpaying capacity. Upon the satisfactory establishment of this balance has depended the success of local government.¹

Government is basically a bundle of services to be performed in behalf of the citizens. When local government units were first created in the American colonies the framework was largely determined by the method of making a living in the particular colony. From an early date the economic existence of Virginia became rapidly dependent upon the cultivation of tobacco. "This colony is founded upon smoke," declared one royal governor as he returned to England in disgust. In order that tobacco raising might not be hindered, all forms of urban life were discouraged. Demands for the creation of towns went unrewarded. *Virginia's Cure*, a pamphlet which appeared in 1662, advocated the building of towns to promote religion and education. Bacon's Rebellion in 1676 gave rise to the demand

for towns as a protection against the Indians, but the act of 1680 authorizing towns and storehouses was for the encouragement of trade and manufactures. This act was disallowed, but in 1705 the mercantile interests succeeded in obtaining the passage of the Act for Ports, which provided also for towns. The opposition to the act among the agricultural interests of Virginia proved to be too great, and it was repealed in 1709 by Governor Spotswood without having been put into effect. Neither in Virginia nor in the other southern colonies did towns come into existence until the chartered boroughs were incorporated in the eighteenth century.

THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN

While the county remained the familiar unit of local government in the southern colonies, Massachusetts and other parts of New England saw the rise of the town. Civil government in New England had to be consistent with religious ideals. Many of the early settlements were undertaken by congregations of people who came from England bringing with them their pastor and their church organization. These colonists were interested in the important business of making a living, but they were also immediately concerned to prevent interference by outsiders with their religious institutions. In the formation of local government, the New England settlers found models for their guidance in their ecclesiastical establishments.

Puritans in religion, the early colonists in New England had recourse to the church covenants through which various groups, electing their own pastors and teachers, declared their inde-

pendence of the ecclesiastical authority of England. The formation of civil communities also sprang from the free will of the inhabitants. Neither definite land policy nor formal legal sanction marked the establishment of the first settlements. The five original towns in Massachusetts—Dorchester, Watertown, Cambridge, Salem, and Roxbury—were founded without express authorization, and it was not until after the transfer of the charter to the colony that indiscriminate settlement ceased. The Court of Assistants on September 7, 1630, ordered "that no person shall plant in any place within the limits of this patent without leave from the governor and assistants, or a majority of them." At the same time it was directed "that a warrant be sent to Aggawam to command those that are planted there to come away." Thereafter the original towns were accorded the same treatment as those whose inception was due to the General Court.

The New England town was a self-contained community centering about the church. The Massachusetts government in 1635 "ordered that no new house be built more than a half a mile from the meeting house in any new plantation to be established by the general court." More than one meeting-house could be built in a town, but only with the consent of the freemen given at a town meeting or by special order of the General Court. Although the Massachusetts settlers insisted upon the separation of spiritual and temporal authority, they agreed with John Calvin that the primary function of secular rulers is the care of piety and religion.

Legal status

The Massachusetts towns had no legal status because they could not be incorporated. Governor Andros, when he came to Massachusetts, is reported to have denied the existence of towns as

legal entities. The governor was supported by a contemporary pamphlet which declared: "For you generally call that a town in America where a number of people have seated themselves together, yet 'tis very well known 'tis in name only, not in fact. I take that body of people to be a town, properly so called, who by some act of law have been incorporated, and in that sense there is no such thing as a town in Massachusetts, neither was there a power to make such before his Excellency's arrival, for *one corporation cannot make another*." Since the colony of Massachusetts Bay was the creation of a corporate charter, it could not give life to another corporation.

Although charters of municipal incorporation could not be issued by the Massachusetts General Court, a crude organic town act was passed on March 3, 1635/6, which recited that "the freemen of every town, or a majority of them, shall only have power to dispose of their own lands and woods with all the appurtenances of the said towns, to grant lots and make such orders as may concern the well-ordering of their own towns, not repugnant to the laws and orders of the general court." Such grants of rights and privileges did not confer corporate rights upon the towns, and the people of Boston in 1650 petitioned for a charter of incorporation. The matter appears to have been debated at some length before it was admitted to be outside the jurisdiction of the General Court.

The uncertain legal status of the Massachusetts towns was to some extent corrected in 1694, when the government of the province passed "an act to enable towns, villages, precincts, trustees for schools, and proprietors in common and undivided lands, grants and other estates or interests . . . to sue . . . and to defend all such suits . . . as shall be commenced against them."

¹ For a much more extended account of the historical basis of local government in the United States, see W. S. Carpenter, *Problems in Service Levels*, Princeton, 1940. The account here given is taken largely from this book.

By this act town affairs were to be closely supervised by the government of the province. It must be remembered, however, that laws after 1691 were enacted under the provincial charter, which provided that the assent of the king was essential to their validity. It was not until March 23, 1786, after the creation of a state government in Massachusetts, that the inhabitants of a town were formally declared to be a body politic and corporate and as such capable of suing and being sued.

THE MIDDLE COLONIES AND VIRGINIA

In the meantime chartered boroughs began to make their appearance in the middle colonies, where the advantages of trade as an adjunct to agriculture were recognized. In 1665, New York was created as a municipal corporation but did not receive a charter from the governor until 1686. Thereafter, until 1746, municipal incorporations were frequent in the middle colonies and in Virginia. There were no permanent incorporations in New England and only two south of Virginia. By 1776, municipal charters had been granted to twenty-three cities and boroughs in the colonies. The charter of Norfolk in 1736 recited that the place was "commodious for trade and navigation," and most if not all municipal incorporations were made in response to demands from commercial interests. These charters emanated from the crown, and were granted immediately by the governor or proprietor of the colony, although they were sometimes amended by acts of the legislature.

COLONIAL PRECEDENTS FOR READJUSTMENTS OF AREAS AND SERVICES

The methods of action whereby the readjustments of areas and services are accomplished are as old as the institutions of local government. The colonial precedents which today condition local

government in the United States embrace not only the accepted local subdivisions of counties, towns, cities, and boroughs but also the devices whereby the units of local government can be adapted to the efficient performance of public services. Consolidation and annexation have their roots in colonial practice, and the special district in a variety of forms was early adapted to the performance of services which could not be obtained readily from the existing units of local government.

The rapid increase in population throughout the New England colonies led to the subdivision of towns in order that the people might be near the place of worship. New towns were ordinarily created in response to petitions from the localities, but these became so numerous that in Massachusetts they aroused the opposition of the provincial government. The distinguishing characteristic of a Massachusetts town was the right to send a full representation to the General Court. The creation of new towns meant an increase in the number of deputies to be elected by the people and thereby might lead to the destruction of the balance of power among the different branches of the provincial government.

The dilemma which confronted the Massachusetts colonists was resolved by the creation of special districts. As early as 1702 the special district had appeared as a device to secure to isolated groups of inhabitants the consolidation of religion. By an act of that year, "the inhabitants of each district, or precinct, respectively, regularly set off from any town, shall be and are hereby empowered to name and appoint a clerk, as of right towns by law have; and also assessors for the assessing and raising a maintenance and support for the minister of such district or precinct, and to make out a warrant, in form as by law prescribed

for town rates or assessments, directed to the constable of the town or district. . . ." A further step was taken in 1752, when the service range of special districts was enlarged. In that year a portion of the town of Salem was erected into "a distinct and separate district by the name of Danvers." The inhabitants of the new district were to enjoy all the powers, privileges, and immunities of a town, "except that of separately choosing and sending one or more representatives to represent them at the general assembly." In other words, they were to have full powers of local government but were not to participate in colonial legislation through representatives of their own choice.

In Connecticut the special district took the form of a village created within a town or plantation. In 1680 the inhabitants on the east side of the river in the town of New Haven complained that they were too far distant from the church, and petitioned that they might become a village. The village of East Haven was established and was granted the powers of a parish. Whatever local services may have been furnished, the village did not have the responsibility for the care of the poor. This service continued in the town of New Haven. In 1707 the village of East Haven was made a village district, the act reciting that it acquired the powers of a town.

At the same time that colonial legislatures were subdividing towns and creating special districts they were also bringing about the consolidation and annexation of existing units of local government. From the very nature of the situation there were few consolidations, but annexations were frequently undertaken in order to provide more efficiently for the performance of local services. Throughout the eighteenth century the units of local government existed as agents of the province to supply those local services which the

colonial legislatures wished to have performed.

CONSOLIDATION AND ANNEXATION— POSTCOLONIAL

Since the formation of the Union the methods of action through consolidation and annexation have been made available in some form by general laws in most of the states. Of course, in all states it is possible for the legislature to proceed with such readjustments through special acts, and the general laws on the subject in Massachusetts are designed merely to secure uniformity in petitions to the General Court for special acts of annexation and consolidation. The New England states have made very few provisions for readjustments of this kind, and neither consolidation nor annexation has been widely used in this section. Elsewhere the two devices have been applied by general laws to the readjustment of counties, townships, municipalities, and special districts. The statutes providing for annexation are more numerous than those for consolidation, and greater use has been made of them. It is superfluous to add that all general legislation on this subject is permissive in character; no modern legislature has attempted to follow the few colonial precedents of mandatory consolidations.

Consolidation involves the combination of two or more separate legal jurisdictions into one. It is ordinarily successful only where the jurisdictions to be consolidated are similar in social, economic, and other characteristics to an extent that will enable the new jurisdiction to function smoothly and efficiently. The voters of each jurisdiction contemplating consolidation should have the fullest opportunity to explore in advance of any final decision the advantages to be obtained from consolidation. There will ordinarily be opposition to any proposed consolidation.

This is sometimes wholly sentimental, but often has a stronger foundation. The consolidation of a rural community with one which is highly urbanized is likely to be mischievous. Since consolidation leads to uniformity in tax rates and assessments, it is likely to be accompanied or at least followed by demands for uniform services throughout the area. The attempt to extend services appropriate to an urban area throughout a rural community, where they are unnecessary and unwanted, may become a costly burden on a jurisdiction resulting from consolidation. The attempt to join a poor community which is heavily in debt to a prosperous neighbor nearly always leads to difficulties. In any case, there is likely to arise opposition from officials and public employees who fear the effect of consolidation upon their jobs. Careful consideration of all the elements in each situation should precede any vote on a proposal for consolidation.

Annexation is a method of action whereby the boundaries of a legal jurisdiction are extended to embrace additional area within an adjoining unit of local government. This procedure is peculiarly applicable where an urban unit and a part of a contiguous unit have become one community in fact, though not in law. In point of fact, every consolidation and detachment is also an annexation, since all territory must belong to some political subdivision. But annexation ordinarily is applied to territory which has already come within the service range to which it is to be joined. Although there is a solidarity of interests between the people in the two areas, difficulties are sometimes created by the governing body in the legal jurisdiction from which territory is to be taken. It must be remembered that in annexation three parties are involved, the people of the

territory to be annexed, the people as well as the governing body of the unit of government to which the annexation is to be made, and the people and the governing body of the local subdivision which is to be diminished by the annexation. Little difficulty is likely to arise if the territory is small in area and embraces few ratables. But where any large amount of territory is to be changed from one legal jurisdiction to another, the more appropriate method of action is by consolidation.

INTERJURISDICTIONAL AGREEMENTS

Recourse to the procedures of consolidation or annexation has been less frequent than reformers desired because of the ease with which units of local government find means to continue their existence. In other words, a great many local governments are able through interjurisdictional agreements, grants-in-aid, and other devices to maintain themselves, although the citizens might be better served if more drastic changes were made in the structure of local government. Taxpaying capacity remains one of the most important criteria of sound government. But people will often for sentimental reasons cling to forms of government which by logical arguments can be shown to lack economy and efficiency.

An interjurisdictional agreement is a contract, written or implied, among two or more political subdivisions of a state or states for the accomplishment through joint action of a result which each is authorized to obtain independently. Agreements may be verbal or in writing. Quite frequently they are definitely authorized by statute, but many jurisdictional agreements find statutory anchorage in legislation which was not enacted with this end in view.

Co-operative enterprise through agreements cannot be justified on general principles. Each case must be decided

on its own merits. Two or more jurisdictions may very properly build a bridge or construct a sewage disposal system. Where joint action has been undertaken in the fields of health and welfare the results have generally not justified the action. These are services which are better performed by transfer to the county or the state. Small units of local government should not undertake through joint action to perform services which are more properly confined to larger jurisdictions. In other words, this method is not universally valid for the readjustment of services and areas in local government.

Two views of interjurisdictional agreements are possible. The first is that co-operation among the units of local government is undesirable because it serves to continue the existence of many tiny units which would otherwise be forced to fold up. Municipalities which are too small or too poor to provide the necessary public services for their inhabitants ought to yield their powers to the county or the state and cease to function. If the conditions are favorable for consolidation or annexation, the areas unable to perform services for themselves ought immediately to join neighboring units to form self-sufficient political subdivisions of the state. In either case nothing is gained by postponing the day when a formal readjustment of areas to the performance of services must be made.

The second and more hopeful view is that co-operation will bring about the consolidation of areas more surely and more speedily than a policy which keeps units of government apart. Local officials learn by co-operation with their neighbors how to achieve results which they could not obtain independently. The rural township may indeed be the vestige of a political environment which has already passed away, but few people are willing to agree to its abandon-

ment until they know how the services confided to it are going to be performed. When a number of important services are being conducted economically and efficiently through joint action by two or more units of local government, it is not a great step to co-operation in all functions of government.

STATE SUBSIDIES

Grants-in-aid or subsidies from the state to assist local governments in the performance of services are common throughout the United States. These take the form of grants similar to those made to the states by the federal government, or shared taxes. The latter comprise allocations from motor fuel taxes, motor vehicle registration and license fees, liquor taxes, income taxes, and sales taxes collected by the state. The amount allocated to a particular unit may depend upon the amount collected there, or may be determined by population or some other basis. The services supported by state aid vary among the states but schools receive generally the largest amounts from such grants or shared taxes. Every state now provides some financial aid to local governments through grants-in-aid or shared taxes, or both.

There has been a growing tendency in recent years to provide state aid for the general financial support of local government rather than benefits for specified local purposes. Some controversy has been aroused over the merits of state aid. On the one hand, it is argued that since the acceptance of state aid is usually accompanied by some state supervision, the local government authorities too often shirk their responsibility and neglect their duties. The result is a weakening of local government. On the other hand, advocates of state aid point out that most local services are state-wide in their importance. For example, a sound school system is

of interest to the people everywhere. It is therefore the duty of the state to equalize the local tax burden so that units having small taxpaying capacity can be guaranteed the same amount and quality of local services as the units having much taxable property. The advantage appears to lie with the proponents of state aid. As long as the local governments are restricted to the property tax as the chief source of local revenues, community needs can probably never be satisfied out of local taxes. The state or the federal government, or both, will of necessity have to assist in bolstering the finances of local governments.

School districts

That is not to say that evils have not been created by policies adopted for the administration of state aid. Tiny school districts have been kept alive by state subsidies when sound educational policy has declared they should have been abolished. The Superintendent of Public Instruction in Michigan announced in 1951 that there were 4,918 school districts in the state. Of these, 3,168 had a population under one thousand and employed less than six teachers while 949 districts gave no instruction but sent their children to schools elsewhere. A careful study indicated that there should be no more than 253 school districts in all of Michigan. These school districts would be delimited in terms of community areas, with sufficient taxable property and sufficient child population to assure an adequate elementary and secondary educational program. Many of the problems of financing education in Michigan were found to stem from the inadequate and uneconomic organization of school districts.

The cure of such evils is within the power of the state legislature. While most people would agree that state sub-

sidies to local jurisdictions must continue, they will expect that the greatest amount and quality of services will result from public expenditures. It makes no difference whether the tax dollar is derived from the property tax in the community or from one of the numerous sources of state revenue. The same degree of care in its expenditure is imposed upon governmental authorities.

It is the obligation of the legislature to scrutinize closely the devices through which state aid is distributed. No formula can remain constant in an environment which is rapidly changing. The Texas legislature in 1949 was confronted with more than five thousand school districts distributed among the 254 counties. In that year it revised its formula for the distribution of state aid to education and established a foundation program. The local fair share of school costs was to be calculated and the state was to pay the difference necessary to maintain a minimum standard of education. The act also provided that any school district which remained inoperative for a period of two years would be consolidated by the county superintendent with those districts to which they sent their children. The result has been to reduce the number of school districts to approximately two thousand.

Public attitude toward public employees

The emphasis in recent years has been upon the improvement of salaries paid to local government employees, including schoolteachers. This has been necessary, or many jurisdictions would have found their public services understaffed. But compensation is not the only factor in public employment. Nobody expects to become rich through working for the government. At the same time, any man or woman who enters government service has a right to be respected by the citizens of the com-

munity, as long as duties are faithfully performed. The overwhelming majority of public employees are conscientious, loyal, and industrious men and women who are genuinely interested in their work. They should be encouraged to take an interest in the program of government as a whole. Unfortunately they are too often rebuffed by citizens who regard them solely as sinecurists. A change in the attitude of citizens towards public employment could do much to improve government.

THE TRADITION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

The successful readjustment of areas and services in local government depends upon a contradiction and its outcome. On the one hand, the traditional theory of democracy in the United States has emphasized the importance of keeping the conduct of the public services, which are the real ends of all local government, constantly under the scrutiny of the community. Thomas Jefferson warned against the dangers to be expected from removing the government too far from its constituents. It has therefore always been easy to argue for the creation of new units of local government where these served to bring local services more directly under popular control. On the other hand, it has become apparent that a multiplicity of governmental units tends to defeat efforts to obtain economy and efficiency in the conduct of public affairs. Communities are created which have neither the population nor the taxpaying capacity to support the essential local services. Within these communities the ends of local self-government cannot be achieved and the democratic ideal becomes impossible of fulfillment.

Obstacles to the reduction of the number of units of local government spring from sentiments long enshrined in the

public opinion of the country. People are often willing to pay a high price for local self-government. Recently the state of Maine undertook to deorganize rural towns in which debt limits had been reached and property taxes had become almost confiscatory. The resistance which the movement encountered was evidence of the strong popular faith in the institutions of local government.

The problem involved in this conflict between the traditional theory of democracy and the requisites of sound local government has long been recognized. It cropped out in a number of constitutional conventions in the states before the Civil War, where attempts were made to restrict the creation of units of local government. Recognition of the evils inherent in the multiplication of local government units did not, however, produce a remedy. All moves to readjust the areas and services of local government have had to be made on a checkerboard of local patriotisms. Particularist sentiment struck so deeply into the Michigan convention of 1850 that a proposal was made that "the legislature shall secure to the inhabitants of every United States surveyed township, having fifty inhabitants, a separate organization, provided the township left contain fifty inhabitants." The argument in behalf of this clause asserted that people would be encouraged to settle the unoccupied areas if they could be guaranteed the right to organize a government for themselves. Temporarily the argument prevailed, but the better judgment of the delegates finally caused this section of the proposed constitution to be dropped. The convention had even great difficulty in preventing the insertion of a clause which would give the boards of supervisors in the counties the exclusive power to organize new townships. It was apparent that at least a minority

of the members felt that the legislature had been too slow in organizing new townships and wished to have this power taken over by the county authorities.

PRESENT NEEDS

The American conception of democracy found safeguards in the nineteenth-century state constitutions. That is to say, the people were secured in their right to make decisions in local affairs. This achievement was possible because the services to be performed were few and simple and could be directed advantageously within small political subdivisions. But a century of progress in science and technology has not only multiplied the services which government must provide but also has enlarged the area within which these can be successfully administered. The growth of rapid means of communication together with the increase of popular education has enabled an enlightened people to supervise larger areas of their government. While more decisions have to be made at governmental levels remote from the local communities, the conditions under which these decisions are reached can be more truly appraised than ever before. It is not too much to expect that the people will find the means of performing economically and efficiently the public services and at the same time retaining control of the government.

William S. Carpenter, Ph.D., has been a member of the Department of Politics at Princeton University since 1920. He was a member of the New Jersey State Planning Board from 1937 to 1944 and president of the New Jersey State Civil Service Commission from 1944 to 1951. He is author of The Development of American Political Thought (1930), The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform (1952), and coauthor of State and Local Government in the United States (1936).

The methods of action whereby self-government, effective service areas, and taxpaying capacity can be brought together in a nice poise and balance are well known. Success in the solution of the problem of service levels depends upon the intelligent application of experience gained in the conduct of local government since the early colonial days. In the readjustment of areas and services of local government the experience of the public officials must conspire with the needs of the people to produce an organization which will ensure the efficient and economical performance of local services within the democratic process. This may require the reallocation of major services, such as roads, schools, welfare, and health, to other units of government than those in which they are at present administered. It will undoubtedly require co-operation among the different units of government through interjurisdictional agreements designed to create a sound relationship for the conduct of services beyond the reach of a single locality. A wider use of the special district may develop in rural municipalities possessing urban concentrations. But interjurisdictional agreements or the use of the special district will in many cases be a preliminary step to the reconstruction of local government through consolidation or annexation, in order that legal jurisdiction may be fitted to service needs.

Citizen Organization for Control of Government

By RICHARD S. CHILDS

CONSTITUTIONS and charters set forth their specifications for American governments at various levels and assign a great array of tasks to the voters in serene, unthinking disregard of the fact that the sovereign voters may or may not deign to exert themselves to perform all those tasks. When, as so frequently happens, the voters ignore a given assignment, the fashion is to denounce the voters for "apathy," as a builder of a mill wheel might petulantly denounce a stream which fails to turn his heavy wheel in a dry summer. Thus, when the writers of Michigan's constitution provided that the state treasurer should be chosen by the voters, the voters promptly and perpetually ignored the assignment; only 4 per cent of them were able to name him when an official committee took a careful poll in 1950.¹ Having such an obscure and relatively small office on the elective list would work if the people would do the task thus assigned. Since they will not, there is no justification for retaining the office as elective, no reason for perpetuating a setup which has never worked. Yet the very commission which uncovered the fact of mere 4 per cent awareness bowed to the sacred cows of politics and shrank from the logical remedy of assigning to the governor the function of filling that office. And when the great bulk of voters thus ignore an elective office, a few politicians proceed to fill it, dealing with it as part of their own private

bailiwick to their own private and partisan advantage. By misuse of such direct patronage, the "ins" entrench themselves against dislodgment by the "outs" and distort the democratic process.

Similarly, each Pittsburgh voter is supposed to select eighty-three candidates for as many offices in each four-year cycle. In fact he does nothing of the sort; he casts an informed vote on two or three top candidates each year and votes for the word Republican or Democratic on the rest of the list, thereby blindly accepting the slate prepared by the machine. In respect to this array of minor elective officers, the machine need not cater to decent mass opinion since there is almost no public scrutiny of these nominees.

Everybody admits that almost all American ballots are preposterously long, submitting lists of candidates for so many dull and trivial offices that only a professional politician is likely to know for whom he is voting on election day. But very little gets done to improve the situation.

CITIZEN CONTROL VIA PARTIES

In England, Europe, Canada, and elsewhere, voters join together in parties to capture government in the interest of a set of ideas, or school of thought, as to desirable public policy. But they commonly do their work on only two levels of government, electing a local member of Parliament in each district and a ward member of a local municipal council. The simple task of selection falls comfortably within the easy grasp of the voter, and the party which groups itself around a policy requires in its internal management nothing comparable

¹ Report of the Michigan Legislative Committee on Reorganization, 1951. Also complete in Richard S. Childs, *Civic Victories: The Story of an Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), pp. 291-95.

to our busy, heavily manned American party machines. Furthermore, the foreign party managements must cater to open-eyed voter sentiment, for the voter has only the task of selecting one man on election day and knows what he is doing just as an American does when voting for President or mayor.

But our American parties must find and advance candidates to fill the elective offices in six layers of government—national, state, judicial (in states where judges are elective), county and (where local elections are partisan) township, city or village, and school district. They will be embarrassed by the necessity of forecasting and catering carefully to public opinion in respect to perhaps five of their nominees in a given district but can exercise fairly complete discretion on perhaps ten—or forty—others. Candidates have to be found and presented in either case, a gigantic task which cannot be handled by the mass action, or inaction, of unorganized voters. Hence our parties in the United States are no more than 10 per cent policy or clannish divisions; they are 90 per cent machines for taking hold of those functions of our peculiar democratic process which cannot be performed by the voters.

UNWIELDY CONSTITUENCIES

The party machines here must also solve the problem of mobilizing voters in our unique, big, unwieldy constituencies, such as the states in their state-wide elections. Finally, they have to deal with the unwieldy constituency of the nation when it is voting for President, when party mechanisms must contrive to bring together at quadrennial conventions a thousand-odd delegates covering every state, each backed by local organizations of sufficient importance to add up to adequate political power.

So our long ballots, our scatterations

of petty elective offices, and the unwieldiness of some of our constituencies require elaborate machines and give them the opportunity to rule unscrutinized in extensive clouded areas of six-layered government.

Indeed the machine, instead of being the instrument in an American party, becomes its master.

Suppose our Socialist party, now uncorrupted by power, should show promising growth and begin to elect candidates! Membership being, under our practices, open to every voter, it would forthwith enjoy an influx of newcomers, including some merely intent on sharing the power. The latter would dismay the original idealists by their unwillingness to cling to doctrine if it gets in the path of victory; so the platforms would become less obnoxiously explicit and items alien to the original concept would be put in as voter bait. Management problems would multiply, a party machine would develop, and practical men would take it over with just enough use of doctrine to cloak their grab for power. At last the platforms would become general and equivocal, the candidates nondescript, and people would say "What real difference is there now between Socialists and Republicans?" Thus the party's machine, taking full possession, would juggernaut the party's soul!

Of course that is just what has long since happened in the two old parties; they are machines primarily, and in terms of doctrine, there are, as Norman Thomas remarks, wider differences within them than there are between them.

Thus the parties have ceased to represent principles, although they do divide on class and regional lines. People just *are* Republicans, their fathers were Republicans before them, their town has always been Republican, they belong to the clan and their thinking on public policy is densely colored by

the question of whether a policy originated therein or was advanced by those curious characters the Democrats. And vice versa. We know, as Gilbert puts it in *Iolanthe*:

That every boy and every gal
That's born into the world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative!

In constituencies on each of the six levels of our governments, voters should logically divide differently, for the questions of policy that agitate the school district are not those that affect the county or the nation. Sometimes indeed they do manage to divide and be counted in issues peculiar to each level, but more often the machine operates at all levels, fills the offices at all the levels, and looks after its own interests in every case.

ATTEMPT TO REGULATE PARTIES

So, parties in our country being mostly machines and machines having such extensive arrays of functions that elude public scrutiny, the reformers in the Progressive era of 1910-20 contrived laws to regulate the party machines and their internal structures and procedures. The central feature of such laws was the government-managed direct primary now existent in every state but Connecticut. Most of those reformers, however, like writers of constitutions and charters, missed the fact that anything devised for mass operation must be simple. They left the party management free to devise the structures of their machines, and the party managers proceeded to organize protective complexities which only experts could operate. In Tammany Hall the selection of the party managers, known as assembly district leaders, has been arranged under the party rules so that the two hundred or so party voters in each voting precinct are called upon at

the primaries to elect five or ten "county committeemen." There on an official ballot is the slate. It is very rarely contested, and when it is, there is the difficulty of inducing the voters to inform themselves as to which of the unlabeled slates will represent their purposes. Great numbers of these committeemen ignore their duties, and many others are unaware that they are committeemen! Then, in a mass meeting of from three hundred to a thousand, the committeemen elected on these slates docilely re-elect the assembly district leader who put them on the slates.

As to those powerful assembly district leaderships, factions of professional politicians have provoked sharp contests in this jungle battlefield, but dislodgment of a leader who has, in effect, elected his own constituency of county committeemen has involved difficulties that only such professionals can cope with. The conditions, like those of a chess game, do not prevent contests between experts, but do debar lay efforts to oust professionals.

The district leaders and their captains also put on the primary ballots their slates of ten or twenty delegates from each assembly district; these delegates then meet, several hundred strong, as "judicial conventions" to select party candidates for supreme court judgeships. Not one in a hundred voters could name to you the delegates he thus nominally elects, and the delegates when they meet, if they have not read the newspapers, need only be told by the leaders what candidate for judge to nominate when they arrive at the convention. The New York State Crime Commission, questioning the leaders in both parties, were unable to find any case in which these judicial conventions had ever disregarded the prior decisions of district leaders.

The logical reform is to let the party voters choose between the actual candi-

dates instead of between two unidentified slates of intervening delegates, but inasmuch as such simplification of the voters' task could crack a machine monopoly, both party managements resist it.

NEEDED REFORMS

So in both the official and the intra-party elections, the control of government by the people through parties awaits sweeping, basic simplifications of governments at the state and lower levels to make machines relatively unnecessary and less potent. The democratic process will never work very well as long as it asks the voters at either primary or final elections to express opinions on matters concerning which they have no opinions to express. Voters of Ohio in 1952, for example, elected representatives to Congress. The office was lost in a ballot list of over forty minor elective state, county, and judicial offices, and a Gallup poll² in 1953 found that only 31 per cent of the voters knew their congressman's name. In Virginia, where ballots are quite short, 57 per cent of the voters gave correct answers.

Where people "just are Republicans" and "just are Democrats" in somewhat equal numbers, competition is usually genuine and party managements must find strong candidates and cater deferentially to public opinion in the case of the few top candidacies which the voters are sure to scrutinize. In the national elections, the nation being rather evenly divided between two parties, it became important for both parties to reach for the strongest candidates they could produce. The Republican state machines were lined up for Taft in 1952 and could probably have nominated him despite the wider appeal of Eisenhower

² *National Municipal Review*, Vol. 42 (October 1953), p. 460.

—if they had dared to do so in the presence of the Democrats that year.

The necessity of catering to the public does not, however, beset the machine in all constituencies. The two-party system, which is so often admired by its active participants, is, in about half the jurisdictions, only another of our myths. It is all too often in reality a one-party system where nomination by the dominant party is equivalent to election and the machine, consisting of a numerically small self-renewing managing group with lots of work to do, can practically appoint public officers for generations on end.

The test is whether insurgency has a chance, for democracy is essentially a government which the people can change. Every device and complication which, designedly or otherwise, baffles insurgency is antidemocratic!

So, to be objective, modern political reformers press for clearing away the clutter of minor elective offices. They would elect in the state administration only the governor (as in New Jersey), a single-house legislature (as in Nebraska), would appoint the judiciary (as in Massachusetts and New Jersey), would elect a board of county commissioners with an appointive county manager (as in seventeen counties), and elect a small city council with an appointive city manager (as in 1,200 communities, including 39 per cent of the cities with a population over 25,000). The result would be ballots of five offices or less for each voter to inform himself about each year. A similar simplification is demanded for the internal structures of political parties. Citizens could control such a system without much organization. These recommendations are set forth in the series of model laws of the National Municipal League.³

³ For a fuller discussion, see Childs, *op. cit. supra* note 1.

CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS

Discontent of citizens leads here and there to creation of those American institutions, the civic associations. They are completely outside of government and, unlike parties, can easily protect themselves from capture by self-seekers. Manned by a few devoted volunteers, understaffed, with pitifully few cash members, they assail impregnable political citadels with facts and invective. In New York City's seven millions, fewer than ten thousand persons support the strictly civic associations. But their findings are widely trusted by press and public, and amidst the records of rebuffs received are found more than enough achievements to justify what little they cost.

One of the best weapons, where available, is the initiative. Civic associations can get up the petitions to force a constructive measure onto a ballot, and the management of the dominant party is commonly unable to influence its party members on a referendum question to any such extent as it can when demanding loyal support for its labeled candidates.

Civic organizations are always nonpartisan. They recruit members from both parties but sometimes lose them when their criticisms are damaging to party interest or indeed to any local vested interest. Hence their vitality is drawn from the true independents, who in most communities are a trifling minority. Indeed only in a very few large cities do these organizations exist with a continuity and size capable of supporting a payroll. In small cities they are seldom strong enough to maintain an office and would hardly have enough to do to be usefully busy if they did. State-wide civic organizations hardly exist at all—the distances between members leave their operations in a condition of almost continuous lapse,

as the valiant Robert Moses found when he spent several full-time years trying to maintain the New York State Association. Nor is there any nationwide civic organization representing general citizen interest, as distinguished from groups organized around limited objectives like the tiny National Civil Service League or serving special interests such as farmers or manufacturers.

Control of state and local government for the general interest is looked after mostly on a part-time basis by taxpayers associations, chambers of commerce, including junior chambers, and service clubs (Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions). When a single program is important enough, special temporary associations of citizens coalesce and do battle—for example, to procure adoption of the council-manager plan or to focus the good-government vote on a set of candidates in a nonpartisan election.

For technical assistance the local civic groups turn to specialized national associations such as the National Citizens Commission for the Public Schools, the National Recreation Association, or the National Municipal League.

The last named indeed began as an annual conference of the municipal civic groups for exchange of experience. This developed a school of thought and a body of doctrine as to the best technical attack on the excesses of political machines and begot programs for setting up the sounder and simpler democratic processes the need for which is indicated earlier in this paper. Its programs, unchallenged nowadays by any but the characters who comprise its targets, have been advanced by the local civic organizations where there were any but in recent years have been expedited vastly by the growth of the League of Women Voters. This organization, sometimes almost alone, more often in temporary combination with all available local allies and leaders, car-

ries the ball in a hundred local contests a year. There are nearly a thousand local leagues today and 122,000 members—an immense new civic force. Their cautious, sure-footed methods protect them from being stampeded by superficial doctrines, and when they go to battle they ring doorbells for reform and turn out their members for practical personal work to a degree unprecedented in male civics. Joining together on state-wide programs they go out to sure defeat in legislatures with perennial pertinacity and always on the side of the general interest. Only a few of their locals or their state groups are big enough to maintain offices, but they enlist immense amounts of volunteer service to make up for lack of paid staff. There is nothing among the men like that great league!

CIVIC METHODS

The Leagues of Women Voters and the local citizens associations cannot and do not compete with political parties in promoting candidates for elective offices. New local parties are usually short-lived and vulnerable to capture, although one, the Liberal party, formed around the union workers of New York City's great garment industry, has persisted.

The Leagues of Women Voters are by their rules inhibited from supporting candidates but have "know your candidates" meetings which are sometimes highly revealing. Several of the big-city civic associations publish "voters directories" providing to press and members brief biographical data on the long array of candidates, most of whom would otherwise be poorly illuminated indeed, and single out for endorsement the preferred candidate in each contest. The most effective directories are those of Detroit and Cleveland, where the ballots sprawl out far beyond any ordinary voter's comprehension. The

directory of the Citizens Union of New York City, which ought to be distributed to 2,000,000 voters, for financial reasons is limited to a circulation of 70,000, plus repetition in the press. Although candidates for minor offices such as the legislative seats eagerly seek its endorsement, its influence is hard to demonstrate. Of course there is a basic absurdity in having so many elective offices that such a directory is essential to informed voting!

Professional organizations of governmental servants develop professional pride and have a great influence in advancing and protecting good work in government. The profession of forestry, for example, is so dedicated to good forestry practices that it bulwarks the public interest. The Astin incident in the National Bureau of Standards stirred the scientific societies to highly articulate and effective protest against tampering with scientific findings. The medical profession will jump to the defense of a politically harried health officer or hospital superintendent and is being helpful just now in the National Municipal League's little crusade to get the coroner's function out of county politics. The Public Administration Clearing House has successfully promoted the organization of new associations of assessors, finance officers, police, city planning officials, and others whose central office admonitions on technical standards are more acceptable to their members than outside criticism would be. Local, privately supported bureaus of municipal research develop methodology for transient public officers, and their systems, once installed, are apt to last and save money until, years later, the bureaus come around again with a further improvement.

SUMMARY

From inability to control our complex of governments by the ballot box,

we Americans have attempted to control government by means of parties and have then found it necessary to attempt control of the complex party mechanisms. Failing there, we have attempted to control public officers by concerted shouting at them through the organized alertness of civic associations!

But political chess is no game for clumsy masses to be required to play in order to protect their interests. The ballot game must not, by complexity,

be made a game for experts only. As Woodrow Wilson said long ago, "Simplification, simplification, simplification is the task that awaits us!" In the forty years since then there have been some simplifications, particularly in municipal government by the council-manager plan, with successes which demonstrate that he was right and that the democratic process, if kept simple enough, can be operated under volunteer leadership with easy effectiveness just by ballots deposited by masses of citizens.

Richard S. Childs, New York, is chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Municipal League, where he has been a full-time volunteer since retirement from business in 1947. He started the short-ballot movement in 1909-19 with Woodrow Wilson and fathered the council-manager plan of municipal government, as related in his book Civic Victories (1952).

Bureaucracy and the Future

By PAUL H. APPLEBY

CARLYLE once illustrated a point by telling of a family of privilege living high on a mountainside above a squalid city and unconcerned about such problems as urban sewage disposal. When the plague came, he said, it did not stop at the foot of the mountain. Enlightened self-interest, if not altruism, has brought to many millions of us concern for the survival of civilization through its popularization and geographical spread, its freedom from confinement to elite classes or powerful states. The extension of civilization is now, as it has always been, a problem in organization and administration. It is a more complicated problem than ever before, because of the stage of civilization we have attained.

Civilization is the attainment and further pursuit of social and personal complexity. This complexity is sought through division of labor and through specialization and extension of activity, experience, and learning, all of which are possible only through progressively more intricate forms of social organization. The process diversifies and enlarges opportunity. It differentiates individuals in functions, experience, and interests, their involvements in and reactions to an enriched societal complex. It creates interdependence enlarging in every conceivable dimension—in number of persons affected, in geographical area, in number and in kind of functions, in technologies, and in bureaucratic structures.

It is easiest for people generally to attend to their specialized functions and situations, and hardest for them to see, understand, and help manage their expanding societal universe in terms of

their largest and broadest interdependencies. Skill in organization tends to be limited to particular structures and functions. Most persons contribute to the multiplication, diversification, and extension of particular organizational efforts, thus complicating and burdening the general organizational mechanisms. The few who have concentrated on extending general order have tended to do it in specialized terms that do not sufficiently comprehend the cultural totality physically covered. Up to now history has told rather consistently of breakdowns in states and empires and of consequent stagnation and decline in grass-roots civilization.

The drive toward an extended civilization nevertheless recurs, pushing to new levels, affording over the ages an experiential learning of large dimensions and great promise, but a learning not intellectually well developed, transmissible, or well spread through areas and peoples become highly interdependent. Developments within single states and cultures now impinge more quickly and directly on other states and cultures and create interactions less immediately associated with military conquest than in centuries past. Acquaintance is also less immediately confined to trade in the conventional sense and moves through books, newspapers, and radio programs, so that the largely intranational achievement of independence and wealth in the United States has helped to fan hope and unrest among hundreds of millions who have little actual dealing with this country. Thus, we have become involved in a world revolution, and our own attainments stand threatened unless similar gains may be made really

able elsewhere. The situation is largely a product of organizational performances, and poses new problems in how to organize and carry on improved efforts.

History is primarily the story of men's various efforts to achieve, maintain, and extend order for the sake of the enrichment that goes along with diversification of interchange. Unhappily, its written record has not often enough been produced by scholars who could see and think deeply in organizational terms. Yet it does reveal to us the fact that at every point of high advance the drive toward civilization has extended much beyond the current understanding of it. The concern for enrichment usually has been directed toward exploitation rather than toward the greater and more enduring enrichment that could have been had through addressing concerns mutual by methods co-operative. Although the record of arbitration and treaty negotiation goes back six thousand years, the large and dramatic drives were toward conquest and empire. For the first time in history we have in this century a large and conscious effort toward extensive co-operative order. The difficulty presented by powers still driving for empire is dramatic and vivid. But the difficulty we still have in the lagging understanding of our own aspiration is no less serious. We have not seen clearly enough that history is the story of the hard search for bureaucratic method, skill, and values appropriate to men's finer aspirations and fullest potentialities. We have too little understanding of bureaucracy, too little mastery of it. Our very approach to it is commonly petty, negative, and archaic.

Organization for individuality

We ourselves have moved so quickly from the most extreme, and probably unprecedented, pioneer condition of

rugged individualism that we still confuse individualism—which is an anti-organizational phenomenon of isolation, mental or physical—with concern for individuality, which in its greatest dimensions may be nurtured only through organizational means. We tend in America as nowhere else in the world to organize more and more variously for specific functions, and to approach reluctantly and in confusion the great task of organizing society and societies in general.

Even apart from our foreign involvements, we are far from an adequate understanding of our present attainments and have inadequate ground for confidence that we can continue our present course indefinitely. We emerged as a society under conditions most extraordinarily favorable, with early political leadership most exceptional, but came quickly to a time when the tempo of total social change began a progressive acceleration which calls for organizational wisdom of the highest order. We have organized diversely for special ends far beyond any similar development elsewhere, greatly differentiating concerns, without often or fully facing the manifold problems of coherence and over-all mastery of organizational devices necessary for continuance on our course.

Failures recorded in the pages of history are attributable to lacks of balance in organizing drives. Their strengths have had corresponding weaknesses. We should be concerned about the weakness of our strength. Pendleton Herring, writing as a political scientist, observed two decades ago that democracy tends toward chaos, not toward unity; and of course there is no democracy in chaos. George Homans, writing as a sociologist, has observed that civilization is, in one of its aspects, centralization. In these two terms it might be seen that our problem is to achieve centralized

democracy, but such a statement would have little of its real meaning, and would be greeted with horror, among those who have little understanding of organization or centralization. The second of these two terms is viewed as axiomatically evil; thus the *interdependence* of pluralism is shunted off the track of thoughtfulness. What is commonly espoused as decentralization is the drift toward chaos. It needs much to be considered as an aspect, a technique, or a mode of centralization. More broadly, there is great need for freer and fuller exploration and understanding of complex social organization. "Bureaucracy" is, perhaps, the commonest shorthand term for that phrase; if not fully synonymous it is at least inseparable from the phenomenon of systematic interaction of many persons associated in common and complex terms. Not all interaction is systematic, of course, and where system begins is hard to say. There are elements of control somewhat apart from formal and visible hierarchies. Division of labor, systematic relationships between differentiated functions, and some capacity for control may sometimes precede or be tangent to formal hierarchal structures; their association with hierarchy is commonly said to constitute a bureaucracy. Widespread division of labor and differentiation in function, intricate interaction of persons and functions, and the interactions of many diverse bureaucracies create a bureaucratic complex which itself needs to be considered in organizational terms. In particular, numerous specialized bureaucracies need to be somehow consciously and somehow functionally related to generalizing conceptions and to generalizing and unifying bureaucracies.

THE BUREAUCRATIC COMPLEX

Max Weber rates, perhaps, as the Adam Smith of organizational study.

His definition of bureaucracy was arrived at without much benefit of the last half century's experience, which would have pointed to important and growing differences between bureaucracies in democratic and nondemocratic societies, and especially to differences between public bureaucracies in advanced democracies and those in non-democratic states. His definition also had in particular a Germanic tinge which further limits the use of Weber's thinking in American application. His conception of bureaucracy was legalistically oriented to coercion. It is true, of course, that some capacity for control is central to all hierarchal organization, and particularly to the organization of sovereign government. However, it is precisely in the qualifications of control, the control of control, substitutes for it, the nuances associated with the elevation of popular politics, and modifications of control in manner and procedure deferring to diverse and humane values that democratic concern centers. Democracy has been specially seeking diminution in the impersonality of factors basic to Weber's thought: oversimplification of system in concentration on the literal "rule," the economic market, and bureaucracy as he defined it. Concern for the dignity of man, if it is not to be a vain hope, must peculiarly impregnate democratic bureaucracy, expressing itself in processes serving compassion and reflecting popular politics.

Free competition is more tolerable and useful within a democratic state than elsewhere precisely because government will direct and influence it there in ways serving a larger freedom than free enterprise alone. Democratic government will also separately appraise and alleviate some of the less happy consequences of the impersonal market and thus preserve it as a useful and acceptable device. International stress is

as great as it is in considerable part because there is at that level no adequate central mechanism for treating the ill consequences of undirected bureaucratic intercourse.

The modifying effect of political democracy

Political democracy has greatly modified both the nature of private capitalism and the mores of public bureaucracy since the days of Marx and Weber. Among American industrialists there is a concern for mass buying power not at all understandable in those democracies which have not yet departed from the Weberian approach to administration. Chester Barnard, writing out of his rich experience in private administration, went well beyond Weber when he wrote that authority derives from consent, "lies always with him to whom it applies," and that "experienced and effective administrators prefer not to use authority."

It is a modern axiom, revealed as an indirect product of political democracy, that there is no more certain means of sabotaging superior authority than for subordinates to carry out its directives *literally*. This is an insight not possessed by many who speak glibly of "government of law." Government of the people, by the people, and for the people seeks some additional and importantly modifying values to be had only through differentiated administration.

Modern insights into administration point emphatically to the importance, in terms of sheer efficiency, of developing and utilizing diverse and numerous potentialities of personnel. The democratic aspiration points in the same direction and includes "citizens" with "personnel." Institutionally this underscores co-operative and flexible interaction with deference to the plural and subtle. This accounts for Macmahon's

description of our present reality: "The problem of compulsion is lessened by the fact that the control methods of a moving consensus, although pinned initially by majority action at crucial points, will be a largely calculated interplay of inducements, incentives and indirect influences, not direct coercion." Outside of this described area, limited to modified compulsion, there are large fields of governmental activity involving research, service, and contractual relationships with no compulsion at all. The efficiency of the complicated and subtle procedures most distinguishing public bureaucracy under democracy is to be judged in important part according to criteria peculiar to democracy. These are subjective tests. But efficiency is to be tested also by the objective criterion of survival. There is some evidence and much hope that by this test, too, democratic ways are superior. The Weberian conceptions would not have been regarded as seriously unacceptable by the Hitlerian bureaucracy that planned the German advance into Western Europe. It sent single makes of tanks and trucks along particular roads so that single sets of supply parts might be sent along those same roads. This was highly efficient in aggressor terms, so long as the initiative was with the Germans. When improvisation became necessary in confronting novel conditions, advantage shifted to the democracies.

Improvisation and flexibility of bureaucratic performances increase in importance disproportionately to increases in tempo of social change. Both root in individual imagination, but require institutional testing and acceptance. In democratic society they are also subject to sanctions of political authority and public reaction. The utilization and development of individual capacities, deference to individual values, in structures providing system and re-

sponsibility, maximizing effectiveness of multiple efforts, yet with rapid adjustment to changing conditions and to highly diversified citizen conditions—all these are involved in the kind of bureaucratic performance to which we are committed. If, with Barnard, we see suppliers and customers as members of an organization, and if with "popular government" we see citizens as vested with powers of control, our consideration of the improvement of public bureaucracy in a more complicated future must range widely.

Bureaucracy's relating function

The relating of interdependent people and functions in ways serving central and common values might be one way of defining the bureaucratic function. Certainly, this relating function is crucial to bureaucratic performance. For many specialized studies it may be useful to define bureaucracy simply as organization characterized by hierarchal structure, and surely hierarchy is an important focus of attention. But hierarchy has more varied forms and processes than we are likely to assume. And what about the highly bureaucratic phenomena involved in the interaction of various bureaucracies not formally structured in a common, visible hierarchy? Is an independent company which by contract manufactures exclusively for Sears, Roebuck and Company wholly without a hierarchal dependency relationship to its solitary customer? Are the more common relationships between manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers wholly unstructured and non-bureaucratic? Certainly if the United States fails as a society it will fail as a state; if it fails as a state it will fail as a society. The whole bureaucratic complex may not be a bureaucracy, but it is surely our major concern with bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is division of

labor, effected, developed, and ordered through hierarchal arrangements and controls. Any single bureaucracy, no less than a functional specialist engaged in it, is a specialized instance of division of labor. In the end, numerous and diverse bureaucracies have themselves to be ordered.

In the study of bureaucracy, division of labor concentrates attention chiefly on specific bureaucracies and specialized aspects of bureaucracy. This is our great genius, and we may be reasonably confident that in the continuation of such studies we may find such improvements as are available to this approach. But while we appraise and extend that function of bureaucracy which is the development of division of labor and specialization, we largely ignore the other primary function—the business of relating and integrating specialisms, to make complexity tolerable, sensible, and fruitful. This is the hard task in any bureaucracy. In terms of the bureaucratic complex it is the supreme problem of advancing civilization.

Public and private bureaucracy

We tend not only to view bureaucracies one by one, or bureaucratic functions one by one, but also to consider public bureaucracy apart from private bureaucracy. Government has distinct and priceless characteristics, of course, but it is greatly dependent on the private organizational whole, just as private bureaucracy is dependent on government. Specialism obscures their interactions and interdependences. We tend also to be highly critical of public bureaucracy, and to sanctify its private cousin. Slanderous clichés on the one side and eulogistic clichés on the other are the counterfeits of thought most often passing as the currency of bureaucratic discussion. The gap between concerns rooted in our sprawling bu-

reaucratic specialisms and our concerns for the relating and integrating functions of public bureaucracy is much wider here than anywhere else, now or heretofore. The gap is principally consequential to the enormous size, range, and variety of our private bureaucratic forms and functions. Whether or not this gap needs to be closed, and if so how much and in what manner, I am by no means wholly confident, except in one respect. I feel sure that the gap in understanding and consideration should be greatly narrowed.

It is extremely doubtful whether the average person can arrive at any comprehensive understanding of the bureaucratic complex by viewing it only laterally. Largely preoccupied with a few primary organizational memberships and a few others of secondary rank, he will not see clearly all his involvements in society regarded as a plane surface heavily populated with other and different organizations. Direct communication between all these bureaucracies and consciously directed reconciliation of them in terms of common indirect concerns would grossly overload the possibilities of cross-lots dealing. Some intellectual treatment in successive terms of increasing generality would appear to be essential. This very statement describes a phenomenon resembling the functioning of hierarchy. Indeed, the intellectual process requires facilitation through some concrete and operating social structures possessing hierarchal character. The theory of sovereignty places government at the apex of any such structure, and the bulk of our plural private bureaucracies at bottom levels, some of them extending moderately upward because of their size, scope, and number of functions. What structures occupy intermediate levels and perform intermediate organizing functions, what processes are used to transform specialized concerns into

relationships and issues of progressively broader significance and usefulness—these are questions which, if pursued, should provide much needed illumination.

Democratic bureaucracy

Any general view of our structural totality, if it is adequate, must highlight elements peculiarly related to our democratic aspirations and present character. Our approach to democracy has been largely negative. We have not much studied democracy in structural terms more precise than those of a general Constitution. Yet Latin American constitutions greatly resembling our own have permitted governments to operate in terms very unlike our own. Even the Russian constitution has many elements of resemblance to ours. And the pre-Hitlerian bureaucracy in Germany without much shock served the Nazis about as readily as it had the preceding regime. Most of our few classical studies of bureaucracy have failed to differentiate well between the forms and processes of democratic and nondemocratic bureaucracies. The common unlearned view would tend to produce myriads of autonomies and to dissipate democratic effectiveness in perpetual consultation. Most of the legalistic treatments take a mystical view of impersonal "law," regarding only a small segment of the bureaucratic whole, that part much withdrawn from politics, and thus have failed to allow sufficiently for the shift from a monarchical to a popular sovereignty.

In a large view appropriate to our hopes for an expanding complexity, then, it seems to me that we need to consider bureaucracy as the vehicle of both specialism and integration, regard it in society-wide terms, and point it positively toward both democratic enrichment and democratic effectiveness.

BUREAUCRACY AS SPECIALISM

In modern democratic society, each citizen is a very special case. He lives in a single community, in one state, has one primary job in greater or less degree unique, has a set of family problems not identical with those of any other family, has a pattern of memberships, hobbies, and interests not just like the pattern of any other person. He embodies all of his past experience and training, and all the elements of his present condition and situation. It is inevitable that he considers all of the social and political problems to which he gives attention in terms of these things, which in their totality differentiate him from all other citizens. Individual "good judgment" consists in focusing on a specific problem all that one knows as a result of his past experience and present exposure. But of course the individual is limited by the very factors that make him an individual; he has not experienced what all other citizens have experienced, is not socially exposed altogether as they are. The others may have quite different judgments about the same problems. No matter what any of us may think about any problem, social and political wisdom is not private property but something that results from the interaction of the many who are concerned, through structures somehow ordering the interaction. The structures within which social decision makers act may provide for imperfect representational character. Responsibility may be to many less than "all those concerned." Yet the decision makers are always located within structures which expose them at the time to multiple forces nowhere else coming into focus so clearly. The decisions made at such points of exposure, therefore, are always narrowly confined by environing forces. They also always have a character re-

flecting a good deal of interaction between persons and groups holding various individual judgments.

I ignore for the moment the matter of qualitative differences between individuals in the same decision-making situations. The point now being submitted is that differences in exposure sharply distinguish the opinion of a citizen critic from the opinion of any responsible decision maker. The former always has a less relevant exposure than the decision maker. In matters of great scope and import, the gap between any single citizen and the decision makers in large institutions widely exposed is very great indeed. The opinion of each single citizen having a functional relationship to the decision-making institution is important; such opinions altogether define the area of discretion open to the decision makers. But, relevant to the decision made within that area of discretion, the citizen's opinion, at the moment, is likely to be largely irrelevant. At least, it is not substitutable for the judgment of the decision makers until it has been subjected to the same bombardment as the judgments of those having the exposures of responsibility, and has been modified accordingly.

No one's past experience ever equips him adequately for a broader responsibility; confronted with the new responsibility, he is too likely to decide in terms of his previous exposure. One's past experience is always, in an important sense, a handicap because of its tendency to weigh too heavily in the new situation. I have observed this frequently when men have been given hierarchal promotions; the one promoted tends to interfere too much with his successor in the field of his past experience, and to see the affairs of men once his peers but now his "inferiors" in terms of his own past preoccupation rather than in terms equally relevant to

all his subordinates. If a highly successful businessman goes into the government on the expectation that his business experience fully fits him for the governmental post, he will make tragic blunders because his past experience is not directly relevant. In almost every particular way, the past experience will be a limiting handicap. It is only when past experience is used as *generally and indirectly relevant* that it is an asset in a post of different exposures and responsibilities. The only equipment that anyone has, of course, is his past experience and his new exposures. The problem represented by the broader responsibility requires emphasis on the new exposures, whereas the tendency is to rely on the old ones.

Universities

The commonest form in which the limitations of specialism appear, of course, is found in the functioning of persons who remain permanently in substantially one status; they are specialists in function and place. In this form limitation appears as a "bureaucratic" attitude, when the word is taken in its common, opprobrious meaning. This is to say that it is the attitude vigorously and unyieldingly insistent on looking at everything else in terms of the individual's special preoccupation. I saw this attitude exemplified on one occasion when a chairman of a sociology department at a university—not my own—sent me a memorandum dealing with the "proper administration of a sociology department." It was a lengthy argument that no one in the university or in the outside world had any "right" to have any say about the conduct of a sociology department except sociologist members of the department. This attitude is often formulated as an espousal of "democratic administration." As a doctrine, this is in fact an unconscious syndicalism, but as a matter of practice

it is merely an impatience with the cumbersomeness of that true democracy which brings to bear many points of view. Talk of this kind, like the writings of Spencer and Marx, seeks escape from the whole social reality of the university universe, solving the problems of interaction by excluding many important elements.

The professions and industry

Universities are by no means the only organizations where such tendencies are evident, although they are, of course, citadels of specialism where, up to now, the interest in and preparation for pluralistic development have far outrun positive interest in social organization. There is probably no field of functional preoccupation which does not very similarly seek autonomy. In business, the pursuit of monopolistic position is only one form of the same drive against "interference." The medical profession is just now a notable example of a group demanding freedom from outside interference. Usually, too, public agencies are locating new hospitals to suit the convenience of medical men, with rare attention to public convenience.

The tendency to break down democracy into small and autonomous units is not everywhere a simple reflection of specialism. Sometimes it is also a sentimental or theoretical desire to extend the values of political democracy to the private field. "Industrial democracy," for example, is sometimes proposed as a pattern for single institutions. If industry became generally and thoroughly so organized, concern for the "integrity" of their institutional democracy might so support their syndicalist specialisms, however, as to give us less, not more, of a democratic economy. "Autonomous" and "social" are antipathetic terms.

It is not the intention here to argue for any particular kind of organization

of universities, professions, or industries, however; rather it is desired simply to draw attention to the social involvements of institutions and practices and to the insufficiency of general doctrines or attitudes based merely upon special concerns. A pluralistic society needs to some degree to be able to relate its diverse parts to each other and to the societal whole. Specialism is inevitably, by itself, parochialism. It has also a peculiar logic which compounds the difficulties of general order.

Military specialism

This logic of specialism is well illustrated by the trend in military organization. In World War I the proportion of the total army organizational personnel engaged in face-to-face combat as riflemen was estimated at 21.71 per cent. In World War II the corresponding estimate was 10.39 per cent.¹ To some extent the difference is accounted for by the distance of the Pacific theater from the United States, but the general factor of determining importance was the need of the military to take account of new learnings, new inventions, new technological resources, and newly realized and newly feasible concerns for humane values—all resulting from the various achievements of specialism. This continuing expansion of "overhead" is an index of civilization, but it moves in the direction of having only one man engaged in combat with all other uniformed personnel, and a very large part of the energies of society, devoted to pursuing collateral business and making available to the reduced

¹ Both figures are based on total military and civilian personnel, except air force. In World War I the War Department had 3,516,504 military and 300,000 civilian employees. In World War II it utilized 5,984,114 military and 1,147,202 civilian persons. If air force had been taken into account, the shift emphasized above would be very substantially greater.

combat manpower increased power of other kinds.

Education

The same tendencies exist in every other functional field. It may be worth while to cite the situation in education as a second example. The case of history may be sufficiently illustrative. Each year adds to the content of history in four dimensions: through the increase in time covered, through the increase in availability of historical materials relevant to the past, through new approaches to old materials, and through the spread of historical concern to areas of the world—such as India—not heretofore much incorporated in Western historical study. To be generally learned in history is steadily less possible if its content merely reflects these increments, and to be really learned in history makes impossible any great learning in other fields concurrently increasing in number and depth. If academicians are slow to realize the present dimensions of the universe of academic learning, they cannot go on for many generations more without appraising the social "overhead" costs of really intensive education and the grave difficulty in the way of providing broadly educated persons.

I once conversed with two very successful industrial entrepreneurs who were themselves inventors. These two happened to be in agreement that "the way to make most money most easily is to invent gadgets and doodads rather than anything at all fundamental." While our total research and experimental resources do produce many new products that have fundamental significance, this use of personnel and the larger use of manpower in developing and turning out doodads—physical, functional, and intellectual—make constant and increasing demands on our total energy pool.

We have moved definitely, of course, toward the great reduction of energies spent on what used to be regarded as essentials and find much real enrichment in the whole process, but somehow we have to equate all of these various, potentially unlimited demands on human capacity. And we have increasingly to relate what we do in our single society to what is done and sought in other societies. This is another aspect of the logic of specialism; it expands the social universe as it enlarges the functional ones. In the end, both aspects point up the general problem of the general management of the fruits of specialism.

BUREAUCRACY AS INTEGRATION

Bureaucracy facilitates specialism, but it is also the initial and the final, if not the exclusive, medium for the integration of specialisms.

The concern for pluralism is a rather modern one, with important aspects peculiar to democracy. Primitive society was characteristically a single, comprehensive bureaucracy uniting the disciplines of interpersonal relations, religion, the economy, and government into a single cultural discipline embedded in custom, ignorance, and a core hierarchy. Feudalism at a later stage provided a rather comprehensive unity. It is a significant feature of the genius of democracy that it opens up many opportunities for informal and collateral supports to unity rather apart from bureaucracy, with a much higher capacity to contain diversity. It is also a significant feature of democracy that it opens the way to larger, formal bureaucracies, greatly extending and stabilizing political order.

In any society there is, and must be, a certain capacity to tolerate diversity, confusion, and variegated unrelatedness. The difference between such tolerance in any primitive society and the same

kind of tolerance in our society is vast. It may be confidently believed that we here have by no means reached the ultimate limits of possibility, and that by improved organizational skills we may continually extend this capacity. Improvement of our intellectual comprehension of pluralism is itself an aid, and by shifting some of our intellectual efforts away from specialism to this general view, we may go much farther on our way. We can also be encouraged by the fact that in lieu of verbalized understanding mere familiarity with complexity will serve in some measure. The American people do not "understand" the huge bureaucracy that is the postal service, itself constituting one-fourth of our civilian national governmental bureaucracy, but familiarity with it gives us a sense of understanding sufficient for our needs. In the same way, children of today are incorporating jet planes and television into their pattern of the familiar.

The economic "market" serves as a rather automatic and unplanned ordering of diverse activities in special and limited terms. There are, within the area of the market, many bureaucracies. The term "administered prices" recognizes such structures, and differences in their functioning reflect differences in their power.

A certain amount of integration is also achieved by a somewhat automatic and unconscious adjustment of our specialisms to each other and to our general societal character. This is a phenomenon without conscious organizational design, but it extends into a higher dimension in which rather definite structure is achieved. It reaches this dimension in the interaction of groups and institutions where, for example, dependence of a producer company on suppliers and customers creates a kind of loose and more or less transient hierarchical relationship be-

tween them all. In a still broader way, Dr. Arthur Morgan has called attention in *Antioch Notes* to the complicated interaction of groups in America as constituting something new under the sun, which, "emerging without conscious intent, combines the vigor and creativeness of free enterprise with a wide range of checks and balances" tending to be "most effective in large, far-flung industries where lack of social control would be most serious."

Wherever there are relationships of dependence, there is organizational form and, therefore, something of bureaucratic character, firm or loose, consciously or unconsciously developed. There are many specialized domains of order, some of them spreading *laterally* through large parts of the society but extending hierarchically *upward* very little. Their upward form is chiefly as an organization of power seeking general influence in terms of special concerns, rather than as an upreaching toward a comprehensive general order. They thus do manage the relations of many specialized interactions, performing a limited but often valuable and acceptable part of the job of organizing and managing society. They do it within confines set up by the public and its government and under conditions in which interaction with government is crucial both to government and to the private scene. General social integration of our complexity has no vehicle except government: its agency as integrator is uniquely structured in democracy, where the *public* control rests in *private* citizens.

Private bureaucracies

Citizens act and react chiefly in private bureaucracies which form the power patterns of the society among these groupings. Power differentials are according to: (1) wealth, which is to a considerable degree directly translatable

into power; (2) structure, including (a) size and location of membership, (b) depth of and degree of agreement on particular sentiments behind exercises of power, and (c) the structural designs in terms of maximizing and channeling the power potential (involving cohesiveness and action capacities); (3) leadership; and (4) the nature and extent of contextual *competition* and *disinterest*.

Aside from single, greatly unified bureaucracies there are in the private scene structures which pyramid or associate bureaucracies. Some of these seek rather exclusively to integrate special interests in extended areas and to maximize power for limited purposes (such as increasing profits or extending communication, mobility, and community). Always, perhaps, a gain in general prestige (an aspect of power or of power potential) is a consequence of the creation of these superbureaucracies. Often an increase in social power is a primary objective. Illustrations of the two classes of purposes would include such varied structures as the bureaucracy of the First Methodist Church of Oshkosh, with its district, "conference," and "general conference" superstructures; county Farm Bureaus with state and national superstructures; local and United States Chambers of Commerce; local unions, craft or industrial unions, and national groupings of each form. There are many formally federal forms in private bureaucracies, and many informal structures of dependence, like-mindedness, imitativeness, and "logrolling." The total result is a somewhat definite structuring of the whole society, with some rough translations of the locally special into more widespread special postures.

A governmental farm policy proposal found acceptable to a few score farm leaders is ordinarily deemed to be acceptable to twenty-five million farm folk. These farm leaders, heading sepa-

rate bureaucracies, are almost as much a hierarchy among themselves as an oligarchy. Similarly, the commercial, financial, industrial, labor, medical, legal, journalistic, and other important communities in America have considerable cohesion and form, despite their pluralisms, and they exercise great influence. It may be guessed that these various hierarchies together constitute or effect some general loose social hierarchy of a million or so persons who can determine fairly well what is acceptable to the whole people. They perform this function in part through special roles in communication, interpretation, and leadership, the latter reinforced by dependence of many others, imitation, and a popular preoccupation with narrower specialisms which rather unconsciously accepts some general direction.

All of those specialized substitutes for a comprehensive bureaucracy have limitations, of course. They treat with reconciling and relating parts of the pluralistic whole, and other parts not integrated may be of equal, if different, importance. The economic market, for example, makes no room for that compassionate concern for individual persons which is a high value in democracy. No private enterprise can shoulder very much responsibility for the state of the general economy or general employment. No American industry engaging in foreign activity will exemplify the whole American interest in that area. The citation of such limitations could go on endlessly.

It is also true, of course, that none of these relatively unintegrated contributions to integration would be of much significance, if they were possible at all, apart from the conditioning context of and their dependence on the formally comprehensive bureaucracy of sovereign government. Some enlargement of the consideration of multiple factors in pri-

vate actions is a direct product of confining structures created by government. Some of this larger orientation is an indirect result of the government's mere being; its capacity to intervene in response to popular appeal causes private organizations to defer more to popular concerns, even when the government has shown no immediate inclination to intervene.

The governmental bureaucracy

The governmental bureaucracy is the one special organizational structure whose forms and capacities are oriented to general comprehensive integration. Its sovereign position is that of the one wholly conscious and intended, fully systematic bureaucracy at the service of the society at large. There is no principle that properly limits its capacity. Only the procedures necessary to its actions and the general judgment of society set limits, and these limits are variable. But we may see in general terms something of the pattern of occasions that cause the public to resort to the vehicle of governance. Government attends to the most general concerns, and in such fashion as to lead to general courses of action that are considerate of minorities and individuals. Government attends to crisis. Government deals with other governments. And government provides enough ordering of the ordinary to make it acceptable and workable.

The forces operating against resort to government are many and diverse. The proliferation of special private organizations and their extensions of power go on apace. The burden on understanding complexity is heavy. Our confidence in the future is often uneasy. It seems to me that as we continue our course we are more likely to prove insufficiently unified than to find ourselves governmentally regimented and standardized. Even our governmental

bureaucracy is not basically unified, but broken into many parts, with thousands of local jurisdictions, forty-eight states, and a national government with considerable and jealous differentiation of powers in branches, the legislative branch divided into two equal houses, the executive branch distinctly least unified among the action arms of important nations. Things centralized in Washington are there drastically decentralized. Other nations have no notion whose commitment on our behalf has any real meaning, and tend never to count on our action at all until we have acted. As a people we are volatile, mercurial, and preoccupied with our specialisms.

We are far more organized in particular than any other society, and less organized in general than any of the large and advanced countries save France—an exception that is hardly reassuring. In some important areas elsewhere, general order is bulwarked by inheritances from an earlier feudalism. These elements of social structure unhappily have undemocratic connotations, but they do contribute to order and continuity. Democracy would seem to require some more conscious structural developments than we have yet recognized or devised, in some part as substitutes for old forms, in some part to take account of new dimensions in internal complexity, and in part to provide for extranational extensions of order. To these ends, we need much more study of the kind reflected in the final chapter of George Homans' *The Human Group* and in the introductory sections of Pitman B. Potter's *Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (first edition).

Present problems

The chief problems facing us in our efforts to advance civilization Homans identifies as those of emotional isolation, group conflict, circulation, com-

munication, and control. "Circulation" he defines as the process by which able persons are brought to positions of responsibility in a society. We have no conscious process for the development and identification of really general leadership, except belatedly and partially in nominating conventions. Apart from political parties we have no conscious process of communication by which the many preoccupations of specialism may be related and progressively translated into terms of broad significance. We react hostilely to the very idea of general societal control. Yet the elements of internal isolation and intergroup stresses extend themselves rapidly.

In recent decades, it has become increasingly clear that our long survival in terms of internal values is heavily involved in problems of world order. At the world level there is no historical tradition to lean on, and any presently acceptable structures are necessarily embryonic. At the international level disparities and diversities are dramatically vivid, whereas our internal diversity is so little regarded and understood as often to yield to the assertion that we are regimented and standardized. Most of our thinking about world order is nonstructural and sentimental. The most common structural idea proposes no more than a simple federalism, in terms little changed since our own national beginning. Experience since then should be the crucial focus of our needed learning.

We cannot afford to take it for granted that democracy will endure through an ever more complicated future by relying on structures merely historical and spontaneous. In our own time we need some inventions. We need a more positive approach to bureaucracy, we need to know more about it. If we are to continue to pursue pluralization with any confidence, we need to be sure we are allowing sufficiently

for the degree and kind of integration appropriate and necessary to it.

HOSTAGES TO ORDER

A young man from India with Arts and Laws degrees, now pursuing graduate work on the campus of my university, recently put a question to me reflecting his thoughtful concern for his own society. "With all the differences in cultural origin of the people here, and with all your divergent and exacting special concerns, what keeps your society together?" This, I think, is the "\$128 question," answers to which, if thoroughly pursued, might prove disturbingly vague and fumbling. We tend to assume our unity without much concern for the amount and distribution of glue in our bodies politic and cultural. I do not pretend to know the answers to the question of my Indian friend, but it may be that I can suggest some of our assets and some of the points to which more conscious attention might be given.

To begin with, we must recognize our pluralism as itself an asset if some of its values are used sufficiently in ways relevant to our concern for effectiveness and survival. It stimulates imagination, inventiveness, and ingenuity in general, making them available wherever there is enough realization of need for them. The geologist president of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), Eugene Holman, has given in the *Atlantic Monthly*² a reassuring view of another field of social concern which is analogous to the one in present discussion. In an article entitled "Our Inexhaustible Resources," he recalled how man moved from the stone age to the bronze age, thence to the iron age, on into the steel age, and currently into the age of lightweight metals, plastics, and atomic fission. In this familiar progression, he saw this significant fact:

each age has been of shorter duration than the previous one, and each has unlocked larger storehouses of potential richness than the preceding. Something of the same sort of progression has been true in the field of social organization, enough to reveal the logic of expanding and enriching order. By turning more of our capacities to these possibilities, this logic can be confirmed and greatly accelerated.

Intermediate organization

As already suggested, merely understanding society in organizational terms will relieve us of much unnecessary and futile distress, increasing our tolerance for diversity. Improved understanding can also guide us in structuring private organization in such a manner as to serve better some general needs and to narrow the great gap now existing between the innumerable variations of individual and group attitudes and attitudes consonant with the general interest. This great area between what is organized in particular and what needs consideration by the public at large is capable of a good deal of what I have elsewhere³ referred to as "intermediate organization." This kind of organizational conception is almost exclusively related to the private area, although it could influence governmental policy, public administration, and political organization.

One example of intermediate organization is afforded by instances in which leaders of the National Reclamation Association can reconcile competing and divergent interests in irrigation in the eleven western states, thereby taking positions far advanced from the particular ones of single chambers of commerce, single reclamation districts, and single states, toward an approximation of the general public interest.

³ In an essay entitled "Managing Complexity," *Ethics*, January 1954.

² Vol. 189 (June 1952), pp. 29-32.

Another example is set forth in the book, *American Capitalism*, by J. K. Galbraith, Harvard economist, in which he elucidates "the theory of countervailing power," under which private interests may be more often and more consciously used to balance themselves in the general interest. Where such conscious use of multiple structures is made, social rationalization is much more cogent and much more relatable to differentiated values than through laissez faire.

Many different kinds of opportunities for more conscious and improved "intermediate organization" exist in the area of private organization concerning functions not primarily "political" in the special sense of that word. But the organization of politics offers additional opportunities for improving social clarity and coherence. I do not refer here to the actual political but nonpartisan functioning of governmental administrative bureaucracies in the multiple adjustment of interests usually quite unmarked by partisan connotations. I point, rather, to such things as party structures and procedures, party discipline and responsibility, registration and voting procedures, representational arrangements, nomination methods, and to the rarity in individual governmental jurisdictions of an actual two-party system. Much of the citizen frustration commonly ascribed to the bureaucracy has its real occasion in these other structures and processes. The tendency to take particular functions out of politics and to break the political process into many not very well-related parts confuses responsibilities and overloads citizens. A recent *Harper's Magazine* article makes a plea for fixing state elections at times other than those when national elections are held; in one view this makes sense, but it is to be questioned whether that view is adequate.

The point here being urged is that there be some fairly clear relationships between different levels of instrumentalities, some upward stair-stepping of mechanisms equipped at successive stages to give relatively more general treatment to matters not felt to have been satisfactorily related in lower-level interchanges and lower-level coordination. Many concerns can be sufficiently treated by those directly involved; some need treatment at a broader level; some at a still broader level. The levels fairly readily available should be numerous enough, definite enough, and near enough to each other to facilitate translation. Administrators know that these are the essentials to more delegation and more decentralization in the real meaning of the word, as well as the essentials to the fixing and clarifying of responsibilities. This directional orientation of structure is the chief significance of a unified view of social organization. It less implies advocacy of any structures than provides a way of seeing and considering our bureaucratic complex.

The directional orientation of structure toward successively higher facilities for ordering affairs points most dramatically today toward the international and world levels. Internally it makes especially vivid the enormous difficulty of translating concerns of our sprawling domestic specialisms into foreign policy. It is recognition of this gap which causes such an observer as Samuel Lubell to say that today "the overriding issue is the new necessity for what might be called a 'national state'—for a government strong enough to define and enforce the national interest in a world in which atomic war constantly threatens."

Majority government

Lubell, as one example among understanding political reporters, shares con-

cern with political scientists specializing in politics over the growing difficulty of the American people to achieve majority positions. Our increasing complexity and pluralization are fundamental deterrents, but the belief here being stressed is that structural arrangements can overcome this difficulty. Majority positions in this country never were so frequent and clear as many have believed, however, and, while more obtainable in earlier years, very often were feasible for reasons now anachronistic or otherwise irrelevant. Lines of cohesion dating back to the Civil War, and earlier, long provided the structural means for achieving majority. The disappearance of old sectional characteristics as they have given way to new and more numerous block interests—very hard to reconcile apart from acute crisis—reveals fundamental weaknesses. Among important democracies it may be said that the United Kingdom has most constant majority government, the United States and France the least constant majority government and the most continuing government by interest blocks separately and in extremely temporary and uneasy association.

The United States, because of its geographical scope and its most extraordinary complexity, has more intrinsic need for block government than Britain has, but we also have need for more majority government than we usually achieve. We talk glibly about having majority government, but pay little attention to the structural means for at-

taining it. This is important to the proper handling of internal affairs. It is especially difficult and urgent at the level of foreign affairs, most of the intrinsics of which are far removed from the view of most citizens.

Government is everywhere essentially the product of the effective public. All of our interrelated structural arrangements very largely determine what is—and when there is—an effective public in the United States. All else depends upon leadership, which our structures at once overload and restrain.

However much in one short essay there may appear to be overemphasis or distortion, it seems undeniable that more attention is owed to our social structures. Except for threats from the right to the basic essentials of free thought and expression, which can be met effectively if we have the will, there seems to be no diminution in our pluralizing momentum. We cannot afford to take it for granted that democracy can be effective and endure nationally through an ever more complicated future by simple reliance on structures historical and impromptu. The longevity of democracy is also importantly involved in the extension of order into the world dimension. Both internal and external concerns are heavily involved with organizational forms and values. Increasing burdens are to be laid on bureaucracy in times to come. We need much more understanding of, and skill in, bureaucratic design and management.

Paul H. Appleby, LL.D., Syracuse, New York, has been dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University since 1947. After a long experience in publishing and editing weekly newspapers, he served as executive assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture (1933-40) and Under Secretary of Agriculture (1940-44), in the latter period also representing the United States on various food commissions. From 1944 to 1947 he was assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget. He is the author of Big Democracy, Policy and Administration, Morality and Administration in Democratic Government, and of frequent magazine articles.

Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1953

DURING the year the staff of the Academy continued to occupy the premises at 3937 Chestnut Street. This place of business is well designed for our purposes and is the best working place we have had in the history of the Academy.

MEETINGS

The Fifty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Academy was held in the Benjamin Franklin Hotel in Philadelphia on April 10 and 11, 1953. The attendance was large and participation by members of the audience was active. The subject of the meetings was "NATO and World Peace," which became, as usual, the subject of the volume of *THE ANNALS* published in July 1953.

PUBLICATIONS

Because of mounting printing costs and staff salaries, the buying power of the funds derived from members' dues has been reduced. We have, accordingly, made a slight reduction in the total number of pages of *THE ANNALS*. The average number of pages per volume during 1952 was 247, for example, whereas the average number for 1953 was 239.

THE ANNALS during 1953 covered these topics:

January	<i>Puerto Rico: A Study in Democratic Development</i>
March	<i>Mental Health in the United States</i>
May	<i>Judicial Administration and the Common Man</i>
July	<i>NATO and World Peace</i>
September	<i>Congress and Foreign Relations</i>
November	<i>The Impact of Atomic Energy</i>

Total sales of *THE ANNALS*, indexes, pamphlets, and monographs during 1953 amounted to \$11,747, which compares unfavorably to the figure of \$13,725 for 1952.

MEMBERSHIP

Membership rose from 16,806 at the end of 1951 to 17,065 at the end of 1952, but, based on the same system of counting, declined to 16,428 at the end of 1953. Toward the end of the year new memberships registered a sharp turn, however.

FINANCES

The Report of the Treasurer reveals that there has been a deficit in Academy operations throughout 1952 and 1953. The Board will accordingly entertain resolution to raise the dues for membership. Our dues have not been changed since the Academy was established in 1889; they are therefore widely out of line with the present costs of operation. To meet the operating deficit, and finance the cost of litigation in connection with the libel suit, the proceeds of securities owned by the Academy to the amount of \$25,000 have been used.

CHANGE OF OFFICERS

Dr. Ernest Minor Patterson, President of the Academy since 1930, retired May 31, 1953, to become President Emeritus. Dr. J. P. Lichtenberg, Secretary of the Academy since 1941, died March 17, 1953. Dr. Carl Kelsch, Vice-President of the Academy since 1912, died October 15, 1953. Anne Elderton, Assistant Secretary of the Academy since 1944, was elected

Secretary May 15, 1953. Miss Elderton resigned as secretary December 27, 1953.

Two veteran employees also retired, one of these having held the position of first editorial assistant for twenty-four years, and the other having handled our annual meetings for thirty-four years.

Dr. James C. Charlesworth, Associate Editor of *THE ANNALS* since November 1949, and acting Editor for a period of a year and half, in 1950-51, took office as President of the Academy June 1, 1953. Dr. Richard D. Lambert was appointed Assistant Editor on the same date.

The officers and staff of the Academy have not yet become fully adjusted to

these changes, but we are pleased to report that the staff is in a good state of morale and is working assiduously to strengthen the administration of our affairs.

Respectfully submitted,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

James C. Charlesworth, *President*
C. A. Kulp, *First Vice-President*
Charles J. Rhoads, *Treasurer*
Jerome J. Rothschild, *Counsel*

Raymond T. Bowman, M. Albert Linton, Otto T. Mallery, Norman D. Palmer, Thorsten Sellin, Stephen B. Sweeney, Alfred H. Williams

January 25, 1954

REPORT OF AUDITORS

January 23, 1954

CHARLES J. RHOADS, Esq., *Treasurer*,
American Academy of Political & Social
Science,
Philadelphia, Penna.

Dear Sir:

We herewith report that we have audited the books and accounts of the *American Academy of Political and Social Science* for its fiscal year ended December 31, 1953.

We have prepared and submit herewith Statement of Receipts and Disbursements for the year ended December 31, 1953.

The Receipts from all sources were verified by a comparison of the entries for same appearing in the Treasurer's Cash

Book with the records of bank deposits and were found to be in accord therewith.

The Disbursements, as shown by the Cash Book, were supported by the proper vouchers in the form of cancelled paid checks or receipts for moneys expended. These were examined by us and confirmed the correctness of the payments made.

As the result of our audit and examination, made in the manner above indicated, we certify that, in our opinion, the accompanying Statement sets forth the results of its operating activities for the period under review.

Yours respectfully,

(Signed) EDWARD P. MOXEY & Co.
Certified Public Accountants

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1953

Cash Balance—January 1, 1953

Unappropriated	\$ 5,389.77	
Trust Funds	6,050.00	\$ 11,439.77

Receipts

Members' Dues	\$42,974.90	
Students' Dues	2,548.80	
Life Memberships	600.00	
Subscriptions		
Individuals	\$ 129.60	
Libraries	4,832.04	
Agents	14,726.01	19,687.65
Sales	11,747.42	
Advertising	2,543.41	
Income from Investments	11,429.87	
Proceeds from Sale of Securities	27,004.23	
Special Donations	17.63	
Translation Royalties	36.52	
Loan—Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank	10,000.00	128,590.43
		<u>\$140,030.20</u>

Disbursements

Office Expense	\$22,779.69	
Philadelphia Meetings	5,002.94	
New Membership Expense	13,238.81	
Publication of Annals	53,101.42	
Membership Records	9,243.71	
Sale of Annals Expense	2,169.93	
Securities Purchased	2,471.88	
Trust Agency Expense	466.28	
Property Improvements	2,519.58	
Discounts, Collections & Exchange	15.81	
Interest Paid on Bank Loan	39.86	
Office Equipment Purchased	3,428.92	
Social Security Taxes	635.41	
Prepaid Postage	43.65	
Professional Services—President of Academy	2,916.66	
Employees Retirement Payments	91.80	
Loan Repaid—Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank	10,000.00	
Libel Suit Costs	5,590.16	133,756.51
		<u>\$ 6,273.69</u>
<i>Cash Balance—December 31, 1953</i>		

Represented by:

Unappropriated and Trust Funds on Deposit in Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank	\$ 6,227.33	
Cash at Academy Office	46.36	\$ 6,273.69

Book Department

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*INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
WORLD GOVERNMENT*

BUCHANAN, WILLIAM, and HADLEY CANTRIL, with the assistance of VIRGINIA VAN S. ZEREGA, HENRY DURANT, and JAMES R. WHITE. *How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion*. Pp. ix, 220. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953. \$5.00.

Incredible as it may seem to some, the cold fact remains that an important current issue with the United States is whether we should try to make our allies of the free world dance to our own tune or whether we should treat them as equal partners in a coalition pledged to securing freedom and keeping Communist aggression in check. A vocal minority within American public life appears to believe that it is possible for the United States to cast the rest of the world in its own image—and some might add "and make them like it."

If it does nothing more, this book sheds a good deal of light on the difficulty and probable impossibility of expecting the rest of the free world to make itself over in the American mold. It might come as a surprise to some in the United States to learn that a sizable part of the people in Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, and Norway think

the Russians are harder working than we. Or that we are *not* looked on as being especially brave, peace-loving, or intelligent. Or that, to many, we are looked on as being conceited and even domineering.

It might also come as a surprise to some who have charged our allies with being "soft" on Communism to find that the prevailing view among the peoples of these nine countries is that the Russians are domineering, cruel, and backward. There are few signs, indeed, that the people of other lands have been any less alert than the American people in realizing what Communism has done to the Russian people.

There is one discouraging over-all note in the book: far less than a majority appear to believe that ultimate world peace is possible of attainment. But a counterbalancing optimistic note is that nearly four out of every ten think that there should be some form of world government.

If we are to find the way toward real international co-operation, studies such as this are essential to the understanding of mankind. Methodologically, one would hope that such studies could be set on a trend basis and that in the future we could gain more and better data on how people's attitudes in the various countries are formed and how they change over a period of time. For instance, it would be interesting to know the changes, shifts, and de-

velopments that have occurred since the field work for this book was completed back in 1948.

Such studies as this book describe add greatly to our total knowledge and ultimate understanding. With information along these lines, we have an important part of the necessary underlying fabric for building free world unity and eventual peace. Without it, we might well fall victim to our preconceived prejudices and rationalizations, and this is inevitably the road to division, despair, and disunity.

ELMO ROPER

New York City

PHILLIPS, WILLIAM. *Ventures in Diplomacy*. Pp. 477. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1953. \$5.50.

Forty years of an outstanding American diplomatic career are reviewed in this fascinating and well-written memoir. Though Phillips has included some private autobiographical material, the emphasis throughout is on his official life. The result is an outstanding contribution to the diplomatic history of the last half-century and a matured analysis of the diplomatic art itself.

Beginning as an unpaid private secretary to Ambassador Choate in the London of Edwardian England, the author served in his first official job in the China of the Dowager Empress. His account of official State Department life in Washington in Theodore Roosevelt's and Wilson's administrations offers a keen insight into the somewhat chaotic, highly personalized methods of policy making before World War I.

His most important assignments were as Undersecretary of State (twice: under Harding and Coolidge, and again under Franklin Roosevelt), as Ambassador to Italy in the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, and as personal representative of the President, with rank of Ambassador, to India for a period during World War II. For the student of foreign affairs, the work has documentary significance of the first rank in its descriptions of those periods. Two examples will suffice: his strong campaign for a merit system in the foreign service during Wilson's administration, and

his repeated urgings of Roosevelt to bring pressure on Churchill to release Gandhi and Nehru during World War II.

A diplomat of the old school, Phillips none the less met well the challenge of an increasingly complex world order. His regrets at the passing of the easy informality and high *esprit* of the old foreign service are few and slight. He speaks with enthusiasm of the technical improvements in the handling of foreign affairs, and particularly of the increased awareness of American opinion of the worldwide responsibilities of this country in the present and future. His advice to young people contemplating a foreign service career should become a classic statement.

If the quality of diplomacy is a major ingredient of a nation's strength, we may feel fortunate that men of Phillips' stamp have chosen this career. The book, written originally for his family, will stand as an example and a guide for future works of its type.

OLIVER BENSON

University of Oklahoma

BROWDER, ROBERT PAUL. *The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy*. Pp. xi, 256. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953. \$5.00.

This excellent monograph is a fresh and penetrating analysis of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1933. The author has combed all available American and Soviet sources to provide a scholarly and thoroughly documented account of the background, the negotiations, and after-effects of recognition.

On the basis of a careful examination of the journals of the period, Professor Browder finds that the major factor in inducing business leaders and the general public to favor recognition was the hope that a great expansion of Soviet-American trade would help end the depression. These exaggerated expectations were less evident in Washington. So far as the Administration was concerned, trade was a "cloak" for recognition, but not the "primary objective." The main purpose was to remove

a barrier to international co-operation, to stem Japanese aggression in the Far East, and to preserve peace in Europe.

The chief obstacles to recognition were Communist activity in the United States, the repudiated Russian debt, and the demand of the Administration for legal and religious safeguards for American citizens in the Soviet Union. Initially, the American negotiators insisted that all of these issues had to be settled by iron-clad agreements before recognition could be extended. Litvinov was willing to give assurances on Communist propaganda and to guarantee legal and religious rights to Americans in the Soviet Union, but the debt issue proved refractory. Instead of delaying recognition until a precise debt settlement was arranged, President Roosevelt entered into a "gentleman's agreement" by which Litvinov agreed to remain in Washington after the resumption of diplomatic relations "to discuss . . . the exact sum between the limits of \$75,000,000 and \$150,000,000 to be paid by the Soviet Government." The discussions were held, but were soon suspended to enable Litvinov to return to Moscow. Negotiations continued over the next years, but no agreement was reached.

The high hopes and good will which ushered in recognition were soon replaced by increasing dissatisfaction and irritation with Soviet behavior. As a result of the failure to reach a debt settlement, Soviet-American trade dwindled to very modest proportions. The participation of American Communists in the Comintern Congress in Moscow in 1935 was treated as a violation of the pledge of noninterference in American affairs and further weakened American confidence in Soviet good faith. "The quest for mutual understanding proved futile," and Bullitt, the American ambassador who had arrived in Moscow in 1933 filled with enthusiasm for the future of Soviet-American relations, departed in 1935 bitter and frustrated.

In Professor Browder's view, American "misconception and naïveté" about the Soviet Union "paved the way for future disillusionment." His assessment of the recognition episode is somber and perceptive. "In that period," he points out, "America had the opportunity to study at

first hand the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Clearly revealed was Moscow's propensity for the clouding of central issues by resort to long and tedious arguments on peripheral points of misunderstanding. Evident likewise was the necessity of securing a simultaneous *sine qua non* for every concession to Russia. Promises for the future brought only frustration and tension. . . . In the light of past experience, the United States should have entered the World War II alliance with Soviet Russia aware of the methods and principles of Soviet diplomacy and prepared to act accordingly. Unfortunately, the lesson was badly learned . . . it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a more practical, less idealistic approach during the Second World War was justified by the experiences of recognition and its aftermath."

MERLE FAINSD

Harvard University

BARNES, HARRY ELMER (Ed., in collaboration with WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, PERCY L. GREAVES, JR., GEORGE A. LUNDBERG, GEORGE MORCENSTERN, WILLIAM L. NEUMANN, FREDERICK R. SANBORN, and CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL). *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*. Pp. xiii, 679. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953. \$6.00.

The editor describes this volume as "a critical survey and appraisal of the development of American foreign policy during the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and of its results, as they have affected the course of world history, the national interest of the United States, and the welfare of its citizens" (Preface, p. vii). However, the formulators of our foreign policy from 1914 onward (President Hoover specifically excepted) are indicted for stupidity, and at times malevolence, in their "meddling abroad in situations which did not materially affect either our security or our prestige" (p. 6). As regards our security it was "not even remotely threatened in the case of either world war" (p. 6).

The reviewer believes that the book might be more effective if the collaborators did not virtually extinguish the light they seek to throw on our recent foreign policy, in clouds of invective and streams of abuse.

Wilson was "a so-called statesman who promised peace while weaving a web of war" (p. 81). He drank lemonade but ordered it "heavily spiked with the hard liquor of deceit" (p. 81). Roosevelt, sly war monger, insisted on peace at Munich because "he did not want any war to start in Europe which might terminate so rapidly that the United States could not enter it" (p. 171).

The chief task of the collaborators is to uncover conspirators and reveal conspiracies. The editor is the chief prosecutor, enthusiastically assisted by seven collaborators. American historians who do not accept revisionism are "court historians," prostituting themselves as special pleaders to "whitewash" Roosevelt's foreign policy. Others, including publishers, who have a "stake" in perpetuating the "historical blackout" are determined "to stifle or silence revelations which would establish the truth with regard to the causes and issues of the late world conflict" (p. 8). It is the herculean task of Barnes and his collaborators, therefore, through "robust Revisionism" to expose the conspirators and their "academic hatchet men," set the record straight, and thus warn the American people against being duped into a third world war.

In spite of prodigious toil in an attempt to cull all possible damaging circumstantial evidence to prove that President Roosevelt, assisted by his fellow criminals, Marshall, Stimson, and others, callously lied the country into war, the revisionists do not quite make it. Rather does the ex-President still remain the consummate and essentially pragmatic politician who gradually was convinced by the totalitarian powers that the United States must abandon neutrality or compromise the nation's security and welfare. The President's moves in preparation for the conflict do not seem to this reviewer to constitute evidence that they were part of an evil design to "maneuver" the country into war. Rather do they seem to represent the prudent foresight of one who bore the chief responsibility for the nation's defense and would have been culpable had he failed to shoulder it.

FRANK M. RUSSELL
University of California

WILLIAMS, FRANCIS. *Transmitting World News: A Study of Telecommunications and the Press*. Pp. 95. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. \$1.00.

The average, intelligent reader is well aware of some of the influences which distort or prevent the free flow of international news: censorship, propaganda, and the tendency of news distributors to offer an erratic supply of information which emphasizes the sensational. The same reader is unlikely to give much if any thought to news fetters in areas such as inadequate technical facilities and unreasonable economic restraints. Yet, as the present work amply demonstrates, the quality and quantity of world news are widely affected by such factors, in some instances to an alarming degree.

The study, *Transmitting World News*, was commissioned by UNESCO in the hope of facilitating beneficial measures at the next International Telephone and Telegraph Conference to be held in 1954 or 1955. A more competent author could scarcely have been selected. Francis Williams, a former British editor and government official, is author of one of the most thoughtful books on the press to appear in recent years, *Press, Parliament and People* (London, 1946.) Not only does he possess first-hand knowledge of telecommunications problems, but he combines a zeal to better existing conditions with all-around fair-mindedness and a sense of what is economically practicable or otherwise feasible.

Although the present statement is brief, it is packed with facts and cogent arguments. There is a short historical introduction and a strong plea for making news "not merely the concern of those professionally involved in its collection and distribution, but of all men and all nations." There follows an examination of both national and world news agencies with the intent of showing where their facilities are adequate or inadequate and why. Each of the major methods used in transmitting world news—the use of ordinary, commercial facilities on a cost-per-word basis, the lease of point-to-point circuits (both wire and radio), multiple address broadcasts, teleprinter systems, and facsimile and telephoto services—is described in

terms of what is presently being done and what can be expected. Mr. Williams' best efforts, however, are in the area of economic problems. Some of the inequities pointed out in news-transmission charges, for which there appear to be no sensible reasons, are little short of startling. The author not only shows how some of these discrepancies affect the news adversely but how improvements may be made on an economical basis.

This excellent study deserves a far larger audience than the one for which it was specifically prepared.

JOSEPH J. MATHEWS
Emory University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

MILLER, PERRY. *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*. Pp. xiii, 513. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$6.50.

The present study takes up the story of the evolving pattern of New England's thinking at the time when the generation of the founders was passing away. It ends when the Mathers have left the scene, and when the Great Awakening is about to usher in a new era. The Bible Commonwealth had been a covenanted society, rightly enjoying special evidences of Divine favor, yet subject to condign wrath should it fail to measure up to the rather exacting standards which a Puritan Deity imposed. Politically and socially, control was in the hands of the saints who did not hesitate to constrain the unregenerate to walk aright. The prevalent homiletic device of the period, the Jeremiad, emphasized the sins of the community, the consequent loss of Divine favor, the inevitably ensuing misfortunes, and the need for repentance and reformation. Particularly suited to the idea of the covenant, the Jeremiad lost its effectiveness as this concept faded.

For the pattern changed with the times. Prosperity as such had never troubled the Puritan, who could see in the increase of his worldly goods the evidence of Divine favor. Yet as New England developed

economically, a more secular point of view evolved. The second and third generations lacked the devoted enthusiasm of the first, and parsons saw their flocks shrinking. They therefore resorted to the Half-Way covenant, the admission of persons, normally the children of church members, to quasi membership, thus enlarging the congregation at the expense of the church. The Bible Commonwealth came to an end when Massachusetts lost her charter. Part of her peculiar institutional system was indeed salvaged when Increase Mather secured the new charter of 1691. Yet she was now a royal colony, and the saints could no longer employ the arm of the state to control the unregenerate—not, at all events, with former assurance.

While in a measure isolated, New England Puritans were responsive to developments elsewhere. They were influenced by, though not always in step with, the non-conformists of old England; and they were able, with an ease which is nothing short of astonishing, to absorb the Newtonian Physics. The central figure in this study is inevitably Cotton Mather. Disrelish of him as a human being does not prevent the author from recognizing his intellect, his learning, and his influence.

Any intellectual history which is of much use has to be written in the idiom of the age which it depicts. Professor Miller's study meets this requirement admirably. He appraises the Salem witchcraft debacle, the inoculation controversy, and countless other developments in the light of contemporary standards. He has written with sympathy and understanding of men whose tastes and ways of thinking are obviously remote from his own, and has succeeded in being profound without being heavy. This is a highly significant study. Anyone interested in American intellectual development will ignore it at his peril.

LEONIDAS DODSON
University of Pennsylvania

MORGAN, EDMUND S., and HELEN M. MORGAN. *The Stamp Act Crisis*. Pp. x, 310. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press (published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture), 1953. \$6.00.

This is a good and useful book. For it is a careful study of the events, the men, and the ideas (chiefly American) that were involved in the crisis in the relations between thirteen of the English colonies in America and the mother country that was precipitated by the so-called "Grenville program" of imperial reform, and, in particular, by the Stamp Act of 1765. It is also the elaboration of a thesis: the thesis that, had Parliament not repealed the Stamp Act, and had the English government attempted to enforce it, the American Revolution would have begun in 1766 instead of 1776. As a study of the Stamp Act crisis, the book is admirable; as a statement of this thesis, it offers food for interesting thought—and ultimate rejection. As a matter of fact, this thesis invites an equally plausible thesis, if not, indeed, a more plausible one, that had England enforced the Stamp Act, the Revolution might never have occurred at all!

The most valuable parts of the book, probably, are the penetrating biographical sketches of the friends of America who were, for the most part, the victims of the mob that were manipulated by the Sons of Liberty. The discussions of the ideas and behavior of such men as Francis Bernard, John Robinson, Daniel Dulaney, Thomas Hutchinson, Jared Ingersoll, and John Hughes, considered against the background of their training and the provincial party-politics of which they were to a high degree the victims, are genuine contributions to an understanding of the true issues in the crisis. There is some room for doubt of the authors' analysis of the ideas of these men in one or two cases. For while the authors present a good case to show that Thomas Hutchinson, for example, "was just as convinced as his demagogical enemies that Parliament had no constitutional [italics are the reviewer's] right to pass either the Sugar Act or the Stamp Act" (p. 210 *et seq.*), the claim does not seem to be adequately proved. In any case, Hutchinson certainly took the opposite position in 1773 when he wrote to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, the mouthpiece of which was Sam Adams. Whatever Hutchinson may have thought before the Declaratory Act,

it certainly seems abundantly clear that in 1773 he did not think Parliament had no "constitutional" right to tax the colonies.

It is in Part Four, "Revolution Delayed," that the authors most clearly present their thesis that by the repeal of the Stamp Act alone "rebellion and civil war had been avoided and the strength of the empire preserved" (p. 281) and that the repeal "staved off revolution in 1766" (p. 292).

Yet it would be a rash historian, indeed, who would say that the activities of the Sons of Liberty and allied local politicians indicated the sort of popular strength and unanimity that would have been necessary to stage a successful "revolution" in 1766. It does seem certain that, sooner or later, the continental Americans, at least, would have demanded, and insisted upon, some larger measure of autonomy within the Empire, and, conceivably, upon totally different grounds. They were, indeed, working toward "something bigger than themselves" (p. 256).

But in 1765 they were confused as to just what this "something bigger than themselves" was. The English, too (whom the authors would have done well to study much more thoroughly than they have), were confused; the English, too, were wrestling with the problem of conceiving and defining clearly "something bigger than themselves." It is a question of perspectives. It appears that the authors have let themselves be misled by the extreme, if prescient, remarks of a few men like John Hughes.

Yet the rejection of the speculative part of the book does not in the least diminish the brightness of the fact that in its purely narrative and analytical parts, partial and incomplete though they be, this little book is, in fact, a very useful study of the "prologue" to the American War for Independence.

MAX SAVELLE

University of Washington

JEFFERSON, THOMAS. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*. Edited by Julian P. Boyd, with Mina R. Bryan and Elizabeth L. Hutter, associate editors. Vol. VII: *March 1784 to February 1785*. Pp.

xviii, 652. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953. \$10.00.

Like its predecessors, the seventh volume in this epoch-making edition of the writings of Jefferson places the world of scholarship in continued debt to Julian Boyd and his associates. The presentation, discussion, and accompanying commentary of each document satisfy the most fastidious standards, while the format and printing are worthy, on aesthetic grounds alone, to enshrine permanently the thoughts of America's foremost philosopher-statesman.

In the period from March 1784 to February 1785, which the new volume covers, Jefferson is still laboring to cut and set in place the foundation stones of the new government. A fine example of his craftsmanship is his argument concerning the coinage and the adoption of the dollar as the unit of currency. There, where he plunges into the intricacies of monetary policy, he displays his unerring gift for penetrating analysis, clear thinking, and lucid expression.

The same quality emerges in the new role which Jefferson undertook in the latter half of 1784—as a diplomatic envoy. Sent to Paris to negotiate, along with Franklin and Adams, a series of commercial treaties, Jefferson now becomes a source of information, not only on the international relations of the United States, but also on the politics of the European powers. A significant pointer to future action is his warning about the piracy practiced by the governments of the Barbary Coast. His advice represents a frank blending of long-sightedness with shrewd realism. "We have two plans to pursue," he states. "The one to carry nothing for ourselves, and thereby render ourselves invulnerable to the European states; the other (which our country will be for) is to carry as much as possible. But this will require a protecting force on the sea. Otherwise the smallest powers in Europe, every one of which possesses a single ship of the line, may dictate to us, and enforce their demands by captures on our commerce. Some naval force then is necessary if we mean to be commercial. Can we have a better occasion of beginning one? Or find a foe more certainly within our dimensions?" (p. 639).

Residence in Europe does not prevent Jefferson from paying attention to his correspondence, though he reminds his friends of its difficulties. A letter mailed directly to France took seven weeks to arrive, and was virtually certain to be opened and read *en route*. As for the undesirability of visits to Europe by young Americans, Jefferson has this critical observation to offer: "Indeed from what I have seen here I know not one good purpose on earth which can be effected by a young gentleman's coming here. He may learn indeed to speak the language, but put this in the scale against the other things he will learn and evils he is sure to acquire and it will be found too light. I have always disapproved of a European education for our youth from theory: I now do it from inspection" (p. 519). The writer of those words was, at that time, aged forty-one. To one of his advanced years, and possessing an intellect so rare, Europe fortunately did have something to offer, as his reports on recent technological inventions and book purchases bear witness.

LESLIE LIPSON

University of California,
Berkeley, California

DE VOTO, BERNARD (Ed.). *The Journals of Lewis and Clark*. Pp. lii, 504. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953. \$6.50.

Although the Lewis and Clark expedition (1804-06) is a well-known historical fact, it is unlikely that many readers have studied it from the original journals kept principally by its two leaders, Captain Meriwether Lewis and Second Lieutenant William Clark, the latter a cocommander of the expedition and called "captain." While the edition of the journals that Mr. De Voto now presents is an abbreviated one, it doubtless will be adequate to all the needs of the general reader. The editor warns that the full edition is necessary for scholarly purposes.

The experiences of the Lewis and Clark party—largely military but ably assisted by civilian members—as they made their way up the Missouri River, over the Rocky Mountains, and down the Columbia River to its mouth, and on the return, constitute a story of adventure, danger, narrow

escapes, and marked resourcefulness of the leaders in meeting emergencies. Always vivid in their descriptive passages, the journals often rise to the level of superb literature. Especially memorable are those portions describing vast grasslands on which grazed great herds of buffaloes, deer, and elk; the hair-raising encounters with grizzly bears; the tense moments with unfriendly Indians; and the running of rapids, a feat that sometimes even filled the natives with wonder.

Although Lewis was the better prepared scholar, Clark seems not to have been his inferior in incisiveness of intellect or in aptness and precision of vocabulary. Clark's unorthodox spelling ("jentele brease," "few," "surcumfrance," for example) is one of the delights that awaits the reader, although it may leave his orthography somewhat confused.

The all-round competence of Lewis and Clark, aged 30 and 34, respectively, in 1804, was amazing: minor surgery, bone-setting, midwifery, and administration to ailments ranging from sore eyes to pleurisy, rheumatism, ulcers, and venereal disease, all came within their ken, especially Clark's. And all the while they had to safeguard the limited supplies upon which the expedition depended; negotiate with Indians for horses, food, and guides; supervise the building of boats and canoes and the killing of game; plan encampments and forts; gather specimens of the flora and fauna; and make maps and write reports.

As long as distinguished service to country is deemed worthy of note, the Lewis and Clark expedition must remain a glorious chapter in the nation's history. Mr. De Voto and his publishers are to be commended for their efforts to make the account of this expedition better known to the American people.

JENNINGS B. SANDERS

Kensington, Maryland

NEVINS, ALLAN. *The Statesmanship of the Civil War* (The Page-Barbour Lectures, University of Virginia, 1951). Pp. vii, 82. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$2.25.

Allan Nevins is a phenomenon of American historiography, remarkable alike for

the number of his publications and the variety of fields into which he has directed his research. At present his major attention is directed to a multi-volume history of the Civil War, *The Ordeal of the Union*, three volumes of which have appeared. This little volume represents certain reflections that have arisen in the course of the larger study.

Professor Nevins first raises the question as to what constitutes statesmanship. He suggests that intellectual power, moral strength or weight of character, and an instinct for the needs and opportunities of a current crisis, all of them infused with a passion for some great ideal—such as nationalism or democracy—are essential qualities.

In contrast with the period of the American Revolution, that of the intersectional conflict produced for the most part only second-rate talents. Jacksonian democracy had perhaps created in the electorate a taste for a certain coarseness of mind and character among their elected representatives. Furthermore, the challenge to most men of both sides was simply the relatively uninspiring one of defending a *status quo*—political union for the North and the anachronistic institution of slavery for the South. In the Confederacy it was only on the field of battle that true leadership appeared. Jefferson Davis, charged with the greatest civilian responsibility although he would have much preferred to lead the armed forces, had many admirable qualities. But he failed utterly to win a true following either among the colleagues who shared his responsibility for governing the Confederate nation and its component states or among the people at large. Thus, for all his devotion to Southern nationality, the way was open for the cancer of state rights to destroy the organism which it had caused to abort from the parent union.

Of all the Civil War generation only Lincoln, humbly willing to accept the verdict of history without attempting to supply anticipatory alibis, deserves, Mr. Nevins concludes, to be accorded the rank of a civilian statesman. He was able to maintain a working relationship with even the most provoking of his associates to the extent necessary to get the job done, and

when the opportunity arose he taught them all lessons in *realpolitik*. Never did he forget that the purpose of military victory was to bring back the rebel enemies as fellow citizens, as equals. By abolishing slavery, at the right time and in the best possible manner, he signalized the opening of a new era not simply of Negro but of human rights. He called upon the people of all lands and all times to lift up their eyes to new horizons "for man's vast future."

Mr. Nevins, in his characteristic smooth literary style, modestly presents these reflections not as final conclusions but as an invitation to thought about some of the larger implications of the sectional struggle. His readers will be grateful for the opportunity to share in the pleasure that must have come to his audience in Charlottesville two years ago.

WOOD GRAY

The George Washington University

LA FOLLETTE, BELLE CASE, and FOLA LA FOLLETTE. *Robert M. La Follette: June 14, 1885-June 18, 1925*. 2 vols. Pp. xx, 730; vii, 731-1305. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$15.00.

For almost 25 years Belle Case La Follette and Fola, wife and daughter of Robert Marion La Follette, worked with boundless effort and affection to produce this superb biography. Although no claim to cold objectivity is advanced these volumes are no mere eulogy. This lengthy book—perhaps it is too long—is the detailed story of Fighting Bob's quarter century in American politics. Naturally the authors have believed with one of La Follette's contemporaries that no American of La Follette's generation "impressed himself so deeply upon the life and thought and institutions of America" as did their husband and father.

La Follette was a genuine product of the frontier and from his entrance upon the "strenuous life" always fought for his conception of a more workable democracy. The chief dangers to the further development of our form of government, as viewed by La Follette, grew out of increasingly centralized corporate power exercised by economic moguls. As Governor of Wisconsin, 1901-1906, he succeeded so

well in curtailing the further growth of concentrated economic power and in regulating existing corporations that his state was widely acclaimed as the most successful experiment in our democratic processes.

Riding the crest of the wave of American liberal reform, for which he himself was greatly responsible, La Follette entered the United States Senate in 1906. Here he was to remain until his death in 1925. Although always in the spotlight of national interest, he was never in a position of control in Washington as he had been in Madison. What influence he exerted was on the domestic scene. His sincere isolationism, fired with an aggressive courage, brought him wide condemnation during World War I. Never in sympathy with the Wilsonian concept of making "the world safe for democracy" La Follette relentlessly sought to make the American republic more secure.

With Roosevelt snatching the leadership of the Progressives from him during a moment of mental and nervous exhaustion, Battling Bob bided his time until 1924 to challenge entrenched conservatism again. As the presidential nominee of the Progressive party at that time he received over 5 million votes or about one-sixth of those cast. His death followed a few months later in 1925.

While not the definitive biography, this voluminous contribution to recent Americana will be welcomed as a rich source of information about the life of this courageous American.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

University of Florida

ROOSEVELT, NICHOLAS. *A Front Row Seat*. Pp. xi, 304. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953. \$4.50.

"I do not know of any young man of his age who has his qualities," wrote Theodore Roosevelt to Robert Bacon in 1914 concerning his 21-year-old first cousin Nicholas. Out of context the sentence has the ambiguity of a Delphian Oracle. In retrospect it would seem to have been prophetic of a notable career.

Nicholas grew up in intimate association with the great tribe, and he notes that "whenever two or more Roosevelts met

each talked vociferously and ceaselessly paying no attention to what anyone else tried to say." These memoirs are crystal clear except where the reader gets lost in a tangle of cousins, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews. Indeed a genealogical chart is necessary and is provided on pages 288 and 289. As a frequent guest at Oyster Bay, Nicholas fell under the spell of the incredible Theodore who was 34 years his senior, and consequently his judgments on this personality lack scientific objectivity. However it must be said that Nicholas deals kindly with the Hyde Park branch of the great tribe and was indeed a frequent White House visitor as a guest of distant cousin Franklin.

His diplomatic career got its start while a graduate student at Harvard in 1914 when President Lowell advised him to accept the opportunity to go as secretary of the American envoy at Bordeaux, to which city the French government had just fled, before the threatened fall of Paris to the German army. Next he was secretary of a mission to Spain. Following the armistice he was one of the ten aides of President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference and was in charge of the mission in Budapest when the Communist *coup d'état* made Bela Kuhn dictator.

Back home he was secretary and aide to General Leonard Wood in his campaign for the Republican nomination for President. When Wood became Governor General of the Philippines, Nicholas went with him as vice-governor. His final diplomatic service was as minister to Hungary in the early thirties.

Nicholas Roosevelt's diplomatic experience equipped him for his career as a journalist. He became an editorial writer of the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *New York Times* and a special correspondent of the latter paper as well as of several European dailies. During the second World War he was deputy director of the Office of War Information. He was the author of several books on foreign affairs and lectured extensively in that field.

The title *A Front Row Seat* appears justified by the intimate acquaintances of Nicholas. Among others than those already mentioned were William Jenn-

ings Bryan, George Clemenceau, Herbert Hoover, Alfred M. Landon, Ogden Mills, and Wendell Willkie.

These memoirs are written with the sparkle and lucidity of a superior journalist, which qualities the author feels that most American historians lack. They are also in his opinion "handicapped by not having had the training in evaluating the importance, as well as the credibility of material which is basic in good journalism."

As befits a one-time graduate assistant of the late Professor Edward Channing, the book is remarkably free from slips of the pen. However Chester Arthur was no Warren Harding, and historians do not so readily accept cousin Theodore's heroic version of the Venezuela crisis of 1902.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY

Ohio Northern University

LEUCHTENBURG, WILLIAM EDWARD. *Flood-Control Politics: The Connecticut River Valley Problem, 1927-1950*. Pp. 339. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$5.00.

OSTROM, VINCENT. *Water and Politics: A Study of Water Policies and Administration in the Development of Los Angeles*. Pp. xviii, 297. Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1953. \$4.00 cloth; \$3.50 paper.

Water does not become a political issue unless there is too little or too much of it, as these two excellent studies of water politics demonstrate. Ostrom's book is a detailed account of how a have-not community, Los Angeles, secured the water supplies essential for its phenomenal growth, and how water shaped the political institutions and the community patterns of the region. The City of Los Angeles was deliberately organized as a unit of government to assure control of the water resources of San Fernando Valley. The Metropolitan Water District has followed a careful policy of annexation guaranteeing its effective control over the entire regional complex of watersheds and ground water basins in the area.

Ostrom follows the fascinating flow of water politics wherever it leads. He explains the Spanish system of pueblo water

rights on which the entire system was based. He analyzes the political process by which municipal power operation was achieved. He discusses the interesting history of the Los Angeles Water and Power Department, concluding that the Department was more efficient in the earlier days when it was "in politics" than later when the goals of a "business-type" administration were substituted.

Seeing how control over water has been used to mold the life of this region, Ostrom is moved to ask whether in other areas public control over natural resources is being employed as consciously or wisely. "What human ends are being served by the nourishment of the local 'grass roots' by the Corps of Engineers? To what kind of society is the Bureau of Reclamation committed by its policies of organization and operation?" He is even led to speculate whether the municipal corporation, operating so successfully in the form of the Metropolitan Water District, might not be a preferable alternative to the device of the federal valley authority.

If Ostrom's story is that of governmental institutions adapted to their resource task and in full command of the situation, Leuchtenburg's tale is one of a continuing stubborn and short-sighted refusal to consider the policies and governmental readjustments which could protect the Connecticut Valley from the conditions which subjected it to three catastrophic floods within eleven years. The record, up to the close of the narrative in 1950, is one of almost complete failure. Less than 5 per cent of the total drainage area of the valley has been brought under control. The reservoirs that have been built are single-purpose, no power being generated. Pollution of the river is still largely uncontrolled.

Leuchtenburg gives his assessment of the reasons. One is the conflict among federal agencies, with the Army Engineers operating in their traditional splendid isolation. A second is the parochialism of the states involved, bitterly resisting any prospect of federal intervention and agreeing to the mild co-operation of an interstate compact only under the threat of a Tennessee Valley Authority for the Connecticut. Ex-

perience with the compact convinces Leuchtenburg that it is a hopelessly inadequate device, and he quotes the Izaak Walton League's statement that "as a legal means of putting off the day of reckoning in pollution control, the inter-state compact probably has no equal."

Finally, Leuchtenburg suggests that failure on the Connecticut results from the habit of turning every water resources problem into an ideological dispute and of viewing every question as a moral issue. Vermont agriculturists and private utilities equally wrap up their selfish interests in states' rights language. The author concludes: "If the future development of the Connecticut Valley is to be accommodated to the New England faith in local authority, the state governments must demonstrate that they are interested in exercising power not to frustrate action by government at any level but to develop the river in the interest of the people of the valley."

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT

University of Chicago

BARTLEY, ERNEST R. *The Tidelands Oil Controversy*. Pp. x, 312. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953. \$5.00.

This is a study in federalism arising from disputed claims over the oil-producing tidelands of the United States, based largely on an examination of "the history and legal background" of the three leading tidelands oil cases. The study is presented in fifteen chapters including a brief statement of the problem (Chapter 1) and a chapter of conclusions. Dr. Bartley summarizes the development of the territorial concept of the marginal seas, reviews the bases of claims thereto attributed to the several states, analyzes the judicial controversies, and digests political points of view gathered from congressional hearings and debates and from actions taken and proposed by officers of the executive branch. In his analysis the author runs the whole gamut of legal concepts, state-federal relationships, party politics, political pressures, and private interests. The tidelands issues are here presented in a manner calculated to emphasize the possibilities of and the consequences of direct

clashes between the states and the nation in our federal system.

The author implies the fabrication of a legal doctrine (the doctrine of paramount powers) to justify an assertion of authority by a power-conscious central government. Having taken advantage of the relatively insignificant oil controversy to voice the doctrine, the author sees these same forces urging its eventual extension to claims of jurisdiction over territories and commodities never before believed to be within the reach of national power.

The doctrine of paramount powers, he asserts, is an extension of the concept of inherent powers and must therefore be associated with theories of external sovereignty. It is thus not an appropriate device for reading new meanings into those delegated powers which relate exclusively to matters of internal concern. Even so, there is the constant threat of encroachment. He states that the doctrine could perhaps be extended, "to cover first the bed of a river which is an international boundary, and later the beds of inland lakes and rivers which are not international boundaries." He questions, however, the possibility of extending the doctrine inland, for example, to the "iron ore in the Mesabi Range."

To me the most disappointing feature of the study is the author's all too casual analysis of his principal thesis, the doctrine of paramount powers. The analysis is neither complete nor entirely convincing. Dr. Bartley says that the doctrine of paramount powers "bears more than a superficial relationship" to Mr. Justice Sutherland's "famed inherent-powers" doctrine; "... it is obvious," he says, "that the two ideas are cut from the same cloth. . . ." These observations are not necessarily self-evident truths. Yet the ensuing analysis is neither searching nor penetrating. In fact, beyond the assertion, the identity of the two doctrines is established almost exclusively by a process of word matching. If the doctrine of paramount powers is "the contribution Justice Black has made to American constitutional law" (presumably in this series of cases), it would appear to merit a more exhaustive consideration. If the doctrine is destined

"to have far reaching effects," it should at least be placed in proper historical perspective, even in a study not limited to the constitutional and legal aspects of the controversy.

Certainly a great mass of materials has been collected and analyzed, and a wide sweep of original and secondary sources has been exhausted. One can well disagree with the author's conclusions and still be rewarded from a reading of the book. One must also admire the industry and perseverance which made this first full length study of the tidelands oil controversy available. The author's opinions and conclusions present a point of view on a highly controversial issue, and one which may well be confirmed.

HAROLD M. DORR

University of Michigan

BEYER, WILLIAM C. *Limited-Term and Excepted Appointments in the Civil Service*. Pp. iv, 186. Philadelphia: Published by the Author, 1953. \$3.00.

The subtitle of this volume is "A Study of the Legal Provisions by Which They Are Regulated in Fifty-nine Jurisdictions in the United States." It is the product of assiduous scholarship and will undoubtedly prove to be a useful handbook for state and local merit systems the country over.

Provisional, temporary, seasonal, emergency, and excepted appointments—all exceptions to competitive examination for entrance—are covered in as many sections. Each part contains an introductory chapter, defining terms and significance; where appropriate there is a chapter on conditions attaching to the type of appointment; and there are one or two chapters on controls and on status of the appointee. In addition, recommendations are made for the type of statute needed to cover each category of appointment. Nine descriptive charts illuminate the text with convenient summaries of existing laws and practices.

In addition to the federal government the situation in 20 states, 30 cities, 6 counties, and 2 special districts is included. The value of this compendium and of its well-considered, concrete legal proposals is

stressed for state and local jurisdictions, because there are some notable omissions so far as the federal civil service is concerned. The timing of Mr. Beyer's study was such that it did not embrace developments in the United States government more recent than 1950. This is unfortunate, but it is understandable that in such an encyclopedic analysis a cut-off point must be made somewhere.

Less clear is an omission in the last section on "Excepted Appointments." Here there is no reference to the procedure in the federal service for excepting "policy-making and confidential" positions, now known as "Schedule C jobs" but covering a category that has existed in "Schedule A" for many years. Although not typical of the usual merit system plan under which political posts are excepted entirely by statute, this time-honored procedure in the largest civil service of them all is deserving of some analysis in a book carrying the title that this one does.

O. GLENN STAHL

U. S. Civil Service Commission
Washington, D. C.

TAYLOR, ELEANOR K. *Public Accountability of Foundations and Charitable Trusts*. Pp. 231. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1953. \$3.00.

Russell Sage Foundation has made a timely move in publishing the first analysis of provisions for public accounting by foundations and charitable trusts. In the present Congress, as in the previous one, a Select Committee of the House has embarked upon an investigation of foundations. Moreover, two bills requiring a more detailed accounting by foundations and trusts to the Internal Revenue Service, most of which would be made available to the public, are before the Ways and Means Committee. Therefore, federal and state officials, foundation officers and trustees, and lawyers, for whom the publication is especially designed, as well as others concerned with the social usefulness of endowments, will welcome this volume. Between two covers are not only the facts concerning present state and federal provision for the supervision of foundations

and trusts but also a thoughtful presentation of the possibilities inherent in the regulation of foundations by their own trustees and a specific proposal regarding the most satisfactory form of governmental regulation.

Professor Taylor considers separately provisions in the states for the supervision of trusts, both testamentary and *inter vivos*, and those for the regulation of charitable corporations. Discussion centers upon an analysis of the regulatory machinery in the twelve states, where the majority of foundations and trusts are domiciled and where officials have been most concerned with the question of supervision.

To readers unfamiliar with provisions for state supervision of trusts, the revelation of the paucity of regulation will be shocking. Only two states, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, maintain registries of trusts. Elsewhere, the establishment of *inter vivos* trusts, not subject to public notice with the probating of a will, can entirely escape public attention. Availability of information concerning the existence of corporate foundations was found to be greater, although only a few states, Massachusetts being outstanding, required any type of report.

While the author covers the federal government's attempt to regulate certain abuses of the privilege of tax-exemption through amendment of the Internal Revenue Code in 1950, she concludes that, "basic supervision over charitable trusts and foundations is a State function." The development of regulatory machinery at the federal level would be "a fantastic break with American tradition."

Instead she proposes that there be established in the office of the attorney general of each state a registry of all charitable endowments, whether testamentary trusts, *inter vivos* trusts, or foundations incorporated under the not-for-profit corporation laws of the state. Such records, she believes, would at least provide a sound basis for establishing other provisions for accountability.

More skillful organization and presentation of the material collected by Professor Taylor would have increased the usefulness of this important book. Nevertheless, it

must be hailed as a valuable edition to publications dealing with philanthropic endowments.

WILMER SHIELDS RICH
American Foundations
Information Service
New York City

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

KUZNETS, SIMON, assisted by ELIZABETH JENKS. *Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings*. Pp. xli, 725. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953. \$9.00.

In this volume Professor Kuznets has produced a model of empirical research involving a large mass of statistical material. The many sources of information on the income distribution have been thoroughly sifted, the data carefully refined into meaningful quantitative concepts, and the results analyzed with insight and due regard to their limitations. Moreover, the detailed results are presented as an aid to future research, and the aims of such research are indicated.

The limitation of the study to the upper income groups was dictated by the available source material; but as the income and savings of these groups are related to total income and total savings, this does not detract from its substance and interest. Within the scope indicated, the author examines the level of the upper income shares and the changes in them over the past three decades, the income and social characteristics of the upper income groups, and the changing shares of the upper income groups in savings.

The most striking conclusion of the study, perhaps, is the significant decrease in the shares of the upper income groups that has occurred in the postwar years. During the two interwar decades, the average shares of the top 1 per cent and 5 per cent of the population in total income were 13 per cent and 25 per cent. In 1947 and 1948, however, the top 1 per cent received 8.5 per cent of income and the top 5 per cent, 18 per cent. For disposable income, that is income after taxes, the

relative decline was even more substantial. It would seem that this change is not due to transitory factors since the range of variation in the upper income group shares that occurred during the violent cyclical swings of the interwar decades was considerably less. The reduction in unemployment, the lower level of interest rates, and steeper income and estate taxes were all probably crucial factors in this change.

With respect to the shares of the upper income groups in savings, Professor Kuznets gives attention mainly to changes during the business cycle. He finds that the savings-income ratios for the upper groups fluctuated much less than those for the lower groups. As the income shares of the upper groups were mildly counter-cyclical, their savings were a fairly stable proportion of total income. Thus, the violent swings in the over-all savings-income ratio must be due to wide variations in the savings-income ratios of the lower income groups. He concludes that, in so far as the savings of the two groups flow to different types of investment, the differences in their behavior must be given serious consideration in studying the nature and causes of cyclical fluctuations.

MILTON GILBERT
Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation (OEEC)
Paris

HELLER, WALTER W., FRANCIS M. BODDY, and CARL L. NELSON (Eds.). *Savings in the Modern Economy*. Pp. xix, 370. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953. \$5.00.

This book is made up of the papers presented at a Conference on Savings, Inflation, and Economic Progress and a summary of the discussion. The meetings were held in 1952 at the University of Minnesota, arranged by the School of Business Administration of that University, and sponsored by a number of business firms. The participants included academic, government, and business economists.

The papers covered a very wide range in subject matter, interest, and importance. There were papers on the savings concept itself and its measurement; on the savings

behavior of corporations and individuals; on the need for less (or more) saving; and on the savings problems in the underdeveloped economies. Some of the papers seem to have been written to persuade noneconomists; others were at the highest level of technical competence and made significant contributions.

In the space allotted to this review, one cannot do more than pick out a few of the outstanding papers for comment. In this list, I should certainly include the ones prepared by Irwin Friend (*The Concept and Measurement of Savings*), by Raymond W. Goldsmith (*Trends and Structural Changes in Savings in the Twentieth Century*), and by John Lintner (*The Determinants of Corporate Savings*). The first presents an authoritative account of the measurement of personal saving. The problems and uncertainties involved are clearly indicated; incidentally, the comments of Daniel H. Brill deserve careful attention.

Goldsmith's paper summarizes his important findings on trends in savings over the last 50 years. Measures of the volume of saving, of the amounts saved by individuals, corporations, and government, of the forms of saving, and of the savings-income ratio over the period are provided. Inevitably, a summary of this sort raises at least as many questions as it answers, but it certainly increases one's appetite for the complete study.

Lintner's study of Corporate Saving seems to me to be a most significant contribution. He properly emphasizes the importance of the saving of this sector. After describing the relatively few earlier studies of this form of saving, he examines various hypotheses bearing on the relations between the national income and corporate profits, and between corporate profits and dividends. In particular, he questions the "ratchet" approach to the determinants of profits.

The book presents other interesting materials; in this connection, I should make special note of the papers bearing on Canadian and British experience. The whole volume will be of real interest to economists, and to other social scientists who are interested in one of the most impor-

tant phenomena of the economy. None of the papers requires a specialist knowledge for its understanding.

LORIE TARSHIS
Stanford University

COCHRAN, THOMAS C. *Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business Mind in Action*. Pp. xii, 564. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$7.50.

It is only recently that business leaders have had their spokesmen among historians. Businessmen, being men of action, have not been especially articulate in their own defense. Indeed, the agrarian crusaders, the "Muckrakers," the antimonopolists, the spokesmen for labor, and the economic determinists have all taken a hand in portraying the businessman chiefly as a greedy villain. Yet this could hardly be a balanced picture, for it is obvious that the American businessman has been largely responsible for the nation's tremendous economic progress. A group of historians of business appeared in the last generation and undertook to examine business records and to report on their findings. It was high time this was done. Yet Dr. Cochran is no apologist for the business leaders. He is primarily interested in discovering their attitudes, their ethics, and their motives.

Railroads were the country's first really big business. This book is based on 100,000 letters by 61 railroad presidents, written between 1845 and 1890, a period when railroads were expanding rapidly and were first being subjected to government regulation. Out of the 61 presidents however, about 15 receive most of the author's attention. They include such names as Henry Villard, James F. Joy, John Murray Forbes, Stuyvesant Fish, and William Henry Osborn. Conspicuous for their absence are Jay Gould, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and Charles Francis Adams, Jr.

The task that Dr. Cochran set for himself was an extremely difficult one. It was to show the composite attitudes of these railroad presidents towards such problems as ownership and control, improvements in managerial organization, ways of commanding capital, the strategy of railroad

expansion, the desirability of innovations, treatment of customers, rules of competition, methods of dealing with labor, influencing public opinion, and submitting to government regulation. He does not attempt to show how each of the 61 felt towards each of these problems. Instead he generalizes as much as possible on each problem and then gives illustrations from the writings of several presidents.

Although the men differed in their attitudes, there were more similarities than differences, for they all had the same problems to face and a common conception of the "social role" they were to play. The social role, says Dr. Cochran, quoting Dr. Leland Jenks, is "an understanding shared more or less fully by the members of a group as to what a given position entails for any individuals who occupy it." For example, a clergyman will not behave like a circus barker, nor will a railroad president hold the same values as a college professor (pp. 13, 223). Railroad presidents might differ on the question of slavery, but on railroad problems they tended to see alike. Each "considered himself an agent of civilization," one of whose chief responsibilities was to build up the country. They disliked rebating but accepted it as a necessary evil to achieve their goal and to stay in business. They shared a hostility to organized labor, a distrust of politicians, a belief that the public misunderstood them and so should be told as little as possible, and a belief that "pooling" was desirable although it needed to be regulated. Maximizing profits appears less important than is generally supposed.

The book is well organized. The assumptions are clearly stated at the outset; a discussion of railroads in the east and in the west gives a general picture; and then the major topics are covered, chapter by chapter. The book is extensively footnoted—50 pages of fine print at the back. Also there are some 275 pages of selections from the letters of the 61 presidents. The index is full and helpful. Although a book of this kind must of necessity be somewhat disjointed, Dr. Cochran has done everything possible to make it cohesive. Historians critical of nine-

teenth-century businessmen should read this book and qualify their sweeping condemnations.

DONALD L. KEMMERER
University of Illinois

MALENBAUM, WILFRED. *The World Wheat Economy, 1885-1939*. Pp. xv, 262. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$6.00.

The reader is given a very clear picture of the maladjustments to be encountered in the up and down trends of the world wheat industry during a 55-year period, taking into consideration the acreage, yield, production, carryover, consumption per capita, supply, and demand in the older and the new countries. The factors that contributed to expansion on new lands and contraction on old ones, as well as those of weather, technological progress, geographical shifts, standard of living, and industrialization, are taken into consideration in attempting to arrive at a solution of the present wheat problem.

The trend in production has been up, and the consumption per capita and the price per bushel have been down, during the 55-year period. The world wheat carryover August 1, 1939 had reached the record total of 1,150 million bushels, with the world wheat price one of the lowest on record. The world yield per acre, based on five-year averages, shows an upward trend and is rather encouraging in that it is not downward as one might expect from the gloomy soil depletion and erosion stories of the 1930's. The author concludes that, for the future, man can increase still more the general level of wheat yields per acre. The question is rather whether man is prepared to pay the costs of the more intensive practices necessary to obtain higher yields.

The relation of the standard of living to the consumption of wheat per capita varies in the different areas. Higher living standards were accompanied by a definite shift to wheat bread on the part of bread consumers in Europe, whereas in exporting countries like Australia, Canada, and the United States, the consumption declined. The explanation is that in the latter coun-

tries bread does not form the basis of the diet. Total human consumption in this country was lower in the last five years than in the five prewar years, despite a population increase of 10 per cent.

Following World War I, France, Italy, and Germany placed effective tariff rates on imported wheat, to protect their own wheat growers from the low-cost foreign wheat coming in. The tariffs were effective and increased domestic production. United States grain exports in recent years have been concentrated in those areas to which our government has been giving financial assistance. In 1950, 250 million of total exports of 365 million bushels were financed in whole or in part. In the crop years 1949 and 1950, an average of about 170 million bushels of wheat imported into Europe were financed by the Economic Cooperation Administration; this was almost one-third of all wheat imports. If the foreign agricultural producers objected to the U. S. pouring a flood of goods into their country following World War I, at prices below their cost of production, and set up barriers to keep them out as cited by the author, how must they feel at this time when we unload our surplus goods on them as gifts or by financial assistance?

Solutions by international agreements have not contributed importantly either to increasing or stabilizing the world price of wheat or to expanding the international trade in wheat. The quota agreement of acreage reduction was not lived up to by the leading exporting nations.

The author concludes that the general movement of wheat prices, both absolutely and relative to other commodities, has been a declining one from 1885 until the outbreak of the recent war, and that the pattern of world output does not reflect the pattern of prices, although the supply actually produced did have an influence on world prices. It would seem that the author has the answers to the above in his early discussions on expansion into new lands, mechanization, and tillage improvement methods in dry-land areas.

Although the author may have given a rather gloomy outlook for the wheat grower, the book is of value because it summarizes widely scattered information

and opinion on a very serious present-day subject.

A. F. VASS
University of Wyoming

GILMAN, GLENN W., and JAMES W. SWEENEY. *Atlantic Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America*. Case Study No. 12 in series "Causes of Industrial Peace Under Collective Bargaining." Pp. xiii, 101. Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1953. \$1.00.

This is one of the best of this excellent series, and a distinct credit to the co-directors of the project, Joseph N. Scanlon and Charles R. Walker, and to the authors, Glenn W. Gilman and James W. Sweeney, of the School of Industrial Management of Georgia Institute of Technology. Oscar Ameringer used to say that a successful organizing campaign in the South would have to be conducted by leaders with a religious message, and the reader feels the deep ethical guideposts of conduct in this story of the deep South. Relationships resolve themselves into questions of what is right and what is wrong in each particular case. Against this backdrop of ethical standards which dominates the scene, the union and the management successfully carry on an intricate pattern of industrial relations of undoubted benefit to both.

The authors place the emphasis where it rightfully belongs. The culture of the Piedmont area is not unique, but it is certainly strongly differentiated from the pattern of some other regions, particularly the industrialized North, which is a partial amalgam of cultures of many origins, with some fairly recent additions. The Piedmont culture is, from one viewpoint, simple, and the course of action resulting from it is direct and unmixed with dissenting viewpoints. There seems to be no division of opinion about the desirability of collective bargaining among management; there are no fractional groups in the union. Even union elections are free from competing slates of candidates representing basic cleavages in the group. Political, racial, (the Negro has an assured place in the union), and policy issues do not divide either union or management.

There is a great deal to be learned from this relatively simple cultural pattern. Because of the powerful ethical standards that guide relations, some important principles stand forth in clear view. For example the industrial relations manager keeps no statistical records, because to have a man numbered and classified would be an insult to his personality. The union contract, another example, is simply a working document, not a legalistic charter of strict formulation. Much more important is what the union and management agree upon. Or, consider the informality of collective bargaining procedures for another example; no formal records are required or kept, no precedents are established, either party may informally initiate proceedings, and bargaining on the contract and on grievances shade into one another.

Because it is a simple, informal system, based upon an essentially complicated but stable social structure, it deserves careful study by students, teachers, and practitioners of collective bargaining. Comparisons with labor relations in other plants will point up many desirable attitudes and practices that are in effect in the Atlantic Steel Company. **FREDERICK L. RYAN**

San Diego State College

LORWIN, LEWIS L. *The International Labor Movement: History, Policies, Outlook.* Pp. xviii, 366. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. \$5.00.

Dr. Lorwin's earlier book, *Labor and Internationalism*, dealt with the history and the importance of the international labor movement up to 1929. At the time of publication that was the only systematic study of its kind, and the book became a classic. The present volume includes an abbreviated version of this earlier book and then brings the story up to date. It thus has additional chapters on the great depression and the rise of Hitlerism, the Second World War, the labor movement of the postwar era, World Federation Trade Unions, and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. It ends its presentation as close to publication date as modern publication techniques permit.

The emphasis throughout the volume is on the presentation of the facts themselves;

the author keeps himself as far as possible in the background. This has tremendous advantages in terms of objectivity; however, this reader at least regretted on several occasions the absence of critical comments on the part of the author, the more so as a close and astute observer such as Dr. Lorwin can speak with particular authority of some of the events discussed in this book. Thus, the story of the I.F.T.U. anti-depression program (pp. 167-168) or the meager record of the contribution to the Matteotti fund (p. 169) seems to me to require some comments so that the uninformed reader not be given the "official" version alone. This applies also to the alleged total refusal of German labor leaders to come to terms with Hitler (p. 173) or the story of De Brouckère's negotiations with the Comintern which ended with a complete reversal of Socialist policy (p. 185). In the same vein, it would have been desirable if the strength of the Morgenthau ideas in the W.F.T.U., or the British-United States rivalries in the leadership of the I.C.F.T.U. had been pointed out to the reader.

It is perhaps more important, however, to point out the author's particular approach. A Continental European would probably have put far greater emphasis than Dr. Lorwin on the ideological developments to the neglect of facts and policies. The author's sound realism in this respect seems to me to make his book particularly valuable. On the other hand, compared with John Price's *International Labour Movement*, Lorwin's volume deals less with structure and organization, but more with the uses to which they have been put.

At a time when the struggle for the soul of the industrial worker of the world is in full swing and its outcome one of the main issues of the battle between East and West, this book will prove invaluable to scholars, statesmen, and journalists alike.

ADOLF STURMTHAL

Cornell University

MORSE, NANCY C. *Satisfactions in the White-collar Job.* Pp. x, 235. Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1953. \$3.50.

The "Human Relations Program" within Michigan's Survey Research Center has been carrying out a series of studies on organizational effectiveness. These studies have chiefly revolved around questions of employee satisfactions, morale, character of supervision, and productivity. Miss Morse's book is a major contribution to this continuing research program.

The central concerns of this study revolve around the characteristics in the work situation that lead or do not lead to work satisfactions. A large number of specific variables are examined within the general categories of financial returns, job prestige, intrinsic job satisfactions, involvement in the company, pride in the work group, and character of supervision. Other variables relate to such "objective" characteristics of the respondents as age, sex, education, and length of service, and such "subjective" characteristics as need and aspiration levels. The whole is cast within an explicit theoretical framework that attempts to specify the general relationship between motivation and environmentally-derived satisfactions.

A part of the use made of the theoretical scheme is an explanation of the circumstance that this study, like others in the series and outside it, finds no necessary relationship between morale and productivity. If work satisfactions and productivity are both tests of organizational effectiveness, much further research and constructive theorizing will be required to determine the conditions for their joint accomplishment. These conditions are likely to involve the character of training and selection as well as organizational variables as such.

Although neither space nor my competence allows a detailed discussion of the issues, I am not altogether happy about the conceptual distinction between "satisfactions" and "motivation," nor the uses to which the distinction is put in formal theoretical statement and interpretation of data. Levels of satisfaction are obviously a function of aspirations as well as fulfillments. The use of other language ("tension-reduction" and "potential energy expenditure") is not necessarily helpful in finding objective indicators of aspirations

or expectations, which, among other things such as cognitive perceptions, would be necessary to predict how individuals will respond to the same environmental circumstances. In short, I wonder if the rather formal theoretical sections say much beyond the following: the degree of satisfaction workers will report about their work situations will depend on what they think they are getting out of it but also on what they want to get out of it; whether a worker will be productive or not depends on whether it serves his balanced interests to be so.

This study is a technical research report with few concessions to the general reader. The exposition is consistently clear and coherent, however, and the summaries largely nontechnical.

WILBERT E. MOORE

Princeton University

TORFF, SELWYN H. *Collective Bargaining: Negotiations and Agreements.* Pp. ix, 323. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1953. \$5.50.

The author, a university lecturer in industrial management, attributes an extensive background of experience and other assistance on the book to the Chicago consulting firm in which he is an associate.

The book contains little documentation or case material except a number of useful citations to National Labor Relations Board and court cases in connection with points discussed in the text. It will serve as an up-to-date briefing for practitioners in industrial relations; and, because it helps to see perspectives in the larger picture, it will also find use in various training programs.

The nineteen chapters are grouped into four major parts. In Part Two ("non-economic" issues), Chapter 7 on no-strike clauses and Chapter 9 on management rights seem particularly useful. "To the employer in a unionized plant," says Mr. Torff, "the no-strike clause is probably the most significant provision of the collective bargaining agreement to which it is a party. . . . Virtually every [such] agreement is a series of concessions from the employer to the union and the employees. The only real concession running from the union and

the employees to the employer . . . is the pledge . . . to refrain from strikes, slow-downs . . . during the life of the agreement." A number of (unidentified) specimen no-strike clauses are discussed, as well as sanctions available through legal and other channels. The matter on disciplinary actions for infractions of such agreements contains some sound and important generalizations, including the assertion that union stewards and officials "are charged with a higher degree of responsibility than rank-and-file union members" for preventing violation of this part of their contract.

A short chapter suffices for management rights clauses, which are held not analogous to the no-strike agreement since management retains the residue of rights not bargained away explicitly in its agreement with the union. (More might well be said on past practice in the plant, as additional evidence of management concessions to workers.) The usefulness of a management rights clause as a reminder to union members is briefly set forth, together with a warning against language suggesting that management has only the rights explicitly enumerated in the clause.

Part Three, on "economic" issues, is naturally much concerned with numerous aspects of wages. A very brief treatment is included of that hardy perennial source of disputes, alleged misclassification of specified employees; and somewhat more is given on bargained-out job descriptions and evaluations. Unions will find some support here for severance pay and guaranteed wages and employment.

Part Four, on administration of agreements, deals first with grievance procedure, then, in the concluding chapter, with arbitration. The legal aspects and history are rehearsed at some length; and it is explained that voluntary settlements are usually preferable to litigation—also why the union is almost always the complainant in grievance procedure, including arbitration. Agencies assisting in selection of arbitrators are mentioned; but the National Academy of Arbitrators and publishers of arbitration decisions may feel aggrieved by omission of reference to them.

Z. CLARK DICKINSON
University of Michigan

CLOW, ARCHIBALD, and NAN L. CLOW. *The Chemical Revolution*. Pp. xiv, 680. New York: British Book Centre (and The Batchworth Press, London), 1953. \$10.00.

This book, in manuscript, earned the Senior Hume-Brown Prize from the University of Edinburgh. The purpose of its authors has been "to create something new out of hitherto unexplored ground common to economic history and chemical technology." The 25 chapters include such important developments as the Economy of Common Salt, Soap, Vitriol, Calico Printing, Glass, Pottery, and the Fermentation Industries. There are 110 illustrations, 16 diagrams, a Glossary of Dead Chemical Language, a Chemical Chronology from 1610 to 1856, the period covered in the book, 28 pages of bibliography, and a full index.

The authors have not only examined a huge volume of source material but have digested it with understanding. The reviewer, a chemist (in the American sense), can find no fault in the treatment of the technology. Social consequences, such as shifts in population, occupation, and domestic life, are constantly pointed out, but without any evidence of purpose to bend them to the support of a particular social theory.

For example, we read of the effects of deforestation resulting from the dependence upon wood of "eotechnic" industries, including the production of iron, salt, soda, saltpeter, gunpowder, soap, sugar, pottery, lime, and many others; and of the effects of the large scale production of soap after Chevreul, early in the nineteenth century, had elucidated the nature of composition of fats and the chemistry of their saponification.

The final chapter, on "Social Personnel," gives an account of the men and societies mainly responsible for the advances in chemistry which laid a large part of the foundation for the Industrial Revolution.

The authors of this book have brilliantly succeeded in the task they set for themselves.

JOEL H. HILDEBRAND
University of California
Berkeley

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

DEGRANGE, McQUILKIN. *The Nature and Elements of Sociology*. Pp. viii, 668. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. \$8.50.

It is extremely difficult to review Professor DeGrange's book. I am charmed with it in one sense. He is obviously one of the few social scientists alive who is truly well versed in the works of Comte, Sumner, Spencer, and Ward. It is a pleasure to read what he has to say of them and to reflect that though the times may have passed them by there is much to be learned from a rereading of them. This is particularly true of Comte of course. Professor DeGrange knows Comte's work in the greatest detail and takes us back through it seeking out "the nature and elements of sociology" as these were conceived by the coiner of the term.

The volume is accurately named. It has to do with "the nature and elements of sociology." Professor DeGrange wants to know what sociology *should* be like. He seeks an ontologically correct answer to this question. Empirical theories and the like are incidental or are means to this end, but his primary concern is not with them. As such the work is not scientifically but is, rather, philosophically oriented. I am an unfortunate reviewer for this work because such efforts appeal to me only when the author is clearly aware of the distinction between such work and scientific work. But my objection runs deeper than an aesthetic concern. I know of no scientific problem that has been solved, or even had its solution aided, by first deciding whether it fell within the field of sociology or anthropology or psychology or economics or whatever. When these field distinctions become masters of the analysis rather than aides in it, we are done in. Furthermore, there is something to be learned from the history of the natural sciences in these respects. They certainly cannot and do not account for their present advances by having first cut the cake in an ontologically correct fashion. In view of the history of recent scientific development the author strikes an ironically

grim note when he states, ". . . there is no connection between sociology and psychology. They are two distinct sciences dealing each with an isolate of its own as definitely and as clearly as do physics and chemistry" (p. 228).

As an excursion into thought provocation from masters out of the past this volume is superb, but positively speaking it has little to offer modern developments in the science. For the author there have been two great social theorists, Comte and Sumner, with Spencer getting off the track between their times. Pareto and Durkheim are referred to but only as verification of some point from the masters. Little time is spent with analysis of social phenomena. The book places sociology. For example, one of the reasons that sociology precedes psychology in the scientific hierarchy plumped for is that ". . . the advent of sociology as a science antedates the rise of psychology" (p. 286). The book goes at length into a distinction between "humanoids" and "men." The evidence for this distinction is not clear to me, but the argument in connection with it is consistent with Comte's view of a three stage development of social systems.

The culmination of the volume is movement toward and hope for an ethic derived from science. This is done quite differently than the pragmatists would do it and with many caveats along the way about the methodological limits of science in these respects, but it is done. Comte founded a church that seemed ridiculous to many who admired his work in other respects. Professor DeGrange at the end of his work has gone as far as we are likely to see in redeeming this last hazy phase of one of the great figures in intellectual history.

MARION J. LEVY, JR.

Princeton University

CURTI, MERLE (Ed.). *American Scholarship in the Twentieth Century*. Pp. ix, 252. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$4.50.

This book is a pleasant surprise. Many readers will approach it, as did this reviewer, with a certain wariness. How can six collaborators, given roughly thirty-five pages each, cover the rich diversity of

American scholarship without superficiality? Professor Curti and his co-authors provide an instructive answer.

This is one of the Library of Congress series on American Civilization. According to the original plan, science was to be the subject of a separate book and was omitted from the present volume. One may regret this, as one may regret the omission of a variety of minor scholarly fields, but, even with these omissions, the task is of well nigh unmanageable proportions.

Professor Curti's opening essay, though not the most well-knit piece in the book, must have been by all odds the most difficult to prepare. Covering such disparate matters as changing emphases in scholarly pursuits, the development of scholarly organizations, sources of financial support, and freedom of inquiry, the author provides an extraordinarily useful review of the intellectual and social context in which American scholars have worked.

Perhaps the most brilliant essay in the book is Rene Wellek's piece on literary scholarship. Displaying all of the superb assurance in opinion which one has come to expect of the literary scholar, Wellek reviews the movements of the past fifty years, appraises their contributions, and suggests the path which literary scholarship must take in the years to come. One may not accept all of his judgments, but one must admire the incisiveness and erudition which characterize his thinking and writing.

Equally lucid and competent are W. Stull Holt's essay on historical scholarship and Arthur Murphy's on philosophical scholarship. Professor Murphy's essay, a brief history of the ideas with which philosophers have been preoccupied since 1900, provides excellent background for the other essays. In his treatment of the social sciences, the late Louis Wirth is handicapped by the necessity of reviewing several fields which have shown markedly different courses of development. His summary of the achievements of the social sciences is a bit uncritical. Walter Agard, on classical scholarship, is predictably concerned with the defense of this embattled field, but his approach is constructive.

A book so brief on a topic so large can easily be criticized for its shortcomings. The principal shortcoming is that to a considerable degree each contributor deals with his special field as though it were self-contained. Yet the effect is remarkably coherent, and the reader comes away with a variety of suggestive generalizations about American scholarship since 1900. Professor Curti and his coauthors undertook an extraordinarily difficult task and have carried it through with distinction.

JOHN GARDNER

Carnegie Corporation of New York

MEAD, MARGARET, and RHODA MÉTRAUX (Eds.). *The Study of Culture at a Distance*. Pp. x, 480. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. \$5.00.

The editors of this volume are also important contributors to it. They define it as a manual on the study of national character, particularly in cases where direct field work is not possible. This is not a situation they advocate as desirable. Many of the formulations and much of the material derive from the Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures initiated by Ruth Benedict. The cultures from which most illustrations come are Russian, French, Polish, Chinese, German, and East European Jewish.

Parts I and II deal primarily with theory. They contain an excellent and modest statement by Geoffrey Gorer. Part III discusses group research considered essential to the task. Part IV, on informants, makes a useful distinction between the informant and the interview technique. Parts V and VI deal with the analysis of themes and imagery in films as well as in oral and written literature. Part VII is a lukewarm appraisal of projective techniques. In Part VIII Rhoda Métraux opens new and interesting fields in her article "Resonance in Imagery." Parts IX and X are titled, respectively, "End Linkage: an Analytic Approach," and "Application of Studies of Culture at a Distance." The total effect of this collection is somewhat incoherent, but it contains charming, penetrating, and provocative vignettes like the interview on friendship in France, the pas-

sages on Russian sensory images, and Leites' analysis of Camus' *L'Étranger*. Much of the material is published for the first time. Some is in the form of abridged versions of articles that have appeared elsewhere. Some is written as mortar for the volume. I am not sure that this all adds up to a manual, but it is nonetheless good reading.

The study of national character has not gained general acceptance among social scientists for various reasons. Perhaps the most commonly expressed objection is that "it is not scientific." The editors and some of the contributors would appear to agree, since there is frequent reference to the aesthetic, intuitive, and perceptual gifts needed for such analysis. Whether in fact such capacities are any more irrelevant to science than "intelligence" is certainly open to debate. There is certainly no attempt to dodge objectivity and rigor although they are not always easily achieved at this stage of the inquiry. Unfortunately, I seem to detect also a certain esoteric note in the volume. This may be no more than defensiveness against ill-informed and destructive criticism. A fair-minded reading of this volume will not necessarily convince opponents of the validity of national character studies, but it should allay the caricature of such research so frequently indulged in by its enemies. Whatever the ultimate appraisal of this type of inquiry may be, its proponents will have contributed importantly to sensitivities and techniques in cross-cultural studies.

CORA DU BOIS

Institute of International Education
Washington, D. C.

Gemeinschaft und Politik. Jhg. 1, Nr. 1, Oktober 1953. Pp. 48. Bad Godesberg am Rhein: Institut für Geozologie und Politik, 1953. Published quarterly. 2.—DM per copy, or 6.—DM annually.

The new and energetic intellectual life of West Germany has been marked by a boom in publishing and by the emergence of a series of scholarly journals. The most recent of these quarterly publications, *Gemeinschaft und Politik*, is edited by Dr. Rolf Hinder, of the Institute for Geosociology

and Politics, Bad Godesberg. The editor and his colleagues are convinced that there is a necessity for an interdisciplinary approach to the problems of contemporary society and government. The specialized approach of current science has led man to live his life in details without understanding the deeper relationships between the seemingly different strands of his communal pursuits.

"*Gemeinschaft und Politik*," says the editor in his lead article, "is intended as a program for the social sciences. It hopes to show the coresponsibility of science as against public life. The colorless position of the positivists must yield to the genuineness of those who are earnestly concerned with the meaning of society. A realistic approach can be achieved only by drawing a power of conviction from spiritual work. . . ."

The articles in the initial issue are mostly of local or national German interest. Johannes Arndt, director of the geographical-geological section of the Museum of Wolfsburg, contributes an article on the problems of modern city planning. Professor Walter Taeuber, of the University of Würzburg, writing on the cultural tasks of the domestic economy, denounces "false leaders" (*Falsche Fuehrer*) and calls for a new élite of scientists who understand the nature of leadership. Dr. Werner Lindner writes about forms of cemeteries and monuments as social and cultural-political expressions. Günther Pacyna contributes an article on agricultural politics versus land politics.

The articles are written with that painstaking, conscientious, almost colorless technique which has come to be associated with German scholarship. While the papers in general show some regard for an interdisciplinary approach, they are so specialized and so oriented to the German scene that they may not be of intense interest to scholars outside Germany. Nevertheless, the new publication will be welcomed to the community of world scholarship and its editor encouraged to continue his praiseworthy attempt to help secure a synthesis of the social sciences.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

City College of New York

KINSEY, ALFRED C., WARDELL B. POMEROY, CLYDE E. MARTIN, PAUL H. GEBHARD, et al. *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*. Pp. xxx, 842. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1953. \$8.00.

This is, as the reviewer sees it, one of the most significant books of our time despite certain serious shortcomings.

The principal limitations may be briefly set forth as follows. (1) The nature of the sample. Although the cases are sufficient in number, they consist of volunteers and do not constitute a representative, random sample. Groups underrepresented include those over 50, Catholics, devout Jews, rural residents, inhabitants of the Southeast, Northwest, and Rocky Mountain areas, those previously married and now widowed, separated, or divorced, and those with less than a college education. Because probability sampling was not used, it is difficult to know to whom the generalizations apply. (2) The lack of an explicit hypothesis to be tested. The data constitute an inventory of sexual outlets; but the bearing of the data on, say, marital happiness or individual adjustment, must be surmised. (3) Method. Personal interviews were utilized, which yield mainly data based on recall and not data based on records of behavior, although a little material of the latter kind was included for purposes of corroboration. Recall introduces error of memory, if not deception. (4) Moralizing. The book, while primarily a scientific study, mixes propaganda with fact-finding, for Kinsey is exercised about our Puritan sex tradition. Kinsey is not content to let the facts speak for themselves, although in this regard he offends less in this volume than he did in his earlier book on the male.

Yet the book remains a powerful book, one of the most important books of our time, mainly because it deals with a highly significant topic in a monumental way. It is not great like Freud's work because of its ideas, and yet it is not just another book on sex. Consider the effort that went into the making of this book. Fifteen years of labor, about 8,000 interviews averaging one and one-half to two hours (equivalent to 1,500 eight-hour days), plus the hundreds and hundreds of hours required

in correspondence and in the communities in setting up the interviews and in becoming acquainted with the subjects and their social situations. Since each subject was asked between 300 and 500 questions, all together more than 3,000,000 answers were recorded. In addition, records were scanned including sexual calendars, diaries, correspondence, scrapbooks, 16,000 works of art, clinical studies, and many thousands of previously published studies. Hundreds of consultants gave advice on the project, and the results in the book are presented in 179 tables and 155 figures. We have never had on this significant subject of sex anything like this herculean labor. No wonder it is a landmark and must be reckoned with. While the Kinsey study was possible because of the social changes regarding sex attitudes and behavior in the first half of the twentieth century, the Kinsey report itself becomes a powerful influence for the full and free discussion of sex behavior.

M. F. NIMKOFF

The Florida State University

KONVITZ, MILTON R. *Civil Rights in Immigration*. Pp. xii, 216. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953. \$3.50.

The author undertakes a critical evaluation of American immigration and naturalization policy, points out what he considers to be the principal inequities in present procedures, and frankly presents his own views. Altogether, the book is an argument for more liberal treatment of the alien. The subject is discussed under three headings: first, admission and exclusion policies; second, deportation policies; and third, naturalization. Under each of these topics the author first gives a brief review of the historical background of the present policies and procedures, then points out hardships or inequities that may arise, and ends by giving his own recommendations.

As the author states, his manuscript was largely completed before the publication of the report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, but has been amended to include footnote references to that report. It also includes material as recent as President Eisenhower's message to Congress of February 2, 1953.

In most respects the author's position parallels that of the Commission; but several points of difference in recommendations are noted (p. ix).

The evaluation of immigration policy is made from what can perhaps best be characterized as a humanitarian point of view, with only incidental reference to labor market, economic, and demographic implications. Without space to summarize the author's treatment of the subject, it can be noted that he especially condemns the nearly absolute administrative authority in matters of exclusion and deportation, with only limited opportunity for judicial review of administrative decisions; and he further condemns what he considers to be unjust and impolitic discriminations between racial and other classes of immigrants, between alien and citizen, between native-born and naturalized citizen.

There is a bold facing of the problem that faces any man of good will: given that the subversive and disloyal must be excluded or deported, how can procedures be devised that will not do violence to fundamental human rights or endanger the innocent?

If the author errs, it is perhaps in trying too zealously to make his case against the immigration laws and in presenting a more unfavorable than representative picture of their operation. And it is perhaps assigning too large a role in international affairs to immigration legislation to imply that the abrogation of the Gentleman's Agreement with Japan set us on the path that led to Pearl Harbor (pp. 6-7). To cite an example that really proves nothing, relations with China have not been perceptibly improved by the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts ten years ago.

E. P. HUTCHINSON

University of Pennsylvania

UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour*. Pp. vii, 621. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. \$3.75.

There have been numerous regional and national studies of forced labor, in one or another of its disguised forms, since the technical abolition of slavery in the United

States and finally in Brazil. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, working under the joint auspices of the United Nations and the International Labor Organization, is the first attempt to gather together all the facts currently bearing on forced labor in all countries of the world. It should be the most penetrating and comprehensive study of the subject ever made. In conclusiveness, however, it leaves much still to be said.

The committee had access to voluminous reports on all debates in the UN Economic and Social Council. It sent questionnaires to the governments of all countries and invited nongovernmental agencies and private individuals to submit complaints and supporting documents. The report represents a two-year study, and contains 129 pages of summaries and 492 pages of documentary papers.

By its terms of reference, the Committee was limited to the study of legally entrenched national systems, particularly those with economic, political, or ideological purposes, thus excluding forced labor in violation of domestic law, as well as penal and correctional types. This has made it, essentially, a study of the laws and regulations applied to such labor in the countries under investigation.

Of the 81 questionnaires sent to the various governments, 48 were returned after an urgent follow-up request for information. Governments which did not reply included such populous and reportedly flagrant offenders as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Roumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Egypt, Portugal, Mexico, and twelve of the South American Republics. On the later list appear 9 of the 23 countries in which forced labor was alleged to exist and which were exhaustively examined by the Committee.

Each of the 20 countries, or territories administered by a country, was treated separately: the complaints against it, the regulations governing labor in it, any peculiar circumstances under which it fell short of standard practice, and the Committee's conclusions.

These individualized treatments bring out the high complexity of the question of forced labor; the thin line between it and

other types of labor; the difficulty of applying any simple, universal yardstick; and the impossibility of getting a true perspective of the subject without taking into account rigid wage scales, long term wage contracts, living conditions, and other pertinent data excluded by the terms of reference from consideration by the Committee. It is perhaps this fact which has softened the language of censure, even in cases where the evidence, both in the summary and in the pertinent documents, appears to be convincing. The last statement of the General Summary, however, leaves no doubt about the Committee's attitude: "The Committee feels, therefore, that these systems of forced labor in any of their forms should be abolished to ensure the respect for and the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms."

CHARLES W. COULTER
University of Rochester

UNITED STATES SENATE. *Retirement Policies and the Railroad Retirement System: Report of the Joint Committee on Railroad Retirement Legislation*. Two Volumes. Pp. xxv, 770; lxxv; vii, 173, xvii. Washington, 1953. I: \$2.00; II: 45 cents.

These two volumes on retirement policies contain much valuable information and were prepared with excellent professional care under the able direction of Senator Paul H. Douglas by Robert A. Wallace, the staff director.

Part I, on "Issues in Railroad Retirement," is an extensive compendium of over 800 pages of the many complex and challenging issues faced in the inauguration, evolution, and improvement of the Railroad Retirement program. In a larger sense, Part I is a very useful and interesting case study of the financial, actuarial, social, political, economic, and administrative problems arising from the establishment of an industrial pension plan. The report brings together in one convenient place such useful information as the historical and legislative development of the program, the administration of the disability insurance provisions, and the assumptions and methodology in making actuarial estimates. The report deals ex-

tensively with the question of "co-ordinating" or "integrating" the railroad retirement system with the social security system—a problem which has vexed the two programs since their inception and engendered much controversy, and which was the reason for the establishment of the joint congressional committee making this report.

Part 2, dealing with "Economic Problems of an Aging Population," contains a summary and brief analysis of valuable statistical information on the number, income, employment, and retirement of aged people, and data on old-age and survivors insurance, old age assistance, and private pension plans. There is also a useful digest of selected recent references on problems of the aging. Both volumes have an extensive index.

The report contains no recommendations either on the railroad retirement program or social security legislation. Nevertheless, the information contained in the report will be of great value because as a fact-finding compendium it is well organized and documented and points up issues and problems.

The economic needs of the aged are going to be with us for a long time in the future. The programs providing for the aged are growing and changing. The number of aged is growing, and their needs will change as our economy changes and as various other economic and social changes in our economy occur. The Douglas reports should serve as an excellent guide to the kind of material that must be brought together from time to time if our legislators and the community as a whole are to evaluate and to make intelligent decisions on the complex economic and social questions that we face as our population ages.

WILBUR J. COHEN
U. S. Social Security Administration
Washington, D. C.

MATLIN, MATTHEW (Ed.) *Crime Prevention Through Treatment*. Pp. vii, 241. New York: National Probation and Parole Association, 1953. \$1.50 paper; \$2.00 cloth.

This volume represents a collection of papers which were presented at the 1952

meeting of the National Probation and Parole Association. They primarily contain points of view, philosophy, and suggested good practices for the treatment of adult and juvenile offenders.

Judge Irving Ben Cooper, Chief Justice, Court of Special Sessions, New York City, contends that the judge nowadays really must be a good diagnostician and understand the possible alternatives for the proper treatment of the individual case. Mr. Ervis W. Lester of California makes out a very excellent case for a program of preparation for release in the adult correctional institutions. Mr. John A. Wallace of Minnesota contends that the family should also be prepared for the parolee's return home. Mr. Jean Long of the New York Parole Division presents a plan for job reference and job information which will help institutional parole officers and parolees in getting job placements. Mr. Frank J. Remington, Wisconsin Law School, tussles with the felony-misdemeanor confusion in the law and suggests that the distinction be abandoned as far as it relates to disposition of cases. Dr. William Oldigs, Chief, Milwaukee Probation Department, claims that probation service for the misdemeanant can be effective—even the drunk and disorderly cases have an 81 per cent success record on probation.

Paul W. Tappan, former professor of New York University and now Federal Parole Board member, presents the argument for easing up on civil disabilities of adult offenders since they interfere with complete rehabilitation of the offender. Dr. Kenneth Chapman, Medical Director, U. S. Public Health Service Hospital, Lexington, Kentucky, presents a very fine and hopeful view for the treatment of the drug addict. Libby E. Sachar, Judge, Juvenile Court, Union County (Elizabeth), New Jersey, laments the fact that juvenile judges have not taken over the treatment approach to juvenile delinquency. Several authorities come to grips with the practical necessity of screening juvenile court cases through intake procedures (Judge Harry W. Lindeman, Charles S. Antolina, Sherwood Norman). Mr. Charles H. Boswell, Chief Probation Officer, Juvenile Court, Indianapolis, contends that the probation

department needs to keep actively after fathers in nonsupport cases who lapse in payments and should develop a business-like plan to follow up each support order in systematic fashion.

In general, the tone of the articles is good; however they rehash progressive thinking that has been current for several years.

WALTER C. RECKLESS
Ohio State University

STRAUS, ROBERT, and SELDEN D. BACON. *Drinking in College*. Pp. vii, 221. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. \$4.00.

This book, a product of the Center of Alcohol Studies at Yale, is primarily a report on a survey of 15,747 college students in 27 colleges who provided usable responses to a pretested questionnaire on the drinking of alcoholic beverages and attitudes of students about such drinking. The data were collected during the period 1949-1951. The remainder of the book consists of an excellent general background of the history of drinking in America and the controversies surrounding the alcohol problem.

The analysis of the survey results centers largely around the attempt to find reasonably homogeneous subgroups in the definitely heterogeneous class, "college students." Throughout the analysis, subclassifications are made by sex, by religious affiliation, by income group of family, with frequent additional classifications relating to degrees of customary drinking and scores on a "social complications" scale. It is impossible to summarize fairly in this brief review the findings given in the 108 tables. A few points, however, may be mentioned. The authors admit that one cannot determine from the data what college attendance has to do with the results, because there are no controls taken from noncollege groups. From certain responses, however, which are believed to have forecasting significance, it appears that about 6 per cent of the male drinkers and 1 per cent of the female drinkers manifest signs of being potential problem drinkers, and this corresponds to sex differentials in the general alcoholic population. One is led to

believe from this and other evidence that statistically, but not necessarily for particular individuals, it is highly doubtful that college life has an important influence on drinking habits. Less than 6 per cent of the male or female drinkers said that the college room or fraternity was the usual place of drinking, and the vast majority started to drink before entering college. Males are more prone to drink with males than females with females.

Great emphasis is placed on trying to obtain reasonably reliable estimates of influences. For example, if home practice and church preaching conflict, the church influence appears to be minor.

In general, this is an excellent study, although it is not easy to read. The main adverse criticism of this reviewer is that the questionnaire as used was not included. It is especially to be hoped that the authors' tentative findings concerning the possibility of detecting incipient problem cases and their susceptibility to treatment may be justified after further study. What place is more ideal than a college for such further study? The authors' final plea for greater emphasis on drinking as an area of research in college should be taken seriously.

E. DOUGLASS BURDICK

University of Pennsylvania

TUNNARD, CHRISTOPHER. *The City of Man*. Pp. xxii, 424. Illustrated. New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. \$8.50.

PARKINS, MAURICE FRANK. *City Planning in Soviet Russia: With an Interpretative Bibliography*. Pp. xiv, 257. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. \$6.00.

The publisher engages in a legally permissible seller's puff in characterizing Professor Tunnard's as "the first important book to emphasize the role of art in city planning since Camillo Sitte's *The Art of Building Cities* was published over sixty years ago." (The belated English translation of this classic was hailed in this journal in 1946.) It is fair to say that the second half of Tunnard's imposing and beautiful volume is an illuminated, humane, richly learned, and deeply felt treatise on the relationships of architecture, landscape

architecture, civic art, and city planning, in the tradition of Sitte, Unwin, Lanchester, Saarinen, Rasmussen, and others.

As a social scientist interested in urbanism, I applaud every ringing declaration that traffic surveys, population analyses, and tallies of substandard houses alone do not create the city of man which must reflect his spirit and his aspirations. Tunnard distinguishes housing projects that "tend to impose a pattern rather than establish a design." He calls for the fresh recognition of the "Grand Design": "a principle of composition married to a recognition of the power of art"—that made "the Renaissance City . . . the truest expression of the power of man to create an esthetically satisfying environment," because artists and sculptors were called upon to give the Piazza of San Marco its form.

Tunnard illustrates with rich reference to history the forgotten role of color and of moving water in civic design. He has firm views on the falsity of the "town-country" of Ebenezer Howard—of the proper separation (and appropriate spare urban use) of "Leaf and Stone."

The middle chapters of the book belong in some sort of planner's *New Yorker*: "profiles" of a forgotten prototype of romantic planning at Llewellyn Park, New Jersey; of Newport, Rhode Island as the embodiment of one high point in American social tradition; and other bits and pieces of planning Americana.

In the first part of the book Tunnard seems to fall in the trap that he recognizes when he says that "all the latest New York buildings, including the UN complex, were planned by architects who fancy themselves economists, sociologists, or businessmen." His attempts to trace the origins and growth of cities are disorganized and inconsecutive, with many insupportable generalizations about economic forces. Part 1 of the book is poor; Part 2 is charming but inconsequential; Parts 3 and 4 are authentic, pregnant, and significant.

Mr. Parkins' terse and concise 120-page monograph on City Planning in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is based upon the literature listed in an annotated bibliography of equal length, without benefit of visit to USSR. Admittedly one cannot

tell how closely the dogmas and principles recited correspond to actuality. Early chapters show the impact of rule by ideology. If the "Planning Structure and Process" portrayed in Chapter VI prevail in fact, it is hard to see how any cities get built at all. The chart of "Structure of the Committee on Architectural Affairs of the USSR" includes a dotted line for "ideological leadership" from the Central Committee of the All-Union Party of USSR to the Committee on Architectural Affairs, a wavy line of "general economic directives" from the State Planning Commission, and a solid line of command from the Consul of Ministers of USSR—and these lines radiate down to each city planning bureau. The brief chapter on "Criticism and Self-Criticism" shows the same processes at work in city planning as in biology and music: the accepted style of the 1930's is now "bourgeois" and "marasmic." The Central Executive Committee of the Party has forced the removal of a high official of the Academy of Architecture for "cosmopolitanism."

The monograph presents useful data on standards, number of city plans underway, and other categories culled from the reports. These are helpful for comparison, but no more proof of fact than parallel reports from national ministries in any other country.

CHARLES S. ASCHER

Brooklyn College

GINSBERG, ELI, JOHN L. HERMA, and SOL W. GINSBURG. *Psychiatry and Military Manpower Policy: A Reappraisal of the Experience in World War II*. Pp. xi, 66. New York: King's Crown Press, 1953. \$2.00.

This small but important volume may well be considered a turning point in applied psychiatry and possibly in psychiatric theory in general. By the end of the second World War, the United States found itself confronted with the unexpected problem of manpower shortage. Personnel to man war machines, turned out at such high speed, was lacking. This was the reason for the establishment of the Conservation of Human Resources Project at Columbia University.

In Chapter II, the authors question the meaning of the figures in which the psychiatric activities are reflected, that is, rejection before induction and separation from the services. The result is that these figures mean very little. There was no uniformity of conditions; instead, local influences prevailed; and, worse, there was a complete lack of what, in the language of cybernetics, may be called feed-back information. Irrespective of the numbers he saw, no psychiatrist achieved real experience, because there was no opportunity to learn about the correctness of the prognoses that had in the beginning been made mainly on the basis of clinical personality diagnoses. It is a flaw in the central organization of psychiatric service that such a condition was allowed to exist to the end of the war.

Notwithstanding this fact, most of the psychiatrists, whose answers to a three-point questionnaire form the backbone of this book, thought they were in a position to make a theoretical adjustment and formulate practical suggestions. As to the former, there was agreement that we need more consideration of motivations, the morals, and the morale of the soldiers. However, the answers, as far as they are embodied in this book, seem to indicate a lack of deeper understanding of the problem of motivation. The respondents were guided more by such aspects of motivations as they could grasp at random, here and there. This is obvious in Chapter IV, Military and Civilian Life. The aspect of industrial motivations is too much simplified; likewise, the incentives suggested for the soldiers are too superficial. A survey of motivations in industrial life should be put on the wanted list for future research. The reviewer wants to direct the attention of the group to such a survey which appeared in the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, Volume 94, Number 6, December 1941, page 679 ff.

The book contains a number of worthwhile observations on motivations, generally speaking, governing the change from the civilian to the "You're-in-the-Army-now-situation." It is interesting to note that the converse problem, turning back to civilian life, is not mentioned. This has

played a big role in Europe, especially in Germany. The viewpoint is important wherever the regular Army, with the signing of peace, is reduced to skeleton numbers.

This report on the confrontation of psychiatric theories with real-life problems shows that psychiatrists came down to earth. In the psychiatrists' co-operation with sociologists rests the hope of future valuable achievement.

W. G. ELIASBERG

New York City

BOWEN, HOWARD R. *Graduate Education in Economics*. Supplement to *American Economic Review*, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, Part 2, September, 1953. Pp. xv, 223. Menasha, Wis.: American Economic Association, 1953. \$2.50.

This volume reports a study which was sponsored by the American Economic Association but is not an official report of the organization. It is a status study concerning the profession of economics and graduate education in economics. The study was carried out during the academic year 1951-1952. The author interviewed 250 professors, heads of departments, and graduate deans at 30 universities, as well as many graduate students and professional economists. He also sent questionnaires to department chairmen, graduate professors, professional economists, graduate students, and supervisors of economists in federal agencies.

A great deal of information is made available here with regard to the number and variety of professional economists; salaries of and demand for economists; standards for the master's and doctor's degrees; quality of graduate students in economics; recruitment, admission, and selection of graduate students; the content of graduate programs; research and verbal skills; research training and dissertations; teacher training; residence requirements and the length of time actually taken in graduate study; the nature of graduate departments; instructional procedures; and numbers of enrollments and degrees awarded.

Although the study relates directly to economics, much of it will be useful to those interested in graduate education in other fields. This is especially true of the

sections dealing with admission and selection policies, foreign language requirements, dissertations and research training, teacher training, and instruction methods.

In addition to statistical information relating to the items listed above, the author summarizes the opinions he found in regard to such matters as admission practices, a common core program, relative value of various courses, a broad versus a narrow program of study, a course in methods of research, foreign language requirements, and training for teaching. The author also makes his own suggestions and recommendations concerning many of the issues and problems pointed up by the study.

It is to be hoped that this report will stimulate departments of economics to make careful evaluations of their policies and programs. For instance, there is need for agreement as to whether the master's degree is to represent a standard of achievement or be a "consolation prize" for those who fail to attain the doctorate. There seems to be general agreement that the graduate program should be built around a common core of subjects, but it appears a majority of professors agree on only one subject to be included in this core for the master's program and only three subjects for the doctoral program. There is general dissatisfaction with the foreign language requirements, but in most places they remain unchanged. There is general consent that the majority of Ph.D.'s in economics become teachers, but little agreement as to the effect this condition should have on their graduate education. Mr. Bowen has provided a point of departure from which graduate departments can work toward the solution of these and other problems. WILLIAM H. CARTWRIGHT

Duke University

MORTON, JOHN R. *University Extension in the United States*. Pp. xv, 144. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1953. \$2.25 cloth; \$1.00 paper.

This study which was sponsored by the National University Extension Association is essentially a survey of the extension practices and services of the 75 member institutions. The principal topics included

in the study are the following: historical development, functions, organization, financing, facilities, staff, curriculum, consumers, and methods of institutional adult education. The tables provide excellent summaries of the current administrative practices which should be of much interest and assistance to university administrators.

The definition of "university extension" used by the author is concerned with eleven extension services, including: correspondence instruction, lectures, summer sessions, extension classes, publication services, resident centers, library services, films and visual aids, broadcasting, conferences and institutes, and special community services.

Presumably, by definition, and because fewer than 10 per cent of the National University Extension Association's members are privately supported higher institutions, no account is taken of the work of the evening session or evening college variety which many urban colleges and universities conduct. Nor is there an analysis of the work and problems of the very important and successful adult education program of co-operative agricultural extension under the auspices of the United States Department of Agriculture and the land grant colleges. No reference is made to experimentation currently in progress in a number of universities in such new and promising fields as educational television, workers' education, and international relations.

Although university extension has gained substantial status within the university administrative framework and offers its facilities annually to thousands of adults, Morton indicated that these services are still required to be virtually self-supporting. His data show that approximately 70 per cent of the cost of extension services come from the fees of extension users and that in the case of about one-third of the institutions this source of income accounts for more than 80 per cent of the extension budgets. The author points out how this undue dependence upon fee income and the negligible foundation support for special projects sharply restricts new and experimental activities.

A special canvass of extension service "users" indicated significantly that 90 per cent of the group expressed satisfaction

with the services rendered. The median age of users was approximately 35 years, almost three-fifths were men, and only 5 per cent had not completed high school. Approximately three-fourths held full-time jobs. The principal occupational groups enrolled were business and industrial workers and teachers. About 75 per cent indicated that their primary motivation was to earn credit toward college degrees.

This volume provides a comprehensive statement and summary of university extension services and is a valuable handbook for university administrators and others interested in this important segment of adult education. Professor Morton has made an important contribution to a neglected area of higher education through marshaling and presenting many facts in an interesting and significant context.

ERNEST V. HOLLIS

U. S. Office of Education
Washington, D. C.

DIMOND, STANLEY E. *Schools and the Development of Good Citizens*. Pp. xiii, 215. Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1953. No price.

This is the final report of the Citizenship Education Study carried on through the joint sponsorship of the Detroit Public Schools and Wayne University. Assistance in the financing of the study was given by The William Volker Charities Fund, Inc. The study itself was carried on over a period of five years from February 1945 to June 1950. A small staff and more than 300 teachers and administrators developed the program; its activities were directed by a special committee, jointly chaired by the Superintendent of Schools and the President of Wayne University. Eight schools were selected to participate in the study. These schools, six elementary and two secondary, represented distinctly different types of school population and communities, yet each was typical of public schools in any metropolitan community.

The staff did not attempt to develop its own program and to carry it out in the participating schools. Instead the entire program was developed over the years through the close and continual co-operation of the teachers and administrators of

the participating institutions. The activities were developed on the basis of three fundamental concepts: "1. The place to begin improving citizenship education programs is with a particular school and its problems. 2. In each school educational leadership must be given an opportunity to function. 3. The process employed for improving citizenship programs should be consistent with democratic values."

All who had responsibility for the development of the program conceived citizenship in the broad context of developing in children: allegiance to the ideals of democracy, the practice of human relationships consistent with a democratic society, and knowledge, skills, and ability to help in the solution of social problems and to facilitate the process of democratic living. The study included not only an appraisal of the usual citizenship material but also the utilization of the entire curriculum in developing these major concepts, the non-instructional activities of the school, and the relationship of the institution to the total community. Both standardized tests and other measures were used in an effort to determine the extent to which the program was influencing the behavior of the students. While it appeared evident that real values were developed during the five years, the test and community data indicated little change. There was very real gain in the development of co-operative relationships among all of the participants in the study, but as the author points out "Changes in the behavior of children over a span of a few years is quite slow. The educational increment from year to year is exceedingly small, but it is the constant addition of small increments that makes the difference in the education of the child."

The major conclusion of the study is that "the missing ingredient in citizenship education programs is a course of action capable of bringing about the satisfactory emotional adjustment of all children." Many helpful suggestions are included in this report of ways through which the school may be more effective in bringing about the emotional adjustment of children.

FRANCIS J. BROWN

American Council on Education
Washington, D. C.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

ROY, RALPH LORD. *Apostles of Discord*. Pp. xii, 437. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. \$3.75.

When the reader lays down this book he feels like exclaiming, "Incredible!" But the amazing account which the author gives of the lunatic and disreputable "fringes" of American Protestantism is too well documented and supported by other evidence to be discounted. Much of it is a description of the "Protestant underworld," by which the author means "those who espouse ideologies which are immoral, undemocratic, and subversive of the Christian faith."

Mr. Roy disarms hostile critics at the outset by explaining that he is a Republican and "generally a supporter of the 'middle way' of the present administration." Moreover, he permits himself but little commentary, letting his facts tell the story. His exposé is in two parts: "The Ministry of Hate" and "The Ministry of Disruption."

In the first part the "minister demagogue" Gerald L. K. Smith is quoted as calling General Eisenhower "the Jew-bought candidate" for the presidency and Adlai Stevenson a "Jewdealer." Evangelist Gerald Winrod, three times indicted for sedition, appears as a fanatical anti-Semitic fascist whom "dozens of Protestant ministers" support. Catholics, Jews, and Negroes are denounced by supposedly Christian leaders in violent and sadistic language.

In the second part of the book the bitter battle over "modernism" is described, and a sordid story is told of sectarian intrigue directed toward the sabotaging of the co-operative movement in Protestantism and the paralyzing of denominational agencies. The unholy alliance between theological fundamentalism and economic reaction is revealed in all its crudity. Greed and ambition are seen feeding on ignorance and fear.

The author looks at all this with admirable objectivity. He shows how the "red" menace is exploited to the detriment of honest liberalism, but he also reveals the irresponsible use, by a very small

but very aggressive group, of ecclesiastical influence to advance revolutionary ends.

"Protestantism's apostles of discord," says Mr. Roy, "appear to be gaining in numbers and in strength." On the other hand he makes it clear that much of the present commotion in Protestantism is created by small dissident groups that are desperately trying to sound big. Many a splinter is posing as a sizable limb on the Protestant tree. But no extenuating considerations can make *Apostles of Discord* anything but a disturbing and depressing book.

To be sure, harrassed church leaders may find a bit of comfort in reading of the brawls and tantrums that are currently the stuff of secular politics at all levels. But this is cold comfort to Christians who believe in the redemptive mission of the church, and desire it to become the "conscience of the community." It would appear that Protestantism has been growing much faster in size than in internal communication, fellowship, and spiritual discipline.

F. ERNEST JOHNSON

National Council of the
Churches of Christ
New York City

BRAUER, JERALD C. *Protestantism in America: A Narrative History*. Pp. 307. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953. \$3.50.

Narrative histories of American Protestantism that combine lucidity with comprehensiveness are few. As a popular account of the Protestant heritage in this country, Dr. Brauer's useful volume has much to commend it. It should fill a needed function and prove valuable both as a readable and compact survey for college classes as well as for the general reader who wants a preliminary briefing on the currents of thought and action that make up the Protestant story in America.

According to Dr. Brauer, who is a member of the church history staff of the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago, two dominant traits of American Protestantism have been "a constant free experimentation and search for a fuller manifestation of God's truth and

will, and . . . a sustained effort to avoid going beyond the truth and light already known in the Bible and codified in certain basic beliefs and confessions" (Foreword).

Within this framework of "free experimentation and an enduring Biblicism" the author has brought together in three hundred pages a very succinct account of Protestant development. A wealth of historical facts are skillfully woven in narrative style, starting with the Church of England in the Jamestown settlement, the Puritans of New England, the Revolutionary War, *The Age of Reason*, revivalism in the early 1800's, dissension and sectarianism, slavery and schisms, the Civil War, Dwight Moody and Billy Sunday, evolutionism and biblical criticism, the social gospel, World War I and its aftermath, the depression, World War II, and the postwar era.

The vitality of Protestant faith is revealed in its adaptation to new historical and cultural situations. Despite differences of belief and emphasis, which are treated with fairness and balance, there is an essential cohesion between the varying strands that bind them together in a single movement.

It would be unreasonable to expect, in a short popular work, a detailed account of the various aspects of such a history. *Protestantism in America* does not claim to be more than a readable story of the main outlines. As such it provides a compact survey of the struggles, divisions, witness, and basic strength of the American Protestant heritage. The volume should meet the needs of religious educational workers and undergraduate classes in religion, as well as providing collateral reading for courses in the history of American culture. In furnishing a popular narrative review of a significant topic, Dr. Brauer has made a useful contribution.

JOHN E. OWEN

Florida Southern College

WEBER, OTTO. *Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics*. Translated from the German by Arthur C. Cochrane. Pp. 253. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953. \$6.00.

Here is a book for the theologically initiated. Laymen will find this schematic

outline of Barth's eight-volume *Church Dogmatics* hardgoing due to its preservation of Barth's fine distinctions, his technical vocabulary, and his slanted biblicism. However, since Barth is doubtless the most widely discussed theologian of the day, an effort to read him becomes a duty for the informed. Only Volume One of his 6,000-page work has been translated hitherto. Hence this digest of Barth's essential position largely in his own words introduces an important body of literature.

Barth, it will be remembered, left the University of Bonn in the middle thirties rather than "Heil Hitler." Since that time he has been a professor at the University of Basel. Weber, professor at Göttingen, brought out this analysis of Barth's major work in German in January 1950. Now comes a translation by Cochrane, a long-time student of Barth and a professor at the University of Dubuque in Iowa. The ecumenical movement, whose language is mainly English, may subsequently deal with Barth more adequately. His thought has been much misconstrued, though several of his shorter single works have been translated for some time.

Cochrane's translation is quite adequate, for it pleases even Barth! Weber's editorial work is designed to introduce the curious to Barth himself and hence it seeks to be unobtrusive. As a whole, this objective has been realized, though the condensation of eight volumes into one leaves some large issues still cryptic. But it is the obscurity of Barth, not Weber, that leaves us searching now and then for the right pair of semantic glasses to see what has been meant.

For Barth theology, or "dogmatics" as he prefers to call it, is the exposition of the "Word" or the revelation given in scripture. Whether God exists is not open to debate (p. 73). Barth takes the existence of God as given in the existence of the Church. He is revealed in scripture which is the possession of the church. Dogmatics is a "function of the church" then by which it examines its language about God (p. 19). Dogmatics is a special pathway to knowledge, though its propositions are statements of faith (p. 20), and faith is something given to us by

the Word (p. 30). The criterion of dogmatics is "the Word" (p. 23).

It is a merit of Barth's work in theology to warn against the presumption that human reason can "by searching find out [all about] God." Yet his discussion of revelation, the basis of theology, indicates that revelation supplies a criterion for revelation, and frankly that does not help much! We may be cautious about using human reason as an "analogy of being" (p. 125), but its standards have to lay hold on the revelation somewhere, or man can never know how to relate himself to God or to accept his human responsibilities. To say that "dogma is an eschatological concept" forgets that this judgment itself invokes a whole apparatus of human thinking which keeps us aware of other things besides dogmatics.

Many doctrines receive illumination from Barth's treatment of them. This will be apparent especially in the relation of ethical questions to theology discussed in the last four chapters of the volume. Yet his serious entertainment of angelology as an "annex to Christology" (p. 195) reveals the complications of a too strictly biblical theology. His love of paradox (for example, "God's wrath appears in his love," p. 88) and his new uses of old terms leave one wondering if he is needlessly obscure.

Nevertheless, Barth's reaction to humanism, his stress on the love of God which "elects" to save us (p. 54), his emphasis on humility (pp. 81, 108), and his treatment of evil as the possibilities God has passed over and which he seeks to circumvent (pp. 187-189) are contributions to contemporary thought deserving careful appraisal. An honest struggle with the profoundest themes of Christian thought does not always result in unambiguous conclusions. But it may turn the problem over so that a new beam of light falls on it; that is perhaps the theologian's greatest service.

LOUIS WILLIAM NORRIS

MacMurray College

BIGONCIARI, DINO (Ed.). *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Pp. xxxviii, 217. New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1953. \$1.25 paper; \$2.50 cloth.

The social sciences have long needed a one-volume edition of St. Thomas' writings on man and society. For political science, at least, this book will fill the gap. The text is mostly from the *Summa Theologica*, Part II, with a few pages from *On Kingship*.

More excerpts would have made the book more useful for the other social sciences. Perhaps a later edition may include more of the early chapters of *Kingship*, some of the commentaries, and additional "questions" on law and ethics, especially those on heresy, war, equity, and precepts of justice (S.T., II-II). Even for political science the present selection is a bare minimum. The editor's excellent preface, however, rounds out a full picture of St. Thomas' political thought. But no effort is made to relate Aquinas either to the history of social theory or to the society that produced him.

St. Thomas (d. 1274) was the master theologian and philosopher of western Europe's later middle ages. The isolated rural community, the social basis of early medieval culture, was being transformed by the renewed rise of town life and commerce. The transition from Greco-Roman urban society to early medieval rural society had involved the triumph of otherworldly over worldly values. As Augustine epitomizes the world-outlook or ideology of that earlier era, so Thomas expresses the spirit of the later.

The eleventh-century rebirth of urbanizing trends meant on the ideological side a revival of secular values and a rediscovery of classical philosophy, especially Aristotle's. Thirteenth-century western Europe was something of a balance of rural and urban elements, and so was its philosophy. In reconciling the rival Augustinian and Aristotelian dogmas, Thomas combined two great traditions of thought: Christian supernaturalism and Greek rationalism. The framework of his cosmology is Christian; its political content, chiefly Aristotelian. Yet his work is an organic synthesis, a whole greater than its parts.

That the West in this era of revolution and reaction should show renewed interest in Thomist orthodoxy is not surprising.

At least four one-volume excerpts have been published in English since 1948. The Modern Library and Everyman editions are mainly theological in content. The Blackwell selection has the best coverage of Aquinas' political thought, but it prints only the conclusions of the "Questions." This Hafner version, fortunately, includes the arguments as well as the conclusions. Its text is the official Dominican translation revised and clarified by the editor.

No single book can convey adequately the structure of St. Thomas' immense work—the *Summa Theologica* alone runs to a score of volumes. The present edition, despite its brevity, is the best short introduction to the political theory of Thomas Aquinas now available in English.

ARTHUR K. DAVIS

University of Pennsylvania

DEWICK, E. C. *The Christian Attitude to Other Religions*. Pp. x, 220. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. \$5.00.

In this courageous book, the author, who is an educational missionary of long experience, never flinches from facing all the challenges of the modern world. He writes with considerable restraint, avoiding what an eighteenth-century bishop once described as "the exhorbitance [sic] of enthusiasm and bigotry."

He opens with a statement of the counterattacks which confront the Christian movement today from: (1) modern political movements with ideologies of their own, (2) the older oriental religions, and (3) new religious movements such as Spiritualism and Theosophy. He refers to the invitation of the Oriental non-Christian faiths to co-operate with them against secularism, and to the allegations of scientists that the attainment of truth can only be relative and never absolute, and to the allegations of students of religions that many features in the teaching and practice of Christianity which were formerly assumed to be unique have, in fact, close parallels elsewhere.

In his second lecture Dr. Dewick surveys the various answers which have been made to these various challenges, and he shows that different Christian groups give different answers—for example, that Funda-

mentalist groups in America have not a good word to say for communism, whereas others, while repudiating the Marxist atheistical presuppositions, see in communism elements which are a true judgment upon the existing social and economic order. In the face of the ancient non-Christian faiths, the answers are classified into those of (1) war and conquest, (2) aloofness and discontinuity, (3) comprehension and fulfillment, and (4) co-operation.

In the third lecture, Dr. Dewick seeks to elucidate the actual message of Jesus Christ in relation to other religions. He shows that the traditional Jewish attitude was one of aloofness and discontinuity, and even of hostility. Yet in the Gospels, if we be reasonable, we must accept the fact that insofar as Jesus had contact with the adherents of other religions he was restrained in his criticism. He spoke favorably of individual Samaritans and could say of an individual Roman officer, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." Although Dr. Dewick rightly detects in Jesus a note of authority which would not have endorsed the superficial slogan: "all religions are equally good," he notes the universalistic passages in the Synoptists (Mark XIV: 9, Matthew XXIV: 14, and Luke XIII: 29); yet he considers further that the saying "There is none other name . . . whereby we must be saved" needs to be interpreted (as perhaps Robert Barclay the Quaker interpreted it) to mean by "the name" "the experience of the Eternal World of God," and he quotes Archbishop William Temple as endorsing this interpretation.

The fourth lecture, on the tradition of the Church, shows the latter as successively (1) on the defensive against other religions, (2) in power over them, and (3) oscillating in the post-Reformation world between liberalism and exclusiveness.

The fifth lecture calls for a recovery of first principles by a consideration of the positive teaching of Christ, and insists that the revelation of God in him is complete and exhaustive in the sense of being *distinctive* rather than *exclusive*.

The sixth lecture calls for a reform of missionary policy and practice in the light of first principles. In the concluding pages

we find a personal definition by the author of what he conceives to be the aim and purpose of Christian propaganda, that is, the advancement and fuller realization of the Reign of God, either here or in some sphere beyond our knowledge, with God conceived in Christian terms.

Dr. Dewick would no doubt have written willingly with more fervor and converting zeal, but his aim was clearly to review and to persuade, and here we think he has been successful. Yet his argument is so closely knit and so dispassionately put forward that the reader must follow it closely if he is not to misperceive the significance of what he reads.

A. C. BOUQUET

Trinity College
Cambridge University

SPANN, J. RICHARD (Ed.). *The Church and Social Responsibility*. Pp. 272. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1953. \$2.75.

Like any anthology, this assembly of fifteen articles on the social attitudes and obligations of the Christian churches displays inequalities and discontinuities. It is, however, far above the average symposium, and at times its high quality and vital relevance to present situations make one wish that at least all ministers would read it. The contributors have been wisely chosen. No one is better fitted to write on "The Church and the State," for example, than Anson Phelps Stokes; or on "War and the Christian Ethic" than Roland H. Bainton; or on "The Church and World Political Order" than Walter W. Van Kirk. To an extraordinary degree the writers have succeeded in being outspoken and forthright in dealing with controversial problems, pulling no punches and dodging no issues, while at the same time maintaining a convincing fairness and objectivity in their judgments.

It may be invidious to select any one article for special mention but, to this reviewer, Eddy Asirvatham's treatment of "World Economic Problems" is an especially brilliant and timely statement. Americans desperately need to hear what he has to say if they are to understand our nation's present problems in dealing with

international affairs. On another reader, Donald M. Maynard on "The Family in Relation to Church and Community," or Walter W. Sikes on "Race Relations and Civil Rights," or L. Harold De Wolf on "The Church in the Prevention and Treatment of Crime" might have a similar impact.

Undergirding the whole symposium is the basic conviction that, while Christianity is centrally and intimately concerned with persons, one by one, it cannot be so concerned with any sincerity if it does not tackle constructively the social, economic, and political problems which so profoundly mold the lives, affect the characters, and shape the destiny of persons. It is an intelligent plea for the social gospel and a useful guide to churchmen who desire to understand it and to do something practical about it.

HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK
New York City

TAYLOR, G. AIKEN. *A Sober Faith: Religion and Alcoholics Anonymous*. Pp. ix, 108. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$2.00.

A man must be born again to be a Christian, it is said. A man must be just that desperate before he is ready to join the transforming fellowship of Alcoholics Anonymous, in the view of this author, a Christian minister, who tries to draw a parallel between A.A. and religion. His parallel, though, it seems is really not with respect to religion, but the organized Christian religion—specifically, the Church. The Church does not do so well in this parallel.

One parallel, at least, the author does not draw. He might have mentioned the estimate of the Alcoholic Foundation regarding users of alcoholic beverages, on the one hand, and the estimate of Christian church members, on the other. He would find 50 million who are no strangers to the taste of alcohol, among whom are to be found between 3 million and 4 million problem drinkers, one million of whom are confirmed alcoholics, yielding approximately 100,000 active A.A. members in the United States and 29 foreign countries.

It is estimated that there are millions of people who are no strangers to the Chris-

tian Church, with respect to regular or occasional attendance, millions of church members, considerably less who take church membership more or less seriously, and here the parallel probably breaks down. Christians, defined in terms of those who have really been born again—would they be less than A.A.'s 100,000? I suspect so.

Here is an interesting and sympathetic view of A.A. and a desperate attempt to see "What has A.A. got that I haven't got? . . . Is there anything this Fellowship can say that's worth listening to, not only about alcoholism, but about religion?" (He did not say the Church.)

The author makes an analysis of the Twelve Steps of A.A. and the successive steps in a profound religious experience, and he finds a striking four-cycle parallel: impotence, dependence, fellowship, and service.

He might have pointed out, too, that in the same way an alcoholic is no true member of the A.A. fellowship (that is, that his safety is not assured) until he makes it his business to help lead others to it; likewise, no man is a true Christian until he makes it his business to lead others to Christ.

He might have pointed to the lack of another parallel between A.A. and the organized Protestant churches with respect to step eleven, which says in part, "praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out." It seems to some people that pulpit prayers seem to go quite beyond this and consist of considerable attempt to tell God what to do.

In the end the author sounds a note of uncertainty with respect to his parallel in the very title of his last chapter, "An Unresolved Conflict." There is no merger of ideas, he maintains—just parallel highways, headed in the same direction. After saying that A.A. does not pretend to replace the Church, it appears at times his parallels are drawn with this in mind. He is not satisfied with A.A.'s treatment of sin. At this point he faces the question troubling him the most: How can you account for A.A.'s success in view of its seeming impatience with some of the things that Christians declare are a necessary part of the God-man relationship? His partial

answer is not very convincing to this reviewer.

In the end he concedes that the A.A. in principle is essentially correct, and that it is an "almost perfect analogy of true religion, which is unique in its claims."

But elsewhere he expresses some grave doubts with what appear to him as trends toward institutionalization and more formalization of A.A. Could our author be pointing at what may be a weakening aspect of the formalized and institutionalized religion of the Christian Church?

This is recommended reading for all church folk and all drinkers. True Christians and A.A. members only can afford to skip it. This will not be too serious to either publisher or author.

W. I. NEWSTETTER

University of Pittsburgh

MANSON, T. W. *The Servant-Messiah: A Study of the Public Ministry of Jesus*. Pp. vi, 104. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. \$2.00.

The present volume contains in substance the Shaffer Lectures for 1939 delivered at Yale University Divinity School. These have been revised and expanded for a course at Cambridge, offered in 1951, and it is this revised version of the original Yale lectures that is here presented to the public.

The first chapter, "The Messianic Hope," deals in rather masterly fashion with the religious background in Israel just before the time of Christ's ministry. The position is adopted that the Palestinian Jews of that time were ready to acclaim anyone who might appear as a champion of Israel's cause and "to take up arms in a holy war for the kingdom of God" (p. 35). Of particular interest is the author's discussion of the Sadducees, whom he regards as a political body that passed from the scene when the Jewish state as a political entity ceased to exist. The name Sadducee, it is maintained, resulted from the transliteration of the Greek word *sundikos* into Aramaic or Hebrew.

The author proceeds next to sketch briefly the work of John the Baptist, whom he regards as having received a prophetic

call. Indeed, John was a "true prophet of the Amos school" (p. 47), a proclaimer of stern judgment, who was the last to try to carry out a religious and moral reformation, and who failed, albeit the failure was a magnificent one.

Three brief chapters treat of the Messianic Ministry, its principles and practice, and the Passion, and a last chapter deals with the Risen Christ. To understand Dr. Manson's treatment of these matters we must recognize that he regards the *kerygma* in which the Christian case is presented as asserting: "(a) that Jesus was descended from David; (b) that he fulfilled his Ministry among the Jews; (c) that he was crucified; (d) that he was raised from the dead and exalted to God's right hand; (e) that he will come again" (p. 53). This material is further enclosed in a framework, but the author thinks that there is a solid "body of historical material which makes an intelligible and credible story" (p. 54).

The present reviewer is unable to accept this fundamental position, for it appears to be insufficiently objective. Furthermore, it limits the picture of our Lord, so that an adequate understanding of His ministry cannot thereby be obtained. To obtain such an understanding, this reviewer believes, one must approach the Gospels from the standpoint of historic orthodox Christianity.

EDWARD J. YOUNG

Westminster Theological Seminary

WILD, JOHN. *Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law*. Pp. xi, 259. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. \$5.50.

Nothing I have read in the field of ethics and political theory meets the need of our time so profoundly as this treatment of the problem of right and wrong in personal conduct and in the social order. The study of Plato is incidental to the purpose of the book. The purpose is to demonstrate that right action and right social order are determined by the nature of man; that this nature is a tendency or process of change which conforms to a certain structure when it is not impaired; that this tendency

can deviate from this structure or fall short of completing it, in which case the deviation or deficiency is evil; that human choice and human action can enable this tendency to conform to the structure or hinder it from so doing; that right action and right social order enable the tendency to fulfill itself according to the structure which is distinctive of human nature, while wrong action and social order do the opposite.

Not only the human being but every living thing and, in a more indefinite way, even nonliving things, says Wild, are what they are by reason of a process of change having a structure which is common to all members of the species.

Thus good and evil are determined by the nature of things when nature is understood to be structures more or less completely fulfilled by the process of change which occurs in each existing thing. Moral obligation is the demand of this inherent constitutive tendency in man to fulfill itself according to the structure which distinguishes the human being from what is not human. To be sure, human beings are still human when this tendency deviates from the required form; but when this occurs internal self-destructive processes get under way. In the living organism we call this disease. When it occurs in the human mind the psychotherapists have various theories about it, but they all recognize it as a kind of impairment.

Present day thought makes many objections to this interpretation of right and wrong and to this interpretation of nature. The author recognizes these objections and meets them. He shows that Plato and Aristotle initiated this approach to the problem of ethics and social order; and since their time many have defended it. The ethical theories now dominant in philosophy oppose it; but these current theories are unable to provide a demonstrable basis for a universal ethic. Wild's interpretation of natural law can provide such a basis.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

Houston, Texas

STRAUSS, LEO. *Natural Right and History*. Pp. ix, 327. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. \$5.00.

The present volume is an expanded discussion of lectures delivered at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. Attempting to remedy the neglect of political philosophy in responsible government, the author seeks to re-establish a natural law doctrine as a basis for the limitation upon state authority. The abandonment of the natural right theory has led to an unqualified relativism, with disastrous consequences which can be remedied only if the historical trend is reversed.

Beginning with Plato and Aristotle, the classical natural right concept emerged in medieval thought as the basis for the Thomistic notion—only to be challenged by the social theorists at the beginning of modern times. The political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke, while inferior to classical theory, were more effective, for the moment. Subsequent developments by Rousseau and Burke could not patch up the weaknesses of modern political theory. The fundamental dilemma of contemporary social science results from the dualism of nonteleological natural science and teleological social behavior, and the deplorable consequences of this dichotomy appear in the perversions of positivism, the meanderings of the historicists who seek for the essence of man's humanity in the historical process, and the irresponsibilities of those amoral social scientists who take refuge in the fact-value dualism.

Today our task is to discover some absolute natural standards, if we are to provide a basis for just laws and resolve the conflicting claims of social groups. The present volume is devoted largely to the history of the problem, and there are hints that a subsequent study will reveal a solid basis for a rehabilitated natural right theory.

OLIVER L. REISER

University of Pittsburgh

GOMPERZ, HEINRICH. *Philosophical Studies*. Edited by Daniel S. Robinson, with a Foreword by Philip Merlan. Pp. 287. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1953. \$7.50.

This posthumous volume of original essays covers the period from 1935 to 1943

during which the author was visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California. Previously he had served as professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna from 1924 to 1934 and was in intimate contact with members of the "Vienna Circle," such as Carnap and Schlick, whose views he shared in essentials.

The papers reprinted here deal with the history of early Greek philosophy, ethical theory, and epistemology. Those dealing with the history of Greek philosophy are models of clarity and precise scholarship which compare favorably with those of his illustrious father, Theodor Gomperz, whose *Greek Thinkers* he edited. The paper on "Problems and Methods of Early Greek Science" serves to illustrate the author's ability to summarize briefly and clearly the results of his profound research in the earliest phases of Greek scientific thought.

The essay on "The Concept of History," written in 1937, is to my mind one of the best in the volume. As against the facile distinction of Rickert between the "understanding" of history and the "explanation" of science, Gomperz indicates the need for employing both methods. "It seems hardly possible to draw a precise line of demarcation allowing us to practise 'understanding' while renouncing 'explanation'" (p. 218). Gomperz avowedly inclines to the positivistic view of Leopold von Ranke that history should describe "how things really happened" and demonstrates how the contrary thesis which denies the possibility of historical truth leads from history to myth. Gomperz frankly confesses that he hardly knows how to refute the opposite view by argument (p. 221). In the last analysis his position is that "This seems to be one of those disagreements that cannot be settled by argument. Indeed, values are objects of faith and resolve, not of proof and demonstration. We cannot, perhaps, *prove* truth to be an ultimate value. The only thing we can do is to *believe* in it and to *strive* for it" (p. 222).

As indicated also in his "Autobiographical Remarks," Gomperz was inclined to the view that "in ethics, all that philosophy can do is to clarify alternatives: decisions

are, ultimately, made by the will, not by reason" (p. 22). In discussing the question whether "the end justifies the means," he concludes that "it depends on sentiment" and that sentiment ultimately depends on "the spirit of the age" (p. 145). The problem of how far collective responsibility may be carried as over against individual responsibility is one, he maintains, which cannot be answered by appeal to principle but only pragmatically by ascertaining how far collective responsibility may be carried "without revolting our feelings." In sum, Gomperz tended to adopt a pragmatic attitude in questions of ethics since he had no absolute theoretical convictions as to the objective validity of values. "In practice," he concludes, "compromise works better than an ideal" (p. 25). At the same time, he preferred freedom to security and felt that one ought not to be neutral in the struggle between good and evil, although he himself failed to provide any theoretical justification for his stand. As Dr. Merlan has indicated in the Foreword, there are for Gomperz no final cognitive certainties on which to base rational action—a position which reflects "the tragedy of the scientific spirit" which he felt so deeply but which he and the intellectuals of his generation were powerless to avert.

DAVID BIDNEY

Indiana University

HEALD, MARK M. *A Free Society: An Evaluation of Contemporary Democracy*. Pp. xii, 546. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. \$4.75.

This is a broadly conceived, well-reasoned, systematically organized, clearly expressed, largely philosophical treatise upon the doctrines of liberal democracy viewed both as a process of government and as a form of social relationships. It is not presented as a study of democracy from the technical viewpoint of professional political scientists but offers a redefinition of the basic concepts of political, economic, and social democracy. Ethical and spiritual concerns and bases are strongly emphasized.

Mr. Heald is deeply concerned with the

preservation of individualism in a free society as he faces up to the necessity of government and state authority to achieve the fundamental purposes of civil society—namely, protection, peace, prosperity, and progress. He recognizes the problems encountered in making democracy work and appreciates its weaknesses, but, after comparing it with fascism, bolshevism, and moderate socialism, he strongly affirms the survival power of democracy in the confused, chaotic world of today. Significant in this survival power is its respect for moral and spiritual values of life and its faith in man and his cultural destiny.

He examines at length the dilemma in choosing between coercion and individualism, sees a strong trend toward authoritarianism everywhere today, but believes that too much emphasis is placed upon the coercive and restrictive nature of government. It is his conviction that the fundamental freedoms of human beings can be preserved by earnest efforts at sincere democratic procedure in the organization of civil society (as not found in totalitarian "isms"), so that in terms of civil liberty individualism becomes fused with general social welfare. Thus, democracy comes to be viewed as a program for social as well as for individualistic values.

The chapters on "Democracy, Ethics, and Christianity," "Democracy and Authoritarian Society," and "The Preservation of a Free Society" are specially to be commended.

"Democratic doctrine embodies," says the author (p. 482), "at one and the same time, an ethical ideal and a set of practicable procedures. It is a way of life, a goal of personal achievement and self-realization, and a formula for adjustment and cooperation. It is the only tolerable system of civil society for individuals with differing aims and values. . . . In a free society, men may have anything they choose, either bad or good. Without freedom, men will have no choice, and only the bad will prevail, because then only might determines right."

Mr. Heald is a member of the Department of History at Rutgers University.

HAROLD R. BRUCE

Dartmouth College

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

MURPHY, GARDNER. *In the Minds of Men*. Pp. xiv, 306. New York: Basic Books, 1953. \$4.50.

In this book Dr. Garner Murphy, at the request of the Ministry of Education, Government of India, gives a nontechnical report of his impressions regarding social tensions in India. It is encouraging to the social scientist in India to find that his government feels the need for organizing research to explore the reasons for social tensions, as well as the need for scientific approach in the promotion of better understanding among different peoples. For the first time, on the Indian scene, a leading social psychologist is applying the method of science to the analysis of group prejudice and hostility, thus opening up for Indian psychologists a hitherto unheeded area of attitude survey and measurement.

For an Indian it is gratifying to note that, in this book, Dr. Murphy speaks not only of tensions but also of the many constructive forces such as the essential Indian tolerance, the basic education, and the universities, which are working for national unity. Very sympathetically and delicately, he has isolated and identified the subtle causal factors that make for cohesion and conflict in our intergroup relationships. With a sensitive and scientific imagination he has probed in the minds of a foreign people and revealed their strengths and weaknesses.

His observations on the upbringing of Indian children, their emotional patterns, their attitudes, and their habits, in their causal relation to their mature social outlook and behavior, are a first-class contribution to scientific group-psychology.

Many well-meaning Hindus will heartily agree with his view that the whole conception of "exclusion" in Indian society is a functional one based upon the hierarchical position of groups; that is, one is "excluded" from the privilege of higher groups, not because of hatred or what would be called "prejudice" from the Western point of view." They will regard all talk about caste frictions and social tensions as dis-

turbing ideas from the outside. However, caste prejudices exist, and we have to remove them by bringing about change in our attitudes and practices backed up by the pressure of progressive education and policies. The chapters on "The Insecurity of the Muslims" and "The Frustration of the Refugees" show great understanding and insight into the anxieties and suspicions of the Muslims and the disappointments and anger of the refugees. At the same time we find genuine appreciation of the very real difficulties of the indigenous population. Drawing upon his vast experience, in India and outside, Dr. Murphy has given us very significant and weighty generalizations regarding human relations in times of stress and some valuable suggestions to improve them. However, I would have liked to know a little more about the stability of the reported results and, in general, about the conditions of reliability and validity of interview-questionnaire data. To suggest a slight correction, my own experiment was conducted on school adolescents and not on college students as stated on page 114.

Those of the persuasion of economic determination of all social difficulties would consider that most of the problems of social tensions discussed in this book are peripheral rather than central—the only basic tensions being those between the exploiting capital and militant labor or between the ruthless landlords and the armed peasantry. Murphy's diagnosis on page 117, that "economic frustrations are of major importance and that economic rehabilitation is now the primary problem," may give this group some comfort and feeling that he has hit the nail on head. It is, however, exceedingly naïve to suggest that the topic of caste feelings, the Hindu-Muslim tension, and the refugee rehabilitation, discussed in this book, are not important problems and it is false simplification to regard them all as merely economic. The more fruitful approach is to recognize that the social scene is continually changing its tension-patterns and therefore there is really no resting on oars but a need for constant and co-operative scientific research. I hope it will be possible for at

least a few social scientists to follow up Murphy's wise and inspiring lead.

V. K. KOTHURKAR

University of Poona
Poona, India

TREVOR-ROPER, H. R. *The Gentry, 1540-1640. Supplement I to The Economic History Review*. Pp. 55. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. \$1.00.

Whether interpretations which stand the test of time advance the cause of scholarship more than hypotheses that provoke critics to further effort is a debatable question. It need not trouble Professor Tawney. He has both to his credit. In this essay Mr. Trevor-Roper seeks to modify what he disarmingly calls the "faulty formulation" of Professor Tawney's now famous theses on the rise of the gentry and the contemporaneous decline of the aristocracy in 1540-1640. He likewise presents certain theses of his own.

The first charge is that Professor Tawney's distinction between nobility and gentry made on the basis of their economic difficulties is "artificial." Mr. Trevor-Roper himself finds a decline among part of the aristocracy under Elizabeth though he observes an even more important rise under James I. He partially agrees also with Professor Tawney in noting a rise *within the gentry* at the same time, though to him both phenomena have taken place, not as Professor Tawney suggests, by careful estate management or the lack of it; but by the acquisition (or lack of it) of lucrative offices stretching from the highest offices of the Crown downwards. I believe that Mr. Trevor-Roper has made a significant contribution in pointing out this important source of the wealth of many Elizabethan and Stuart families. That he regards it as *supplanting* rather than *supplementing* Professor Tawney's reasoning on the nature of the "rise" when such occurs is less convincing. Are they mutually exclusive explanations? Or are they manifestations, one economic and the other political, of the same thing—the exercise of initiative and use of "business methods" by both gentry and aristocracy to keep or augment their fortunes in uncertain

times? Only more thorough analyses made of the whole of England will answer that question.

But it is in his handling of the minor gentry that Mr. Trevor-Roper lays himself most open to question. He does well to point out these "mere gentry," some, perhaps many, of whom were suffering reverses. But did they all feel "themselves to be a depressed and declining class" who "consoled—or armed—themselves with religious dissent" (p. 52); whose disgruntlement and difficulties "gave substance" to abortive risings, and finally "led directly to the Great Rebellion" (p. 32)? In supporting these and other points of view, interesting if as yet unproved, Mr. Trevor-Roper does indeed, in good American vernacular, *stick his neck out*. But, as I suggested in the beginning, scholarship can be advanced in different ways.

MILDRED CAMPBELL

Vassar College

BROWNING, ANDREW (Ed.). *English Historical Documents, 1660-1714*. Vol. VIII of "English Historical Documents," David C. Douglas, general editor. Pp. xxxii, 966. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$17.50.

This is the second published volume of an impressive and important enterprise, which, when complete, will present in 13 volumes an easily accessible and comprehensive body of documentary evidence for English history from circa 500 to 1914. Early in 1953 appeared the volume on the period, 1042-1189.

The declared aim of the editors is to facilitate "that direct study of the evidence which alone can give validity to historical judgment," and they believe that "the essential prerequisite for the healthy development of English historical studies is wider acquaintance with the original authorities." It is, however, highly doubtful that that vague constituency, "the reading public," will, in any considerable numbers, seize the opportunity here offered. Too often the average person is interested in the study of the past merely to justify his own present. And even those more objectively minded, but uninitiated in the mysteries

and limitations of historical method and interpretation, will find little meaning in stark texts presented without comment.

But for those who are willing to make the effort necessary to bring documents to life, and especially for those whose business it is to teach and study history, this project is of great significance. Fairly close study of a period on the basis of the more important sources will now be possible without recourse to a large library. For this purpose, the soundness of this particular volume is attested by the commanding reputation of its editor, Professor Browning, an outstanding authority on the later Stuart period. His is no conventional source book. It is true that for strictly legal and constitutional material the recently published collection by W. C. Costin and J. Steven Watson is more complete. But for history broadly conceived we have here assembled in some 400 items by far the most comprehensive collection of contemporary documents on the period. There are of course the standard items illustrative of constitutional conflict; but there are also extensive sections on Public Finance, the Church, Social Life, Trade, the Armed Forces, Scotland and Ireland, and important personalities.

The selection is often perforce arbitrary, but there is likely to be little serious quarrel with the choice made by Professor Browning. Much out of the way material appears; a few selections come directly from manuscripts, enough to make one wish for more. There are brief but useful introductions to the various sections. Students will especially appreciate the fresh and stimulating treatment of the period as a whole, in the general introduction. The selective but critical bibliographies will be consulted with profit; however, relatively little material published since 1940 is included.

ALFRED F. HAVIGHURST

Amherst College

BENNETT, GEORGE (Ed.). *The Concept of Empire: Burke to Attlee 1774-1947*. Pp. xix, 434. London: Adam and Charles Black (distributed in New York by British Book Centre), 1953. \$4.00.

This is Volume Six in the "British Political Tradition" series edited by Alan Bullock and F. W. Deakin. The series presents selections from "contemporary documents of the most varied character" and should, according to the *London Economist*, not only "prove a godsend to the undergraduate but a source of great pleasure to the historically or politically minded layman." The documents in this volume are hardly of a "most varied" character, since nearly all are either excerpts from speeches of politicians or from nineteenth-century works dealing with imperial or colonial issues.

The selections are, however, numerous—128 in all, few occupying more than three pages. At least half of them deal with the broader aspects of imperial policy, as expounded by such politicians as Burke, Brougham, Huskisson, Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, and Churchill, and by such writers as Adam Smith, Cobbett, Macaulay, Bentham, Wakefield, Buller, Carlyle, Goldwin Smith, Froude, Dilke, Seeley, and Hobson. Among the remainder, selections illustrating the constitutional development of the Dominions are well represented, but neither India nor tropical Africa receives comparable attention. There are no explanatory footnotes, and each speaker or writer is introduced by no more than a half dozen sentences of biographical data.

Teachers of British imperial history will find this collection very useful indeed, but its value to the uninitiated American student or layman is greatly lessened by the absence of adequate explanatory material. This reviewer found the 28-page introductory essay a masterpiece of compression. Nevertheless, the author, perhaps unconsciously, takes for granted a background of far more than the rudiments of this vast subject. Even British students and readers are likely to be mystified by such phrases as "Westminster Model" (p. 16) and "High Commission Territories" (p. 24), to say nothing of "Mervousness" (p. 26). Admirable as it is in providing an excellent choice of contemporary materials, this book would have benefited greatly by fewer and longer excerpts accompanied by more editorial comment. Also, how could the Empire get from

Burke to Attlee without Kipling and Rhodes?
HOLDEN FURBER
University of Pennsylvania

GASH, NORMAN. *Politics in the Age of Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation, 1830-1850*. Pp. xxi, 496. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953. \$8.75.

The House of Commons reform of 1832 did not make as great a break in British parliamentary development as historians sometimes unconsciously assume. Norman Gash, in his fascinating analysis of electoral realities, demonstrates in detail the continuation of many practices and conditions which had characterized the older political system. This result followed naturally on the principles of the reformers, who were only interested in allying new interests with the old governing class and this only so far as necessary. They therefore consciously arranged a system which had a complex variety of franchises and constituencies and even preserved in a limited degree the family, proprietary, and "government" boroughs. In Ireland after 1832 one man in twenty had the vote, in England and Wales one in five (p. 89). In the election of 1832 one English borough (Reigate) polled 101 votes, choosing one member; another (Liverpool) polled 8,600 votes, choosing two members.

Our author introduces us to the actual working out of the system over a period of two decades. To those who do not realize how the office seeker and his friends operate in our day it may be a little shocking to read of voters lining up to receive payment for their votes, of Sudbury and St. Albans being deprived of representation because of their flagrant corruption, of the 185 official inquiries occasioned by the first six general elections which took place under the reformed system, of the systematic rioting during the South Staffordshire election of 1835 (pp. 149-151), and of the deals by which the contenders sometimes divided two-member constituencies between them. Perhaps the book places too much emphasis on these aspects, but there can be no doubt that the picture as presented here gives one a feeling of seeing normal human beings coping with understandable

problems much better than does the amusing but grotesque Eatanswill election of Dickens' *Pickwick Papers*.

The specially detailed account of the elections and electoral maneuvers in Berkshire (chapter XI) vividly illustrates the way candidates were selected and the factors which determined their success or failure. The chapter on "club government," which traces the origins and workings of the Carlton Club and the Reform Club, throws welcome light on the elaboration of party machinery necessitated by an expansion of the electorate. The author has carried out a minute investigation, making use of extensive manuscript and other documentary material, yet he has skillfully kept the subject in focus.

CHESTER KIRBY

Brown University

HUTTON, GRAHAM. *We Too Can Prosper: The Promise of Productivity*. Pp. 248. London: George Allen and Unwin (distributed in the U. S. by The Macmillan Company, New York), 1953. \$2.75.

One of the most important international experiments since World War II has been the investigation made by 66 Anglo-American Productivity Teams of our manufacturing and managerial processes. Although wide publicity has been given to the studies published by these Teams in scholarly and popular journals, prior to Graham Hutton's survey no single volume presented an overall view of the project, or emphasized special divergencies between British and American conditions which are vital when the transfer of industrial and managerial technique across the Atlantic is contemplated.

There is no peculiar American secret about high wages, high manufacturing outputs, and high standards of living, as Mr. Hutton points out. However, admittedly, there are many things which, in combination, make the American industrial machine "tick" and its British counterpart "backfire." Basically, the comparative productivity of the average British worker and the average American worker lies in the will to work which the people in the tight little island have lost, at least temporarily.

The rise of the "couldn't care less" attitude toward employment and the decline of the abiding philosophy of a day's work, honestly performed for a fair wage, for the good of the worker, his family, and, in the larger sense, his country, are closely correlated with two wars, rationing, and taxation. It is an insidious, demoralizing element which must be rooted out of every aspect of British industry. Then American shop procedures, managerial methods, company publicity, and cost accounting can aid in the elevation of personal and plant peacetime goals.

If this modern psychological phenomenon, which cultivates leisure rather than effort, afflicts the United States, the productive impetus, easily won and carelessly guarded by the American people and admired by Graham Hutton and other discerning economists, will fall into other hands, the great American industrial pattern passing from reality into history. In this present volume our industrial genius is described in detail as is the contribution this genius could make now and tomorrow if it were somehow miraculously harnessed and transferred from Pittsburgh and points North, South, East, and West to Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, and the Clyde.

Coupled with the man in the street's desire to labor must be greatly enlarged facilities in Great Britain for the study of every aspect of business management. In the United States, business is a profession, an honorable career to be prepared for at a University and pursued happily throughout one's life. In contrast, in England, as Mr. Hutton indicates, this field is considered somewhat beneath the talents of the Oxford or Cambridge man. With the decline in the number and importance of Civil Service posts abroad and the drastic readjustment of the economy at home, it is imperative that graduates of British Universities come to regard business management as a profession of intellectual standing and social prestige comparable with law and medicine, and one which makes as great a contribution to the Crown as a civil appointment in the Commonwealth and Colonies.

MARY E. MURPHY

Los Angeles State College of
Applied Arts and Sciences

EGGLESTON, FREDERIC W. *Reflections of an Australian Liberal*. Pp. iii, 301. Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1953. 27s. 6d.

In this book Sir Frederic Eggleston reflects on a lifetime in Australian public affairs. Though somewhat unevenly written and organized, we can be grateful for a trenchant critique of Australian politics. With great insight, Sir Frederic probes into the philosophy and record of parties and politicians.

Though he has some pungent things to say about the liberal party, his sharpest words are reserved for the Country and Labor parties. The Labor party has set the pace in Australia but, in the view of the author, it fails in the crucial test of service to the whole community. Many of the major problems in Australia, as in other advanced countries, are bound up with the operation of large-scale industry. Upon the efficient and capable operation of industry, therefore, the prosperity of the community depends. Yet, the author points out that the Labor party is apparently unconcerned with maintaining and developing the productive structure of the Commonwealth. It preaches class war depicting the capitalists upon whom industry depends as morally depraved and sinful in their desire to make their enterprises profitable. "I do not hold any brief for the capitalist—but, if nine-tenths of our industry and enterprise are to be conducted under capitalist conditions, it is no use sabotaging the industry by which so many of the needs of the community are provided . . ." (page 54).

His criticism of the Country party is equally severe. Though he recognizes that the primary producers have worked harder and endured more than any section of the community, he finds the party which represents them to have played a selfish and unenlightened part in political life.

The future of Australia, Sir Frederic asserts, depends on the development of an overwhelming social idea which will attract the loyalty of the majority of her people. In Australian politics the parties which represent vested interests have had the initiative. On the other hand, with all its shortcomings the Liberal party and its

predecessors have reflected views which are a truer expression of the Australian pattern as a whole. And for this reason they have held office and have exercised leadership to a greater degree than any other party.

Much of this book will be unpalatable to many Australians. Yet, it is to be hoped that it will be widely read and discussed, for Sir Frederic has gone to the roots of Australian problems. And, until these basic weaknesses are recognized, the progress of Australia will continue to fall far short of the hopes of her people. No one who wants to understand Australia today can afford not to read this book.

EDWARD LITTLEJOHN

Detroit, Michigan

Small Towns of Natal: A Socio-economic Sample Survey. Natal Regional Survey Additional Report No. 3. Pp. xi, 113. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1953. 17s. 6d.

Dunn Reserve, Zululand, The. Natal Regional Survey Additional Report No. 4. Pp. xiii, 69. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1953. 15s.

Africa has a plethora of continent-wide surveys, a paucity of detailed studies. The need for the latter is being ably tackled both in quality and quantity for its own region by the University of Natal. Under the direction of Professor H. R. Burrows, an economist who should be noted for his skill in building up social-science-wide research teams, four volumes and six reports have already appeared in print with more to follow.

Report No. 3, *Small Towns of Natal*, looks at the general population characteristics, types of families, their income, and their housing situations of seven towns representative of Natal. Of the 45,000 individuals surveyed, about 47 per cent were African, 31 per cent European, 17 per cent Asian, and only 4 per cent Coloured. Among the Europeans, the home language was English in 50 per cent of the cases, Afrikaans in 42 per cent, and both in 8 per cent. In Newcastle and Ladysmith Afrikaans predominated by 58 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively, the former figure being closer to the national average.

The Asians spoke an Indian language and sometimes a European one in addition, but not two Indian languages, which, it is suggested, may be a bar to intermarriage among Asians unless the wife accepts her husband's tongue. Hindustani, Tamil, Gujarati, and Urdu were most common in that order although significant variations between towns were found. Nearly all the Africans spoke Zulu at home.

The masculinity ratios of the seven rural towns per hundred females were 95 among Europeans, 108 for Indians, and 119 for Africans. The drift of the European men to the pioneering areas of southern Africa (Southwest Africa, the Rhodesias, and lately the Orange Free State goldfields) is reversed for Natives. Where the women normally do the agricultural work, the tendency for the male African is to go off alone to town to work.

Age structure in the towns shows a maturing European and a multiplying Indian population. Over 50 per cent of the Indians were under 16 against 34 per cent of the European and 38 per cent of the Africans. In the 60 and over bracket there were twice as many Europeans (9 per cent) as Indians or Africans (both 4 per cent).

Family types in these rural towns show marked racial differences. The man-wife-children household occurred in 45 per cent of the European cases but only 31 per cent of the time among Africans, where in 19 per cent of the cases men were alone and in another 9 per cent the household had a man, wife, children, and other relatives. Among Indians, 3 per cent had relatives in the ménage. Among couples with children, the average family size was 6.3 for Indians, 5.2 for Africans, and 4.5 for Europeans, and was reasonably constant from town to town.

The racial complexity of South Africa is emphasized by the Dunn people, subject of Report No. 4, who are descended from one John Dunn, born in South Africa of a Scots father, who sired over 100 children from some 48 African wives. Dunn became a powerful chief in the Zulu nation and had his own territory, where some 200 of his descendants live today. For some tax purposes the Duns are "Natives," under liquor laws they are "Coloured,"

while under the Sugar Act governing cane quotas a number of them are classified as "European." The report examines social problems and legal cases arising out of the Duns' chaotic position.

EDWIN S. MUNGER

University of Chicago

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

FAINSOD, MERLE. *How Russia is Ruled*. Pp. xiv, 575. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$7.50.

Professor Fainsod's book is one of the most important studies on the Soviet Union ever published in the United States. It must be admired for its wealth of material and for its balanced judgments. The author knows, for instance, very well how to utilize and evaluate the statements given by the refugee from Soviet rule. The events since the downfall of Beria, which occurred after the completion of the book, prove the correctness of various tentative remarks of Professor Fainsod on the future developments in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The book is a sociological-historical description of the power system, which, established by Lenin, found its definitive complete form under Stalin. The first part is devoted to the "seedbed" of revolution and to the seizure of power by Lenin's Bolsheviks. The second analyzes the Communist Party, and the third the instruments of its totalitarian rule (constitutional myth, terror, bureaucracy in the army). The fourth is devoted to controls and tensions, paying particular attention to the conditions in Soviet agriculture and factories.

The mixture of Soviet politics, composed of utopian elements which continue to operate as a formal belief in a particular mission justifying total power and utilization of all means, with a cynical realism ready to apply all kinds of maneuvers and manipulations is brought out with great clarity and many details. The basic identity of the regime despite all change and adaptation to new situations is not overlooked. Professor Fainsod shows the roots of the

urge for centralization and belief in elites which culminated in the deification of Stalin, in the writings and policies of young Lenin. Brilliant is the chapter on terror. Professor Fainsod realizes that Soviet terror is directed not only against concrete enemies but that it is destined to create general insecurity which is decisive for the working of the totalitarian regime. Very enlightening is the survey of the various oppositions in the Bolshevik Party and the analysis of the party organization with its changes. The chapter on the army ought to be pondered by those who expect an end of Malenkov's regime by a revolt of the marshals.

In future editions some repetitions can be easily omitted and a few words on the role of Stalin's personal secretariat added. The Russian Research Center of Harvard University must be congratulated for having published this outstanding work.

WALDEMAR GURIAN

Notre Dame, Indiana

GARTHOFF, RAYMOND L. *Soviet Military Doctrine*. Pp. xviii, 587. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953. \$7.50.

Soviet Military Doctrine is an important, much needed, and potentially very useful contribution to our knowledge of Russian power. In a field in which accurate information is as vital as it is rare, this painstaking, exhaustive, and thorough analysis represents a most welcome pioneer work which may serve as a model as well as a source book for future students of the subject.

Mr. Garthoff's study was made as a part of the research program conducted for the United States Air Force by the RAND Corporation. In pursuing it he had to consult a wide variety of sources and sift an enormous amount of material in Russian, German, and English; in consequence, his bibliography covers some 60 pages and constitutes one of the major assets of the book.

According to the author's own words, he intended to discover and clarify "that which is taught, believed, and intended by the Soviets as the basis for their conduct of war and battle." But beyond that he also

wanted to find and formulate "those tenets which are themselves not recognized by the Soviets as part of their formal doctrine, but which nevertheless actually play a substantial role in it." This is most important, because, as his material strongly indicates, there are sometimes significant discrepancies between Soviet military theory and practice, due mainly to an over-evaluation of Stalin's "always correct" Military Science, which is said to have won the Soviet-German War, and to a tendency to draw lessons only from recent Russian victories, conveniently overlooking Soviet mistakes and failures.

The work is divided into three parts. The first part, dealing with the bases of Soviet military doctrine, points out that one of its main pillars is the assumption that war and peace are only two aspects of the perpetual struggle for world domination, in which one either destroys or is destroyed. However, after tracing the influence of Marxism, Imperial Russia, and foreign military authorities on Soviet military thinking, the author concludes that it corresponds closely to that of the West and that it is fundamentally sound.

Part II is an analysis of Soviet principles of war, in which the author discusses those assumptions and beliefs about military science and art, which are accepted in any armed force as the basic guide for its conduct of military affairs. He brings out the fact that the Soviets have an almost exaggerated faith in the efficacy of the offensive, which to a large extent was responsible for their lack of preparedness against the German attack in 1941.

Part III is concerned with the operational and tactical employment of combat arms, and shows the central position of ground forces in the Soviet military doctrine. Air Force and Navy are regarded primarily as auxiliaries of the Army. Consequently, the belief that war could be won by air bombing alone is considered "pseudo-scientific" and alien to Soviet military art. This does not mean, however, that Russia is incapable of developing a strong "strategic bombing" force in case of need.

Numerous notes, an appendix showing the organization of the Soviet Armed

Forces, another discussing the failure of the Soviet armies to stop the German invasion, a glossary of special terms, and an index complete the book and increase its usefulness. Written in a readable style and presenting material of the greatest interest to all of us, the book should be read not only by the military professionals but also by all persons interested in Russia and in foreign policy in general.

A. E. SOKOL

Stanford University

Police-State Methods in the Soviet Union.

Prepared by the International Commission Against Concentrationist Regimes, under the direction of David Rousset. Translated by Charles R. Joy. Edited by Jerzy G. Glikzman. Pp. 64. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. \$1.50.

Coercion of the Worker in the Soviet Union. Prepared by the International Commission Against Concentrationist Regimes, under the direction of David Rousset. Translated by Charles R. Joy. Edited by Jerzy G. Glikzman. Pp. 63. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. \$1.50.

In recent years a few American writers, none of whom to the best of my knowledge has ever been in a concentration camp, have propounded the thesis that the Soviet legal system is a highly advanced one which poses a challenge to the West to develop its own along similar lines. This rubbish has been refuted by a number of authoritative studies dealing with Soviet labor law, forced labor, the status of minorities in the Soviet Union, and the like, among which the writings of Vladimir Gsovski and Solomon Schwarz deserve special commendation. What has misled the "challenge" school has been mainly its failure to comprehend the fundamental distinction between political and nonpolitical crimes. Soviet treatment of the latter sometimes bears a semblance of justice, even of leniency, especially as it is described in the writings of official apologists such as Vyshinsky. In reality, however, many acts, such as offenses against labor discipline, which ought to be considered nonpolitical, not to say noncriminal, are assigned in effect a political character.

Political crimes are dealt with of course by agencies of the secret police which operate almost wholly outside the framework of statute law and hence tend to escape the notice of the "challenge" school.

The exposure of these agencies, mainly for the benefit of a European rather than an American audience, has been the principal concern of the International Commission Against Concentrationist Regimes, led by David Rousset and composed of alumni of Nazi or Soviet concentration camps. The two brief, attractively published volumes under review are among the fruits of their labors.

The main merit of the first is not its description of the administrative procedures by which millions have been condemned to forced labor, for these have been described before. It lies rather in its analysis of the terrible phenomenon of mass deportation, of which less is known outside the Iron Curtain, except in the case of the notorious "dekulakization" process associated with the collectivization of Soviet agriculture during the period of the First Five Year Plan (1928-1932). Mr. Rousset documents in some detail the deportations from the Baltic states in 1941, and less fully the forcible evacuation of the populace of the Crimean and Chechen-Ingush Republics in 1946, in revenge for their pro-German attitude during the war.

The second of the books under review deals mainly with the stringent labor discipline imposed upon "free" Soviet workers, as distinct from those who work in forced labor camps. The condition of the "free" workers is almost as unfortunate as that of the unfree, for there is nothing to protect them from the decrees of an omnipotent state. They are often denied the right to choose their place or type of work; their trade unions have degenerated into agencies of regimentation rather than of protection; the workers are seldom free to leave their jobs; lateness and absenteeism are serious offenses. The dictatorship of the proletariat has become a dictatorship over the proletariat.

The non-Communist peoples of the world, and especially those of Europe, owe Mr. Rousset a debt of gratitude for his tireless exposure of conditions which, but for

American statesmanship, might well have become theirs, not in 1984, but in 1954.

HAROLD C. HINTON

Georgetown University

HASSMANN, HEINRICH. *Oil in the Soviet Union*. Translated from the German with the addition of much new information by Alfred M. Leeston. Pp. xvi, 173. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953. \$3.75.

The Russian oil industry is an area in which data are highly inadequate even after publication of reports delivered at the Moscow Congress of the Communist Party in October, 1952, containing oil production figures previously unavailable. Also, recent events in the Middle East point up this 1951 work in German by Dr. H. Hassmann, now translated into English, brought up to date, and enhanced in its usefulness by the addition of maps and numerous footnotes, by A. Leeston of Dallas.

The book's factual, nontechnical presentation provides much pertinent information not readily available elsewhere. Its second and third parts trace the historical development of the Soviet oil industry and contain a scrupulously fair inquiry into the industry's geographical distribution, production techniques, exports, and domestic consumption. The author failed to extend this valuable discussion as he might have if he had omitted entirely Part I, "The Basis of the Russian Oil Industry"; the few paragraphs which Dr. Hassmann could spare for each of the numerous topics, such as population, Russian history, Constitution, and the like, are too elementary to contribute much even to the knowledge of a reader entirely unfamiliar with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The fourth section, "Problems of the Russian Oil Industry," correlates Soviet oil with the country's economy, the world situation, and oil problems in the United States. Russia satisfies much of her requirements with coal and electricity where other countries would use oil, and Soviet demand cannot be compared with that of other nations. But the fact remains that Russia's oil output has not kept pace with either her own industrial production or

with world oil output. The Soviet economic system must not be blamed for this, since, while hardly suited to European countries, it is "inherently justified" under Soviet conditions "unless the Soviet government is judged by the narrow criterion of production results."

The world's richest oil region is on Russia's doorstep, and oil deliveries from the Middle East, where Western military bases are being built, could solve all Soviet oil problems. Should Russia succeed, it would mean such an increase in Soviet economic power that "the political aspect of the world would be altered, too." On the other hand, says Dr. Hassmann, an artificial restriction of Russia's oil demand is not possible without endangering her economic and political prestige. In this lies the danger to peace.

Dr. Hassmann's intimate knowledge of, and nonpartisan approach to, a subject loaded with political implications makes this book a timely and useful contribution.

V. J. TERESHTENKO

New School for Social Research

STERN, H. PETER. *The Struggle for Poland*. Pp. 79. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953. \$2.00.

The author presents us with an excellent sketch of the principal events concerning the Polish question during World War II with special reference to the Soviet-Polish conflict set in the context of East-West relationships. Most postwar writers on the Polish question, he writes, ignore "the difference between what was desirable and what was possible." The author disagrees with those who hold that "the struggle for democracy in Poland was hopeless from the start," but admits that "Western ideas of justice" could not have been imposed "without difficulty." As he sees it, the Western mistakes consisted "less of losing sight of a desirable solution than in diplomatic errors and a lack of careful planning in achieving it." Poland's chances of survival "as a democracy," he says, depended upon "Western diplomacy, not alone on Western ideals."

According to the author, Poland had fallen to Communist control before the Western powers became fully aware of

Soviet aggressive designs. At Yalta, he says, the United States felt that formal acquiescence in the Russian border demands was the only means to supplant "the *de facto* government which was rapidly communizing Poland." Consequently, the earlier policy of postponing agreements on territorial questions until a postwar peace conference was abandoned. Had the Western Powers, he writes, insisted and been able to obtain more precise terms regarding the exact composition of the new government, a definite date for the election and its supervision, and a guarantee that the terms be faithfully executed, the Soviet attempts to subvert the Yalta agreement could have been prevented (pp. 61-62).

The author contrasts Soviet and American policies. The Russians "took great pains constantly to strengthen their position by seemingly minor moves"; the American efforts were "sporadic and usually exerted only after the problem had become acute." In the author's opinion the changing Polish scene demanded "continual assessment of new developments and prompt response to each individual situation as it arose." Instead the United States relied too heavily on "the few 'crucial' wartime conferences and overall agreements." Yet in spite of this speculation the author wonders if America's actions by themselves could have altered the chances for Polish independence. Stern concludes weakly that such responsibility as may rest with the United States is due in large part "to an undervaluation of the less dramatic tasks of diplomacy." What the author really says is that the independence of Poland was lost due to American diplomatic failures, but, even if our diplomacy had not failed, Poland might still have been lost. One is reminded of a quarterback who gambles on the fourth down; if the play works he becomes a great hero; if the play fails, heaps of criticism of all shades are showered upon him from the sidelines.

Thus, the fundamental question remains unanswered: Can a determined line of policy, emanating from within the Kremlin walls, based on perfidy and Machiavellianism and dedicated to world conquest, be effectively challenged by a democratic policy based on moral principles? Al-

though Mr. Stern presents us with a concise and able discussion of the various ramifications of the Polish question, he does not add anything to what has already been written on the subject.

WAYNE S. VUCINICH

Stanford University

BORKENAU, FRANZ. *European Communism*. Pp. 564. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. \$6.00.

This book is good medicine for "intellectuals" who opposed Fascist aggression and slave labor, but who later insisted on "academic neutrality" when confronted with the same phenomena under Soviet auspices. Borkenau's heavily documented factual masterpiece blows away the myths propagated by Frederick L. Schuman, Alvarez Del Vayo, Vera Micheles Dean, and others.

"Before the purge trials," writes Borkenau, "it had been perfectly possible for an ill-informed Westerner to be a genuine liberal and at the same time a genuine friend of the Soviet Union. After the shock of the trials, mental dishonesty was necessary to remain in that position." Ever since Willi Munzenberg perfected techniques of Communist conquest of the "intellectuals," the task of winning them over, "especially rich intellectuals in socially and financially assured positions, was the easiest task of all." In England and America "a sharp divergence emerged between the party's insignificance within the labor movement and its significance as a factor in intellectual life."

Analyzing Western policy and attitudes between 1941 and 1945, the author states that "enthusiasm for Russia and 'anti-fascism' merged into a blind delirium of subservience to Stalinism. . . . The communists had no need to propagandize Russia. That was done for them by the press, the radio, by society as a whole." Borkenau is particularly severe on Western policy for eastern Europe in this period: "All anti-Communists of eastern Europe were abandoned . . . the exact counterpart of the Munich policy." Referring primarily to Mihailovich of Yugoslavia and Kupa of Albania, he writes: "nothing could provide a Balkan leader with a more effective passport to eternity than unswerving loyalty to

the West." Borkenau concludes that this appeasement was "not so much an error of judgment but a moral disease."

Borkenau sheds much light on the French and Spanish Popular fronts: "The fascist danger in France was largely imaginary. . . . The whole policy of the Popular Front was directed against an imaginary enemy." He quotes Krivitsky approvingly: "The Soviet Union seemed to have a grip on Loyalist Spain as if it were already a Soviet possession," and he then details the bloody roles played by Negrin and Del Vayo. The author thinks poorly of Blum as "naïve"; he shows how thousands of innocent Frenchmen were murdered by Communist "courts" in 1945, and he exposes the double roles played by D'Astier, Joinville, and Cot. His discussion of Jouhaux and Bidault casts some doubt on their anti-Communism. The role of Freemasonry as an ally of Communism in France is rather convincingly demonstrated.

Of Czechoslovakia, Borkenau comments: "Benes and the Czech Socialists gambled away their national independence (in 1948) by a unique combination of folly, sentimental Panslavism, and lack of pluck at the decisive juncture." As for Yugoslavia, he proves that Tito's Partisans "arose, not as an anti-German, but as an anti-Chetnik movement."

This definitive work on Soviet foreign policy and Communist development in Europe urges the Western democracies to "severely repress the clandestine acts of the Communist parties." He concludes that "If we have nothing to oppose Stalin but a passive policy of containment—then we shall be defeated."

ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN
Marquette University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

WHITE, THEODORE H. *Fire in the Ashes: Europe in Mid-Century*. Pp. 405. New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953. \$5.00.

A man walked up to the Duke of Wellington, Britain's most famous and most handsome warrior, and said: "Are you Mr.

Smith?" The Duke replied: "Sir, if you believe that, you will believe anything." Mr. White's report on Europe in mid-century is built around three true stories, namely, those of Pierre Bertaut, former resistance fighter and ex-head of the French secret police; of Willi Schlieker, one-time aid to Hitler's boss of industry, Speer, later a small-time dealer in the gray and black market for steel, and now a Ruhr baron; and of Joe Curry, ex-miner, trusted official of the Labour Government and now a labor relations director of the Coal Board. According to Mr. White, the stories of their respective countries are "refracted" in these individuals which means, I presume, that Mr. White considers them representative, nay typical, specimens of their national societies.

Now by this method, it would be just as easy to tell the story of France by the story of, let us say, a well-known novelist, one-time Communist, resistance fighter, and now Gaullist deputy; the story of Germany by that of a former high bureaucrat, member of a conspiracy to overthrow Hitler, and now editor of a stanchly democratic periodical; and the story of Britain by that of a successful "spiv" who now dabbles in left-wing Labour politics. There is as much that is characteristically French, German, and British "refracted" in these individual lives as there is in Mr. White's selections. Mr. White's method is useless because it is arbitrary. Since it is arbitrary it is necessarily tendentious: Messrs. Bertaut, Schlieker, and Curry are Messrs. Bertaut, Schlieker, and Curry; they are not Mr. Smith (or M. Dupont or Herr Mueller).

It is Mr. White's thesis that, at the end of World War II, the peoples of Europe wanted a social revolution and that we wanted them to have it. Though, in Europe, some people and certain political factions may have wanted just that, other people and political groups wanted reconstruction and restoration, peace and quiet. The American people, as distinct from a small band of officials privileged to experiment abroad with doctrines which they were unable to apply at home, were emphatically disinterested in fomenting social revolutions in Europe. It is not surprising that Mr. White, armed with his

"revolutionary" thesis, views the perennial crisis of France as caused by the frustrations of the brave hopes of the Resistance (the seamy sides of which he appears to ignore) and the reactionary mentality of French capitalists. But it is surprising that he fails to mention that France is saddled with an impossible constitution which would gum up the works of the most progressive national society, and the absurdities of which are stanchly defended, because of strictly partisan considerations, by the Left.

There are lastly some internal inconsistencies. On page 92, Mr. White writes that "the major organs of the French press [are] now back in the hands of the same men who had run them before the war." I must confine myself here to controverting this statement on the basis of the information supplied by Mr. White on page 346: "[The French Communist Party] is the greatest publishing enterprise in all France, owning and controlling more daily newspapers [sixteen] than any other publishing group. . . ." This publishing eminence was achieved by the simple expedient of "liberating" existing newspapers from real and alleged collaborators and hanging on to them. In any case, Communist affluence represents a considerable displacement in the control of the French press as compared with the prewar situation.

It is with a deep sense of regret that I put aside Mr. White's volume. There is much in it that bespeaks keen powers of observation and sensitive response to injustice and misery. His discussion of the power struggle within Russia, for example, is distinguished by originality as well as analytical skill. As it is, infatuation with a shaky thesis and hasty generalizations destroy the book's usefulness. The title is indeed appropriate: fire in the ashes emits some heat and smoke but hardly any light.

ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ
University of Pennsylvania

TAYLOR, A. J. P. *Rumours of Wars*. Pp. ix, 262. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952 (New York: British Book Centre, 1953. \$3.25).

There are thirty-five delightfully readable essays in this volume dealing with the his-

tory of war, politics, and diplomacy in modern Europe. For the purpose of describing them, there are no precise categories into which they can be classified. Almost all of them, however, reflect two firm convictions of the author: first, that a historian has the duty and privilege of making moral evaluations, and, secondly, that the triumph of western civilization depends upon a stanch adherence to democratic idealism.

In commentaries on Herbert Butterfield (*History and Human Relations*) and George F. Kennan (*American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*), Mr. Fisher challenges the "detachment" of those who claim to write history from a morally-detached, "realistic" viewpoint and who reject a foreign policy based upon moral ideals. In his discussion of Kennan and in two other eloquent pieces at the end of the volume, he mobilizes the evidence of Western man's success in relying upon democratic principle and contends that the West, in its international dealings, must answer intolerance with tolerance, intransigence with a readiness to compromise, and unquestioning enthusiasm with scepticism, and must deal with grievances by redressing them.

In a number of essays on Germany, the author's recurrent theme is the tendency of some historians, in common with others, to gloss over that country's record of aggression. Britain, he apparently feels, is in danger of forgetting, as it did in the thirties, that the traditional basis of its security is the balance of power on the continent.

As for the Soviet Union, the author concludes (in an interesting piece entitled "Can We Agree with the Russians?") that, though World War III is not inevitable, stable agreement between the two systems is impossible. But the way to deal with the Soviet Union, he says, is to stop giving the impression that we doubt our ability to negotiate, that we have lost faith in the efficacy of democratic procedure, and that we think Communist propaganda is bound to win out against ours in an open field of argument. Communism, he claims, thrives on hardship. It is therefore in the interest of the West to negotiate with Russia for mutual economic advantage.

Every rise in the Russian standard of living would, he believes, lessen the punch of Communism as a fighting creed. Russia's strength for war is in the numbers and incredible toughness of its manpower. Economic development, says Fisher, "will both use up the manpower and soften the men."

ERIC BEECROFT

Washington, D. C.

GÖRLITZ, WALTER, and HERBERT A. QUINT. *Adolf Hitler: Eine Biographie*. Pp. 658. Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag, 1952. No price.

This is the first complete biography of Hitler to appear in Germany after the war. Both authors are specialists in writing popular biographies and political history. Görlitz in particular has been a prolific biographer of quite an assortment of people: Hannibal, George V, Lincoln, Mussolini, Stresemann, to cite just a few. He may also be known to American readers for his *History of the German General Staff*.

The biography is written for popular consumption. It gives evidence of a wide search of material, and its value is enhanced by a name index with a family tree. The authors evidently did considerable research on Hitler's origin and youth, and found new material not previously published. However, one often wishes that dubious statements or obvious conjectures were documented by footnotes.

Görlitz and Quint relate how Hitler's views of man and the world were conditioned by the frustrated German nationalism in the multi-ethnic Dual Monarchy. This book offers a vivid image of Hitler's embittering struggle for livelihood and self-respect in Vienna. The peculiar microcosm of a down-and-out orphan, a man without roots, leads him to project for himself a jaundiced image of man and world. In the chaos after World War I Hitler's life starts to become interwoven with history. He is a catalyst to the rise of the Nazi Party, and one sees how his extraordinary skills in demagoguery and intrigue lead to his becoming its Fuehrer—eventually undisputed and crowned by charisma.

After an attention-holding account of Hitler's rise to power, the book levels off

in content and quality, especially on the last years of Nazi rule. Here it occasionally lacks depth of analysis, and is inadequate in history. For instance, on one of the most significant points, Hitler's real intentions, the authors would have us believe that the announcement in November 1937 to von Neurath, von Blomberg, Göring, von Fritsch, and Raeder of his proposed conquests was not really a policy statement. Internal evidence from the famous notes of Colonel Hossbach and evidence from the biography itself contradict this view. To cite just one, Hitler enjoins the group that his statements are to be treated as his last will and testament in case of his premature death.

The authors were never quite able to cut the umbilical cord connecting them to their German origin and their German audience. Their bias is strongly nationalist, not sympathetic to the Weimar Republic or its institutions. Though they bring out the self-seeking identification in Hitler of personal ego and political super-ego, and particularly the consequences of Hitler's *va banque* game in foreign affairs, they cannot rid themselves of a considerable amount of awe of Hitler's person. In the final chapters, pity for their fatherland is mingled with pity for Hitler. Hence terror, violence, fear, death, mass slaughter, of the very essence of Nazism, appear in small letters in this book. The over-all impression is one which would not leave an un-reconstructed Nazi dissatisfied.

In other respects, too, the book often tries to be all things to all men. We find research mixed with conjecture, as in the unnecessary projection of Hitler's thoughts and feelings.

These approaches appear in high relief by a contrast with Alan Bullock's *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper, 1952), also published in 1952. It is clear in Bullock, as it is not in Görlitz, that Hitler stood against the Christian tradition and the messages of human rights and individual dignity of Western civilization. Bullock does not subdue the evidence of Hitler's evil and duplicity.

This German biography of Hitler and the postwar German autobiographies lead this reviewer reluctantly to the conclusion

that most German participants in the recent holocaust have not been able to rid themselves of the shadow of strong biases and national identification.

ERIC H. BOEHM

Department of the Air Force

WARBURG, JAMES P. *Germany: Key to Peace*. Pp. xix, 344. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$4.75.

Few Americans have given more attention to the postwar problem of Germany than James P. Warburg. Eight books and at least seven pamphlets on the subject have come from his pen since 1944; in addition, he has delivered numerous lectures, forwarded communications to Washington, and so forth. The present volume draws rather heavily on his earlier works and indeed its main purpose is to bring them down to date, pointing particularly to developments under Truman-Acheson and Eisenhower-Dulles. For the most part the discussion is provocative in character, and one can hardly question the deep sincerity which motivates the author despite the almost devastating criticism which he makes of what he regards as bungling on the part of the United States in virtually everything attempted in Western Europe since 1945.

Scholars may find somewhat trying both the author's tendency to see many complicated problems in terms of clear black or white, right or wrong, completely foolish or eminently wise and also his fondness for dramatic conclusions—for example, America's "falling in love" with the cold war and devil theory of the world crisis—but they will also discover a considerable amount of substance in his analysis. Thinking persons cannot dismiss the major queries which he makes whether or not they accept his arguments. While he may seem to overdo the ignorance of Europe on the part of informed Americans, it is difficult to challenge his emphasis on the lack of knowledge and even interest in German problems among the mass of United States citizens.

After reaching the very depths of pessimism on the basis of the past record Mr. Warburg finds it worthwhile to offer a six-point program which he thinks might

still save the day. This involves returning territory beyond the Oder-Neisse Line—except for East Prussia and Upper Silesia—to a united Germany, putting the Saar under a United Nations mandate for some years, neutralizing Germany under a peace treaty providing disarmament for five to ten years, extending freedom in economic and political organization to the Germans, and so forth. And he appears to find some reason for believing that these could be achieved despite the recent attitude of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics if the United States were really desirous of preserving world peace.

HAROLD ZINK

Ohio State University

LITCHFIELD, EDWARD H., and ASSOCIATES. *Governing Postwar Germany*. Pp. xvii, 661. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953. \$7.75.

This is a very timely volume. It evaluates the kind of Germany to be incorporated into the Western power complex at a time when opinion is so heavily weighted on the why and how of incorporation.

Seventeen authors with both scholarly and practical experience in German affairs have contributed the twenty chapters of this work which treats "the functions, the processes, and the levels of government" in Western Germany and, to a lesser degree, in Eastern Germany. Emphasis is rightly focused upon contemporary German institutions rather than upon military government. However, most chapters weigh its impact and that of the Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi eras. Useful appendixes include the Basic Law and the Occupation Statute.

In the period since May 8, 1945, characterized by Professor Litchfield as one of "Occupational Legal Sovereignty," and without precedent in international law, Germany has again achieved considerable freedom in molding her political institutions.

Chapters on local government, state government, the federal Constitution, the judiciary, and personnel management both implicitly and explicitly delineate a growing conservatism. A substantial return to the Weimar pattern and strong centralizing

tendencies are indicated. Professors Friedrich and Spiro attribute much of this growth to the delegation of specific functions to the federal government instead of to the Laender. Similarly, Professor Brecht presents an excellent essay on the return of bureaucracy to its traditionally pre-eminent place in German affairs. Legal rather than operative norms govern administrative science, asserts Mr. Glaser, because the Federal Ministries interpret laws executed by the Laender.

Chapters on budgetary problems, legislation, public finance, and police confirm the proliferation of federal authority through such means as the use of concurrent legislative powers in taxation, federal emergency powers over Laender police, and the extreme authority of administrative departments over financial legislation. A notable exception is the decentralized banking system described by Mr. Howard Jones.

The search for stability, the resurgence of traditionalism in political parties, and an analysis of postwar elections combine with an excellent functional discussion of the electoral process in two chapters by Mr. Scammon. Through no fault of the authors, the most recent Bonn election results are not included.

Herta Kraus deplores the lack of an ideology and of the Weimar client participation in Health and Welfare administration.

The traditional philosophy of a special education for the intellectually gifted beginning, for the most part, after the four-year *Grundschule* persists.

By and large, this is an excellent reference work. However, one must observe that a better balanced work would have resulted if the informative chapter on Labor by Professor Taylor had been accompanied by one on business; that a basic dilemma of East German government is that of reconciling its position as a Soviet satellite with the political necessity of appealing to German unity sentiment; and that in the field of foreign policy, Germany's freedom from an armament burden is an important reason for her economic viability and perhaps for the success of her current regime.

HAROLD LEWIS

Howard University

NOBLEMAN, ELI E. *American Military Government Courts in Germany: Their Role in the Democratization of the German People*. Pp. x, 261. Washington, D. C.: The Provost Marshall General's School (copyright 1953, by the author), 1950. No price.

The author of this volume, Dr. Eli E. Nobleman, served as the Chief of the Military Government Courts Branch, Legal Division, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Germany. In this position he equipped himself admirably to analyze the documentary materials which are the heart of his study and to relate them to the American objective of democratizing the German people. Although the book is published as Training Packet No. 52 of the Provost Marshall General's School and is designed to provide source material for instructional purposes, it will prove useful to students of international law and to all who are interested in American occupation policies of the last 130 years.

Dr. Nobleman begins with a chapter on the international law applying to occupational tribunals, a chapter which introduces the discussion appropriately although it adds little or nothing to our understanding of the subject. In Chapter II, he deals with American military government tribunals prior to World War II, giving us a concise statement and a fair evaluation of the practice of the past; he brings out that for the most part those tribunals (1) were staffed by army officers, (2) conformed closely to procedures followed by court-martials, (3) lacked many of the safeguards of Anglo-American justice, and (4) concerned themselves primarily with the protection of American armed forces, leaving to the indigenous courts cases involving infractions of local law. The most illuminating chapter of all is the third, which explains with convincing concreteness the organization, composition, jurisdiction, and procedure of the occupational tribunals in Germany from the combat period of World War II through the postsurrender occupation. Chapters IV and V deal, respectively, with civilian military courts and with military government courts as a force for democracy. Thirteen appendixes to the book provide the reader with orders and

proclamations relating to occupational tribunals from the Mexican War on down to the present.

Dr. Nobleman gives ample support for his conclusion that "American military government courts have played a more important role in demonstrating democracy and its advantages to the German people than any other governmental operation." By their essential fairness the courts were much more than an agency for the protection of American armed forces; they were "guarantors of the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of the occupied area." Those courts won the confidence of the German people and provided an atmosphere in which they could reorient their thinking.

NORMAN L. HILL

University of Nebraska

REITLINGER, GERALD. *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945*. Pp. 634. London: Vallentine, Mitchell & Co. (distributed in the U. S. by Beechhurst Press, N. Y.), 1953. \$6.00.

Last February I met in Germany a distinguished group of Germans discussing the German-Jewish problem, and the majority of them did not know that the "final solution," or general liquidation of the Jews, was a plan set by the Hitler government. The German youth does not know and is not told about what went on, and therefore cannot have any sense of responsibility concerning the extermination of the Jews, and others, in the gas chambers of Auschwitz and other camps.

The digesting of the material, its evaluation, and the reporting on what was meant by the "final solution" are indeed a major undertaking. Therefore the book by Gerald R. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945*, deserves recognition.

Reitlinger starts his narrative with a chapter on forced emigration and pogroms in September 1939, but the story really begins with the "week of the broken glass" when mass arrests of Jews followed the assassination of van Rath, third German Legation counselor in Paris, by Grynszpan. Interestingly enough, the term "final solu-

tion" is already found in 1938 German Foreign Office papers, but its meaning at that time was not general physical destruction but forced mass emigration—expulsion of the Jews as paupers.

Apparently, the decision to exterminate the Jews physically was the result of deliberations by Hitler, Himmler, and his brutal Gestapo henchman Heydrich, chief of the Reich Security Office in Berlin until he was shot by Czechoslovak partisans near Lidice. To the inner circle of the people preparing the plan to kill as many Jews as possible belonged more than 200 officials—by the way, not all of them Nazis.

The value of Reitlinger's matter-of-fact presentation is that all the material about the happenings in the various European countries is given with sources, and there appear no gaps left open. The only issue we have to take with Reitlinger is his appendix, "Statistical Summary of the Final Solution," where he tries to prove—though there is no proof possible—that instead of the accepted figure of 6 million Jews "only" 4.5 to 4.7 million Jews were killed.

All available sources—the testimony of the Nazis before the International Tribunal, the investigations of Jewish and non-Jewish scientific institutes, and the studies of the German population expert Professor H. Arntz—have confirmed the figure of 6.1 million Jews, all of whom were killed in the gas chambers; some died also from such reasons as starvation, epidemics, and suicide. With that exception Reitlinger's book, *The Final Solution*, appears to me the best and most thorough study on this question, and I agree fully with the author when he exclaims: "The mood of Nuremberg has passed. Men whose conduct was far worse than that of most of those who were found guilty and hanged are alive and free; others are released from their prisons from time to time in some confused notion of appeasement."

KURT R. GROSSMANN

Kew Gardens, New York

FORD, FRANKLIN L. *Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy After Louis XIV*. Pp. xiii, 280. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$6.00.

In the 1770's and 1780's the nobility of the robe, the personnel of the 31 sovereign courts of France, took the lead in defending aristocratic privilege. Professor Ford in this important and illuminating book finds that the years 1715 to 1748 were the crucial ones: it was during this period that the noble judges, some 2,000 to 2,300 in all out of a total of about 190,000 nobles, assumed this leadership.

The reign of Louis XIV was marked by a curious ambivalence towards the nobility. They received all the honors, as well as pensions and sinecures; but at the same time they were excluded from civil office (except the high administrative posts), deprived of influence in the shaping of policy (the few ministers excepted), and forced at times even to pay taxes! No wonder then that when the king died in 1715, the upper ranks of the nobility hoped to regain political power for the protection of their privileged position. It was however soon evident that only the *noblesse de robe* had the qualifications necessary for this task.

The judges of the sovereign courts, like other officials, had for centuries bought their offices, a system regularized and stabilized by the famous "Paulette" decree of 1614; but, in addition, the high judiciary had by the middle of the century acquired hereditary nobility by the very purchase of office. It took some time before the robe was accepted by the non-robe nobility—this social fusion was completed during the years 1715–1748. Moreover, both in wealth and education the robe was well above the great majority of nonrobe nobility. Besides, the *noblesse de robe* had functions. They had the highest judicial as well as many administrative responsibilities; but, most important, the right of remonstrance gave the Paris Parlement the opportunity to interfere with the actions of the Crown, and to acquire even popular favor by such interference. Practically quashed by Louis XIV in 1673, the right of remonstrance was revived in 1715 when the Regent found it necessary to win the support of the Paris Parlement to upset the will of the late king. The right of remonstrance became the most powerful weapon for the retention of aristocratic privilege.

Since the *noblesse de robe* was the only noble rank which combined political power, social position, wealth, and education, it is easy to see (thanks to Dr. Ford) why it took over the leadership of the nobility. And also it is clear that the monarchy was doomed when it succumbed to the concept of a medieval nobility demanding its privileges.

The reviewer's only criticism of this admirable book (incidentally, it is also attractively illustrated—a welcome change in the printing of monographs) is that it might have been carried further, at least to 1771.

E. A. BELLER

Princeton University

DURAND, CH. *Le Conseil d'état Napoléonien: l'Emploi des conseillers d'état et des maîtres des requêtes en dehors du conseil*. No. 45, Nouvelle Série, *Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Aix*. Pp. 142. Aix-en-Provence, France: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1952. No price.

Administrative history is a relatively neglected field. For that reason, this brief monograph (Professor Durand's second on the Napoleonic Council of State) will be useful to specialists. It is consciously aimed at that audience alone.

The scope of the volume is narrow. Its single purpose is to show how Napoleon used the members of his reorganized Council of State as a staff of top-level troubleshooters in administering his Empire. These special assignments extended to almost every conceivable aspect of administration, both in France and in the satellite areas. M. Durand classifies them under four headings: (a) membership on other governmental boards or commissions; (b) short-term assignments as inspectors or diplomats; (c) long-term appointments on detached service, especially in the colonies or in conquered provinces; (d) part-time posts in Paris itself, involving continued active service in the Council of State as well. So common was this practice that about four-fifths of the Councillors served at one time or another on some sort of special assignment.

Napoleon's purpose was not merely to use trusted advisers to get difficult jobs

done. Rather, it was to keep those advisers from degenerating into mere theoreticians, divorced from the practical problems of government. The Emperor, a man of action himself, never overcame his suspicion of the cloistered man of thought. He felt that if the men who drafted his laws could be immersed frequently in the tasks of daily administration, they might be protected against "that systematizing spirit, that tendency to ideology and metaphysics" which must always afflict policy-formulators who think too much and act too little.

M. Durand believes that Napoleon's experiment was, on the whole, a wise and successful one, and that its drawbacks were clearly outweighed by its advantages. He admits, however, that there can be too much of a good thing, and that the Emperor carried the practice to excess. The Councillors' energies were so often diverted to other duties that the Council of State was hampered in carrying out its own functions. One is reminded of more recent experiments in Washington, where policy planners find themselves constantly drawn into the stream of daily action and diverted from their effort to take a long view.

Incidentally, the precedent set by Napoleon has been followed to this day. Councillors of State are still used on special assignment, although far less frequently than in Napoleon's time.

GORDON WRIGHT

University of Oregon

CHAPMAN, BRIAN. *Introduction to French Local Government*. Pp. 238. London: George Allen & Unwin (distributed in the U. S. by The Macmillan Company), 1953. \$4.25.

This well-written monograph fills an important gap in the literature on local government in contemporary free Europe. As the basis for his study, the author, one of the younger British political scientists, has combined thorough documentary analysis with direct observation and interviewing in France itself. Following an interesting introductory description of the framework of French local political and administrative institutions, there are illuminating commentaries on the interaction of local politics

and administration, on the riddle of local government finance, and on the operation of the French system of central control over local government. The study also includes an up-to-date survey of the problems of government in the Paris metropolitan area.

Mr. Chapman rightly points out that "local government in England has hinged on the development of particular services in local areas, whereas in France the emphasis has been on the evolution of local institutions." This being so, the French tend to place local government efficiency on a lower value scale than the insurance of effective safeguards against abuses of authority—a behavior trait, be it noted, equally conspicuous at the national level. Even so, in Mr. Chapman's view, French municipal government is efficient in the sense of "the prompt, smooth and predictable passage of matters requiring decision to a known authority [by way of prefect and mayor], who can and does take those decisions on his own responsibility." This reviewer's experience with French local authorities both before and since World War II would suggest a considerably less favorable estimate, but perhaps Mr. Chapman sampled a different segment of the "departmental" and communal bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the author properly contends that "there is more interest in local matters and more vitality in local government in France" than in England. One important reason for this lies in the fact that in France but not in England local political office is the natural stepping-stone to national political careers. As a distinguished French scholar observed years ago, France has had more great mayors than prime ministers, and the postwar situation does not appear to have changed much in this respect.

One special point made by Mr. Chapman is worth noting here. The ill-fated experiment with "regionalization" attempted by the Vichy regime has made it unlikely that any further extension of regional administration will take place in the near future. The *département*, although artificial in origin, is now so much a part of the French pattern of parliamentary politics and elec-

tions that it seems a fixture, administrative economy to the contrary notwithstanding.

WALTER R. SHARP

Yale University

OTHERS

FITCH, GERALDINE. *Formosa Beachhead*. Pp. ix, 267. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. \$3.50.

Formosa Beachhead reflects valuable personal experiences of the author on two levels. Mrs. Fitch knows both the China mainland and Formosa through more than passing contacts (she lived in China for a good part of her life, and she visited Formosa three times in recent years); and she fought vigorously for an American China policy that would recognize Mao Tse-tung and his followers for the genuine Communists they always were. Mrs. Fitch met many Chinese who were prominent in Nationalist China and who today on Formosa and in the United States of America are upholding the banner of Free China; and she also met Americans who, for a variety of reasons, cherished (and spread) illusions about the Chinese Communists. Thus she is well-prepared to understand the extraordinary mixture of misguided action and self-defeating passivity that characterized America's official attitude toward China during and after World War II.

Formosa is the starting point of her story. In a punchy and popular style she introduces her readers to the "Beautiful Isle," as the Portuguese called it, and to its people; and she returns to the Formosa story again when she later discusses the present government, its efforts at reform, and its military strength. Two chapters, "The Landlords! The Landlords of China!" and "Farmer Chang of Formosa," go far to counteract the often repeated misconceptions of tenancy conditions in pre-Communist China, and to point up the differences between the dishonest and enslaving Communist agrarian revolution on the Chinese mainland and the honest and constructive land reform accomplished recently by the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa.

The data included in these chapters deserve the widest attention. They raise im-

portant questions concerning the chances of a Nationalist return to the mainland. Mrs. Fitch is extremely optimistic about the success of such an enterprise. While sharing her desire to see the mainland Chinese liberated, the reviewer feels that the problems involved—and these are complex—should be studied with an eye on the socio-military developments in Russia during the first years of Soviet power.

The chapter headings, "Which Experts on China were Right?" "The White Paper—a Lie that Failed," "China Lobby?" and "Is America Safe?" indicate both the explosiveness of the American section of Mrs. Fitch's book and the frankly polemical way in which she deals with her subject. Particularly important is her discussion of the "China Lobby"—the Nationalist lobby, which was pathetically small and ineffective, and the Red China lobby, which was eminently and disastrously successful in shaping American public opinion. Few spokesmen of the anti-Communist camp are as familiar with certain details of the "China Lobby" as is Mrs. Fitch. Her presentation provides an urgently needed antidote to a much-publicized legend.

KARL A. WITTFOGEL

University of Washington

FEIS, HERBERT. *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission*. Pp. x, 445. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953. \$6.00.

"Tangle" is too mild a word for the apparently insoluble problems which confronted the American government in its wartime involvements with China. The inability of the administration—despite the most earnest efforts of all the highest officials involved—to effect an outcome conforming to the interests of the American and Chinese people (as understood by our government) is a somber chapter in recent history and an explosive issue in domestic politics. Herbert Feis lays before us this first objective account, based upon all the available American evidence, of what we tried to do and how we failed to bring about what was, perhaps, unattainable—a free, strong, democratic, and friendly China.

The study is more comprehensive than

the State Department's "White Paper" on China, the United States Army's history of the China-Burma-India Theatre, or the published reminiscences of various participants. It is far more lucid than the reports of various Congressional investigating bodies that have pried into the subject. In pursuing his study Feis had generally free access to State Department archives, records on China in the Office of Chief of Military History of the Army, and, directly or indirectly, pertinent parts of the papers of Roosevelt, Morgenthau, Hopkins, and Hurley.

From reading this narrative it is amply evident how hard the American government worked to uphold China in the war against Japan, to restore it as a united and independent country, to secure for it a place of authority among the nations, and to avert the threatening civil war. In seeking these worthy ends there was always a great divergency between the Chinese and American governments concerning the necessary means. These fundamental divergencies, which arose from differences in culture, in strategic situation, in political and economic systems, are laid out clearly. China always demanded a greater voice in decisions and a greater volume of aid than America believed wise to grant. During the war, American planners had their eyes riveted upon Japan; the Nationalists had theirs fixed upon Russia and the Chinese Communists. After the war American officials clung to their vision of a peacefully united China; the two hostile parties in China clung each to the vision of supremacy over the other.

Events were transpiring in China—political and social conflicts, war weariness, inflation, famine, and wise or foolish acts of men—over which America had no control. Events were transpiring throughout the rest of the world—decisions in Russia or Japan, distant battles which shifted the balances of power and upset time tables and calculations, demobilization fever that robbed this country of its military might. All these were part of the China tangle. Feis does not indulge in praise and blame. The theory that a conspiracy within the American government brought about the loss of China finds no support in these

carefully written pages. No single American or Chinese is harshly treated, though clashes in concept and personality are not concealed.

The note on which the excellent book closes is really its theme. Let us study again the record. But we "need not make excuses either to ourselves, the Chinese people, or the rest of the world" for having pursued the purposes in China that we did.

C. MARTIN WILBUR

Columbia University

NORTH, ROBERT C. *Moscow and Chinese Communists*. Pp. ix, 306. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1953. \$5.00.

Mr. North takes as his principal theme the story of the Soviet impact on the course of the Communist revolution in China. He approaches the question in the spirit of objective historiography, and employs a substantial documentation to support his analyses and conclusions. Since the Soviet impact on the Chinese Communist revolution was especially pronounced prior to 1935, about one-half of the volume deals with the events of the 1918-1935 period. Where Mr. North retells the fairly familiar parts of that story, his account will be of interest for the general reader; where he probes into more obscure historical questions, employing an original documentation derived from his personal interviews with some of the surviving actors—Chang Kuot'ao and M. N. Roy, in particular—Mr. North is speaking primarily to the specialist in the history of the period.

Sino-Soviet relations within the Communist apparatus of world revolution have been highly complex, and Mr. North faces their ramifications squarely. Thus, he examines the early orientation of Lenin and the Comintern toward China and the effects on subsequent Soviet policy toward China of the Stalin-Trotsky feud. Similarly, from the Chinese aspect, he traces internal political developments within the Chinese Communist Party before and after Mao Tse-tung's rise to a position of unchallenged control. The principal political relationships of the Kuomintang to the Chinese Communists necessarily receive some attention. Passing rather rapidly

through the World War II period, Mr. North devotes two chapters to the recent period (1945-1953) of the civil war in China and the subsequent experiences of the Chinese Communists in the realms of domestic and foreign policy. In these concluding substantive chapters, the author considers the interests and policies of the United States as these are shaped by the unfolding of the revolutionary situation in China and by the new relationships between China and the Soviet Union.

Mr. North's book is not written in popular style, although he evidently seeks to bring a "message" to his readers concerning their attitude toward the emerging political situation in Asia. The evident intellectual integrity of the author constantly keeps the reader informed of the differences between conclusions based on scholarly documentation and conclusions derived from personal judgments and opinions. The volume itself, reviewed from a colorful, paper-bound copy, is a helpful addition to the bookshelf of contemporary world affairs.

H. ARTHUR STEINER

University of California
Los Angeles

BEARD, MARY R. *The Force of Women in Japanese History*. Pp. 196. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953. \$3.75.

Between 1935 and 1939 a committee of scholars in Tokyo, under the leadership of the then Baroness Ishimoto (now Mrs. Kanju Kato), prepared a series of biographical and historical sketches pertaining to Japanese women for an encyclopaedia on the world's women to have been published in Austria. The war prevented the issuance of this work, but the Japanese sketches have been assembled by Mary Beard and published in this volume. Half of the pieces concern women in Japanese court circles in ancient and medieval times; the remainder deal with social and political events in the modern age as they relate to women and women's rights. The final chapters, apparently written in 1950, bring the story up to the point of enactment by the Diet of legislation providing for the woman's ballot, and the encouragement

by the government of population control measures.

Mrs. Beard has chosen to present the sketches with only a minimum of linguistic editing; consequently the reader may find them somewhat awkward in style and not a little opaque. The pieces are decidedly uneven, with some of them engaging in voluminous and often irrelevant detail, while others are broader in scope and more incisive in content.

The role of women in Japanese social and cultural history is a topic of first-rate importance, and one that badly needs thorough and insightful treatment. Interesting as these sketches may be, they provide little more information than may be obtained from existing standard English-language works on Japan. The book contains no analysis of the position of women in Japanese patterns of value, nor in the distinctive hierarchical, yet achievement-oriented system of Japanese social relations. Also lacking is a study of the great differences in the roles of women in social classes, communities, and occupational groups. For these reasons the book's chief value lies in its simple biographical flavor and often charming treatment of the Japanese scene, particularly in ancient elite circles.

JOHN W. BENNETT

Ohio State University

BATTISTINI, LAWRENCE H. *Introducing Asia*. Pp. xiv, 289. New York: John Day Company, 1953. \$3.75.

Introducing Asia, by Lawrence H. Battistini, is a generally sound but extremely brief historical introduction to Eastern Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Despite the rather expansive title (this reviewer anticipated a work of at least a thousand pages) the book contains nothing at all on Western Asia and runs the whole gamut of Indian history in 35 pages. China, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific are treated in the rest of a slim 264 pages of text, from which must be subtracted 17 pages of maps (very worthwhile ones) and sketches.

With such brevity the author must, of course, cover centuries in paragraphs or even in sentences, and he must depend upon generalization or implication to carry

the subject across the valleys to the mountain tops on which alone he has time to alight. Hence supreme care must be exercised in the choice of almost every word, particularly so those key words of "implication." It is to the credit of the author that most of his words are well chosen, and his generalizations and implications, though over-simple, usually set a clear projection in the right direction.

Occasionally they do not, however, as in the following cases (reviewer's italics): page 20 places the Mohammedan invasions of India in the "early centuries after Christ" (perhaps before Mohammed was born?); pages 46-51 fail to consider Mongols and Manchus as part of a general Chinese northern frontier problem, and have Mongols violating Chinese traditions less than Manchus (the opposite being more likely); page 70 has the Jesuits in Ming times enjoying success until persecutions "set in" (rather invited by Rome?); pages 180 ff. give no explanation of how or why the Japanese militarists after 1930 "began exerting a dominating influence over the civil government"; page 184's "However, President Franklin D. Roosevelt," would better read "Moreover, President . . ."; page 231 makes Pakistan "constitutionally" a "theocracy," which it is not; page 233 has American policy bringing the Filipinos toward self-government "after World War I," which would seem to give the unsympathetic Republicans of the 1920's credit for Wilsonian and Rooseveltian steps in that direction; page 206 ff. and page 253, on the American occupation of Japan and Korea, respectively, seem tinged with an overly rosy glow.

There are some errors in dates and spelling: for example, read 1638 for 1689 (p. 10); 9 A.D. for 8 B.C. (p. 44); 1882 for 1878 (p. 146); Pan for P'an but Ch'ien for Chien (p. 46); Chu for Chuh (p. 165); dates of early Chinese dynasties are rounded off mercilessly (p. 39).

These shortcomings detract from the book, but they are not numerous enough to spoil it. The further reading and source lists at the end of the book show the author's acquaintance with and use of numerous standard texts and special studies

in the field. For the uninitiated general reader *Introducing Asia* can serve as a pleasant, easy, and yet sufficiently reliable introduction to a vast and complex field of knowledge.

HILARY CONROY

University of Pennsylvania

LILIENTHAL, ALFRED M. *What Price Israel*. Pp. viii, 274. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. \$3.95.

The establishment of an independent Israel has given rise to some speculation as to what the relationship would be between world Jewry, particularly American Jews, and the new state. The reason for the wonderment lies perhaps in the fact that the event was in a number of ways unique in history—the creation of a state *ex nihilo*, so to speak, by the efforts of people scattered throughout the world but at the same time united by the bonds of a common history and religion. No one wondered what the relationship of American Czechs, Poles, or Lithuanians would be towards their countries of origin after these achieved their independence following World War I, also with the indispensable assistance of Americans, for that was considered as a "natural" occurrence. Yet, basically, the case of Israel is not any different. Only the circumstances are.

After a flurry of excitement over an admittedly remarkable achievement, the Jews, like other ethnic groups in America with a similar experience, are "getting used to the idea." They have been showing, to an ever diminishing degree, be it noted, an interest in the new state, which expresses itself chiefly in monetary contributions. A tiny number, perhaps much smaller than in the case of the above-mentioned nationalities, have even gone to settle there. But beyond that Jews, even when Zionists, remain unquestionably attached as much as any other ethnic group, as other Americans, to their country, which is the United States.

Mr. Lilienthal, however, fears that this is not the case. He feels that the whole effort of American Jews in helping the Palestinian Jews to gain their independence and their subsequent interest in Israel

amount to little less than disloyalty to America. He, therefore, felt duty-bound to write this book to enlighten the American public of the true state of things.

The book is largely devoted to an account of the political efforts of American Jews on behalf of Israel. Now, politics, whether one likes it or not, often involves "ugly" tactics, manipulations, and pressures of all kinds. This undoubtedly was also true in this instance. The author, however, inclines to see in these political activities a kind of sinister plot on the part of American Zionists to sell out American interests. Non-Jews who have been helping in the efforts, from former President Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt, and various senators, congressmen, and governors down to mayors and other civic leaders, are suspected of being either cheap politicians, disregarding American welfare, fools, or dupes of the Zionists. In some cases, they are pictured as individuals seeking expiation for sins they feel they have committed against the Jews and thus relieving their guilty consciences. Mr. Lillienthal somehow cannot conceive of such persons taking an active interest in this "un-American" affair except for ulterior motives. He is bitter, cynical, and even abusive when writing of their role in the Zionist effort. On the other hand, active opponents of Israel—advocates of a pro-Arab policy—are considered as being, by this very fact, humanitarians working for the best interests of America.

Thus, what supposedly was to have been an objective evaluation of an historical event and its implications for America and American Jews, designed to clarify an issue presumably beclouded by misleading propaganda, turns out to be a one-sided and extremely subjective interpretation of it which the reader is asked to accept as fact.

SAMUEL KOENIG

Brooklyn College

PATAI, RAPHAEL. *Israel Between East and West: A Study in Human Relations*. Pp. xiv, 348. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1953. \$4.50.

Geographically, Israel is situated in the Middle East; its social-economic-political-

cultural structure is, however, based on Western patterns. More than half of its present population is European or American born, and the rest is of Asiatic and African origin. During the first four years of its existence (1948-52), the State of Israel doubled its population by absorbing some 700,000 immigrants, one-half of whom came from Africa and Asia and the other half from Western countries. On the crossroads between East and West, Israel, in its internal demographic structure and rapidly changing socio-cultural values, presents an interesting field to the social scientist.

Professor Patai, having lived in Jerusalem for some 14 years prior to the establishment of the State of Israel and having visited Israel twice in the last five years, has attempted to treat the topic from the human relations angle. Professor Patai approaches his study with sympathy, with the command of the language of the country, and with access to its current publications; it is regrettable that the result is far from satisfactory.

The author's long historical digressions are not always illuminating and are often superfluous. The book contains many statistical tables, quoted from reliable sources, but Professor Patai quite often applies the statistics of 1939-40 to the entirely different scene of the 1950's. Again, it is one thing to cite statistics of 1950 for illustration purposes but not quite justifiable to draw "scientific" conclusions from constantly changing figures relating to the short period of Israel's existence as a State. The sources used by the author are a mixed lot; alongside most reliable ones, the author sometimes depends too much on a newspaper article. At times the informed reader will wonder where the author gathered, for instance, that "the most numerous Oriental Jewish community [in Israel] insists on separate schools for their own children" (pp. 284-5). It just is not so.

However, the main shortcoming of the book is a more serious one. The author embarked on his study with the preconceived basic premise that the European-American born Jews in Israel and those who arrived from Asia and Africa represent the clash between Western and East-

ern civilizations. Glamorizing the Eastern culture and tradition, he bemoans the Western Jews' "colonial" attitude towards what they consider their "inferior" Eastern brethren and their attempt to force westernization on them. The premise does not hold true in Israel. Many of the facts cited by the author in proof of his theory are of a temporary and passing nature, some of them greatly changed even in the few months since the publication of the book.

The 700,000 immigrants from fifty-odd countries, districts and territories, coming from all corners of the earth, have brought with them into Israel fifty-odd languages and cultures representing worlds apart, ranging from medieval times to the twentieth-century atomic age. These newcomers have joined a community of an equal number of Jews, two-thirds of whom have been living in the country less than 15 years, having also arrived from numerous countries with varying backgrounds. Add to that the 170,000 Arabs living in Israel—a mixed lot of Moslem and Christian communities—and you get an unusual melting pot—all of this is in a comparatively small country where an old-new State and cultural society are being rapidly built and expanded, where the country is coping with great economic odds, and where politically it is not yet at peace with its neighbors. The country and its people are facing an interesting challenge, which bears watching. But the problems besetting Israel and their impact on the human relations within its borders are somewhat different from what they appear to be in the book under review.

M. AVIDOR

Jerusalem, Israel

KOENIG, NATHAN. *A Comprehensive Agricultural Program for Puerto Rico*. Pp. xii, 299. Washington, D. C.: United States Department of Agriculture, in co-operation with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1953. \$1.75 (paper).

Koenig, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture in the United States, produced this study in co-operation with some 100 agricultural experts in Puerto

Rico organized in 14 task forces. The book presents very extensive, detailed information concerning most aspects of agriculture and rural life in Puerto Rico and is useful for their improvement. The effective utility of the book has been enhanced by the series of conferences on the Island in which Mr. Koenig took part following its publication, by the extensive reports about the book in the newspapers, and now by its use in the public school system. This is entirely consonant with the practice of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which stimulates research about its basic problems and then uses the research extensively in drafting its policy and in launching its operations.

Agriculture provides 40 per cent of the national income of Puerto Rico, which is too low for a reasonable level of living (the per capita income is about four and a half times greater on the Mainland). If present knowledge about seeds and cultivation were used, food production, exclusive of sugar (which cannot be expanded beyond its legal quota of 1,080,000 tons), could be increased 171 per cent in about ten or fifteen years. Improvement and diversification would increase the production of many crops for the local as well as the export market: for example, oranges could be increased 289 per cent, avocados 295 per cent, sweet potatoes 252 per cent, bananas 97 per cent, corn 155 per cent, and cotton 321 per cent. To attain these goals, three factors must be greatly improved and expanded: education, capital and credit, and market facilities.

The definition of these goals and of the factors which would make them attainable in about a decade is a valuable instrument for the improvement of agriculture and the level of living in Puerto Rico. The detailed information facilitates planning and operations to diversify and modernize food production. But the difficulty which is not sufficiently recognized is the cost of improvement. Only 53 per cent of rural children of school age are in school despite the fact that the government spends over one-fourth its budget for education. Similarly, where will capital be found for the

cost of improvements in farm operations and for the purchase of family farms? Development always hinges upon improved education and increases of capital, but their cost in low income economies can only be met very slowly. In this competent study, the cost of the improvements recommended is rarely counted.

MILLARD WINCHESTER HANSEN
University of Puerto Rico

LINARES QUINTANA, SEGUNDO V. *Tratado de la Ciencia del Derecho Constitucional*. Vols. I and II. Pp. 505; 513. Buenos Aires: Editorial Alfa, 1953. No price.

Segundo V. Linares Quintana, who has established a reputation as one of Argentina's most distinguished scholars and most prolific writers in the field of constitutional law, has just published the first two volumes of a massive five-volume "Treatise on the Science of Constitutional Law." Two more volumes are now in press; the final volume has yet to be written. Each of the first two volumes contains more than 500 pages, so it is reasonable to assume that the final work will run to about 2,500 pages, or very nearly one million words.

The scope of the work is sufficiently broad to justify such an outpouring of words. It ranges from ancient Greece to modern Argentina; from the United States of America to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It deals with the antecedents of constitutional government (Vol. I, Pt. I) and also with constitutional law in the atomic age (Vol. I, Pt. IV). It has something to say about almost every modern constitution, and about some of the more important documents of earlier days. Indeed, the author's principal weakness—if indeed it can be considered a weakness—is his tendency to cover too much ground without saying a great deal about any one subject. Yet he could fairly say in rebuttal that his remarks, though often brief, are almost always to the point, and that he has performed a real service by bringing so much material together in a single integrated work.

One may perhaps wonder how anyone can talk and write freely about constitutional guarantees of liberty in Perón's Ar-

gentina. The answer may perhaps be that such an attempt is foredoomed to failure. Dr. Linares Quintana served as professor of constitutional law in the Universities of Buenos Aires and Eva Perón (formerly La Plata) for many years, but he has recently been dismissed for failure to expound the "national doctrine"—in other words, the Peronista hocus-pocus that goes by the name of *Justicialismo*. The first two volumes of Linares Quintana's new work have indeed been published in Buenos Aires, and have not been confiscated by the authorities. But their subject matter is quite general, and their criticisms of the Perón regime are merely implied. So neither the author nor the censor has yet met the acid test, which must be faced in subsequent volumes. The very fact that such questions must be raised is an eloquent indictment of Perón's Argentina.

AUSTIN F. MACDONALD
University of California

WAGLEY, CHARLES. *Amazon Town: A Study of Man in the Tropics*. Pp. xi, 305. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$5.00.

This is a socio-anthropological study of the inhabitants of a small town in the Amazon Valley of Brazil. It is based mainly on data gathered from June to September 1948, during a survey of UNESCO for the International Hylean Amazon Institute. During these three months, Dr. Wagley, Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University, and his associates lived in the community (referred to throughout the book by the fictitious name of *Ita*), visited in the homes of the residents, participated in the daily life activities, and collected case studies of 113 families covering details of their diet, expenditures, income, personal possessions, and other related information.

The book supposedly gives a representative picture of conditions in the region of the Brazilian Amazon "where a distinctive way of life has been formed by the fusion of American Indian and Portuguese cultures during the past centuries." It is both a study of the adaptation of man to a tropical environment and a study of an underdeveloped area.

The scope of the work is best indicated by the titles of the eight chapters arranged in order as follows: I. The Problem of Man in the Tropics; II. An Amazon Community; III. Making a Living in the Tropics; IV. Social Relations in an Amazon Community; V. Family Affairs in an Amazon Community; VI. People Also Play; VII. From Magic to Science; VIII. A Community in an Under-Developed Area.

The author finds that the standards of living in *Ita* are relatively low as indicated by such factors as the primitive agricultural techniques, inadequate housing, lack of sanitation, and high death rates. He points out that anthropologists have often argued for "cultural relativity," insisting that progress, good and evil, success and failure, beauty and ugliness, are values relative to the particular culture in which they are found. While he feels that this point of view is helpful in teaching one to understand, tolerate, and respect other ways of life, he would also hold that "when a culture, through lack of technological equipment and for reasons of social organization, fails to provide for the material needs of man beyond a mere survival level, that society and culture must be judged inferior."

The author is convinced that the major deficiencies in well-being in this area are due to social and cultural factors and could be altered greatly by the introduction of different techniques and ways of doing things. He says "tropical climate presents many difficulties to human life, but none that are insurmountable when adequate technical equipment is available." He hastens to add that never in history has the best of Western technology been available to the people of this area. The author contends that our most advanced technology is aimed at controlling and exploiting the Temperate Zone. The central problem, therefore, is one of adapting some of the modern techniques of living now found in the Temperate Zone to tropical conditions; and to do this in such a manner as to retain the many positive values which have survived through generations of life in that area.

The book is interestingly written and

should be of interest both to the layman and to the student of the social sciences.

N. L. WHETTEN

University of Connecticut

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PRISONS IN TRANSFORMATION

Edited by

THORSTEN SELLIN, Ph.D., LL.D.

Professor of Sociology

University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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FOREWORD

Twenty-three years ago—in September 1931—a volume of THE ANNALS dealt with prison reform. Then, as well as now, recent riots and disturbances had revealed glaring defects in our prison system. Most of those defects still exist, for progress in penology moves on leaden feet, but here and there penal management and methods are being reorganized so that better advantage may be taken of our growing scientific knowledge of human behavior and our penal institutions transformed into positive assets in the prevention of recidivism, which is their primary task. The authors of the articles in this volume are active and prominent members of the vanguard of this movement, and I owe them all a special debt of appreciation for their friendly co-operation.

THORSTEN SELLIN

The Prison: Asset or Liability?

By SANFORD BATES

AN *asset*, according to my dictionary, is "any article of value in the valuation of a person's property as compared with his debts." The plural of the word is defined as the "entire property of a person, association, or corporation, applicable to the payment of debts."

A *liability* is "state of being liable; debt or obligation," and the plural means "debts or money claims against a person or a company."

Nevertheless we need not be too hasty in assuming that because the prison is a place where a great many men are sent for the purpose of paying their debt to society it may be accounted an asset.

Modern society must invest money in a number of projects which it would be difficult to classify as assets under our definition, yet they serve a purpose and contribute to the welfare of a community. A prison may be a dismal place and at the same time a necessary investment in the safety of a modern state.

The question implicit in the title might be put this way, Does a prison do more good than harm, that is, does it increase general public safety and prosperity? or, by intensifying the resentments and inabilities of its inmates, does it diminish the public safety? If it does the former, it could be regarded as an asset. If the amount of good is exceeded by the amount of harm done, then it may fall into the classification of liability. But having so classified the prison, we should still find difficulty in knowing what to do with it, or what to do with the human beings confined in it.

More than two decades ago the so-called Wickersham Commission appointed in Washington to investigate the treatment of crime and criminals, in one of its volumes, undoubtedly written by Frank Tannenbaum, condemned prisons in unmeasured terms as positively harmful. The point was made that they did not succeed as a school for the instruction of inmates, as a business enterprise for the production of usable goods, or as a disciplinary institution. Parenthetically one might ask how, under the circumstances generally prevalent in a place of punishment, adult men can be educated under duress, or how a business could succeed if it took only the community's rejects for workmen, had no way of discharging them, and gave them very little incentive to produce good products.

These thoughts raise the question as to what we have a right to expect from the prison as we now operate it. While men are sent to prison as a penalty for a wrong they have committed, with the inherent promise by the court that there they will be taught through suffering and deprivation not to offend again, is it fair to expect the prison to be a truly regenerating influence?

THREE PURPOSES OF A PRISON

On one occasion I asked a prison guard who was a candidate for civil service promotion in a certain eastern state, "What are the three purposes of a prison?" His answer was: "(1) to punish murderers, (2) to punish robbers, and (3) to punish burglars." That could well have been a correct answer a century ago. Even a schoolboy today gives the following answer: (1)

to carry out the sentence of the court and administer punishment to the individual; (2) by so doing to deter others from crime; and (3) to rehabilitate the individual prisoner and thus prevent his recidivating.

Is it possible to achieve these three objects simultaneously? If we place too much emphasis on one, do we jeopardize success in the other directions? Many go so far as to justify withholding a complete system of rehabilitation lest the notion of deterrence be minimized. As I have said elsewhere, is it possible to make a man sorry that he committed a crime and yet glad that he went to prison on account of it? It sounds a bit absurd put this way, but how much short can we fall of this dual accomplishment and still say that the prison is an asset?

In a challenging article entitled "Keep Your Convicts,"¹ a prominent industrialist some years ago advanced the theory that it was not the commission of the crime that made men unacceptable to a job in industry but the fact that they had spent some time in prison as a result of it. Have we got ourselves into something of an impasse in the solution of our problem, if the remedy proposed for crime does more harm than the crime itself?

Can we punish constructively? Or, stated otherwise, does the degree to which the prison foregoes punishment measure its success as a social instrument? Without withholding punishment and risking success on the first two of the objectives of a prison, have we ability and insight enough to make punishment through deprivation and discipline an improving experience?

We have been asking ourselves these questions for a great many years, and we have with considerable optimism

¹ Christopher Rollman, *Forum*, Vol. 97 (February 1937), pp. 102-5.

felt that these three objects could be reconciled and that the prison might become an asset. But things have happened in the last two years that make it necessary for us to re-examine our conclusions. A series of destructive prison riots, an unprecedented record of escapes from our juvenile correctional institutions, and a disheartening rise in the rates of crime and juvenile delinquency have somewhat shaken our faith.

MASSACHUSETTS STATE PRISON—1811

Let me show you two pictures. The first comes from a book printed in 1811 describing the Massachusetts State Prison:

... the outer walls are 4 ft. and the partition walls, 2 ft. thick. Each cell has two openings for the admission of air and light, each 2 ft. in height and 4 inches wide ... with glazed windows, double-grated with iron bars 2 inches square ... competent judges pronounce this to be among the strongest and best built prisons in the world. It has these advantages over other buildings of its kind. It can neither be set on fire by the prisoners nor be undermined. Its walls are built of hard flint stone from 6 to 14 ft. long.²

Among the rules set up at that time by a board of managers imbued "with the heartfelt desire of aiding in the honourable and Christian views of the governments" were the following:

If the warden ... shall suffer any convict committed and in custody as aforesaid under sentence of solitary imprisonment to be at large without the cell or apartment assigned to such convict, or to be there visited, conversed with, comforted or relieved, contrary to the rules

² *Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Massachusetts State Prison by the Board of Directors, With a Description of the Edifice, An Act of the Legislature on the Subject, and Remarks on the Present State of the Institution* (Boston: J. Belcher, 1811), p. iii.

and regulations of said prisons ... he shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding \$500.00. ...

Each of the officers of the prison shall be furnished with a gun, bayonet, the necessary accoutrements, and a cartridge box containing at least twelve cartridges with balls, and a strong heavy cutlass to be kept in good order in a safe and convenient place for use, in cases of insurrection of convicts and when self-defense becomes indispensable.

To prevent as far as possible intercourse with the convicts from abroad, to seclude them from the world, and thereby to leave them, as far as it is practicable, to their own reflections, to profit by the lessons of morality and religion bestowed on them while in confinement, that when they again return to society they may be improved in their minds and dispositions, it is important that as few visitors as possible be admitted within the precincts of the Prison.³

A prison menu

The diet of the prisoners will be as follows:

Monday, Thursday, and Sunday	Breakfast and Supper—Three gills of Indian meal made into hasty pudding, half a gill of molasses, half a pound of coarse bread.
	Dinner—Three quarters of a pound of coarse meat or offal made into soup, half a pint of potatoes, and half a pound of coarse bread.
	Breakfast and Supper the same.
Tuesday and Friday	Dinner—One quarter of a pound of salted pork, half a pint of peas or beans, and half a pound of coarse bread.
	Breakfast and Supper the same.
Wednesday and Saturday	Dinner—Half a pound of salted fish with one ounce of butter or hogs' lard, and half a pound of coarse bread, and a pint of potatoes. ⁴
	Breakfast and Supper the same.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. viii, 11-12.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

This house of punishment

While it is melancholy to find so many of our fellow beings lost to honesty and virtue, as to be sentenced to this house of punishment, it is a solace of incalculable value to find that here they are well taken care of, sufficiently though coarsely clad and fed, that in the regular routine of labour, they acquire counter habits to their former lives of idleness and profligacy, and are favoured with a steady attention to their moral and religious conduct and conversation, and that all which human benevolence can accomplish is here industriously and anxiously applied that there may be "joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth."

With the heartfelt desire of aiding in the honourable and Christian views of the governments, the present Directors have undertaken to perform the arduous duties assigned them by the Executive. In their regulations respecting visitors they have been governed by a knowledge of the evil which a promiscuous admission of company occasions. They hope in this and their other regulations to receive the support of their fellow citizens, and they sincerely desire that the blessing of providence may aid their humble exertions for the welfare of those unfortunate beings whose depredations on society have subjected them to the discipline of the Prison; and that those who are restored to society, as well as such who are condemned to pass their miserable lives in penitence and labour, may have reason in another and a better world to bless the authors of this institution.⁵

Although it is written as fiction, Dr. A. J. Cronin's recent book, *Beyond This Place*, presents a graphic record of what the old-time prison could do to the character of even a decent individual.

Suppose we now move ahead 140 years and for our second picture visit one of the new federal penitentiaries or a modern prison in a northeastern state.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

TODAY'S PRISON

Except for those who live in dormitories, each prisoner has a separate cell, frequently somewhat like a menagerie cage, to be sure, but fairly well ventilated (often in the newer prisons by an outside window), with running water, a bed and mattress, and probably a toilet. He goes out three times a day to meals, where he may converse with his fellow convicts. A considerable number of the prisoners have daily work to perform, albeit not at a high rate of speed and with very small wages, sometimes a few cents a day. In the winter he will have at least an hour a day in the open air, and in the summer perhaps two or three hours, with opportunity for baseball, softball, touch football, and so forth. He will see one movie a week; he will have a radio in his cell, although he may have to deposit a dollar or two for the rent of the headphones (some of our prisoners object to being obliged to pay this amount); and he will have access to a fairly good library. His diet, in contrast with that described in the first picture, will be selected by a dietitian, and, although it will not be sumptuous, it will be designed to furnish an adequate amount of nourishment, and he may supplement it with limited purchases from a commissary. He will be visited by the doctor, the psychiatrist, the chaplain, the social worker, and he can have an interview with the warden or the deputy warden at reasonable times. He will have a visit perhaps once a week or every two weeks from his relatives, and from his lawyer at any time he wishes. He has free access in writing to the governor, the courts, the commissioner, the head of the department, and the judge who sentenced him. He can receive a practically unlimited number of letters and write to approved correspondents. If a near relative dies or is fatally ill, in

most prisons he will be allowed, in the company of an officer, to make a visit home. And, finally, when a small part of his sentence is served he will appear before the Parole Board, where he will have a personal hearing and, unless his record is bad and the prospects of his success are dim, he will have opportunity to serve the latter part of his sentence under supervision in the open air.

At the time of our disturbances in the spring of 1952 we were amazed to receive letters from susceptible people who pictured the men in our prisons as living in dark cells and being beaten and starved. We pointed out that they were infinitely better off than men in most European prisons.

Now comes the "sixty-four dollar question." Does the prison of today as described above have greater success in reforming individuals and preventing crime than did its grimmer predecessor? Why did prisoners recently stage such violent disturbances at a considerable risk to themselves? Is there an analogy between the change in prisons and the change in our society generally? We all now have many more creature comforts and more of the habiliments of civilization than formerly, but are we any better behaved? Are we actuated more by ethical concepts than when living conditions were more severe and we lived more simply? Has the improvement in our prisons been limited to these material matters, and have we failed to recognize the spiritual needs of the men who live there and their need for self-discipline?

PRISON REALITIES

The causes of crime are many and complex, and it is generally conceded that the conditions in our prisons contribute only to a very minor extent to the prevalence of crime. But, we must ask, are there conditions existing that,

no matter how improved may be the prison plant, still militate against complete success? The fact persists that no matter how sumptuous we might make a prison, it would still be a prison. Men would be sent there not because it was deemed to be a pleasant place but because they were to be punished or deprived or disciplined. Nothing really compensates for the loss of liberty. Prisoners must be recognized as being difficult personalities to start with; they have become used to self-indulgence; they have been conditioned to believe that the crooked get along best; the character of their environment may have put a premium on stealing, conning, and lying. In the institution they will be introduced immediately to an abnormal condition where there must be conformity, and a stifling of emotions and appetites; they will be surrounded by rules and reminders of restraint; they will have to get accustomed to the restricted life of an institution and when their term is over they will have to be reaccustomed to the greater freedom and self-reliance on the outside. There are ample reasons why men are not, even in our best prisons, broadened by confinement.

In the midst of our present-day concern over the increase in juvenile delinquency and the stubborn prevalence of criminal activity, we are assailed by new and recurring doubts as to whether we have been going too far or even in the right direction in the treatment of the delinquent and the criminal. For example, has the juvenile court made too many naïve assumptions about the effectiveness of kindness on youngsters? Does the Youth Authority have a complete realization of the facts of life in its application of a more indulgent approach to the adolescent criminal? In our modern institutions have we relied too heavily on the mere relaxation of punishment?

I inquired of a well-known Wall Street financier, who was serving a term, what he thought of the prison. His reply was, "Too long and too easy." It has been pointed out that celerity and certainty of punishment are more deterrent than severity. Perhaps because we apprehend such a small proportion of offenders, we lengthen the sentence out of all reason and then attempt to ameliorate conditions by granting privileges and to shorten the sentences by early releases. It is the fact of being caught and imprisoned that deters crime as much as what happens inside.

PUNISHMENT

If the prison is to become an asset, we cannot do away with punishment without putting some new motivation in its place. We cannot abolish the old kind of prison treatment without installing a new and equally effective discipline.

It is an ignorant or cowardly warden who as a result of the bestowal of excessive indulgences and unearned privileges eventually finds that the prisoners are taking over the management of his institution. His successor will pay with blood, sweat, and tears for his interpretation of what constitutes modern penology. A warden who is sufficiently honest and sincere to be safe from criticism, who is courageous enough to insist on obedience by all, and who is wise enough and calm enough to explain the necessity for such discipline may have a rough time of it for a while, but he will be the one who in the long run will set the standards of the new prison treatment.

Punishment is the necessary result of a breach of law, whether it be a law of nature or a law of man. In neither case will the punishment always be inflicted for the first offense. Winston Churchill realized that punishment was an essen-

tial element in reformation when he referred many years ago to men in prison who "have paid their due in the hard coinage of punishment." But if the prison is to be an asset, the punishment necessarily administered must not be brutal or vengeful or so out of proportion to the character of the crime as to defeat its ends. It can be made to mean something, even though this result can be achieved only by intelligent and resourceful men and women.

CONTRIBUTING DISCIPLINES

The kind of psychiatrist who says that all convicts are sick men dodges an issue and so far has presented no ready cure for the sickness.

The social worker who believes he must keep on the side of his convicts is on the wrong side; he must get them on the side of law and order. The rather ridiculous stories in the book called *My Six Convicts*, so presented as to lead the reader to believe they were facts, are an example of this disastrous philosophy. They were not the author's six convicts. Rather was it his responsibility to see that they realized they belonged to society and must be loyal to it, not to him.

The chaplain who preaches that the Lord will forgive sinners must not attempt to make a hit with his compulsory parishioners by absolving them of blame for their acts.

And the teacher who merely makes a crook a more able or intelligent crook has not made him a better citizen.

Practitioners of all of these disciplines, however, must of necessity have a hand in the conduct of a modern prison.

Every person from the warden down to the lowest watchman in a penal institution should have a *psychiatric* approach, the kind of approach which looks beyond the name of the crime which a man committed and into the motivations which led him to do it. He

can understand these motivations without condoning or relieving the individual of responsibility.

All should have the approach of the *social worker*, who seeks not to relieve an individual of his responsibility to himself, to his wife and family, to his community, and to his state, but to confront him with these responsibilities and show him how to fulfill them.

Likewise, all should have the *religious* approach which leaves vengeance to the Lord and tries to assist an individual, through penance and promise, without thought of selfishness or sadism.

Finally, nothing is more important in a prison than to substitute the *educational* approach for the punitive one. There may be in the institution only a few professional schoolteachers, but the whole staff can go about their tasks as though the prison were a school in which adult men can learn even while undergoing an unpleasant experience.

The warden who faces the discouraged, envious, selfish, scheming, and disappointed group of individuals who are given into his charge needs the advice and assistance of all these disciplines. Prisoners, whatever may be their relative positions on the outside, have equal rights, privileges, and obligations when they come into his institution. He will be confronted by men who are sharp and clever and quick to take advantage of his weaknesses, but he will do his job best not by showing the inmates how they can escape punishment but how they can profit by it. The head of a prison who towards his group shows friendliness, courage, good humor, infinite patience, combined with an inexorable sense of justice and a strict adherence to the law and the regulations, will deserve success.

One of the great contributions to penology was made by the late Kenneth Pray, Dean of the Pennsylvania School of Social Work, in a paper de-

livered before the National Conference on Social Work. He did not take the position maintained by some social workers and psychiatrists that punishment should be eliminated because it makes rehabilitation less likely, but he advanced the theory that through punishment men can become better, that punishment can be constructive and helpful, that the opportunity of social workers is to make this interpretation to the probationer, the parolee, the prisoner, and their families, not without sympathy but still with firmness reconciling them to their situation and assisting them to profit from it.

PRESENT STANDARDS

The treatment of the convicted offender is so important a matter that sentiment should not supplant or impede sound judgment—and this means excessive sentiment in either direction. A desire to coddle the criminal is as bad as a vengeful attitude towards every person who has received a sentence.

Of course, a prison to be an asset must be built according to the architecture of 1950, not 1800. It must have guards who are recruited not because of their physical prowess but because of the breadth of their vision and the depth of their understanding. It must be under the control of a warden who is not selected because he carried a certain county for a certain political party, but because he understands human beings and what can be done for them and is not afraid to enforce the rules against them.

It must also provide meaningful work for prisoners. The misguided viewpoint that just because men have committed a crime they should not be permitted to labor and help support themselves and their dependents must be replaced by a realization that human beings, in as well as out of prison, must be taught

that they may live only by the sweat of their brow. The distinguished committee that investigated the riots in New Jersey made this statement in their report:

All those who had short-sightedly opposed the extension of a reasonably diversified system of productive industries, none of which would be large enough to offer any serious competition to free labor and all of which would be producing goods for the use of the departments and agencies of the State and its political subdivisions, must accept their share of the blame for the situation at the time of the riots.*

The prison must offer opportunity for spiritual contact and for education, not only in the multiplication table but for living, which includes the practice of group therapy as made famous in some of the New Jersey institutions. And all these opportunities must be based upon a firm, reasonable, and well-interpreted disciplinary procedure.

If the chance can be given to the inmates to perform a service to their fellow men, as happened in the experiments carried to success in some prisons during the war, where new serums were perfected which saved the lives of thousands of servicemen, then that may be the finest discipline that could be devised. It certainly is in the public interest to teach prisoners the value of a requital, that by serving the public they have wronged they can balance the account in their favor.

A wise warden will find opportunity within the limits of authoritative control to organize the well-behaved members of the inmate body into a committee with whom he can consult.

After serving sentences whose terms have been lengthened or shortened according to their deserts, prisoners will be sent out not with a suit of clothes

* Report of the Committee to Examine and Investigate the Prison and Parole Systems of New Jersey, Trenton, N. J., 1952.

that can be easily recognized and nothing in their pockets, but with parole supervision under a system whereby the public can be protected from future depredations and the parolee assisted over a difficult transitional period.

It will take courageous and persistent leadership to bring about this kind of a prison, but it can be done without sacrifice of the sanctions of the law.

Careful reading of the authoritative document issued by the American Prison Association as to the causes of the riots indicates that in most cases one or all of the above characteristics had been lacking in the prisons where trouble started. These lacks were many times emphatically not the responsibility of the warden or the supervisory department but had resulted from careless legislation or from a lack of understanding by the public.

The old-time penology was easy, but its harvest of embittered and dangerous men was great. The newer principles of penology which the American Prison Association has been advocating for many years are not easy to implement. Justice Brandeis once said of democracy that "it demands continuous sacrifice by the individual and more exigent obedience to the moral law than any other form of government." In the same way it will require more than lip service to these principles to improve conditions in our prisons permanently. It is hard for prisons to stay reformed. They can quickly become a liability.

PUBLIC INTEREST

One encouraging factor nowadays which must be noted is that the prison has ceased to be the thing of mystery and neglect that it was a century ago. Through frequent visits to inmates, through practically unlimited correspondence, in and out, through the admission of newspapers and radio to the prison, through frequent visits by law-

yers, legislators, and others, the prison has now become, as never before, the interest and the responsibility of the public. If alert, the public will realize that it has an interest not only in the cost of prisons, not only in the proper control and distribution of products of prison labor, but in the reliability of their human produce, the degree to which prison treatment has been effective. It must live as neighbors with the men who are discharged therefrom, and unless the underlying purpose of imprisonment has been not revenge but discipline, society will not be protected beyond the mere time of incarceration.

LIABILITY OR ASSET?

If carelessly handled, the prison will always be a liability. It can make bad men worse. It can teach habits of idleness and slothfulness, and it can give men opportunity to connive for the commission of even worse crimes.

On the other hand, the prison can teach lessons in self-control through discipline, educate men for life in a democratic civilization, rid diseased bodies and minds of their disqualifications, inculcate habits of work, and present valuable opportunities for research into the nature of crime and the causes of criminality.

Many years ago President Hoover asked me a searching question: "Which is the more important to our communities, to reform the small number of criminals that get into our penitentiaries or to teach the great mass of our citizens that crime does not pay?" I, of course, made the obvious reply that with proper conditions both could be done, that there was no fundamental or insuperable inconsistency between these two objectives.

Winston Churchill, in the quotation referred to above, urged an "unfailing faith that there is a treasure, if you

can only find it, in the heart of every man." With this optimistic viewpoint the prison which aims to bring out the best in each inmate may become an asset to the community. If it merely confirms and intensifies the worst, it must remain a liability.

As Kenyon Scudder says in the title of his book, "Prisoners Are People," and the prison must act on this simple assumption even though they are bad people. And, finally, we do not have to decide on the future of the prison by deciding whether it is an asset or a liability, because in a sense the public has no choice. Some kind of an insti-

tution for the protection of the public and the discipline of its inmates must be maintained. Although alternatives to the prison such as probation, parole, and honor camps may be developed, the hard core of determined criminals must be segregated for a time, and perhaps forever, from their fellow men. Whether in the future we can call the prison by a different name depends upon the success that we achieve in improving its objectives. Let us hope that, like any good business house, it will be able at least to keep its balance sheet such that whatever its liabilities may be they will always be exceeded by its assets.

Sanford Bates, LL.B., LL.D., Trenton, New Jersey, has been commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies since 1945. He was commissioner of Boston's penal institutions (1918-19) and of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (1919-29), director of the federal Bureau of Prisons (1930-37), executive director of Boys Clubs of America (1937-40), and parole commissioner of New York State (1940-45). He is president of the board of Federal Prison Industries, Inc., has served as president of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, and received in 1950 a decoration from the Dutch government for his long services in the field of international prison reform. Besides serving as officer or board member of many organizations he has been a lecturer at various universities and schools and is the author of Prisons and Beyond (1938).

Evaluating a Prison

By JAMES V. BENNETT

TIME was when the American prison was the subject of great controversy at home and abroad. Principles of justice and humanitarianism were at stake. Men of stature and vision were active in the two great cultural centers of a young nation, Boston and Philadelphia, and visitors like Dickens and Tocqueville were finding the American prison a fascinating social experiment. But these debates were concerned largely with the value of imprisonment as a deterrent to crime. Only Dickens tried to judge prisons on their disciplinary methods, on their program, and on the way they were administered. More recently "prison reform" has been the cement which bound many a Victorian era group together so that it could decry the inhumanities of some prisons, the economic drag of the contract-labor system, and the blight partisan politics cast on penal progress. The controversies that raged about the mutual welfare league of Thomas Mott Osborne caused sharp clashes of opinion among prison administrators as to the validity of his methods. And now more recently the rash of prison riots has caused searching inquiry as to why they occurred, how they can be prevented, and by what standards a prison can be evaluated.

What indeed are the fundamental criteria for judging the modern prison? Results, to be sure, would be the supreme test. But the figures available to show the kind of prisons that turn out the largest proportion of men who do not again come in conflict with the law are meager and open to question, as incidentally are most of the statistics relating to crime.

Parenthetically, one of the crying needs in the field of correctional work is for more information about the influence of the various programs of treatment on the conduct and adjustment of the offender. Yet at the present time no research of any kind is being carried on to determine the effect of different methods of institutional treatment. We must depend on such figures about repeaters as come from the Census Bureau report. For the year 1946 these show that of the 36,926 prisoners released from state institutions 53.9 per cent had had prior commitments.¹ In other words prison had failed to rehabilitate, redirect, frighten—describe it as you will—over half of those sent to them. But when these figures, bad as they are, are analyzed in detail they show how inconsistent are those making the report. We note for example such absurdities as Virginia having only 13.7 per cent of its prisoners returning while in West Virginia 51.1 per cent were repeaters.²

A much better basis for judging failures or successes comes from carefully made samplings. Several of these indicate that at least 55 to 60 per cent of the prisoners leaving prison today will return within five years. In some places the recidivist rate exceeds 70 per cent. We must be cautious, however, in too quickly condemning the prison, because a large proportion of the more hopeful offenders are skimmed off by the ever

¹ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories, 1946* (Washington, D. C., 1948), p. 95, Table 60.

² *Loc. cit.* See also the article by George B. Vold, "Does the Prison Reform?" in this issue of *THE ANNALS*.

widening use of probation, leaving the prison to work with the handicapped, the seriously psychopathic, and the habitual offender. A man having absolutely no arrest record, no prior commitments of any kind, is a rare arrival in all prisons. The truly first-time loser in prison is limited to a few accidental offenders, contempt of court cases, and white-collar criminals.

Lacking unassailable statistical data we must judge the prison then on the basis of empirical standards. We have to ask ourselves whether this or that situation or program is calculated to bring about the desired results. We appraise much of our educational program, our courts, our law enforcement agencies on whether their methods will stand time-honored tests. And so it must be with prisons. What scale can be used to find the specific gravity or, to change the metaphor, "the atomic weight" of a penal system?

LIMITED ESCAPES

The first, and to many, the only measure needed to determine how well a prison serves its purpose is to decide whether the sentences of the court are faithfully executed. Here the prisons rate high. Few men escape permanently. When one takes into consideration the antiquity of most prisons, the flimsiness of some prison structures, the Rube Goldberg character of the

locking devices, the hit or miss standards used in selecting men for "trustworthy" assignments, the extent of overcrowding, personnel shortages, and the increasingly more desperate character of offenders, there are few enough escapes. For the calendar year 1952 the numbers of escapes and returnees are given in the accompanying table.

In other words, a relatively small number of prisoners succeed in escaping when one remembers that upwards of 200,000 men and women spend some time in prison each year. Out of the average prison population on any one day—about 150,000—less than 200 were unaccounted for at the end of the year. These may yet be captured, of course. Since January 1, 1937 upwards of 300,000 men have been committed to federal prisons, and out of those who have escaped or walked away from farms and camps, only 7 are now unaccounted for.

PRISON EXPENDITURES

Prisons like other public agencies have to be judged on whether the taxpayer is getting full value for his dollar. To say that most penal institutions are prudently and frugally operated is a gross understatement. It would be more accurate to say they are austere operated, getting only crumbs from the most limited of budgets. Comparative data are meager, as methods of

ESCAPES AND ESCAPE RETURNS PER 1,000 PRISONERS—STATE INSTITUTIONS

REGION	ESCAPES		RETURNS FROM ESCAPE	
	Number	Per 1,000 Prisoners Confined	Number	Per 1,000 Prisoners Confined
Northeast.....	154	5	148	5
North Central.....	618	14	557	13
South.....	1,791	33	1,679	31
West.....	227	10	216	10
Total.....	2,790	19	2,600	17

computing prison operation costs vary widely. In judging the dollar costs shown in annual reports and budget statements, one must take into account the size of the institution, its location, salary standards and perquisites of personnel, the extent of farm activities, budgetary practices with respect to inclusion of plant maintenance in operation costs, and a host of other items.

A number of samplings, however, have shown that the cost per prisoner per day for the ordinary prison, omitting hospitals for the criminal insane, women's institutions, and small prisons having a population of less than three hundred, varies roughly as follows:

ITEM	Low	High
Food.....	\$0.40	\$0.85
Clothing.....	0.05	0.25
Medical.....	0.005	0.10
Education & welfare.....	0.00	0.05
Utilities & housekeeping....	0.02	0.15
All other, including transportation.....	0.03	0.15
	\$0.505	\$1.55
Personnel.....	0.15*	3.25
Total.....	\$0.655	\$4.80

* Two states operate their prisons with trusty guards, the only paid personnel being the warden and his staff.

These figures do not take into account credits for industrial earnings or the sale of agricultural products, breeding stock, the value of prisoner labor used in road construction, and the like. As a matter of fact, there are a few prisons that are actually self-supporting or very close to being on a self-sustaining basis.

But taking the very highest figure, ordinary prison operating costs are low enough when one compares them with the cost of hospitals, sanitariums, or homes for the aged, in none of which there is any element of safekeeping.

PERSONNEL

Of equal importance in judging the prison is of course the personnel. Are they individuals of high caliber in all that term connotes? Are they individuals who look upon their job as challenging every one of their faculties, or are they mere litters and timeservers themselves? Are they part of a career service where rewards are made on a basis of merit alone? It goes without saying that the method of appointment and tenure of office have an important bearing on the type of men who manage and operate the prison. If employees are appointed under a genuine merit system, if their tenure is permanent, subject only to removal for misconduct, their sense of security and their independence and objectivity in making decisions are assured. Such persons can be guided by principle and can plan with reference to the future.

Manifestly, one of the tests to be applied in determining the caliber of employees or workers in any occupation is the salary scale. While there are of course some callings which men enter because of satisfactions accruing from the nature of their work, and this applies to some prison workers, in the main the attraction is the pay scale. Where the pay is good competition for jobs is keen and qualifications can therefore be set high. In most American institutions the pay of prison officers is nothing short of scandalous. It ranges from \$100.00 a month for a seventy-hour work week for the ordinary prison officer, or guard as he is frequently called, to a maximum in one state only of \$400.00 a month including overtime pay regularly allowed. The usual scale is now between \$50.00 and \$60.00 per week for a forty-eight-hour week, two weeks' vacation, and a moderate amount of sick leave. In the federal system the entrance pay for custodial officers is

\$3,200.00 per annum gross and the average pay is about \$3,500.00, approximately \$67.00 per week. But in all too many states the pay averages about \$45.00 a week for forty-eight hours' work—roughly \$1.00 an hour as compared to average hourly earnings of \$1.75 an hour for industrial workers. Is it any wonder that the only questions some wardens ask of applicants for jobs are: "Is he warm?" "Can he see?"

The qualifications of a prison officer and the hazards of his job closely approximate those of a member of the state police or highway patrol, and it seems reasonable to suggest that he receive a commensurate salary. But actually this is not the situation in any state or in the federal system. In some systems the officers also receive various perquisites gratis or at a nominal cost. Housing, uniforms, farm products, meals, are frequently extra emolument that makes such jobs more attractive. But even when these are included the pay is usually less than that of a semiskilled industrial worker.

There are other factors to take into account in judging the personnel—the extent of their training, selection methods, retirement provisions, tenure, and the influence of partisan politics. And it is precisely this point which bears so much on the kind of prisons a state operates. Bad as the spoils system is in any public agency, it is fraught with greater danger in the law enforcement field, including prisons, than in any that comes readily to mind. Where prison officers hold their jobs through political preference it is easy to understand how it is possible for favoritism to permeate the system. The "big shot," the "wheels," the "politicos," get their special cells, the privilege of eating special food "off-the-range," unlimited visits, trusty assignments, and similar favors wherever the personnel are responsive to political pressures or jobs are handed

out on a patronage basis. In all too many places wardens are virtually without authority to discharge employees unless they commit some gross breach of the rules.

PLANT AND FACILITIES

The fourth guidepost in measuring a prison is the plant and facilities. Little can be done to upbuild the prisoner unless the environment in which he lives is something more than a cold and comfortless abode of wretchedness. Out of 152 state penal institutions only 17 are less than fifty years old. The Maryland prison was built in 1805. The one presently in use at Charlestown, Massachusetts, held the malcontents and outlaws of the Revolution. The Trenton, New Jersey, prison dates back to 1835. And so it goes. The persistence of these ancient and obsolete structures is of course a millstone about the neck of progressive penology. No counterpart to this longevity can be found in any other public institution. They no more can serve the purpose demanded of a modern correctional system or carry the load heaped upon them by a public and by courts who demand the reform or care of a psychopathic sex offender, a drug addict, or a sworn enemy of society than the rude bridge that arched the flood can carry today's turnpike traffic. It is self-evident that there can be no program directed at giving the prisoner skills unless there are shops, classrooms, industrial facilities, and equipment. Chapels, auditoriums, libraries, and counseling facilities must also be available for helping wherever there is any possibility of reaching and changing the prisoner's philosophy and his way of life. No prison can operate unless it has a modernly equipped hospital, not only to treat the prisoner's physical ailments but to rid him wherever possible of those physical handicaps which are so

often an important contributing factor to his maladjustment.

One of the reasons why prisons have moved forward at so sluggish a pace and cramped antiquated institutions continue to struggle along in crowded cities with cold-water cells, walk-arounds for recreation yards, and dilapidated shops is the failure of the administrator to recognize that these ancient bastilles reach a point when no more money should be spent upon them. To attempt to modernize a century-old institution by patching up long outmoded cell blocks or crowding modern kitchen facilities or a hospital amidst a jumble of cell blocks, shops, or storerooms is wasteful in the extreme. And where this is done it is a faithful index of the sort of leadership a prison system boasts.

PRISON ARCHITECTURE

Another test for use in judging a penal system is the extent to which the architectural standards of a hundred years ago repeat themselves. John Haviland (1792-1852), the Philadelphia architect, was the father of classic American prison architecture. His ideas as embodied in Philadelphia (the Eastern State Penitentiary), Trenton, New York (the Tombs), and a half-dozen other places have long since been shown to be out of step with modern standards. Yet even today we see them duplicated, with a few modern frills. Concrete and toolproof prison construction reminiscent of John Haviland costs today at least \$10,000 a man in most parts of the country. Some recently constructed prisons have run upwards of \$15,000 a man to build. Individualized casework and classification, however, have taught us that relatively few prisoners require maximum-security facilities of this type. Louisiana is now building an institution to replace the scandalous shacks that made Angola

one of the worst prisons in the United States. The new prison will have diversified types of housing—maximum-custody inside cells, outside strong rooms, different types of dormitories, a hospital, receiving building, administrative offices, and the like at a cost of roughly \$3,000 an inmate exclusive of the cost of the site. It has no wall, of course, and about half of the less difficult type of construction is being done by inmate labor. California's new prison at Soledad, modeled closely along the lines of the federal institution at Terre Haute, cost approximately \$5,000 an inmate. But some prisons complete with a wall, conventional cells, and a reasonable layout of shop buildings are costing, or being estimated at, from \$12,000 to \$15,000 an inmate. This is too high a price for most states, even taking into account current labor and material prices. So something better must be found.

The experience of the State of California with its institution at Chino and of the federal government with its correctional institution at Seagoville, Texas, is living proof that there may be no need to build costly cell blocks except for a few chronic escape artists, a few desperadoes, and a few who have lost all hope. Certainly Chino, Seagoville, Annandale, the Wisconsin prison camp system, and other similar facilities show that there are a substantial number of prisoners who can be handled in so-called "open institutions." As a matter of fact, the old controversies that used to rage about the solitary confinement, or Pennsylvania system, as opposed to the congregate or cellular (Auburn) system have their counterparts today in discussions as to the relative merits of a super-security prison like the new Norfolk, Massachusetts, prison or a Seagoville. In its over-all design this new federal prison is constructed on the unit or cottage plan. It has no

walls, no gun towers, no visible physical restraints whatever. Yet it works. It has operated successfully for eight years. During that time 4,382 men have been sent there—most of them directly from the courts with only superficial screening—and yet but 32 have escaped. All of these have been recaptured. California has had much the same experience.

CASE HISTORIES

But no such institution can operate successfully unless its classification methods have been developed to the point where intelligent judgments of each individual prisoner can be made. A fair way to judge a prison is by the kind of records that are maintained. Do they describe fully and accurately the prisoner, his offense, his mental capacity, his employment history, his institutional record—do they give, in short, a complete picture of the prisoner? Good case records are vital to any system that seeks to individualize the treatment of prisoners.

These records too are essential for routine operating purposes. A prisoner cannot be disciplined intelligently unless the deputy warden or the disciplinary committee have knowledge of the prisoner's case history and his whole behavior pattern. Discipline cannot be maintained at a high level through any system of rules, tables of punishment, or arbitrary and hasty decisions. Each case must be handled on its merits by an objective person or group with no show of emotion or assuming the misbehavior to be a personal affront. And every action or observation relating to the prisoner must be painstakingly and fully logged for the guidance of all concerned.

PLANS AND STUDIES

A prison system must also be measured by the amount of thought and

ferment that goes into planning its future development. Obviously there is hardly a state that cannot look forward to the day when its population growth will not require additional correctional institutions. If costly mistakes are to be avoided and advantage taken of employment pump priming through construction of public institutions, advance consideration must be given to future needs. This calls for studies of existing institutional needs, for appraisal of program, for surveys by people outside the system as well as by those closest to the problem. Where there is resistance to acceptance of legislative studies, to reports by informed outsiders, the system will not progress.

PROGRAM AND PHILOSOPHY

But the acid test of the prison is its program and philosophy. A program without a philosophy and without definite objectives is empty of value. An administration without an idea or sense of direction is mere routine. A sound philosophy of prison management will result in a fine balance between the demands of custody and the individual's need for correction and rehabilitation. The elements of a modern prison program are fairly well known, and the recent publication by the American Prison Association, *The Manual of Suggested Standards for a State Correctional System*, marks the diversity and range of these elements. The extent to which they have been put into practice varies widely. Some pessimists have estimated that of the 167,000 men and women in federal and state institutions less than one-third ever come in contact with any real rehabilitative force. This may be so, and if it is a fact it is because those in charge do not really believe prisoners can be rehabilitated or limit their hope to a few who obviously ought not to be considered real criminals in the classic

meaning of that term. If defeatism, mistrust, skepticism, are everywhere manifest, if there is a tongue-in-the-cheek attitude, then, of course, the whole program will be a farce. Such an institutional climate will not be hard to detect and will be the mark and measure of its leadership. It is this constant heart searching to find the good in every prisoner and build upon it that Sir Winston Churchill declares to be an unfailing test of the civilization of any country. Probably no other standard for evaluating a prison is needed.

James V. Bennett, LL.B., LL.D., Chevy Chase, Maryland, has been director of the federal Bureau of Prisons since 1937, having served as assistant director from 1929. After the war he was appointed head of the Prisons Branch of the American Military Government in Germany and later was awarded the War Department's Exceptional Civilian Service medal and the Navy's Distinguished Service Award for this work and for acting as adviser in connection with methods of custody and treatment of military offenders. He is a member of the District of Columbia bar and has been active in the work of the Section of Criminal Law of the American Bar Association, having been its secretary for over ten years.

Behind the Prison Riots*

By AUSTIN H. MACCORMICK

THE years 1952-53 have the dubious distinction of being the darkest years in modern American penal history. During the eighteen months from April 1952 through September 1953 there were about thirty prison riots, or other major disturbances—more than had taken place in the entire preceding quarter-century. In 1951 there were a few disturbances that now appear comparatively unimportant in retrospect. The riots of greatest magnitude and importance began in April 1952, when the violent and destructive revolts that flared up almost simultaneously in the ancient New Jersey Prison at Trenton and the huge Michigan Prison at Jackson touched off a series of explosive disturbances in prisons throughout the country.

The series seems to have stopped at last, except for occasional outbursts in prisons that are still seething with unrest. Long overdue improvements have been made in some prisons; conditions and practices that should never have been allowed to exist are being corrected at last. Concessions have been made to the prisoners, some constructive, others purely conciliatory and of questionable merit. Prison officials have been putting into effect some of the measures of riot prevention and control recommended by the American Prison Association's Committee on Riots, whose excellent report was published in May 1953 and has been widely distributed.

But the prison world is in a period of uneasy calm, at best. The major characteristics of our prisons which formed

the basis of the riots have not materially changed, and the roots of the riots in the minds and emotions of the prisoners probably run deeper and more tangled than ever. Our prisons are still a fertile field for trouble. No state has a right to feel smug or secure because it has escaped trouble thus far. For every prison that had a riot in the 1951-53 series there were a half-dozen that had just as much reason to expect one.

The riot pattern showed neither rhyme nor reason. Riots rocked institutions of every age, size, type, and quality: the oldest, Massachusetts' 148-year-old Charlestown Prison; the newest, California's medium-security institution at Soledad, opened in 1951; the largest, the 6,500-man Jackson Prison; one of the smallest, the 500-man Utah Prison; the Louisiana Penitentiary, rated until recently the worst prison in the country but now being transformed by a reform administration; and the Federal Reformatory for young men at Chillicothe, Ohio, considered one of our best institutions.

The form the riots took in prison after prison did not vary greatly: a sudden flare-up of violent rebellion, seizing of hostages, setting fire to buildings, looting of food supplies, hordes of prisoners running through the cell blocks and yards like madmen, assembling of extra guards and police, display of armed force, negotiations between riot leaders and harried officials, sullen surrender and release of hostages, return to wrecked cell houses, chaos and confusion crippling the prison for months, and finally the ominous quiet of a volcano after an eruption.

The most sinister feature of the 1951-

* This article, with a few changes, was submitted to the *Reader's Digest*; a digest of it was published in the issue of December 1953.

53 riots¹ was the taking of hostages. This was not a new procedure but it had never been done so widely before. That hostages held by desperate prisoners armed with knives are in grave danger is certain, and officials who considered ordering an armed attack on a barricaded building knew that they might be signing the death warrant of guards whose wives were waiting outside the gates of the prison as miners' wives

¹ Chronology of riots, strikes, and other serious disturbances in prisons and reformatories for men in the United States, 1951-53. 1951: May, Utah State Prison, Draper; July, Colorado State Penitentiary, Canon City; August, Utah State Prison, Draper, Oregon State Penitentiary, Salem; October, West Virginia Penitentiary, Moundsville; November, Kilby (Alabama) Prison, Montgomery. 1952: March, New Jersey State Prison, Trenton; April, New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, New Jersey State Prison Farm, Rahway, State Prison of Southern Michigan, Jackson; May, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Idaho State Penitentiary, Boise; June, North Carolina Central Prison, Raleigh, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Kentucky State Penitentiary, Eddyville, California State Prison, Soledad; July, Massachusetts Reformatory, West Concord, State Prison of Southern Michigan, Jackson, Massachusetts State Prison, Charlestown; September, Federal Reformatory, Chillicothe, Ohio, Federal Reformatory, El Reno, Oklahoma, Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard; October, Utah State Prison, Draper, New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard, Ohio Penitentiary, Columbus; December, New Mexico State Penitentiary, Santa Fe. 1953: January, Western State Penitentiary, Pittsburgh, Pa., Western State Penitentiary, Rockview Branch, Bellefonte, Pa.; February, Arizona State Prison, Florence, Oregon State Penitentiary, Salem; April, Minnesota State Prison, Stillwater, United States Penitentiary, Alcatraz Island, Calif.; May, Eastern State Penitentiary, Philadelphia, Pa.; June, New Mexico State Penitentiary, Santa Fe; July, Oregon State Penitentiary, Salem; August, Washington State Reformatory, Monroe; September, Washington State Penitentiary, Walla Walla, Maryland State Reformatory, Breathedsville; October, November, and December, none recorded in *New York Times Index*. Total listed above, May 1951 to December 31, 1953, 39; by years: 1951, 6; 1952, 21; 1953, 12.

wait at the shaft head in a mine disaster.

There have been several instances in prison history where rioters carried through their threats to "send out the hostages' bodies on a platter one at a time" if their demands were not granted. Officials know this, and sometimes negotiate with rioters at great length or make humiliating concessions to save the hostages' lives. It was nothing short of a miracle that the hostages during the Jackson Prison riots came out of 15-Block alive. Not only were the men holding them highly unstable psychopaths, if not insane, but their weapons included straight razors, as deadly weapons as one can put in the hands of excited and desperate men.

After the Trenton Prison riot, on the other hand, the hostages said that they did not feel in grave danger, that the riot leaders appointed picked men, armed with knives, to guard them against attack by excited or revengeful prisoners, that the rioters shared food and water with them, and so on. The prison officials negotiating through a barred window did not know this, however, and the hostages themselves must have felt at times as though they were being guarded by temporarily well-disposed rattlesnakes.

HOW RIOTS BEGIN

The way riots begin does not differ greatly from prison to prison. They are usually started by a few ringleaders, sometimes men of the quiet-agitator type, who stir up other prisoners to start trouble and stay in the background themselves. Sometimes the ringleaders are reckless and unstable men who are not accustomed to weigh the consequences of their actions, and they continue leadership of the riot down to the bitter end. The leaders in the seizure of 15-Block at Jackson Prison were of that type. Earl Ward, the king pin, has

a high I.Q. but has not in many years received a better rating than "homicidal psychopath" and in his youth was twice committed to state hospitals. "Crazy Jack" Hyatt, his first lieutenant, has been living up to his nickname for years. The handsome young prisoner who tricked a green guard into opening his cell, put a knife against the guard's ribs, took his keys, and opened Ward's and Hyatt's cells, was classified as an overt homosexual. Another of the 15-Block hierarchy, whose picture appeared in magazines and newsreels throughout the country as that of a big-shot riot leader, was a nineteen-year-old homosexual who is also epileptic. An older prisoner who was Earl Ward's self-appointed lieutenant in the main inmate body on later examination showed signs of marked mental deterioration. He proudly told an investigating committee of arming a group of prisoners with knives and cleavers and of rounding up some extra hostages, whom he delivered to Ward in 15-Block.

Whoever starts it, a riot picks up recruits rapidly. Prisoners are drawn into it from sheer excitement, others join it eagerly because of their grievances, and others are swept in against their wills, either because they do not know how to get out of the path of the storm or because they do not dare to stay out for fear of reprisals from other prisoners. In many riots, however, a large percentage of the prisoners do not participate at all. At Jackson Prison there were theoretically over two thousand men involved, although some of them committed no violent acts and were probably going along with the mob against their wills. About three thousand prisoners stayed out of it entirely, and a large percentage of them were outspoken in their bitterness against the rioters. Another fifteen hundred were outside the walls on farm and forestry camp assignments and were completely

out of the riot picture. At Jackson and in other riots, moreover, prisoners have resisted the rioters, stopped fires, protected guards against injury, and saved power plants and other expensive installations from destruction.

THE UNSTABLE AS RECRUITS

The unstable prisoners, of the type generally placed in the vague but convenient category of "psychopaths" and more inelegantly classified in prisons as "screwballs," are the most ready recruits for any riot task force. Our largest and most secure prisons tend to become the dumping ground or catch basin for all the prisoners who are a serious problem in other institutions, including some who should be in a state institution for the mentally ill or defective instead of a prison. At Jackson Prison the "ordinary," relatively stable prisoners lived in the cell blocks known as the North Side and manned the industries and the more important maintenance details. The remaining 2,500 prisoners inside the walls lived on the South Side. It was in the latter area that, with the exception of the men under punishment or in permanent segregation in 15-Block, most of the unstable and "incorrigible" prisoners were quartered. The big riot at Jackson, beginning the morning after Ward and his followers seized 15-Block, was almost exclusively a South Side affair.

At the time of the riots the population of the prison included over a hundred insane prisoners and another two hundred who had been in the institution's mental ward but were deemed well enough to be quartered in ordinary cell blocks "until they blew their corks again." There was not a single psychiatrist on the prison staff,² and officials stated that they were able to get

² Since the riots a psychiatric clinic, staffed by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, has been established at Jackson Prison.

the overcrowded State Hospital at Ionia to accept insane prisoners only by swapping them "body for body" for criminal sexual psychopaths who were recognized as receiving no benefit from being in the hospital and were occupying valuable space. The prison had more than a hundred and fifty sexual psychopaths, who were scattered through the various cell blocks and were receiving no special treatment whatever.

Hundreds of passive homosexuals and aggressive "wolves" were similarly scattered through the prison, mostly on the South Side, except for those who had landed in 15-Block. The problem of perversion was accentuated by the policy of holding at the prison young prisoners who belonged in the Reformatory but were not acceptable there because of low mentality or epilepsy. Some of this group were locked in their cells at all times for protection.

Trenton Prison similarly had for many years been the dumping ground for misfits and problem cases from the other New Jersey correctional institutions: insane, mental defectives, psychopaths, epileptics, young offenders who could not get along in the reformatories, passive homosexuals, "wolves," escape artists, and agitators.

OVERCROWDING AND IDLENESS

At both prisons, overcrowding and idleness accentuated the problems presented by these unstable elements in the population and produced tensions and pressures in the more stable prisoners that made them potential recruits for a revolt. Jackson Prison was not only the largest in the country in population but also, with 57.6 acres inside the walls, a vast and sprawling compound. Huge as it was, it was so overcrowded at the time of the riots that men were sleeping on cots in the cell-house corridors. In spite of the excellent industries, farms, and forestry

camps, at any given time there were 1,750 men idle, an idle population equal to the total population of Sing Sing Prison.

Trenton Prison, an ancient and grimy institution opened in 1836, was so overcrowded at the time of the 1952 riots that 300 of the 1,300 prisoners were quartered in the ninety-two cells of Wing 4, a 116-year-old cell house. About four hundred men, 30 per cent of the population, were completely idle. During the summer months they spent approximately twenty hours a day in their cells, in the winter close to twenty-two hours. Just after the riots I went into a gloomy cell house built in 1870. On one of the tiers a young prisoner was sitting close to the bars in the front of his cell, clothed only in the lower half of a pair of pajamas, with a makeshift chessboard and pieces cut out of cardboard on his knees. He was playing a game of chess with another prisoner on the tier above him and five or six cells away, and I heard them shout their moves back and forth through the din of this crowded idle house. He was nineteen years of age. At Jackson, in the South Side cell houses where the cells face each other across a wide corridor, hundreds of prisoners spent most of their time pressed against the bars of their cells like animals in a zoo, holding shouted conversations with prisoners on the tiers above and below or across the way, conversations that were hardly more intelligible than the screaming of animals.

THE TEENAGERS

Not all prisoners are markedly unstable by nature. Many of them become restless and reckless after months or years under the tensions produced by conditions like those just described. The main factor in the instability of others is their youth. The "hard core"

of the July 1953 riot in the Oregon Penitentiary, which receives prisoners down to the age of fifteen, was a comparatively small group of youths in their late teens. It was the same age group that staged a riot in one wing of the California Prison at Soledad soon after it opened in 1951. One way of accounting for the outburst in this institution, the newest and one of the best in the country, is that it had been filled up very rapidly to relieve overcrowding at San Quentin and had not yet finished its "shakedown cruise." The chief reason, apparently, was that the group of younger prisoners had been hearing about other riots and wanted to show that they too could be tough.

Another of the best institutions in the country, the Federal Reformatory at Chillicothe, Ohio, had a riot in September 1952, that was also a case of the wrong kind of youth movement. All the prisoners there are in their late teens and early twenties. The personnel and program are superior to those of most correctional institutions, and there seemed to be no big basic reason for a riot. The prisoners afterwards said it started as a protest against the light evening meals and against "flies in the food," and there was no intention of carrying it to extremes of violence.

The excitement mounted rapidly and rose to the point of frenzy when some prisoners started beating on tom-toms that were used in an inmate band. The drum beating could be heard for two miles and seemed to release primitive impulses in the young rioters. The officials finally used gas to prevent the destruction of buildings, and later laid down a barrage of tracer bullets, one of which wounded a prisoner. This increased the prisoners' fury, and the revolt lasted for hours, ending only when they apparently quit from weariness

rather than a return to common sense.

After it was all over, the official report of the affair stated that the evening meal had for some time been inadequate, that the steward had cut the meat ration 20 per cent below the Bureau of Prisons standard without getting approval, and that there were "flies all over the kitchen, in the food, and everywhere else in the institution . . . every table was covered with flies . . . they had dropped into the jello, into the soup, and into other food." The steward was replaced, but the damage was done. This riot is a perfect example of how one bad factor in an otherwise excellent institution can unleash insensate fury.

A single factor such as bad or insufficient food is frequently the fuse in prison riots, but there has to be explosive material ready to blow up. The many prisons in which a large percentage of the inmates, half of whom are in their twenties or younger, spend long years in enforced idleness, are locked from fourteen to twenty-two hours a day in narrow cage-like cells or in overcrowded dormitories reeking with perversion, and can rot like vegetables in a cellar for all anyone cares, have at all times the explosive quality of dynamite.

It is a pertinent fact that you can burn dynamite, but it is dangerous to jar it. The population of a prison can burn for years with the slow fires of bitterness and frustration. But let an unstable psychopath yell "When do we eat?" some day in the mess hall. His tablemates may attack the nearest guard, and in ten seconds a riot gets under way that may take days to bring under control. That explosion may set off a riot in any other prison within range of its shock waves, and that in turn another and another, until a veritable chain reaction is in progress.

One factor that is obviously of enormous importance in the creation of ten-

sions and pressures in prison is the sexual problem: not alone the effect of sexual deprivation but also the demoralizing effect of seeing or sensing the perverted relationships which poison the atmosphere of correctional institutions. This subject is not discussed here because it is too difficult and dangerous an area to enter unless one has at his disposal more space than this entire article covers. I am always reluctant to discuss the sexual problem in prisons, moreover, because there are already too many people who think of all prisoners as wild beasts, without realizing that they too might become bestial if they were locked long enough in an iron cage.

"PAREGORIC PRISONS"

There are only a few good prisons in the country and only a few very bad ones. The great majority of our state prisons are mediocre. Their buildings are either ancient firetraps or "whited sepulchers" with pretentious twentieth-century buildings and nineteenth-century programs. Most of them are so overcrowded that there are two men in every cell, and the makeshift dormitories are jam packed so tightly that you could ride a bicycle down the line of beds. There is nowhere near enough work for all the prisoners, and many men have less than two hours of real work a day. The educational program frequently consists of a few classes in the three R's, taught by prisoners. The "idle and unassigned" men loaf for endless hours in the prison yard or are locked in their cells most of the twenty-four hours. Lockup time is 5:00 P.M., or sometimes 4:30 P.M., for all the prisoners except those who are lucky enough to have work assignments or yard privileges that extend beyond that time. The cell doors open again at 6:30 or 7:00 A.M., the beginning for most men of another day of deadly monotony.

When you walk through the cell

blocks in one of these prisons in the evening, you see men lying on their beds with radio headphones on, staring vacantly at the ceiling, or trying to read by the light of a dim bulb, or swapping jailhouse chatter with their cell mates. At the end of the first month of their sentences they have had enough sleep, enough radio, enough hours in a cage four and a half to five feet wide to last them a lifetime.

Prisons of this type are run on the principle of what I once called "paregoric penology," remembering the old remedy for keeping bothersome babies quiet. The constantly changing political appointees who head them and the mediocre, underpaid guards who man them go on the idea that "a good prison is a quiet prison." As long as there are no escapes, no disturbances, nothing to draw unfavorable publicity, they do not care that the prisoners are drifting along on a low physical, mental, and moral level and that most of them will leave the prison worse than when they entered it.

Discipline in the "paregoric prisons" is lax. Almost anything goes except escape. Favored prisoners are granted special privileges, and anyone with money on the books or in his pocket can buy extra food stolen from the kitchen. Prisoners with the right connections sell jobs, cell assignments, transfers to the prison farm, food, extra blankets, soap, special clothing, everything that is not nailed down. Payment is by cash in the many institutions that do not make any serious attempt to keep it out; in all prisons cigarettes by the pack or the carton are legal tender.

This may begin to sound to the average citizen like the description of a bad prison, but it is the picture of ordinary ones of the type found in the great majority of our states. These prisons do next to nothing affirmative to help prepare their prisoners for life in free com-

munities when their sentences end, and in that sense they are destructive. But the bad prisons are definitely and directly destructive, and sometimes seem to be deliberately so.

HOW BAD CAN A PRISON BE?

A good example of a bad prison was Kilby Prison in Alabama as Dr. Edward Galway and I saw it in 1949, when we surveyed it for the Osborne Association. It is difficult to say which is worse in prisons in the long run, extreme laxity or excessive severity. Certainly there is nothing worse than a combination of the two such as we found in Alabama. Flogging with a heavy leather strap was the routine punishment, and the guard who inflicted it could take the hide off a rhinoceros. Yet almost no efforts were made to prevent the offenses that were punished by the lash.

Open gambling was permitted, and the warden told us that he guessed some men had several thousand dollars "stashed away" somewhere in the prison. The doors of the cells, which housed a dozen men each on double-decked beds, were left open until 8:30 in the evening, and men wandered freely from cell to cell and from one gambling game to another. No record was kept of who lived where, and prisoners changed cells and cell mates at will.

Stabbings over gambling debts or tied in with perversion, which was rampant, were frequent, but neither the stabbings nor the practices that led to them were taken very seriously. One afternoon we saw in the prison hospital a man who had been stabbed in the lung. That night we saw the man who stabbed him wandering around the cell block as free as a lark. He had been flogged and then turned loose. He took down his clothes and showed us what the strap did to him. He was a wild-eyed psychopath, and unquestionably had al-

ready obtained another knife and was ready to use it. Whether he was a wild beast when he entered the prison or not, he had certainly become one.

Influential prisoners had an easy time of it in the Alabama prison system. One wealthy man, serving a sentence for murder, lived in a special room where his wife and business manager were allowed to visit him, and went home frequently for week ends. Another wealthy prisoner lived at the prison ranch, wore civilian clothes, ordered both prisoners and guards around, kept his car nearby, went off on frequent trips, including one to the Mardi Gras, and spent about as much time at home as he did before he was sent to prison for shooting his son, a returned veteran, during a quarrel over business matters. That the two men were receiving these special privileges was known not only to the other prisoners but also to the public. Two conscientious parole board members protested repeatedly but without effect.

What I have said thus far bears on the question, What causes a rioter? more closely than on What causes a riot? But too little thought, it seems to me, has been given to the pent-up feelings, the tensions and pressures, the bitterness and sense of grievance, whether or not they have valid basis, that constitute the mental and emotional state in which prisoners are ready to riot. This state of mind exists even in our better prisons, because they are prisons, and the chances that it will reach the point of explosion are obviously greater in a prison or correctional system that is maladministered.

MALADMINISTRATION

The report of the American Prison Association's Committee on Riots, published in May 1953, is concerned mainly with causes that have their basis in maladministration, and with methods of

prevention and control. After stating that "the immediate causes given out for a prison riot are usually only symptoms of more basic causes," the report lists the fundamental causes and forms of prison maladministration as follows:

- A. Inadequate financial support, and official and public indifference.
- B. Substandard personnel.
- C. Enforced idleness.
- D. Lack of professional leadership and professional programs.
- E. Excessive size and overcrowding of institutions.
- F. Political domination and motivation of management.
- G. Unwise sentencing and parole practices.

In my opinion, of the factors listed the most important single one *outside* the prisons is *F*, political domination and motivation of management. The most important one *inside* the prisons is *C*, enforced idleness, although one of the most potent factors in producing bitterness and grievance is the last one listed, unwise sentencing and parole practices. "Unwise" is entirely too mild a word for the laws and procedures under which a young first offender serving a thirty-year sentence imposed by one judge has as his cell mate another first offender, as like himself as an identical twin, who was given five years for the same offense by another judge.

COSTS OF ENFORCED IDLENESS

It is a curious thing that the public stands for enforced idleness in prisons, considering how much it costs on a short-range and long-range basis. It is high time the taxpayers demanded that every prisoner who is able to work be provided with productive employment, preferably of the type that has training value for the future, and that free labor and industry abandon their shortsighted opposition to prison industries, insisting only that they be properly diversified

and that prisons not be permitted to flood the market with shoddy goods at substandard prices. It is time too that prison administrators got up off their swivel chairs and started telling legislators and the public exactly what enforced idleness may mean not only in terms of destruction of state property during riots but also in destruction, for which the public also pays the bill, of the ability and the will of prisoners to make an honest living on release.

The taxpayer has a right to demand that everything possible be done, without exploiting the prisoners or permitting undue competition with any sector of free labor and industry, to reduce the annual bill of 200 million dollars for the operation of our federal and state prison systems. That prisoners can and will work under proper leadership was demonstrated beyond question during World War II, when prisons throughout the country produced war goods valued at over 138 million dollars and agricultural products worth an additional 75 million, with thousands of men voluntarily working long extra hours.

The immediate cost of operating prisons, however, huge as it is, is secondary in importance to the long-range cost to society of crimes committed by men who have not been prepared while in prison for free life as law-abiding, self-supporting citizens but, on the contrary, have been actually unfitted by years of enforced idleness to keep up with the fast competitive pace of the working world outside of prisons.

The restrictive federal and state legislation that has been passed in the last twenty-five years and the persistent opposition of lobbyists who try to defeat every specific legislative proposal for the establishment of a new industry have shackled prison labor to the point where it is estimated that 40,000 of the 170,000 inmates of our prisons are in practically complete idleness. The effect this has

on the prisoners has been thrown into lurid highlight by the riots.

SUCCESSFUL PRISON INDUSTRIES

The way in which the problem may be solved is being demonstrated by a number of prison systems, notably the federal system and California's. Instead of sulkily blaming free labor and industry for all their problems of idleness, they have enlisted their aid in working out a solution that is fair to all concerned. Both systems have organized their prison industries as one would a manufacturing corporation, and have on the boards of directors representatives of labor, industry, retailers and consumers, agriculture, and the general public. Whenever they have planned to open a new industry or expand an old one they have called in representatives of the industry under consideration and have obtained their agreement on what amount of production would be fair. The federal system produces goods for sale to government departments and services only, and California for state departments and agencies. As one concrete example of what can be accomplished, southern textile-mill operators co-operated in planning the cotton mill at the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, the institution's largest and most profitable industry. Last year this penitentiary, once a notorious idle house, did not cost the taxpayers a single dime.

The California Department of Corrections, similarly, in getting authorization for the large textile mill soon to open at San Quentin as the modern replacement of the old jute mill, secured the co-operation of the textile industry. The Department has made notable progress also in developing harmonious working relations with trade unions in the development of its vocational training programs. A score of advisory committees representing various unions have been established and visit the institu-

tions regularly to help in the planning of new vocational courses and necessary buildings and equipment, keeping training programs up-to-date and in line with the newest developments in the trades involved, examining prisoners before they are released, helping them get union cards and jobs, and giving them friendly guidance and help after they get out.

FARMS AND FORESTRY CAMPS

Industries and organized vocational training are not the only answers to the problem of idleness. Some of our better prison systems, even those in the northern climate, operate large farms where the men live in ordinary farmhouses or in barracks and work under trained farm supervisors but not under guard. A number of states, notably California and Michigan, operate forestry camps on a trusty basis and save incalculable sums by fire prevention and other types of conservation work. During the summer months California has over a thousand prisoners in its camps, preventing as well as fighting fires and building roads, using none of the custodial and disciplinary practices characteristic of road camps of the chain-gang type. Michigan now has about six hundred men in conservation camps. Such things as these are the answer to enforced idleness in prisons, and in part the answer to the question, How can we prevent riots?

POLITICAL DOMINATION

"Political domination and motivation of management" is politely placed in next-to-last place in the American Prison Association Committee's list of fundamental causes of maladministration of prisons. Yet recognition of the evil influence of politics appears in the discussion of all but two of the causes listed. It could well appear also in the discussion of "enforced idleness," for

the power that has been wielded to strangle prison industries has been mainly political power.

The most destructive result of political control of prisons is its effect on personnel, the factor of paramount importance in correctional work. People with neither training nor experience in such work and frequently with no aptitude whatever for it are given political appointments as department heads and parole board members, as wardens and other key institutional officials. As the report of the Committee on Riots states, "While serving their apprenticeships at the top instead of at the bottom of the personnel pyramid, they are able to exercise little constructive leadership, and often bring disaster to themselves and to the programs for which they are responsible. In many cases, just as they are beginning to develop competence in correctional administration and aptitude for it, the wheel of politics turns and they are replaced by another set of inexperienced appointees."

In one of our largest states it has proved practically impossible to fill well-paid top positions in the prison system with experienced administrators because the system is known to be dominated by politics and no qualified career penologist is willing to accept appointment where security of tenure and freedom to administer without fear or favor are not assured.

Political control of prisons frequently means a change of personnel on all levels whenever a new party, or a new faction in one-party states, comes into power. I once visited a state just after a new governor came into power and found that everyone in the prison system from the director and wardens down to the lowest paid clerk had been replaced. Sometimes wardens of politically dominated prisons survive a change because they have influential friends in both parties, having played politics on

both sides of the street and down every alley.

There are other evil effects of politics too numerous to mention: graft in varying degrees on building contracts and on purchases of food and other supplies, sale of jobs and kickbacks in salaries, pressure to grant special privileges or early parole to favored prisoners and to give the better work assignments to personnel with political connections, and so on. The worst over-all effect, however, is the mediocrity of physical plants, personnel, and programs characteristic of politically dominated prisons and correctional systems.

The building programs of politically dominated systems do not keep up with their needs, and institutions are dangerously overcrowded. Industrial and farm programs struggle for their existence and prisoners deteriorate in idleness. Salaries are on such a low level that custodial personnel are continually leaving for better jobs, and the institutions are staffed with green guards lacking proper qualifications for their jobs. Fully qualified professional personnel, both because of the salaries and the working conditions, will not accept appointment in the medical, educational, and other rehabilitative services, and these activities are too frequently staffed by people who find it difficult to get jobs in the free world. It is only fair to say that there are also in our prisons custodial, professional, and technical personnel—guards as well as doctors, teachers, foremen, farmers, and so forth—who are able, conscientious, and well adapted to prison work. But the political system cripples their efforts, subjects them to constant frustration, and fires them when their jobs are wanted for someone with an influential political sponsor.

The report of the Committee on Riots closes its discussion of political domination with the following: "Any state

which seriously wishes to reorganize its prison system and place it on a sound foundation, must begin by developing an organizational structure as free from improper political influence from top to bottom as it is possible to make it within the framework of a democratic form of government."

OUR BEST PRISON SYSTEMS

The two best prison systems in the country, the federal system and California's, have had for some time the good fortune to be as free as one can realistically hope to be of political domination, the former for nearly twenty-five years and the latter for about a decade. During those periods they have risen from the status of being among the worst prison systems in the country to a joint position of leadership in the United States, which probably means in the world.

They are headed by two of the ablest career administrators in the prison field, the United States Bureau of Prisons by James V. Bennett, the California Department of Corrections by Richard A. McGee. In both systems professional and technical services are staffed by fully qualified personnel with civil service appointments, adequate salaries, and security of tenure. Correctional officers and other custodial personnel are also under civil service and must meet rela-

tively high standards for appointment. They then receive systematic in-service training of both the theoretical and the practical type.

Both systems operate diversified institutions ranging in custody from maximum-security prisons to open farms and camps, and in function from industrial institutions to reformatory where vocational training is stressed and medical centers for the physically and mentally ill. The classification services determine what degree of custody, type of job, and special training and treatment each prisoner needs. Their recommendations are carried out, as far as possible, in a well-balanced program of employment, general education, vocational training, medical treatment, and other rehabilitative activities.

These are not the only two prison systems in the country that are coming close to accomplishing their dual function: to hold prisoners during their sentences under decent conditions in as secure custody as each requires, but no more, and to prepare as many as possible by rehabilitative training and treatment for successful return to free life. But they are the best of our prison systems, and they clearly point the path all prisons must take. The lesson of the riots is that we cannot reform our prisoners until we have reformed our prisons.

Austin H. MacCormick, Berkeley, California, is executive director of the Osborne Association and professor of criminology at the University of California. He was assistant director of the United States Bureau of Prisons from 1929 through 1933, and Commissioner of Correction of New York City from 1934 to 1940. He received the Presidential Medal for Merit for his services as the Army's chief consultant on correctional problems in World War II. During the 1951-53 prison riots he served as consultant in several states, notably Michigan and New Jersey.

Catchall Jails

By ROY CASEY

What has the gray-haired prisoner done?
Has murder stained his hands with gore?
Not so—his crime's a fouler one—
God made the old man poor!

These lines by the poet Whittier express perhaps the greatest contributing factor in the yearly "catch" of nearly two million persons who for various lengths of time become inmates of America's "catchall jails," in any case, of those who remain there for any appreciable length of time. Jails, which are the most costly units of our correctional and penal systems to maintain on a per capita basis, are institutions for criminals without money or without "connections." Criminals with money or influence have devious ways of staying out of jail and, to the discredit of our American system of justice, many offenders undeserving of probation get by somehow without going to prison though convicted of heinous crimes.

With the exception of the so-called city or county "workhouse," "work farm," "prison camp," "work camp," "house of detention," and similar institutions known by various names, whose functions are to hold convicted offenders for the serving of misdemeanor sentences (one year or less), all jails can perhaps be classed as of the catchall kind.

There are 3,073 counties in the United States and at least 99 per cent of them maintain a county jail of some kind. A few of these counties do not have jails of their own, and some maintain two or more institutions of a jail type. Consequently, the round figure of 3,100 county jails is perhaps a reasonably accurate one.

Rand McNally's Road Atlas for 1953 lists approximately 200,000 cities, towns, and villages in our forty-eight states. There are no available statistics as to how many of these centers of population have jails or lockups. A conservative estimate of 5 per cent might be made as to the number which provide some place of detention for their local law violators. This would place the probable number of city jails and town lockups at 10,000. There are approximately 4,600 cities and towns in the United States with populations of 2,000 or more. No doubt each of these has a jail of some description, while many large cities maintain two or more. Until more accurate statistics are compiled on the subject, we might strike an average from the preceding data and not be far wrong in assuming the total number of county, city, and town jails and lockups in the United States to be at least 10,000.

JAIL POPULATION

Through these 10,000 jails there passes each year one American citizen out of every hundred of our population. Some perhaps remain only long enough to be booked and to post bond, if their offenses are minor, or if they have money or influential friends. Others stay locked up with the usual "catch" of the police dragnets: drunks, prostitutes, sex deviates, murderers, rapists, dope addicts, dope peddlers, embezzlers, gamblers, insane, juvenile delinquents, first offenders, highjackers, confidence men, ex-convicts, chronic alcoholics, kidnapers, amnesia victims, traffic law violators, disturbers of the peace, bums,

vagrants, victims of economic reverses "without visible means of support," suspects held for investigation (illegally, in many instances), detained witnesses (when frequently the criminal himself has money for bail and a smart lawyer, and is free on the outside), immigration detainees, bank robbers, white slavers, procurers for prostitutes—all thrown together or only nominally segregated. Some stay in our catchall jails a day, a week, a month, a year, or sometimes longer, to await trial in our overcrowded and slow moving courts of justice, or while serving sentences for misdemeanor violations, or perhaps awaiting a new trial or an appeal. In all too many instances some are completely forgotten, apparently by God and man, and left to brood over the injustice of man to man in a land whose motto is "Freedom" and whose fundamental law proclaims that a man is considered innocent until adjudged guilty by a jury of his peers.

These are our American jails. They vary in size from the four- or five-bunk "hoosegows" maintained by small towns and counties to those holding one thousand, two thousand, and in one instance three thousand inmates. Through all of these, infrequently in the smaller ones, but almost continuously in the larger ones, pass each year a motley crowd of nearly two million violators of the law.

Conditions within these jails are not wholly within the power and the province of their custodial and administrative staffs to establish and control. Many factors are involved besides those of operation, and the public is perhaps too quick to blame jail officials for things they are helpless to deal with and to correct. Many of the deficiencies of our jails have their bases in archaic or ill-advised laws, or in customs and procedures followed by our courts of justice and by our elected or appointed

law enforcement, budget, or appropriation officials whose areas of responsibilities overlap those of the jail administrators.

EFFORTS TOWARD REFORM

There is, however, rapidly developing in a large and influential segment of the American public an awareness that problems of health, of public welfare, of economy, of justice, and of community self-respect are involved and that there is need for better managed local jails. Credit for this development can be shared by many organizations and by our news disseminating agencies, which often bring vividly to the public's attention the daily happenings within its jails. The press, the radio, and more recently television are powerful influences in arousing the public's interest in its jails. The more frankly and efficiently these agencies perform their services as the "public's eyes and ears," the more certain is our progress in improving these ten thousand units of our penal and correctional system which are at our very door.

The history of prison reform movements goes back many years, but not until well into the twentieth century was particular attention given here in the United States to our common jail system. The American Prison Association has pioneered in the movement for better city and county jails, and in more recent years other influential and nationwide organizations have entered the fight for a cleanup of these local institutions. Among them special mention should be made of the National Jail Association, the National Sheriffs' Association, and the Jail Inspection Service of the federal Bureau of Prisons. Many other agencies of a state and local nature too numerous to name here have given powerful and effective impetus toward jail improvements.

Despite the progress being made and

the effective work that is being done by groups and individuals who are giving unstintingly of their time and effort, there are many perplexing problems yet to be solved, some of which have not yet been recognized by our law enforcement, judicial, and correctional agencies.

BASIC PROBLEMS

Some problems connected with jails are fundamental and universal, and their nature and scope must be recognized and acknowledged if progress is to be made. As long as the nature of mankind remains what it is and has been through the centuries, there will be the necessity of depriving some individuals of their freedom because their conduct meets with disapproval by the majority, or at least by the most influential members of the majority. In the United States our jails and prisons are the institutions designed and designated to perform this function of criminal segregation. And human nature being what it is, these institutions will always be necessary, as essential in the scheme of things as are our hospitals. Consequently, an enlightened citizenship cannot safely ignore these ten thousand institutions scattered throughout the length and breadth of our land.

What are some of the fundamental facts about jails? First, jails must perform the primary function of keeping in custody and under control those persons whose conduct has been, through due process of law, adjudged inimical to the best interest of the community. Concomitant with this right of the community to protect itself by depriving an antisocial individual of his freedom, there is its duty and responsibility to protect such an individual's civil and human rights during the period of his incarceration, when he himself is helpless to prevent the violation of those rights. Fortunately what we are pleased to call civilization has advanced far

enough to make the average thinking citizen aware of the fact that he is "his brother's keeper," that "a tooth for a tooth" and "an eye for an eye" justice will not correct the evils of criminal behavior, and that criminals are still human beings. Second, for each time a jail or prison door opens to receive a new commitment that same door opens to release someone back into the community. Unless the care, treatment, and rehabilitation programs of jails and prisons endeavor to carry out the best possible objectives it is almost a certainty that society will have returned to its midst criminals more of a menace to its safety after release than before commitment.

JAILS AS WAY STATIONS

Jails are the first way stations to prison for criminals whose conduct requires the loss of their freedom, and every inmate confined in state and federal prisons, reformatories, and correctional institutions has come by way of some city or county jail. Because jails are of a catchall nature it is a difficult task to formulate and carry out effective care, treatment, and rehabilitation programs to meet the needs of their heterogeneous and transient population. Progress is being made in some larger cities and counties whose normal jail populations of both sentenced and unsentenced prisoners are sufficiently large to make feasible the classification of inmates into groups and areas of confinement and the development of effective rehabilitative programs. Not all large population centers are doing this, however, and most of those which have endeavored to accomplish something are doing only a superficial job and are developing only a few of their potentialities. It is true, moreover, that it is next to impossible to devise work or rehabilitation programs for the vast majority of inmates in these catchall jails. The ma-

jority of such inmates are there awaiting police investigation, a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, or trial, and the duration of their stay in jail is generally short and uncertain. Also many offenders who receive jail sentences, get only five, ten, fifteen, or thirty days, or small fines to "sit out," and it is hard to fit such short-term prisoners into a correctional or work program. Moreover, the range of their ages and their social, educational, and occupational backgrounds make each a problem unto himself and militate against group training, guidance, and therapy. The smaller the jail and its population, the more difficult it is to work out and maintain constructive programs for inmates and the less likelihood there is of institutional or community resources being available.

PROGRAMS FOR SENTENCED PRISONERS

There are many possibilities for developing those inmates who get sentences of substantial lengths—enough time to adjust themselves to some educational, vocational, work, or other rehabilitative program—into better citizens, more capable of making good after release. These possibilities depend on two things. First, if the county and the cities within the county are sufficiently large they can establish, preferably as a joint project, a short-term correctional institution for their sentenced prisoners. Second, there can be established state regional work farms or workhouses to handle sentenced prisoners from the smaller cities and counties whose resources and number of committed prisoners are not sufficient to justify institutions of their own.

THE UNSENTENCED JAIL INMATE

Although a state and its larger cities and counties may provide necessary correctional institutions for short-term sentenced offenders, there will always re-

main the necessity for maintaining local places of temporary detention for offenders awaiting a magistrate's hearing, for some who cannot make bail while awaiting trial, and for others whose cases are on appeal, or who have been granted a new trial. These classes of individuals generally make up a large percentage of jail inmates, and the responsibility for their detention under as favorable an environment as possible always presents a challenge to the custodians of the jail and to the community. Such prisoners cannot be moved to other institutions until certain legal and judicial requirements have been met. While none may remain long in jail, their total number constitutes a major detention problem. Because most jail prisoners come into and go out of jail so rapidly it is difficult for good and effective procedures to be maintained in important matters pertaining to their incarceration. It is almost impossible for jail employees to come to know them as individuals and the problems each presents. During the few hours or few days such prisoners stay in jail they cannot be effectively screened and classified as to custodial and health risks, tendencies for homosexual acts, suicidal and homicidal urges and other mental abnormalities, and many other factors on which proper segregation, care, and treatment rest.

In institutions which are established and operated primarily for prisoners under sentence, officials have sufficient time to study their inmates, to set up a care and treatment program on an individual basis, and to make changes when necessary, but this is not so in our thousands of catchall jails. In most of them new prisoners arrive without prior notice at any hour of the day or night and leave just as suddenly. The arresting officer frequently knows but little about the man he brings in—often not even his name. The prison-

er's personal, criminal, and medical histories are either totally lacking or so incomplete as to be valueless. Despite the absence of such important information the jail's booking officer must immediately decide where to put the prisoner, if the jail is fortunate enough to have more than one section for segregation purposes.

SANITATION

Only in a few of our biggest and best jails are provisions made for new prisoners to be examined by a physician until hours or days have elapsed after commitment and for decent standards of personal hygiene to be maintained. In the vast majority of catchall city and county jails prisoners are compelled to continue to wear their own clothes regardless of how filthy or vermin-infested they may be; facilities for delousing drunks, vagrants, and bums are totally lacking; and too frequently hot and cold running water, soap and towels, any sort of provision for bathing or even for washing face and hands are nonexistent. Such deplorable conditions are almost universally found in our smaller city and county jails, and too often they exist in large ones which have funds to provide these necessities, but fail to do so.

No state or section of the country has a monopoly on either good or bad jails, as records of the federal Jail Inspection Service show. Some of the most revolting and deplorable conditions of filth, overcrowding, and lack of adequate facilities for segregation, sanitation, and control of common jail irregularities have been found almost literally within the shadows of the capitol buildings of some of our richest states that are reputed to have high standards of living and a highly developed social consciousness. On the other hand, some small jails in states commonly considered poor

and backward are maintained at decent levels.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

The responsibility for high or low standards in our thousands of jails falls on three groups: first, the public; second, the officials responsible for appropriations for maintaining jails, and third, the officials who operate them. The relative importance of their responsibilities is perhaps in the order named.

In the matter of public service and public institutions, a community receives only what it is willing to pay for or what it is willing to tolerate. If local jail conditions are bad and facilities are inadequate public demand can soon correct these deficiencies. It may take a local jail scandal involving finances, brutal treatment of inmates, a tragedy connected with a jail kangaroo-court killing, the suicide of a juvenile inmate, collusion in the escape of a dangerous prisoner, or any other of the many irregularities which are likely to happen in poorly equipped and poorly managed jails to arouse the community's interest in and demand for jail improvement. There is nothing so effective in arousing a community's interest in its jail as a bright spotlight of publicity thrown on it by press, radio, and television. When these "eyes and ears of the public" have done their job effectively, fairly, and without personal and political bias or vindictiveness, officials who hold the purse strings and those who run the jail cannot long resist the community's demand for better jail conditions. It is true that officials who operate jails may not make the best use of those facilities which tax money provides, or may through carelessness and indifference allow such facilities to be abused, broken, or destroyed, but when an aroused public demands an accounting these officials cannot and will not shirk their responsibility.

bility. The community can and should provide adequate building, equipment, supplies, and salaries for operating personnel, and then compel its public servants to make proper use of them.

When the community maintains an alert and intelligent interest in its jail, and when the officials who hold the purse strings do their job well, those who operate the jail can hardly fail to fall in line. Many jail officials can and do accomplish much and maintain decent institutions despite the indifference of the public. However, good catchall jails are a co-operative responsibility. Good jails are dependent on both adequate and well-maintained physical plants, and on proper and well-administered operational procedures.

PERSONNEL SELECTION AND TRAINING

Proper and acceptable standards in jail operations in turn are dependent on capable and trained personnel. All other factors may be present—a well-designed and secure building, adequate equipment, sufficient and wholesome food supplies, and reasonably high salary scales, but if personnel are untrained and incompetent, if they are lazy, careless, and untrustworthy, or if there is dissatisfaction, dissension, and working at cross-purposes, bad conditions are certain to ensue. As long as the appointment of jail employees is on a personal or political basis, or so long as merit and devotion to duty are not the basis for job and salary advancement, conditions are sure to suffer and the community should not be surprised when unfavorable news emanates from its jail. To ensure against such a situation progressive jail administrations should endeavor to start their jail improvement by raising personnel standards and promoting a training program for employees. Many deficiencies in a jail's

physical plant can be almost fully compensated for by proper selection and training of its staff.

Training, of course, presupposes the appointment to jail jobs of qualified persons who are capable of being trained for their responsibilities. In addition, salary scales and working conditions which will attract competent, intelligent, and trustworthy employees to such work are essential. Beginners in jail custodial assignments should meet reasonably high standards in physical condition and work attitudes and come within age limits that ensure adaptability to new ideas and ways of doing things. Jail jobs are not for persons who are strongly opinionated or who think they can be adequately guided by intuition or hunches. Specific qualifications are too numerous to list here, but a few of the more fundamental ones can be mentioned: alertness, sufficient physical agility to cope with sudden and dangerous situations, and a capacity to make prompt and correct decisions when confronted with situations demanding them.

PATTERN FOR PROGRESS

If a community has provided for jail purposes a properly designed and adequately equipped physical plant together with sufficient funds for its operation and particularly for competent personnel, officials whose responsibility it is to manage the jail are without excuse when they fail to meet the standards established for good jails by such recognized agencies as the Jail Inspection Service of the United States Bureau of Prisons, the National Jail Association, and similar groups that have devoted years of study to jail problems. These specialists in their field are always ready to give free consultation and advisory service to communities and public officials in solving jail problems.

However, despite the progress that has been made in recent years, particularly in raising operational standards and in the almost complete elimination of the vicious kangaroo courts which formerly exercised unlimited power over inmate activities and conduct in most city and county jails, local communities still have many difficult jail matters to deal with.

Substitute institutions in place of jail detention now appear to be out of the question, at least in the foreseeable future. So long as crimes are committed and criminals have to be segregated from the more law-abiding citizenship, places of detention are as necessary for community welfare as are hospitals, fire stations, schools, and churches. Consequently, communities with self-respect and a well-developed social consciousness need to exert every conceivable effort to see that their jails have as few inherent evils as possible. To this end intelligent and concerted action on the part of officials and groups of leading citizens is necessary to ensure provisions for adequate physical plants and competent personnel for their jails. In addition, news gathering and news disseminating agencies must serve the pub-

lic by keeping it fully informed concerning jail conditions.

However hopeless it now appears for local jails to be replaced with something better, there is one possible and effective measure for improvement which should not be neglected or forgotten. This is the always present possibility of keeping jail populations to the lowest feasible count. To accomplish this there must always be full co-operation and teamwork among the three local agencies involved, the courts, the prosecuting and investigating officials, and the law enforcement officers. When these agencies function together efficiently, the average time accused persons remain in local jails is materially shortened, and the daily average inmate count decreases accordingly. Unless the United States can develop ways to prevent juvenile delinquency and reduce crime, we are not likely to see any decrease in the nearly two million yearly commitments to our ten thousand catchall jails, but the total number of jail days these persons remain there can perhaps be cut substantially, and the crime-breeding and demoralizing effects of confinement under bad jail conditions can be lessened.

Roy Casey, Anchorage, Alaska, is superintendent of the Alaskan Jail System of the federal Bureau of Prisons. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Prison Association, representing the Territory of Alaska, and is a charter member of the National Jail Association, having served as vice-president for several years. While in the federal Jail Inspection Service he was assigned to make state-wide county jail surveys at the requests of the governors of Missouri, Iowa, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. Articles by him on jails and juvenile detention problems have appeared in Prison World and other publications.

Do Our Prisons Cost Too Much?

By MYRL E. ALEXANDER

PRISONS are public tax-supported institutions often in the news because of disturbances, riots, or escapes, but seldom because of their less spectacular successes. Their goals, strengths, weaknesses, and failures are discussed everywhere, from pulpits to tavern bars, and from university classrooms to farmyard fences. Inevitably, the discussions turn to prison costs, since ultimately taxpayers bear the burden of prison support, and people are interested these days in the returns they get for their taxes. Street improvements, police and fire protection, school systems, and libraries are tangible benefits easily seen and experienced in the life of the community. But prisons are intangible and mysterious institutions tucked away in some remote section of the state, seldom thought of, and never seen. The harassed taxpayer sometimes reasons that after all, if a man steals, assaults, embezzles, or rapes, he belongs in "durance vile," he goes there, and the community is better for the riddance.

But those who must work closely with community problems and with the prisons are joined by many responsible citizens in the realization that these human problems are not solved by merely putting them out of sight for a time and that the ultimate cost of prisons cannot be measured by the fiscal statistics of legislative appropriations. A perspective encompassing five, ten, or twenty years leads inevitably to a most difficult question, What kind of a return are we getting for the money we spend on our prisons?

The cost of maintaining and operating prisons, like any other cost, can be evaluated best in terms of the return

received on the investment. Profits in a business or a factory can be measured with precision. The returns from an investment in a church, a school, a program for the blind, or a Boy Scout troop can be measured only in terms of intangible human values. Dividends on an investment in prisons must be measured in terms of both human values and social protection.

Any attempt to compile and analyze the *precise* costs of American prisons is an impossible undertaking at the outset. No two prison systems use fully comparable methods of cost accounting and, surprisingly, few systems even attempt to employ any kind of valid cost accounting. Moreover, legislative appropriations do not necessarily have a direct relationship to actual costs. It is not unusual for a legislature to appropriate minimal funds for prisons with the understanding that prison administrators must supplement the appropriation with extensive farm or industrial production and somehow eke out an existence as best they can. Under those conditions the prison administrator must devote most of his energy and time to revenue-producing activities, and he is an unusual administrator who does not eventually develop a distorted big business perspective of prison administration.

There are other prison systems whose appropriations are based on performance budgeting related directly to the actual costs of operation. The administrator under those systems is able to allocate funds for essential activities and to prepare and justify more realistic appropriation budgets. The procedure does not necessarily guarantee

adequate funds but it does provide a more realistic approach to the entire fiscal structure of prison management.

In the study of prison costs, one must always be aware of the fact that cost statements are not in themselves a measure of the quality and worth of a prison system. Personnel costs are a case in point. Cost statements of two different prison systems may reflect comparable expenditures for personnel and similar salary scales. In one system, thorough and continuous personnel training has been developed, and selection and retention of personnel is under a civil service system having the strengths and attributes of a constructive career service. The other prison system having comparable costs may be subjected to open political recruitment, provide no personnel training, and be honeycombed with political intrigue, unskilled handling of prisoners, and indifferent business management. The two systems have comparable costs but widely divergent results.

In some respects, however, the dollars and cents costs of our prisons can be evaluated and, in fact, must be subjected to careful scrutiny if we are to have any real expectation of improving the product of our prisons and, thereby, the return on our investments in prisons.

CAPITAL EXPENDITURES

The costs of new prison construction can be evaluated more accurately than regular operating costs. Even in construction costs several variables are involved, particularly the thoroughness of preliminary studies of inmate characteristics, population flow, and the function of the new institution in the total prison system. Whether construction is to be by contract or the use of prisoner labor directly affects costs.

Most of our present prison plants were built when prisons were intended to intimidate, coerce, and prevent es-

capes through sheer force and physical security. But in the past twenty-five years a new body of administrative experience has developed which has substantially altered the older concepts of the prison plant itself.

The classification method of inmate study, diagnosis, and treatment has produced new approaches to prison administration which are reflected in prison construction. The distribution of inmate populations to a series of diversified institutions having specialized functions in a prison system has substantially altered the old principle that every prison must be designed with an eye to the most difficult prisoner group. Large numbers of prisoners can now be housed in medium- or minimum-security institutions. To be sure, a maximum-security unit is needed in most systems for the most dangerous and difficult group of prisoners within the system, but the design of all prisons need not be geared to the security requirements of the few.

It is abundantly clear that prison construction costs ascend sharply in direct ratio to the degree of security required. According to current cost estimates compiled by the Construction Section of the federal Bureau of Prisons, camps for minimum-custody offenders in rural areas can be constructed at a ceiling cost of \$2,000 per inmate. But a maximum-security prison will cost \$15,000 per inmate. An average penitentiary, housing 1,200 inmates, will cost approximately \$8,500 per inmate, while a medium-security correctional-type institution can be constructed for about \$5,000 per inmate.

Those states having smaller prison populations often cannot develop a diversity of institutions. Under provisions of the Interstate Compact for Control of Crime, two or more states may enter into a reciprocal agreement to supervise parolees and probationers

and to provide care and treatment of prisoners. While the Compact has been widely used for reciprocal supervision of probationers and parolees, it has seldom been utilized for prisoners. Under its provisions neighboring states can develop a series of specialized institutions similar to the prison systems operated by larger states. In the future, it is possible that through operation of the Compact, prison construction can be planned jointly by smaller states at reduced construction costs to each and with far more adequate services than one of the participating states could possibly provide for itself.

As prison design develops toward more functional plants geared to the needs of a diversified prison system, the cost in capital investment will be substantially less than under the old American prison tradition. But wherever we continue to build large catchall prisons, or to sink money in addition after addition to ancient, outmoded prisons, we can expect diminishing returns on the capital investment.

OPERATING COSTS

Although capital investment in prison plants can be evaluated with reasonable exactitude, the operating costs of prisons are elusive, often unavailable, and frequently without real significance. While prisoner population statistics and the amount of appropriations for prison operations are usually known, the actual costs of the several pertinent features of expenditures are seldom computed or available. Despite that fact, however, certain general observations and conclusions can validly be made.

Personnel salaries and requisites are the major cost of operating any prison system, with the exception of those few states who use prisoner guards in lieu of a paid officer staff. Rarely are personnel costs less than 50 per cent, and in at least one instance they are as high

as 72 per cent of the total operating budget. As stated earlier, however, the cost of personnel is not in itself a true measure of personnel efficiency and effectiveness. An exception, obviously, is the state which pays its untrained guards \$100 a month for an 84-hour work week.

The objectives of the modern prison reach beyond mere custody to the more constructive goal of redirecting attitudes and behavior toward acceptable life standards. Therefore, when personnel expenditures are restricted to a staff responsible for nothing other than security, subsistence, and administration, the prison must inevitably fall short of its real goal. An investment in a carefully selected and trained staff, including those trained in the professions which deal with human behavior, will assuredly return far greater dividends on the proportionate additional personnel investment required.

Another important item in prison costs is plant maintenance and operation, which naturally varies somewhat with geographical location and skill of management. Plant operation—heat, light, water, sewage disposal, and cleaning supplies—is always costly. Experienced engineers estimate that approximately 2 per cent of plant replacement cost must be expended annually in plant maintenance. Equipment replacement and repair is never inexpensive.

The prison must furnish food, clothing, laundering, shoe repair, personal hygiene supplies, release transportation and gratuities to the prisoners. Food costs alone in American prisons will vary from 35 cents to 85 cents a man day, depending upon production of the prison farm, procurement policies, nutritional standards, efficiency of menu planning and preparation, and how many of the staff and guests are fed out of the prison mess. Release costs are variable, depending upon the loca-

tion of the prison in relation to large centers of population. Gratuities to released prisoners is an old and often debated story, but few prison administrators can begin to give a prisoner sufficient funds to meet his barest needs for even a few weeks after release. The cost of prisoner care varies widely, but usually is amazingly low. In the federal prison system, for example, actual cost for this entire feature is currently within a few mills of 75 cents per man day.

After the plant has been operated and maintained, the personnel paid, and the prisoners clothed, fed, and released, there remains only the question of whether any funds have been left over for religious and recreational activities, medical supplies, library, educational and psychological testing supplies, and similar costs of inmate treatment and training activities exclusive of personnel. In some prisons virtually nothing is left for those activities and in others little more than a token fund. Some institutions have turned to using profits from inmate store sales, handicraft sales, and even paid conducted tours of sightseers to finance education, recreation, and welfare activities.

THE MANAGEMENT FACTOR IN PRISON COSTS

To the most casual student of prison costs, it is evident that experience and skill in management determine to a high degree the effectiveness of the prison. The preparation, justification, and presentation of budget requests to legislative committees or to administrative agencies alone requires special experience and skills. Budgeting and managing appropriated funds by central administrative authorities vary greatly. Control and management of prison dollars by institutional administrators affect in widely diversified ways the real

goals of the prison. But as long as prison management is characterized by constant administrative turnover depriving prisons and prison systems of the managerial skills which come only through long experience of sincere, intelligent, dedicated prison administrators, the taxpayer will continue to get minimal returns on his investment in prisons. Some personal experiences document that fact.

In one large penitentiary where the staff changes every election year, the library is a pitiful collection of Western pulps and old public library discards. Yet I saw enough money wasted in the uncontrolled use of soap powder, toilet paper, and cleaning supplies to stock the world's finest modern prison library.

In another institution which had sought assistance in preparing a justification for a proposed \$25,000 appropriation for education and classification personnel (the institution had none) an ancient six-foot garden wall surrounding a large plot in front of the prison, outside the security area, was surmounted by four completely useless tower boxes requiring the services of sixteen officers to man around the clock and the calendar at an average salary of \$2,700 a year. The four towers contributed little to security. A modern control tower erected in front of the institution would have given greater security, could have been manned by four officers, and would have saved more than enough money to provide essential treatment personnel. But the garden wall with its little towers had stood unchallenged for more than fifty years.

In yet another prison an administrative policy of assigning only extreme behavior problems to a modern prison industries plant so completely stymied production and training that profits of untold thousands of dollars were lost which could have been available for a

program of inmate training with increased profits for the state.

In another section of the country a prison warden's pride and joy were his beautiful dairy barns and steam-heated swinery. The dairy herd produced more than four pounds of milk per day per inmate in the institution, despite the fact that the most liberal nutritional standards do not exceed one and one-half pounds of milk per man per day. More than two and one-half times the necessary cost of stock feed went into that dairy herd. The warden also liked to see his hogs go to slaughter well fattened. Despite expert opinion that ideal slaughtering weights are approximately 225 pounds, the institution purchased feed and fattened hogs to one hundred pounds excess weight, producing mostly unneeded cheap lard. And that institution had no educational director, vocational director, caseworker, or full-time physician.

Dollars wasted through unskilled management have no impact upon ultimate goals of the prison and are lost forever to the taxpayers.

Yet throughout the entire American prison scene there is an accumulating body of improved managerial experience, and proven, successful methods are being practiced here and there throughout the country by prison administrators. Perhaps the most notable step taken in recent years toward improving prison management is publication by the American Prison Association of the *Manual of Suggested Standards for a State Correctional System* (revised 1954). But those principles can be translated into daily practice only after mature experience in prison management. Nowhere on the American prison scene is there a school or an executive workshop which provides a forum for the exchange of grass-roots practice in the management of prison funds or compiles proven managerial practices. The

publication of the *Manual of Suggested Standards* should be followed by the organization of a forum or a workshop in prison management where career prison administrators and junior executives can come together for a week or two each year to systematically study, compile, and organize a body of working methods and techniques which would contribute to the more rapid development of superior managerial skills in prison administration.

PRODUCTIVE PRISON LABOR

One of the most costly aspects of prisons is the widespread failure to provide productive employment for prisoners. Less than one-half of the available prisoner manpower of the United States is constructively employed, and the proportion is increasing. This idleness in American prisons costs the taxpayers millions of dollars annually. Prisoners should contribute to their support to the greatest possible degree consistent with a philosophy which does not permit exploitation. Their productive efforts can ease the taxpayer's burden by producing and processing much of the food they consume; by maintaining and preserving plant and equipment; by performing public works such as reforestation, land reclamation, and road building; and by producing a portion of the goods used by the state and its political subdivisions. Prison riots and disturbances bred by conditions of endless enforced idleness result in other direct and unnecessary costs to the taxpayers.

Perhaps more important than the direct and immediate costs are the unmeasurable indirect costs resulting from the deteriorating effects of idleness on men. Whereas meaningful productive employment offers training, self-respect, and hope, mass idleness fosters mental and physical stagnation with the promise

of future additional cost to the taxpayer.

A well-balanced productive prison work program is essential. It should take into account the needs of the state in reducing the costs of imprisonment, and both the present and the future needs of the prisoners. In most prisons, maintenance, farming, and training activities cannot provide enough useful work for all prisoners. The remainder must be employed in a diversified prison industrial program using modern methods and equipment to train prisoners in present-day industrial skills. It is generally accepted that the state-use system of industries, which supplies a reasonable proportion of the diversified products used by government agencies, best meets the requirements of our present penal philosophy and is least objectionable to the self-interested groups who oppose prison industrial programs. Prison administrators must develop a forthright approach to this problem. An effective mandatory purchase law by all the state agencies and political subdivisions for such products and services as may be available from prison labor is essential. The guidance of an advisory policy board composed of public-minded citizens representing the major interests concerned is useful in interpreting the problem to the public and in meeting the resistance of groups who oppose such a program in their own narrow interests.

Full productive employment of prisoners must be attained if the burden of unnecessary prison costs is to be lifted from the economy of the nation.

A PROFIT AND LOSS SUMMARY

While prison costs are elusive, inaccessible, and subject to wide variations in interpretation, certain general facts are clear. Prison construction has not kept pace with accumulated experience,

population increase, or scientific knowledge in dealing with human behavior. The majority of our prison plants are ancient and outmoded structures which act as barriers to the actual practice of modern correction philosophy and contribute disproportionately to the ultimate cost of prisons.

Personnel costs represent a major part of every dollar spent on prison operations. But too little—sometimes nothing—is expended for professional treatment personnel. Personnel expenditures per se mean little except when evaluated in connection with personnel standards, training, and performance. The total annual cost of prison operations includes very little for the financial support of broad programs for inmate treatment and training.

The failure to provide alert, flexible, realistic management is one of the most glaring aspects of prison costs.

Widespread idleness of prisoners, the direct result of our failure to provide constructive prison industries, is an intangible but very real and unnecessary cost in American prisons.

The cost of our prisons can be measured only in terms of their ultimate effect upon those hundreds of thousands of men and women, who, when released from prison, resume normal community life. Those who have found in prison only experiences which embitter and thrust them deeper into criminal pathways, and who again commit crimes only to return again and again to the prison, compound beyond imagination the ultimate cost of prisons. On the other hand, those persons who, through constructive prison experience, are able to carve out useful, productive, law-abiding niches in society return dividends far beyond any calculation on funds invested in their reformation.

Our prisons in their failures are piling up costs beyond reckoning. To be sure, there is a developing awareness in

some sections of the country that unreasonable frugality accomplishes little more than to delay the eventual price which must be paid for our prisons at usurious rates of compound interest.

In facing squarely the issue of today's prison costs we can only conclude that if we would reduce our ultimate costs, a small additional fraction of today's expenditures must be invested now in the

widespread development of career personnel, in the replacement of outmoded prison plants, in more effective programs of inmate treatment and training, and in the development of badly needed research in prison administration. This additional investment is the one best hope of freedom from the encumbrance of tomorrow which the prisons of today place upon our economy.

Myrl E. Alexander, Washington, D. C., is assistant director of the federal Bureau of Prisons in charge of the Division of Field Operations. In the federal prison service since 1931, he has, among other assignments, been warden's assistant at the U. S. Penitentiary, Atlanta, Ga.; associate warden, U. S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pa.; warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Conn.; and chief of prisons, Office of Military Government for Germany. In his present position, which he has held since 1947, he is often called upon to serve as consultant on local and state prison and jail problems.

Does the Prison Reform?

By GEORGE B. VOLD

THE fact that this question has been included as an appropriate title for analysis and elaboration in a 1954 symposium on prison reform is of itself perhaps more important than any simple yes or no answer that might be given. It is well to remember that there was a time when such a question would not have been asked because the prison was not expected to serve a reformatory function.

Imprisonment came into penal practice as a substitute for corporal and capital punishments and not as a device to make men good. Apparently it was conceived of as softer, less painful, less horrifying for the convicted criminal than the otherwise familiar and traditional brutalities of crude and savage abuse of the body. The object of punishment, then as now, was to frighten the culprit through painful experience so that he would not again yield to temptation and commit crime. Imprisonment as a substitute penalty therefore had to be a sufficiently unpleasant and disagreeable experience so that the inmate would be as thoroughly frightened at the evil consequences of his criminality as if his punishment had been an agonizing ordeal of physical pain.

Yet concern for the consequences of punishment is implicit in the very idea itself. Theoretically, punishment should lead to a change in behavior so that the individual who has been properly punished will not again become involved in misdeeds. If he continues to misbehave, it has usually been taken to mean that the punishment was somehow inappropriate, principally that it was not sufficiently severe.

Characteristic of this whole frame of reference is the basic principle of some kind of scale of severity increasing with the seriousness of or the repetition of the offense. As a normal consequence, imprisonment was first used as a substitute penalty in the punishment of petty crimes. Vagrants and "sturdy beggars" or were incarcerated in "workhouses" or jails as a substitute for whipping, branding, and other mutilations long before imprisonment began to be used as a suitable punishment for more serious offenses. When imprisonment began to be used for many kinds of offenses, it was nevertheless on the general assumption that it was *less severe as punishment* than the penalties for which it was substituted.

REFORMATION BY IMPRISONMENT

The transition from the idea of imprisonment as a form of punishment to one of imprisonment as a device for the reformation of criminals constitutes a large chapter in the history of penology that need not be reviewed here. It should be noted, however, that always there has been the persisting problem of repeaters in crime. Undoubtedly the failure of the system of increasing severity of punishments, both corporal and institutional, to control recidivism had a considerable part in bringing about the so-called reformatory movement.¹

It is a well-established fact that the

¹ Those unfamiliar with the general story of a changing penology may get a good orientation in a book like H. E. Barnes and N. K. Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology* (2d ed.; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951) Chaps. XVI-XXXVIII.

savage punishments of earlier days were notoriously ineffective in keeping those punished from repeating their misconduct.² A single short account may serve as a useful illustration:

In spite of the absence of modern identification procedure, the recidivist was often recognized. . . . In 1617 a woman who was strangled at Amsterdam was found to have been arrested previously twenty-one times—seven times in Amsterdam, three times in Leiden and in Delft, twice in Haarlem, and once in Alkmaar, Middelburg, Dortrecht, Wesop, Enkhuizen, and The Hague. Altogether, she had been exposed on the scaffold eleven times, whipped eight times, branded five times, and her ears cut off. She had been banished for life seven times. During 1603-6, one Amsterdam offender was whipped six times and branded five times; in 1614-16, one was whipped eight times and branded four times; in one year, 1616, one man was four times whipped and thrice branded; while during 1614-18, one had a record of eleven whippings and five brandings. The prisoner who in 1617 had his eyes pierced, recovered the sight in one eye, but within a few years he had been six times whipped and thrice branded.³

Few will quarrel with Professor Sellin's interpretative conclusion that "the ineffectiveness of public and severe penalties was becoming obvious to those who imposed them and to other thoughtful citizens."⁴

The historic "Declaration of Principles" of the Cincinnati, Ohio, meeting of the First Prison Congress in 1870 therefore comes as climax to a long process of change in thinking about crime and punishment. One of the "principles" mentioned above includes the famous statement that "the su-

preme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals, not the infliction of vindictive suffering."⁵ Since that time there has been increasingly general acceptance, in verbal expression at least, of reformation as the desired end product of imprisonment. Controversy continues over how to promote or achieve reformation, but there is no dispute about its desirability as an end objective. The terms "prison" and "reformatory" persist but with no real difference in purpose between the two institutions.

This present-day emphasis on the need for the rehabilitation of criminals makes the question of whether prisons do accomplish reformation one of crucial importance for modern penology. For the past several decades the prison—that historic institution that whatever else it sought to do must always guarantee the secure confinement of its inmates—has been the central unit or principal device for the implementation of whatever "treatment" our society has sought to carry out on its convicted offenders. As such it is the visible symbol of the entire penal system. If the prison fails to reform, then it follows as a necessary logical inference that the present penal system, as a whole, fails in any major accomplishment of its declared purpose and objective.

Enthusiasm for the ideal of reformation as the objective of penal practice must not be permitted to color judgments about actual accomplishments in the realization of the ideal. If reformation is taking place, it should be apparent in terms of factual data about those involved in crime and subjected to penal treatment. Information about the outcome of prison treatment must be examined with impersonal objectivity re-

⁵ Quoted by F. H. Wines, *Punishment and Reformation* (New York, 1895, 1910, 1919), p. 205.

² See George Ives, *A History of Penal Methods*, London, 1914.

³ Thorsten Sellin, *Pioneering in Penology* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944), p. 15.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*

ardless of whether it gives comfort to or tends to discourage belief in the reformation ideal.

Two general kinds of source materials are available that throw some light on the principal problem, namely, information about recidivism, that is, the failure to reform, and information about positive accomplishment, the story of those who have changed from criminality to noncriminality. The principal sources and indications, including some tending in both directions, will be summarized in the sections that follow.

FIGURES ON RECIDIVISM

Considerable statistical information is now available on the prevalence of repeaters in the various jurisdictions or levels of procedure that handle criminals. These statistics do not add up to a single conclusive index, but the tendency of the many separate reports to point in the same direction suggests a consistency that invites the serious attention of everyone concerned. Some of the more important indicators of the extent of recidivism in the United States are reviewed below.

Police information about previous arrests

When the police arrest a culprit, are they dealing with a "first timer," or are they taking in a person who has been arrested before? Obviously, absence of statistical information about arrests cannot be taken uncritically as an indicator of actual nonarrest. It may mean only that no report of arrest was made to a central agency. The basic information now available appears in Table 1.

The seeming increase in recidivism shown in these figures represents in all probability primarily the fact of more complete reporting of arrests by local police to the FBI. Also, of course, as the time span increases during which uniform records have been kept the de-

TABLE 1—PER CENT OF ALL ARRESTS REPORTED TO THE FBI THAT HAD CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT RECORDS ALREADY ON FILE

Year	Per Cent
1937	42.4
1938	44.0
1939	45.4
1940	50.0
1941	51.2
1942	49.1
1943	47.7
1944	49.3
1945	51.9
1946	54.2
1947	55.4
1948	58.0
1949	59.3
1950	60.2
1951	60.2
1952	60.6

Source: United States Department of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports*, Washington, D. C., Annual Bulletins for the years indicated.

gree of coverage increases in depth as well. As coverage increases, both in space and in time, the probabilities are increasing that a condition of "no record" actually means no previous arrest. But for the present, it must be remembered that there are still a great many arrests made every year that are not reported to the FBI and about which no information is available as to previous arrests. In other words, police information about recidivism understates rather than overstates the actual condition as far as arrests are concerned.

Sentenced prisoners in jails and workhouses

Statistical information about prisoners in American jails and workhouses is notoriously inadequate and unreliable. These institutions are under local government control and no central reporting system, nor any type of uniform definitions or classifications, has ever

been worked out for them. The Census Bureau no longer concerns itself with this kind of statistical report. The decennial census of population, which does attempt to count noses wherever found, records no data on previous arrests.

Scattered information about those serving sentences in jails and workhouses, as distinguished from mere detention, is relatively consistent, however, as the following figures show:

1923, Special Census Bureau Report,⁶ 46.8 per cent of those committed to jails or workhouses had been previously committed.

1933, Special Census Bureau Report,⁷ 58.5 per cent of those committed to jails or workhouses had been previously committed.

1934, Connecticut Jail Study,⁸ nearly 80 per cent had records of previous criminality.

1937, District of Columbia Jail Survey,⁹ about 77 per cent had records of previous criminality.

Many other special jail studies have been made, usually concerned with the deplorable conditions of housekeeping and general care provided but giving no systematic attention to the difficult question of recidivism. It should be noted in the above figures that, with improved sources of information in the

⁶ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Prisoners 1923*, Washington, D. C., 1926.

⁷ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Jails, 1933: Prisoners in Jails and Other Penal Institutions under County or Municipal Jurisdiction*, Washington, D. C., 1935.

⁸ Jerome Davis, Chairman, *Report of the Legislative Commission on Jails with a Special Study of the Jail Population of Connecticut*, December 1934.

⁹ *The Prison Problems in the District of Columbia, A Survey by the Prison Industries Reorganization Administration*, summarized in L. N. Robinson, *Jails* (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Company, 1944), pp. 56-57.

more recent studies, the recidivism rate is much higher than the one reported in 1923. If a current report for the country as a whole were available, it would probably show that approximately three-fourths of those committed to jails and workhouses have been previously committed.

Prisoners in state and federal prisons and reformatories

These institutions deal almost exclusively with persons convicted of felonies, that is, relatively serious crime. Understandably enough, therefore, more effort has been expended on discovering previous records for this group than for any other type of prisoner. Even so, it must be remembered that any failure to discover or to report a previous conviction results in the kind of error that understates, rather than overstates, the amount of recidivism involved. The average proportion of prisoners with previous commitments in all institutions reporting is shown below for the years indicated:¹⁰

1923—50.5 per cent of all prisoners received from the courts.

1930—55.4 per cent of all prisoners received from the courts.

1933—50.8 per cent of all prisoners received from the courts.

1939—50.3 per cent of all prisoners released from the institutions.

1946—51.1 per cent of all prisoners released from the institutions.

A more detailed breakdown shows percentage distribution for 1946 (Table 2).¹¹

¹⁰ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories*, Washington, D. C. (report for year indicated).

¹¹ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories, 1946* (Washington, D. C., 1948), p. 94, Table 59.

• TABLE 2—PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS OF ADMISSIONS TO FEDERAL AND STATE PRISONS, BY PER CENT

Prior Commitment	All Institutions	Federal Institutions	State Institutions
With prior commitment information reported.....	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
No prior commitment.....	48.9	55.9	46.1
Jail or juvenile institution.....	20.2	18.4	20.9
1 prison commitment.....	18.0	14.6	19.4
2 prison commitments.....	7.2	6.1	7.6
3 or more prison commitments.....	5.7	5.0	6.0

These averages do not have a great deal of significance in view of the fact that variations in reports on prior commitments are considerable among the several states. A few examples will illustrate the point.¹² California, a state with relatively complete statistical service, reports only 25.0 per cent as with no previous commitment, while 39.9 per cent had previous prison commitment and 35.2 per cent had been previously committed to jails or juvenile institutions. Comparable information for New York State is: 40.6 per cent, no prior commitment; 24.6 per cent with prior prison commitment; 34.8 per cent with jail or juvenile institution commitment. On the other hand, Arizona reports only 19.0 per cent as having a prior prison commitment; 0.6 per cent with jail or juvenile institution commitment; and 80.4 per cent as having no prior commitment at all. It seems reasonable to conclude that such differences reflect primarily differences in the completeness of information and variations in reporting procedure rather than in the actual frequency of recidivism involved. Where the information is most nearly complete, these recidivism figures check in general with the police reports on arrests.

With the reorganization of government statistical services after World War II, the Census Bureau discontinued

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 95, Table 60.

its regular reports on prisoners. No generally comparable source of information is now available and therefore these series end with 1946. The "National Prisoner Statistics" currently issued in fugitive form by the United States Bureau of Prisons is only a stopgap effort to keep alive some of the more immediately needed administrative series. It has not attempted to publish information on currently received reports on prior commitments. In its own report¹³ on federal prisons for 1952 only 38.9 per cent are shown as without previous commitment. In other words, 61.1 per cent had already experienced institutional treatment before their current admission to the federal prisons.

Special Follow-up Studies—Massachusetts

Of follow-up studies now at hand, probably the best known and the ones with the most complete information about all aspects of the inmates concerned are the studies by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck. These authors reviewed and interpreted their findings in a little book prepared for the English Studies in Criminal Science series and published in 1945.¹⁴ The after-discharge

¹³ United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, *Federal Prisons: 1952*, Washington, D. C., 1952.

¹⁴ Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck, *After Conduct of Discharged Offenders*, London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1945.

conduct of two principal series of offenders (500 reformatory inmates and 1,000 juvenile delinquents) are reported on through three separate five-year follow-up periods (fifteen years) for each series. The arrangement below gives the per cent who were recidivists (officially delinquent plus unofficial delinquency) for each period:¹⁵

	Period I	Period II	Period III
Juvenile delinquents	85.4	73.2	63.4
Reformatory inmates	80.1	69.9	69.2

In another follow-up study of women after confinement in the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women, the Gluecks report a situation not significantly different for the first five-year follow-up period. Thus there were only 15.2 per cent who did not become delinquent either during the parole period or in the five years after release from the institution. That is to say, 84.8 per cent were recidivists by individual case follow-up.¹⁶

Special Follow-up Study—Minnesota

In a recently published¹⁷ follow-up study of the inmates of the Minnesota State Reformatory, St. Cloud, the findings were slightly less dismal than those reported by the Gluecks for Massachusetts. The St. Cloud report was for the whole group of 345 men who left the reformatory during the fiscal year 1944-45. Their subsequent conduct was carefully checked through June 30, 1950. "... 47.2 per cent were clear of offenses and revocations during the follow-up period . . . [with] . . . recidivism not exceeding 52.8 per cent."¹⁸

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34, Table 1.

¹⁶ Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck, *Five Hundred Delinquent Women* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934), p. 253.

¹⁷ S. B. Zuckerman, A. J. Barron, and H. B. Whittier, "A Follow-up Study of Minnesota State Reformatory Inmates," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, Vol. 43 (January-February 1953), pp. 622-36.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 626.

There is also an interesting comparison of after-conduct of 183 parolees and 110 released on expiration of sentence. Of the parolees 57.9 per cent were involved in later offenses but only 52.7 per cent of the expiration group had subsequent offenses.¹⁹

Many other statistical findings could be cited in further elaboration of the extent of recidivism, but there seems to be no point in additional detail. Sufficient material has been reviewed to show why the conclusion is generally accepted that "all studies show that a large proportion of offenders are recidivists."²⁰

INFORMATION ABOUT REFORMATION

It is still impossible to demonstrate statistically that reformation, when it occurs, is due to institutional treatment. Penology, in this sense, is in the same boat with medicine. When a sick patient recovers it is always somewhat problematical whether the recovery was brought about by the treatment prescribed, or whether the patient possessed recuperative powers and got well in spite of treatment. When the patient dies there is no question about failure of treatment, but when he recovers the situation is much less clear. Failure to achieve reformation can be demonstrated—the inmate returns to crime and in due season comes back to the prison for postgraduate treatment. But for the one who does not come back—did he change his behavior because of prison training and treatment or in spite of it? No information now available can give any serious scientific answer to that problem.

It is a basic fallacy of the sentimental approach to rehabilitation to assume that every inmate committed to prison

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 632.

²⁰ Mabel A. Elliott, *Crime in Modern Society* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 92.

constitutes an equally good prospect for rehabilitation. Actually, some are very poor risks while others are relatively much more promising prospects. Whether one views the apparent preponderance of recidivists in prison as an indication of failure to accomplish reformation or places the emphasis on the smaller segment successfully salvaged from further criminality seems to be largely a matter of temperament and point of view.

The fact that from 20 to 40 per cent or more of offenders do not repeat their misconduct in such ways as to be returned to prison is of tremendous significance in view of the long chain of factors, involving all kinds of negative selection, that precede commitment to a penal institution. All recidivism studies show considerable proportions who did not recidivate. In the more careful follow-up studies this fact has been verified through elaborate individual case study.

Thus the Glueck reformatory series revealed that a total of 140 cases out of an initial 417 achieved reformation in the sense of nondelinquency for fifteen years after release from the institution. This is approximately one-third of the whole group and should not be dismissed as insignificant.²¹

All responsible prison administrators, parole agents, and others who have worked directly and intimately with the criminals in prison know, through personal knowledge of after-conduct, of numerous individual cases of whom it may truthfully be said that reformation has taken place—be it because of or in spite of prison experience.

The conclusion is inescapable that some reformation or rehabilitation does take place in the course of present penal treatment procedures. Whether the pro-

²¹ Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck, *Criminal Careers in Retrospect* (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1943), p. 121.

portion reformed represents all that possibly can be done is quite another matter. Presumably no type of treatment would rehabilitate 100 per cent of prison inmates. How increase the proportion who are reformed or rehabilitated? Suggestions for some more adequate answers to that question will have to come from other considerations than attention to recidivism per se.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT PROGRAMS

The fact that the people who enter our prisons have more often than not been in institutions before poses a number of interesting questions for the future. Does the poor record of accomplishment result from misconceptions and mistaken ideas about what needs to be done? Or do the poor results flow from facilities (buildings, materials, staff, and personnel) inadequate to do what clearly needs to be done? Or is extensive rehabilitation, as such, possibly an essentially hopeless task, and is only a decently humane program of more or less permanent care needed, the cost of which may in part be offset by the returns from efficiently managed prison labor programs?

Rehabilitation, according to the present orientation of penology, seeks to provide two kinds of services, seeks to do two kinds of things, from which it is hoped that the rehabilitation of the inmates will result.

1. Ideally, there should be adequate psychological and psychiatric services to uncover the deep-seated mental disturbances assumed to be significantly related to individual misconduct. When the individual "gets straightened out inside," he understands himself and his surroundings better and therefore seeks a more intelligent life orientation than crime—hence reformation should take place.

2. Similarly, there should be adequate

(and fairly elaborate) programs of education and vocational training to correct the ignorance, poor habits, and lack of skill (presumably due to unfavorable environment and underprivilege) that are assumed to be important factors in the unfortunate individual's criminality.

These two general techniques, either singly or in combination, encompass almost the entire battery of procedures with which the modern "treatment program" in prison hopes to bring about rehabilitation. Perhaps one of the difficulties may be the very inadequacy and inappropriateness of this basic approach.

Viewed from a somewhat different perspective, the high proportion of failure in reformation is seen to be logically related to the composition of the population treated. The ordinary prison population may be characterized as consisting of three segments, or parts, namely:

1. *The psychologically disturbed, for whom crime is some sort of symbolic release of persistent and deep-seated mental conflict.* The only effective treatment known, and that is not very effective, is that patterned on the modern mental hospital. Many patients are released from mental hospitals as "improved," but the lapse rates for most mental ills are very high. Readmission, in relation to first admission, often gives rates not too dissimilar from those found in criminal recidivism statistics.²² To the extent that the prison population is made up of similarly disturbed people, high recidivism rates rather than complete reformation should be expected.

2. *The unskilled and uneducated but otherwise "normal" person whose need*

²² For particular year of interest, see the long series of reports entitled *Patients in Hospitals for Mental Disease*, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D. C.

is to acquire sufficient skill to earn an honest living. Too often, however, such unskilled inmates are also of very limited ability, so that no high level of skill or accomplishment can be achieved. Frustration, defeat, and ineffectiveness are inevitable consequents. The problem is often more one of downgrading self-expectations than of supplying the skills and training that would make possible successful achievement of high expectations. That aspect of the American educational problem, outside of prisons as well as inside, so far has not been met in any adequate manner. The end result, however, is high recidivism rates rather than reformation.

3. *The psychologically "normal" and educationally "average" persons who identify themselves with a different, an "antisocial," or a non-law-abiding way of life.* Such people represent no special training problem in the ordinary sense—they are often well-trained and well-adjusted individuals who are only marking time in prison. They are not disturbed; they have no need of, and no interest in, advice or counsel; they are only waiting to get out to resume their customary life orientation. The prisoner whose incarceration involves political or religious principles is typically of this kind. So, too, is a large segment of the dishonest "high class crook" type whose only difficulty is that he is "agin" the forces of the organized community rather than with them. There is no present information or "wisdom" that can supply any effective programs for the reformation of this group. In this case, too, the result is more likely to be recidivism than reformation.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

If there is any validity in the above analysis, it is apparent that the high recidivism rates come about as a result of

a combination of a number of basic factors. The mere increasing of facilities and manpower to do better and more completely what we now are doing will not help much unless there is developed a comprehensive and deeply searching program of research as the springboard for new techniques of treatment.

Serious research needs the support of regular budgets and a stable, skilled group of research workers. That seems

to be the principal next requirement, and the response must come, first of all, from top-level responsible administrators. When basic research gets budgetary support, as well as lip service, from those in control of budgets, several new pages may be turned in the still to be written chapter on how to increase the proportion of inmates rehabilitated, or reformed, as a result of prison experience.

George B. Vold, Ph.D., Minneapolis, Minnesota, is professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota. He has served as technical adviser to the Minnesota Crime Commission, as chairman of a Governor's Committee on Sex Criminals (Minnesota), and as chairman of a Governor's Special Committee on Prison Conditions in Minnesota. He is author of Prediction Methods and Parole (1931) and coauthor of Report of Minnesota Crime Commission (1935), Survey of Police Training (1937), and Report on Prison Conditions (1951).

The Process of Reception in the Adult Correctional System

By NORMAN FENTON

FOR some offenses, the law makes commitment to prison mandatory. In the majority of cases in the criminal courts, alternatives to prison commitment are probation, fines, incarceration in the local jail, or, in some states, commitment to a hospital for the mentally ill or mentally defective.

If there are no local diagnostic clinics serving the criminal courts, then it is reasonable to suppose that men and women may be sent to prison who could have been handled in some other way more economically and more humanely. Many individuals now sent to prison and examined there in the reception center may be found by clinical study not to have required the drastic treatment of prison commitment. Had they been studied by the courts and the personality features of their cases revealed, the judges might have been able to use methods more suitable than prison commitment. Ideally, it would be desirable to work toward the concept of preprison clinical screening under local or state auspices, so that the sentence to prison may be used only when absolutely necessary.

Acceptance by local and state authorities of mutually overlapping responsibilities has been more ready for juvenile delinquents than for adult offenders. A generation ago, the states of Illinois, Ohio, and California, to mention but three, had developed resources directed toward keeping children and youth out of state institutions. These resources were principally local clinical centers or traveling child guidance clinics. To fortify the efforts of the clinics

and the probation officials, other local resources were established, such as the employment of visiting teachers, the addition of counseling services in the schools, and the enrichment of local recreational facilities—all of these designed to help children and youth at the local level and to try to prevent institutionalization in state correctional schools.

It now seems desirable and necessary to develop more resources for adult offenders to prevent their institutionalization. Again, as in the history of the treatment of juvenile delinquency, the clear recognition of the overlapping responsibility of local and state correctional agencies must be the preface to this development. If the local agency is too small or too poor to establish clinical resources to screen out from the parade of prison-bound human beings those who should not go there, then the state must establish such resources. The state should be empowered to provide clinical study and to recommend to the local judicial authorities alternatives to prison commitment in individual cases.

In California, where the average rate of probation for all the counties has been reported as about two cases in five and the range in the use of probation from a little less than one in five to almost three in five, it is obvious that more persons may be sent to prison than need be. In fairness, one might add that in some jurisdictions, perhaps, probation may be used for some cases that really need treatment in a correctional institution for their own welfare and for the protection of society. Until

by adequately staffed diagnostic clinics the state and local authorities join in the screening of convicted offenders before use is made of prison commitment—as in New Jersey, where a beginning in this direction has been made—we shall never fully appreciate to what extent commitment to prison is used unnecessarily.

FROM "QUARANTINE" TO THE RECEPTION CENTER

Whatever the situation may be regarding the screening of cases before institutionalization, state prison authorities, it would seem, can no longer evade their responsibilities for the diagnostic study of prisoners upon admission to prison. Advances in clinical methods for the personality appraisal of adult offenders have been such as to offer practical help to those in charge of prisons. From the custodial standpoint, the anticipation, through individual diagnostic study, of prison maladjustment in individual cases and the forewarning to the custodial staff that certain prisoners may try to escape or to engage in assaultive behavior, is good management practice. The need for efficiency in the operation of prison maintenance or correctional industries makes the clinical appraisal of the capacities and interests of new inmates (employees) as necessary as are the screening and assignment methods of personnel departments in large mercantile or industrial establishments. Early recognition by the reception center staff of the needs of newly received inmates is essential for corrective medical and psychiatric services, for education or vocational training, for guidance in religion, or for individual or familial social assistance. The prison may thereafter utilize its treatment resources for the welfare of those inmates who are most likely to profit from them.

All but the most ignorant and in-

secure prison officers, those who are sometimes "symptomatically omniscient," have recognized these practical values of the study of newly received prisoners and have established some type of initial observation and "quarantine" procedures. The current trend is away from the use of a few "holding" cells for segregation of the newly committed inmates, with inmates and staff members interviewing them and co-operating in case recording, toward introduction of the professionally staffed reception center. Reception centers have been developed in several states and are now under consideration in others. If the prisons are ever to become genuine treatment agencies, this transition from the procedures of the quarantine section to professionally staffed reception centers seems necessary.¹

PURPOSES AND VALUES OF RECEPTION PROCESS

It may be profitable at this point in our discussion to summarize the general objectives of the adequate reception process.² These are:

1. The study of the personality and social background of the newly com-

¹ For more detailed information on the role of the reception process in the treatment of offenders consult N. Fenton, "The Relationship of the Reception Center to the Correctional Program," *Proceedings of the American Prison Association* (New York, 1947), pp. 134-44; *Handbook on Classification in Correctional Institutions*. New York: American Prison Association, 1947. 88 pp.; G. M. Kendall, in Paul Tappan (Ed.), *Contemporary Correction* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), Chap. VII, pp. 107-24.

² The material in the following pages has drawn upon an earlier publication prepared by Glenn M. Kendall, Director of the Reception Center of the New York State Department of Correction, and the present author, and published as Chapter II of the *Handbook on Classification in Correctional Institutions*, New York: American Prison Association, 1947.

mitted inmates by a competent professional staff.

2. The screening of prisoners for assignment to particular institutions and to special segregation units in terms of their needs and the custodial provisions of the institutions.

3. The planning of a program of individual treatment for consideration by the staff of the receiving institution.

4. The preparation of individual case studies of value in the assignment of men to work in the maintenance of the prison and in correctional industries in accordance with individual needs and institutional provisions.

5. Recognition of the prison subversives and the psychopaths, and recommendation of individualized programs to prevent escapes, assaultive behavior, arson and other destruction of property, and other incidents unfortunate both for the inmate and the institution.

In addition, the reception center has these further values:

It offers an excellent locale for individual and group methods of adjusting the inmates to being in prison and for their orientation to the opportunities and restrictions of prison life.

The results of case studies in the reception center may reveal the need for specialized institutions not as yet provided in the state prison system and for additional or improved segregation or treatment facilities in existing institutions.

In a broader sense, the systematic and consistent collection of data regarding the characteristics of the men received makes possible the constructive development of the entire training and treatment program of the prison.

Finally, the data from the careful and consistent case studies of the reception centers lend themselves readily to research into the causes and treatment of delinquency and criminality. Findings from these studies may ultimately lead

to the prevention and control of the types of social maladjustment leading to prison commitments.

RECEPTION NEEDS IN THE SMALL PRISON SYSTEM

As the prison system obtains appropriations for clinical services, the question arises whether or not to utilize these resources in a reception center for newly received prisoners. The size of the prison system may determine the answer. If the prison facilities of a state are limited to an institution for ordinary male prisoners and a reformatory for younger men, it would seem to be impractical to establish a separate reception center. In contrast to necessities in the larger states, to be discussed later, it should be possible in the smaller states for the same members of the clinical staff to continue to counsel and treat the man from reception to discharge from parole. In some of the larger states at present the inmate may develop rapport first with one group of caseworkers in the reception center, thereafter with others in the institution, and finally with those on the staff of the parole bureau. If recent experience in psychiatric casework has taught anything, it is the value, ordinarily, of continuity of treatment rather than this relaying of cases from one caseworker to another. In the small prison system, clinical resources should be integrated with the entire program of the correctional system rather than limited to the reception process.

THE LARGER PRISON SYSTEM

In the larger prison systems where there may be several geographically rather widely separated prisons, some with overlapping characteristics as to kinds of inmates and types of programs, valid arguments may be offered in favor of the centralized reception center. For example, almost five thousand male

prisoners are received annually in the California reception centers. Most of them are classified for transfer to one of the state's six prisons. A few who have been returned for parole violation may be recommended for transfer from the reception center to one of the honor camps. Also in each of the prisons there may be special units for the segregation of particular types of inmates, such as the effeminate sexual deviate, the blind, the elderly, and the tubercular. It is evident that a centralized reception process, separated from the individual institutional programs, is a practical necessity in California.

Because of the size of the state, adult male offenders are received in two centers—one with a capacity of 408 in the south near Los Angeles on the grounds of the California Institution for Men at Chino, and the other with a capacity of over 800 near San Francisco on the grounds of the California State Prison at San Quentin. The Department of Corrections operates two prison buses, which take the men after classification in the reception centers to the prisons and segregation units recommended for them by the reception center staff and approved by the Director of Corrections. To achieve effective classification in a prison system the size of California's, which receives inmates from fifty-eight different counties, the separate reception center seems to be almost a necessity. For states of intermediate size, careful study and analysis of many factors will need to be made before deciding whether to have a separate reception center or to integrate these clinical resources with the staffs of the institutions.

THE RECEPTION CENTER—ADMINISTRATIVE SETTING

The question of location of the reception center, whether on the grounds of

an existing prison or as a separate facility, may be answered only by study of the local situation. In the small prison system, for reasons of economy, the reception center should be on the grounds of one of the institutions. Administratively, the head of the center should report directly to the warden or superintendent. The administration of the clinical phases of the program may be separate. Whatever particular arrangements are made, the success of the program will usually depend primarily upon the good will and co-operation of the staff of the host institution with the center.

In the larger prison system, the center should have a location independent of any other institution and it should be separately administered. If this cannot be done, then as great an approximation as possible to the independence of the agency should be developed. There are many reasons, almost all on the basis of economy, which are significant in answering this moot question in favor of the location of the reception center on the grounds of an existing institution and administratively under the head thereof. Opposed to these is the basic fact that the reception center is a departmental operation and should not be subordinated to the management of the particular institution where it is located. There is always the danger that objective attitudes toward institutional assignments may be negated by local interference. The warden of the host institution may bring pressure to bear to have the more desirable inmates transferred to his place and the more troublesome prisoners sent to other institutions to rehabilitate.

The broader purposes of the reception center as an agency for collaborating with local jurisdictions in preventing prison commitments is another obvious departmental function, and a forceful

argument for the separation of the reception center from any local institutional entanglements.

PHYSICAL FACILITIES

Whatever the administrative auspices, the physical facilities must be carefully planned.⁸ The different types of inmates received in a reception center make it necessary to have good security and custodial control. Facilities for the segregation of special types and for disciplinary cases are necessary. Dormitories are not desirable. Some of the cell arrangements must be of maximum security, other of medium security, with outside windows. Ordinarily, minimum-security facilities should not be used.

The resources of the center should include adequate and soundproofed offices and interviewing rooms for the staff. For the purpose of providing constructive activities, dayrooms are necessary with facilities for reading, correspondence, and quiet games; so likewise are a gymnasium and good and easily accessible outdoor recreational facilities. Classrooms for group counseling and remedial education, general shops for trial of performance abilities in the manual skills, and arrangements for religious services and instruction are other necessities. Pleasantly furnished visiting rooms should be provided.

The receiving unit should be carefully planned. The procedures during the period immediately after the actual reception of the inmate from the county authorities would differ with each prison system; their importance for morale should be recognized. A manual of procedures for the reception center may be prepared to cover these admission procedures, including the checking of commitment papers, preliminary physi-

⁸ The first reception center for adult offenders, planned and built for the purpose, was opened in 1951 at Chino, California.

cal examination, dressing in, the details of identification, and the like.

PROGRAM

The first and perhaps the major emphasis of the program of the reception center should be to obtain as complete a picture as possible of the inmate and his needs. This will be done not only through the customary clinical channels, but also by observations in other situations, such as group counseling sessions, recreational activities, attendance at religious services, and classroom and shop behavior. The inmate's relations with those who visit him and with others on the outside are also very important areas of observation.

Since the minimum time necessary with adult prisoners for an adequate admission study and prison orientation is two months, the above activities are essential not only for the purposes indicated but also to prevent the idleness and destructive talk that exist in the ordinary jail or "quarantine" section of the prison. The thoughts of the inmate from the time of admission should be guided toward consideration of the situation he will face when released to society. At the same time, and in the same focus, the relationship of the therapeutic aspects of the prison program to adjustment on parole must be explained. For a time, in one prison system, the members of the parole board and the chief of the parole bureau spoke to the inmate group at regularly scheduled intervals and permitted them to ask questions. In this way it was possible to allay some of the false rumors and to counteract somewhat the rantings of those in the group who had failed on parole.

While stressing in the reception center preparation for release, it is also important to clarify as far as possible in the minds of new inmates the nature of the program in the reception center and

the prisons. This may be accomplished in part by booklets about the reception center and about each of the prisons. The training and treatment opportunities described for each of the institutions may be presented also by illustrated lectures. The rules and regulations of the prison system should be explained by a member of the custodial staff, sufficiently mature to deal calmly and helpfully with whatever questions and comments the inmates may offer.

THE CASE SUMMARY

The reports prepared by the reception center represent the combined results of all the tests, interviews, and observations of the various staff members.⁴ To a large extent, the work of the reception center must be evaluated from these reports. It is extremely important, therefore, that they be clear, concise, and comprehensive. The case summaries should not only demonstrate the professional competence of the staff, but also be readily understandable and usable by the layman in institutional work.

The reception center summary or report should include material under each of the following headings: social background; criminal history; initial adjustment to the institution; medical examination; psychological study; vocational study; educational history and analysis; religious background and attitudes; recreational interests and abilities; psychiatric evaluation.

THE STAFF CONFERENCE

Staff discussion of the case has been called the guidance conference or case conference. In the reception center this takes place when sufficient data have been assembled, usually after the man has been there about six weeks. The

⁴ For a suggested list of personnel for a reception center see page 26 of *Handbook on Classification*, *supra* note 1.

clinical staff, together with the teachers, work supervisors, correctional officers, and others who can attend, should meet in a friendly, democratic session at which all report their findings. There should be no domination of the conference by any one specialist. What the teacher or correctional officer has to say should be given the same recognition accorded the contributions of the professional clinicians. The human problems dealt with are so difficult and have so many aspects that no one person, however self-assured, could possibly have all the answers.

Half an hour or longer is required, on the average, for adequate discussion of a case prior to the preparation of the admission summary. Difficult and dangerous cases usually need much more time. It is unfortunate when the case-load pressure requires the staff to telescope the case conferences.

Data from all ten areas of inquiry noted above are reported by the staff, who also try to evaluate their observations. Relevant questions may be raised during each presentation. An attempt may be made, thereafter, to interpret each history in terms of the relationships of causal factors to the problems the man presents, with a view to trying to understand what may be responsible for his antisocial behavior. To be of most help to the man, an effort should be made to ascertain the unmet needs in his life, during childhood or later, which may have brought about conflict or frustration and prepared the soil in which the personality disturbances grew. This phase of the study is exceedingly difficult.

The group as a whole may later formulate some tentative explanation of causal factors, why or how the man developed his problem. The conference should also consider the degree of treatability of the man, how much can be done for him.

Classification has too often ended with diagnosis. After all the significant facts are in, the important question remains, what should be done for the inmate? It is important, therefore, that each staff member outline briefly and specifically what steps should be taken in his area of treatment to eliminate the man's deficiencies and to help him solve his problems. By having such recommendations made by the individual staff members as a part of their reports, they are forced to formulate their suggestions prior to the staff meeting. Time and effort is, therefore, conserved at the staff meeting for evaluating the recommendations in relation to the entire clinical picture.

Finally, recommendations are formulated by the group for the types of treatment most needed by each individual in order to help him solve his problems. All types of treatment may not be available at the institution to which the man may be transferred. Alternative recommendations must be included which may more nearly accord with practical possibilities. Recommendations for desirable treatment should not be omitted entirely, however, because the reception center also has the function of stimulating the improvement of institutional programs in order more adequately to meet the basic needs of inmates.

Some assurance is necessary that the recommendations of the reception center will be carried out as far as facilities permit. In one jurisdiction this has been accomplished by a statement in the official departmental transfer order to the effect that the recommendations of the reception center shall be the basis of the treatment program in the receiving institution. Subsequent follow-up in this prison system has revealed a very encouraging correlation of reception center recommendations and the

actual program for the inmate in the receiving institution.

The case conference, or guidance conference, not only serves the purpose of integrating the data about each man and planning for his guidance and treatment in the institution but also provides an excellent occasion for the study of the functions and procedures of the reception center itself. As a medium for in-service training it is very valuable. Additional staff members of the reception center and some from the other institutions and from the parole bureau may also profit by attendance.

SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT

After the case study has been completed, the inmate must be prepared for transfer from the reception center to a regular institutional program. Before leaving the center, the inmate should be advised regarding the results of the clinical study. Unless his interest in the program planned for his welfare be elicited, constructive outcomes are not assured. If the inmate recognizes his problems and has gained some insight into how he may proceed to overcome them, a major objective of the reception center will have been accomplished.

The effectiveness of the reception center is dependent upon the adequacy of the total environment offered subsequently by the receiving institutions. Although helpful in many ways, individual diagnosis and orientation to prison, in themselves, offer no assurance of later good adjustment in the institution or on parole. The constructive influences of the institutions, especially perhaps their resources for vocational training and psychotherapy, are the crucial factors. Unless the prison system as a whole is geared to an equally high level of correctional service in social welfare, religion, medicine,

and other areas of treatment, the reception center program may have only a limited effect upon the later lives of those who enter there.

Because an adequate reception process is expensive, its limitations under inadequate support must be clearly recognized. A clinical staff under pressure on an assembly-line type of case output may carry out many of the objectives of the reception process, but the more subtle clinical values, which only ample and unhurried opportunity for case discussion and thoughtful case analysis make possible, may be lost. If the reception process in the correc-

tional system is ever to achieve maturity as an operation, it must have adequate legislative appropriations to accomplish all of its purposes, including the more subtle ones, to which laymen are blind. In the public service, as in life elsewhere, what is best is likely to be expensive. Reception centers are no exception to this axiom. If the prisons are ever to be genuine treatment agencies, it is essential, likewise, to provide adequate clinical and other resources to carry out in the institutions, and subsequently during the period on parole, the treatment for the individual prescribed in the reception center.

*Norman Fenton, Ph.D., Sacramento, California, is a deputy director of the State of California Department of Corrections. Previously he served as professor of education at Stanford University and as director of the California Bureau of Juvenile Research. He is the author of *Shell Shock and Its Aftermath* (1926), *The Delinquent Boy and the Correctional School* (1935), *State Child Guidance Services in California Communities* (1938), *Mental Hygiene in School Practice* (1943), *An Introduction to Classification and Treatment in State Correctional Service* (1950), and *Observations in the Prisons of Denmark* (1954).*

Saving Prison Waste

By RICHARD A. MCGEE

SINCE institutional care is the most expensive form of treatment in common use, we ought to use it only when other methods appear to be impractical or inadvisable. The growing use of probation and the gradual strengthening of probation services during the past half century is a healthy trend, but it is accompanied by an attitude on the part of many probation executives and judges which is unsound if not dangerous; namely, that institutions are so bad that only those who are virtually hopeless should be sent to them. This does not square with the fact that, except for the two or three per cent who die in institutions, those sent away all come home sooner or later. If we maintain institutions which are merely places of temporary banishment, they must, of necessity, become not places to which criminals are sent but places from which criminals come.

There can be no rational theory about prisons which does not conceive of them as places of re-education, treatment, and readjustment. To believe that the mere purposeless service of time in a listless, degrading environment will produce such an objective is infantile.

It is not the purpose of this article to plot grand strategy for the total struggle of making the prison a place for correction and rehabilitation; rather, let us consider one of the most obvious types of prison waste, namely, the waste of the time and energy of thousands of human beings who could produce and, by producing, reduce the public fiscal burden and at the same time improve themselves. Failure to meet the challenge will cost society untold treasure

not only in dollars but in the sum total of human resources which is the basis of all our wealth.

There are many ways of making constructive use of a prisoner's time besides engaging him in productive work. They include, to mention some of them in passing, education, vocational instruction, psychiatric treatment, wholesome recreation, reading, religious instruction, and guided group activities. But even the richest program for adult prisoners should be built around a normal forty hours a week of productive work of such a character as to develop acceptable work habits, marketable skills, and some economic return to the state.

OPPOSITION TO PRISON WORK

Few disinterested students of the problem will quarrel with the principle involved. The difficulty lies in the opposition of organized labor on the one hand and of organized business on the other. Unsound and often irrational as this opposition is in terms of the general public welfare, it has had its way to a large extent because the public has not been interested and because prison administrators have been almost helpless in the face of the potency of the forces arrayed against them.

It is difficult, too, for the prison administrator to appreciate what the shouting is all about when he considers that of the 170,000 state prisoners in the United States in 1953, probably not more than 50,000 would need to be employed in industrial production in order to eliminate the worst of the idleness problem. Viewed against the 60,000,000 persons gainfully employed in the country, this seems pitifully

small, indeed—a ratio of one to 1,200. Yet to hear the ravings of some of the opponents of prison labor, one would think it a major threat to the very foundations of our free enterprise system.

One is tempted to undertake a review of the whole history of restrictive state and federal legislation aimed at controlling prison labor and to attempt an analysis of the forces which place these laws on our statute books. However, this has been well done elsewhere.¹ Perhaps it is worth while to point out here merely that such restrictions were first imposed because of abuses of the use of prison labor, but more recently, especially during the depression of the 1930's, because of political activity aimed at eliminating competition. The movement to restrict and control prison labor was started for the purpose of correcting a public evil, but most of the activity of this kind since World War I has been negative and rarely in the public interest. Here is an excellent example of the pendulum of reform swinging too far.

THE CALIFORNIA PROGRAM

Be all this as it may, the blunt question we must ask ourselves is, What can we do about it? The statesmen of both labor and industry must be encouraged to make a new approach to the prob-

¹ See Frank T. Flynn, "The Federal Government and the Prison Labor Problem in the States," *The Social Service Review*, Vol. 24, Nos. 1 and 2 (March and June 1950), later reprinted for private distribution by The John Howard Association, Chicago, Ill.; Blake McKelvey, *American Prisons: A Study in American Social History Prior to 1915* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 93-125 and *passim*; U. S. Department of Justice, *The Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures*, Vol. V: *Prisons* (Leavenworth: Federal Prison Industries, Inc., Press, 1940), pp. 27-34; and Louis N. Robinson, *Should Prisoners Work?* (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Company, 1931).

lem on a nationwide basis. The prisons are a part of our democratic system of government. It is time that both labor and industry took a positive interest in this matter since they are largely responsible for the restrictions which now hamstringing prison employment programs. All this is not to say that prison administrators and state officials might not struggle a little harder to find some remedies of their own. In 1947, the State of California instituted a program which may be of general interest. The state anticipated a doubling, or even a trebling, of its prison population during the postwar decade. This presented a multitude of problems, not the least of which was how to develop employment for several thousand inmates in the face of a long history of active and rather effective opposition to the expansion of prison enterprises within the state.

Acting on the theory that the forces at work in the state which had opposed prisoner employment ought to assume a positive responsibility for a problem of government to which they themselves had contributed, a small conference of leaders of labor and industry was called by the governor. They were willing to recognize the problem, but expressed fear that these proposed industries, backed by what they called the "unlimited financial resources of the state," might grow into a socialistic Frankenstein. They wanted to see some better controls established than the law then provided. A long series of conferences and discussions followed between business and labor leaders and the Director of Corrections. Growing out of these, a law was enacted which created a Correctional Industries Commission² con-

² This commission took its general form and concept from Federal Prison Industries, Inc., which has proved so successful in developing a program for the United States Bureau of Prisons.

sisting of two representatives of industry, two of organized labor, one of agriculture, and one of the general public. Each member is appointed by the governor for a term of four years. The seventh member, who serves as chairman, is the Director of Corrections. The scope of the responsibility assigned this commission, as stated in the law, is that it

... shall recommend productive industrial and agricultural enterprises in the prisons and institutions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections in such volume and of such kinds as to eliminate unnecessary idleness among the inmates and to provide diversified work activities which will serve as means of vocational education as well as of occupational and financial support.

The law made it quite evident that the commission was to find practical ways "to eliminate unnecessary idleness," and "to provide diversified work activities" by determining "the advisability and suitability of establishing, expanding, diminishing, or discontinuing any industrial or agricultural enterprise involving a gross annual production of more than twenty-five thousand dollars value."

To carry into effect successfully this vital and difficult responsibility requires continuing co-operative relationships with labor and industry. Relationships of this kind were established through such organizations as the State Chamber of Commerce, the State Manufacturers' Association, the State Federation of Labor, the State Council of Industrial Organizations, the State Farm Bureau Federation, the California Council of Agricultural Associations, and with the subsidiary or auxiliary subdivisions or units of these state organizations. These co-operative relationships are the result of putting into practice the kind of thinking exemplified by Howard Coonley, a former president of the Na-

tional Association of Manufacturers, when he said:

Mistakes have been made by management and by labor. There must be an end of indictments, of accusations, of fault-finding, on both sides. We must behave differently in the future. We have the resources both material and human. What we need is the common sense to work together with a common understanding of the purpose we want to accomplish; and we should behave so as to benefit the public, the worker, the employer, and the consumer. There must be no exploitation by any one person of another person, or by any one group of another group.

SERVICES OF STATE COMMITTEES

With adequate co-operative relationships guided by the kind of thinking cited, the operation of suitable productive enterprises in prisons can be made practicable by:

1. Providing co-operative services through state committees which will aid in (a) exploring and selecting suitable markets in state agencies and (b) determining types and quantities of commodities which can be manufactured for tax-supported agencies by prison productive enterprises.

2. Providing co-operative services through state committees which will aid in (a) integrating the vocational training program with the program of productive enterprises and (b) co-ordinating the services of state departments which can contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of the rehabilitation of prisoners and their placement in gainful employment.

FUNCTIONING OF STATE COMMITTEES

Specific examples will serve to illustrate the practical way in which appropriate state committees can and do function. The Director of the State Department of Education, in co-operation with the Director of the State De-

partment of Corrections, appointed a state committee designated as the State Correctional Industries Implementing Committee and assigned to it the responsibility of "promoting the manufacture of articles for public schools after appropriate exploration and experimentation." The State Committee proceeded as follows:

Four area meetings were planned in co-operation with representatives of the State Department of Corrections. On display at each of these area meetings were articles suited to the needs of the public schools already being manufactured, and samples of articles which were being considered for manufacture on recommendation of the committee. The co-operative area meetings had these practical results:

1. Public school officials, and especially purchasing officers, had opportunity to see and appraise the specific articles being manufactured by prison enterprises.

2. These same individuals were provided a rendezvous for exchanging experiences and ideas concerning articles being manufactured, as well as new articles proposed for manufacture.

3. Opportunity was afforded for making suggestions, based on actual experience, designed to help in improving some of the articles on display.

4. An estimate was made of the total quantity of each displayed article that might be purchased during a fiscal year by the school districts represented in each area meeting.

5. Supplementing the estimate, a survey was made based on the established contacts, which provided data sufficiently comprehensive and reliable to justify the establishment by the Correctional Industries Commission of a substantial productive enterprise, without opposition from any source.

Following these area meetings the State Correctional Industries Imple-

menting Committee published a leaflet, which was widely distributed, entitled "A Platform for The California State Correctional Industries Implementing Committee." In part, it read as follows:

The State Department of Corrections can serve the public schools in terms of the following services:

1. *Display for Inspection and Evaluation the Articles Manufactured by Correctional Enterprises on Recommendation of Qualified Personnel.*
2. *Manufacture Articles for Experimental Use in Classrooms.* Any school district may request the manufacture, by California Correctional Industries, of sample items for experimental use, when such items hold promise of state-wide acceptance.
3. *Manufacture in Sufficient Volume the Articles Selected for State-Wide Use.*

The same co-operative procedure can be, and has been, used with other state departments and agencies, and with state and local labor, industrial, and agricultural organizations. A convincing example is the support which was obtained for the establishment of a cotton textile mill at the State Prison at San Quentin, California. Arrangements were made for appropriate committees, or groups, to visit the prison, see and appraise the physical facilities available for the mill, meet with the Correctional Industries Commission, and become fully informed concerning the proposed enterprise. The organizations represented were: California Cotton Co-operative Association, California State Federation of Labor, California Industrial Union Council—CIO, California Manufacturers' Association, California State Chamber of Commerce, California Farm Bureau Federation, Agricultural Council of California, Pacific Coast Garment Manufacturers, U. S. Department of Agriculture—California Research Cotton Station, National Cotton

Council of America, Textile Workers of America—CIO, International Ladies Garment Workers, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, California Cotton Mills, San Francisco Chamber of Commerce—Industrial Department, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce—Industrial Department, and the Central Valley Empire Association. The substance of the information given the representatives of the co-operating bodies was that qualified textile engineers reported the proposed cotton textile mill could be operated successfully under certain prescribed conditions. The result was unanimous action by the Correctional Industries Commission providing for the establishment of a cotton textile mill at the State Prison at San Quentin. The opposition which had been expressed initially by some was withdrawn. The mill will be in full operation beginning in January 1955, with unanimous approval.

These examples are intended to confirm the fact that the co-operative approach is the procedure which can, and does, provide the services that contribute effectively to the solution of the prison labor problem. The common expression which predicates the need for a co-operative approach is: "I'm not going to stick my neck out." There is a prevalent fear that sponsoring or endorsing the establishment of productive enterprises in prisons, as an individual, is very likely to make that individual, as one person expressed it, "the target of attack." Because of this too prevalent attitude, the co-operative approach is the way to get practical results. These results may be enumerated, briefly, as follows:

1. Determination of markets for state-used articles which can be manufactured by productive enterprises in prisons.

2. Estimating the market for each such state-used item.

3. Enhancing the effectiveness of the services of prison productive enterprise by continuous co-operative planning.

4. Establishment of better understanding of the rehabilitative and economic benefits of the program of productive enterprises.

5. Providing key individuals with the kind of information which can be used in establishing better understanding by the general public of the urgent need of reducing idleness in prisons through sound productive enterprises.

TEST OF REHABILITATION

One of the most practical and understandable ultimate tests of rehabilitation is satisfactory performance in a suitable job. The solution of the prison labor problem requires, therefore, the integrating of the prison vocational training with work experience in a prison productive enterprise and with placement opportunities in free society. The case of a rehabilitated prisoner will serve to illustrate the integrative process. The inmate started to work in the bakeshop in the State Prison at San Quentin. He completed a total of 4,800 hours with a very good record. When his case was referred for parole, he was recommended for placement as a baker. With the co-operation of the Bakers' Union, he was employed as a second-year helper, at the prevailing wage scale, in a large nationally known baking corporation. His work record is excellent and he is well thought of by his superiors and his coworkers. He has received several increases and has been given additional training in various departments so that he would be familiar with all aspects of the work. He will complete his training on the job.

Again the co-operative approach is found to be the practical way to integrate the rehabilitative process of the prisoner, namely, vocational training followed by related job performance in

a productive enterprise in prison, fitting the inmate, on his being released, for placement in a job in which he can make maximum use of his vocational training and work experiences in prison, and providing opportunity to complete his education and job training in free society.

INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT

Acting jointly on this conviction, the directors of three state agencies appointed a State Coordinating Committee consisting of two representatives from each department to function in accordance with a specific agreement. The three departments are the Department of Industrial Relations, the Department of Corrections, and the Adult Authority (Parole Board). The agreement reads as follows:

I. Purpose

Service with respect to the training and placement of inmates is being rendered throughout the State by these three agencies. Although there is a close correlation in scope of endeavor, the realization that there is a need for further coordination of efforts and conformity in practice has resulted in the recognition that a general description of policy is deemed advisable. The Adult Authority is interested in training men for proper placement upon release from the institution, to have such training recognized as substantial and as meeting the requirements set forth by the Department of Industrial Relations in the California Apprenticeship Training Program under the Division of Apprenticeship Standards. Arrangements will be made with the Department of Industrial Relations and the Adult Authority to make placements that will complete the training begun in the institutions and correlate the program of supervision to give the individual every opportunity to develop his trade skillfully and under normal procedures.

II. Policies of The Department of Industrial Relations

It shall be the responsibility of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards:

- A. To inform its personnel, concerned with the administration of the Apprenticeship Training programs, of the extent and nature of the training programs offered by the Department of Corrections in the various state correctional institutions.
- B. To inform its personnel, concerned with the administration of the Apprenticeship programs, of the extent and nature of the services provided by the Adult Authority for placement and supervision of parolees.
- C. To the maximum extent possible, to keep the Department of Corrections and the Adult Authority informed of employment opportunities for apprentices and other on-the-job trainees.
- D. To provide the Department of Corrections and the Adult Authority with information that will assist in the establishment of apprenticeship and trade training programs in the correctional institutions.
- E. To appoint representatives to work with designated representatives of the Department of Corrections and the Adult Authority developing procedures based upon this agreement and in coordinating activities resulting from this agreement.

III. The Policies of the Director of Corrections and The Adult Authority shall be as follows:

- A. To inform personnel, concerned with training and placement activities, of the extent and nature of the services provided by the Division of Apprenticeship Standards.
- B. To insure, through regular channels, any instructions necessary to implement this agreement and any procedures that will effect correlation.

- C. To arrange for classification and referral of applicants to the appropriate joint apprenticeship committee.

- D. To provide the Division of Apprenticeship Standards with such information as will assist in the coordination of apprenticeship and trade training programs in the institutions. However, it is understood that such information is confidential and only such information as may be legally disclosed will be exchanged.

- E. To request the appointment of representatives of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards to serve as consultants to the various institutional trade advisory committees.

IV. Joint Policies

- A. The Department of Industrial Relations, the Director of Corrections, and the Adult Authority will appoint staff representatives to a Coordinating Committee. This Committee will meet on call to determine joint policy in establishing methods and procedures for both training and placement, to coordinate their services, all for better utilization of opportunities for inmates in apprenticeship and in other on-the-job training programs.

- B. The agencies will encourage correctional inmates who qualify to participate in apprenticeship and other preparatory training, and further to advise and guide them towards the procedure that will be followed upon their release on parole.

- C. The agencies further agree that inmates or parolees will not receive preferred treatment, but a mutual agreement is necessary to insure proper processing for apprenticeship.

GOALS OF REHABILITATION

The provisions of this agreement point clearly to the fact that there are

certain major ends in the rehabilitation of the prisoner which must be achieved if the prison labor problem is to be solved. These ends, briefly enumerated, are:

1. Adjusting the prisoner to useful living in prison, with hope for a better life in the future. The prisoner must be made to feel as one did when he wrote: "I entered the Guidance Center at San Quentin not knowing and actually not caring where the road might end. Now at least I do have something definite in mind and can see in my tomorrow a new era."

2. Providing meaningful employment so that the prisoner will not feel he is "the forgotten man" but, rather, that he is using his time to improve himself in ways that will make him better able to adjust to the outside world with satisfaction to himself and benefit to the community.

3. Assigning the prisoner to a job in a prison productive enterprise so as to make maximum utilization of all his previous education and work experience.

4. Securing for the prisoner, on release, placement which will afford him opportunity to make maximum use of his institutional training, and enable him to make arrangements for completing his job-training requirements guided by the appropriate Trade Advisory Committee and by the Local Joint Apprenticeship Committee.

5. Developing in free society an understanding and intelligently helpful attitude towards the prisoner who is making an honest effort to live in the community as a useful and responsible person.

It is obvious that when these enumerated ends are achieved the prison labor problem is solved; but the achievement of them requires well-integrated services. Trade advisory committees are of very practical assistance in securing such integration.

TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEES

The co-operation of labor and of industry, which is indispensable in establishing and operating prison productive enterprises, functions in the most practical way through these trade advisory committees, which can, and do, render the following practical services. (1) They give practical and up-to-date counsel concerning a proposed productive enterprise in prison. (2) They recommend the kind of equipment required for the efficient operation of the enterprise. (3) They help to formulate standards designed to ensure the development of the skill, technical knowledge, and attitudes required to succeed on the job. (4) They recommend the kind and quality of items to be produced. (5) They meet at the institutions at stated intervals to give critical and constructive evaluations of the enterprises and make specific recommendations. (6) They help in securing suitable employment for those qualified inmates who are ready for parole. (7) They help in arranging, under prescribed procedures, for completing on the job the training started in the institution and pursued during the period of incarceration. (8) They help to develop intelligent public interest in the program of prisoner rehabilitation.

A member of the California State Correctional Industries Commission, Mr. Frank K. Runyan, President of Western Merchandise Mart, at a meeting of Governor Earl Warren's Council, made these observations concerning trade advisory committees:

No matter how efficiently and scientifically our penal institutions may be conducted, continuous education of the public is essential. This is particularly true of our correctional industries if they are to serve effectively the constructive purposes for which they are intended. Simply stated, the basic purposes of our correc-

tional industries are: first, to provide the means by which prisoners may acquire training and good work habits; second, that upon their return to society, their adjustment will be such that they will be accepted as self-respecting and self-sustaining citizens; and third, to recultivate their mental processes so that they will think straight and give a full measure of service in their new lives.

In realizing these basic purposes, our Trade Advisory Committees, a number of which have been created recently, are becoming increasingly effective. Those selected for these Advisory Committees are men who have a sympathetic understanding of our problems and a real desire to be helpful in solving them. They are prominent and successful executives of industry and of labor, specialists and leaders in their respective fields, and they are willing to contribute their time to improve the functioning of our correctional industries.

The members of these Advisory Committees contribute in three ways: first, in practical advice on designs and standards of technical equipment and "knowhow" so that the men leaving our institutions may be capable of adapting themselves to modern equipment and methods; second, through their direct aid and influence, the absorption by industry of paroled and discharged men is accelerated; third, and most important, is the service of these advisers as influence centers in improving our public relations and education that more people may become more aware of the end purposes of our correctional institutions program and its beneficial results, both human and economic.

The men of these Trade Advisory Committees are giving freely of their knowledge and time. They are doing a fine job in helping to implement in a very substantial way the programs of both your Adult Authority and your Correctional Industries Commission. As these Committees gain experience, the state administration, the taxpayers, management, labor, and the public at large may be justly proud of them. On behalf of the Commission I should like to bespeak for them merited recognition and encouragement and an expanded field of operation.

To facilitate in a practical way the "expanded operation" recommended by Mr. Runyan, a pattern for trade advisory committees was formulated to govern their activities and facilitate expansion of operation. This pattern was unanimously approved in principle by the Correctional Industries Commission. It reads:

A PATTERN FOR TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Governing Policy

The productive enterprise will have for its primary purpose to provide meaningful work for which the inmate has respect and through which opportunity is afforded to acquire good work habits and basic skills which will be fundamental assets in any gainful occupation, and will be of practical value by helping to make the inmate capable of adjusting more readily to community living as an acceptable member of free society.

Occupational Fitness

A productive enterprise is not expected to turn out *every* inmate fully qualified to be gainfully employed in a specific occupation. The Advisory Committee will give guidance on matters concerned with the continuation of training after release, which will enable parolees to complete their training while gainfully employed.

Appointments

The members of the Advisory Committee will be appointed by the Director of Corrections under general policies to be determined in consultation with the Correctional Industries Commission.

Chairman

The chairman of the Advisory Committee shall be chosen by the Committee members.

Composition

Each Advisory Committee will be composed of representatives from industry and from labor.

Meetings

Regular and special meetings shall be called by the chairman, except that at least four regular meetings shall be held in each calendar year.

Reports

At reasonable intervals appropriate reports will be made by the Committee to the State Director of Corrections.

Equipment

The Advisory Committee will be consulted regarding types and quantity of equipment deemed essential for the successful operation of the enterprise.

Visits to Institutions

Each Committee member will be issued an identification card which will admit him to an institution for the purpose of appraising the program in which he is interested and reporting his findings to the Committee of which he is a member.

EXTENT OF IDLENESS

In discussing procedures and techniques designed to aid in practical ways of solving the prison labor problem, the current extent of idleness in a prison—and what is being done about it—is the primary consideration continuously to be kept in mind. Each institution should make a careful analysis of its population to determine the approximate number of inmates which must be engaged in maintenance and housekeeping services, the number that are not available for assignment because of illness or other incapacity, the number that are engaged full time in training projects, and the number engaged in productive enterprises. The difference between the sum of these figures and the population, of course, represents the current degree of idleness. It is not enough to determine the extent of idleness at a given date, but, rather, a perpetual inventory of idle men should be maintained and a conscientious effort made to predict the amount of idle-

ness which may be expected in the months and years ahead. These figures should be accurate and should be made available to the public, to the legislature, and to the fiscal authorities of the state. It follows, then, that there must be continuous planning for the development of work projects to absorb the idleness existing or anticipated.

The severity of the idleness problem in the state prisons of this country tends to fluctuate with the economic cycle. When there is full employment, labor is less concerned about the alleged competition of prison labor. When there are ready markets and a shortage of goods, business organizations are less disturbed by this matter. In periods of economic depression there is more public resistance to prison labor. Opposition from these different sources takes the form of political pressures upon the governor and his subordinates, and during legislative sessions more restrictive legislation is introduced and efforts are made by devious means to retaliate against the prison system by attacking its appropriations. The fact that the top-flight leaders of both labor and industry are on record enunciating a reasonable policy of state-use industries for prisons does not prevent local labor and business interests from resorting to every trick in the political bag to keep prison industry from developing if it offers the slightest threat to some individual manufacturer or group of employees.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

This being the case, this observer sees no easy solution to the prison labor problem. The only hope lies in gaining the co-operation of labor and industry in terms of specific people and specific organizations. This involves a continuous effort in public relations between the prison system and the leaders

of free enterprise. This cannot be done successfully as a part-time activity of a warden or a director. California has made its approach to the problem by the employment of a full-time field representative for the Correctional Industries Commission who devotes his entire time to the direct personal public relations aspects of the problem. Whether this would be a suitable approach in another setting may be open to question, but the fact remains that prison industry must develop friends and supporters in labor and in industry, and this cannot be done in any way other than through personal contacts and a co-operative attitude.

The most anomalous situation in the whole field of prison administration lies in the fact that the public appears to reject the idea that prisoners should contribute to their own support by economic production and, at the same time, the public is reluctant to authorize the appropriation of the large sums of money that are necessary to carry on constructive programs of vocational education and psychiatric treatment, which offer two of the most promising hopes for the practical rehabilitation of the prisoner. Prison administration, as presently constituted, has demonstrated little capacity for resisting the pressures of selfish economic interests in holding down the development of prison industry, and that same weakness is manifested in the failure of the prisons to convince economy-minded legislators and taxpayer groups that it would be wise economy in the long run to make use of the time that men spend in prison to improve them mentally, morally, and vocationally. We are inclined to argue in generalities and to make our appeals on a basis of sentiment. This approach has met with little success in the past, and there is no reason to believe that it will meet with more in the future.

PILOT PROGRAMS

The most promising approach to convincing public bodies that it pays to spend money on rehabilitation is to set up small pilot programs which do not require large sums of money. If funds cannot be obtained from public sources, they are often available from foundations; however, no foundation will be willing to risk money for experimental purposes unless it is set up under the best possible guidance and leadership and with some assurance that it will continue over a sufficiently long period of time to prove or disprove the hypothesis upon which it is based. As a practical matter this, again, will mean that the prison system must bring in outside advice and assistance. These pilot or experimental programs are, in their essential nature, research projects; consequently, each experiment should be designed by research experts and during the period of the operation should be subject to the supervision of research specialists. These are normally not found on the payroll of a prison. It is usually not difficult, how-

ever, to obtain the co-operation of universities and private voluntary associations. Because of the very nature of such projects and the materials with which they deal, it would be unusual to obtain any conclusive results in less than five years. Because of the political uncertainties of government, it is obviously difficult to carry on projects of this kind. The greatest hope lies in the few jurisdictions in the country in which there has developed a tradition of stable and continuous administration; however, even in these jurisdictions there can be no guarantee that there will be a steady flow of funds, however small, to finance such projects. Here lies a fertile, but fallow, field for the wise use of the grants of foundations.

It is so obvious that it seems futile to say: we are not going to learn new and better techniques for treating convicted felons unless we are given an opportunity to experiment in the atmosphere of science rather than in the climate of political pressures, economic competition, and sentimental preachments.

Richard A. McGee, B.S., M.A., Sacramento, California, is director of the California Department of Corrections. He has been a staff member at the U. S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pa., warden of the New York City Penitentiary, deputy commissioner of correction of New York City, and supervisor of public institutions of the State of Washington. In 1951 he made a survey of the German prisons in the U. S. Zone and served as consultant to the U. S. Occupation Authorities on prison problems. He organized and was the first editor of The Prison World and has written extensively on correctional questions.

Correctional Institution Personnel—Amateurs or Professionals?

By A. A. EVANS

"OH! He's a guard out at the prison," she said, in response to my question where I could locate my friend. This was a completely natural statement of a neighborly lady in the community where my friend resided. But it also epitomizes the public concept of the correctional worker today and the public attitude toward him. It thinks of him as someone who merely carries a gun, turns keys, and maintains order. The public still considers him the same "guard" or "hack" that he was known to be thirty years ago. It tends to look upon him through force of habit as an amateur.

CORRECTIONAL WORK IS BIG BUSINESS

As an occupational field, penal and correctional work engages the full-time attention of many thousands of persons and the utilization of facilities and resources reaching multibillion dollar proportions. The core of the correctional task—changing human behavior through modifying attitude—influences every decision and action of employees and staff in this work. The civil service examination announcement for the basic correctional officer position in the federal service states that incumbents of this position "are responsible for carrying out plans developed for correctional treatment and for modification of attitudes of persons who have been confined." Correctional work is the influencing of others to gain their respect, to accomplish a change in their attitudes, to improve their behavior and understanding of responsibilities for normal, socially acceptable conduct. What are the special qualifications and attributes

required of an individual to succeed in the fulfillment of this mission? What progress has been made in the development of a professionally skilled corps capable of accomplishing this task?

WITH THESE HANDS

Since there is no counterpart to correctional work in civilian life or private industry, correctional institution administrators must train all employees in firearms and self-defense as well as in how to obtain co-operation of the frequently warped personalities with whom the employees deal. Every correctional employee must be qualified for his responsibility as a supervisor, a leader, a foreman. He must not only know the duties and responsibilities of the exact position to which he is assigned, but also have an understanding and knowledge of methods for handling attitudes which are in conflict with the law. In the face of being tempted, threatened, and frequently maligned, he must possess patience, a resolute character, and intuitive understanding of human nature.

Many states and the federal government include penal and correctional workers in the civil service. Under the merit system there is competitive examination for initial appointment. The individual brings to the position such native intuition and resources as the stature and prestige of the position attract. In the past most persons have entered the correctional field accidentally. At a time when they were interested in a change of job, their names as eligibles on clerical, mechanical, social worker, librarian, or other civil service registers available for government-wide

appointment were certified to Departments of Correction for consideration. Frequently an inquiry from a Department of Correction as to availability for employment is the first occasion for their considering work in this field of endeavor. Quite often they have not previously visited a penal or correctional institution and have no conception of the duties and responsibilities of employees engaged in this work.

THE LABORER IS WORTHY OF HIS HIRE

In the long-range planning of organized Departments of Correction, an essential element of the planning is the development of personnel possessing high qualifications and capability for more responsible assignments. To get this quality of personnel it must be recognized that recruitment for the variety of skills, trades, and professions required in correctional work is in competition with private industry and other government employment opportunities. A good salary is probably the most important means of interesting individuals in a type of employment which they had not previously planned as a career.

The compensation attached to a position determines to a large degree in this, as in all other occupations, the number of able men and women who are willing to accept it. The \$100 per month salaries paid correctional employees in some jurisdictions do not attract amateurs possessing a capability for training and development which will ensure their success in this work. A prime reason that some persons engaged in correctional work are amateurs is that the rate of pay is inadequate to attract persons with a potential for successfully handling correctional problems. The ability of these individuals in the public service to devote the best of their time and energy to the task is impeded if they have personal worries as to their financial future, or as to the

welfare, security, and support of their families. A tabulation or comparison of wages paid correctional workers in different geographical areas does not satisfactorily focus attention upon this facet of the problem. It is natural that the wages of correctional personnel should vary, since there is variation from area to area in living costs and wages paid in other occupations. But it is essential that the salaries of correctional workers maintain an equitable relation to the cost of living and to the salaries of other positions carrying comparable responsibilities and requirements. As things stand today, the salaries paid correctional workers are out of line. And at the same time the correctional worker is confronted with increased living costs and higher taxes. Many of these employees see inflation precluding their setting aside any savings, equity, or resource for emergencies, for the education of their children, and for the future well-being of their dependents. Persons who enter this important function of the public service ought to be able to expect a decent opportunity for comfort and saving and for the proper upbringing of their families. A recent survey in one jurisdiction disclosed that the average take-home pay of the correctional worker was the same as that paid garbage collectors—and at that time the latter were on strike in that jurisdiction for a wage increase.

The position of the correctional worker makes it difficult for him to supplement his income from outside activities. He should in propriety avoid part-time work which dissipates his energies, interferes with his recall in event of emergencies, or reflects unfavorably upon his reliability as a counselor and an influence for uprightness among inmates. In the nature of things this closes to him many sources of supplementary income. Yet in the face of higher living costs with which correc-

tional salaries have not kept pace, it has been necessary among some penal and correctional staffs for as many as half of the employees to take up outside part-time jobs.

Moreover, management is continually confronted with pleas from some of its most promising young correctional officers for advice on how they can remain in this work. Though they find very interesting and challenging the many dynamic situations which arise, the position does not offer a salary which will enable them to maintain a growing family. These are the persons correctional institution administrators would search for when trying to find individuals most likely to succeed in this work. Their loss compounds itself in the consequent discouragement of others in the same generation from seeking a career in this field.

AROUND THE CLOCK

The nature of his position and duties requires that the correctional worker be available for frequent emergency call. He must render, for his compensation, not merely a full day's work, but the dedication of his whole life. His work is fraught with many hazards; he is frequently physically assaulted; he and his family are the objects of threats of reprisal, bribes, and ridicule. The burden of these onerous incidents to his service is not confined to his working hours. While the community and society require that his conduct and performance be such as to merit confidence and trust, he is at the same time the whipping boy of that society. While he strives earnestly to protect society, to lift the standards of his profession, to improve the quality of his influence in modifying the attitudes of persons confined, he is being belittled, ridiculed, and maligned. Just as the neighborly lady saying, "He's a guard out at the prison," was subtly expressing her low esteem of

my friend, so also does the public too often ostracize and look down upon persons engaged in this work.

For, you see, my friend has never been employed as a guard. In fact, the agency with which he is employed has had no guards on its payrolls for more than eighteen years—well-nigh a generation. The institution at which he is employed is not now and never has been a prison. Change in this attitude of society towards its correctional staff has been very slow. Are members of this occupational field expected to reconcile themselves to the fact that other generations will come and go before the public accepts the correctional worker as socially and economically equal?

SELECTIVE RECRUITMENT

The task of supervising and guiding prisoners is no job for amateurs. The correctional worker must have a potential to benefit from training, to become skilled in all phases of his work. It is necessary to look for skills, talents, and capabilities in those recruited for this work. We mean not only skills, talents, and capabilities for doing a particular job, but also for teaching it to untrained and frequently resisting inmates.

Pinpointing the qualities of personality and experience most likely to assure success in the correctional field has long engaged the attention of administrators. Research along this line can make a vast contribution to success of the individual and progress in the profession. An experiment was undertaken by the federal Bureau of Prisons to ascertain whether there is a correlation between results of a practical judgment test and success in adaptation to correctional work.

Each new appointee during a period of one year was given a written practical judgment test at the time of entry on duty. There were 150 such appointees

who took the test and completed one year of employment. The average score attained was 203. Instructions provided with the test stated that when taken by schoolteachers, foremen, accountants, and junior executives in private industry, half of them scored above 190 and half below 190, and in one of the largest industrial organizations the mean score for a group of 109 industrial engineers was 207. The scores achieved by the 150 new correctional employees indicate that there had been success in recruiting persons with a rather high degree of practical judgment in dealing with supervisory problems.

The test, however, does not measure whether an employee likes correctional

tion on the book. Also, (4) during his basic indoctrination when he was being oriented in the organization and policies of the service, qualifying in firearms and physical training, performing on specific key posts under the immediate instruction and supervision of experienced officers, and writing on seven assigned subjects pertaining to this work, he was rated by some thirty different persons and these ratings were converted into an over-all grade on basic training.

The accompanying tabulation reflects the results of these several processes for a typical group of the new employees at one of the institutions which participated in the program:

EMPLOYEE RATINGS AFTER ONE YEAR'S CORRECTIONAL SERVICE

EMPLOYEE	JOB PERFORMANCE RANKING	JOB PERFORMANCE RATING	EXAM GRADE ON SERVICE TEXTBOOK	OVER-ALL GRADE ON BASIC TRAINING	PRACTICAL JUDGMENT TEST SCORE
A.....	1	93.0	84	81.7	219
B.....	2	90.0	76	82.3	209
C.....	3	89.0	88	82.8	214
D.....	4	89.0	90	84.4	188
E.....	5	88.0	85	81.9	213
F.....	6	87.0	97	87.9	211
G.....	7	86.0	85	82.8	183
H.....	8	84.0	89	81.8	203
I.....	9	81.3	83	86.0	176
J.....	10	77.3	70	78.0	184

work or chafes under it, whether he is lazy, whether he has courage, is cool in emergencies, is patient, and whether he has a devoted interest in helping others solve their personal problems.

At the conclusion of the first year of service the supervisors at the respective institutions were requested to (1) rank these new employees in order of successful job performance and (2) rate them in relation to a score of 100 as indicating outstanding performance in every area. In addition, (3) each new employee was required to study a textbook written for correctional work and was required to take a written examina-

When we attempt to make correlations of the rankings based on the year of job performance as supplied by the supervisors with the practical judgment test score, or with the over-all rating on basic training, or with the examination grade on the textbook covering the work of the organization, we find insufficient pattern to indicate definite conclusions. Validation was undertaken by experts on tests and statistics. It was their judgment that a correlation of nearly 80 per cent was reflected.

It is evident that we have here a very intricate matter, one which is sensitive to the effectiveness of supervisors as in-

structors. It is also sensitive to the latitude of opportunity afforded in the different institutions for the exercise of judgment and participation in management. It offers some promise as a tool for use by administrators in the selection of personnel and the measurement of their suitability for this field of endeavor.

The training and development of personnel can only succeed when built on a solid foundation. It is with and through these hands that the correctional institution administrator must work. No matter how many, how beautiful, and how well-fitted his facilities, without quality in his personnel his program cannot succeed. There is no substitute for the personality, the genuine interest, the ability in judgment, and the knowledge and understanding of personal relationships between workers and inmates. Yet the poorer and more inadequate the facilities and the tighter the budget for providing reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, and generally accepted comforts of human existence, the greater the burden upon personnel and the greater the need for staff competence.

TRAINING CORRECTIONAL WORKERS

We have already mentioned the need for basic orientation of personnel newly entering this field. There is no counterpart in private industry, no course in elementary school, high school, or college, experience in or completion of which will enable the newly appointed correctional officer to become fully productive on his first day of duty. While custody, discipline, and security have always been recognized as the first duties of correctional personnel and take precedence over all other functions, it is now equally recognized that the correctional worker—who is in contact with the inmate at work, in quarters, at

school, in the library, the visiting room, on the recreational field, when the inmate eats, sleeps, bathes, or does any other of a million normal or abnormal, natural or unnatural, things—is the individual who has the greatest influence upon the inmate during his institutional life. He is the employee through whom the modification of attitude must be accomplished. He is the individual who represents to the inmate the prosecutor, judge, and warden in the execution of the sentence. He implements a program of reformation and rehabilitation coincident with assuring custody of the inmate, or he effectively undercuts and thwarts those programs. He is the most frequently seen and felt human link between the inmate and the institution's administrative and management staff.

Which it will be—constructive or obstructive—and whether he is to remain in this field, depends in large measure upon his orientation, his on-the-job training, close supervisory assistance, and the evaluation of him during his first year of employment. The practice of placing the new employee in the most remote fringes, in the towers, during his early years of employment has been thoroughly discredited. His first days and weeks afford the golden opportunity for interpreting to him his responsibility as a counselor and leader of persons in need of constructive guidance. During this period the lack of prior experience from which to formulate prejudices and misconceptions can be exploited by correctional administrators. Capturing those early opportunities to train and indoctrinate new employees in the ways supervisors would like them to perform is possible in this specialized field of work as it is in few other occupations. New employees are far more likely not to depart from guidelines to the achievement of desired objectives than they are by trial and

error "on their own" to hit upon successful methods of performance.

AUTHORITARIANISM VERSUS PROFESSIONALIZATION

Systems of administration and operation for handling large groups of individuals have traditionally invoked an authoritarian spirit. It has its advantages. Chaos and confusion are avoided. "Prussian" discipline, orderliness, and mass subordination become the watchword of those who cannot trust subordinates to show initiative, judgment, and resourcefulness. In the authoritarian-type organization the individual must subordinate himself completely. To permit the exercise of initiative at various levels of supervision and operation is to complicate and disorganize the machinery of precisionlike performance, claim the authoritarian devotees.

The goal of correctional treatment is the reformation of individuals, preparing them to assume upon release the responsibilities of normal living in modern society. The content and purpose of employee training in correctional institutions should be geared to the achievement of this objective. The transition for the inmate commences with his first contact with correctional personnel. This transition continues and progresses as each further contact fills out the pattern of preparing the inmate for successful living, good citizenship, responsibly facing economic, social, and other situations and problems.

In the basic orientation training of new employees entering this field, it is essential they be indoctrinated in the tremendous influence which relationships bear upon the programs and upon all of the individuals. The relationships between coworkers, between workers and the public, between institutional departments, among the inmates, between employees and the inmates, influence every thought and act of the indi-

viduals in this institutional community. These relationships play all-important roles in motivating others to do or refrain from doing the things we wish done or left undone rather than irritating or aggravating them to the opposite course; they constitute the generating force which sets the tempo and behavior pattern of the institution. To a large extent they determine the success of the treatment or rehabilitative effort. During this background indoctrination of basic training new employees are told about, observe, and finally perform under close direction actual assignments in the various institutional departments. They see how experienced personnel work together to get the total job of operating an institution accomplished. The reasons for doing things in a particular way, as well as the way of doing things, are explained to them. They have a firmer grasp upon the co-ordination and integration techniques and relationships of the organization as a whole; they are shown that it is the *sum of the parts* which makes success.

By the nature of these relationships and objectives, success in correctional work is largely dependent upon the employee's professional skill in working with others, whether this skill is inherent in his personality and brought to the position from other experience or acquired by training and development on the job. When we speak of the professionalization of the institutional worker we mean the encouragement of these qualifications and skills which he must have in order to handle successfully the difficult persons who come under his control.

GOLD IS TRIED IN THE FIRE AND MAN IN THE FURNACE OF ADVERSITY

The correctional worker is tested over and over again. A new group of inmates arrives each day to match wits with him. The public hears much of

the confirmed and notorious criminal who often successfully uses delaying and nuisance tactics during his competition with the prosecuting officials. In recent years the agitating and annoying methods of some troublesome defendants have taxed even talented, experienced, and venerated occupants of high judicial seats to the end of their patience and perseverance.

The public expects upon conviction and sentencing that these individuals will be handled justly, firmly, securely, and in anonymity by the correctional worker. More remarkable still, the public hopes that prior to completion of the sentence these individuals will have been reformed. A large-sized expectation from a small group of employees working in an environment which houses a concentration of such individuals! It is in truth no public responsibility to entrust to the hands of amateurs.

CONTINUED TRAINING

With a view to meeting this herculean responsibility the correctional worker's training must continue throughout his employment. In his career the demands upon him represent an ever-moving horizon. Upon a sound base of initial training and understanding, his further training should include: first, technical training—to enable him better to comprehend the specialized duties of his particular job and organizational function; second, cross training—to capture the experience of others and to integrate the various institutional segments, and so to prepare himself for promotion to more responsible staff and supervisory positions.

Much of his learning incident to acquiring a depth and breadth of understanding of interpersonal relationships will be accomplished on his own time by studying books, magazines, and articles suggested by his supervisors and

available through the staff library, and by participating in college-level training. Just as the burden of responsibility in all his relations with inmates rests upon him, so also does the burden of responsibility for maximum utilization and development of his own skills, aptitudes, and abilities rest upon his initiative. Through training he will have access to the fundamentals, to the time-tested results of trial and error, to the experience of those who have preceded him.

Training on state or government time should include periodic refresher sessions at least quarterly. During these periods new policies, trends in population, improved procedures and techniques, may be presented by the correctional institution administrator and discussed by or with members of his staff before groups of correctional workers. It is ever the duty of the administrator and his department heads to interpret policies, give leadership, and foster an understanding of the programs among the workers who implement those programs. These sessions afford an opportunity for the administrator to "see and be seen" by all of the employees. They provide a medium for promoting a sense of feeling "on the team" in this joint endeavor. Another opportunity occurs as the administrator and his staff contact workers on the job, making inspections, encouraging, and counseling with the employee and discussing problems or operating procedures. Keeping in mind on these occasions that quality cannot be inspected into a product, that the real watchword for quality is the correctional worker as an individual, enhances the probabilities of successfully imparting knowledge and sharing information with the subordinate.

Training is the democratic process of sharing experience. It permits the younger and newer employee to leapfrog the years of trial, and the problems which have confronted others and

been resolved. It goes on continually in an organization imbued with a strong moral sense of mutual understanding and reciprocity. When the worker is stimulated to pride in his work he does quality work. When overconfidence and the immediate needs and pressures of his organization influence him to allow slipshod performance to get by, he does a disservice to himself, to the inmate, to his coworkers, and to his organization.

WHO WILL LEAD THEM?

In correctional work there has been a tendency for each organization to blaze its own trail instead of profiting from the experience of others. The duplication of cost in this repetitive method of improving techniques and principles points up the need for a pooling of resources and knowledges, and, as a corollary, the need for an organized, continuing, joint training enterprise for correctional administrators. Jurisdictions which have placed their correctional services on a career basis can profit by this type of top-level, broad orientation for administrators, particularly for those who have developed in a specialized phase or function of correctional work. The decision-making process of the executive, particularly the decision-making responsibility over areas of operation in which the individual has had no experience, represents the most profound and difficult part of the transition from worker to supervisor to administrator.

While intra-institutional training programs can alleviate this through committee assignments, cross training, "acting" designations, and seminars or forums, the preparation for decision-making administratorship responsibility can be only partial. Training at the top is even more important than at the bottom. Too often the techniques and procedures advocated in the better

training classes for the worker fall short of their objective because they are to some degree in conflict with the policies of the untrained administrator. It is extremely difficult (when not impossible) to effect any changes or reforms in an institution where there is only lip-service support from the administrator, or where the desired objectives are not understood by him or are not in line with his ideas and policies. The quality of correctional administration is dependent upon the quality of correctional executiveship in the administrator.

Progress has been accomplished in many places throughout the nation in the correctional treatment of offenders. The need for an organized, joint, continuing program at a designated center for the sharing of that experience and for progress in the training of junior correctional-institution executives is upon us. Training is the communication of ideas to improve understanding, promote sound relationships, and strengthen that leadership which influences a response of followership from within.

As a force for overcoming fundamental weaknesses in American prisons, none shows greater promise than fortifying the administrative, management, and personnel capabilities. This is a movement in which local, state, national, and international jurisdictions have a mutual interest, to which they can make a contribution of ideas, and from which they can benefit by exploiting the experience of others.

AMATEURS OR PROFESSIONALS?

In the nature of things, many persons newly entering correctional work are amateurs. Many of them are prevented from acquiring experience, competence, confidence, and professional skill in this field. In those jurisdictions where frequent and complete turnover

of personnel occurs, the task is committed recurrently to the hands of inexperienced and untrained employees who have no opportunity to build upon their own experience or the cumulative experience of others. In those jurisdictions where the pay does not attract individuals with capacity for growth and success the solution of correctional problems is entrusted to hands unequal to the task.

On the other hand, in systems which offer a respected career to the individu-

als entering the field, which have a sound classification and pay scale with promotions based upon merit from within the organization, and in which a strong sense of mutual assistance prevails among the personnel, there the gains of each generation can be passed on to their successors. A professional devotion to the work and an understanding of its rehabilitative possibilities replace the insecurity and instability of an untrained personnel gravely concerned with its job tenure.

A. A. Evans, LL.B., LL.M., M.P.L., B.C.S., Washington, D. C., is assistant director of the federal Bureau of Prisons.

The Open Institution

By KENYON J. SCUDDER

AMERICA cannot solve her crime problem by locking men in prison. Neither can she adjust men in prison and prepare them for the day of release by dumping them into a great bastille.

It is a well-recognized fact today that a prison experience is apt to bring out the worst in a man and leave its permanent scar upon his personality. Therefore what happens to men in prison will in large measure determine their attitude upon release. Now 98 per cent of those who go to prison return to the community some day. We should be greatly concerned whether they come out soured and embittered against society for having placed them there or full of hope and new courage for the future because we have afforded them ample opportunity to improve their condition during incarceration.

One reason for clinging to outmoded prison traditions of the past is the fundamental fear that men will escape if given the slightest opportunity. So we continue to build our prisons of concrete and steel, with clanging doors and electric locks, with armed guards and barbed wire, on the old theory that since we cannot determine who can be trusted and who cannot, we must treat all men alike, expecting them all to escape.

I am certain that the sternest warden of our penal institutions in America will admit that if he had the proper facilities in the form of different types of institutions for different types of prisoners, and the necessary trained personnel to sort out and place the hardened and dangerous offenders in the proper maximum-security institution, he would need such a secure unit for not more than 25 per cent of all his prisoners. The

rest could be handled in medium- and minimum-security institutions.

Twelve years ago the men at Folsom Prison in California refused to work. Their attitude was expressed by a prisoner: "What? Me Work? Why the judge sentenced me here to do time, not to do work."

As a result, it was difficult to administer that institution. Later, when prison industries were introduced and men experienced the dignity of work, the whole atmosphere at Folsom changed, and now men line up each morning eagerly asking to be employed.

I once asked Bob Heinze, warden of Folsom, California's super maximum-security prison, how many of his 2,600 men were too dangerous to be at large in the prison yard. He replied: "If I could lock up eighty men and keep them away from the general population, this place would be a paradise."

Since then the State Department of Corrections has furnished a new unit for such a purpose, housing two hundred men. The warden is experiencing difficulty in keeping it filled. Even the willful troublemakers would rather behave than be deprived of the meager freedom of a prison yard.

And yet with few exceptions our states have been unwilling to support any change in their penal systems, content to go on as before. The majority of the prisons of the world are still of a maximum-security type, surrounded by high walls bristling with guns and other restrictive devices.

In twenty-three states our prisons are from seventy to one hundred and ten years old and should have been torn down long ago and replaced by another type of prison.

During the last three years we have witnessed the greatest series of prison disturbances in the history of our country.

While some states and penologists recognized that there was a better way to administer our prisons, it was the federal Bureau of Prisons led by Sanford Bates and James V. Bennett in the 1930's that blazed a new trail in the housing, classification, care, and treatment of prisoners. As a result, some states have now surpassed even the Bureau's fine achievements.

THE CALIFORNIA STORY

During the last nine years under the leadership of Richard A. McGee, director of corrections, and with the splendid backing of former Governor Earl Warren, the prison system of California has been completely overhauled; new medium- and minimum-security prisons and a new institution for women have been built, two reception-guidance centers have been set up, in the north and south, and a medical facility for those in need of such service, thus providing a state-wide system of classification and treatment of all offenders regardless of the seriousness of their crime.

The real beginning of these changes in California's penal system occurred in 1935 when an enlightened legislature decided that prisoners should be treated as individuals and that the more hopeful cases should be separated from the hardened offenders. To that end provision was made for the "segregation" from the hardened criminals of those prisoners capable of moral rehabilitation and restoration to good citizenship.

A farm-type institution with suitable buildings and program was proposed, and a site of 2,600 acres was secured near the town of Chino in southern California.

The project was under the direction of a state board of prison directors, a

group of five unsalaried lay members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state Senate.

It was then that fear entered the picture. The custody-minded prison board, dominated by custody-minded wardens, differed in their ideas on prison management from the intent of the legislature. "If southern California wants a prison, a prison it shall be," they said, and because of the great fear of escapes they proceeded to build an old-type penitentiary. The two prisons we then had were in bad shape. On the national rating scale for the United States California stood second from the bottom.

In spite of this, the prison board started two maximum-security cell blocks at Chino, surrounded half the 2,600 acres with a high chain link fence topped with six strands of barbed wire, and erected ten gun towers, all of which had no place in a minimum-security prison. They further planned a twenty-foot wall to surround all the buildings and expected to provide five additional gun towers to keep the men in at night.

In 1938, after a serious disturbance at San Quentin prison, the intransigent prison board was removed and with the appointment of a new board the way was opened for a more reasonable attitude toward a minimum-security institution.

OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS . . .

In 1940, I was appointed superintendent at Chino and given a free hand to select my staff. Here was such an opportunity as seldom comes to a state more than once in a century to start a new type of institution for the first offender. The brutal and impersonal treatment I had witnessed at the hands of ignorant and untrained guards in institutions where I had worked convinced me that there should be some better method of dealing with prisoners if they were to be restored to useful

citizenship. Why not weave into this new fabric the best we could find in the good prisons in America and develop a different pattern for the care and treatment of men in trouble?

Here, emphasis would be placed on freedom of choice, acceptance of responsibility while in prison, and preparation for return to community life. We would recognize that individuals change slowly; therefore, the process of adjustment must be gradual. It is easy to be good with a gun in your back when you are told what to do and when to do it. It is quite another thing to have to accept responsibility while in prison, the kind of responsibility you are expected to assume in a free world outside the walls. We must follow a new prison philosophy, namely, "that there can be no regeneration except in freedom. That rehabilitation must come from within the individual and not through coercion."¹

CHINO'S STAFF

In selecting our staff, why not look for young men just out of college, who perhaps had never seen a prison; young men with vision and courage and a desire for a career in penology? Then we should not be tied down by old traditions binding us to the many outmoded methods of the past. And since we were not going to build the inside wall with its five additional gun towers, we should be forced to rely upon the personality, ability, and courage of the staff to handle the men without the use of force and firearms.

Could such staff personnel be found? There were 50 positions in the budget for Chino and 2,300 people had signed up for those jobs. Most of them had been promised a position by some politician.

¹ Kenyon J. Scudder, *Prisoners Are People* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1952), p. 28.

We gave a screening examination which eliminated all but 700 who could meet our minimum requirements. Then we interviewed the 225 who scored the highest. From this group we selected the 50, in spite of vigorous political opposition. Most of them had an A.B., although we were not looking for degrees, and only one had ever worked in a prison. We were looking first of all for men who understood how to handle people.

These young men were given an intensive eight weeks' training course before we were ready to open the prison. The course included instruction in the use of firearms so that no one would get hurt. Then we locked up the guns, and they have never been used except in case of escapes. Through the teaching of judo, the art of self-defense, we developed in each man poise, courage, and confidence in his own ability to deal with any emergency that might arise without resorting to arms. A part of each day was devoted to the theory of handling men, some sociology, psychology, problems of discipline, and the general philosophy of freedom that was to govern the institution.

They were a fine-looking group with an eager desire to make good on this new job. This careful selection of staff has paid big dividends to the State of California, as evidenced by the positions these men hold today, twelve years after the institution opened. Thirty-nine are still with the Department of Corrections, five as associate wardens or superintendents, five on the Director's staff in Sacramento, and all the others advanced in position and making their individual contributions to the work of the department.

THE FIRST BUS LOAD OF PRISONERS

We had quite a discussion about how to transport our first load of men from

San Quentin to Chino. Old-timers said we should get a prison car with locks and bars, handcuffs, and leg irons or we would never get them there.

We had personally interviewed each man, and he had been carefully selected to make the trip. Many had families in southern California, mothers, wives, and children whom they had not seen in months or years, lasting ties that should anchor the men to Chino. Eagerly they inquired about the visiting privileges, whether the family or friends could come to see them.

"My wife can make it up here to San Quentin only once a year," one man said, "and then she can't bring the baby."

"Do you really think I can make it?" another inquired. "I'd like to write my wife."

"Go ahead and write her," I said, "for you will be one of the men to open the institution at Chino."

On July 10, 1941, instead of a prison car we chartered a Greyhound bus and took the first group the five hundred miles to Chino as ordinary passengers. There were thirty-four convicts and three of us. We had no handcuffs, leg irons, billy clubs, or guns, and there was no lock on the bus door.

We arrived at Chino at six o'clock that night. I couldn't have asked for a better behaved group.

As the young, unarmed supervisor, dressed in sport clothes, waved us through the front gate, a new institution was born, based upon this new philosophy of freedom.

The reaction of the men was something to remember. That night we waded through the mail home. One man wrote: "Dear Mom: You don't have to be ashamed of getting letters out of this place because it isn't a prison. It's the California Institution for Men." Another said: "Dad: When I arrived, I lost my number and got

back my name 'cause they call me Jack around here."

That was twelve years ago. Since then Chino has grown from those 34 men to a population of 1,800, of whom 300 are in five forestry camps administered by the institution.

More than thirteen thousand men have been transported to Chino by bus. We have never had a single man attempt to escape en route, and the conduct on the bus has been exemplary.

ESCAPES

When we decided not to build the inner fence around the buildings with its five additional gun towers we thought we might lose 10 per cent of our men by escape. The first four years we lost less than 4 per cent. Now, with 1,500 men at Chino proper, our escapes are less than 1 per cent, and the housing units are never locked.

This fine record has been maintained because of the highly selective process made possible through the two reception-guidance centers in the department; in addition, it is a great tribute to the men and the personnel.

At Chino, we endeavor to take all the glory from escaping.

"There are certain responsibilities you must carry," they are told.

"First, you must decide whether you are going to stay here or escape. It's easy to get out of here. Let us tell you how to get over the fence. Just take your jacket, throw it over the barbed wire and over you go—and you won't cut yourself getting out. If you stay on the inside of the fence you can enjoy limited freedom. When you drop down on the other side you are a fugitive felon and we will bring you back no matter how long it takes. Many more years will be added to your sentence and you can never come back to Chino.²

Fear of escapes dominates every in-

² *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

stitution. It magnifies itself and becomes a challenge, especially in the absence of a proper classification system and institutional facilities to serve the different types of prisoners. When these are present, escapes are few.

The offense a man committed has little to do with his selection for Chino. We have everything from murder to passing bad checks. The selection is based on the man himself, on his attitude and whether he is likely to get into trouble again. The largest number at Chino are in for robbery with a gun; next burglary, grand theft, and bad checks. A few murderers are selected toward the end of their imprisonment to give them a chance to get ready for release and to accept responsibility for their own custody. It is the man and not the offense that is important.

DISCIPLINE

Discipline in a minimum-security prison must be handled on a fair and impartial basis. How can we maintain order when fear is removed?

Men in prison, with the exception of the 25 per cent who must be confined in maximum security, do not want trouble. They want to get out and to do it in the right way, and they will respond to just treatment.

By means of a disciplinary committee, all cases involving serious infractions are given a fair and thorough hearing. If the man cannot get along with other people or has refused to co-operate with the institution officials and program, he is removed from the group until he is willing to do so. We have no isolation unit at Chino. No man is sent to segregation for any stated length of time, such as fifteen or twenty-nine days. We have no restricted diet, every man getting the same food as others, even to his dessert, although he may be locked up and not allowed to go to the dining room.

A man is placed in segregation only until he declares that he can behave himself and is now able to get along with other people. When he does so declare himself, he is released. We seldom have him locked up more than twenty-four hours, and he is seldom placed back in segregation. With 1,500 men at Chino and 300 in our forestry camps, we often go thirty days without a single man locked up for discipline. Very few have to be transferred to a higher-security prison.

VISITING PRIVILEGES

In a minimum-security prison, liberal visiting privileges help to develop further an atmosphere of freedom and to place responsibility upon the individual inmate.

During our first year at Chino, visiting was limited to one hour a week, under close supervision, but with no screen between the man and his family.

We were then impressed with the type of visitors who came each Sunday. They were a good cross-section of society and conducted themselves very well. Statistics showed that men on parole had a much better chance to succeed where the family had been kept together. In order to encourage family visiting, the men were allowed to build a beautiful visiting area outside the Administration Building. They constructed a large pergola, planted lawn and trees, and built many varicolored picnic tables. Here the family unit could visit together on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.

When you visit at Chino, you can bring the children and a picnic lunch. Over the loudspeaker a voice calls,

"Will Mr. Johnson come in and meet his guest."

As Mr. Johnson appears, his little girl runs across the room and jumps into her daddy's arms; while he holds her closely, the wife comes up with the

food basket. He embraces his wife and picks up the basket.

"Come on out to the visiting grounds."

The wife looks around and says, "But where are the guards?"

"There are no guards here, honey," he replies. "Come on. I'm the host." And for four hours the little family can visit undisturbed with no one listening in to the conversation.

The men say, "It's a wonderful thing to be able to visit with your children and not have them forget you while you're in prison."

Occasionally there are abuses. Some marijuana, heroin, and liquor are found, but we deal severely with individuals receiving them. We have to take some chance if we are ever to make progress in prison reform.

Every Sunday we have a thousand visitors, men, women, and children, and they are a much better behaved group than you would find in any public park. We think the liberal visiting privileges at Chino have contributed a great deal to the adjustment of the men. It is one of the best things we have done.

Another factor contributing to an atmosphere of freedom is that the men are not escorted to work, meals, or recreation. They are responsible for their own custody. In the big dining room, no guards line the walls as 1,500 men are fed cafeteria style. They sit where they please, linger over their coffee, and leave the dining room when they are through.

WORK, WORK TRAINING, RECREATION

The Department of Corrections has emphasized the importance of constructive useful work, and in our prison industries or in the many other tasks to be performed all men work seven and a half hours a day. Over half of them are paid from two to ten cents per hour. If by this process we merely teach them

to get over the fear of work we have accomplished a great deal.

More than six hundred are in trade classes half a day; the other half day is devoted to helping run the institution by means of useful work. Through classification, each man is interviewed, his case studied, the findings and recommendations of the guidance center reviewed with him, and he is placed in the kind of training and work he has requested.

Classes in bricklaying, tile setting, plastering, welding, machine shop work, body and fender repair, auto mechanics, and a host of others, taught by journey-men instructors furnished by the Chino High School District, furnish men with skills to sell to an employer upon release.

This is of great importance in a prisoner's ultimate adjustment, because our records indicate that 85 per cent of the men who go to prison have no special skills to make them employable. We must give these men an opportunity while in prison to correct this deplorable condition, so that when they leave prison they will be able to secure and hold a job.

Men in prison must be kept busy in useful work and wholesome recreation for their leisure hours. The recreation program ranges from football to checkers. Music, radio, television, dramatics, play their important part. It is amazing what talent a prison population contains. Too often we never afford it opportunity for expression. When we do, men rise to great heights and receive a great deal of therapeutic treatment in the mere performance.

RELIGION

There is an important place for religion and spiritual counseling in every prison in the world. Too often it is overlooked or pushed aside, the last thing for which adequate provision is

made. It calls for carefully selected and well-trained chaplains who have a genuine interest in the welfare of prisoners. When the religious program is sincere the men will respond.

Each Easter and Mother's Day we hold the religious services on the visiting grounds and invite parents, wives, and children to come an hour earlier than usual for their visit. Between four and five hundred come. The robed inmate choir, as they march out singing their processional, give dignity to the service from its opening moment. I have sometimes wondered what was going through the minds of the visitors and the men as together they join in the hymn, "He makes the woeful heart to sing."

One Easter Sunday the Columbia Broadcasting System used a poem written by one of our men, a Negro. There was a hushed silence when the announcer said, "And now the prayer, 'I Walked With God,' by F. H."

I walked aloft with God the other night
Among the stars above the village green.
A thousand angels lent their light
To mark my way and they remained unseen.

I knelt before His throne
And kneeling there, laid bare my heart
And bade Him enter in.
And lo! The grace of God shone everywhere
And I arose refreshed and cleansed of sin.

I walked abroad with God the other night
And learned the wondrous glory of his might.
He spoke and put my fears and cares to flight.
God smiled and made me whole the other night.

As the prayer ended, I thought that perhaps through his poetry this man really had found God.

Now the state has furnished us with two beautiful chapels, Protestant and

Catholic, which have added a great stimulus to the religious services.

SOCIAL LIVING

Men in prison often fear the day of release. How will society receive them? Will there be a whispering campaign against them in the neighborhood? What about traffic, bright lights, noise and confusion in public places? Will they be able to meet and converse with people?

One night in 1942, the California Community Players from Pasadena played *Charlie's Aunt* for our men. There were twenty-two in the cast. About forty of our men helped to put on the show. Afterwards Mrs. Scudder invited the cast over to the house for refreshments, and with them the forty men. It was raining outside when they arrived.

Here were about seventy people in our living room. Things were a little tense at first. Then Mrs. Scudder opened the door to her dining room and we all went in for refreshments. The table with its lace cloth, candles, silver service, and flowers was a beautiful sight. We each picked up our ice cream, cake, and coffee and went back to the living room. Some sat on the floor, others stood in front of the fire. Then with the food came a hum of conversation. One of the men went to the piano and began to play the songs *America loves to sing*, "Home on the Range," "Let Me Call You Sweetheart," and the whole house burst into song.

I stood in the doorway looking at the group. As our men dress in civilian sport clothes when they have them, if I had not known each individual I could not have told who were free and who were not. They were all people together, but forty of them were reaching out for that precious thing called freedom and trying to get it back again,

for now they realized what they had lost.

When the men left that night to report themselves to their dormitories, unescorted, there were tears in the eyes of men who had not shed a tear in years. Since that night, we have had more than a thousand men in our home on the grounds and never have we had the slightest difficulty. They have conducted themselves as gentlemen. And in each case we have seen some of the pressures removed, pressures of doubt and frustrations, a relaxing of tensions and an eager determination not to treat freedom so lightly in the future.

CLASSIFICATION AND SELECTION

In setting up a minimum-security institution in any state adequate facilities must be provided for the proper classification and selection of men from the prison system. A few wrong selections can cause a lot of trouble.

One of the best means of selection is the facility known as a reception-guidance center. In California, instead of prisoners being sent by the courts to any particular prison they are committed to the state Department of Corrections, and the director instructs the sheriffs of the various counties to deliver them to the guidance centers at San Quentin or at Chino. At these centers an able staff of trained psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and counselors study them for a period of two months before any final action is taken on which prison they shall be sent to.

When Chino opened it was estimated that we could handle about 6 per cent direct from the two guidance centers. With the many forestry camps and the ranch units connected with several institutions, in all of which men work with little supervision, the California state Department of Corrections now has 37 per cent of its prison population

serving their sentences under minimum security.

Chino is only one institution in a department of seven, and all of the others contribute to its success by sending the better type of prisoner to be handled under its program.

In the twelve years since Chino opened, 13,025 men have been received. There have been only two acts of violence against any member of the staff. Three hundred and seventy-two have escaped; of these, all but sixteen have been apprehended. Last year we had our largest population and our lowest escape record.

PAROLE

It is difficult to estimate the final success or failure of parole. California has an excellent parole system handled by an Adult Authority of five members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate. These men are carefully chosen, devote full time to the work, and are amply paid. They do an excellent job, entirely free from political influence or interference. They attempt to deal with the facts in the best interests of society and the prisoner.

Available figures indicate that the rate of failure on parole is much lower from Chino than from the other institutions in the state. We should expect that, because these men are carefully selected as the better prospects for successful adjustment if kept away from the hardened offender. About 8 to 10 per cent commit new felonies. Another 20 per cent are returned from parole on a technical violation. They get drunk, won't stay on the job, leave the state without permission, or refuse to report. The percentage of return for technical violators depends of course on the type of parole supervision given, which varies greatly in the different states.

RECENT PROGRESS

In the past twenty-five years several states have made real progress in the care and treatment of men in prison. They have abolished the silence system and the striped clothing; mail and visiting privileges have been improved; and men are being classified and trained for useful work. These few privileges were granted over the years in spite of a hue and cry that prisoners were being coddled and that trouble would surely follow. But trouble did not follow. Instead, in these few prisons men are being better prepared for the day of release. In some other states little progress has been made, and men are still treated with brutality and utter disregard for their welfare.

Seagoville, Texas, a minimum-security institution of the federal Bureau of Prisons, is an outstanding example of what can be done with carefully selected and well-trained personnel. Wallkill, New York, is another splendid institution where emphasis is placed on training and adjustment instead of on mere custody. Several states have extended the forestry camp program, an excellent way to get started in minimum security, for the outdoor life and the sense of freedom in these camps bring out the best in men as they approach the day of release. Construction costs and upkeep are much less, and more men can be handled on a six months' turnover schedule than in the large institution. In addition, these men make excellent fire fighters and more than earn their entire keep through the work they perform.

Minimum-security prisons should be kept small. Seagoville with its three

hundred men is ideal. No such institution should ever exceed a thousand men. When it goes beyond that figure individual treatment must give way to mass treatment.⁸

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

And what does all this treatment of adults in prison add up to?

Simply this. If we can successfully adjust men in prison after they have run the whole gamut of the law, if we can get them over the fear of work, if we can send them back to society a little better than when they entered, then how much more sensible it would be if we could reach these cases earlier in life before the damage has been done. Reach them in the early years of childhood before they become delinquent, before we allow them to enter upon a criminal career. We make our criminals in this country. They are not born into crime. Then why not place our emphasis upon prevention by reaching these cases at the source of trouble—in the average community?

When society realizes that her prisoners are people, that they come from her communities and will return there again, then I think she must turn her attention upon those unsatisfactory conditions that exist in every community in this country, conditions that breed delinquency and crime, and enlist the help and assistance of the average citizen to clean them up.

When she does that, society can start closing down her prisons.

⁸ The California Institution for Men with its 1,500 is too big but we have been forced to this high figure because of the unprecedented population increase in California, an increase of four million people in twelve years.

Kenyon J. Scudder is superintendent of the California Institution for Men at Chino, California. He has served as superintendent of the Whittier State School in California and probation officer of Los Angeles County, California. He is the author of numerous articles and of a book, *Prisoners Are People* (1952), which is now being turned into a motion picture by Hall Bartlett Productions of Hollywood.

Resocialization Within Walls

By LLOYD W. McCORKLE and RICHARD KORN

AS the concept "socialization" implies group membership, so the derivative concept, "resocialization," implies changes in group memberships. Many findings in the social origins of individual behavior suggest that the problem of reshaping the antisocial attitudes and values of offenders is related to the possibility of altering the patterns of group membership which they bring with them into the prison. The question therefore arises, To what extent does the prison community provide opportunities for altering the group memberships and reversing the socialization process which contributed to the criminal behavior of those incarcerated in it? A necessary starting point for this inquiry would appear to be an examination of the prison community as a functional social unit.

A prison is a physical structure in a geographical location where a number of people, living under highly specialized conditions, utilize the resources and adjust to the alternatives presented to them by a unique kind of social environment. The people creating and enmeshed in this environment include administrative, custodial, and professional employees, habitual petty thieves, one-time offenders, gangsters, professional racketeers, psychotics, prepsychotics, neurotics, and psychopaths, all living under extreme conditions of physical and psychological compression. The formal administrative structure of the prison may be comprehended in a brief glance at its table of organization. This table reveals a series of bureaucratically arranged positions with the warden at the top, and formal flow of power downward from his position. A

more penetrating glance at the social structure of the prison reveals an ongoing complex of processes that can neither be described nor anticipated by a static enumeration of formal powers and functions. For interacting with this formal administrative structure—and in many ways independent of it—is another social structure, the inmate social system, which has evolved a complex of adaptational processes with which inmates attempt to cope with the major problems of institutional living.

THE INMATE SOCIAL SYSTEM

Observation suggests that the major problems with which the inmate social system attempts to cope center about the theme of social rejection. In many ways, the inmate social system may be viewed as providing a way of life which enables the inmate to avoid the devastating psychological effects of internalizing and converting social rejection into self-rejection. In effect, it permits the inmate to reject his rejectors rather than himself. If it is valid to assume that the major adjustive function of the inmate social system is to protect its members from the effects of internalizing social rejection, then it would seem to follow that the usages of this system are most beneficial to those who have most experienced the consequences of, and developed defenses around, social rejection. It would also follow that the system would find its strongest supporters among those who have, in the process, become most independent of the larger society's values in their definitions and evaluations of themselves. We might also expect to find that those individuals whose self-evaluations are

still relatively dependent on the values of the larger, noncriminal society and whose supportive human relationships are still largely with its members would have the most difficulty in adjusting to a social system whose major values are based on the rejection of that larger society.

If these inferences are correct, we may only conclude that the inmate social system is most supportive and protective to those inmates who are most criminally acculturated—and conversely, most threatening and disruptive to those whose loyalties and personal identifications are still with the noncriminal world. Observation supports this conclusion. The nonacculturated offender is rejected not only by the society which defines him as a person, but he suffers the double jeopardy of rejection from the subsociety in which he is now forced to live. In effect, he is denied membership in both. The adaptive inmate, on the other hand, is not only protected from loss of the group membership which defined him as a person, but he is placed in an environment where that membership is assured and his personal adjustment consequently powerfully bolstered. Continued group acceptance of these individuals is based upon their adherence to inmate codes and values.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SYSTEM

The first and most obvious characteristic of the inmate social system is the absence of escape routes from it. The offender is not only incarcerated in a physical prison without exit; he is enmeshed in a human environment and a pattern of usages from which the only escape is psychological withdrawal. Another aspect of the inmate social system is its rigidly hierarchical character, in which vertical mobility, while possible, is highly difficult. The causes of this immobilizing rigidity are various.

The numbers of roles an individual

may play are severely limited and, once assigned, are maintained—particularly at the lower status levels—with enormous group pressure. The degree to which the individual can partake in the selection of his role is similarly limited and conditional. From the moment the new inmate arrives from the court or the county jail, he is exposed to a series of very direct defining experiences. It is of interest to note that those inmates who participate in and administer these experiences are frequently those who recognize that the inmate is somewhat near their level, a perception which stimulates anxiety in them. For example, an obviously tough professional hoodlum will create no special problem to the majority of the lower-status inmates who, responding to minimal clues, will either avoid him or immediately acknowledge his higher status. The arrival of this inmate, however, will pose a threat to the wing's chief "bad man," who will be expected to challenge the newcomer to a battle of mutual definitions.

There is an additional aspect of this defining process which sheds light on another characteristic of the social structure, namely, its extreme authoritarianism. The role-defining conflicts carried on by inmates on or near the same status level point up the fact that any situation of equality is a situation of threat which must be resolved into a relationship of superordination and subordination. However vehemently inmates in groups demand equal treatment and condemn favoritism, inmates as individuals continuously press for special personal advantages. Where demands for increased permissiveness have been granted by authorities, the results have almost invariably been that the rigid authoritarian patterns have not been destroyed but merely transferred to a new and less stable center of gravity. The history of inmate self-

government reveals that the yielding up of powers by the external ordering authority usually generates patterns of internal group coercion more punitive, more rigid, and incomparably more discriminatory than those which they supplanted. This authoritarian character of inmate relationships suggests that members of the system afford no exception to the general psychological observation that the victims of power tend to regard its possession as the highest personal value.

Possession of power

The dominating value of the inmate social system seems to be the possession and exercise of coercive power. There are probably no relationship functions which have escaped the influence of this factor. Even usages of mutual aid have been contaminated and made subservient to it. To illustrate: one way to proclaim possessive rights over another inmate is to help him in some way, usually by material aid. New inmates, unaware of the subversive motivations behind these services, are quickly apprised of their coercive character. Once an inmate has accepted any material symbol of service it is understood that the donor of these gifts has thereby established personal rights over the receiver. The extreme degree to which these mutual aid usages have been made dependent to power struggles is illustrated by the custom of forcing other inmates to accept cigarettes, a frequent prison invitation to submission. Aggressive inmates will go to extraordinary lengths to place gifts in the cells of inmates they have selected for personal domination. These intended victims, in order to escape the threatened bondage, must find the owner and insist that the gifts be taken back. Should the donor refuse to take them back, the re-

ceiver may be forced to fight him then and there.

One measure of the inherent cohesive strength of any social system is the degree to which behavior controls have been individually internalized, thereby obviating all but a minimal degree of interpersonal coercion. Since the basic values of the inmate social system, personal power and exploitation, are inherently inimical to co-operative group living, enormous pressures are required to prevent the inherently centrifugal forces from disintegrating the system. These pressures are supplied in part by the external control and punitive threats of the official world. In the absence of these external unifying forces, order can be maintained only by the most tyrannical inmate rule.

Evasion of rules

Like every other social organization, the inmate system provides not only rules and sanctions for their violation but also methods for evading those rules and escaping the sanctions. The disruptive forces inherent in the basic personal value (personal domination through the exertion of coercive power) have generated techniques for the violation of the most fundamental ordinances in support of group unity. The power of these disruptive forces is indicated by the fact that even the most sacred rule of the inmate code, the law against squealing, is daily violated and evaded with impunity. Contrary to the propaganda generated by the more solemn of the inmate clergy in defense of their code, informers and betrayers require little or no seduction by prison officials. Actually the main administrative problem presented by informers is not gaining them but avoiding them, since they come as volunteers from all levels of the inmate hierarchy.

In face of these weaknesses and in-

ternal contradictions the question arises, How does the system avoid breaking down and why have prison officials generally failed in exploiting its weaknesses? A part of the answer may lie in the fact that prison officials have generally tended to use the inmate power structure as an aid in prison administration and the maintenance of good order—not realizing that in this attempt to manipulate the structure they themselves are more used than using. Far from systematically attempting to undermine the inmate hierarchy, the institution generally gives it covert support and recognition by assigning better jobs and quarters to its high-status members providing they are "good inmates." In this and in other ways the institution buys peace with the system by avoiding battle with it.

THE WORK SITUATION

The freedom from the necessity of earning a living in prison introduces a striking difference between the requirements of material success within and without the walls. A significantly different configuration of traits and aptitudes acquires value, some of which represent direct reversals of those developed outside. In prison the direct relationship between work done and material value received has largely broken down. The relationship between individual productivity and personal status is even more markedly broken down. From a sophisticated inmate's point of view this relationship seems to become a negative one. Strategic placement and effective informal connections rather than individual productivity are the crucial methods for the attainment of material goods.

As a consumer-producer, the inmate lives and trades in two economic worlds: he is a barterer in the informal and illicit inmate market and a wage earner in the prison work system. The con-

trast between his behavior in these two worlds is most revealing. As a trader in the informal inmate barter system, he is resourceful, ingenious, and usually co-operative: there is a kind of "Better Business Bureau" tradition which is generally effective in encouraging the liquidation of debts. As a wage earner in the prison labor system he is, by contrast, encouraged to be nonproductive, dilatory, and contentious, articulating his work relations with the institution in terms of declarations of rights and grievances. In many modern institutions, the "workers' rights" of inmates go beyond the most extreme of those advanced by organized labor on the outside.

Inmates' attitudes

The following is a summary of the sophisticated inmate's view of his economic rights—those attitudes and values concerning work most frequently articulated to institutional officials by leading spirits of the inmate social system:

The fundamental authority in defining the inmate's job obligations is *tradition*. Inmates are to be required to work only so much as the tradition concerning given jobs requires. Any departure from these traditions—especially those departures in the direction of increased work for the same pay—are violations of the inmates' work rights and justify obstructionism. (In a certain penal institution, for instance, "tradition" had established that one inmate lay out all the salt cellars on the mess tables while a different inmate was required to lay out the pepper.)

Increases in the amount of time or output may only be required under extraordinary circumstances and merit increased pay or special benefits, since these added efforts are "favors" extended by the inmates. The inmates have a right to resent and take reprisals against any of their number who "show the rest up" by doing more than the traditional amount of work. These hostile attitudes toward more ener-

getic inmates effectively condemn them to the deteriorating work patterns enforced by the group. Any inmate who performs more than the usual expectation must prove that he has received a special reward—usually food or informal permission to evade some institutional rule.

The providing of jobs is a duty of prison officials and a right, rather than a privilege, of inmates. Once assigned to a job, there are only a limited number of legitimate reasons for which an inmate may be "fired." None of these legitimate reasons includes adherence to the accepted job tradition. Thus an inmate rarely feels that he may rightfully be dismissed for laziness, if he performs only the usual amount of work traditionally required, despite an increase in institutional needs, since the tradition protects him from any definition of himself as lazy. Inmates generally feel that the fact that they are paid less than comparable civilian workers entitles them to produce less.

The total result of the prevalence of these attitudes has been to reduce "imprisonment at hard labor" to a euphemism existing chiefly in the rhetoric of sentencing judges and in the minds of the uninformed public. The inmate social system not only has succeeded in neutralizing the laboriousness of prison labor in fact, but also has more or less succeeded in convincing prison authorities of the futility of expecting any improvement in output. Responding to a multitude of pressures within and without the prison, most institutional work supervisors have adopted patterns of expectations which are largely supportive of the inmate position.

Supervisors' attitudes

The following summarizes what the writers have found to be the prevalent attitudes of work supervisors toward convict labor:

Convicts are inherently unindustrious, unintelligent, unresourceful, and uninterested in honest work. They are, generally

speaking, a worthless lot of men who have never learned, and can never learn, good work habits. In the face of these facts, the supervisory staff cannot be held in any way responsible for the low output of prison labor. Any attempts to force increases in output of prison labor are dangerous and must be resisted by realistic administrators in order to protect what little work can be secured from inmates.

But there is another reason for the low labor standards of inmates. Convicts may not justifiably be expected to do as much work as their civilian working counterparts because their pay is so much less. It is basically unjust to demand that a man work as much as he would have to work on the outside for as little as he earns on the inside.

One is reluctantly forced to the conclusion that, in adopting a set of expectations which support inmates' attitudes, prison work supervisors have surrendered to the realities of inmate pressure rather than to the realities of the work situation. This surrender has implications that extend far beyond prison walls, since it encourages inmates to fixate work habits which severely cripple their ability to make realistic work adjustments upon release. Since the inmate's ability to make an effective noncriminal adjustment on the outside is directly dependent on his ability to hold a job, the conclusion is inevitable that the fostering of deteriorated work patterns in prison represents a considerable contribution to recidivism. It is probable that the much decried "prison idleness" in its brutal honesty represents far less of a contribution.

There is another far-reaching evil in this surrender to the inmate social system. In manipulating supervisory authorities into support of his position, the adaptive inmate destroys a major therapeutic objective of the prison experience, namely, that of learning compliance to duly constituted authority. By learning that he can successfully de-

ceive, connive, and evade, the inmate is re-encouraged in the hope that, by using the social skills perfected in prison, he may avoid the unfortunate "errors" that first trapped him and sent him there.

THE CUSTODIAN

Probably the most important and strategically placed individuals involved in the problem of reconstruction of attitudes are the cell-block officers and shop instructors—those representatives of the external community who come in direct, face-to-face daily contact with the inmate. How these individuals relate to the inmate determines, in the long run, not only the care and treatment policy of the institution, but that of the larger society as well. Consequently, any attempt to evaluate reconstruction within walls must make a careful and exhaustive analysis of these highly significant relationships.

The responsibility of those who man the locks is as confining, in many ways, as is the imprisonment of those confined by them. The keeper of the keys is a prisoner too. By the time he retires, the custodian will have spent from eight to fifteen years totally within the prison walls. During this time he will have been personally and singly responsible for the custody and discipline of many thousands of inmates. During most of the time he has spent inside the walls he will have been continually outnumbered and continually under the threat of being outwitted by inmates whose obedience to him is protected only by his status as a symbol of power. His duties are as manifold as those of a commander of troops and as hazardous as those of the commander whose forces may at any time cross the brink of rebellion. One of the hazards of his situation paradoxically is the ease with which he can be lulled into forgetfulness of its hazards.

In order to preserve his status as a symbol of authority, the custodian must surround himself with a social distance which prevents the realities of his weaknesses from becoming apparent to the inmates. The realities of his situation are most unfavorable. He is dependent in part on inmate personnel for the physical mechanics of operating his wing. He is also continuously exposed to numerous techniques of deception. However, these tangible weaknesses do not form the main hazards threatening his effective functioning. These are more intangible and, as such, difficult to detect and even more difficult to control.

The inmate social system has developed techniques to exploit the custodian's psychological as well as his physical vulnerability. These techniques are aimed at a reduction of the social distance protecting his role as guard, outflanking it with a personal relationship, and exploiting that relationship for the inmates' own purposes. Once the relationship between keeper and inmate is on a man-to-man basis, the dependency and vulnerability of the custodian become apparent. "Obeying orders" becomes transformed into "doing the guard a favor." When obedience undergoes this transformation, reciprocity becomes operative, "One favor deserves another." Should a keeper now refuse to return the favor, the inmate feels it within his right to become hostile because of the keeper's "ingratitude." Once the Pandora's box of special favoritism is open it cannot be shut again without a painful and dangerous demonstration of how fickle are the personal relations between those improbable "friends"—the keeper and his prisoner. Neither can be loyal without violating the principles and risking the rejection of the groups which define their roles and set the limits of mutual accommodation. Once these limits are passed, and it is usually the inmate who

attempts to pass them, one or the other must balk. This is interpreted as a "betrayal" which terminates the relationship and transforms the friends into enemies. In the process, both become discredited by their own groups—which have now victoriously redemonstrated the insurmountability of the mutual antagonism.

It thus becomes apparent that a breakdown of the social distance between the inmate and his keeper must, sooner or later, result in the exploitation of one by the other and the ultimate degradation of one or both. It is at this point that the most hazardous consequences of this breakdown emerge. Having lost, through a personal relationship, a large measure of the control which had previously been protected by his formal, impersonal role, the keeper is far less able to cope with the powerful and eventually antagonistic emotions which that personal relationship unleashed. A violent resolution of the conflict now becomes increasingly probable, unless harmony can be re-established by a new capitulation or coerced by a convincing show of force.

THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

When the activities of the various categories of prison personnel—administrative, custodial, maintenance, and professional workers—are compared in terms of a *clear definition of function*, a curious result of the comparison emerges. Of all the personnel at work at the prison, the professional workers are charged with the most far-reaching and socially urgent responsibilities. These are, however, the very persons who are assigned roles and functions which are defined in the most ambiguous and uncertain terms. The new custodial officer, for instance, comes into a defined situation, with his expectations concerning his role reinforced by tradition. Almost anyone he meets has a more or

less clear expectation of what his behavior ought to be in practically every situation, and these expectations set distinct limits to individual deviation. In well-run institutions, the very uniform he wears functions as a kind of insulation against personal failings; it is understood that security and discipline require that the official community organize its responses around the role rather than the man. Consequently, it is universally acknowledged that the institution will support the uniform, within limits, whatever the personal characteristics of the individual who wears it. A comparable situation exists in the cases of the administrative and maintenance personnel. Here, too, objectives are limited, well defined, and matched with reasonably effective powers for their realization.

But what of the psychiatrists, the psychologists, the social workers, the counselors, and classification specialists—those to whom the larger society has assigned the mission of resocialization within walls? What are the work aspirations and expectations which are to guide their operations? What are the traditions which will unify the expectations related to their work and set standards for their behavior and the behavior of the personnel interacting with them? They do not exist; they never existed.

The professional entered penal treatment through the breach in the wall forced by the zeal and indignation of the nineteenth-century religious reformers. His forebears, the humanitarian reformers, moved by a profound faith in the direct educability of human nature, sincerely believed that the problem of crime could be solved by a combination of decently treating and religiously exhorting confined criminals.

It is the tragedy of modern correction that the impulse to help has become

confused with treatment and seems to require defense as treatment. One of the more ironic difficulties with this position is that, when one makes "rehabilitation" the main justification for humane handling of prisoners, one has maneuvered oneself into a position potentially dangerous to the humanitarian viewpoint. What if humane treatment fails to rehabilitate—shall it then be abandoned? The isolated survivals of flogging and other "tough" techniques which still disgrace American penology remain to remind us that this is no mere academic question.

The bleak fact is that, just as the monstrous punishments of the eighteenth century failed to curb crime, so the more humane handling of the twentieth century has equally failed to do so. Professional workers in penology have an overriding obligation to acknowledge this failure and to seek for its causes. In their inquiry they ought not to exempt their own concepts and methods from scrutiny.

We shall now attempt to examine a process by which the professional services, by defining themselves as the rescuers and helpers rather than the rehabilitators of convicts, helped to maneuver themselves into exploitation by the inmate social system and collaborated in their own neutralization.

"TREATMENT BY HELPING" NEUTRALIZED

In the first part of this paper the observation was made that the inmate social system appears to function as an adaptation to social rejection and punishment, enabling the offender to avoid the pathological effects of converting the hostility of society into hatred of himself. Rather than internalizing this hostility, as does the typical neurotic, the adaptive inmate appears to be able to turn it back upon society, using the misery of prison life as his reasonable

pretext. If this interpretation is correct, it may help explain the failure of any attempt to rehabilitate which is based on easing the harshness of prison life.

In order to externalize hostility, individuals must find external objects or conditions against which to express that hostility. The harshness of prison life has been suggested—and is, in fact, suggested by inmates—as the external condition which satisfies this requirement. The question now arises: given the need to externalize hostility, would the effect of improving specific conditions be to reduce the hostility or would it require the inmate to find new outlets for it? Putting the question in a different form: does acceding to the demands of the aggressive adaptive inmates result in a decrease in their protests or does it give rise to new demands around which the hostility generates new protests? Observation and experiences with the results of acceding to inmate pressure strongly suggest the latter.

Much as he protests bad prison conditions, the adaptive inmate *requires them*, because his system of adaptation creates in him a *need to protest*. By finding reasonable pretexts for aggressive protest, he is able to accomplish at least three essential psychological objectives:¹

1. The cathecting of hostilities originally generated by his failures in human relations generally and his resentment at confinement in particular.

2. Reinforcement of his self-picture in the role of a martyred victim of superior force, with attendant justifications of his "heroic counterattack."

¹ None of the remarks above justifies complacency about vile prison conditions. One of the worse consequences of these conditions is that they supply reasonable pretexts for the externalization of hostilities which could be utilized more therapeutically in internal disruption of the inmate social system.

3. Absolution of any personal sense of guilt or responsibility for his offense against society by emphasizing and concentrating on society's real or fancied offenses against him.

The implications of this widespread psychological orientation for any treatment based chiefly on permissiveness and helping will become painfully obvious for any professional staff member who enters the prison with a missionary zeal and a determination to undo, by openhanded giving, the "evils of generations of prison corruption." The inmate social system has an infinite reserve of grievances and injustices with which to capture his sympathies and divert his efforts. The new professional can walk through the corridors of the cell block reserved for the most notorious prison "bad men," and hear the noble principles of the Declaration of Principles of 1870 mouthed by the most cynical and deteriorated of inmates—men who a moment before and a moment after they speak with him will be ridiculing his naïveté to the very "brutal hacks" they complained about to his face. All too frequently the lingo and point of view of the professional becomes the property of the articulate champions of the most aggressive and corrupting inmate forces in prison. Like some strange human hothouse, the prison has a way of developing a species of flowery "bleeding hearts" which put forth especially sticky and luxurious blossoms to ensnare the new professional. It is almost as if the inmate social system recognizes the special value of these articulate inmates and puts them forth as a kind of burnt offering with which the professional can make penitential sacrifices on his personal altar of social conscience. The inmate social system throws a diversionary human screen of institutional "problem cases" around the professional staff member, eating up his time and mis-

directing his efforts away from his proper target, the system itself.

LACK OF TREATMENT RATIONALE

Mention has been made of the lack of any systematic theory of correctional treatment. This situation is closely related to the absence of any comprehensive and tested theory of crime causation. Since the majority of professional personnel working on the treatment of offenders have been trained in the field of psychological therapies, it would be of interest to determine to what extent their methods of correctional treatment are in harmony with the larger body of theory and practice available in social and psychological pathology and treatment.

We are not prepared, in this paper, to enter into the controversies concerning the nature of the malady—personal or social—from which the habitual, acculturated offender suffers. Assuming, for the purposes of discussion, that he is suffering from some form of personality deviation or disturbance, we may raise two questions. First, do contemporary theories of psychotherapy, however diverse, agree on any common core of requirements and procedures? Secondly, if this common core be ascertainable, what inference may be drawn from it for some general statement of a treatment rationale for offenders? Our survey of contemporary theories and methods of psychotherapy persuades us that such a common core exists, or is at least implicit in contemporary practice. The following summarizes our understanding of the principles of any form of psychological treatment. These are principles common to all methods, from the most superficial brief counseling to the most intensive and extended depth therapy.

1. The person must somehow be brought to an awareness that his diffi-

culties are related to motives and patterns of perception within himself. His attempts to account for these difficulties by blaming a hostile or unfavorable human environment must be analyzed as deriving at least in part from a natural human tendency to avoid guilt and self-rejection. He must be assisted in the gaining of an awareness and a motivation for the taking of present initiative toward change or growth within himself, and he must be shown the fruitlessness of evading this responsibility by futile attempts to change merely his environment.

2. This assistance toward understanding comes about through some relationship with the therapist (or therapeutic situation) in which the individual actually attempts to make his faulty modes of perception and behavior work. Repeated demonstrations of this failure may be necessary before he is able to abandon them. It is important that these failures be not interpreted by him as indicating that he is a worthless or helpless person.

3. Finally, the individual must be provided with opportunities for the learning, testing, and fixating of newer, more effective modes of perceiving and relating to his human environment. As these new patterns emerge and are found rewarding in terms of increased success in relations with the self and others, they tend to become more and more established in the individual's total pattern of adjustment.

Therapeutic changes based on the processes just cited are critically dependent on the individual's taking the first step of locating the source of his difficulty somewhere within himself. But it is against this first and all-important acknowledgment that the inmate social system mobilizes all its forces and values. This mobilization takes the form of defining all situations in terms of grievances and demands justified by

those grievances. On the basis of this orientation, the inmate social system divides the whole world of people with whom it relates in terms of a simple dichotomy: there are people who persecute inmates and people whom inmates may exploit. When the professional staff member defined himself as the friend and helper of the inmate he was automatically redefined by the values of the inmate social system as one to be exploited as a champion of inmates in their grievances against society in general and the custodian in particular. Any deviation from this assigned role—especially in the direction of co-operation with measures of custodial control—were then viewed, quite logically, as a betrayal by the professional of his mission to help the inmate. Treatment—defined as help—at this point becomes the enemy of control.

But it is only through strict and careful measures of control that the inmate may be brought face to face with the inadequacy of his faulty technique of adjustment, as he tries to carry out the same pattern of violation and evasion of rules within the institution that required his institutionalization in the first place. By defining himself as one who only aids and eases the inmate in his prison adjustment, the correctional therapist implicitly contributes to the frustration of the all-important objective of demonstrating to the inmate that his pattern is ineffective. Treatment, viewed in this way, now becomes an obstacle to therapy.

CONCLUSIONS

The total result of the interacting trends and processes described has been to isolate the confined offender from socially beneficial contact with individuals outside the inmate social world and to prevent the formation of relationship bonds which might redefine him as an

acceptable member of the noncriminal community. This is the major dilemma of penology.


The writers see little possibility of a resolution of this dilemma within the universally prevailing context of a large institutional approach. Large institutions (walled and unwalled) are dependent on the development of a bureaucratic apparatus based on formal structuring of human relationships. This formal structuring, which is required for the efficient and secure operation of the large institution, is in turn dependent on the maintenance of a social distance which sets crippling limits on contact with members of the official community—the only available representatives of the larger society. Where these limits have been redefined—as in the case of the professional worker—the results, to date, have largely been supportive to the inmate social system and have contributed to the weakening of measures of control.

Effective measures of control are

viewed as essential to any therapeutic program which would attempt to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the coercive or conniving or evasive personal and social adjustment which the adaptive offender brings with him into prison. Only after this demonstration is made will it be possible to create the relationships and set up the learning situations required for the fixations of new patterns of behavior. In order to participate effectively in this two-phase therapeutic process—the breaking down of old and the building up of new behavior patterns—the professional and the custodian alike must work to heal the breach which traditionally divided treatment and custody and which ultimately weakened both. The custodian's definition of the therapist as an enemy of discipline and the therapist's conception of the custodian as an obstructor of treatment must be replaced by new definitions which view both as united collaborators in a unitary therapeutic program.

Lloyd W. McCorkle, Ph.D., is warden of the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton. He has served as director of the Highfield Experimental Treatment Project for Youthful Offenders, State of New Jersey; assistant professor, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University; assistant director, Division of Classification and Education, Department of Institutions and Agencies, State of New Jersey; and in the Prison Administration of the Army of Occupation, Tokyo, Japan.

Richard R. Korn, B.S.S., is director of education and counseling in the New Jersey State Prison, Trenton. He has served as an instructor in the Department of Psychology, City College Extension, New York City.



The Legal Rights of Prisoners

By PAUL W. TAPPAN *

NO asset in our cultural heritage has been more precious than the sense of justice and the methods by which we have traditionally sought to fulfill it. We have accepted as a rudimentary necessity of social control the fair testing of man's legal guilt of crime. The struggles of democratic revolution in England and on the Continent have erected a bulwark of procedures to assure a full protection against wrongful conviction, so that innocent suspects might not be accused as criminals. In this country, the legal rights with which history has endowed the accused have persevered more or less intact through the vicissitudes of recurrent emergencies and hysteria.

The critical observer of our culture is confronted with a strikingly different picture in our methods of dealing with convicted criminals. For the accused, there is regularity and uniformity assured through the rule of law, but once convicted, offenders are handled under a veritable chaos of procedures, philosophies, and objectives. In sentencing and treatment, one finds an administrative hegemony little restrained by legal or due process conceptions. This contrast between a well-defined legal ordering of trial and a poorly defined administrative system of sentencing and treatment appears to be rooted largely in the differing historical evolution of each. The modern correctional sanctions, together with their supporting theories and procedures, have developed

in the main subsequent to that renaissance of criminal law in which our basic ideals of justice were molded.

The old retributive penology was predicated on the view that the proven criminal was an "outlaw" without legal rights. Not only might he be subjected to the crudest penalties, but he lost his citizenship (if not his life), his identity of person, and his property. The historical development of a legal due process to protect those accused of crime did not substantially alter the nature of punishments inflicted on those convicted. Religious, moral, and political conceptions established little refuge for the criminal, once his guilt was established. However, humanistic influences, particularly during the nineteenth century, came to alleviate some of the barbarism in the treatment of offenders, to provide extenuations, exceptions, and escapes from the full rigor of punishment. There has been a gradual and considerable change in modern penology under the impact of social humanitarianism, of behavior sciences and permissive philosophy, and of diverse other cultural influences. Correctional treatment has been swayed by new and often conflicting ideologies of individualization, rehabilitation, social protection, and social reform. But the changes have occurred for the most part administratively, with little relation to conceptions of due process and the rule of law that had developed during the eighteenth century and before. In an age of reliance upon administrative judgment and process, we have deprecated the restriction of executive authority by law. As in other areas of governance, we have looked, often with dewy-eyed expectancy, to the expert, though with great

* Acknowledgment is made to Samuel W. Widdifield, whose statutory research in his unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, "The State Convict" (Yale University School of Law, 1952), has been invaluable in the preparation of this material.

uncertainty in the field of corrections as to what constitutes expertness. We have sought abstract, loosely defined goals, with a minimum of direction or control by law over the authorities charged with the treatment of the criminal.

Thus it is that as we look to the legal rights of prisoners in the United States we find, in vivid contrast to the substantive law of crimes and to the law of evidence and procedure, that there are broad penumbra of vague legal specifications and areas of deep shade, where the law is wholly silent. Rights of citizenship and of person and property attaching to the criminal have not been clearly defined by constitution or statute. The convict generally has the right to appeal from conviction and to protection against cruel and unusual punishments but, as we shall note in more detail below, even these protections are limited and vary in practice. Certain other rights and restrictions are established by law in some jurisdictions, but there is no consistency in the matter.

LOSS OF RIGHTS

There are four main ways in which ordinary political or civil¹ right of the individual may be taken away as a direct or indirect consequence of criminal conviction.

Civil-death statutes

1. Special statutes may attach the status of civil death to the offender, usually on the basis of a sentence to life imprisonment or to death.² Civil-

¹ "Civil rights" as distinguished from rights which are naturally inherent in the individual are those defined and bestowed by positive law. *Green v. State of N. Y.*, 251 A.D. 108, 295 N. Y. Supp. 672 (1937).

² It is a popular myth that felony conviction results automatically in a loss of citizenship. The notion may be traced historically to the status of civil death under ancient law and the doctrines of attainder and corruption of blood by which the chattels of the felon

death statutes survive today in some seventeen jurisdictions, though the meaning of the term is far from uniform in these states.³ It has been held that the convict who is civilly dead cannot sue to enforce his rights in court. The seriousness of this restriction is discussed briefly at a later point. In several of these states, offenders under life sentence are specifically prohibited from exercising rights to contract or to sell or inherit property. In some, their property is distributed after conviction as though they were actually dead.⁴ In others, it may pass at once under a will, though it is unlikely that this could result in the absence of a statute specifically so providing. Ordinary political rights to vote, hold office, testify, or act as juror are extinguished.

Civil-death statutes are among the most primitive survivals in our system of penalties. It appears clear that where certain rights should be taken from the felon, this ought to be done in specific terms rather than under a civil-death law.

Suspended rights

2. Rights may be suspended during a term of imprisonment less than life.

were forfeit, his lands escheat, his heirs cut off. These doctrines were restricted and then largely abandoned during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even under old law the forfeitures of civil death, inflicted for felony and treason, were not complete, since the criminal could contract and be sued and, if later pardoned, could sue for wrongs sustained. The outlawry of another day is virtually extinct, though modern civil death still carries some of its restrictions, as noted in the text. Federal law provides for the deprivation of citizenship for a certain few crimes against the government today.

³ Alabama, Arizona, California, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont.

⁴ Alabama, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont.

Nine of the states with civil-death statutes⁵ and one other⁶ provide for the general suspension of rights during imprisonment short of a life term. Where no such statutes exist, it appears that convicts can sue⁷ but that where rights are suspended, they cannot,⁸ though they may be sued and can defend against an action.⁹ The right to hold public office or positions of honor or trust is suspended during imprisonment in several states,¹⁰ though a majority of jurisdictions provide for actual forfeiture persisting after incarceration rather than mere suspension. The right to testify is suspended as a matter of convenience in most jurisdictions, but a number of states provide that the offender's deposition may be taken in prison.¹¹

Permanent deprivations

3. Conviction of a felony, generally, or of specified crimes involving "moral turpitude" may result in the absolute loss of certain rights. Commonly, these statutory provisions establish the deprivations on conviction coupled with imprisonment, and one must look to the provisions on restoration of rights to determine whether the conviction terminates rights or whether imprisonment merely suspends them. The laws are neither consistent nor clear in this matter. It appears from the statutes

⁵ Arizona, California, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah.

⁶ South Dakota.

⁷ *Hardin v. Dodd*, 176 Ga. 119, 167 S. E. 277 (1932); *Bosteder v. Derling*, 115 Neb. 557, 213 N. W. 809 (1927).

⁸ *Lipschultz v. State*, 78 N. Y. S. (2) 731 (Ct. Cl. 1948); *Hayes v. State*, 50 N. Y. S.2d 492 (1944).

⁹ See below.

¹⁰ Idaho, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota.

¹¹ Arkansas, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee.

that there is not mere suspension but full deprivation (unless and until there is a subsequent restoration by pardon or other means) of the right to vote in at least thirty-five states.¹² In a majority of states, there is also actual forfeiture of public office and positions of trust.¹³ A few states disqualify the felon for jury duty.¹⁴

Marital rights and status present a somewhat peculiar problem. Rights of cohabitation are suspended universally. In other respects, policy varies extensively. In several jurisdictions, life imprisonment involving civil death automatically terminates the marriage, without the necessity for any legal action.¹⁵ In others, the spouse must secure a decree even though the prisoner is civilly dead.¹⁶ In thirty-six states, conviction of a felony, coupled with imprisonment, is a ground for divorce, and if a divorce is granted pardon does not restore conjugal rights.¹⁷ In some

¹² Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Indiana merely suspends the right during imprisonment.

¹³ Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming. South Dakota merely suspends the right and Utah suspends except for instances of treason or crimes against the franchise, in which case there is forfeiture.

¹⁴ Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Wyoming.

¹⁵ Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York.

¹⁶ Rhode Island and Vermont.

¹⁷ Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,

jurisdictions, the felon's children can be given to adoption without his consent.

Deprivation by commissions or boards

4. Conviction may be the basis of action by a licensing agency or professional board to deprive the offender of certain rights, usually those of employment. This is an indirect method of determining his rights. In the fields of civil service regulations for governmental employment, licensing and revocation of license for certain professions and other occupations, and rights of compensation for injury or other wrongs and of residence within the United States, deprivations may often be determined by commissions or boards rather than by courts of criminal law.

State statutes commonly list some of the following who may be deprived of their occupations as a result of their conviction of an infamous crime: accountants, barbers, civil engineers, detectives, automobile operators, embalmers, hairdressers, junk dealers, real estate brokers, liquor store owners, pawnbrokers, pharmacists, midwives, naturopaths, nurses, veterinarians, chiropodists, chiropractors, dentists, physicians, surgeons, and lawyers. It is the general rule that a licensing agency, court, or governmental department may refuse to issue or may revoke a license or permit in such occupations where it is shown that the offender has been convicted of a felony, a crime involving moral turpitude, or an offense specifically designated as a basis of exclusion.¹⁸ Where revocation has occurred,

Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

¹⁸ N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law, Vol. 19, § 81; Arkansas Stat., § 12116; Louisiana Statutes, § 9437; Delaware Laws, c. 157, § 5393; Idaho Code, tit. 53-812; California Laws, Act 2070.

the offender generally has a right of appeal to a court for review, as provided by statute. He may have a similar right to appeal if a license is denied him. The power to issue or revoke is a specialized administrative one, however, and the courts will not generally overrule the decision of an agency without a clear showing of gross abuse of discretion.

It may be noted that there is some provision limiting or postponing the exercise of civil or personal rights directly or indirectly (as, for example, by tolling the statutes of limitations) in every state. Since the deprivations that we have mentioned are derived to a large extent from the common law, it is probable that some losses of rights are drawn from tradition in jurisdictions where there are no express statutory provisions therefor.

RESTORATION OF RIGHTS

We have summarized briefly the general patterns relating to the suspension or deprivation of rights entailed by criminal conviction. It is apparent that the existing structures have developed crescively and differentially throughout the country over a period of time. There has been nothing uniform or systematic in the philosophy or objectives by

Colorado Law, c. 58, § 58, provides for anticipatory suspension without notice or conviction.

Under the Alcohol Beverage Control Law, state liquor authority had discretion either to grant or withhold a license from a pardoned convict. Op. Att'y Gen. (1934) 116 (N.Y.).

A pardon issued to a doctor whose license was revoked after conviction of manslaughter does not restore the right to practice. *State v. Hazard*, 139 Wash. 487, 247 Pac. 957 (1926). To reinstate an attorney to the bar, there must be a factual demonstration of innocence as well as a pardon. In *re Finos*, 256 A.D. 288, 10 N. Y. S.2d 29 (1939). It is clear that a pardon does not necessarily and automatically restore a license.

which the rules have developed. And there has been little effort to assure a regulatory due process of law to protect either the offender or the public. In practice, two or more of the methods described above are employed in most jurisdictions in denying or limiting offenders' rights, and the restrictions differ considerably in nature, as we have noted. Commonly it is impossible to determine from the statutes alone whether particular rights are lost, suspended, or retained by the offender.

Further confusion arises from the variation in practice as to the restoration of rights forfeited or suspended. There appear to be several patterns by which rights may be restored. (1) Restoration may occur automatically, by operation of law, upon discharge from imprisonment or from parole. (2) An ordinary executive pardon may restore some or all rights automatically or particular rights may need to be specified in the pardon. (3) Some form of special action of certification, as provided by statute, may be required.

State pardon

The most generally prevailing method of restoring civil rights that have been denied as a consequence of conviction is through pardon by the state. Some or all rights removed may be restored either by pardon or by some similar form of executive or legislative clemency in thirty-seven states.¹⁹ In ten of those noted, only the suffrage is re-

¹⁹ Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

stored by pardon,²⁰ but in one of these (Rhode Island) the voting privilege may not be restored where conviction was for perjury or an infamous crime. Two others (Nevada and Virginia) prohibit the subsequent holding of office or positions of trust. A minority rule, prevailing in at least five jurisdictions, requires that the pardon must provide specifically for the restoration of any rights that the executive may wish to return.²¹ It should be noted, moreover, that in certain situations, rights lost may not be restored even by a full and unconditional pardon. Thus, property interests that have been vested in others cannot be returned. Pardoned offenders who have been rendered civilly dead are most likely to have suffered permanent loss of property rights, of course. Also, where a spouse has exercised the privilege of divorce from the offender, the convict cannot regain connubial rights through a pardon. The writer has noted elsewhere his opinion that pardon is a poor device for restoring civil or other rights.²²

²⁰ Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia.

²¹ Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, Rhode Island.

²² "While in theory pardon is an act of executive clemency, to be used sparingly in instances where innocence has been shown subsequent to conviction or where some other injustice has been worked, actually in many jurisdictions the pardoning power is often used by the chief executive of the state as a substitute for parole and in this connection may be badly misused. It does not make sense or justice to grant restoration of civil rights either generally or by specific provision through the governor's pardon and to withhold these rights from those released on parole or discharged at the expiration of sentence. The effect is to make restoration a matter of gubernatorial leniency rather than a considered policy of correctional rehabilitation. Other methods, therefore, are desirable to restore the offender to the normal rights and duties of the citizen in the community."

Enforcement of franchise loss

Enforcement of provisions for the deprivation of the franchise and other political rights, when they are not automatically restored upon release from imprisonment, is generally of a quite superficial nature. Unless a special investigation is made into voting frauds, for example, the police and FBI files are not ordinarily consulted to determine whether men have been convicted of crimes. There are laws in most if not all jurisdictions, however, making illegal registration or voting and the usurping of office crimes, and such laws undoubtedly act as some deterrent. When an offender moves into a jurisdiction where his prior conviction or incarceration raises a bar to certain civil rights he may wrongfully but unknowingly exercise the rights that he has lost without being discovered. It has been held that where the defendant honestly believed that his rights had been restored by a pardon, he was improperly convicted of willful and knowing violation.²³

Automatic restoration

The most liberal, least discriminating method of restoring lost rights is to return them automatically upon completion of sentence. Wisconsin provides for automatic restoration when the offender serves out his term, or otherwise satisfies the sentence of the court. Somewhat similarly, Ohio law restores forfeited rights to all prisoners who have served their maximum terms or who are granted final release by the Pardon and Parole Commission. In Colorado, rights may be restored either

Tappan, "Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights," National Probation and Parole Association, *Yearbook*, 1952, p. 97.

²³ *State v. White*, 237 Mo. 208, 140 S. W. 896 (1911). *Contra: State v. Boyett*, 32 N. C. 336 (1849).

by pardon or service of a full term, and in Kansas "citizenship" is restored where the governor commutes sentence or where prisoners are discharged from supervision. In several jurisdictions, a time factor or some other element is introduced into this sort of provision. Thus, Missouri law releases from disabilities prisoners who have had only a single felony conviction, who have received good time allowances, and who have lived in the community without further offense for a period of two years. In South Dakota the criminal discharged from the penitentiary with a clear record of good conduct is restored to full rights. Tennessee restores rights automatically after six months or three years, depending on the offense involved, except for infamous crimes, where a court action is required. Several states apply a rule of restoration to probationers comparable to the principle recommended by the Model Act of the National Probation and Parole Association. Delaware allows the striking of the verdict or plea of guilty from the record, when a probationer has complied with all conditions of his probation. Idaho and Illinois provide, somewhat less liberally, for the restoration of civil rights upon completion of the probation period. In Oregon, the probationer or parolee may exercise all civil rights that are not "political," presumably voting and holding office.

Certification

A more selective approach to restoration has been established in several jurisdictions where some form of certification is required for the purpose. A California law of 1944 provides that any felon released from a state institution may apply for a certificate of rehabilitation and a pardon after completing his sentence or parole period with satisfactory behavior. The certificate restores

most civil rights. In New York a certificate of good conduct may be granted by the Parole Board, upon application of the offender, after he has conducted himself satisfactorily for five years after suspension of sentence, release on parole, or termination of sentence. This certificate ends disabilities that were created by conviction. Certificates of good conduct are also issued in Colorado, Minnesota, Ohio (at the Women's Reformatory), and Wyoming. In these states, however, certification is by the warden of the institution and on the basis of that action the governor will restore civil rights in Minnesota and Ohio and may do so in Colorado and Wyoming.

Restoration of licenses

Finally, where licenses or permits to practice certain occupations or professions are taken away by special boards or commissions, such privilege is ordinarily not restored merely by pardon or by certification of the sort noted above. These deprivations represent the effort of an occupational group to protect itself and the general public against dangers that may be threatened by the criminal. Once an agency has withdrawn a privilege, it must itself act positively to restore it and may refuse to do so, depending on the law and the rules under which it operates. In order to force its favorable action, it must generally be shown in court that the agency has abused its discretion.

RIGHTS GENERALLY RETAINED

We have discussed above some of the rights that are lost as a consequence of criminal conviction or imprisonment and how these rights may be regained. Our penal system also provides specifically for the prisoner's retention of some rights of person and property, generally so that he may be protected from excessive abuses. As we have noted, the

tendency has been to avoid or mitigate the harsh consequences that historically have attached to civil death and to imprisonment. There are serious problems involved, however, in the lack of consistent policy and even more in finding means by which to make these rights real in practice.

As to property rights it is the general rule that the prisoner may sue. However, as indicated above, where rights are generally suspended, the inmate cannot sue. This is a serious restriction on his power to secure remedy for injuries or wrongs that may have been done him during imprisonment. It is generally held, however, that the prisoner may be sued and can, therefore, defend such action. Moreover, except where statutes specifically provide to the contrary it appears to be the rule that the prisoner may contract and may take, hold, convey, or inherit property. In several jurisdictions, provision is made for the appointment of trustees to care for the prisoner's property until after his release. And in thirty states there are provisions suspending the statutes of limitations during imprisonment, so that where inmates cannot sue while imprisoned, they may have their action after release.²⁴ In at least twenty-eight states the laws make some provisions against forfeitures, so that the historical consequences of attainder and corruption of blood may be avoided.²⁵

²⁴ Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

²⁵ Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

PROTECTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR THE OFFENDER

One form of protection for the convicted offender is the provision against cruel and unusual punishments that may be found in the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution and in those of all states except Connecticut and Vermont. Presumably, the infliction of cruel punishments would also be in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seven of the states establish in their constitutions the principle that punishment should be proportioned to the offense. Unfortunately these general provisions do not inform at all concretely as to what should be considered cruel. They are generally interpreted to refer to the kind rather than the amount of punishment, but conceptions of excessive cruelty vary. In nine states, specific laws prohibit corporal punishment,²⁶ and in some others restrictions are imposed on the forms or conditions of its employment.²⁷ Such practices as whipping and striking, showering, tying up, and using the strait jacket, gag, or thumbscrew are prohibited in a few states.²⁸ Only one jurisdiction (Louisiana) prohibits solitary confinement and many provide specifically for its use, some with severe dietary restrictions to accompany it. The Attorney General's Survey in 1939 observed that solitary segregation was being used in all but four prisons of the United States.²⁹ That report also noted that at least twenty-six prisons were employing some form of corporal punishment; probably

²⁶ Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Wisconsin.

²⁷ Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Utah.

²⁸ Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Utah prohibit one or more of these devices.

²⁹ Vol. 5, p. 122.

many more were, since it is difficult to secure valid information on this sort of question.³⁰ It appears that constitutional and statutory provisions are of limited utility in protecting the committed offender, mainly because we have found it difficult to define what is improper and because enforcement of a good policy is extremely difficult.³¹ Perhaps sound practice depends more on the good sense and humaneness of individual wardens than anything else.

Legal remedies

The legal remedies available to the prisoner against wrongs occurring to him during confinement are injunctions, habeas corpus writs, and civil suits for damages. Unfortunately, these are by no means always adequate. As Samuel Widdifield has noted:

... it has been held that disciplinary punishment is peremptory and not subject to review except where there has been gross excess. The problem of proof may be a difficult one to surmount. In states where the prisoner has been declared civilly dead or has had his civil rights suspended access to the courts may be impossible. Further, the prisoner may not be permitted to see a lawyer, or may not be able to afford one, in order to be made aware of his rights. Most objectionable, the prison officials may do everything they can to prevent a prisoner from asserting his rights.³²

The remedy of injunction is ordinarily not allowed unless it can be clearly shown that irremediable injury to property or personal rights is threatened.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Nineteen states do provide for inspection of prisons, though this appears generally to be a quite ineffectual protection: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin.

³² Samuel Widdifield, "The State Convict" (J.S.D. dissertation, Yale University School of Law, 1952), p. 132.

The writ of habeas corpus, however, may be used to rectify mistreatment under both state and federal practice. Its effectiveness has been limited by the holding that recourse to federal process can only be had after state remedies are exhausted. The record in Illinois reveals that the state courts can effectively prevent such remedies over an extended period of time, and it has recently been held that the federal courts will provide remedy where the state has failed to do so.

A civil suit for damages sustained is a somewhat inadequate remedy, not only because it is not designed to prevent injury initially, but because in a number of jurisdictions, as we have seen, the prisoner cannot sue until after discharge from incarceration. The difficulties of proof are greatly increased, of course, when this is the case. There is a federal civil rights statute that may be invoked for wrongs sustained, either under state or federal imprisonment. A few states have similar laws. Actions brought under such statutes must be taken against the warden or his staff, however, since state governments are protected from suit. The courts have generally held that it is the duty of prison officials to exercise reasonable care to protect the life and health of the prisoner.³³ There have been very few such suits successfully pursued, however.

Criminal action may be directed against those responsible for prison mistreatment or neglect of duty under the federal civil rights law and special criminal statutes in some thirty-four states.³⁴ These provide generally for

³³ *Kendrick v. Adamson*, 51 Ga. App. 402, 180 S. E. 647 (1935); *Smith v. Slack*, 125 W. Va. 812, 26 S. E.2d 387 (1943).

³⁴ Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,

finest or jail terms. Difficulty of access to the courts and of mustering proof may account for the small number of such cases successfully prosecuted.

RIGHTS AS AFFECTED BY FEDERAL LAW

Some special comment must be made on civil rights as they are affected by federal law.³⁵ For the most part, United States statutes do not provide for the loss of either citizenship or civil rights. Most such rights derive from state constitutions and laws rather than federal, and their deprivation occurs, therefore, through the jurisdictional power of the state. Hence, a federal conviction of a crime or imprisonment in a federal institution may result in loss of political and other rights by reason of the specific legal provisions for the deprivation of such rights in the particular state, even though the conviction was not had in a state court. Restoration of rights also depends upon state law, but it too may be affected by federal action: Presidential pardon, while it does not itself confer or restore any rights, generally removes the effect of conviction and imprisonment, so that the individual may regain his privileges either with or without further action by the state, depending upon its legal provisions on restoration.³⁶ As under state practice, federal actions of clemency may be specifically denominated as

North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming.

³⁵ For a more extended treatment of the subject of deprivation through federal conviction see Alexander Holtzoff, "Loss of Civil Rights by Conviction of Crime," *Federal Probation*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April-June 1942), pp. 18-19, and *idem*, "Civil Rights of Criminals," in Vernon C. Branham and Samuel B. Kutash, *Encyclopedia of Criminology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 55-58.

³⁶ *Jones v. Board of Registrars*, 56 Miss. 766; *Cowan v. Prouse*, 93 Ky. 156, 19 S. W. 407.

"pardons to restore civil rights" where they are not based upon innocence. Naturally, only federal pardons may be granted for federal offenses, state pardons for state crimes. It should be noted that, in accordance with the principle involved here, civil and other deprivations that are auxiliary to the conviction are quite different in effect than are the major penalties imposed by the courts: a conviction or imprisonment in *any* state or in the federal courts may result in loss of rights in another jurisdiction in accordance with its laws.³⁷ Similarly a pardon or other device of clemency employed by an appropriate executive has effects elsewhere that depend upon the laws of the jurisdiction where the offender attempts to assert his rights.³⁸

As a partial exception to the generalizations made above, it should be noted that there are some limited provisions in the laws of the United States for a direct denial of rights. Loss of citizenship or nationality may result from a court martial conviction for desertion in time of war or from a charge of treason, of attempting to overthrow the government by force, or of bearing arms against the United States.³⁹

Beyond these provisions, the law disqualifies from holding federal office or

³⁷ It should be noted, however, that a prisoner sentenced to life in a federal court is not civilly dead, and it has been held that a state may not so treat him though he be imprisoned where the local law provides for civil death of prisoners sentenced to life terms. *Presbury v. Hull*, 34 Mo. 29 (1868).

³⁸ The principle appears clear and sound that a federal pardon cannot be given to a state offender and that state authorities should not pardon for federal crimes. However, at least three states (Alabama, Kentucky, Virginia) have issued certificates restoring civil rights lost through federal convictions, and in two of these the highest courts upheld this power in the governor. See *Hogan v. Hartwell*, 242 Ala. 646, and *Arnett v. Stumbo*, 287 Ky. 433.

³⁹ U. S. C., tit. 8, § 801 (g-h).

position of trust individuals convicted of treason, inciting rebellion, conspiracy to violate civil rights of any citizen, bribery, mutilation, or falsification of public records, and government employees who receive compensation for rendering service to any person in relation to a matter, in which the United States is interested, before any government department.⁴⁰

Deportation and loss of citizenship

On a somewhat different footing are the provisions for deportation of aliens on the basis of criminal conviction: the deprivation of the privilege of domicile. The Immigration Act of 1917 makes provision for the deportation of undesirable aliens upon the directive of the Attorney General where it can be shown that they have been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.⁴¹ An order of deportation may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals or attacked by a writ of habeas corpus, if the alien is in custody and can show that his hearing was not fair, that the evidence was not substantial, that the order exceeded the Attorney General's authority, or that he has been held unreasonably long.⁴² Also, in accordance with provisions of law in the jurisdiction where such convictions occurred, an unconditional pardon may preclude

⁴⁰ U. S. C., tit. 18, §§ 4, 202, 207. There are a few other provisions for such disqualification that are of lesser importance.

⁴¹ Immigration Act, § 19. What is "moral turpitude" has been far from clear in the cases. The law provides for deportation where (1) the alien had been convicted of such crime prior to entry; (2) he has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of a year or more for such a crime committed within five years of entry; and (3) he has been sentenced twice to imprisonment for such crimes at any time after entry.

⁴² See Charles Gordon, "The Writ of Habeas Corpus in Deportation Proceedings," in *Monthly Review* (Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service), Vol. 3, No. 5 (November 1945), pp. 218-23.

deportation by blotting out guilt. In at least one jurisdiction (Pennsylvania) completion of the prison term is sufficient to accomplish this result. In one recent year, a governor of New York State granted forty-eight pardons to aliens whose prison terms had expired but who had remained liable to deportation, some of them for a number of years.⁴³

Save for the exceptional offenses we have noted, the native does not lose his citizenship through law violations. When he does sustain such loss he becomes a stateless person, but this does not necessitate his deportation. However, it has been held that when a native here has become a citizen of another country, though he did not intend to abandon his United States citizenship, he may be deprived of the latter and refused admission to the United States as an alien, even if no crime was involved. Under our immigration laws the criminal alien may be excluded or deported for fraudulent admission. The noncriminal alien who is admitted may be deported for the subsequent commission of crimes involving moral turpitude and, if he has been issued a certificate of citizenship, may be deprived thereof.

A REASONABLE APPROACH

It is not proposed in this paper to deal elaborately with solutions to the problems of civil rights. Our purpose was merely to describe summarily the present confused condition of these matters. In conclusion, however, it may not be inappropriate to comment on the principles involved and what may be a reasonable social and penological approach. The deprivation of "civil rights" may be conceived to be either an auxiliary punishment in itself or the

⁴³ *Statement of Pardons, Commutations and Reprieves*, Leg. Doc. No. 30, Albany, New York, 1945.

incidental consequence of conviction and sentence, not intended to be specifically punitive but merely protective of public interests and of official convenience. Such a distinction as this appears unimportant to the offender: he may well consider these losses to be a part of the vindictive punishments that society exacts. And, in fact, they do appear very frequently to reflect retributive sentiments rather than any real need for community protection. The risk of repeated crime to which society is continuously subject from released offenders is patently greater than the possible consequences of their exercise of the rights that are generally removed.

Deprivation of the right to vote, to hold public office, or to act as juror during a period of incarceration is quite clearly a matter of convenience, if not necessity. Loss of the right to practice one's business or profession or to assume a position of trust, even after release from imprisonment, may often be more largely a matter of public protection than of retribution. However, when the right to vote, to act as juror or to testify, to hold office or trust, to practice in an occupation of one's training and choice is denied to probationers, to parolees, to those who have completed their sentences and been discharged, and even to those who have been pardoned, the gratuitously punitive element is great. In such instances, it appears that more mischief than benefit may commonly be worked, for the restrictions imposed do more to prevent rehabilitation than they do to protect the public.

The customary forms of deprivations of civil rights, it is submitted, are not for the most part sound as auxiliary punishments. Except for the deprivation of occupational privileges (including the holding of public office), they do little or nothing to repress crime. This is not to deny that auxiliary pun-

ishments—such as restitution, for example—may serve an obviously useful purpose, but the losses of civil rights are not, for the most part, of comparable utility.

SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In the light of what we have written, the following principles are submitted:

1. The ordinary forms of deprivations that we have discussed are not appropriate as auxiliary punishments, for they serve little purpose in deterring crime or incapacitating criminals. Put differently, they are not appropriate measures under a penology that would eschew punishments exacted for their own sake or designed to brand the offender as infamous or outlaw.

2. As a matter of public and official convenience, it is desirable during imprisonment to limit the criminal's freedom to act as juror or serve in public office, perhaps to vote (though no great harm would result, it seems, from prisoners' use of "absentee ballots"). This principle of convenience is restricted, obviously, to the period of actual incarceration. Moreover, though some considerable inconvenience may be involved, it is desirable to *permit* the exercise of certain important privileges, such as the right to sue and to receive and convey property, real and personal. The right to sue for wrongs done to the prisoner or his property is of special importance. If the offender is not allowed direct access to the courts for such purposes, he should at least be permitted to enjoy these rights through a representative.

3. Aside from periods of incarceration, it may be desirable to protect public interests by prohibiting the exercise of certain ordinary rights for some period of time, such as the privileges of occupation and office. It appears, however, that a finer discrimination should be employed in serving this objective.

Some balance must be struck between the measure of threat to community welfare, on the one side, and on the other both the intrinsic value of maximizing personal freedom under a system of democratic justice and the utility of encouraging the sound exercise of rights in helping individuals to become responsible citizens. For the most part, aside from exceptions that have been noted, the civil and property rights lost through conviction raise small problem of social danger. It appears that the law should not provide flatly for denial of civil and political rights to those who are on probation or parole. Limited and special provisions might well be made, however, for the denial during the period of their sentences of certain political rights (particularly the holding of office) to those who have committed atrocious political offenses and of certain occupational privileges to those who have exploited their occupations in seriously illegal ways. There appears to be no excessive hazard, however, in the English rule that leaves full rights with those who are selected for probation. And there is merit in assisting the rehabilitation of the parolee by restoring all rights to him. There is also some danger, of course, but prison release must involve risk in any event.

4. Justice demands an end to penalties. So does rehabilitation. No principle is more clear, perhaps, than this: upon completion of his sentence, if not before, the offender should be fully restored to his rights. If any of these deprivations are so significant penologically that they should persist beyond the court's sentence to prison or probation, they should be elevated to the status of primary and independent sanctions, specifically designed to accomplish appropriate correctional goals of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. In that way, they would receive the special focus of attention required

in adjusting penalty both to the offense and the offender. Possibly the grafting politician, the corrupt judge, or the purveyor of illicit medication, for example, should not be permitted ever again to ply his trade. Restrictions of this sort have major impact on the offender, however, comparable to that of imprisonment, and often of even greater seriousness to the individual involved. The employment of a permanent or long-persistent sanction of this sort should be based on quite specific categories of offense and on judicial discrimination as to those individual offenders for whom the sanction appears to be necessary as a matter of public protection. Unfortunately, it has not been possible under our system to con-

trol the actions of licensing agencies in accordance with sound principles of justice, but so far as legal deprivations and the behavior of courts are concerned we can eradicate from current practice such obsolete residuals as civil death and blanket deprivations based on conviction or sentence, and such unnecessarily complicated forms of restoration as pardon and certificates of good conduct.

In this entire area of the incidental deprivation of rights and their restoration, we can liberalize practice greatly with very little threat to the public and with considerable advantage in maintaining a legitimate measure of self-respect on the part of the offender. Wisconsin law seems reasonable in this respect.

Paul W. Tappan, Ph.D., LL.B., J.S.D., Washington, D. C., is chairman of the United States Board of Parole and sometime professor in criminology and law at New York University. He is author of several volumes in the field of criminology, including Juvenile Delinquency, Juvenile Delinquency in the North American Region, Delinquent Girls in Court, The Habitual Sex Offender, coauthor of Social Problems, and editor of Contemporary Correction. He has contributed numerous articles to the professional journals of law, criminology, psychiatry, sociology, and social work.

Substitutes for Imprisonment

By WILL C. TURNBLADH

OBVIOUSLY the best substitute for imprisonment and all of its attendant problems and evils would be the prevention of criminal behavior itself. Unfortunately, until such time as the pressures of our society upon the human personality are lessened or realigned, we must deal with the casualties. Until such time as the schools and other community agencies possess the knowledge and facilities to isolate and treat preventively both manifest and latent behavior problems in the very young and make the treatment stick, the magnitude of the crime problem demands that we apply fully the best present knowledge of correctional treatment. And this we are failing to do.

Prison disturbances throughout the country during the last few years have focused public attention not only on the prisons themselves, but on our whole approach to the crime problem. They have clearly revealed that the problem is deeper than the personnel, program, and plant of the prison, vital as these are. Sharing in the responsibility for prison disturbances are sentencing laws, the sentencing practices of judges, probation, and parole. Most prison administrators are saddled with large congregate institutions frequently overcrowded with inmates, young and old, first offenders and hardened offenders, alcoholics, sex deviates, drug addicts, neurotics, and psychotics. Underlying these factors is an apparently widespread public reliance on the jail and the prison as the answer to crime and criminals. Major questions then are: Are we sending to prison only those requiring institutional care and custody? Can we reduce prison populations so

that smaller institutions or units of a specialized nature can be developed, or must we look forward to more and larger institutions? Are there alternatives or substitutes for imprisonment which offer at least as much or greater protection to the public?

SENTENCING

The criminal court judge is dealing with a calculated risk each time he imposes a sentence, and the criminal court judges of the nation are called upon to exercise this responsibility over about a million adult and young adult offenders every year. The sentence the judge imposes affects the destinies of individual offenders and their families. It affords or fails to afford protection to the public, and it determines to a large degree the type and extent of the correctional process. The trial or plea is past, guilt has been established, and it is the judge's responsibility to determine what disposition will prevent recurrence of criminal behavior in the individual before him. He cannot categorize all offenders, nor can he find a solution in broad generalities or platitudes.

Since over 80 per cent of the convictions for major offenses are based on a plea of guilty, the judge, in most instances, does not have even the information about the offender which might be brought out in the course of trial. If we agree that the primary function of the sentence is to protect the public, then the sentence must be predicated upon knowledge of the individual offender and the calculation of a course of public action most likely to prevent recurrence of criminal behavior in the

individual offender. A major and essential means for the achievement of scientific sentencing, then, is the presentence investigation—a procedure of probation. This investigation, carried out by a trained, qualified probation officer, provides the criminal court with the necessary information relative to the offender's history, his capacities and limitations, his motivations, and his ability to understand his own problems. Often overlooked is its value in helping the offender and his family to understand and accept the disposition by the court. Without the verified information gathered through the presentence investigation, the court is seriously handicapped in discharging its responsibility to society and must inevitably make prejudgments. Many jurisdictions have acknowledged the presentence investigation by a probation officer as an indispensable preliminary to proper sentencing and have made it a statutory requirement in a major category of criminal cases, the category being determined by the penal code and judicial structure.

Presentence investigations

The California statute requires that in every felony case, before judgment is pronounced, the court shall order an investigation by a probation officer.¹ Michigan has had such a provision for years. In any felony case in Colorado the court, if it has discretion as to the penalty, is required to order a presentence investigation.² In most counties in New York State the courts of general criminal jurisdiction order a social investigation prior to sentence in every felony case. In all courts in Massachusetts a presentence investigation is had in all felony cases. In Rhode Island all cases in the superior courts are investigated. Generally, throughout

New Jersey approximately 70 per cent of all felony offenders are sentenced on the basis of a presentence investigation by a probation officer, and some counties make investigations in all cases. The rules of criminal procedure for the United States district courts require a presentence investigation in every case unless the court otherwise directs.³

The function of a presentence investigation is, then, far broader than investigation limited to only those offenders likely to be eligible for probation. The lack of a presentence investigation opens the way to two serious faults in sentencing. First, it makes it difficult for a judge to place on probation suitable defendants, for he does not have the factual basis for selecting them and thus must either take a chance in granting probation or "play it safe" and commit to an institution. Secondly, where there is no presentence investigation, the term of commitment stems not from the characteristics of the defendant, but from other factors, usually the nature of the offense or the strength or weakness of the case against him. A presentence investigation may develop potentials for community correctional treatment in cases which would otherwise appear to be obvious jail or penitentiary commitments. Similarly it may reveal dangerous behavior on the part of a defendant who has been convicted of a relatively minor crime, and it may reveal previous criminal behavior more completely than does the criminal record itself.

It is not without significance that our ablest judges insist on a presentence investigation in disposing of criminal cases. This is, in effect, an assertion that the criminal court is entitled to probation service just as it is entitled to other services, medical and legal. Experience has shown that where

¹ Laws of 1947, c. 1178.

² Laws of 1949, c. 195.

³ Rule 32C.

thorough presentence investigations by a competent probation staff are available to the criminal court (1) there is greater use of probation as a disposition, (2) jail and prison commitments are relatively lower, and (3) the rate of recidivism or failure on probation is reduced.

PROBATION AS A DISPOSITION

Most persons experienced in work with offenders agree that the individual's eventual adjustment must be to the family unit, the neighborhood, the job, and community standards. This must be achieved *in the community*. For the majority of offenders who do not require secure custody or institutional training and treatment (and in most penal institutions "training and treatment" are hardly possible under conditions of mass overcrowding and budget limitations) we are, through imprisonment, postponing the rehabilitative process which must take place if the community itself is to be protected. For this large group of offenders the prison experience and the stigma attached to them and their families are road blocks that we have placed in the way of eventual adjustment.

While national statistics on dispositions have not been available since 1945, when the United States Bureau of the Census stopped issuing *Judicial Criminal Statistics*, our best estimates are that the criminal courts throughout the country are using probation in about 35 per cent of felony cases and in less than 10 per cent of misdemeanor cases.

Where probation services of a high order are available, courts use probation as a disposition in more than 65 per cent of their cases. Similarly, where the rate of probation use is high the percentage of successes on probation is correspondingly high—this despite the fact that a well-staffed pro-

bation service in the exercise of consistent supervision of probationers will revoke probation for violation of conditions which would go unobserved by an overloaded staff. Within many of our states the rate of use of probation as a disposition ranges from 10 to 70 per cent in different jurisdictions, depending on the attitude of judges and the existence or nonexistence of probation service. Of collateral interest is the opinion of a number of wardens that between 25 and 40 per cent of the inmates of their penal institutions could have been dealt with on probation.

At least two conclusions are inescapable: (1) the use of probation can be substantially increased if a sufficient number of qualified probation officers are available to the criminal courts, and (2) such an increase will provide at least as much protection to the public as will a low use of probation and a high ratio of imprisonment.

SOME OBSTACLES

Crime and delinquency are one of the major problems confronting the nation and most of our states and communities. Yet the lack of understanding and the widespread misunderstanding of the nature of the problem itself are appalling. We are far short of possessing a basic philosophy for dealing with the offender, a philosophy which should guide planning and support community and state-wide efforts. Perhaps partly because of this lack of a dynamic correctional philosophy the public generally appears to rely on jail and prison as the answer.

Nationally, less than one-third of our criminal courts have probation service which could be considered adequate or nearly so. Approximately one-third of the criminal courts have no probation service of any kind. The balance have available to them only token probation services.

Case Load

For the 167,000 inmates of federal and state penal institutions there is a total custodial staff of 15,000. This represents a ratio of one custodial staff member to every eleven inmates. If we add the 460 wardens and deputy wardens and approximately 7,500 other employees of these penal institutions, we obtain an over-all ratio of one custodial employee to every seven inmates. Despite this, many of our institutions must be considered understaffed.

For the 675,000 adult and youthful offenders placed under probation supervision by our criminal courts throughout the country, there are approximately 3,000 probation officers. This means that we have a national average of one probation officer for 250 offenders under probation supervision. It is obviously unrealistic to expect even the most skilled probation officer to provide the guidance and supervision required to re-educate and effect a readjustment in severely disturbed individuals where case loads are so high. Where case loads are in excess of one hundred, not even effective surveillance is possible, let alone guidance and redirection. If probation is to approach its optimum use and if it is to provide the full measure of protection to the public, we must establish case-load standards through a realistic appraisal of the duties and responsibilities of the probation officer toward the convicted offender and the time and working conditions required to perform these duties effectively. Certainly the probation officer, working on an individual basis with offenders, should be able to devote at least thirty or forty minutes a week to each probationer and a similar amount of time to case-related contacts such as the family, relatives, clergymen, employers, and other agency representatives who

can re-enforce the probationer in his community adjustment. When to this we add the time consumed in travel, minimum administrative detail, participation in training, and the cultivation of neighborhood and community resources, it is obvious that the probation officer has a full-time job with a case load of twenty-five probationers. While this degree of intensity of service and treatment is not required for all offenders, we should not continue to permit such a rationale to justify the prevailing situation. Where probation is allowed to become nothing more than a bookkeeping or card recording system, it is positively dangerous to society and hinders the entire development of probation as an essential and integral instrument in the administration of justice.

California's experiment in parole supervision

The California Department of Corrections and the Adult Authority are taking a courageous and significant step forward by testing the validity of intensive supervision in parole, a comparable community correctional service. In addressing the Western Probation and Parole Association at its fifteenth annual conference, Walter Gordon, chairman of the California Adult Authority, set forth some of the ingredients of this program which he calls an "experiment in intensive supervision."

"Fourteen experienced parole officers have been selected and assigned throughout the state to provide special assistance to newly released men. Each of these officers supervises just fifteen parolees for approximately three months after release, the period when the parolee is most likely to experience confusion and emotional distress. [Specifically, intensive supervision means that the parole officer spends a minimum of

two hours a week with each of his fifteen parolees.] . . . Thus, in a year, each of the fourteen parole officers will give this early intensive supervision to about sixty men."

Mr. Gordon's description of the project—the categories of parolees in experimental and control groups, methods of evaluating the success of the program, etc.—can be found in the proceedings of the Western Probation and Parole Association conference and in the March 1954 issue of *Focus*. The realistic appraisal of this project should have real meaning for all planning and should spur similar experimental efforts in both parole and probation throughout the country.

COSTS

While ideally the full development of probation and related community correctional services should be bound only by their capacity to protect the public and to prevent the recurrence of criminal behavior in the individual, the dominating factor usually is cost. Even so, from a dollars and cents standpoint we have nothing to lose in the optimum use of probation, both as an aid to sentencing and as a disposition.

While completely accurate figures are not available for all penal institutions, the national average is approximately \$1,500 a year per inmate. For the average case load of twenty-five probationers per officer at any one time, the cost of probation service would be between \$150 and \$200 per year per case. The actual cost of probation in criminal courts throughout the country now ranges from a low of \$20 to a high of approximately \$150 per case.

ACTION THROUGH THE JUDICIARY

In the spring of 1953, thirty judges from juvenile, domestic relations, criminal, and appellate courts, federal, state, and local, gathered at a three-day work-

ing meeting called by the National Probation and Parole Association to consider the nation's crime and delinquency problem and to seek some better answers. After probing deliberations there was unanimity of opinion that the judiciary itself had both the responsibility and an opportunity to provide leadership through judges, lawyers, and laymen for the development of services essential to courts in coping with delinquency, family disorder, and crime. A relatively small official body was created—the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Probation and Parole Association—and an agreement was reached on a program of initial action. Former United States Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts was elected honorary chairman; Chief Judge Bolitha J. Laws of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, chairman; Chief Justice Irving Ben Cooper of the Court of Special Sessions, chairman of the criminal courts section; and Superior Court Judge William B. McKesson of Los Angeles, chairman of the juvenile and domestic relations courts section.

One of the first steps taken as a result of this program was the creation by the Association of a National Citizens Council. Under the chairmanship of Charles E. Wilson, former president of the General Electric Company, the Council has been organized to formulate a nationwide attack on crime and delinquency and to seek broad understanding of the nature of the problem. The co-operation of the American Bar Association and the state bar associations is being developed. State citizen councils will be organized to help in the appraisal of state-wide needs and in vigorously seeking these services and facilities as required. There is widespread enthusiasm for this leadership through the judiciary. It is of more than a little significance that

judges are seeking and welcoming the active co-operation of lawyers and laymen in these socio-legal problems of the administration of justice.

LOOKING AHEAD

The juvenile, domestic relations, and criminal courts of the country, dealing as they do annually with well over one million cases of human disorganization resulting in delinquency, family breakup, and crime, are natural laboratories for the study of cases. A major key to the solution of the problem of both prevention and correction lies in these courts. Only a few of them have research facilities, and these are extremely limited. What is needed is major research into causes, backgrounds, and the efficacy of treatment methods. Half a million dollars a year spent on research in crime and delinquency would be an infinitesimal fraction of the nation's twenty billion dollar a year crime bill.

As vital as is the need for this dynamic research the fact is that our criminal courts are constantly frustrated in their efforts to apply present knowledge through the lack of probation services. The situation is not unlike that of the farmer who was pressed by the eager salesman to buy a book on scientific agronomy. His answer was, "Shucks, son, I ain't farming half as good as I know how to now."

Since we know that crime motivation is individual, all courts should be entitled to the necessary probation and related services to provide appropriate social investigations of cases prior to disposition or sentence. This diagnostic function should be performed on the first occasion the individual comes before the court and not after successive failures of summary dispositions.

Probation work should be professionalized not only from the standpoint of qualifications of probation officers but

also through a realistic approach to case loads and working conditions which make possible effective community correctional treatment.

The use of probation treatment as a disposition should be sharply increased from the present average of about 35 per cent to between 75 and 80 per cent of convictions as corresponding probation services are provided for our criminal courts. In one state, for example, a 10 per cent increase in the use of probation would lessen the demands upon the state penal institutions for facilities for between 1,000 and 1,200 inmates. This, coupled with the estimate of many wardens that as many as 40 per cent of the inmates of their institutions could have been dealt with within the community on probation if necessary probation facilities had been available, underscores the profligacy of our present practices.

A fine, imposed after consideration of the social effect upon the individual and his family and payable in installments where appropriate, is a form of treatment in the community. Experience in England has demonstrated the effect of deferred payment of fines in the substantial reduction of institutional commitments.

When community correctional treatment is utilized at a rate closer to its optimum, then and only then will administrators of our correctional institutions be able to think realistically of smaller specialized institutional facilities. The some three thousand probation officers in our criminal courts and the four thousand in our juvenile courts are attempting a task of public protection and human rehabilitation which requires a force of not less than forty thousand. Until such time as we build a real foundation of community correctional services for all the nation's towns and cities the outlook is grim indeed. We must look forward to the

continuance and extension of large congregate penal institutions, where specialized correctional treatment is impossible. And we must look forward to the continuation of the waste of public

funds for the commitment to institutions of persons who could have learned to live successfully in the community if they had been helped with their problems early enough.

Will C. Turnbladh, New York City, is executive director of the National Probation and Parole Association.

English Prisons Since the War¹

By SIR LIONEL W. FOX

TO understand the purposes and methods of the English prison system we should see it first against the background of the penal system as a whole, as it stands after the Criminal Justice Act of 1948. A primary purpose of this act, as of most English penal legislation of this century, is to keep people out of prison—especially young people and those of unsound mind. The modern tendency both of legislation and of court practice is to think in terms of "treatment" rather than of punishment for the individual offender, though the conception of treatment does not exclude that of punishment. Whatever action the court takes towards a convicted offender, in so far as it mulcts him of his property or limits his freedom of self-determination, is in fact a punishment; and it does not cease to be so because it may also be used as a form of remedial treatment, adapted to the personality of the offender and directed to his social rehabilitation. It is in this sense that we say that a man is sent to prison as a punishment, but not *for* punishment.

The English courts have available a wide variety of treatments. In addition to discharge with or without conditions, they may impose fines; they may make probation orders subject to conditions appropriate to the special needs of the offender, including residence in a home or hostel or submission

to specified mental treatment;² and where institutional treatment in custody is required they have for adults three types—imprisonment, corrective training,³ and preventive detention.⁴ For persons under twenty-one, over and above the probation system, there is a still wider range. There are attendance centers, based on the compulsory deprivation of liberty during evenings and week ends; detention centers, designed to administer, during a sentence which is normally three months, a short sharp shock to youngsters who will not heed milder measures but do not yet need prolonged institutional training; and for those who do need such training there are approved schools for those under seventeen and Borstals for those over sixteen. Finally, for those over seventeen,⁴ as a last resort when the court finds no other treatment suitable, there is the prison. The whole purpose of all these measures, however, is to keep young people out of prison, and the Criminal Justice Act provides for the eventual prohibition of imprisonment by magistrates' courts of persons under twenty-one, when the alternative measures have been fully developed. These measures, it should be added, include remand centers which will avoid the committal to prison of untried persons under twenty-one years of age.

The law provides not only for treatment but for previous diagnosis. Magistrates' courts have powers to adjourn cases, after conviction and before sen-

¹ This account covers the system in England and Wales, but the differences in Scotland and Northern Ireland, which are under separate administrations, are not significant. The Borstal system is legally outside the prison system and is mentioned here only by reference.

² Criminal Justice Act, 1948, § 4.

³ Special sentences for different degrees of persistent offenders passed under section 21 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948.

⁴ For offenses tried by superior courts the minimum age is fifteen.

tence, to enable full social and medical inquiries to be made to help them to determine the most suitable method of dealing with a case.⁵ Further, before sentencing an offender to Borstal training, corrective training, or preventive detention, a court must consider a report from the Prison Commissioners on his physical and mental condition and his suitability for such a sentence. The duty of providing this guidance to the courts falls largely on the prisons, whose medical officers obtain much experience in forensic psychiatry. But this problem of providing adequate facilities for the medico-psychological and social examination of offenders before sentence, whether in custody or at liberty, is still awaiting serious consideration and development.⁶

We cannot show statistically the practice of the courts on diagnosis. On treatment, the position is clear. In 1951 the courts used the various forms of treatment⁷ open to them, in dealing with offenders aged seventeen or over convicted of all indictable offenses excepting murder, as follows:

Persons aged seventeen and under twenty-one years of age. Magistrates' courts: discharged or bound over 20 per cent; fined 42 per cent; placed on probation 26 per cent; sentenced to imprisonment 4 per cent; otherwise dealt with 8 per cent. Superior courts: discharged or bound over 12 per cent; fined 3 per cent; probation 32 per cent; sentenced to Borstal training 34 per cent; sentenced to imprisonment 11 per cent; otherwise dealt with 8 per cent.

⁵ Criminal Justice Act, 1948, §§ 25 and 26.

⁶ These questions have been more fully considered by the writer, in the light of the U.N. seminar held in Brussels in 1951, in the *British Journal of Delinquency*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (October 1952), pp. 85-103.

⁷ No worth-while statistics are available on the use of attendance centers and detention centers, which have only recently been developed, or on the forms of condition used in probation orders.

Persons aged twenty-one years and over. Magistrates' courts: discharged or bound over 15 per cent; fined 54 per cent; probation 8 per cent; sentenced to imprisonment 20 per cent; otherwise dealt with 3 per cent. Superior courts: discharged or bound over 8.9 per cent; fined 9 per cent; probation 12.4 per cent; sentenced to imprisonment 58.9 per cent, to corrective training 5.2 per cent, to preventive detention 1.3 per cent; otherwise dealt with 4.3 per cent.

The foregoing considerations serve two purposes: they show the place taken by the prison among the treatments used by the courts, and they show that classification in the English system begins with the sentence of the court.

There are certain other factors in the use of imprisonment which may be of interest in relation to American practice. English courts do not favor very long sentences. In 1950, out of 27,703 men received in prison on conviction with sentences of imprisonment, only 2.6 per cent had over three years, including thirty-eight men with over seven years. While this is in itself a favorable factor for good prison administration and results, its counterpart of useless short sentences equally exists and looks no better for being part of an internationally recognized problem. In the same year, 70.7 per cent had sentences of not more than six months.

Sentences of imprisonment have no indeterminate element. A prisoner may earn by good conduct and industry a remission of one-third of his sentence, and when he is discharged his sentence is deemed to have expired.⁸

Lastly, our penal system seeks to minimize the periods that untried prisoners are held in custody, usually a mat-

⁸ This statement is not applicable to sentences of Borstal detention, corrective training, or preventive detention, or to sentences of imprisonment for persons under twenty-one. Later reference will be made to these.

ter of weeks and hardly exceeding three months in any normal case.

PRINCIPLES OF THE PRISON SYSTEM

The basic principles of the contemporary prison system do not derive from the Criminal Justice Act of 1948. They had been gradually developed in practice between the wars and received their legal imprimatur in the act and the rules made under it. They are in close accord, allowing for national differences, with the contemporary version of the Cincinnati Principles of America. They do not appear anywhere in a complete code of this nature, but if they did they would be stated in almost the same words as those used in the General Principles which preface the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners recently approved for the United Nations by its European Consultative Group. Some of them are stated in the Prison Rules of 1949, as follows:

R.6. The purposes of training and treatment of convicted prisoners shall be to establish in them the will to lead a good and useful life on discharge, and to fit them to do so.

R.29. The Rules in this section shall be applied, due allowance being made for the differences of character and response to discipline of different types of prisoner, in accordance with the following principles:

(i) Discipline and order shall be maintained with firmness, but with no more restriction than is required for safe custody and well ordered community life;

(ii) In the control of prisoners officers shall seek to influence them through their own example and leadership, and to enlist their willing co-operation;

(iii) At all times the treatment of prisoners shall be such as to encourage their self-respect and a sense of personal responsibility.

R.154. The training in a regional prison of prisoners so sentenced shall be designed to carry out the purposes specified in Rule 6, and shall include

(i) the provision of work which will so far as practicable help to fit them to earn their living after release, with technical training in skilled trades for suitable prisoners;

(ii) special attention to education;

(iii) the exercise of personal influence on the character and training of individuals by members of the prison staff;

(iv) the provision of every opportunity for the development of a sense of personal responsibility, including for suitable prisoners training in open conditions.

An earlier statement, given in 1945 in an official description of the system published for general reading,⁹ reads as follows:

The contemporary phase of the system develops from five basic ideas: first, that for all prisoners with sentences of suitable length, the prison régime should be one of constructive training, moral, mental, and vocational; second, that such training can be fully carried out only in homogeneous establishments set aside for the purpose, though the principle should apply, so far as practicable in the limitations of an ordinary prison, to all prisons alike; third, that the special training prisons need not, for all prisoners, provide the security of normal prison buildings, since men can only acquire a sense of responsibility by exercising it, and experience has shown that a high proportion of prisoners can be trusted to exercise it in open conditions; fourth, that the services of the community outside the prison should be enlisted to help in the training at every practicable point, so as to break down the tradition that the prisoner is a person cut out of society; and fifth, that this continuing responsibility of society should be maintained after his discharge by effective aid towards social rehabilitation.

But today these principles are commonly accepted. What is of interest is to find out how close practice comes to principle and what are the means em-

⁹ *Prisons and Borstals*, 2d ed., London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1950.

ployed. The writer would certainly not claim that the English system is among those in which principle and practice have reached 100 per cent conformity, particularly in view of the considerable difficulties which have had to be overcome as an aftermath of the war. These may be summed up as too many prisoners and too few resources.

At the present time the over-all population of our penal establishments is running between 23,000 and 24,000, as compared with from 10,000 to 11,000 in the prewar years. We cannot claim that we have been unfairly hampered by government financial policy, but in the economic and financial circumstances of this country in the postwar years no one would expect penal establishments to have any high priority of claim on the painfully limited resources. Nevertheless, we have been enabled to open twenty-six additional establishments, of which seventeen are "open" in the fullest sense and two are of medium security. In spite of this expansion, there is overcrowding to the extent that at present some 4,500 prisoners are sleeping three to a single cell, and perhaps another thousand are sleeping (within prison walls) in huts and other places that could be more constructively used.

In addition to overcrowding, there has been difficulty in recruiting and training the necessary staff fast enough to keep pace with the situation. The lack might have been met by lowering standards, but this we have declined to do, though we shall be glad to increase the length and quality of both preliminary and in-service training as soon as resources permit.

It may be said that today these difficulties of overcrowding and understaffing are found only in the local prisons,¹⁰ and not in any prison where long

¹⁰ See below for a description of local prisons.

sentences are served or constructive training is carried out.

CLASSIFICATION

In America the term "classification" is generally used to describe the arrangements made to provide for each prisoner a program of treatment and training within the institution best suited to his individual needs. The English meaning is different. Here it means the division of all prisoners into classes or groups with two purposes: first, to prevent contamination; second, to facilitate the provision of suitable treatment and training. For the first purpose, the classes must be kept separate from each other, and that is fundamental.

The matter of interest here is the classification of convicted prisoners, but there is an initial separation into three primary categories—untried, civil, and convicted. And it has already been noted that the process of classification begins with the sentence of the court, since different forms of sentence will result in different forms of treatment in different types of institution.

For prisoners sentenced to imprisonment, the system is based on divisions by two vertical, or "type," lines and two horizontal, or "length of sentence," lines. The vertical divisions create three classes: the young prisoners class (all under twenty-one), the star class (first timers, more or less), and the ordinary class. These three classes are kept separate from each other, as far as possible in separate prisons. The horizontal divisions separate out first those with long sentences (over three years), and these go to central prisons; then those with sentences of twelve months or more, and these go to regional prisons—automatically if they are in the star class, by selection if they are in the ordinary class. On top of this crisscross there is subclassification

by type of custody—maximum, medium, or minimum.

It will be observed that this system calls for a full classification of prisons as well as of prisoners. In fact there are five different types of prison—local, regional, central, corrective training, and preventive detention—and any type except the last two may include open prisons. It follows that no English prison corresponds in any way with any American penitentiary, reformatory, prison, or jail, and American visitors who have not appreciated the whole setup may be liable to misunderstandings in any one institution.¹¹

The local prison, for example, is the nearest approach—at any rate in function—to the American county jail. It is where every offender in custody goes first, civil or criminal, on remand, committed for trial, or sentenced. Whether the convicted prisoner stays there, and for how long, depends on the operation of the classification system described above. Thus it tends to combine the jobs of a post office and a checkroom. The prisoners there are either waiting to go somewhere else or serving short sentences or left there because it is not worth while doing anything else with them. Star-class prisoners are not however left in this unpromising atmosphere; they are transferred at once (unless they have very short sentences) to separate local prisons for their class, as far as possible in open conditions. Young prisoners with sentences of three months or more are also got away to separate prisons for their class. There are twenty-five "all purpose" local prisons serving the whole country and eight more to which stars and civil prisoners are transferred. Five of the last type are open prisons.

¹¹ An up-to-date guide to English prisons and Borstals is included in the American Prison Association's annual directory of State and National Correctional Institutions.

Central prisons are those most suitable for prisoners serving long sentences, who in our view are happier if they are not mixed up with those who are regularly going in and out. For men, there are two for stars and one (Dartmoor) for ordinaries. All long-sentence stars go first to the closed central prison at Wakefield, whence after careful observation and selection they may pass to the open central prison at Leyhill; the latter holds about three hundred men serving any sentence up to life. For women there are also central prisons for stars and ordinaries, but star women suitable for open conditions go to an open regional prison.

Regional prisons carry out a full program of constructive training, on the lines laid down in Rule 154 quoted above, for prisoners with sentences of from one to three years. Not less than 60 per cent of their population is from the star class, with the balance composed of ordinaries or corrective-training prisoners selected as being likely to profit from and co-operate in this regime; those who do not are ruthlessly returned whence they came. For men there are two closed prisons, each of which has an open camp attached, two open prisons, and one of medium security. The selection is made by "review boards" at the local prisons. For women there are two small open prisons, taking up to sixty each.

For young male prisoners there are two regional prisons and one wing of a central prison.

In local prisons the separation of classes is carried out as strictly as may be inside one building not designed for the purpose. Members of the different classes do not meet at exercise or in any form of association, and they are located in different parts of the building.

Such in outline is this complicated system, designed to ensure that each

prisoner gets placed with a similar group in the type of prison most likely to provide the training he needs in the conditions of custody most suitable for him.

The arrangements for prisoners sentenced to corrective training or preventive detention are described in the later sections dealing with those sentences.

TREATMENT AND TRAINING

To deal fully with every topic arising under this heading for every type of prison would need a separate article. The situation can only be briefly surveyed under the headings of Rule 154, and one or two others.

Work

All prisoners in all prisons are actively and usefully employed on every weekday, unless for medical or other special reasons it is unwise for them to be so. Even untried prisoners work if they choose.

The working week is about forty workshop hours except in the local prisons,¹² where since the war, owing to staff shortages that are being gradually reduced, we rarely get more than about twenty-two hours a week in the workshops, though there is sometimes additional work in cells.

Except in some local prisons, all industrial work is of good quality, covering a wide range of skilled and semi-skilled trades, though it does not always reach the standards of some of the best American institutions. Almost all articles of furniture, equipment, and clothing used in the prisons are made in the prisons, and large orders are filled for other government departments. Building and engineering construction and maintenance are carried out by the prisons Works Department with prison

¹² And for the present at Dartmoor and Parkhurst, though they are scheduled to come onto the full working week very shortly.

labor, largely with material made in prison shops, and men in this department may have full vocational training courses in bricklaying or painting and decorating. There are many other vocational training courses covering such trades as engineering fitting, blacksmithing, molding, weaving, carpentry and wood machining, shoemaking and shoe repairing. The rest of the prisoners are employed on housekeeping work and about the farms and gardens.

In local prisons the problem of finding enough simple work for unskilled short-sentence prisoners is difficult, as it is in most prison systems. Except in the larger prisons, where there are usually fairly good industries, and in the open prisons, the majority of local men have to do work of little vocational value, such as making and repairing sacks and post office mailbags, simple tailoring, and mat making. But at least they work, and the incentive of cash earnings ensures that they work hard.

It may here be added that all prisoners are paid for their work,¹³ but the payments are not related to the conception of an economic wage. They are intended as an adequate stimulus to hard work and to enable prisoners to provide themselves with tobacco and other small amenities at the prison canteen.

Education

Education is a highly organized and important aspect of English prison life and takes many forms.

By arrangement with the Ministry of Education, whose inspectors encourage and inspect the work, an evening education institute is set up in each prison (including local prisons) by the local education authority for the county or city, staffed by its professional teachers. The emphasis is on mental stimulation

¹³ This does not apply in Northern Ireland.

rather than formal education, and a wide variety of classes is provided, with special interest in handicrafts and the arts. At the end of 1951, 781 classes for men and 196 for women were being held weekly. These included 52 art classes, 59 music classes, and 103 handicraft classes. There are special arrangements for illiterates on the one hand and for higher education on the other. By arrangement with the University of London, prisoners may read for the general certificate of education or for degrees.

At the end of 1951 over a thousand prisoners were also taking correspondence courses in a variety of subjects. These are provided at public cost for those for whom they may be of real value and who are educationally capable of profiting by them.

All this study is voluntary on the part of the prisoners and (except for the illiterates) done outside working hours. All are eligible to take part from the beginning of the sentence, provided it is long enough for a term to be completed.

The libraries too are usually furnished by the local public library as a branch library. No more restriction is placed on reading than is necessary for administrative convenience, and the men and women normally have open access to the library shelves. A selection of daily newspapers is provided in the rooms where prisoners eat together, and any prisoner may have weekly newspapers and periodicals sent in and keep them in his cell.

Somewhere on the border line between education and recreation lie the radio, which is provided in every prison, and the various concerts, lectures, and entertainments which good friends bring in every two or three weeks. More certainly educational, because something the prisoners do for themselves, are the bands, orchestras, choral societies, dra-

matic societies, and other such activities which the prisoners run in most central and regional prisons, and in some local prisons too.

Character training

Character training takes many forms and, at least in the training prisons, underlies every aspect of the work. Its essential basis is a small prison. Those now being designed are for three hundred men in four separate wings, for each of which an assistant governor will be responsible as a Borstal housemaster is responsible for his house. All training prisons are already run on these lines, with populations varying between about one hundred and fifty and four hundred, and assistant governors in charge of wings or groups.

This system relies not on elaboration of casework, but on personal knowledge and influence, used as occasion offers, each in his own way, by governor, assistant governor, chaplain, doctor, teacher, trade instructor, and every member of the staff. Co-ordination is achieved through the review boards of senior officials.

Self-responsibility

To teach self-responsibility in the artificially ordered and controlled life of a prison community is almost a contradiction in terms, but if training for freedom is to have any real meaning, there must be opportunities for choice and self-determination. The first step is to keep the prisoners out of their cells, which except in the local prisons and for the present at Dartmoor are used only for sleeping. The prisoners spend the day and most of the evening at work, at exercise, in the association rooms, and in the classrooms, and this free mixing gives them the chance to choose how they will act in a variety of circumstances. Then they can choose whether or not to join in educational

classes, clubs, bands, football teams, and so on; how to spend their money in the canteen; what books to read and what papers to have sent in. They manage their own sports and recreations. Those who show reliability and co-operation can become "leaders," which gives them a measure of responsibility though it does not give them any disciplinary powers. Leaders will look after the cleanliness and good order of messes and dormitories, assemble the education classes and see them back to their wings, and so on.

In the local prisons the star class are in association for meals and recreation after the first four weeks, the ordinaries after sixteen weeks. The hour's daily exercise for both classes also gives an opportunity for conversation.

So far as possible in the difficult conditions of local prisons, and certainly in all training prisons, every effort is made to encourage not only self-responsibility but self-respect. This appears in many small ways—by making men shave every morning and letting them keep (within reason) their normal hair styles; by letting women use cosmetics and encouraging them to do their hair nicely; by providing reasonable styles of clothing; by serving meals pleasantly on white plastic compartmented trays, and requiring clean and decent table appointments and good manners in dining rooms; and by encouraging constructive work in handicrafts and the arts.

OPEN INSTITUTIONS

Of all the methods by which a prison regime may hope to inculcate self-respect and self-responsibility and in other ways prepare the prisoners for a normal life in society, the open institution appears to be proving itself the most effective.

Before the war there were in England a few open Borstals, but only one open

prison in the strict sense, that is, one in which there are no security walls or fences, locks, bars, special guards, or other physical precautions against escape. At present out of twenty-one Borstals ten are open, and there are seven open prisons for men and two for women. In addition three closed prisons have "satellite" open camps, and there are two prisons which have open camp conditions inside a secure perimeter.

Although this rapid expansion of open institutions was forced on us by overcrowding, we quickly appreciated the intrinsic value of the system; we regard its development as perhaps the most permanently valuable contribution to enlightened penal treatment of our post-war experience. The next step in its extension will be the establishment of open "geriatric centers" for aged and infirm prisoners.¹⁴

PERSISTENT OFFENDERS

The arrangements described above for the treatment and training of persons sentenced to imprisonment import no new penological principle, but the provisions made under the Criminal Justice Act of 1948 for the treatment of persistent offenders may be said to do so. The persistent offender, or habitual criminal, forms the central problem of all penal systems. It is generally accepted that traditional punishments are not sufficient to fight against habitual criminality, and the idea has long been generally accepted that, for the protection of society, persistent offenders who have shown that they are neither reformed nor deterred by traditional punishments should be segregated for prolonged periods under a special regime which is rather preventive than punitive.

¹⁴ The open prison system has been more fully treated by the writer in the *International Review of Criminal Policy*, No. 2 (July 1957), pp. 1-11.

This regime had existed since 1908 in the English system under the name of preventive detention and is retained in the act of 1948, with the difference that the "cumulative" or "double-track" system has been abolished. The sentence of preventive detention is now passed direct and not on top of another, "punitive," sentence for the particular offense which has brought the offender before the court; he receives the sentence because he is found to be a persistent offender, not because he has committed a particular offense. The maximum sentence is fourteen years.

The new interest here lies mainly in the nature of the regime, which seeks to solve first the problem of providing, for a large number¹⁵ of the worst prisoners in the country, a regime which can be distinguished as preventive rather than punitive; and second the problem of treating prisoners who are *ex hypothesi* hopeless as if they were not hopeless and trying to fit them to lead honest lives after release. Space does not permit a full account of every feature of this regime, but it may be said that it is served in three radically different stages, of which special interest may perhaps be found in the third.

The third-stage procedure introduces an element of indeterminacy into the preventive detention sentence, in that a prisoner selected to enter it may secure release after serving two-thirds of his sentence, whereas those left in the second stage must serve five-sixths. Selection is made by an Advisory Board, presided over by a magistrate, on procedure analogous to American parole board procedures. Within the stage, the regime follows a normal "prerelease block" pattern, up to the point where a man may be allowed to leave the prison and live in a hostel in another town, under prison management, and go out to work in the town. Except for obey-

¹⁵ At present over a thousand.

ing the hostel rules, these men have full self-responsibility, draw their wages at the factory, and live as far as possible like free men. They pay their keep in the hostel, support their families, and are allowed a generous amount for expenses and recreation; the balance of their wages goes to compulsory saving.

All preventive detention prisoners are released on a conditional license, which places them under the supervision of the Central After-Care Association, a semi-official body charged with providing for the resettlement, aftercare, and supervision of all categories of offenders released on a conditional license, and of all released from central prisons.

These methods of dealing with the "incurable" persistent offender are interesting, but there is greater novelty in the approach made by the act to the persistent offender who seems to be not yet so old or so hardened in crime as to be beyond hope of reclamation.

One of the difficulties with this class was due to the courts' practice of passing sentences which required them to consider primarily the nature and gravity of the offense rather than the nature and needs of the offender. To enable the courts to get over this difficulty by giving them power to take the potential persistent offender in good time and give him a sentence of a length and nature to have some constructive effect, the Criminal Justice Act of 1948 provided a new form of sentence known as corrective training.

It was unfortunate that some new name had to be found for this form of sentence, since corrective training as a prison regime is not some novel invention, but simply the type of training which has been given in training prisons for many years. In practice it works as follows. When a prisoner is sentenced to corrective training he is sent as soon as possible to an allocation

center for prisoners sentenced to corrective training. There he is observed by an expert staff, who try to find out why he has become a habitual offender and what kind of training will be most suitable for him. He may then go to either (1) an open regional training prison; (2) a closed regional training prison; or (3) an ordinary corrective training prison.

Which type of prison a trainee goes to depends on the view formed at the allocation center of his character and potentialities. The most promising go to (1), the less promising to (2), and the worst to (3).

A prisoner who is sent to a regional training prison to undergo his sentence is not marked out in any way from other prisoners. In separate corrective training prisons we follow—as far as is compatible with complete safe custody and the closer control that is necessary for the type of prisoner sent there—precisely the same methods as those in a regional training prison. The men in these corrective training prisons are given useful work in a suitable type of industry during the daytime, with vocational training for selected prisoners, and a lively educational program in the evenings. Special attention is paid to personal influences, and the prisoners are grouped under assistant governors.

The maximum sentence for corrective training is four years, but the normal sentence is three years. One-third remission may be earned, and the prisoner is then released on a conditional license to the care of the Central After-Care Association.

AFTERCARE

No prison system is complete which does not provide adequately for what is generally called aftercare, though this is in some ways a misnomer. In the first place, if aftercare is done properly

the process starts from the beginning of a man's sentence. Furthermore, it also includes the immediate help necessary to re-establish the offender in society, even though he receive no further attention. This distinction is seen in the names of the two forms of society through which aftercare is administered in England.

At all the local prisons there are Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies, which in general concern themselves with what their title implies, the immediate aid a prisoner needs on discharge—to get home decently clothed, with enough money in his pocket to see him to the office of the National Assistance Board, and to get into a job as soon as possible. These societies must be officially approved and have a certificate of efficiency. They are all affiliated with the National Association of Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies, which they manage themselves through elected committees, though the office and staff expenses are paid from public funds. This association co-ordinates the whole of the local work and also takes direct responsibility, as agent for the local societies, for the aftercare of prisoners discharged from regional prisons, where it employs full-time resident welfare officers.

But there are certain categories of prisoners whose obligations are not terminated on release, as are those of men sentenced to imprisonment. These come under the supervision of the Central After-Care Association. Mention has already been made of the functions of the association in regard to prisoners discharged from corrective training and preventive detention, and it also covers prisoners discharged from central prisons, since these cannot be looked after by the local societies. A separate division of the association looks after boys discharged from Borstal and also boys discharged from a sentence of imprison-

ment. These boys form an exception to the rule that a release from imprisonment is absolute; they are released on a conditional license, an exception made because of the importance of ensuring that young offenders who have served a term of imprisonment have the positive supervision of aftercare, whether they like it or not. For adults released from imprisonment, it is there if they want it, but they cannot be required to accept it.

The Central After-Care Association provides aftercare in the widest sense, not only by re-establishing the offender

but by advising and befriending him, and if need be disciplining him, till the expiration of his sentence. To carry out this work it is necessary to have a network of trained social workers all over the country, and for this we use the Probation Service, whose duties include the supervision of such categories of persons discharged from custody as the Home Secretary may prescribe. We also have the co-operation of the Ministry of Labour in finding work, and their officers come into every prison and see every prisoner who wishes to see them some time before discharge.

*Sir Lionel W. Fox, London, has been chairman of the Prison Commission for England and Wales since 1942. From 1946 he was a vice-president of the former International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, and later became president of the United Nations European Consultative Group in this field. He is the author of *The English Prison and Borstal Systems* (1952) and other works.*

Prison Reform in Belgium Since the War

By PAUL CORNIL

IF one is to understand the reforms of Belgian prisons since 1945, it is necessary to cast a quick glance at the past to learn the background of this new developmental stage. It is a striking fact, for that matter, that each essential stage in the history of our prison reform has arisen out of social problems or political conflicts in which Belgium has been involved. The reforms begun in 1945 confirm that rule.

In Belgium the first penitentiary institution worthy of that name was the house of correction at Ghent, begun in 1772 on the plans of Councilor Vilain XIIII.¹ A decree dated November 12, 1770, and signed by Charles of Lorraine invited the Council of his States of Flanders to search for effective means to combat begging.² It was in response to this wish that Vilain XIIII prepared his project. The institution which he created received, in separate sections, criminals, petty offenders, women, and juveniles. But it was designed especially for the confinement of the vagrants and beggars who were ruining Flanders and with whom fines and corporal punishments had proved ineffective. Vilain XIIII estimated at forty to fifty thousand the number of vagrants "confirmed in idleness and reduced to the necessity of living at the expense of good citizens." It was for the dual purpose of preventing these vagrants

from committing outrages and of making them productive at useful tasks that he put them to work in his house of correction. "Why not make them laborers, useful to the community," he wrote, "before they become criminals?"

The inmates worked in knitting and weaving shops organized by private contractors. John Howard, who visited this prison four times, found it at first well organized. In 1783, however, he noted a great change. The shops had been closed because of protests from manufacturers who had complained of the competition they suffered.³ Thus the first Belgian effort at re-education by labor ended in defeat.

A second important stage in the history of Belgian prisons began in 1831, immediately after the revolution which separated Belgium from the Netherlands. A young lawyer, Édouard Ducpétiaux, had been sentenced to a year in prison in 1828 for having criticized in a newspaper article the expulsion of two French journalists. Confined for fifteen months in the Petits-Carmes prison, Ducpétiaux had become acquainted with the promiscuity of congregate imprisonment.⁴ As a result, when he was appointed general inspector of Belgian prisons in November 1830 he undertook the construction of cellular prisons in order to ensure the separation of inmates from one another. Under this impetus a number of cellular prisons were erected throughout the

country, the last one not being finished until 1919, half a century after his death.

The regime he put in force completely isolated the prisoners from each other. They worked in their cells. Physical exercise, schooling, religious services, took place in quarters so constructed as to eliminate all communication between inmates. Only certain classes of offenders—juveniles, the sick, and the feeble-minded—escaped this isolating regime.

WORLD WAR I

World War I struck a death blow at this system, which had been conceived by a theorist who had not perceived the serious practical inconveniences of this artificial cellular life. During the German occupation, 1914–18, a rather large number of Belgian citizens were arrested by the enemy and sent to prison. Like Ducpétiaux, therefore, they experienced imprisonment, but this time under the system of cellular isolation. The inconveniences and defects of this system seemed evident to them. After the war, the Minister of Justice, Émile Vandervelde, a disciple of Professor Adolphe Prins, undertook to reform the prisons. Aided by Dr. Louis Vervaeck, he created in 1920 an anthropological penitentiary service for the examination of prisoners and their allocation to appropriate institutions. Since then, every prisoner has been subjected to a medical and anthropometric examination, and since 1930 a social investigation has been made of the prisoner's family if the physician thinks it advisable. The resulting case history should serve to orient institutional treatment. In reality it serves chiefly to spot mental and physical abnormalities.

Since 1924, the anthropological service has been supplemented by the creation of psychiatric annexes, where inmates suspected of mental diseases

are submitted to constant observation. Since 1931, prisoners with serious mental disorders have been interned in a social defense institution after a period of observation in a psychiatric annex.

Special prisons were set up in succession: a school-prison for youthful offenders (1921), the regime of which was inspired by that of American reformatories and British Borstal institutions; prison sanatoria for tubercular inmates (1924); social defense institutions for abnormal and habitual offenders (subsequent to the act of April 9, 1930); prisons for first offenders and recidivists (1935–37). In 1938, a medical and surgical center was organized at Forest, in order to permit diagnosis and, eventually, medical or surgical treatment of diseases requiring the aid of specialists.⁵

Parallel with the organization of specialized institutions, the rigorous regime in the cellular prisons was relaxed: exercise, instruction, and religious services were more and more performed in common. A prison labor division was instituted which opened shops for apprenticeship training and production. Preoccupation with the need of assuring the social rehabilitation of discharged prisoners led to the creation of bureaus of social readaptation (Brussels, 1922) and later of a prison social service organization (1930).⁶ These important reforms nevertheless left untouched certain regulations of the Ducpétiaux regime, especially those made necessary by the continued use of solidly con-

¹ For a description of the prison system in 1925 see Thorsten Sellin, "Prison Reform in Belgium," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 17 (August 1926), pp. 264–77. A later description is found in A. Delierneux, Jr., "Evolution of the Prison System in Belgium," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 157 (September 1931), pp. 180–196.

⁶ M. Poll and P. Cornil, "Prisons et établissements pénitentiaires," in *Répertoire pratique du droit belge*, Brussels, 1939.

¹ Vilain XIIII, *Mémoire sur les moyens de corriger les malfaiteurs et les fainéants à leur propre avantage et de les rendre utiles à l'État . . . présentés aux États de Flandres en 1771 et en 1775*. iii, 390 pp. New ed.; Brussels, 1841.

² P. Bonenfant, *Le problème du paupérisme en Belgique à la fin de l'Ancien Régime* (Brussels: Hayez, 1932), p. 251.

³ John Howard, *État des prisons, des hôpitaux et des maisons de force* (2 vols., Paris, 1788), pp. 339 ff.

⁴ E. Rubbens, *Édouard Ducpétiaux*. 2 vols. Brussels, 1922, 1934; cf. Vol. I, especially pp. 123 and 177.

structed cellular buildings, the massive design of which was a barrier to the development of a new order.

WORLD WAR II

The tidal wave of World War II brought reform in its wake. As in 1914, the incarceration of numerous political offenders by the occupation authorities revived an interest in prison problems. Furthermore, the Prison Administration, for lack of finances, had been compelled during the war to make experiments which had unforeseen effects.

The winter of 1940-41 was terrible. Public food rations were inadequate and, in order to live, it was necessary to secure additional food on the black market. In the prisons the inmates could not avail themselves of this expedient. Even the Administration could hardly do so, for it had no money. Long-term prisoners literally died of hunger. At the Louvain Central Prison there were several deaths and many cases of edema from starvation. In order to remedy to some degree this tragic condition, it was decided to expand horticulture in the institutions and, in particular, to exploit the lands of Marneffe, which had been occupied by Jewish refugees and had been abandoned since their exodus to France in May 1940. A group of about fifty prisoners, chosen solely for their physical aptitude for such work, was sent to the château of Marneffe, situated in a park surrounded by an ordinary hedge. It was expected that escapes would be numerous, but this radical experiment with an open regime demonstrated instead the possibility of keeping in custody, without the aid of bars or iron gates, a group of offenders in whom a group spirit, interest in the kind of work undertaken, and also the fear of being returned to a cellular prison took the place of physical restraints.

After the liberation of the country, the prison unit of Marneffe was retained and became a school-prison for youthful offenders and an institution for adult first offenders. Among the latter, we now find criminals serving, almost in freedom, sentences of ten or twenty years. The methods of scouting, which had been timidly tried at the school-prison at Hoogstraten as early as 1930, are much in use at Marneffe. They seem to give good results. This educational system designed for children had to be adapted, however, to the mentality of the adolescents and adults who make up the population of Marneffe.

In 1946 a fire broke out at night in one of the buildings. To fight the flames the inmates formed a chain down to a nearby swamp. In the morning all the prisoners were present. Some months later, when torrential rains caused a nearby village to be flooded, a group of the prisoners went to the assistance of the villagers and earned their gratitude by rendering valuable aid.

Today the open regime is used in four institutions, containing about 5 per cent of the prison population, and it is expected that this system will be considerably expanded.

COLLABORATORS

The occupation period was a difficult one for the Prison Administration, but the postwar period was to subject it to an even more severe test. Owing to the physical hardships of life and aided by the insidious effect of propaganda, the enemy occupation had succeeded in gaining the political, economic, or military collaboration of a certain number of Belgians. Even during the occupation, the actions of resistance groups had resulted in the disappearance of some of these collaborators, who were killed in the street or in their homes.

As soon as the country was liberated, a wave of popular indignation caused the arrest of thousands of collaborators and even of persons merely suspected, who were soon released. In a few weeks, 170 internment centers had to be improvised in order to supplement the inadequate prisons. The number of prisoners rose from 5,000 to 50,000 and then to 70,000. At the end of 1946, 26,000 collaborators were still being held; by the beginning of 1954, their number had dropped to about 600.

The repression was severe, motivated in some cases by odious crimes. Death sentences were imposed on several thousand, and 237 men and 4 women were actually executed.⁷ A considerable number of collaborators were sentenced to long terms in prison.

These prisoners could not be abandoned to their fate behind the walls or fences of their internment centers. As soon as the housing problem was settled and the first hundreds of defendants had been convicted, it was necessary to try to set up a more positive regime for them. The problem was a delicate one, for the majority of these prisoners differed considerably from the ordinary inmates of penal institutions. In particular, the proportion of intellectuals and skilled workers was much higher. Besides, a large number of very young people, without a trade or vocational training, were under sentence for military collaboration.

Classification

With a view to organizing this mass of people somewhat, a preliminary classification was made on the basis of the crime committed: military, political,

⁷ J. Gilissen, "Étude statistique de la répression de l'incivisme," *Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie*, Vol. 31 (February 1951), p. 620.

economic collaborators; informers. This was only a first step—inadequate, even contradictory to the principles of individualized treatment. It was justified by the necessity for clearing the ground and using summary methods. The available means were few. The temporary personnel, recruited in a hurry, was initiated as well as might be by the nucleus of experienced officers of the Prison Administration.

Work programs

The second step was to put these prisoners to work. This had to be done for two major reasons: to avoid their demoralization by idleness and to help to combat the lack of manpower suffered by a country in process of reconstruction. A vast program was initiated, described on the radio on September 16, 1946, by the Minister of Justice, Mr. Albert J. Lilar.⁸ It was a question of launching the task of re-education and reconciliation of these thousands of prisoners, and it was especially necessary to give them an opportunity to atone, by their labor, for the wrong they had done to the national community. Work gangs left the prisons to repair airfields, clear away the rubble of ruins, repair drainage systems, and dig ditches. To begin with, popular reaction was acute at the sight of these prisoners who had been baptized with the name of "incivics" (*inciviques*), but little by little people became used to them.

The "Battle of Coal"

The country lacked fuel. The Prime Minister, Mr. Achille Van Acker, had launched the "battle of coal." It was decided to have the collaborators participate. Those among them who were

⁸ Cf. *Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie*, 1947-48, pp. 165 ff.

under thirty-five years of age and capable of heavy work were invited to volunteer as miners, a dangerous and hard occupation, especially for those men who had never done manual labor.

Many were hired. The first camp of prisoner-miners was installed next to a coal pit; it was opened on January 17, 1946, and by the end of the year over 600,000 tons of coal had been extracted by this labor force,⁹ which consisted of as many as 3,500 men. The work was hard and dangerous, but the compensations were not negligible. The prisoner received the normal wage of a miner, from which only about 50 francs a day were withheld to pay his cost of maintenance. He could therefore send fairly large amounts to his family, averaging 2,000 francs (\$40.00) monthly, but sometimes reaching twice that sum. In addition, he received the benefit of social welfare laws like a free worker, which guaranteed him compensation for an accident or an occupational disease, family allowances for his children, and even paid vacations. It was thought at first that these vacations would remain hypothetical, but a year's work at the bottom of a mine showed that to preserve the health of these workers they must have a week's rest in camp with special nourishment. It was possible to pay them their wages during this leave. And finally, as a last and appreciable advantage, every work day in the mine extracting coal was counted as equal to two days of the sentence.

This experiment was completely successful and lent considerable support to the "battle of coal." But the force of inmate miners declined, owing to the release of young offenders. Furthermore, the lack of regular miners lessened. The last mining camp for prisoners was closed on December 31, 1950.

⁹ A. Luyckx, "Les centres pénitentiaires miniers," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 1 (1947), pp. 29-46.

Re-educational programs

Important as labor was as an element in rehabilitation, it was not enough to guarantee the re-education of those sentenced for enemy collaboration. A special agency directed by a justice of the Court of Appeals was set up to organize the regime of these offenders and supervise their social readaptation. All these prisoners had committed serious breaches of civic duty, but the idea was discarded of trying to reform them by theoretical instruction in the principles of civic responsibility. The problem was attacked by indirect means. First, an effort was made to create a favorable climate in the internment centers. Various services were organized there, through an appeal for the voluntary co-operation of the inmates, who were allowed to take the initiative, based particularly on a spirit of mutual aid and solidarity. A welfare service grew up in this way, based on money withheld from the wages of the inmates. For several years, for instance, the inmate miners alone set aside annually over 15,000 dollars for the "welfare." Another source of revenue was the sale to relatives or other visitors of objects made by the prisoners. With these funds a social service was set up to aid needy families. Libraries and collections of phonograph records and photographs were purchased, boxed, and circulated among the institutions. Periodic bulletins, edited by the inmates, were published in Flemish and French. Athletic contests, dramatic productions, and concerts were organized.¹⁰

Hundreds of those imprisoned for military collaboration had fought on the Eastern front and had lost a limb or been crippled. Thanks to the spontaneous help of a medical specialist, the

¹⁰ W. Hanssens, "Autres considérations sur la rééducation des inciviques," *Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie*, 1948-49, pp. 356-89.

rehabilitation of these persons and the manufacture of orthopedic appliances were begun.¹¹

The vocational training of the youthful offenders who had no trade or who had had to give up their previous trade was done in the classroom, in lectures, or on the job in the vocational training shops. The presence of experienced, well-educated people and skilled craftsmen among the older prisoners made available a teaching force that was sympathetic and often very capable. In addition to the trades ordinarily taught in prisons—carpentry, shoemaking, tailoring, blacksmithing—it was possible to set up shops for watchmaking and radio repairs, to organize courses in commercial advertising, and so forth. The results were remarkable and were later validated by the social readjustment of the young offenders.

It would take too long to describe in detail the many efforts made in this area. Briefly, it was necessary not only to conquer the lack of material means but also to surmount the lack of understanding of that part of the public which protested vehemently because they thought that these enemy collaborators were being treated too well.¹² By and by, however, public opinion calmed down, and, furthermore, the number in this class of prisoners decreased rapidly due to commutations of sentences and conditional releases. The last internment center, at Sainte Croix-lez-Bruges, was closed on March 31, 1951. At the end of 1953 there were still about six hundred of these "incivics," confined in a few prisons and under sentence for very serious crimes—murder, betrayals, and so forth. The re-education services

¹¹ M. Van Helmont, "Le problème des amputés," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 1 (1947), pp. 65-66.

¹² P. Cornil, "Considérations générales sur le régime des condamnés pour incivisme," *Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie*, 1946-47, pp. 924-33.

have practically finished their work, for most of the younger people have been freed and those who have spent eight or nine years in prison are hardly likely to be capable of making an effort at vocational training or of moral re-education.

PRESENT TRENDS

This special experience with the improvised training of thousands of offenders has left profound traces in the management of the prisons. Of course, it affected a special category of prisoners and therefore one which differed greatly from the average in age, social status, and level of general or vocational education. One could not repeat without modification, for common criminals, the experiments made with the above group. Nevertheless, reforms undertaken since then by the Prison Administration have frequently been inspired by lessons drawn from this sad episode in our national life.¹³

Generally speaking, the trend is toward a less rigid regime than that conceived by Ducpétiaux. The cell will be used only as lodging except for those held for trial, who must be isolated, and dangerous criminals unfit for communal living.¹⁴

The specialization of institutions is being pushed along. It has already led to open and half-open institutions. Recidivists are being separated into the "antisocial," who are regarded as dangerous, and the "asocial," among whom we find feeble and weak-willed individuals incapable of avoiding recidivism.¹⁵

¹³ J. Dupréel, "Leçons à tirer du traitement pénitentiaire appliqué aux détenus pour infractions contre la sûreté extérieure de l'État," *Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie*, 1948-49, pp. 348-55.

¹⁴ J. Dupréel, *Aspects de l'action pénitentiaire en Belgique* (Nivelles, 1952), p. 103.

¹⁵ P. Genonceaux, "Le traitement des condamnés récidivistes," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 5 (1951), pp. 319-22.

Disciplinary regulations for all prisoners are being progressively modified. The rule of silence, for instance, till recently practiced in most unspecialized institutions, has disappeared.¹⁶ The general tendency is to abolish all prohibitions which made the life of a prisoner artificial and painful without serving any really useful purpose.

A modified regime

Here, for instance, are a few of the measures taken, not all, of course, of equal importance.

The uniform of the prisoners has been changed to resemble the fatigue dress of the army, and has therefore lost that degrading character deliberately aimed at humiliating the prisoner.

Prisoners are permitted to subscribe to a daily newspaper and to certain technical, literary, or illustrated magazines.¹⁷ The introduction of the periodical press into the prisons had evoked some apprehension because of the pointed political character of most Belgian daily papers. The experiment has, however, produced good results and does not seem to have aroused the political strife which had been feared.

In some institutions the use of the radio by prisoners antedated the war. Today it has been extended to most institutions. In the large prisons, a central radio is used and selected programs are broadcast to the cells and certain other areas. The prisoner can shut off the loudspeaker in his cell.¹⁸

All letters written by prisoners and those addressed to them from the outside used to be censored by a staff member. This device was very useful for

¹⁶ "Circulaire du 10 novembre 1949," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 3 (1949), p. 291.

¹⁷ "Circulaire du 1er octobre 1948," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 2 (1948), p. 322.

¹⁸ "La radio en prison," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, January 1949.

learning to know the prisoner and appraise his relations with his family. It required, however, considerable work, often superfluous, and from the point of view of the security of the institution or the discipline it had little practical value. Today prison directors are satisfied to control correspondence by a sampling method. They exercise no constant surveillance except over the correspondence of certain prisoners.¹⁹

Visits by the families of the prisoners no longer occur in partitioned visiting quarters. Visitors and the prisoner sit around a little table. Only those held for trial and those who are refractory or dangerous continue to receive their visiting relatives in a cellular room where they are separated from the visitor by a glass window and a grilled partition.²⁰

Prisoners now exercise in common and not in individual little yards. Similarly, the partitions which separated prisoners from each other in the school or the chapel have now been demolished. Football fields and basketball and volleyball courts have been constructed and are being increasingly used.

The design of the cell as envisaged by Ducpétiaux no longer meets present needs. The small, elevated windows were originally meant to keep the prisoner from seeing his fellow inmates. More modern and better equipped cell rooms are being built to the extent permitted by the budget.²¹

In the wings of the cellular prisons sanitary installations are being made, in-

¹⁹ "Circulaire du 21 avril 1950," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 4 (1950), p. 236.

²⁰ M. Van Helmont, "Les visites aux détenus," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 1 (1947), pp. 111-13; *Circulaire* du 17 avril 1948, unpublished.

²¹ J. Dupréel and P. Genonceaux, "Le nouveau modèle de cellule," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, January 1953.

cluding washrooms, showers, and toilets, so that prisoners can keep themselves clean by better means and avoid the use of the toilet bucket in the cell.²²

Small dining rooms are being provided by removing walls between two or three cells, permitting prisoners, in small groups of ten to twenty, to take their meals together.

PRISON LABOR CONDITIONS

The Administration is trying to accomplish a rather fundamental transformation of prison labor conditions. Actually, according to the theory hitherto accepted, the working prisoner has no contractual relationship with the state, and the work he does is regarded as part of the punishment he is undergoing. One notable effect of this is that if he suffers an accident at work the law which regulates the payment of indemnities for such accidents does not apply to him. Instead he receives as gratuity an indemnity smaller than the payment he would have received under the law governing accidents during employment.

Nor is this all. Other social welfare laws—unemployment and disability insurance, family allowances, etc.—do not apply to prisoners either, for the reasons just mentioned. The result, for instance, is that the family cannot receive any family allowance and that when the prisoner leaves the institution he does not meet the specifications which would entitle him to unemployment benefits, if he does not find a job. Even before the war, this situation seemed abnormal. The experience already described, involving the collaborators working for private contractors or in the coal mines, led to an initial modification. Today, social welfare laws cover pris-

oners working outside the institutions for public authorities,²³ and ways are now being sought to extend the benefits of this legislation to other categories of prisoners.

EDUCATION

In the field of education, the Administration in 1950 set up a "documentation center" at the Nivelles prison. This interesting innovation was stimulated in particular by an analogous attempt begun in 1946 by collaborators imprisoned at the internment center of Petit-Château. The documentation center of Nivelles is operated entirely by prisoners assigned to it. It is their job to gather and put at the disposition of inmates of all prisons instructional material referring to the various fields of knowledge or technology. When a prisoner wants to inform himself about some specific field, he fills out a special form indicating especially his occupation and the schooling he has had. His request is forwarded to the Nivelles prison, where the personnel of the documentation center assemble the books, pamphlets, and periodicals which contain the information needed by the prisoner. This material is sent to him and is returned to the center when he has finished with it. In 1952, 7,100 requests were met by the center, which has some 5,000 books, 2,500 pamphlets, and 22,000 issues of periodicals.²⁴

This innovation undoubtedly marks a forward step. It permits prisoners who can study by themselves to receive material specifically bearing on the matter they wish to learn about and appropriate to their level of education.

²³ "Circulaire du 6 février 1950," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 4 (1950), p. 100.

²⁴ "Rapport annuel du Centre de Documentation, 1952," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 7 (February 1953), pp. 371-84; *Bulletin . . .*, Vol. 7 (March 1953), p. 401.

²² M. Van Helmont, "Activité de l'Administration des Prisons en 1950," *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 5 (1951), p. 172.

In April 1951, the Administration also set up, at Nivelles, a permanent penitentiary exhibit, where staff members and students can see models and plans of penal institutions and other documents of interest to specialists in such matters.²⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The reform movement, some aspects of which I have tried to describe, is still in progress. There is nothing spectacular about it; rather it is a series of minor changes inspired by a general trend. Since 1919 the Prison Administration has stopped regarding itself as a static service satisfied to apply current regulations. It is constantly trying to improve its methods. If we continue to believe in the relative and hence transient value of any type of prison regime, the reform of prisons will never be finished.

Recent developments undoubtedly tend to render prison regimes more humane and give them a more educational character. Does this attitude

²⁵ *Bulletin de l'Administration des Prisons*, Vol. 5 (1951), p. 308.

Paul Cornil, *Docteur en philosophie et lettres, Docteur en droit*, is secretary-general of the Ministry of Justice, Brussels, and professor of criminal law, the Free University, Brussels. He has been inspector and head of the Belgian prison system and member of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission and is now president of the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation and the International Association of Penal Law and member of the scientific committee, International Society of Criminology. In 1951 he directed the United Nations Seminar in Brussels on the medico-psychological and social examination of offenders. He is the author of many articles on penal problems published in various scientific journals.

show better results than did the old system based essentially on repression and intimidation? This is difficult to prove. The number of recidivists remains high. New institutions, like Marneffe, can already show very favorable statistics of social rehabilitation. However, one must note that the process of selection which operates at the time of admission to these institutions permits only the best prisoners to enter, a fact which explains, in part at least, the favorable outcome.

Furthermore, we must recognize that the relative ineffectiveness of penal treatment derives at least in part from factors extraneous to the prison system. The prison is only a link in the penal system. It cannot be an all-purpose institution and still give favorable results. Too often, courts send offenders to prison who do not belong there. Still more often the duration and the forms of punishment do not meet the needs of individual treatment. Before passing any judgment on the effectiveness of prison treatment it would be necessary to improve the methods by which the courts select and measure out the penalties they impose.

Postwar Prison Reform in France

By CHARLES GERMAIN

PRISON reform is a continuous and uninterrupted task. The history of penal institutions is but the recital of a constant evolution of ideas concerning the basis and the means of administering different punishments, especially that of imprisonment, which has remained the characteristic punishment of modern times. This evolution is nowhere ended. Nowhere have penologists declared themselves satisfied. On the contrary, everywhere a constant search goes on for new means more suitable to the struggle against criminality and to the treatment of offenders. In general this work progresses imperceptibly under the influence of ideas that advance slowly and end by prevailing. But it may happen that after some special crisis this or that country will decide to hasten matters and solemnly proclaim a set of principles on which it plans thenceforth to base its penal policy.¹

In France, it was the conditions pro-

¹ In that connection one might mention for the United States the Prison Congress of Cincinnati in 1870, which adopted the famous Declaration of Principles that served as a starting point for the entire modern reform movement; see H. E. Barnes and N. K. Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology* (2d ed.; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), pp. 523 ff.

This congress was no less important from an international point of view. In fact it was Cincinnati that gave birth to the idea of the international congress held in London in 1872, where it was decided to create a permanent international commission which was given final form at the Stockholm congress of 1878 (see Thorsten Sellin, preface to the *Proceedings of the Twelfth International Penal and Penitentiary Congress*, The Hague, August 14-19, 1950, Vol. II, pp. xi ff., and preface to the *Index analytique et des noms* [of the proceedings of the twelve international prison congresses], xii, 323 pp. Bern: Stämpfli & Cie,

duced by World War II that occasioned a vast reform movement. Events had brought about a considerable increase in the prison population,² touching social strata which until then had had no experience with prisons. The result was an acute awareness of a problem which for some years had been pressing because of the elimination of the transportation of convicts to French Guiana and which had become still

1952). There is hardly any need to stress the influence which the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission has exercised on penal administration in the various countries up to the moment it was absorbed by the United Nations in 1951. It may be of interest to American readers to note the fact that the first and the last presidents of the commission were American citizens (Enoch Cobb Wines from 1872 to 1878 and Sanford Bates from 1946 to 1951) and that its last secretary-general was Professor Thorsten Sellin. The writer also wishes to draw their attention to an excellent source of reference, the compilation of the *Deliberations of the International Penal and Penitentiary Congresses* by Negley K. Teeters (198 pp. Philadelphia: Temple University Book Store, 1949). Finally, it is a pleasure for the writer to say that the old IPPC gave him an opportunity to enter into professional and friendly relations that are very precious to him with several Americans, who no doubt will recognize references to themselves in this article.

² The prison population, which fell below 20,000 before the war, reached its peak of 67,000 in 1946. Since then it has been decreasing constantly to 23,000 on January 1, 1954. Postwar statistics include three categories of prisoners unknown before the war: enemy collaborators (29,000 in 1946; 900 on January 1, 1954); hard-labor convicts formerly transported beyond the ocean (on January 1, 1954, our prisons contained 3,200 sentenced to hard labor for crimes against the general criminal law); habitual offenders sentenced to preventive detention, who also used to be transported before the war (1,600 detainees on January 1, 1954).

more distressing because by 1945 the conditions of both prisons and prisoners were disastrous, due to the destruction or deterioration of numerous institutions, the complete lack of physical equipment, difficulties in food supply, and so forth. It was precisely because of these troubles that the time seemed appropriate for drafting a plan for reforms, the urgent necessity of which no one contested any longer and which were based on "the concept that prisons are correctional institutions and that the rebuilding of lives and the ultimate social rehabilitation of their inmates is their primary objective."³

BASIC PRINCIPLES—1945

In 1945, a Commission convened at the Ministry of Justice⁴ formulated the following fourteen points to be regarded as the basic principles of the reforms anticipated.

1. The deprivation of freedom as punishment has as its eventual aim the reformation and social rehabilitation of the convicted offender.

2. In France or in Algeria provisions for its execution apply to all persons sentenced for violations of the common criminal law by the courts of continental France, Corsica, or Algeria.

3. Free from corrupting promiscuity, the treatment of the prisoner should be hu-

³ Richard A. McGee, *Prisons at the Crossroads*. An address delivered at the Annual Congress of Correction, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, October 12, 1953. 13 pp. Privately printed.

⁴ The administration of prisons was attached to the Ministry of Justice by statute as early as 1911 but not in fact until 1937. Its organization is one of highly centralized services. The authority of the central administration, the head of which is a general director, who is a career member of the judiciary, extends over continental France, Algeria, and the departments of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, and Guiana. It covers only adult offenders; juvenile delinquents fall under another division of the Ministry of Justice, that of "supervised education."

mane and devoid of vexations and should aim principally at his general and vocational training, and his improvement.

4. Every convicted offender against the common criminal law must work; he shall enjoy legal protection in case of injuries sustained while at work. No one shall be compelled to remain idle.

5. Detention before trial shall be in isolation by day and night.

6. The same applies in principle to penal imprisonment up to one year.

7. The allocation to penal institutions of persons sentenced to terms longer than a year shall take account of the offender's sex, personality, and degree of depravity.

8. A progressive system shall be used in each of the institutions in order to adapt the treatment of the prisoner to his attitude and his degree of reformation. The regime shall range from confinement in isolation to semifreedom.

9. In every penal institution where prison sentences of more than a year are served for violations of the common criminal law, a judge charged exclusively with the execution of punishment shall alone have authority to transfer the prisoner to an institution of a different type, to order promotions through the successive stages of the progressive regime, and to transmit petitions for conditional release to the Board created by the departmental order of February 16, 1888.

10. A social and medico-psychological service shall function in each institution.

11. The benefit of a conditional release shall be extended to cover all time sentences.

12. Assistance designed to facilitate their social rehabilitation shall be given to prisoners during and after their imprisonment.

13. Every member of the prison personnel should complete courses given in a special training school.

14. Instead of transportation, preventive detention in a penal settlement may be substituted. In principle, such detention would be for life. However, the detainee might be given the benefit of a conditional release.

These principles, of course, are not marked by any great originality; they

are hardly up-to-date.⁵ But they have the merit of having infused into our very old penal system a new spirit which has enabled us to move toward more satisfactory solutions of the problems that criminality raises for every prison administration.⁶

The limited space allotted permits me to give only a very brief sketch of the efforts of the French Prison Administration in some fields which seem particularly worthy of mention. They are: (1) the specialization of institutions for long termers; (2) the problem of short terms; (3) the scientific examination of offenders; (4) the role of the judge in the execution of the sentence; (5) the punishment's function of social rehabilitation; (6) the beginning of probation in France.

I. THE SPECIALIZATION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR LONG TERMERS

In a resolution adopted in July 1951, apropos of the problem of the unification of punishments by imprisonment,⁷

⁵ In a recent article, "La réforme des institutions pénitentiaires en France" (*Revue pénale suisse*, 1953, pp. 277-320), I have noted in detail the extent to which we have succeeded, with reference to each of the fourteen points, in getting close to the recommendations of the congresses organized by the old IPPC and of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted in Geneva, December 1952, by the organization which, under the sponsorship of the United Nations, has replaced the old IPPC in the European area. See *Conference of the European Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 8-16 December, 1952* (Melun [France]: Prison Printing Shops, 1953), pp. 11-22, 49-66.

⁶ For details regarding the progressive realization of the reform program, see the annual reports of the Prison Administration published in the *Revue pénitentiaire et de droit pénal*, 1947, pp. 3-136, 163-245; 1948, pp. 141-69; 1949, 115-37; 1950, 257-318; 1951, 277-458; 1952, 145-350; 1953, 165-216.

⁷ On this question, cf. Commission Internationale Pénale et Pénitentiaire, *Rapport de Charles Germain, président de la sous-com-*

the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission expressed the wish "that differences based only on the nature and seriousness of the offense be removed and replaced by a new differentiation meeting the needs for individualizing punishment."⁸ The unification of these punishments has not been realized in France at the legislative and judicial levels. Depending on the gravity and the legal definition of the offense, courts impose either imprisonment at hard labor (*travaux forcés*), strict imprisonment (*réclusion*), or simple imprisonment (*emprisonnement correctionnel*). In reality, however, there are no longer any substantial differences in the manner in which these different punishments are inflicted. Under such circumstances, it has been possible to abandon this tripartite division in institutional practice. Today the Prison Administration recognizes no other criteria than those based on the personality of the offender and on the treatment he needs. Since it is inconceivable to give each offender a completely individualized treatment, it has been necessary to separate the prisoners into distinct classes⁹ and, consequently, to organize institutions or sections of institutions characterized by more and more diversified regimes.

The selection made necessary by the physical health of the sentenced prisoners is done in a manner that can be considered satisfactory; we have an adequate number of institutions of the hospital type. As for character deviants, the feeble-minded, and the men-

mission de l'unification des peines privatives de liberté. Melun: Imprimerie administrative, 1949.

⁸ International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, *Proceedings of the Session held at Bern, July 1951* (x, 219 pp. Bern: Stämpfli & Cie, 1951), p. 82.

⁹ Charles Germain, "La classification des délinquants en France." *Revue pénitentiaire et de droit pénal*, Vol. 77 (1953), pp. 319-49.

tally abnormal, their detection among those awaiting trial is assured in observation sections called "psychiatric annexes." For those sentenced we have the psychiatric center at Château-Thierry where we place abnormal individuals not yet suffering from a real mental disease; the insane properly speaking are confined in mental hospitals, like the noncriminal insane. The problem of the offender who is neither sane nor insane¹⁰ is, however, unsolved, and it is regrettable that numerous difficulties and, especially, financial obstacles have prevented us from undertaking as yet the very important projects which were studied and elaborated prior to the war.

As far as those now called "youthful offenders" are concerned, the Administration opened a school-prison at Oermingen in 1947 for boys and a school-prison at Doullens in 1950 for girls. The treatment embraces moral, scholastic, and vocational training that should permit these young people to start a new life upon their release. In 1950 a controlled freedom hostel was opened at Maxeville as an adjunct to Oermingen.

The need for providing appropriate treatment for two other classes of offenders led us, on the one hand, to set up a center for apprenticeship training (Écrouves) reserved for prisoners who are about twenty-five to thirty-five years of age and who show an aptitude for apprenticeship courses in various mechanical and building trades; and, on the other hand, to organize two open institutions¹¹ (Casabianda and La Trévarresse) for prisoners likely to benefit

¹⁰ Sir Norwood East, "The Non-sane Non Insane Offender," in his *Society and the Criminal* (London, 1949), pp. 229-41.

¹¹ On the question of open institutions, see resolutions adopted in August 1950 at the Hague Congress (*Proceedings*, Vol. 2, p. 586) and in December 1952 at the Geneva Conference (*op. cit. supra* note 5, p. 70).

from a regime based on confidence and a discipline voluntarily accepted.

Habitual offenders

A great effort of categorization has been going on since 1948 with respect to habitual offenders, who cause so much worry to prison authorities the world over,¹² as well as to one segment of the doctrinal field, where the war hatchet has not yet been finally buried between the partisans and adversaries of "security measures" (*mesures de sûreté*; in German, *sichernde Massnahmen*). This is not the place to engage in a doctrinal quarrel from which the Anglo-Saxon countries have wisely decided to abstain. What is pertinent, however, is that almost everywhere there are attempts to organize for these offenders, who are generally regarded as unreformable by the usual punishments, a special measure, a kind of nonpenal confinement, the regime of which would be clearly different from that of long-term imprisonment. In France, we are at present engaged in segmenting the problem of preventive detention (*relégation*) by searching for different solutions according to the exceedingly variable personality of hardened recidivists. During the last few years we have set up for them three specialized observation centers, of which further mention will be made later, and five treatment institutions (Saint-Martin-de-Ré, Mauzac, Gannat, Clermont-Ferrand, and Saint-Sulpice), where the inmates are subjected to strongly individualized regimes ranging from close custody to semifreedom. Gradually, as this experiment proceeds, we shall prob-

¹² See the excellent comparative law study by Norval Morris, *The Habitual Criminal* (London, 1951; cf. also resolution adopted at the Hague Congress on the treatment and release of habitual offenders (*Proceedings*, Vol. 2, p. 588).

ably require additional new institutions for these habitual repeaters.¹³

Large central prisons

Finally, for the application of long prison terms which do not fit any category mentioned so far, we have a dozen central prisons, large establishments capable of holding from 500 to 800 prisoners each. Five of these (Eysses, Nîmes, Poissy, Fontevault, and Clairvaux) are prisons of the classical type where treatment pivots almost exclusively on labor and discipline. Six others (Haguenau, Mulhouse, Ensisheim, Melun, Caen, and Toul) are reformatories; the re-education of the prisoners rests on several bases: work, vocational training, and, finally, an attempt at moral transformation more particularly entrusted to "educators," specialized officers whose task is composed entirely of observation and education. The regime in these reformatories is that of the progressive or Irish system,¹⁴ characterized by the division of the term into five stages: (1) observation period; (2) first treatment stage; (3) a so-called improvement stage; (4) a confidence stage which may approach semifreedom; (5) conditional freedom (*parole*).

We find these days a certain dislike for the progressive system, which has been abolished by several countries. We have used it in France too short a time to be able to abandon it yet, especially since it is having encouraging results. It seems to be one of those remedies which have preserved all their effectiveness, partly because people believe in it and partly because it has not yet been abused. It has certainly not

¹³ Charles Germain, *Le traitement des récidivistes en France*. Melun: Imprimerie administrative, 1953.

¹⁴ On the origin of the progressive or "intermediate" system, see Barnes and Teeters, *op. cit. supra* note 1, pp. 522 ff.

drawn its last breath, and the chances are that, thanks to refinements of this method of treatment, the name of Crofton is not ready to disappear from our memory.

II. THE PROBLEM OF SHORT TERMS

It is universally recognized today that short prison terms present serious inconveniences from social, economic, and familial points of view.¹⁵ How, then, can they be remedied, when as a result of statutes and court sentences short terms are in the majority among those received in prison?¹⁶

In the interest of avoiding the mutual contamination which can be produced by the promiscuity resulting from imprisonment in common, which unfortunately frequently persists, a statute of 1875, the provisions of which on this point were conserved by the Commission of 1945, prescribed that terms of one year or less should be served in solitary confinement, night and day, according to the regime which, in memory of the old Walnut Street Prison,¹⁷ we continue to call Pennsylvanian. But while cellular isolation can prevent harmful contacts between prisoners, it is powerless to avoid certain other consequences, such as social rejection and loss of employment. Besides, a regime so uniform contradicts modern tendencies toward individualization of treatment. For these reasons we have recently undertaken a limited experiment

¹⁵ Cf. resolution adopted at the Hague Congress (*Proceedings*, Vol. 2, p. 592).

¹⁶ In France terms are regarded as short if they do not exceed one year's imprisonment. On January 1, 1954, there were only 5,000 short terms out of a total of 23,000 prisoners, but almost 50,000 were received and about the same number discharged during the preceding year.

¹⁷ Thorsten Sellin, "Philadelphia Prisons of the Eighteenth Century," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 43, Part I, (1953), pp. 326-30.

conducive to a better handling of the execution of short sentences. The mechanism of this experiment is as follows:

Once the sentence has been imposed, the authority responsible for its execution (the state prosecutor) requests opinions from the presiding judge of the sentencing court and the magistrate who is chairman of the discharged prisoners' aid committee on the advisability of having the sentenced prisoner serve the term immediately. Armed with these two opinions and the results of a social investigation, the prosecutor decides either to order the prompt execution of the sentence or to defer it indefinitely.

If the prosecutor holds that the sentence should be executed, he so informs the chairman of the aid committee, who then chooses one of the following methods: commitment to solitary confinement, placement in an exterior workshop, or commitment to a regime of semifreedom. In all these cases the offender undergoes punishment, the mode of execution alone being different.

1. For instance, cellular confinement would be used for persons on whom the rigors of cellular isolation are likely to produce an intimidating effect or, again, either for perverts from whom an active contamination may be expected or, conversely, for offenders who need protection against promiscuity.

2. The prisoner placed in an exterior workshop would be assigned to a gang working outside the institution and guarded by officers of the Administration. This regime is especially suited for offenders who were unemployed at their arrest; it permits them to adopt or preserve habits of work, earn a wage that is often appreciable, and stay in good physical shape.

3. Semifreedom involves individual placement in a job outside the penal institution without administrative surveillance during the day and staying in

the institution at night and when the prisoner does not work (Sundays and holidays). Applied to serious offenders and youthful ones before their release on parole or imposed as a preliminary test on preventive detainees likely to profit by the same measure, semifreedom is equally suitable, as a mode of serving short terms, for the petty offender when it is desirable for him to maintain reasonably easy contacts with his family and his status in a trade, or when it is desirable to oblige him to engage in regular work at a steady job.

The state prosecutor may consider that, in the interest of the offender as well as of society, there is an advantage in having him avoid all contact with a prison in order to save his job, his place in his family, and if possible his social status. In that case the execution of the sentence is postponed, and the chairman of the aid committee, after written acceptance by the offender, appoints a "delegate" charged with assisting him, supervising his activities, and reporting anything of a nature to cause a modification or cancellation of the order. This situation definitely appears as a form of probation.

III. THE SCIENTIFIC EXAMINATION OF OFFENDERS

The reader will understand that a simple prison administrator can only tread gingerly when he approaches a problem about which it has been possible to write that "the indeterminacy of the phenomena [of human behavior] makes scientific truth [about them] impossible"¹⁸ and also that "the most obvious obstacles to the introduction and carrying out of the ideals of classification are the lack of knowledge of human nature and the absence of definite

¹⁸ Mortimer Adler, cited in Thorsten Sellin, *Culture Conflict and Crime* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938), p. 4.

and certain methods for the diagnosis and treatment of personality defects in the inmates of a penitentiary."¹⁹

Nevertheless, since 1950 the idea of the necessity or utility of scientific observation of an offender, either for the purpose of sentencing him or for the purpose of his treatment, has been affirmed in five international conventions.²⁰

Presentence examination

The resolutions adopted during the most recent international meetings claim that in order to be able to impose the most appropriate sentence on an offender the judge should, in addition to the "criminal case history" dealing with the circumstances of the offense, have available a "personal case history" containing all the data that a scientific investigation can furnish, bearing upon the offender's personality and social background. But it has also been recognized that this scientific examination is of interest to the judge only to the degree that the law places at his dis-

posal a gamut of sanctions which permits him to adapt the sentence to the personality of the offender. This is not the case in France at present, and except for mental examinations made to determine the criminal responsibility of defendants, people certainly do not see any necessity for proceeding to lengthy, learned, and costly investigations in order to permit the judge, in the end, to choose between a fine and one of the three forms of penal imprisonment—hard labor, strict imprisonment, and simple imprisonment—since we have noted that they hardly differ in the manner of their execution. The disproportion between the apparatus set in motion and the results obtained would be too flagrant.

It is planned to introduce a presentence examination before granting probation and imposing preventive detention as soon as certain projects now being studied have received the approval of Parliament.

Postsentence examination

Our Administration has very seriously equipped itself in the last few years for the task of making postsentence examinations. We shall quickly review (1) observation in specialized allocation centers and (2) observation in the treatment institutions.

1. The most important specialized allocation center is the National Orientation Center at Fresnes, a sort of clearinghouse or guidance center set up in August 1950 on a national scale, where—except for habitual criminals—all prisoners are sent who have more than a year to serve on the day when their sentences become definitive.

Observation, which lasts on the average five to six weeks, is done by a team of experts who have available a previously compiled case history containing a social investigation, data of a medical nature, and all useful details

¹⁹ Norman Fenton, "What Principles Should Underlie the Classification of Prisoners in Penal Institutions?" *Proceedings of the Twelfth International Penal and Penitentiary Congress*, Vol. 3, p. 400.

²⁰ Hague Congress, IPPC (*Proceedings*, Vol. 2, p. 581); Preparatory Session of the Third International Congress of Social Defense, San Marino, September 1951 (*Rivista di Difesa Sociale*, Nos. 3-4 [1951], p. 81); U.N. European Seminar on the medico-psychological and social examination of offenders, Brussels, December 1951 (see report of Sir Lionel Fox, *British Journal of Delinquency*, Vol. 3 [October 1952], pp. 85-103); Société Internationale de Criminologie, *Premier cours international de criminologie: L'examen médico-psychologique et social des délinquants*, Paris, Septembre-Octobre 1952. 684 pp. Melun: Imprimerie administrative, 1953; Sixth International Congress of Penal Law, Rome, September-October 1953, resolution adopted on second discussion topic, the protection of individual rights during investigation of crime (*Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie*, Vol. 34 [January 1954], p. 384).

concerning the prosecution and trial and the offender's behavior in jail since his arrest. The observation includes intensive biological, psychological, and psychiatric examinations, and the center is proud to have even an electroencephalograph. At the end of the observation period, a synthesis of all accumulated data is made by the directors of the center, and this report is discussed by all the experts acting as a committee with a chairman who is a juridical official of the central Administration.

After hearing the opinion of each committee member concerning the treatment that could suitably be applied to the offender, the chairman selects the institution where it will be applied.

The idea of a single guidance center for all of France's habitual offenders having been discarded, the Administration opened, in succession, observation centers at Loos (1948), Rouen (1952), and Besançon (1953), with the aim of arriving at the segregation of the different types of detainees (antisocial, asocial, and retrainable). Because of the special complexity of the personality of these recidivists, the observation period lasts longer—six months—first under a close custodial regime, then in semifreedom which, in favorable cases, may lead directly to a conditional release. The team entrusted with the observation is composed of specialized officials, a social worker, a psychiatrist, and a judge. The judge presides over the allocation committee and selects the treatment and the appropriate institution.

2. Once treatment has begun, continued observation of the prisoner is necessary to determine its effects and, if need be, to modify or revise it according to developments, in other words, to individualize it as much as possible.

At the present moment, the scientific observation of prisoners serving terms is

conducted in the school-prisons of Oermingen and Doullens, the six reformatories of Haguenau, Mulhouse, Ensisheim, Melun, Caen, and Toul, and in the treatment centers for detainees at Gannat, Clermont-Ferrand, and Saint-Sulpice.

Here we are dealing with a continuous observation process lasting as long as treatment does and ceasing only with the prisoner's release. It is a teamwork process in which a psychiatrist, a social worker, and the prison director participate together with an "educator" and a judge, who is chairman of the allocation committee.

IV. THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE

When it comes to defining the duties and powers of judges in penal affairs, it is possible to choose among several conceptions.

The most common conception is that the criminal court is a fact-finding, law-applying, and sentence-inflicting agency, the imposition of the sentence being the outermost point where the competence of the judiciary ends and that of the administrative authorities begins. But the conflict of power between the criminal courts and administrative bodies has led at times to a restriction and at other times to an expansion of the role of the judge. According to the first way of thinking, the function of the judge would end with the formal finding of guilt, and the imposition of the sentence would be left to special agencies of the type of the "treatment tribunal" of Finland or the "adult authority" of California. According to the second, the judge would be empowered both to find the guilt and to supervise the execution of the sentence;²¹ as

²¹ On the respective powers of judicial and administrative agencies, see Max Grünhut, *Penal Reform* (Oxford, 1948), p. 115; Hermann Mannheim, *The Dilemma of Penal Re-*

a matter of fact, some legislations are veering toward a participation by the judge in the executory phase of the sentence, as, for example, Italian law, which has created the "supervisory judge," and Portuguese law, which has instituted a "court for the execution of punishments."²²

In France, courts have traditionally been regarded as a guarantee of public liberties against arbitrary administrative actions. There is no question, then, of depriving them of the power to impose the sentences provided by law. And when the Commission provided in 1945 that the allocation of the long termers to the different treatment institutions should no longer be made in accordance with purely legal and juridical criteria but on a criterion based on the personality of the offender,²³ the Commission, in order to quiet the scruples of those who feared an abuse of power by the Prison Administration, recommended the intervention of a judge to control the execution of punishment.²⁴ The Administration accepted this suggestion and today the magistrate charged with keeping an eye on the execution of punishments has become part of our penitentiary organization. He is found in all institutions where modern methods of observation and treatment are applied. Designated, at the request of the Ministry of Justice, by his hierarchical superiors, he acts as the dele-

form (London, 1939), pp. 172 ff., and *Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction* (London, 1946), pp. 196, 223-38; Norval Morris, *The Habitual Criminal* (London, 1951), pp. 22, 199, 200, 264; Barnes and Teeters, *op. cit. supra* note 1, pp. 292-98, 810-12; Teeters, *op. cit. supra* note 1, p. 181; IV^{ème} Congrès International de Droit Pénal, Paris, 1937, *Actes*, Paris, 1939, p. 443.

²² J. Beleza dos Santos, "Le juge d'exécution des peines au Portugal," *Revue internationale de droit comparé*, 1952, pp. 401-18.

²³ See point 7 of the principles of reform, above.

²⁴ Point 9.

gate of the central Administration and consequently has no jurisdictional power, but it is not impossible that, as ideas change, such power may ultimately be granted by statute. With the development represented by the scientific examination of offenders, the most important duty of the judge²⁵ consists of presiding over the allocation committee composed of the experts who participated in the examination. This provides an excellent occasion for a magistrate to exercise his natural role of arbiter and break a tie vote by technicians from the different disciplines, each of whom might sometimes have an understandable tendency to claim pre-eminence for his particular scientific specialty.

There are other circumstances in which the judge is called upon to intervene during the period following the imposition of the sentence. In Section II we described the role played in the execution of sentences to short terms by the magistrate who is chairman of the aid committee. There is hardly any need to stress that by his activity on this committee a judge has to become familiar with all the difficulties of after-care problems.

These examples show that there is a growing tendency in France to react against the old conception, according to which judges should stay cooped up in law and procedure, and to make them aware of the social mission which is theirs as well. The personal contacts they have with offenders; furthermore, permit them to supplement their purely legal training, which hardly brings them more than an abstract knowledge of the criminal. By this kind of practical initiation they thus begin criminological training, which, it is agreed, is today essential for the administration of good criminal justice, at least in systems like

²⁵ For other duties, see point 9.

ours which extend the duties of the judge beyond the mere finding of guilt.

V. THE FUNCTION OF PUNISHMENT IN SOCIAL REHABILITATION ²⁶

In his two latest annual reports, the director of the United States Bureau of Prisons has quite properly stressed some "prison paradoxes," ²⁷ the most striking of which is the one that consists in wishing to correct the social maladaptation of an offender by removing him from life in freedom and, in the artificial environment of a prison, instilling habits in him that are contrary to those of the outside community to which it is expected that he will be integrated or reintegrated when he is released. It is in view of this difficulty that the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted in Geneva in 1952, specify:

10. The regime of the institution should seek to minimize any differences between the life inside its walls and normal life outside which tend to lessen the self-responsibility of the prisoners or the respect due to their dignity as human beings.

11. The treatment of prisoners should emphasize not their exclusion from the community but their continuing part in it. ²⁸

The ideas just expressed are quite in conformity with the views of the French Prison Administration which, through certain provisions, seeks to neutralize the effects of social maladaptation inherent in imprisonment. That is why

²⁶ The author's comments on this topic are the gist of observations made in his lecture, March 24, 1954, during the Fourth International Course in Criminology organized in London by the International Society of Criminology and directed by Dr. Denis Carroll and Dr. Hermann Mannheim.

²⁷ James V. Bennett, in United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, *Federal Prisons: 1948*, p. 3, and *Federal Prisons: 1952*, p. 46.

²⁸ Conference of the European Consultative Group, *op. cit. supra* note 5, p. 51.

it attempts to prevent the breaking or weakening of the prisoner's bonds with his family or spouse and to maintain constructive contacts with the outside world. ²⁹ That is also why his leisure hours are made profitable by sustaining or, if need be, arousing his taste for sports, reading, or music. As to industries, the Administration is working toward an organization which is inspired by that found on the outside; furthermore, the prisoners are protected against occupational injuries and diseases. Since 1949 vocational training has developed to the point that the number of prisoners capable of profiting from it does not exhaust the capacities of the apprenticeship training centers or courses. This training is given under conditions identical with those outside—the same programs, the same theoretical and practical exercises, the same diploma, with no distinctive mark to show whence it came; in this area the similarity to life in freedom is complete. An analogous line is followed in the general education of prisoners.

An important share of the work of social readaptation falls to the social service units of the prisons; they have been greatly expanded in our country. Instituted in 1945, they now include 94 full-time and 70 part-time social workers, 164 all told; only 36 institutions—small ones, for that matter—have none officially. The social workers visit, counsel, and assist the prisoners and provide a liaison with their families. When the day of freedom approaches, they take steps to find housing and employment for them through co-operation with the aftercare organizations.

²⁹ American readers will on this point find a description of an organization model in *Handbook on the Inmate's Relationships with Persons from Outside the Adult Correctional Institution*, prepared by the Committee on Classification and Casework of the American Prison Association, 1953.

These various measures demonstrate how, while respecting the principle of punishment, it is possible in some respects to bring the living conditions in prison into closer resemblance to the conditions of normal living. But it is possible to make further advances on this line; social readaptation will be made much easier through recourse to certain special facilities in the execution of sentences, such as outside workshops, open institutions, semifreedom, and parole. We have already discussed, in Section II, the outside workshops and semifreedom. A few additional remarks need to be made about parole.

Parole

Parole should be "something more than a mere legal escape route to the outside world." ³⁰ Such, however, had become its practice in our country in spite of the intentions of the authors of the Act of August 14, 1885, who had wanted it to be a means of preventing recidivism. The Hague Congress formulated the problem correctly when it affirmed that "the protection of society against recidivism requires the integration of conditional release in the execution of penal imprisonment." ³¹ This is the manner in which we must view parole, not as an end in itself, but only as the last phase of the punishment, which then ceases to remove freedom and merely restricts it.

In an ideal system, the prisoner should be granted parole "at the moment when—taking into account the limitations of the law and the sentence, the effect of institutional life, and the prospect of social rehabilitation—both he and the community could profit

most by such a step." ³² But the perfect application of such a system presupposes an indeterminate sentence, ³³ which is not found in our laws; in France, the offender cannot expect to be paroled before he has served a fixed portion of his term.

When the legal requirements as to the length of time served have been met, the offender can, by ministerial decree, be granted parole, to which are attached various conditions. The first of these is an obligation to reside and work in a specific locality, a requirement that makes it easy to control observation of the other conditions, such as assignment to supervision by an Aid Committee for Discharged Prisoners, transference of all or part of his savings while in prison to this committee, to be paid to him in installments, placement in some privately operated home for discharged prisoners, and so forth. The most important conditions are those that concern placement under the supervision and guardianship of aid committees, charged, in co-operation with the social service units, with the task of co-ordinating the activities of private agencies. The re-establishment of these prisoners as good citizens definitely depends on an effective collaboration between these various organs, for the task is rather difficult when one considers that "the offender who remains reformed must be superior to the society in which he lives." ³⁴

³² Ernest W. Burgess and Thorsten Sellin, in introduction to Lloyd E. Ohlin, *op. cit. supra* note 30, p. 10.

³³ Thorsten Sellin, "L'expérience de la sentence indéterminée aux États-Unis." Conférence prononcée le 16 mars 1951 à l'Institut de droit comparé de la Faculté de droit de Paris, *Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé*, 1951, pp. 417-43.

³⁴ Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 588.

³⁰ Adlai E. Stevenson, cited by Joseph D. Lohman in the preface to Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Selection for Parole* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1951), p. 7.

³¹ *Proceedings*, Vol. 2, p. 594.

VI. THE BEGINNINGS OF PROBATION IN FRANCE

Although it is already a venerable institution in Anglo-Saxon countries, probation, at least for adult offenders, is considered a novelty on the Continent; for these countries the United Nations secretariat organized in London in 1952 a seminar on this significant problem,⁸⁵ having already published, in 1951, an important and stimulating work on *Probation and Related Measures*. It was a question of convincing these countries that, as Richard A. McGee puts it, "no convicted offender should be sent to prison or reformatory if he can be dealt with constructively by some other means."⁸⁶

According to the definition given in the United Nations book just mentioned,⁸⁷ "it may be said that probation is a method of dealing with specially selected offenders, and that it consists of the conditional suspension of punishment while the offender is placed under personal supervision and is given individual guidance or treatment."

The conditional suspension of punishment is no novelty in our country, for it was a French act in 1891 which first established "the suspension of the execution of punishment" and which has since stimulated its adoption by many foreign legislatures. It operates as follows: the court imposes a sentence (imprisonment or a fine) and, taking into account information gathered about the offender and on condition that he has no record of prior convictions for a felony or misdemeanor, orders a suspension of the execution of the sentence. It is a mere suspension and differs es-

entially from probation in that it involves no special obligation for the offender, nor does he receive any assistance whatever. If he is not given a prison sentence within five years for a new crime, the sentence that was suspended is considered null and void.⁸⁸ There is no intention in France of abandoning this traditional form of suspension. It is perfectly suited for offenders of whom it may reasonably be assumed that the warning given by the court will suffice to keep them in a straight and narrow path in the future, without having to assign them to a kind of guardian who is in duty bound to watch over their conduct as well as give them counsel and aid. But during very recent years it has become clear that it would be useful to have a special type of suspension, to which there would be attached both a control over conduct and aid by guidance for certain individuals who, not being subject to a mandatory punishment, need both control and help during a probationary period if they are to be saved from recidivism.

For these reasons, the Prison Administration began, early in 1951, within the framework of the reorganization of short-term punishments discussed in Section II, a practical experiment which has mainly aimed at verifying whether or not probation could be introduced into our mores. Since the experiment has been conclusive, the government has introduced a bill in Parliament according to which probation is granted by the court, which will then have a choice among: (a) a sentence to a mandatory punishment, the execution of which is ordered; (b) a sentence to a punishment the execution of which is suspended in the traditional

⁸⁵ United Nations, European Seminar on Probation, London, 20-30 October 1952, *Proceedings of the Seminar*. Melun: Imprimerie administrative, 1952 (nonofficial record).

⁸⁶ *Op. cit. supra* note 3.

⁸⁷ Page 4.

⁸⁸ Roland Berger, *Le système de probation anglais et le sursis continental*. Geneva: Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique, 1953.

manner; (c) a sentence to a punishment the execution of which is suspended and probation ordered, for a period of five years, with certain conditions imposed on the offender, who is at the same time to be given constructive aid and guidance.

It seems useless to go into more details of a text which is still only a proposal and a rather timid one at that in certain respects, notably in the sense that probation is not considered an autonomous measure, but simply a special type of suspended sentence, and also in

the sense that, like the traditional suspension, its field of application is limited to less important punishments—fines and simple imprisonment. What must be remembered is that, in spite of these gaps, it would be a starting point in our country for a new trend, about which it can be said that, in the words of Sidney and Beatrice Webb—and this is our conclusion with regard to postwar prison reforms in France—"the most practical and the most hopeful of prison reforms is to keep people out of prison altogether."

Charles Germain is director general of the French Prison Administration, Paris. After graduation from the Law School, University of Nancy, he practiced law at Metz and in 1929 entered a judicial career as vice-president of the Seine court in Paris until 1948, when he assumed his present post. He has been the chief delegate of France to the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission and is secretary of the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation and vice-president of the European Consultative Group of the United Nations on penological matters. He is an officer of the Legion of Honor and author of numerous reports and articles on penal questions.

Postwar Prison Reform in Sweden

By TORSTEN ERIKSSON

AT the beginning of the last century a lively concern with prison problems arose in Sweden. There, as in most European countries, the Pennsylvania system made a strong impression on the advocates of prison reform, and in 1840 the principle of individual cellular punishment was approved by Parliament. A number of new prisons were constructed and the older congregate system was gradually abandoned. Toward the end of the century the period of solitary confinement was fixed at three years. Prisoners with sentences longer than three years served the balance in congregate sections.

The satisfaction with the cellular system began to pale half a century ago. Its disadvantages led to a progressive reduction of the period of isolation. By the end of World War I it had been cut to six months; for young prisoners it was three months. At the same time other questions were coming to the fore: the occupation of prisoners in the institutions, vocational and other training, medical and psychiatric care for those needing it, the transfer of the care of the mentally abnormal or disturbed to the mental health department, special forms of treatment for youthful offenders, parole and aid for discharged prisoners, probation, and so forth.¹ In Sweden the thinking on these problems took a concise and purposive form in the plan for the reform of the treatment of offenders which was drawn up in 1934 by the then Minister of Justice, Karl J. Schlyter, who captioned it with

the motto: "Depopulate the prisons." This plan affirmed the principle that imprisonment should be used as a last resort and that other forms of treatment should be employed to the fullest extent possible. The most important parts of Schlyter's plan aimed at reforms of the system of fines, conditional release, and special legislation governing the treatment of youthful, abnormal, and dangerous habitual offenders.

THE SCHLYTER PLAN

Fines constitute about 90 per cent of the punishments in Sweden. In former years, unpaid fines were transformed into imprisonment according to a fixed scale. For instance, eight days' imprisonment equaled a fine of a hundred kronor (about twenty dollars at present rates of exchange). The number of persons committed for nonpayment of fines ran to about 12,000 or 13,000 a year during the early 1930's. Schlyter's reform of this system, begun in 1931 and completed in 1937, was based on the idea that if the court punishes by a fine, it is to remain a fine and be collected. The following changes were introduced to achieve this end. First of all, the fine itself was democratized by scaling its amount to the offender's capacity to pay. (The exceptions to this rule are of no interest here.) This is now being done by fixing the fine at a given number of *day-fines*. The number is the same for poor or rich, but the *amount* of the day-fine varies with the offender's economic situation. A workman with a small income may be sentenced to ten day-fines of two kronor each, while a rich man may get ten day-fines of two hundred kronor each for

the same offense. Besides, it is possible to pay the fine in installments. Nobody is put in jail any more because he is too poor to pay a fine. If he openly refuses to pay, the fine is changed into a jail sentence, but this sentence must be imposed by a court, which may suspend both the order to pay the fine and the substitute jail sentence. Because of this reform the number of prisoners committed for nonpayment has dropped to a few hundred a year.

The suspended sentence

Gradually the use of the suspended sentence has been extended to include more and more offenders. In 1939, the courts were granted power to suspend the execution of sentences to hard labor under a year and to simple imprisonment under two years. The recipient had to serve that sentence, however, if he committed a new crime or violated the rules involved. In addition, a form new to Sweden was introduced, namely, the Anglo-Saxon suspension of the imposition of a sentence after conviction. In connection with either form, the court may order probation and fix its conditions. For instance, it may order the probationer to take certain training, avoid undesirable localities, refrain from the use of alcohol, and so forth. In any comparison with other countries with respect to the scope of the suspended sentence, it must be recalled that punishments for theft, fraud, and other property crimes are milder in Sweden than in most countries.²

Waiver of prosecution

We may consider the legislation of 1944 on the waiver of prosecution in

² See Thorsten Sellin, "Probation and Parole of Adult Offenders in Sweden," in *Bulletin Against Crime: 1948 Yearbook, National Probation and Parole Association* (New York, [1949]), pp. 239-51.

the case of offenders under eighteen years of age as complementing the law on suspended sentences. The public prosecutor can now drop a case if the offense is insignificant or if there are assurances that the youth will be otherwise properly cared for and treated. By means of a suspended sentence or a waiver of prosecution most offenders under eighteen are now transferred to child welfare authorities, who must deal with them in supervised freedom or in schools of child care. The system set up for the treatment of criminals therefore rarely has any contact with these youngsters. Prosecution may even be waived in the case of older offenders if the offense is trifling.

Parole

Swedish parole legislation was reformed in 1943. Two forms of parole were instituted, one mandatory when five-sixths of a term of not less than six months had been served, and the other discretionary, when two-thirds of a term of not less than eight months had been completed. When the sentences are for these shortest periods, mandatory parole is generally given. Discretionary parole cannot be given unless certain other prerequisites exist. The parolling authority must, for instance, take into account the circumstance of the crime, the offender's previous conduct, his conduct in the institution, the situation facing him on release, and so forth.

Each one of the above reforms has in its way helped to "depopulate the prisons." Even though the drop in the number of commitments for nonpayment of fines has had little relative effect in reducing the daily population of the institutions, because such prisoners generally stay a very short time, the fact that some ten thousand petty offenders are saved annually from contact with jail must be regarded as a

¹ See Hardy Göransson, "Treatment of Criminals and Other Asocial Individuals," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 197 (May 1938), pp. 120-33.

great gain both from the humanitarian and the penological point of view.

"Youth prisons"

Two other reforms, however, have had the reverse effect, and have increased the average daily population in the institutions. One involves the treatment of offenders eighteen to twenty years of age. In 1935 a new form of commitment was designed for them, namely the so-called "youth prison," which in spite of its name is intended to be an educational institution for youthful offenders. A person sentenced to the "youth prison" is committed for an indeterminate maximum term of four years to a special treatment agency, the Youth Prison Board. This board fixes the length of time to be served in the institution, generally one year. The idea back of this plan was to get rid of the short, definite time sentences for youthful offenders who need real educational and vocational guidance and training in an institution for a longer period.

Mentally abnormal offenders

The second of these reforms was the legislation of 1937 concerning detention and internment, respectively, of certain mentally abnormal offenders and normal recidivists. According to Swedish law, offenders suffering from mental disease, or an analogous mental abnormality, are transferred to the regular mental health authorities for treatment after having been declared free from criminal responsibility by a court, following a mental examination by experts. The prerequisites for such a judgment by the court are not so rigid as in countries that follow the M'Naghten rule or similar precepts. This means, among other things, that many psychopaths are sent to mental hospitals upon a finding of insanity. In the case of psychopaths who could not be found in-

sane, a law of 1927 had made it possible to commit them for relatively indeterminate terms to special penal institutions, if they constituted a manifest danger or vexation to society because of their abnormal constitution. Chronic recidivists could also be interned for an indeterminate period even though they were pronounced quite normal by medical examiners. This last group of offenders has practically disappeared, but the number of abnormal offenders has been increasing, especially since the amendments of 1937 widened the basis on which commitments to so-called "security institutions" could be made. Questions concerning releases from these institutions are decided by the Internment Board. No one may be paroled until a minimum period, fixed by the court, has been passed.

The Schlyter Plan has not been fully executed as yet. Its originator, no longer Minister of Justice, still functions as chairman of the Penal Code Commission, a committee appointed by the government for the purpose of proposing and making preparation for reforms in the treatment of offenders. But in 1945, the Plan was in a manner of speaking rounded out by a law on the execution of penal imprisonment, which took effect in 1946 and which constitutes a complete break with earlier principles of treating prisoners. Therefore a brief description of its content is in order.

PRINCIPLES OF PENAL ADMINISTRATION

Sweden is somewhat larger than California and of similar shape; it has about seven million inhabitants, approximately a million of whom live in the metropolitan area of Stockholm. In 1950 about 170,000 persons were brought to justice for offenses, or about 32 per 1,000 persons over fifteen years of age. The great majority of these offenses were of a petty nature, such as

traffic violations. Those sentenced for property offenses (theft, pilfering, fraud, etc.) numbered 9,972, or 1.8 per 1,000. Eighty-eight per cent were fined and 7 per cent received a waiver of prosecution, leaving 5 per cent who received more serious punishments than fines.

The accompanying table gives an idea of the population of the penal institutions for the year 1952.

COMMITMENTS TO SWEDISH PENAL INSTITUTIONS, 1952, AND POPULATION PRESENT ON DECEMBER 31, 1952

	Committed during 1952	In prison Dec. 31, 1952
Held for trial	2,788	136
Held for mental observation	560	181
Sentenced to hard labor	2,519	1,609
Sentenced to simple imprisonment	2,806	364
Sentenced for nonpayment of fines	362	30
Sentenced to preventive detention	204	434
Sentenced to internment	2	6
Sentenced to youth prison	144	176
Found insane	120	51
Others	164	15
		3,002

The right column gives an approximate picture of the average number of different classes of prisoners; the left column cannot be summarized because of transfers from one class to another. There were 7,043 new admissions during 1952, of whom 173 were women. Sixty women were in prison at the end of the year; half of them were serving hard labor sentences, the other half sentences to simple imprisonment. Fourteen of the new admissions fell in the age group fifteen to seventeen, 315 were from eighteen to twenty, 971 from twenty-one to twenty-four; 4,222 were twenty-five years of age or older. These figures give some idea at least of the or-

ganizational problems of Swedish prison administration.

As a human being

The first paragraph of Chapter 4 of the Prison Act of 1945 reads as follows:

The inmate shall be treated with firmness and earnestness and with the consideration due him as a human being. He is to be employed at suitable labor and, furthermore, shall receive such treatment as promotes his adaptation to social life. The injurious effects of confinement must be prevented as much as possible.³

The prisoner has a right to secure books, periodicals, and daily newspapers. He must even be "provided with opportunity to read newspapers," which implies that the institution must lend him a paper if he cannot afford to subscribe to one. He is to be encouraged to maintain "desirable" contacts with near relatives. The warden may censor his mail but may waive this prerogative.

An offender sentenced to hard labor shall as a rule stay in a closed institution during the first three months but can then be transferred to an open institution. Prisoners below twenty-five years of age are to be so transferred at the earliest opportunity. Unless there is some special reason for doing otherwise, a person sentenced to simple imprisonment will be assigned directly to an open institution.

In the closed institutions work is done as a rule in common. The leisure hours of those sentenced to hard labor

³ The complete translation of the Prison Act of 1945 as well as a survey of the Swedish penal system may be found in Thorsten Sellin, *Recent Penal Legislation in Sweden*. 70 pp. Stockholm: Strafflagberedningen, 1947. See also his "The Treatment of Offenders in Sweden," *Federal Probation*, Vol. 12 (June 1948), pp. 14-18, and "Some Aspects of Prison Reform in Sweden," in Philadelphia County Prison, Board of Inspectors, *Annual Report 1947* (Philadelphia, 1948), pp. 53-82.

or to simple imprisonment are to be spent in private except when the inmate is participating in group activities such as sports, studies, or hobby work. Reliable prisoners may be permitted by the warden to spend other leisure hours together, but usually only in small groups. Those sentenced to youth prison or to preventive detention or internment spend all free time together unless they misbehave or are difficult to discipline.

The differences between the various forms of imprisonment have been more and more eliminated in practice. But there is still one difference between hard labor prisoners and those undergoing simple imprisonment: the latter may wear their own clothes, find work for themselves, dispose of all their own earnings, and receive a quicker transfer to an open institution. A bill has been introduced to merge these two forms of punishment into one called merely "imprisonment."

A prisoner may be allowed to work outside the institution, and occasionally he may live in the institution but work outside for a private employer in the vicinity.

Permits to prisoners

All prisoners may receive permission to visit a near relative who is seriously ill or to attend his funeral; permits to visit relatives may even be granted under other reasonable conditions when there is no likelihood of abuse. As a rule such permits are issued by the warden, unless the prisoner has in some way misused a previous permit; in that event the Prison Administration reserves to itself the right to grant a new one. The rules governing the granting of permits are: No prisoner receives one—exceptions being made in case of sickness or death, as mentioned above—unless his sentence calls for at least ten months' imprisonment. In that

case, and when the sentence is not longer than for one and a half years, he may apply for a permit after six months. If granted, he may have forty-eight hours, plus the time needed to travel from the institution to his destination and back. Later permits are given at intervals of four months and are lengthened to seventy-two hours each and travel time. Prisoners with sentences in the range of one and a half to three years may receive their first permit after ten months, while those with longer sentences must make special applications to the Prison Administration. The rules governing permits for detainees (that is, abnormal offenders) are much the same; they are more liberal for those committed to a youth prison. The latter may receive their first permit after four months and for a four-day period; later permits are granted at intervals of three months. During 1952, a total of 2,537 permits were granted, of which 391 (15 per cent) were abused. The lowest percentage of abuses was shown by those sentenced to hard labor or simple imprisonment (8 per cent) and the highest by the "youth prison" inmates (30 per cent). It should be noted, however, that as a rule the abuses in question were of a trifling character.

Institutional boards

The so-called institutional boards or committees were another novelty in the 1945 act. Institutional treatment was being administered by a central agency, the Prison Administration. Paroles of those serving some form of indeterminate sentence were being granted by special boards under the chairmanship of judges—the Youth Prison Board and the Internment Board. It was decided to strengthen lay influence and inspection by providing every institution with a local board, chaired by a judge. These boards were to be advisory and were to

express their opinion on questions relating to pardons and parole, among other things.

Building program

The Prison Act of 1945 not only presupposed a radical improvement of institutional facilities but made such improvement a chief prerequisite. The Minister of Justice asked the Prison Administration to submit appropriate plans, which was done. These plans called for extensive remodeling of old institutions and the construction of new ones. In the meanwhile the postwar situation had created serious shortages in the building industry and the program was slowed up. Besides, there were differences of opinion about the program proposed by the Prison Administration. New studies of an organizational character would hardly clarify matters. Therefore, Mr. Herman Zetterberg, Minister of Justice, decided on a step-by-step policy, outlined in a proposal to the Parliament in 1950 and approved by that body.

THE ZETTERBERG PLAN

Mr. Zetterberg told Parliament that the differences in opinion regarding the manner in which the institutional system should be developed were connected with the fact that no one had a clear picture of the clientele treated at the institutions. Therefore, the first step should be to study the physical and mental make-up of this clientele and the possibilities for its social rehabilitation. The need for institutions and the nature of their organization would then be easier to assess. The most important questions to be answered would be: How can the clientele be best differentiated? To what extent is there a need for medical treatment, psychotherapy, or occupational therapy? What trades are most appropriate in prison? How large should the institu-

tions be and how should they be designed? How should the personnel be composed and trained? Since institutions and treatment systems usually have been planned on the basis of arm-chair speculation about the clientele and its response to treatment by the means proposed, Mr. Zetterberg's point of view was important. He suggested that the reform of the institutions and of the treatment methods for youthful offenders should be the first step. The second step should be to take up the questions of how to deal with abnormal offenders. In the third and final step attention should be focused on the treatment of the ordinary prison clientele. Since Mr. Zetterberg had in mind a very thorough reorganization of institutional treatment it was obvious that it would take considerable time to complete it. In the meanwhile all possible reforms should be undertaken within the framework of existing facilities.

STUDIES OF THE PRISON CLIENTELE

The studies of the prison clientele referred to above have so far been modest. Primarily, they have been designed to yield some comprehension of the volume of the population received in youth prisons and security institutions. Available recorded data have been used as well as information supplied by the wardens of the institutions. This first series of inquiries is being completed with (a) a prognostic study of all offenders under twenty-one years of age who in 1949 were granted a waiver of prosecution or sentenced for the first time for an offense serious enough to be recorded in the Penal Register; and (b) a prognostic study of all prisoners who left the penal institutions in 1946.

RESEARCH PROJECTS AND EXPERIMENTS

A research project planned to begin in 1955 is of special interest. Samples

of offenders subjected that year to different sanctions will be selected, taking into account age differences as well as differences in sanctions. These offenders will be divided into two matched groups, one experimental and the other a control group. The research committee will devote itself intensively to the experimental group, taking part, if necessary, in the determination of their treatment in order to achieve the best possible results. The control group will merely be kept under covert observation for a five-year period. An attempt will also be made to arrange for a second control group made up of non-offenders. The advantage of this type of research is that the reactions of the clientele can be observed as they occur; the conclusions should, therefore, have greater validity. In addition to these studies made at the behest of the Ministry of Justice, a number of penetrating researches are under way. Some are being made at the Criminological Institute, directed by Professor O. Kinberg, others by individual research workers.

The studies of the institutional population have so far yielded rather distressing results from a treatment point of view. Recidivism is generally great among all who leave the institutions, particularly the youngest and the abnormal offenders. In the youngest offenders, the rate is high for those given conditional sentences. The discussion has therefore come to center more and more on the weak spots in treatment. All institutions and all supervisors of treatment tend to lull themselves by false assumptions about the excellence of their methods. Hence, one serious problem is how to evoke a frank and humble attitude toward the results of treatment and yet to preserve at the same time an audacious treatment policy. The same discussion has stressed the importance of a better planned co-operation and preferably a real co-ordina-

tion of penological research by different countries. The question has been raised whether it would not be more fruitful for the advancement of correctional policy if the United Nations, for instance, were to abandon most of its procedure of formulating resolutions about the treatment of offenders and instead encourage and assist in the co-ordination of penological research.

The importance of experimentation with different forms of treatment has come to be realized in Sweden. Consideration is now being given to a plan to ask for appropriations to conduct the following types of experiments:

1. Intensive individual therapy of different types, carried on in an institutional setting or in supervised freedom, with control groups made up of offenders not so treated.
2. Intensive group therapy along various lines, control groups being used.
3. Intensive efforts to change the environment to which the prisoner will be released after treatment; control group of prisoners not subject to such efforts.

The cost of the different experiments would have to be analyzed in order to estimate their economic implications.

ROXTUNA

The first item of the Zetterberg Plan was the improvement of the treatment of youthful offenders. Three problems arise in that connection. First, there is the group that receives suspended sentences and needs help and supervision during probation. Second there is the group needing a long period of institutional care—the "youth prison" clientele of Sweden, for instance. Between these groups we find an intermediate one for whom these treatments seem inadequate or too harsh. While the Penal Code Commission under Karl J. Schlyter's direction was considering what to do with the probation clientele and with those seemingly in need of some form

of brief institutional treatment, the Minister of Justice had a special committee take up the question of the reform of long-term treatment of the "youth prison" clientele. The problem of what should be done to resocialize the worst of the eighteen-to-twenty-year-old offenders was to be the point of focus in the discussion. Out of this came a proposal to set up a special institution at Røxtuna. Parliament approved, after a bitter political fight due to the high construction and maintenance costs involved. The institution is now nearly completed and can probably be opened in the fall of 1954.

Røxtuna is the result of both Swedish and American experience and views. It is organized on a "small group" principle, which means that the sixty-five inmates will be assigned to separate houses with no more than nine in each. The treatment will be medico-psychological in orientation and the director will be a psychiatrist. The vocational training will be first class and leisure-time activities will be developed with the aid of the Big Brothers.

When the youth arrives at the institution he will be placed in a reception section, accommodating six persons and located in the building where the physician and other high ranking staff members have their offices and where, besides, a sick bay and clinic will be found. After a preliminary examination the new arrival may be assigned to one of the two special houses designed for escape artists and dangerous inmates. A maximum of seven persons can be placed in either house; each will have its own workshop and be surrounded by a wire fence (not barbed, however). At least two officers will always be on duty in each house. If the newcomer is not presumed to be either a bad escape risk or dangerous he will be assigned to one of the four intermediate houses, each of which has

room for nine persons, is supervised around the clock by an officer, and is locked at night; the boys may work in shops located on the outside and use the gymnasium and the athletic field during their free periods, under supervision. Finally, there will be a completely open section, without constant supervision from an officer and in which the boys may move quite freely. This can be regarded as a release section.

All the houses that serve as dwellings lie at least fifty meters from each other. They and the houses of the personnel are beautifully situated in a grove; the whole tract will be unfenced.

The personnel will consist of a physician, a psychologist, a nurse, a social worker, and an assistant, who together will form a treatment team, plus administrative and custodial personnel, fifty-one persons in all. Eventually it is expected that a second physician and an assistant will be added. The assistants will chiefly guide leisure-time activities. The custodial personnel will work a forty-eight-hour week.

The cost of Røxtuna will run to 7.5 million kronor, or 110,000 kronor (over \$21,000) per inmate, the highest per capita cost ever expended in Sweden for a penal or welfare institution. This fact has aroused criticism, which has been met by an insistence that there should be no stinting when the salvaging of youthful offenders is concerned. The extra cost of their treatment can become a good economic investment if it stops a career of crime which otherwise might be lifelong, cost the public large sums for prolonged and constant incarcerations, and lead to great losses and injuries to private citizens who become its victims.

The animating idea

The idea behind the Røxtuna plan is, therefore, to utilize in the treatment of

these most difficult youthful offenders the whole arsenal of medical, psychological, and pedagogical knowledge for the purpose of making them useful and law-abiding citizens. During this treatment the staff must have at its disposal adequate security facilities (closed sections) but otherwise have full discretion in applying the treatment in the light of what seems best from a treatment point of view. This means gradually giving more and more freedom to the inmate. Before he is released to complete freedom among his fellow citizens, his chances of mastering the temptations of freedom will be tested by permitting him freedom of movement in an open section of the institution. The first risk will thus be taken at the institution and not outside in free society.

An expectant and lively interest is being shown in the awaited proposals of the Penal Code Commission concerning the open treatment of youthful offenders and a form of short-term intensive institutional treatment. Some British and American experimental institutions, especially New Jersey's Highfield, with its group therapy program, have been kept in mind in this connection. In order to get a clearer view of Highfield and also the potentialities of group therapy in an institutional setting, American authorities have been requested to lend us Dr. Lloyd W. McCorkle for a couple of months. Furthermore, an experiment in group therapy has been begun with prisoners.

THE DISTRICT PLAN

The Swedish penal institutions number about fifty. Most of them are very small. A few accommodate a hundred or more inmates; the largest one can take six hundred prisoners. The institutions in the middle range have places for about fifty inmates each and a number of so-called colonies have room for

about thirty each. The system is therefore complicated and rather difficult to administer. The progressive emphasis on individualized treatment has made these administrative disadvantages increasingly apparent.

Beginning with 1954, the remedy for this situation has been sought in the division of all institutions into seven groups or districts. The largest and best-equipped institution in each is a so-called central institution, to which a number of smaller institutions and colonies are attached. Four of the groups are to handle ordinary prisoners, one is for detainees and internees and one for youthful prisoners. An institution for women and a colony attached to it form a rudimentary group by itself with accommodations for ninety inmates. Only the four groups for ordinary prisoners have been completely set up. Three of them have room for five hundred prisoners each. The fourth, which includes the largest prison, can accommodate about a thousand, but it is planned to divide it into two groups when its central institution is replaced in a few years by two or three smaller institutions.

The southern group

To illustrate the district organization we shall describe the so-called southern group. It consists of the central prison at Malmö, which has a capacity of 180, including 30 beds in a psychiatric section and 10 hospital beds. It also has a special isolation section for disciplinary cases. The other institutions in the group are scattered over southern Sweden: three closed institutions, two of which accommodate about fifty prisoners each, the third about twenty-five; four colonies, each with about forty beds.

The director of the central prison is also superintendent of the entire group

of institutions. The main rule governing commitments is that the group is to receive prisoners who belong in southern Sweden. The Prison Administration can allocate a prisoner to a district, but assignment to a specific institution is made by the district superintendent. In deciding this question and the treatment to be given the prisoner, the superintendent shall utilize a classification procedure based as much as possible on the discussion of the case by a classification committee composed of certain officials of the institution. A conscientious effort is being made to limit the written case record of the prisoners to essential annotations on the principle that writing about the prisoner must be reduced to gain time for his treatment. These annotations shall be made consecutively, and the case record must accompany the prisoner wherever he is sent. When the treatment is completed, the case record must be transmitted to the parole authorities, who upon the final discharge of the parolee will send it to the Prison Administration for filing. If the individual later commits a new crime, the court or treatment authority can demand the file from the Prison Administration.

Classification committees will be found in all institutions. The best qualified one will, of course, be found in the central institution, where an inmate who needs a more detailed examination will be transferred. Prisoners with sentences of six months or longer will as a rule be examined at that institution. In any case, the superintendent will decide whether or not such a detailed study is to be made.

The district plan also includes the novel provision that the psychiatrist of the central institution will have the right and duty to keep in touch with the treatment of the inmates in all the institutions in the group. He may

admit any prisoner he wants to his own section of the central institution.

THE FUTURE

The next task, in accordance with the Zetterberg Plan, will be the reorganization of the treatment of abnormal and habitual offenders. A project exists to set up an institution of a kind new as far as Sweden is concerned.⁴ It had been estimated that this clientele needs about five hundred beds. The question to be decided was whether these beds should be distributed over several separate institutions as at present or centralized in one. The latter solution was not acceptable to our way of thinking. The planning committee concluded that a middle road could be followed, and proposed the erection of several institutions close together. This arrangement would permit the use of a common kitchen, heating plant, assembly hall, athletic field, hospital, and so forth, and yet keep inmates divided into small and separated groups. The plan provides, therefore, both closed, semiopen, and open departments on a single large tract. Although a considerable increase in personnel—physicians, psychologists, social workers, and other treatment personnel—is envisaged and there is to be no skimping in custodial staff and work supervisors, the end result would mean a considerable saving in costs of operation. Comments on the plan, however, have revealed great hesitancy. It is feared that such a concentration of abnormal offenders may bring trouble. The attitude which the government and the Parliament will adopt is not yet clear.

⁴For details see Thorsten Sellin, "The Treatment of Mentally Abnormal Offenders in Sweden: A Blueprint of Reform," in *Vårdorganisation för Förvarade och Internerade* (Stockholm: Ministry of Justice, 1953), Chap. 12, pp. 91-103.

The plan of the committee also presupposes a reorganization of the after-care of those released from the institution. It is planned to set up special boarding homes and to improve parole supervision a great deal, with the expectation that the high recidivist rate of this class of offenders will be reduced.

Torsten Eriksson, Cand. Jur., Stockholm, heads a bureau in Sweden's Department of Justice and is its expert consultant in penal affairs. He has served as director of various penal institutions, as staff member in the Prison Administration, as state inspector of the schools for delinquent children, and has participated in the work of numerous official commissions. He has studied penal treatment in several European countries and has twice visited the United States for the same purpose. He is one of his country's representatives on the United Nations Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, and has published (in Swedish) *Prostitution and Society* (1939), *Crime and Society* (1940), *Gang Criminality* (1941), *Juvenile Delinquency* (1942), and numerous articles in professional journals and the periodical press.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

McCLOY, JOHN J. *The Challenge to American Foreign Policy*. Pp. 81. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$2.00.

Mr. John J. McCloy, whose experience as lawyer, Assistant Secretary of War, President of the World Bank, High Commissioner for Germany, and Chairman of the Board of the Chase National Bank has given him that capacity to understand which Carlyle in Mirabeau called an eye, tells us in this series of lectures delivered last year at Harvard University what he sees as the nature of the Russian-led Communist threat, the problems which this menace presents to the free world, and how the United States may formulate and execute domestic and foreign policies which will lead the free peoples into surmounting and surviving this danger.

The tyrannical and enslaving Soviet-led threat, Mr. McCloy points out, is political, military, and ideological. It can be met and mastered only by a program for freedom not only stronger but equally comprehensive. While the United States towers as the colossus of freedom, we alone cannot overcome the power of these evil forces. We can win this struggle for lib-

erty, prosperity, and peace only by mobilizing and effectively leading the free nations and peoples of the world and continuing to strengthen the institutions of the free world such as the United Nations, the European community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which we have, and by building yet other associations which will give us the power of effective collective action. This is what Mr. McCloy calls the community era of history.

Effective American leadership demands, the author tells us, not only the closest cooperation among all the departments and agencies of our government which must participate in the carrying out of our many-sided program, but the men and women who conceive and execute our policies must have broader training and wider understanding of the problems which we must face than has been possessed in the past by those who have had the limited information and outlook only of their particular department or agency. So Mr. McCloy calls for both new policies and new types of minds to formulate and implement the blueprint of the United States-led forces of freedom.

It is essential, Mr. McCloy emphasizes, that we cannot win the battle for a free world unless we preserve the vitality of our own free institutions and traditions and

show the unity among ourselves which we call upon other free peoples to exhibit with us and freedom-loving people everywhere.

This book should be required reading for every person at the policy level of our government, for it depicts the challenging magnitude of the struggle in which we are engaged and the wisdom, vision, courage, and strength which the mastering of this menace will demand.

CLAUDE DENSON PEPPER
Miami, Florida

CHAMBERLIN, WILLIAM HENRY. *Beyond Containment*. Pp. vii, 406. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. \$5.00.

Mr. Chamberlin has written a number of informative books on the Soviet Union, most of them moderate in tone and all of them based upon wide personal observations in Russia. Like most others he has become increasingly critical of the Soviet government and its foreign policies. In this, his latest book, we find no trace of a former belief that far from being an aggressor the Soviets entertained an almost pathological fear of an attack by others. The reasons for this changed opinion are conclusive and are marshaled effectively.

Beyond Containment, although its title would seem to promise a program for future action, is devoted chiefly to an account of our deteriorating relations with Russia after World War II. It is the author's contention that the developments of these years, so unfavorable to interests of the United States, were largely the result of the mistaken foreign policies of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. The "appeasement" policy at Yalta, the insistence upon the unconditional surrender by Germany and Japan, the failure to furnish adequate aid to the Chinese Nationalists, all these policies created power vacuums in both the West and the East and were, so the author contends, an invitation to the Soviets to press forward to their goal of world domination. After Roosevelt's "appeasement" came Truman's "containment," an improvement on the former yet wholly inadequate to meet the present crisis. What then should be done? Here the author becomes less definite. Our

"main objective," he says, "should be to divide our enemies and do everything possible for the disintegration of the Communist empire," an echo of the campaign speeches of 1952 which caused such tremors of fear among our European allies.

Mr. Chamberlin, however, is no advocate of World War III. Instead, he believes that "Coexistence with a swollen dictatorship like the Soviet Union is possible only on the basis of equal or superior strength, military, economic, diplomatic, moral." Against this view Mr. Truman would probably not protest since it is exactly the one he frequently himself expressed. The new program is thus not substantially different from the old.

If, as is intimated, the first American crusade resulted in the establishment of Communism and the second in its enormous expansion, one may well pause to reflect on the probability of the ultimate good that might result from a third, whether hot or cold. It may well be that there is no definitive solution for the problems confronting a nation placed in the position of world leadership. Perhaps we too shall have to learn, as others in the past have had to learn, to live with our troubles, uncomfortable as that prospect may be. Perhaps even old-fashioned diplomatic negotiations based on realistic power situations may promise more in the long run than crusades, however high the moral and legal plane upon which they rest.

ELMER D. GRAPER

University of Pittsburgh

LANGER, WILLIAM L., and S. EVERETT GLEASON. *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*. Pp. xvi, 963. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. \$10.00.

The jointly authored study of United States foreign policy between 1937 and 1941, of which this is the second volume, has provoked an array of assessments by a glittering galaxy of reviewers. The encyclopedic proportions (over 1,700 pages in both volumes), the outstanding reputations of its authors who were enabled to give four years of their time to its preparation (the Rockefeller Foundation provided \$139,000 while the Sloan Foundation gave \$10,000), and the sources which were

made available to these privileged researchers come dangerously close to making of the study "the final word." McGeorge Bundy has written that the magnificent achievement of collection and organization is so thorough it will not have to be done again. If the authors themselves would not quite agree with Mr. Bundy's enthusiastic appraisal, it is only because they are quite aware of the questions left unanswered by their narrative.

Perhaps the most brilliant analysis of the first volume, which would apply in part to the second, was made in a review article by E. Malcolm Carroll in the January 1953 *South Atlantic Quarterly*. Mr. Carroll raised the question of scholarly detachment of authors who had identified themselves so closely with the government during the war and afterwards. He questioned whether Russian motives could be assessed so easily and categorically without sufficient documentation, and he lamented the lack of consideration for the direct relations between the United States and Germany.

This second volume chronicles the events of 1940 and 1941, and like the first concentrates its attention upon developing world conditions as they impinge upon American foreign policy. While many have regretted the detail required of this approach, it is nevertheless to be expected that it should have been the orientation of historians who have specialized in the balance of power. Their assumption that conditions abroad assume primacy over public opinion in the formulation of U. S. foreign policy is implicit in the remark "Not until the autumn of 1941 did the unrelenting pressure of ugly facts lead the American people to at least tacit acceptance of undeclared and limited war against Germany in the Atlantic." It may be that this assumption has led them to undervalue the role public opinion plays in the formulation of policy. In any event, it is apparent to this reader that the authors have not attempted to compare and contrast the opinion polls they rely on so heavily with other barometers of articulated attitudes which have been available. To conclude, therefore, that Roosevelt often lagged behind public opinion is valid

only in so far as the authors' conclusions on the public temper are exact.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.

Stanford University

HILGER, GUSTAV, and ALFRED G. MEYER. *The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918-1941*. Pp. xiii, 350. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$5.00.

This excellent book begins like a mystery novel: a silent handshake inside the Moscow Kremlin in the early dawn, and four pages later five shots and Count Mirbach lies dead. The farewell of Count von der Schulenberg and Gustav Hilger to Molotov on June 22, 1941 came a few hours after Hitler had broken his treaties of non-aggression and friendship by sending planes to bomb Soviet targets. This was 23 years after the assassination of the first German ambassador to Soviet Russia on July 6, 1918. This book is the history of German-Soviet relations during these 23 years, a narrative supplemented and enriched by the recollections of Mr. Hilger, a German born in Russia, who as a German official took part in or observed the conduct of these relations.

These recollections give support to the belief that the Soviet leaders found it easier and more congenial to deal with Germans of the military and the imperial tradition and later with the Nazis than with officials of democracies—German or any other. For example, during the days of the Weimar Republic the Kremlin was in hot water with the Reich political authorities more often than with the military authorities, with whom they were collaborating secretly. Messrs. Hilger and Meyer add to our knowledge of this hush-hush military collaboration, which was exposed but not liquidated until 1933 when Hitler suddenly ordered the Reichswehr to close down all its activities in Russia. One aspect of this military collaboration not mentioned here but revealed by the late V. N. Ipatieff in his *The Life of a Chemist* (1946) relates to joint preparation of poison gas which Germany and Russia had agreed to share in case of war. Many of the high-ranking Red officers and diplomats involved in this Soviet-German col-

laboration were victims of the purges of 1936-38.

Hitler's "virtual declarations of cold war against Bolshevism" furnished Stalin with a convenient justification for his liquidation of potential rivals. But Messrs. Hilger and Meyer believe that this elimination of the allegedly "pro-German" faction was in fact "a necessary preparation for the German-Soviet alliance" of 1939. They also believe that Stalin and Hitler, for different reasons, were influenced by the Munich conference to decide that Russian-German collaboration was more to the advantage of both dictatorships than continuation of their cold war.

Once Stalin was convinced that the Nazis might agree to an ideological armistice he went to great lengths to show his willingness to make Hitler's enemies his enemies and to collaborate in the congenial task of destroying what was left of parliamentary democracy in Europe. Once the trade, non-aggression, and friendship treaties with the secret protocol dividing the territories to be conquered were signed, the Soviet rulers appear to have fulfilled their obligations more fully and promptly than the Nazis. There were difficulties, of course, but Communists and Nazis seem to have had fewer troubles while the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was supplying materials to the Nazis than Communists and Americans had later when the Americans were supplying materials to the Russians.

This beautiful friendship between Stalin and Hitler soon came to an end as each became convinced that the other was breaking the agreement in order to gain territories or advantages that both coveted. Hitler decided that the Soviet Union was getting stronger and, if Germany were to settle accounts, as sooner or later she must, it had better be soon. On December 18, 1940, five weeks after Molotov had visited Berlin to bargain for a new settlement, Hitler gave orders for Operation Barbarossa "to crush Soviet Russia in a swift campaign." Meanwhile, in the U.S.S.R. anyone who spread rumors about a possible Soviet-Nazi war was sent to jail. One gets the impression that Stalin was unpleasantly surprised by the swiftness of the Nazi conquests, that he feared, dis-

trusted, and at the same time respected Hitler, and that he was ready to bargain and make concessions to avoid a break. He did not see in Hitler his own weakness, that "dizziness from success" by which dictators are so often afflicted and destroyed.

HAROLD H. FISHER

Stanford University

DEUTSCH, KARL W. *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*. Pp. x, 292. Cambridge, Mass.: The Technology Press, jointly with John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1953. \$5.00.

The writer of this review is not a student of nationalism and is therefore directly concerned only with Mr. Deutsch's program for investigating it. A proposal to study nationalism with all the relevant methods of the social sciences is not easily distinguished from a proposal that we all resolve to be just as intelligent as we can. This book is so clear (I do not mean that it is easy to read at every point, but that its difficulties are resident in the subject matter rather than the language employed to treat it) and so responsible that its hortatory quality does not offend, but it remains true of this work—as it is of other proposals for broad interdisciplinary research—that study design cannot substitute for what used to be called providence; that is, for our responses to events as they occur. Long before Mr. Deutsch's program could be carried out in toto we should have been forced to reformulate it a dozen times.

Experience in research aimed at informing those who make policy in industry and government suggests that in social research as in the lives of individuals we must limit the span of our attention to problems generated by particular social changes or dictated by particular goals. And, if there is no time to think about the meaning of our partial successes or our failures, there is, for the purposes of science, no time at all. In reading Mr. Deutsch one feels (especially in his earlier chapters) that he is trying to arrange matters so that we can skip the stage of reformulation or reflection which assimilates our earlier results. If we could do this,

would not events themselves force us (as they always have so far) to change our perspective?

To particularize: I am much more impressed by Mr. Deutsch's sixth and seventh chapters which make ingenious use of new combinations of existing social science techniques for area study than I am by his suggestion that we study the ability of a people to communicate with one another as the prime index of nationality, taking as our model of communication the communications engineer's concept of the transmissibility of message units through various systems such as telephone networks or between the elements of an electronic calculator. Of the practicability and desirability of such studies there can be no question. One may wonder, however, whether the results would be "critical" with respect to such an extensive concept as nationalism.

More important perhaps is the question of the size of the enterprise to which Mr. Deutsch would be committing his energies. He is so possessed by his sense of the moral and political urgency of understanding nationalism that he proposes in effect to measure the ability of the people of the world to understand each other. Is it improper to say that any undertaking on the large scale he proposes is itself a matter of national policy? And that it therefore requires that its initiators and directors be in possession of national power? Mr. Deutsch is not a technocrat, but his enthusiasm for world organization leads him to suggest means which the social sciences cannot, in isolation from the directing powers of the society, responsibly employ on so large a scale.

ELMO C. WILSON

New York City

EER, HILDING. *Freedom of Information as a Project of International Legislation: A Study of International Law in Making*. Pp. 176. Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln (for the Royal University Library of Uppsala), 1953. 12 kr.

The United Nations has been able to place international discussion of freedom of information in a setting of grand de-

sign—the ideals of the Four Freedoms articulated as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The indifference which plagued the efforts of the League of Nations in this field is gone, but the same difficulties and dilemmas are present. This book reports on the conferences dealing with the transmission of news and the right of correction, 1949 and 1952, and the drafts of the covenant on freedom of information, 1948, 1949, and 1951.

There is as yet, despite a great deal of earnest work, limited reality in efforts to transmute these ideals into international law. The antagonists in East and West hold their bitter, mutually-exclusive positions and the East is excluded from these proposed covenants by their terms. But the nations for which the documents are intended are spaced widely in their development of political freedom. Some baldly censor the press. Most of the delegates taking part were instructed on the assumption that it was quite proper to pass the current of international news through the magnetic field of nationalism.

Mr. Eek has ably placed the conference materials in their social contexts and has noted differences in traditional legal standards of freedom of the press. Drawing on sources outside the conferences with which he deals, he discussed press industrialism, monopolism, professionalism, and performance standards. Linked with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these topics are domestic and controversial. Efforts to deal with them by international law are wholly unsupported by legal machinery to handle litigation. In bringing them into the frame of reference, Mr. Eek adds to the unreality which persists in this field. He has left to his readers, however, evaluation of the chances of forming international legal institutions which can deal with such problems.

The author was a member of the U.N. secretariat for four years. In the case of the several freedom of information conferences, Mr. Eek did what many a staff man has wanted to do before: After the meetings were over, he sorted out the litter and prepared a draft convention of his own which he felt would improve chances of ratification. This draft stands now un-

tested by discussion as only one man's opinion, but it may gain in importance if discussed by succeeding commissions. Certainly the service performed is one of usefulness to international society.

The principal need of teachers was for a book which would clearly separate and also relate the major documents and the arguments which explain them. Since Mr. Eek chose to go outside the conference rooms for useful material about the press and society, he should also have brought in the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press (1948). As it is, his valuable and helpful book is directed too much at the departed delegates.

The editing and proofreading are not up to professional standards, and this is especially to be regretted in a book published for a distinguished university.

J. EDWARD GERALD

University of Minnesota

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

WALLACE, DONALD H. *Economic Controls and Defense*. Pp. xiii, 260. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953. \$2.00.

The subject of Economic Controls and Defense contains very little to make it a subject of any long time interest or of any interest whatsoever except in periods of extreme emergency. The fact that Donald Wallace was able to write so interestingly about this subject, which so many people seek to avoid, is a tribute to his long background in the practical aspects of controls. Unless one has lived with the problem of attempting to find a common meeting ground between the theories of defense controls and the practical application of the same, he could not have a proper appreciation of the depth of thought in the contents of Mr. Wallace's book.

This work is one that should be a "must" for government officials who are working on stand-by programs. It outlines most clearly the pitfalls that must be avoided, the danger of too much reliance on direct controls, the benefits and disabilities of

indirect controls, and yet weighs all of these against the greater danger of inflation. It does not in any way attempt to glorify the benefits to be derived from a program of controls even in an emergency period, for although controls can only exist as long as some popular support can be maintained for the same during periods that are generally recognized as dangerous, even in those periods a program is subject to constant attack, both frontal and flank. The best way to minimize these attacks is to have a program so well prepared that attention can be given to the current problems of adjustments that are so often used by the detractors of the program.

Wallace's work is one of the best textbooks I have ever had the opportunity of reading on this subject. It is concise and yet it is complete. It meets the requirements of the economists, and yet it is clear enough for the layman to secure a comprehension of the problems involved. It discusses most clearly the fine lines of demarcation as to when each program of controls might be the most effective, and it points out most clearly the dangers of each program. The reading of this volume when the stress of the immediate problems is not with us should be very helpful to all those who might later be involved, whether it be from the standpoint of business or of government.

MICHAEL V. DiSALLE

Toledo, Ohio

MASON, ALPHEUS T. *The Supreme Court: Vehicle of Revealed Truth or Power Group, 1930-1937*. Pp. 58. Boston: Boston University Press, 1953. \$2.50.

This little book of less than sixty pages contains the text of three lectures delivered at Boston University in 1953 on the Gasper C. Bacon foundation. One may wonder initially why Professor Mason felt either a need or a desire to repeat once more the oft-told story of the events that led up to the Roosevelt court plan of 1937 and to the sudden reversal of position by the Supreme Court that did so much to bring about the defeat of that plan. But before one has read many pages the answer is clear, for this is by all odds one of the most informative and sophisti-

cated analyses of the Hughes Court yet available. Chief Justice Hughes is the central figure in these pages, but he is not their hero. That role is reserved for Justice Stone. Indeed, it is probable that this is a preliminary study to the definitive biography of the latter justice that is presumably to issue from Professor Mason's pen at some later date. If so, it holds high promise for the later work.

Let it be clear that this is a highly meritorious study in its own right. This reviewer knows of no other similar essay that more completely and convincingly destroys the theory of the Supreme Court as an automatic purveyor of immutable justice or as a dispassionate arbiter of the early New Deal legislation. Merlo Pusey's recent biography of Hughes is the latest of a long line of works to give support to this theory, and in some ways Professor Mason's analysis of the anti-New Deal decisions of the Hughes Court is a conscious refutation of the Pusey position. Mason does concede that there is something to be said for Pusey's claim that there was no essential change between Hughes's position in the *Schechter* case and that in the *Jones and Laughlin* case, but he adds that this was merely the result of "the most characteristic feature of the Chief Justice's leading opinions—that built-in escape hatch through which he might move later on, in whatever direction expediency might then seem to demand" (p. 54).

In fact, the most striking thing about this book is the critical language used to describe Chief Justice Hughes. Moreover, Mason finds support for his views in the Stone-Frankfurter correspondence of the period, to which he has had access. The blunt way in which these two men referred to Hughes in their correspondence is amazing. After the Court's change of position in 1937, Frankfurter (still professor at the Harvard Law School) seemingly had Hughes in mind when he referred in a letter to Stone to "a synthetic halo being fitted upon the head of one of the most politically calculating of men." There is more of the same.

All students of the Supreme Court will find this little essay fascinating reading

and a highly intelligent analysis of a crucial period in American constitutional history.
ROBERT K. CARR

Dartmouth College

WEEKS, O. DOUGLAS. *Texas Presidential Politics in 1952*. Public Affairs Series Number 16. Pp. x, 116. Austin: University of Texas, 1953. \$1.25 paper; \$2.00 cloth.

The 1952 presidential election was quite different, in its essential character, from any of the other forty-one in our history. The disciplined armies of organized political parties were less conspicuous than in any contest since 1860. The amorphous electorate divided into all sorts of *ad hoc* organizations. Our partisan politics lost its non-ideological character. In 1912 and 1932, liberal thrusts struck at the respectable way of things. In 1952, there occurred the greatest conservative reaction in our history. It was more pronounced than its prototype of 1920, since the threat posed by the barbarian hordes beyond the Vistula was more real than that of the American Socialists and "Wobblies" after World War I. There was a bit of Theodore Roosevelt's "standing at Armageddon and battling for the Lord," but there was more of the grim desperation of Chalons, and Tours, and Vienna.

In no state more than Texas was politics untraditional. Both parties were split. In fact, there were four parties in this fundamentalist uniparty state. Douglas Weeks has done an excellent job in tracing the course of each of these movements. The author and his excellent corps of assistants observed precinct meetings and county and state conventions of both the regular and "rump" variety. Minorities bolted all over the plains of Texas. Sometimes the bolters were the Loyalist Democrats, sometimes the Shivercrats; sometimes the Taftites, sometimes the lusty Eisenhower amateurs. The confusion of two Democratic and two Republican state conventions was worse confounded by two slates of delegates to each of the great Chicago conventions, by struggles in national committees, in convention credential committees, and finally on the floors of both national conventions.

Most of the data were collected for the

Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations of the American Political Science Association. But the author has gone beyond the convention delegations to the study of the general election. He analyzes the four competing groups with respect to geographic, social, and economic factors. And he gives some attention to future Texas political allegiance. I am quite in agreement with his contention that "Presidential Republicans" in the South are not, per se, a herald of a two-party system there. An enduring Republican Party can emerge only as it builds its local organization and achieves a continuing leadership which strives to win elections—and not merely to await the patronage crumbs which fall from a national Republican table. The South may indeed become, in the immediate future, the "swing section" of the United States, moving as a bloc to support the less objectionable of the two great parties.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING
University of Oklahoma

NEW YORK, Temporary State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York. *Four Steps to Better Government of New York City*. Pp. 137. Albany, New York, 1953. No price.

A spirited contest between the Mayor of New York City and the Governor of New York State over the exact nature of the deficiencies and disabilities of the metropolitan government led, in 1953, to the establishment of a commission charged with the duty of examining said government and reporting thereon to the Governor and the Legislature. This report is the result of that study. The Chairman of the State Committee was Mr. Devereaux C. Josephs; there were a Vice-Chairman and seven commissioners (one of whom, Professor Belle Zeller, is a political scientist). The staff was headed by Mr. Arthur Goldberg, as Counsel, and Professor Wallace S. Sayre, as Director of Research.

Early in 1950 the Board of Estimate, at the Mayor's (O'Dwyer's) bidding, had established a *Mayor's Committee on Management Survey*. This Committee was

presided over by Mr. Lazarus Joseph, who is not the same person as the chairman of the state committee although the names are similar. The Director of Research was Professor Luther Gulick. Several of the people who served as staff members or consultants with Dr. Gulick were associated with the state committee. Therefore, although these two committees seem to have been inspired by different conceptions, those who did the work in each committee are either the same persons or people with the same background, experience, and point of view.

In many respects, the Sayre report is based on the findings of the Gulick report—if one may distinguish the reports by the names of the respective directors of research. The differences lie in the fact that the Gulick study is a very comprehensive one (it took years to complete) whereas the Sayre study took only months) and in the fact that its recommendations are highly detailed. Yet the two reports are obviously closely related and the later one is built on the earlier one.

The state report makes four recommendations. First, that there be a City Administrator, whose function would be similar to those of the typical city manager, with certain important modifications. Of these, the most significant is that he should be the "Mayor's man," completely subordinated and responsible to the Mayor, even though in actual practice he would exercise nearly complete authority over the management of the city's affairs. The second recommendation is that the office of Deputy Mayor be retained, but with certain modifications, chiefly in the representative and ceremonial fields. The third recommendation is that the performance budget system be introduced. The fourth is that there be established a modern personnel system clearly responsible to the Mayor through the City Administrator.

By making these specific recommendations the state committee renders an extremely valuable service. Firmly grounded on the research carried out under Dr. Gulick's direction as well as on scores of other studies made in similar fields, it lifts out of the mass of recommendations made by the Mayor's Committee the most

significant and comprehensible reforms implicit in the larger study.

The state committee appears to have found a way to satisfy the demand for a general manager for New York City without diminishing the political importance of the Mayor's office. Already the new mayor, Mr. Robert F. Wagner, seems to have accepted the challenge by putting Luther Gulick in a position to test the validity of the proposal that there be an effective reorganization of the metropolitan executive. As the Sayre report indicates, there has now been adequate study. There is ground for hope that action will be taken along the lines of these recommendations. Not until these steps are taken does it seem likely that the major proposals of the Gulick report will be adopted.

ROY V. PEEL

University of Utah

MARSH, BENJAMIN C. *Lobbyist for the People: A Record of Fifty Years*. Pp. xii, 224. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953. \$3.00.

This book is an autobiography of Mr. Marsh who organized a "peoples' lobby," located at Washington, D. C. He did not work for himself or for a private interest. As he, himself, says (p. 34), "While it is true that the blood of the kickers is the seed of reform, it is equally true that in America a good many kickers—reformers—are extremely anxious to get into the class they are most vigorously damning. They want to abolish classes by getting into the class they want to abolish. That's one way to do it."

At the turn of the century, these people of Mr. Marsh's type were known as "professional reformers," and in recent years they have been described as "do gooders." He had the confidence of the Almighty but lacked the necessary omniscience. He was carried away by the current wave of socialism and seemed to think that a "planned economy" could settle all the ills of man in society. Unlike a leading American socialist who has been converted away from such specious opinions, he was not persuaded that socialism would not work and that it "enslaved the individual." He in-

sisted that "the three great bulwarks of reaction in America today are organized religion, organized labor and organized farmers" (p. 207). He adds that "the program we urged, with the exception of heavier taxation of land values, is much like that of the British labor party and the moderate Socialist parties of Europe" (p. 208).

Were it not for the sincerity of Mr. Marsh, he would have been a most accomplished demagogue, but there is no doubt of the man's sincerity. However far he wrongly wandered in the remedies he advocated to cure the ills of society, there are many shrewd observations in the book, for he knew "Roosevelt's unlimited capacity to fool a lot of people a good deal of the time" (p. 109).

A careful reading of the book from cover to cover brings this reviewer to the conclusion that its main value is in the fact that it affords a psychological study of a professional do-gooder, and also recounts many of the struggles of those who would substitute a European system of governmental control of the affairs, perhaps both public and private, of the American people for the free enterprise system that has been the cause of much of their outstanding success for the past century and a half.

WILLIAM STARR MYERS

Princeton, New Jersey

MIDDLETON, ARTHUR PIERCE. *Tobacco Coast: A Maritime History of Chesapeake Bay in the Colonial Era*. Edited by George Carrington Mason. Pp. xii, 482. Newport News, Va.: Mariners' Museum, 1953. \$5.00.

Neither the title nor the subtitle of Dr. Middleton's monograph quite describes its contents. It might be called: "Aspects of the Economic History of Virginia and Maryland, 1607-1775." It begins with a well-informed account of the ocean passage from Europe to Chesapeake Bay, with emphasis on the conditions of travel and the art of navigation. Then follow two excellent chapters describing the physiography of the region and its flora and fauna. Part Two surveys the tobacco trade, the slave trade, commerce with the West Indies and southern Europe, the fur trade,

and internal and intercolonial commerce. The concluding section consists of chapters on ships and shipbuilding, the merchant marine, masters and mariners, the convoy system, naval defense, and prizes and privateers.

The topical arrangement of data is suggestive of an encyclopedia. The work treats many special subjects, such as ferries, pilots, the volume of shipping, tobacco inspection, and the fisheries. Each topic is treated in isolation; hence the arrangement does not give a full sense of total situations, relationships, or large-scale movements and changes. A discussion of the methods of producing tobacco is somewhat foreign to the general maritime theme; yet the work does not deal with other important features of the internal economy, such as land tenure, the size of farms, or social classes. Two important aspects of commerce—currency and foreign exchange—are ignored. Equally unfortunate is the failure to include an adequate discussion of the English Acts of Trade and Navigation, under which the Chesapeake trade was carried on. And one regrets that the author has not offered an appraisal of the effects of the British colonial system. He shows that commerce bound Virginia and Maryland more closely to Britain than was the case with respect to any other mainland colony. Why, then, did the area that was most closely tied to Britain, commercially, take the lead in resisting Britain's rule?

Mr. Middleton's research has been wide and thorough; hence his study presents an exceptionally large amount of new material. His scholarship is accurate and precise. Most of his accounts of the subjects he has treated are the best now available. The writing—clear, forceful, and concise—imparts a sense of assurance that comes from mastery of a subject. The book belongs in company with the works of Bruce, Wertebaker, U. B. Phillips, and L. C. Gray. Among the many interesting contributions, two stand out. One shows how the Chesapeake network of waterways made possible the tobacco industry; the delicate nature of the cured leaf precluded long hauls by land. The second explains how the Chesapeake region was riveted to Brit-

ain in trade by virtue of the convoy system that was employed during the Anglo-French wars.

CURTIS P. NETTELS

Cornell University

FISHER, DOROTHY CANFIELD. *Vermont Tradition: The Biography of an Outlook on Life*. Pp. 488. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1953. \$4.50.

Mrs. Fisher here undertakes to define the Vermont tradition. She is much concerned with Vermont history, but the history is not an end in itself. Rather, the author uses the story of Vermont's past to show how it "shaped, molded and created Vermont character." This is an attempt to relate "the growth of the tradition by which the people of Vermont . . . live, measure the relative importance . . . of the diverse elements of human existence, decide what makes life worth the great effort of living."

After two introductory chapters, the book really begins with the story of the settling of western Vermont in the 1760's. Two chapters set forth the contrast between the free farmers of western Connecticut, many of whom moved to Vermont, and their neighbors in New York. Much of the bitterness of the Yorker controversy, Mrs. Fisher believes, as well as the rugged individualism that is part of the Vermont tradition, stems from this contrast between freedom and New World serfdom. There are two interesting chapters on the Revolution and on the New Hampshire Grants controversy and a fascinating one on the great Vermont folk hero—Ethan Allen.

The problem of political survival was settled when Vermont entered the Union in 1791; the question of economic survival remained. In three provocative chapters, the author sets forth as many important milestones in Vermont's struggle against poverty: the potash industry, the importation of Merino sheep, and the breeding of the Morgan horse. There is a lengthy discussion of the financial ruin that seemed to face the state at the close of the Civil War, and of how four different crises were resolved. There is a concluding chapter

which defends the author's thesis that the Vermont tradition has not been destroyed, or even dissipated, in this atomic age.

This is a fascinating book. The organization and approach are original, the author's convictions are as staunch as her research was diligent, and her style is delightful—as witness this:

"Set to write of that peaceful, cheerful swarming out from the old hives to found new communities, a Vermont pen begins to dance and gambol, to toss its head and gallop down the page like a colt let out from the barn to spring sunshine. For it was springtime—no matter what the season of the year—to those forward-looking young people stepping confidently along the roads and trails leading them to the future."

Since this book was written, a community near the author's home has banned books, an action that must have made Mrs. Fisher wince. We shall hope, however, that she is right and that the tradition of freedom and the admiration of integrity remain inviolate in the Green Mountain State.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

Cornish Flat, New Hampshire

FLEXNER, JAMES THOMAS. *The Traitor and The Spy: Benedict Arnold and John André*. Pp. x, 431. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953. \$5.75.

When an officer of high military rank tries to sell his honor, it is hardly pleasant to lack for takers or to be lectured by an enemy subaltern. Yet that is what happened to Benedict Arnold in 1779 because he seemed to the British strangely inactive after his treasonable offer. Wounded in body and mind, he actually had nothing of worth to offer the enemy until he finally persuaded Washington to place him in command of West Point.

Arnold was consumed by a personal ambition for social recognition, a quality of his character that originated in the humiliating experiences of his childhood. Learning then that a display of bravery would bring praise from his playmates, he later used the same technique on a grander

scale as a merchant speculator and a soldier of the American Revolution. When politicians and accountants—neither of whom he ever understood—denied him the honors he thought his courage and wounds should have brought to him, he used his authority as commandant of Philadelphia to engage in illegal trade. Even with the additional income, he still supported his lovely second wife, Peggy Shippen, in a state far beyond his financial means.

Peggy was equally as ambitious as was Arnold and seems to have been the leader in entering into the treasonable plot with John André. When, however, the treason was discovered, her hysterics appeared genuine enough to convince even Hamilton and Washington that she was entirely innocent. Aaron Burr later learned her true role but kept it a secret until after her death.

John André entered the British army as an officer who was ambitious to gain recognition only through his literary productions. While a prisoner of war under brutish American guards, however, he acquired an intense hatred of the leveling tendencies of the Americans, a hatred that eventually led him to urge his commander to slaughter them without mercy. Thus firmly convinced of the righteousness of his cause and sustained by a zeal and courage surpassing Arnold's, André entered into acts of espionage in contacting Arnold that finally brought him to the gallows. There he displayed a courage which made him a hero on two continents.

James Thomas Flexner has told this stirring story entertainingly. Without becoming bookish or psychological, he has related certain experiences and circumstances that may put one in the mood to engage in treason or espionage. Because of the current spy hunt, his account is most timely. Of the three principals, only André comprehended the political implications of the struggle.

This volume is important, too, because of the new information presented in it. In England and Australia André family papers have been discovered that do much to change the accepted picture of the dashing counterintelligence officer. Moreover, a more important book on the traitor than

this one probably has not been published since I. N. Arnold's *Life of Benedict Arnold* in 1880.

ROBERT LEROY HILLDRUP
Mary Washington College of
The University of Virginia

BERTHOFF, ROWLAND TAPPAN. *British Immigrants in Industrial America, 1790-1950*. Pp. 288. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$5.00.

Rowland Berthoff's *British Immigrants in Industrial America* fills a gap in immigrant literature all the more striking because the rest of the wall has been so thoroughly bricked up. There are many studies of British immigration in colonial days, books about every kind and sort of continental European immigrant to the United States and innumerable impressions of British visitors who were our guests for a weekend or for a decade or anything between. But the "forgotten man" has been the nineteenth-century British immigrant workingman in the American mine or factory.

As the author himself points out, there are many reasons why this should have been so. Barring the Welsh, and a few Scottish highlanders, no contrast of language kept the immigrant under special observation. The British-American was simply taken for granted, while politicians and sociologists alike directed all their attention to the southern Irish, the Germans, the Italians, and the eastern Europeans. Moreover, the tempo of British immigration, though it increased throughout most of the nineteenth century, did not show such a sudden and spectacular rise as that of some other national elements. Except that most British immigration went to the northern states, and there was a strong concentration of Welsh miners in Pennsylvania, there was little of the intense localization which existed in so many other cases.

Unlike most immigrants, the British moved directly to the same occupations which they had followed in the old country; perhaps because nineteenth-century Britain was the most thoroughly industrialized country in Europe. "Thus nineteenth-century British migration to the

United States ran not in a broad, undifferentiated stream but rather in many parallel channels. Textile operative, miner, machinist, potter, and stonecutter, though passengers aboard the same emigrant ship, followed each his own course" (p. 29). Those with a Celtic strain—the Scotch, Irish, Welsh, Cornish, Manx—showed the greatest tendency to preserve old customs and ceremonies and a separate press (Chapter XI). It is interesting to note, however, that the Welsh became naturalized at a faster rate than either the English or the Scots (p. 140).

PRESTON SLOSSON

Ann Arbor, Michigan

MANNING, CLARENCE A. *Russian Influence on Early America*. Pp. vii, 216. New York: Library Publishers, 1953. \$3.75.

The title of this brief book should perhaps better have been Russian interest in the west coast of North America in the century before 1870. Whether that period can be considered "early America" is a matter of opinion. Some comment in the introduction and two brief chapters at the end seem to have been a sort of afterthought to bring the story up to date, with no regard for the title of the book, but as an attraction, one must suppose, for today's readers. Certainly the post-World War I period and the "Meaning of Communism" have little to do with the rest of the book which is largely concerned with the Russian-American Company and its activities.

The author indicates in his footnotes and in the astonishingly brief bibliography the use of some Russian material which seems to have corroborated the already well-known and much longer accounts of Hector Chevigny, Frank Golder, Hubert Bancroft, Thomas Bailey, and others. The chapters on the connections between the Siberian merchants and the St. Petersburg directors of the company and relations between the company and the Russian government are the most interesting parts of the book. The grandiose schemes of merchants and government officials and the almost incredible difficulties of the men in the outposts of empire are clear—as clear

as the reasons why these schemes were doomed to failure.

The most apparent weakness of the book both for the general reader and the student is the lack of a map of the vast area considered. Eighteenth century place names conceal some spots that a twentieth century might recognize. From eastern Siberia and the islands off that coast to the islands and the mainland of upper North America there are many spots that are not, even yet, familiar, and such names as the Charlotte Islands, Bodega Bay, and Trinidad may not be recognized by present-day readers unfamiliar with the coast north of San Francisco.

The chapter on the background of the Monroe Doctrine has some interesting material, but the brief account in the next chapter of the United States position in 1823 and of Monroe's message of that year is trite, that is, his statement (p. 105) that the British liked the message but "they objected mildly to the statement against territorial establishments, for they were apprehensive that it might somehow develop in a wrong sense." The effect of the Crimean War and of Russia's interest in the Near East on her Alaska policy is well developed, and the initial steps of the attempt to sell Alaska to the United States before the Civil War have not, I think, been so fully discussed before.

The author is, perhaps, handicapped by his effort to deal so briefly with such a long period and so many episodes, for his style is often awkward and obscure, and there are many statements that have little meaning, are unbearably trite, or seem unintelligible, perhaps from too literal a translation of Russian sources. For example, see page 84, "... once the Russians had quit the [Hawaiian] Islands, they had lost their chance to return, for they at once stressed the difference between the competing nationalities, and the verdicts of the people and of the Hawaiian rulers were not in their favor." Nothing in the context will straighten that one out! Or see pages 89-90, "Russian expansion was a curiously complex process, for it was neither exclusively commercial nor military and naval." What country ever expanded by an "exclusive" process? And

surely there is some misprint or bad editing in the following? "Then in a true, democratic system the wealth and smash the hermetically sealed prison of nations and restore that freedom and liberty so scorned and despised by the Great Russians to their victims in this long remote part of the world" (p. 208).

ALICE FELT TYLER

University of Minnesota

HÖLZLE, ERWIN. *Russland und Amerika*. Pp. 312. München: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1953. DM 19.50.

This interesting and carefully prepared volume endeavors to present a detailed picture of the relations between Russia and America, especially in the fields of diplomacy and of ideas, from the earliest contacts until some time after the sale of Russian America and the development of the socialist and revolutionary movement in Russia. The author, interested in the philosophy of history, starts with the premise that both countries were on the fringe of Europe and that their development went largely on parallel courses, even though the sources of the development, the Russian-Asiatic sense of autocracy and the American sense of republicanism, were almost diametrically opposed.

There is a strange truth in this hypothesis, as Russia expanded to the east and America to the west. The Russian serfs were freed at the period of the American civil war. The Russian railroads like the American were finally constructed to open up relatively undeveloped territory and not primarily to serve already established settlements. The author could have gone much further in drawing these similarities and still have been well within a conservative interpretation of the history of the two countries.

Yet his method of chapter division emphasizes the somewhat overrefined theory on which he works. They are: I. Bases, First Contact and Early Mutual Interest (from Peter the Great to the Congress of Vienna); II. Struggle for Idea and Space (The Times of the Holy Alliance and the Monroe Doctrine); III. The Community of Interest (The Period of English World

Leadership). The rapprochement in I and III are primarily caused by the antagonism of both countries to English sea power. The clash in II is over Russian America and the South American Republics.

The Russians and the Americans had a common interest in opposing England's command of the sea, but for different reasons. The former wished to make sure of their imports in neutral ships, the latter, of their shipping, and under these conditions mutual co-operation failed even during the moments of greatest tension with England. The Russian actions in the North Pacific alienated the Americans far more than did the relations of Hawaii and England. There was a sentimental attraction between the two countries, but except for rare instances of personal contact no real community of feeling—an excess of friendly talk and a lack of real co-operation. It is possible that Baranov might have changed this, but he was unable to carry out his plans, and the Russian-American Company, rapidly turning into an arm of the government, could not support him. It is unfortunate that the book has not stressed the actual friendships and agreements on a low level.

It is curious that the Russians who had crossed Europe and Asia did not expect the Canadians and Americans to cross America by land. They apparently thought of America in terms of the sea and the sea only, until it was too late. They were thinking of legitimacy and the acquisition of new territory rather than of settlement, and even the "progressive groups" from the Decembrists to the Communists were essentially nonsympathetic to the new Republic. The American and Russian use of the same terms differed so widely in their basic assumptions that definite agreement was always impossible, whenever Washington and St. Petersburg tried to deal in realities and not in talk.

This is an excellent attempt to synthesize on a philosophical level the meeting of two countries across the Atlantic via Europe and England and directly across the Pacific where men of the same general character were in close contact. It is in a way an oversimplification, but the author has brought together a mass of material. He

has in a sense opened a new field of study which should prove fruitful. His greatest fault is his failure to understand the peculiar nature of the American-English conflicts within a unified linguistic and cultural background, but this does not destroy the value of the work which deserves the most serious consideration by all students of Russian-American contacts both in the past and in the present.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

TRUMBULL, JOHN. *The Autobiography of Colonel John Trumbull, Patriot-Artist, 1756-1843*. Edited by Theodore Sizer. Pp. xxiii, 404. New Haven: Yale University Press (and Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London), 1953. \$6.00.

This notably fine edition of the autobiography of Colonel John Trumbull, the "patriot-artist," is a historical document of some consequence, for Trumbull was a man of considerable importance in his day. Not only did he win very wide recognition in Europe and America for his portraits of the Revolutionary fathers and his heroic canvasses depicting the highlights of the struggle for independence, but he was also on terms of some intimacy with numerous political and artistic figures of both continents. He was a friend of Jefferson, at whose table he quarrelled with William Branch Giles over the latter's "broad and unqualified avowal of atheism"; he knew Jay well enough to serve as his private secretary in the treaty negotiations of 1794; in Paris, he was the guest of Talleyrand in the company of Madame de Stael and Lucien Bonaparte; the French classicist David was his trusted friend; and he knew and admired Alexander Hamilton.

The autobiography itself, written when the artist was a lonely old man in his eighties, is highly interesting but it is hardly a well-constructed book. Trumbull's memory was faulty, and he committed numerous errors of fact; he omitted entirely any account of whole large sections of life such as that between 1799 and 1804; and he carefully avoided any mention of his illegitimate son or the tragic details of

his marriage to a genteel English dipsomaniac.

For all this, the work is nonetheless a masterpiece of unintentional self-revelation. Trumbull was obviously an easy opportunist, and he suffered all his life from a gnawing desire for public recognition and fame. He failed completely to understand the deterioration in his work which took place because of the distractions of diplomacy and the loss of sight in one eye. He was inordinately proud of his short military career of a little more than a year, and he carried the title of "Colonel" for the remainder of his life, although his actual service as a staff officer under Washington lasted only nineteen days. A stanch and unimaginative Federalist, he was naive enough to believe that the excesses of the French Revolution were due principally to the machinations of the Duc d'Orleans. For all his limitations, he was at the same time a man of little malice and some generosity of spirit.

This reviewer has yet to behold a more masterful and scholarly piece of editing than that performed by Professor Sizer. Casual references are carefully documented, hidden details are supplied, and Trumbull's errors are meticulously corrected. This edition might well serve as a model of what fine historical editorship can accomplish.

ALFRED H. KELLY

Wayne University

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

HAYEK, F. A. (Ed.). *Capitalism and the Historians*. Pp. vii, 188. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. \$3.00.

The thesis of this singular little collection of essays is that historians, American and British, have been engaged, if not in a calculated conspiracy against the capitalist system, at least in a spontaneous attack upon it. As Professor Hayek and his colleagues spell out their indictment, the generality of professional historians, in the service of what Professor Louis M. Hacker calls their predominant "anti-capi-

talist bias," have sedulously propagated and promoted a series of myths about the workings of capitalism. The "supreme myth," according to Professor Hayek, the one which "more than any other has served to discredit the economic system," is "the legend of the deterioration of the position of the working classes in consequence of the rise of 'capitalism.'"

Capitalism and the Historians is apparently prepared to stand or fall on the case it can bring against the historical profession in terms of this "supreme myth." It soon develops that Professor Hayek and his colleagues have no serious case to bring at all. What British or American historian, for example, has argued that living standards for the working class have failed to rise under capitalism? No doubt some one has, some time, somewhere; but Professor Hayek, while pleading as if against overwhelming odds for "the recognition that the working class as a whole benefited from the rise of modern industry," does not name a single historian who would argue to the contrary.

Then, in a tardy effort to whittle down the indictment and render it more plausible, Professor Hayek shifts his ground to denounce historians for suggesting that the immediate impact of industrialism might have been to depress living conditions; this, too, is part of the "socialist" plot. Probably some historians have exaggerated the immediate effects of the Industrial Revolution. (This very phrase is gravely questioned by Professor T. S. Ashton as having too "catastrophic" an implication.) Yet, when Professor Hayek seeks to establish his narrower charge against the historian, even Professor Ashton deserts him. In the course of two able essays, Ashton makes it repeatedly clear that the evidence on the immediate effects of industrialism is complicated, that apparently the industrial system in its first impact benefited some workers and not others (cf. pp. 40-41, 128, 159). Here is Ashton's conclusion: "My guess [sic] would be that the number of those who were able to share in the benefits of economic progress was larger than the number of those who were shut out from these benefits and that it was steadily growing. But the existence of

two groups within the working class needs to be recognized." This is some distance from the fiery dogmatism of Professor Hayek's implication that any historian who suggests that the Industrial Revolution was not just ducky for everybody is probably subversive.

The fact is, of course, that most British and American historians have been deeply and uncritically devoted to the capitalist system. In their desire to make a case against the profession, Professor Hayek and his collaborators must roam far afield to drag in Bertrand Russell, Gustavus Myers, Matthew Josephson, Friederich Engels, John Crowe Ransom, and other nonprofessionals. But all the contributors to this queer volume seem to be driven by some curious sense of persecution. Professor Hayek evidently feels himself persecuted by the "socialists," a category so broad in his apprehensive mind that he can describe the American institutionalists as "mostly socialists" and say that "a socialist interpretation of history . . . has governed political thinking for the last two or three generations"; Professor Ashton, by the students at the London School of Economics, who do seem to turn in monumentally silly examination papers; Professor Hacker, by Myers, Josephson, and Charles A. Beard, as well, no doubt, as by a bad conscience over his own radical past; Professor W. S. Hutt, by those incurable sentimentalists who question the virtue of child labor and a fourteen-hour day; and M. Bertrand de Jouvenel, by intellectuals in general.

There is plenty of room for a book in this area. Professional historians have certainly failed too often to allow for the conditions of industrial productivity; this has much too often been taken as a "given" in the historical balance sheet, as if it were an irresistible natural force. But this book adds nothing to such a discussion, except a summons to a witch-hunt. Americans, one would think, have enough trouble with home-grown McCarthys without importing Viennese professors to add academic luster to the process. What conceivably could have persuaded a university press to publish this book is hard to imagine. This volume is one more example of what Sena-

tor Fulbright recently called "that swinish blight so common in our time . . . anti-intellectualism."

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
Harvard University

CHRISTENSEN, C. ROLAND. *Management Succession in Small and Growing Enterprises*. Pp. xi, 217. Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1953. \$3.25.

This is the fourth of a series of studies of small, growing enterprises by the Division of Research of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. The problem investigated in this report is that of providing for management succession. It does not disclose quantitative data, but it is reasonable to assume that analysis of a substantial number of cases lies behind the qualitative conclusions. The author states that the estimates of interviewed bank and trust officers—that 70 to 90 per cent of small companies fail to plan for next-generation management—is substantiated by the study.

Why do small enterprises fail to make provision for management succession? The reviewer takes the liberty of presenting a reason, scarcely noticed in the report, that he considers a basic explanation for the reasons that are emphasized. It has been the reviewer's more than 50 years of observation that at the beginning, and while small, an enterprise is likely to be organized and managed by an individual (or partnership) of promotional rather than organizational temperament—promotional in the sense that he sees a market for a new product, or a new market for an old product, and possesses exceptional native ability for interesting sources of capital by skill in personal suasion—but he may not have special skill in management, or even marketing. The enterprise rides along successfully for a generation on the newness of the product or of the market, and the manager temperamentally gives little attention to organizing for future problems of production and competitive marketing, including provision for successor management.

Given such a situation, there are present

a complex of attendant reasons, such as are disclosed in this report, for failure to make provision for future management: concern for day-to-day tactics rather than for long-run strategy; unnecessary concentration on details of management; indisposition to teach others; fear that overt training of others will create embarrassing situations; and generally the assumption that because things have come out well in the past they will continue to do so.

The 20 to 30 per cent of small enterprises that do make provision for successor management appear, in varying degrees and proportions, to be possessed of characteristics the opposite of those noted above as reasons for lack of provision. Nearly all of these favorable qualities may be summarized under some degree of temperamental concern for the future and for organization that manifests itself in the development of an atmosphere of interest in management problems, the definition and assignment of management responsibilities, staff conferences, and opportunity for individuals to show their capacities.

Many collateral factors are presented in the study, and the report is one that should be read and pondered by every owner or chief executive of a small enterprise.

H. S. PERSON
Dobbs Ferry, New York

GILBERT, MILTON (Ed.). *Income and Wealth*. Series III. Pp. xiii, 261. Cambridge, England: Bowes & Bowes, Cambridge International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, 1953. 35 s.

For some years now the discussions of national income experts have become so esoteric as to be completely unintelligible not only to the layman but even to the general run of economists. This volume containing papers presented at the meeting of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth held at Royaumont in 1951 does not depart from this high technical level. But most of the papers in this volume are oriented towards a theme in which the common man has become intensely interested of late,

namely the economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

The main theme of these papers is the comparability of the estimates of national income of different countries. As the backwardness of the countries in the world is mainly judged by a comparison of the national income estimates of different countries, the pertinent question is whether such comparisons are valid. In any scheme of international economic co-operation such comparisons are also involved. The present methods of computing the national incomes overestimate the income of the advanced countries and on the other hand underestimate the incomes of backward areas. As a result the difference between the two appears in an exaggerated form. While admitting that such kinds of errors do inhere in the present national income estimates the majority of the papers contend that comparisons within broadly defined limits can and should be made. The national income estimates are not unique totals for each country, but, in so far as they follow common traditions and practices regarding computations, comparisons can be validly made. That there are many pitfalls in such comparisons and that policies based solely on that criterion are apt to be often wrong is readily admitted by all, and the need to be cautious is stressed at every point.

A subsidiary theme that runs through many papers is what guidance in regard to policy matters can be derived from national income estimates. Here again it has been pointed out that although they are by and large not useful for microeconomic decision they can nevertheless be used for macroeconomic decisions because they give a comprehensive view of the economy as a whole.

Two papers deal with long-term estimates of the national incomes of France and Japan. The computations of the Japanese national income for the period 1882-1957 presented here put them at a much higher level than that of estimates hitherto available. These new computations show that in Japan the national income per capita increased at an annual rate of more than 4 per cent, an extraordinary rate of growth as compared with

other countries in the same period. This might permit one to suggest a more critical examination of these estimates.

Full justice cannot be done to the merits of the book in this short space.

N. V. SOVANI

Poona, India

CHALMERS, HENRY. *World Trade Policies*. Pp. xxxvii, 546. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. \$7.50.

This book reproduces, largely in their original form, a series of periodic surveys (annual, except in two cases) of the foreign trade policies of the various nations from 1920 to 1953. The surveys, which in recent years have been published in the *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, deal with changes in tariffs, import restrictions, exchange controls, bulk purchasing and other aspects of the commercial policies of foreign countries. They reflect the wide and detailed knowledge that came to the author from his long tenure as chief of the foreign tariffs division of the Department of Commerce.

While there can be no question about the competence with which the surveys have been prepared or about their utility at the time of their original publication, there is room for considerable doubt that a useful purpose is served by placing them in book form. A succession of annual reviews does not provide the general reader with a satisfactory long-run perspective of the developments in world commercial policies or in any phase of that complicated subject. Although the individual surveys often contain penetrating analyses of the trend of events beyond the time confines of the particular year under study, it remains largely for the reader himself to piece together the various time segments relating to a particular aspect of the topic in order to gain such a perspective. This task of analysis and integration is one that the author was well qualified to perform, and it is to be regretted that he did not do it. The specialist in foreign trade might find some help in these summaries of annual developments, but this will be limited by the very fact that they are summary rather than detailed and by the absence of references to original sources. Also, the book

has no index, a defect which is not entirely compensated by a 20-page analytical table of contents.

IRVING B. KRAVITZ

University of Pennsylvania

BECKER, JOSEPH M. *The Problem of Abuse in Unemployment Benefits*. Pp. xx, 412. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. \$6.50.

This is a greatly needed study and an excellent piece of work. Despite much popular discussion of the abuse problem in connection with the administration of unemployment compensation benefits, this is the first thorough and objective study to appear on the matter. The author is, of course, unable to quantify the problem, but he does seek to determine a crude upper limit to the possibilities of abuse under the present system. This is done by confining the study to the period from VJ Day through 1947. In this period the present system of unemployment compensation was probably subjected to the maximum abuse to which it can be put. Employment levels were high so that the worker had the maximum opportunity to abuse the system. Administration was less well organized to prevent abuse than in any future period that we are likely to see. How significant was the abuse? While evaluating the facts the author is careful to allow the reader to decide by his own standards how significant abuse was as a social and economic problem.

The term "abuse," the author points out, may cover two matters. First there is the matter of legal violation. There is the worker who works too much, who draws unemployment compensation while working, and the worker who works too little, who is either not in the labor force or is voluntarily unemployed yet draws benefits. The author describes the occurrence of substantial legal violations in the 1945-47 period that should cause even the most ardent supporter of the system to want to review its administration. He also describes what some state systems have already attempted to do to check abuse and proposes other constructive measures that may help to correct future abuses.

The second type of abuse distinguished

by the author arises through unfavorable economic effects. Did the unemployment compensation program retard postwar conversion by fostering idleness? The conclusion reached is that limiting benefit payments by a stricter disqualification program could not have raised the level of employment significantly. During this period labor force participation was above normal and unemployment never quite reached 5 per cent.

Since the amount of security society is willing to furnish its members is in large part conditioned by fears of abuse, a study such as this is especially useful as a guide for legislators and as a means for promoting informed public opinion not only as to the facts in regard to abuse, but also as to the nature of the problem.

A. MORGNER

Texas Agricultural & Mechanical College

SMUTS, ROBERT W. *European Impressions of the American Worker*. Pp. ix, 62. New York: King's Crown Press, 1953. \$1.50.

This slender monograph, the first of a series, inaugurates the Human Resources Studies of the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University. The series is intended to present the preliminary findings of the University's expanding studies in the early 1930's and formalized as a project by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the University, in 1950.

The study summarizes the key changes that have taken place in the position of the American workers since 1890. The first chapter looks at the American worker through the eyes of European visitors between 1885 and 1910. The second chapter is based on the reports of British Productivity Teams which have studied American industry in the last few years.

Socialists like H. G. Wells and Werner Sombart found that in the most advanced capitalist nations of the world Marxian theory called for a most militant socialist movement. Actually, as Sombart said, "There is no socialism among the American laboring class and those who are called socialists are really a handful of bankrupt Germans with no following."

The most striking result of the series of viewpoints collected by Mr. Smuts is that the foreign descriptions of work and workers in the United States in 1890 and in 1950 bear such a close resemblance. Sombart found that the American worker was not antagonistic to the capitalist system as such. And sixty years later the British Productivity Teams reported that they were impressed by the same values that had been noticed by the visitors in 1890. Then, as now, Europeans were impressed with the middle-class living standards of American workers and the high productivity which made such standards possible.

Sixty years ago the Europeans were as much taken with American mechanization and simplification of work as they were in 1950. One cannot help but ask: "Why, then, has there not been a greater change in European production methods during that period?" Perhaps the answer is already implicit in the European class viewpoints and the differing attitudes towards work that the Europeans take more or less for granted.

Mr. Smuts points out, however, that in one major respect the reports of both sets of visitors have differed strikingly. This has been their observation on the role of the trade unions. Few of the earlier arrivals dealt with the subject of the unions, but the Productivity Teams found it impossible to discuss most aspects of American industry without describing the role of the unions. Thus, the growth of union power in the United States has appeared in European eyes to be accounted for by the acceptance of change on the part of trade unions, and this has helped lead to our improved social and industrial civilization.

Mr. Smuts has done an excellent job in selecting and particularly in compressing his materials. His conclusions are thought-provoking and should interest all who may be concerned with labor and trade union developments.

LOUIS STARK

New York Times

Fundamentals of Labor Peace: A Final Report by the Committee on the Causes

of *Industrial Peace Under Collective Bargaining of the National Planning Association*. Case Study 14. Pp. viii, 119. Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1953. \$1.00.

If wide distribution and a happy reception are to be taken as indicators that a study has served an important purpose and has filled a need, certainly this can be said of these studies in the *Causes of Industrial Peace*. Industrial plants, unions, colleges, and universities, here and abroad, are putting them to use, in discussion groups, classes, and for reference purposes.

The reasons for their success, apart from the timeliness and the broad interest in the subject, are the high quality of the studies, their factual approach, and the succinctness of their conclusions. This is no less true of this Final Report. Here is brought together a review of each study, general conclusions derived from the entire series, warnings about their limitations, and suggestions for further investigations. This Final Report should be one of the most useful of the entire series.

Within this broad area, which deals with authority and freedom, obligations and production, the series has centered upon the readily observable causes of industrial peace. The most noteworthy point about the studies—their strength and also their weakness—is that they have dealt with these broad concepts factually, just as relations between the parties have worked out in practice, and they have not attempted to explore the numerous problems that lie behind plant relations. Take, for instance, the point of management acceptance of the union. Very frequently, this attitude was born during the days of the Wagner Act. But during this period, as we all know, many powerful employers' associations were insisting upon either no recognition of the unions, or, if the government was adamant, at the most, arms-length bargaining. Nevertheless, many managements, as is clear in these studies, did not listen to this advice, and not only gave a clear recognition to the union, but acknowledged the right of the union to share in many aspects of plant operation

that affected the welfare of its members. Why did these managements take this attitude?

Many similar questions that concern not only the attitudes of management, but the rights and obligations of union officers and members, as well as variations in production in the different stages of union-management relations, are a part of the story of industrial peace. For these, and other investigations suggested in this Report, we shall have to await succeeding studies.

FREDERICK L. RYAN

San Diego State College

PURCELL, THEODORE V. *The Worker Speaks His Mind on Company and Union*. Pp. xix, 344. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$6.00.

Packington, a short distance from Chicago's central business district, is the scene of this study, and the principals involved are Swift & Company and Local 28 of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) United Packinghouse Workers of America. This plan, typical of America's mass production industries, with its polyglot labor force, is the real object of investigation. The book is about the people in this union—their thoughts concerning their work, their company, their union, their pay, their hopes, their fears, their aspirations, their loyalties and their general problems of existence. This is an industrial community of some 6,000 men and women, employed by an old, efficient, and progressive firm. Company and union sanctioned the inquiry and co-operated generously in its execution.

Conducted through the technique of personal interviews, a considerable number of which are reproduced in the text, the study employs skillfully the well-established case method. There is a detailed survey of the whole complex gamut of human relations in a large and dynamic industrial plant, from managerial policies and attitudes to union practices and methods. Appendixes present additional information and statistical data. Photographs illustrate functional aspects of the plant. There is a thoughtful Foreword by Professor Sumner H. Slichter.

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

KALLMANN, FRANZ J. *Heredity in Health and Mental Disorder: Principles of Psychiatric Genetics in the Light of Comparative Twin Studies*. Pp. 315. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953. \$6.00.

No more fascinating research in the human sciences is being carried on than Dr. Franz J. Kallmann's studies of twins. In this book he reports his most recent findings regarding the role of heredity in mental afflictions and various other disorders, and offers constructive suggestions for applying this knowledge. Scores of arresting photographs illustrate the text; and even the most environmentally-oriented skeptic may be hard pressed to argue that the amazing likenesses of the identical twins depicted, persisting through life—in some shown, up to age 95—are not evidence of a genetic pattern of development which may extend also to functional traits.

Basing much of his evidence on the extent to which given psychoses afflict both members of monozygotic ("one-egg," or "identical") twin pairs far more often than they do the dizygotic ("two-egg," or "fraternal") twins, Dr. Kallmann helps greatly to strengthen the belief that hereditary predispositional factors are involved in perhaps most of the common mental disorders. At the same time, the fact that in a certain proportion of cases (about 15 per cent with respect to schizophrenia), one member of a monozygotic pair does not become psychotic whereas the other does, shows clearly that heredity is by no means the sole determinant. Here Dr. Kallmann develops the theory, gaining acceptance among psychiatrists and geneticists alike, that in all complex behavioral conditions genetic tendencies are balanced against environmental influences, and a marked "imbalance" in one direction or another can lead to the disorganization or derangement of vital processes and functions. With a strong genetic push in an unfavorable environment, both members of a monozygotic pair may become similarly psychotic; with

From the detailed analysis there emerge certain fundamental principles, previously established in similar studies, but more adequately defined and supported here. A careful reading of the book quickly reveals the central importance of job protection and status, adequate wages, reasonable hours of work, pleasant and healthful physical environment, racial prejudice and discrimination, nepotism and favoritism, security and seniority, intelligent foremanship, and generally enlightened personnel policies and practices.

The author is firmly of the opinion that in industrial organization, as elsewhere, functional lines should be clearly defined. In his judgment, there is a sound principle of social philosophy which declares that a larger group should not seize for itself functions that can be just as well or better performed by a small group. This is the principle of "subsidiarity," apparently quite generally accepted in Roman Catholic social theory. Father Purcell states: "It is a major conclusion of this book that the principle of subsidiarity must be applied in our American mass-production economy to the industrial plant community" (p. 262). The Chicago Swift-UPWA plant community seems not to have been absorbed or destroyed by the power-centers under which it functions, that is, the corporation and the international union. Rather, sufficient autonomy is enjoyed to assure the well-being and safeguard the interests of all concerned. This significant role of the industrial plant community Father Purcell would jealously protect and preserve.

The whole study is clearly conceived and efficiently executed, reflecting adherence to the best traditions of scientific research in the field of industrial relations. The book is a valuable addition to the literature of industrial psychology and labor economics, and will richly repay thoughtful reading by the representatives of management and of labor as well as by the specialist in personnel management and labor relations.

GORDON S. WATKINS

University of California
Riverside

a minimal genetic predisposition, environmental stress confined to one twin may cause only him to become afflicted. The principle is extended to many other conditions, including epilepsy and various convulsive disorders.

Open to special debate may be Dr. Kallmann's discussion of hereditary factors in homosexuality, the supporting evidence he offers of the remarkable concordance of this behavior in identical twins, and his hypothesis (pp. 118) that there may be a "gene-controlled disarrangement in the balance between male and female maturation tendencies," which may support the old "intersexuality" theory as accounting for certain types of overt homosexuals. Suicide, however, Dr. Kallmann finds highly unlikely to occur in both members of an "identical" pair, thus refuting the belief that suicide may be genetically predestined.

Dr. Kallmann devotes a good part of his book to the practical and constructive application of findings in the field of medical genetics, and puts the aims of this new science in sensible perspective. In this respect, particularly, his discussion is a long step away from the views and proposals of the early fanatical eugenisists. Altogether, this book will offer much useful enlightenment and profit to social scientists, medical men, and serious-minded laymen alike.

AMRAM SCHEINFELD

New York City

GERTH, HANS, and C. WRIGHT MILLS. *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions*. Pp. xxi, 490. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953. \$6.00.

This book is designed "to bridge the departmentalized gap which unfortunately separates the sociological and psychological approaches" to an understanding of "the personalities of men in connection with types of social-historical structure" (p. xiv). Within this frame of reference, the authors build their bridge with concepts, assumptions, terms, and assertions culled from many authorities and societies. The principal borrowings, on the psychological side, have been from Sigmund Freud and George H. Mead; Karl Marx and Max Weber have been used most freely on the

"structural-historical" side. The ideas of these men, along with those of many others, have been woven into "models" of character structure and social structure to enable the reader to "understand man as an historical actor" (p. xix).

Four "key" concepts are utilized to build the character structure model: the *human organism*, as a biological entity; "*psychic structures*," such as feeling, sensation, impulse; the *person*, as a social actor; and *character*, as the totality of the individual. The social structure "model" is built around the "key" concepts of *role*, *institution*, *institutional order*, and *institutional spheres*. The human organism's ability to learn roles provided him by his society ties the character structure model to the social structure model. Thus, the gap between the psychological and the sociological approaches to social psychology is bridged. The authors' theoretical ideas outlined above, are developed in the three substantive parts of the book: *Character Structure*; *Social Structure*, and *Dynamics*.

The several parts of the theoretical argument are integrated one with another in such a way that they are suggestive to the thoughtful reader. However, the materials used to illustrate abstract points are fragmentary; often only a phrase, or a sentence, torn out of its social and historical context, is relied upon to make a point. This method of presentation may confuse the general reader. It will not satisfy the critical professional reader who expects an author to present data to support his argument.

Although the book was written as a general text in social psychology, with the tacit hope apparently that it would be used in both sociology and psychology departments, this reviewer does not foresee widespread adoptions because of the abstract nature of the argument and the shotgun technique used to illustrate it. This will be unfortunate, for the theoretical orientation has merit. The authors have shown imagination in their use of concepts and in the way they have fitted them together. The weakness in the bridge they have built between individual character and social structure is the lack of data to fuse the parts into a whole. Until such data

is added the theoretical structure is in danger of falling into the chasm it was designed to span.

AUGUST B. HOLLINGSHEAD
Yale University

SHERIF, MUZAFAER, and M. O. WILSON (Eds.). *Group Relations at the Crossroads*. Pp. viii, 379. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. \$4.00.

After the pattern of its predecessor, *Social Psychology at the Crossroads* (Rohrer and Sherif, 1951), this volume presents thirteen lectures on problems of human relations within and between groups, lectures first given in April 1952 at the Second University of Oklahoma Conference in Social Psychology. These rather disparate papers, succinctly summarized by Sherif in an admirable introductory chapter, range widely over a broad and active research front that cuts across a number of social science disciplines. However, several recurrent themes may be singled out for brief comment.

The subtle and pervasive influences of the group in shaping the perceptions, attitudes, and aspirations, as well as the social behavior of its members, and the fact that basic phenomena of group relations underlie in a significant way human behavior within such institutional frameworks as economics, politics, and the law are two readily discernible motifs. The former is well documented in Anastasi's discussion of group differences in psychological characteristics, in Gardner Murphy's paper on the dynamics of social perception, in Jennings' treatment of sociometric structure in personality and group formation, and most notably in Sherif's contribution on the concept of reference groups which he defines as "those groups to which the individual relates himself or to which he aspires to relate himself as a part psychologically" (p. 20). The latter is implicit in Festinger's analysis of complaint behavior and in the discussion of public opinion and collective behavior by Nelson Foote and Clyde Hart.

The role of symbolic communication in group relations is a third recurrent topic. The process of word-making is given cen-

tral importance in Gibson's nine-step statement of a theory of perception, and Anselm Strauss makes the telling point that the constitution of any *human* group is a symbolic, not a physical fact. J. P. Scott, a student of animal behavior, in a tempered paper on the implications of in-frahuman social behavior for problems of human relations, sees language as crucial in raising human society to a new level of integration. Scott's summary of the present status of research on animal behavior will be of special interest to social scientists since it reviews much material not readily accessible to them.

Finally, mention must be made of the convergent interest of psychologists and sociologists in the experimental study of small groups. Robert E. L. Faris' paper on this lively research movement stresses the sociological contribution, emphasizing that discipline's traditional concern with the primary group. Launor Carter places leadership squarely in the context of group behavior in an incisive paper that draws extensively on the careful experimental work he and his collaborators have conducted at the University of Rochester over the past several years.

In short, this is an important and richly loaded book that will amply repay close study by both specialists and generalists in the study of human affairs.

JOSEPH B. CASAGRANDE
Social Science Research Council
Washington, D. C.

MADGE, JOHN. *The Tools of Social Science*. Pp. x, 308. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953. \$4.75.

During the last three years there have appeared at least half a dozen treatises (including several two-volume works) on the subject of the book under review. The author has apparently not had access to this new and important material. Furthermore, at least in one case, he quotes repeatedly from the first edition of a work, a revised edition of which has been available for over ten years. Accordingly, his book gives a certain impression of being already out of date. The fact is that developments in methods of social research

in the last decade have been so extensive that no one person is likely to be expert on the various specialized tools involved. The present attempt to cover in three hundred pages the large and difficult field denoted by the title necessarily results in dealing sketchily with most subjects and omitting others entirely.

The book opens with a section on the relation of language and logic to social research methods. It continues with considerations of (Chapter 2) the use of documents, and (Chapter 3) the problems of observation in social sciences. The fourth chapter, occupying more than one-third of the whole volume, is devoted to various aspects of interviewing, including a brief treatment (nine pages) of sampling. A fifth chapter deals with experimentation in social sciences. A brief concluding chapter on "The Limits of Social Science" concludes the book. The bibliography lacks important recent items, most of them perhaps too recent to have come to the author's attention. There is a brief subject index. The treatment throughout is elementary and admirably clear.

The author is modest and cautious in his estimate of the different techniques with which he deals, as well as in his estimate of the prospects of social science in general. This attitude, while in itself admirable, causes him occasionally to fall back upon familiar platitudes which have a reassuring sound but have little else to be said for them. Thus, it is piously asserted that: "He [the social scientist] is a person who is elaborating a special kind of skill, but above all he is a human being, and no one but he can decide whether his skills, both in their application and in their consequences, are to be used for evil or good" (p. 294; italics are the reviewer's). Alas, many scientists today are engaged in solving technical problems, the practical application of which they do not even know. Under these circumstances, they can hardly be expected to influence greatly either the application or the consequences of their scientific work. Once scientific knowledge is published, the scientist's control of application and consequences is gone, except as his influence as one citizen can move the community. In any event, we see

about us on every hand applications of scientific knowledge which the authors of the knowledge could never have dreamed of, or controlled.

But the author of the eloquent sentence quoted need not feel too badly about it, for it will be much applauded as a wishful thought. Indeed, one American reviewer (Alfred M. Lee, *Social Forces*, Dec. 1953) has already singled it out for special praise! The inability to distinguish between science and engineering, between sociology and social work, reform, pressure group activity, and other activities is still common among social scientists.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

University of Washington, Seattle

ANDREWS, F. EMERSON. *Attitudes Toward Giving*. Pp. 145. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1953. \$2.00.

Few Americans would be surprised to be told that the partnership of "death and taxes" has been joined by a third member, namely, philanthropic fund raising. For the certainty of monthly campaigns for health and welfare purposes has become as solid as either of these two. Most people, in fact, have become intimately familiar with campaign techniques—and have rather firm reactions to many of them. Housewives, factory and office workers, and even the street trades are in virtually daily contact with the ubiquitous solicitor for organized charity.

It would not surprise us, therefore, if Mr. Andrews' latest book outsold many temporarily better known nonfictional entries in the 1953-54 competition for reader interest. For his review of "Attitudes Toward Giving" is chock full of interesting information about what some of us think of the charity-solicitation situation.

The Russell Sage Foundation commissioned the National Opinion Research Center to get the answers to some of the following questions: What are the present motives of givers? Does giving spring from sympathy for a suffering fellow-man, or from a desire to be superior? Do people deeply wish to leave the world a better place, or just want to escape being thought a "piker?" How far does the social group

determine the giving pattern? What sort of people give, and how much, and why?

Despite the technical difficulty of securing reliable answers to these questions, the Research Center staff and Mr. Andrews have produced a documented study of considerable importance and interest. As Mr. Andrews says, "[the study,] though statistically unreliable, constitutes a revealing commentary on attitudes of some givers toward welfare agencies, problems, and fund-raising methods. . . . Persons experienced in this field [can] build on them useful hypotheses for later testing by perhaps other methods."

Few aspects of life in the United States are more fundamental to "our way" than the nation-wide network of voluntary health and welfare agencies. If they are to survive, their fund-raising methods must reflect both the most scientific and the most acceptable techniques of solicitation. *Attitudes Toward Giving* is not the final piece of research needed to insure this important objective, but it is a substantial contribution to it.

The book is virtually a "must" for professional welfare workers in voluntary agencies. But the giver himself should not pass it up. If he enjoys reports from the Gallup Poll, he will like this one. He will at least find he has plenty of company in his confusion over the multiplicity of health and welfare appeals coming his way this year and next. He will also secure some helpful hints on how he can be sure his contribution will be well used.

A. DAVID BOUTERSE

Pennsylvania Citizens Association
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

KAHN, ALFRED J. *A Court for Children*. Pp. xxii, 359. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. \$4.50.

This volume represents a three-year study of the New York City Children's Court under the auspices of the Citizens' Committee on Children of New York City, Inc. In the press release, dated October 15, 1953, this committee states: ". . . only a minority of the 7,000 children who appear before it each year are served with both 'kindness and skill.'" Further, in

the same release, the committee "... called upon civic groups and public officials for action to provide the Court with the personnel and services necessary for the adequate performance of its task."

To a reader who is not familiar with the Juvenile Courts in our country these are shocking statements. It would be natural for him to criticize and berate those who are responsible for permitting such conditions to exist. Caution must be extended before condemnation. He must seek the answers to such questions as: What are the conditions in the Juvenile Court in his city or county? Are all the children who come before these Courts handled with "kindness and skill?" Does the Court have the necessary tools, such as physical facilities, probation officers, and clinical staff, to provide adequate services? Has his state fulfilled its responsibility in providing the necessary institutions? Are the social agencies, private and public, coordinated in their services so that they represent resources for the Court? Are the citizens informed and interested in their Juvenile Courts?

In the early chapters Dr. Kahn stresses that the Court is frequently the last resort agency. This places a pressure problem upon Courts dealing with children. Intake, disposition, and treatment must be considered in all cases, and there is no latitude comparable to that which exists in agencies with restricted intake. Dr. Kahn points out the importance of the role of the judge sitting in Juvenile Court and the inter-relationship between the probation officer and the child. Throughout the book, the need and use of clinical services are emphasized as they relate to the work of the probation department and the decisions made by the Court. The necessity of supporting services by private agencies and the unmet needs are outlined.

The Citizens' Committee, President Judge, and the Court officials are to be complimented upon making the study and publishing this book. It is a good example of American Democracy in action. The volume contains recommendations for the improvement of the New York City Children's Court, as well as many observations and principles of good practice that should

help judges and citizens in other localities improve their Courts.

E. PRESTON SHARP

Youth Study Center
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

WOYTINSKY, W. S., and E. S. WOYTINSKY.
World Population and Production: Trends and Outlook. Pp. lxxii, 1268.
New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953. \$12.00.

The purpose of this monumental study is to survey briefly: (a) the numbers, the distribution, the characteristics, and the probable growth of the population of the world; (b) to make an inventory of the resources available to man; (c) to indicate the uses he is making of these resources; and (d) to show how he may conserve them. This survey is intended to assist in providing an answer to some such question as: Is production likely not only to keep up with population growth during the next few decades but to surpass it to such an extent that the level of living of the great majority of the people of the world can be raised well above that now prevailing?

Obviously, even such a heavy tome can only touch these matters lightly and in terms altogether too general to be satisfactory to the student although the lay reader will find it both interesting and helpful. Its great value lies in presenting the vast problem of man's relation to his resources in a clear and understandable form rather than in providing answers to the thousands of specific questions the student would like to ask about the volume and the variety of the resources, the uses being made of them and the problems involved in effecting their better use by the peoples of a hundred areas and countries.

The assembling and organizing of such a vast amount of material relating to the supply of arable land, the carrying capacity of the earth, the world's reserves of minerals, the uses being made of these resources, and the outlook for the increase of particular products (such as grains, fish, animal products, coal, and oil) is very valuable. It commands great admiration on the part of the reviewer both for the

vast labor involved and the calm and scientific attitude manifested in presenting the data.

As a compendium of information introducing the layman to the study of the relation of man to his resources the reviewer considers this a most excellent piece of work. As an interpretation of the role science and engineering can be expected to play in the development of the economy of the underdeveloped areas and their probable effects on human welfare within the next few decades, it seems to him to leave much to be desired. It suffers in this respect from the failure to evaluate in realistic terms the length of time it will take these underdeveloped peoples to put our "know-how" of production into operation and likewise to realize how a more rapid increase in production will affect their rate of population growth. Because of these shortcomings the reviewer fears that it will leave the average reader with quite an erroneous impression that population pressure will be of little significance to mankind in organizing his efforts for better living in the foreseeable future.

WARREN S. THOMPSON

Scripps Foundation
Miami University

LOOMIS, CHARLES, P., ET AL. *Rural Social Systems and Adult Education*. Pp. viii, 392. East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1953. \$5.00.

This study attempts "to describe the nature and functioning of systems as well as the channels of communication which provide the information and attitudes governing the actions of men. . . . For the first time in the social sciences the linkages of these systems and the manner in which programs and information funnel through them to reach the individual are described."

The volume concentrates on adult education in rural America, that is, in places of less than 2,500 population. (The sample consisted of 263 counties from the major farming areas of the nation.) It seeks to understand "how various organizations use mass media, the use made of various program 'forms,' such as public meetings, conferences, workshops, demonstrations, institutes, tours, and radio listening groups."

Different specialists deal with adult education in the public schools, the Cooperative Extension Service of the United States, the educational efforts of the general farmers' organizations and the co-operatives (Grange, Farm Bureau, and Farmers' Union), the services of the professional and civic clubs (Rotary, Kiwanis and others), the role of the public libraries and the churches. Nowhere can one find in a single volume the overall picture of rural education given in this series of contributions. The wealth of material is almost staggering.

The several contributors are cautious in their conclusions regarding the best organizational procedure with which to carry on community projects and educational activities. It is highly important to understand precisely how the informal relationships are geared to the formal organizations. Who are the leaders? How many formal organizations do they influence? How do they wield influence? How much propaganda is present, and for whose interests? How do various formal structures tie in with each other (church and school and civic club, for example)? These phenomena were not investigated in these studies and yet these data are important for the understanding of how communication takes place and how change may be introduced.

The authors agree that the leaders involved in adult education in rural America need professional training and experience in rural life, the social sciences, and adult education. The reviewer feels this is the keystone of the complicated program of rural adult education, as it is of any educational program. The different kinds of leaders in the various public, private, and religious agencies involved in rural adult education do not seem to have a clear understanding of their own function, of their educational philosophy, or even of the meaning of education. Indeed, the chief limitation of this exceedingly valuable study is the lack of clarity in what passes for rural "education." The inquiry, by design, was limited to three areas, strengthening of democracy, and understanding and strengthening of the economy. Much, if

not most, of the effort of the agencies and organizations described in the study as relating to these areas can be considered educational only by grace of language.

It should be added that this is no reflection on the competence of the contributors. It reflects, rather, the complex, loose, unclarified, and relatively unsystematic nature of our rural adult education.

NATHANIEL CANTOR

University of Buffalo

STORR, RICHARD J. *The Beginnings of Graduate Education in America*. Pp. ix, 195. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. No price.

Professor Richard J. Storr of the University of Chicago offers an account of the history of graduate education prior to the founding of Johns Hopkins in his *The Beginnings of Graduate Education in America*. His book describes the gradual transformation in objectives and organization occurring in our institutions of higher learning during the years 1787 to 1865.

Looked at superficially, Professor Storr's work is an account of failure. Jefferson's hopes for the University of Virginia were not all realized within his time; Ticknor's proposals for the reform of Harvard College in the 1820's fell afoul of faculty conservatism and shortage of funds; the Yale faculty of 1828 was dead against "that deluge of innovation and would-be improvements in doctrine, discipline and pursuits which is sweeping over the rest of the Country"; three grand programs for great universities in New York City came to naught within a few years of their conception or founding; the Smithsonian funds went for other purposes than the founding of a national university; while other ventures at Western Reserve, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Union College, and the University of the South either petered out, were frozen out, were damaged in internal University controversy, or were lost in the chaos of the Civil War. Offsetting these losses were a few gains, of which the most memorable, perhaps, was the founding of the Department of Philosophy and the Arts at Yale University, the registration of students in that Department in 1852, the

offering of the Ph.D. degree in 1860, and the beginning of an uninterrupted history of the conferring of that degree at Yale, with the first doctorate in 1861.

So much for the ostensible losses and gains; the story is somewhat different if looked at with the modest expectations of the historian. It is clear now that during these years was emerging a consciousness of the pressure of advancing knowledge, an awareness of the gulf separating American and European (particularly German) institutions, insight into the need for the financial support of advanced students, a perception of the difference between the spirit of the gymnasium (using the word in its German meaning) and the proper spirit of the liberal arts, and a crystallization of the competing objectives of graduate work—the further cultivation of the intellect as an end in itself, and the furnishing of professional education for career instructors. In the development of these awarenesses many men participated, of whom especial note is taken of George Ticknor of Harvard, Alexander Dallas Bache of the United States Coastal Survey, Henry P. Tappan of New York and the University of Michigan, and that association of scientists comprising Pierce, Agassiz, Gould, Whitney, Hall, and Gibbs, among others, known as the Scientific Lazzaroni. In their efforts to promote graduate education, all knew their failures, some of them bitter, but after their work was concluded, as Professor Storr notes, President Gilman of Johns Hopkins could say at his inauguration on February 22, 1876: "We begin our work after costly ventures of which we reap the lessons, while others bear the loss."

MALCOLM G. PRESTON
University of Pennsylvania

OTTAWAY, A. K. C. *Education and Society: An Introduction to the Sociology of Education*. Pp. xii, 182. New York: Grove Press, 1954 (first published in London by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), 1954. No price.

Apparently consideration of the sociology of education from an English point of view has been neglected until quite recently. The British have relied chiefly on

publications of United States authors whose general conclusions seem to have been found acceptable but whose detail has not been entirely applicable to the English social landscape. Moreover, as the writer of the introduction to the book under review suggests, there is always room for a clear presentation of the problems of society undefiled by the jargon and verbal infelicities with which some schools of thought have cluttered up our vocabulary.

The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, founded by the late Karl Mannheim and dedicated to the study of society and to contemporary social problems on an international scale, sponsors this book. The volume is described as the first general introduction to the study to be written entirely from an English point of view. The author, a former science teacher, is at present a lecturer in education at the University of Leeds.

The audience at which the book is specifically directed includes teachers at all levels of education and students preparing for the teaching profession. The aims, methods, institutions, and administration of education are examined in light of the economic, political, social, and cultural forces at work in England. Most of the book is written from the point of view of a reasonably objective sociologist. Only in the final chapter does the author consciously assume the role of social philosopher. There he describes the kind of democratic society toward which he would like to see education guide and be guided.

American readers will probably be most interested in the chapters devoted to the social determinants of education in England and to the educational needs of England in the second half of the twentieth century. Comparisons between U. S. and British educational systems are interesting, enlightening, and frequently provocative. For example: "Obviously average standards in the universities of the U. S. A. tend to be lower than in this country, but the conception of university education is different, and the better students all proceed to higher degrees so that the first degree does not count for so much as ours." U. S. plans to increase the common intel-

lectual and social experience of the population "take our breath away." "The problem of specialization . . . has been solved in America; it is postponed to the university stage. They can afford in their High Schools to spend more time in learning less" (pp. 96-97).

Students of comparative education should find this book valuable. Educators who are not familiar with the literature in educational sociology will find the text informative and the annotated bibliography covering the leading references in the field since John Dewey's first publications helpful.

CLAUDE E. HAWLEY
Washington, D. C.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD. *Christian Realism and Political Problems: Essays on Political, Ethical, and Theological Themes*. Pp. 203. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. \$3.00.

In this volume Niebuhr examines a number of seemingly heterogeneous problems, the contents of which are subtly interrelated. Methodological themes of social science are judiciously interwoven with incisive analyses of the phenomena of power and human egotism. Through it all shines more clearly than through any previous book of the author the mature judgment of a mind which accomplished the rare feat of balancing liberal elements of thought and true conservatism. American conservatism, Niebuhr reasons, could not come to terms with responsibilities which the growing power of this youthful nation involved. The failure of American conservatism is the more remarkable because traditional European conservatism understands the hazards and responsibilities of foreign policy better than does traditional liberalism. European conservatism knows the relations of the nations "to be governed by power factors, to which the liberal mind is usually oblivious." While liberal minds are inclined to project overly comprehensive plans into the future, European conservatives have, through centuries-long ex-

perience, been accustomed to the "limited possibilities and short range plans to which the caprices of international relations must reconcile a wise statesman."

In examining the causes of the curious defect of American conservatism, Niebuhr comes up with what he himself calls a sweeping generalization: American conservatism is not conservative at all in the traditional sense; "it is a part of the traditional liberal movement and it exhibits the defects of its creed; but it has not retained many of its virtues." The liberal creed is the product of the bourgeois class. Americans are "a more consistently bourgeois nation than any other," and the many varieties of their political programs are centered in the liberal ethos with such a high degree of unanimity that the term "liberal" has become almost meaningless as a term of distinction.

Our conservatives are conservative only in the sense that they resist social innovation. The business community selected for obvious reasons that part of the liberal philosophy which was drawn from the physiocratic theory and from the ideas of Adam Smith, and which proclaimed the greatest possible freedom of human initiative from state control. Not by mere chance was Britain able to turn toward an "authentic conservative in the hour of peril" while our nation had to turn toward a liberal for leadership in a real national crisis. It was very apparent that only a small fraction of the Republican leaders assessed our position and perils correctly. The business community did not understand the total complex of forces which go into the making of world politics. The liberals of the Roosevelt type, with all their weaknesses in foreign policy, at least were "genuinely internationalist in outlook." In the case of Wilson, the internationalist outlook was devoid of appreciation of the power elements in international relations. "Roosevelt's realism corrected this fault; but both Roosevelt and Wilson were inclined to defy one of the canons of a wise conservatism which restricts policy to limited and foreseeable ends." Even Roosevelt shared the "modern liberal's" penchant for too wide and too sweeping objectives.

The consequent problem arises as to how to generate the practical wisdom of true conservatism without at the same time "losing the humane virtues which the liberal movement developed." Commercial "conservatism" pure and simple tends to create abstract systems of thought which are no less distant from the complex realities of world politics than the systems of the professional theorists, the "ideologues," whom the "men of affairs" despise because they "have never met a payroll." True conservatism is the product of experience which includes all the problems of man's collective life. It is not merely concerned with economic problems. In part at least, true conservatism, according to Niebuhr, is the product of a realistic Christian approach to "the perennial facts of human nature." Whether we win it or not therefore depends on the addition of some measure of Christian humility "to the compound which must serve us as wisdom."

LUDWIG FREUND

Roosevelt College

RAVEN, CHARLES E. *Natural Religion and Christian Theology*. Vol. II: *Experience and Interpretation*. Pp. vii, 227. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. \$4.00.

This is the second volume of the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh, 1951-52, by Canon Raven, Regius Professor of Divinity, Emeritus, at the University of Cambridge, a scholar who has earned distinction as biologist and philosopher as well as theologian. The first volume was on the topic of *Science and Religion*. The present volume continues, in the same empirical spirit, to analyze the nature of religious experience and from it to develop an examination and reinterpretation of Christian Theism in Liberal Protestant terms.

The basis of religious experience he finds in the sense of wonder at the mystery of the universe and of self-consciousness at our isolation from it. Man in attaining his self-consciousness encounters the universe and recognizes it as other and alien. His recognition of the mystery and wonder and fear associated with it disclose to him his individuality. This encounter with the

infinite is characterized by amazement, adoration, rapture, dread, ecstasy, a sense of communion, abasement, and a consciousness of need and of obligation. It has the distinctive quality of contact with a personal or superpersonal reality. This experience is not confined to saints and mystics. "Most normal people will at some time in their lives have known something not very dissimilar" (p. 45). But the religious mind dwells upon it, cultivates it, and seeks to understand its meaning. It is the argument of these lectures that "The experience is emphatically not to be explained in lower than personal categories. . . . A universe which contains the personal must not be interpreted on a lower scale" (p. 58).

Canon Raven does not claim that his argument for an organismic Theism, as interpretation of the universe thus disclosed, can do more than give reasonable support to a faith which is willing thus to interpret it; and he finds the principal stimulus to that faith in the historic personality of Jesus. In the view of the present writer, however, he does not succeed in making the transition from the primarily aesthetic character of religious experience as he analyzes it to the primarily moral character of that which the Christian finds religiously convincing in the personality of Jesus. He follows Augustine in holding that the sense of sin requires a prior awareness of God (p. 24). Yet how could God be thought of as a moral being unless man had first felt the constraint of "the moral law within"? Surely, as John Baillie so cogently argues in *The Interpretation of Religion*, and as William James showed in his studies of religious conversion, man's conviction of the existence of a moral power beyond him arises from his experience of the constraining and uplifting influence of a moral power within.

A. CAMPBELL GARNETT

University of Wisconsin

BAINTON, ROLAND H. *Hunted Heretic: The Life and Death of Michael Servetus, 1511-1553*. Pp. xii, 270. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. \$3.75.

With admirable directness of style and manner Professor Bainton tells the story

of the remarkable Servetus, a figure whose career baffled his contemporaries as it does us. He is recalled largely for the role he played in the career of Calvin, yet he stands on his own feet as a man of importance and distinction. The sixteenth century produced more than its share of men with many-sided accomplishments and into this company Servetus fits easily. A Spaniard, a Catholic by birth, he lived a hunted life to the full. Like his Protestant contemporaries he came early in his career to question papal claims and necessarily left service he had taken in the imperial court. His attacks on orthodox views on the Trinity aroused antipathy in Catholic, Protestant and humanistic circles.

By 1532 Servetus was in Paris, living under the name of Michel de Villeneuve, a pseudonym derived from Villanueva, the Spanish hamlet of his birth. With royal and inquisitorial authorities on the watch for him, Servetus nevertheless continued his studies in Paris and, in order to support himself, became corrector and editor for a publishing firm. In this capacity he found opportunity to indulge his humanistic interests. Certainly one of the most engaging parts of his work was his activity in the field of medicine. Although he remained under the influence of Galen and "did not attain an understanding of the circulation of the blood through the body," he did, however, give "an accurate delineation of the course of the blood in the heart and lungs. His first correction of Galen was the result of dissection." For him scientific knowledge could also lead to greater knowledge of God.

The dramatic climax of Servetus' life story comes, of course, with the writing of the tract on *The Restoration of Christianity*, dissemination of his contentions, and the violent reaction to them, especially in Geneva circles, which led ultimately to his death at the stake in 1553. In connection with this tragic affair Calvin has had many apologists. Professor Bainton is not one of them and he clearly shows Calvin's questionable position. Professor Bainton has told his story well and again demonstrates his pre-eminent qualities as historian, biographer, and writer. Although he writes of the sixteenth century, his pages

offer a constant challenge as we face modern problems and should make us ponder long his concluding admonition that "the story of Calvin and Servetus should demonstrate for us that our slogans of liberty need continually to be thought through afresh."

GRAY C. BOYCE

Northwestern University

EDWARDS, JONATHAN. *Puritan Sage: Collected writings of Jonathan Edwards*. Edited by Vergilius Ferm. Pp. xxvii, 640. New York: Library Publishers, 1953. \$7.50.

Jonathan Edwards was born 250 years ago last October 5, and this volume is a commemorative tribute to his memory. The standard edition of the published works of Jonathan Edwards fills ten volumes, and there are also numerous unpublished manuscripts. This volume therefore is of necessity made up of selections from the voluminous literary remains of this most erudite colonial American. It will be surprising to the many who think of Jonathan Edwards as primarily a theologian and a philosopher to learn that his earliest interest was in natural science. And appropriately the early chapters in this volume are devoted to this interest. The first chapter is entitled "Of Insects," which he wrote at the age of twelve, while chapter two is entitled "Of the Rainbow"; the third chapter is "Notes on Natural Science," in which his observations are illustrated by carefully executed drawings.

The second series of chapters have to do with the New England Revival and are introduced by Edward's "Faithful Narrative of Surprising Conversions," followed by five of his revival treatises, the last being "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," which is generally assumed to have been typical of his revival preaching, though it was not. "Some Thoughts Concerning the Revival" and the "Treatise Concerning Religious Affections" have, as Dean Sperry states, a "curious modernity" and are based upon Edwards' observation of what he thought he saw taking place in his converts, and in a real sense these treatises may be considered the forerunner of what is now called the Psychology of Religion.

The treatise for which Jonathan Edwards is most widely known is his "Freedom of the Will," which is chapter XXI of the present volume. It marks the culmination of his long controversy with Arminianism and with the advocates of Free Will. It is a masterpiece of subtle and sustained logic, characterized by McGiffert as "one of the most notable Museum pieces" of historical Christian thought. John Wesley, himself no mean logician, was accustomed to say "you cannot reason concerning spiritual things."

For 20 years Jonathan Edwards was the minister of the Northampton Church, and until George Whitfield jarred him out of his old ways he was a manuscript preacher, which partially explains the quantities of manuscripts he left behind. He was never a revivalist in the usual sense; he did not preach primarily on terrifying themes, as is often erroneously thought. He was always quiet spoken, but at the same time was an unsparing critic of the conduct of the people who sat in the pews. Under his preaching each individual felt singled out, and as Miss Winslow tells us he made hell real enough to be found in the atlas, and more than that "He made those consigned to it personally responsible for being there." And when religion is personalized it is automatically emotionalized.

The revival of interest in Jonathan Edwards, as indicated by a half dozen or more biographies of relatively recent date, gives this careful selection of his writings a special timeliness.

WILLIAM W. SWEET

Dallas, Texas

CULLMANN, OSCAR. *Peter—Disciple, Apostle, Martyr: A Historical and Theological Study*. Translated from the German by Floyd V. Filson. Pp. 252. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953. \$4.50.

This important volume on the place of Peter within the history of the Christian Church will interest a variety of readers. To students of Christian antiquity it offers a scholarly and fascinating re-evaluation of the evidence bearing on Peter's relations to Christ, the early church, and Rome. Persons concerned with the contemporary ecclesiastical scene will appreciate its ori-

entation to the modern ecumenical discussion and debate. And if these interests are united significantly, that is, if one considers religious convictions as resting upon judgments concerning history, specifically the history of Christ, the book may be regarded as one of the most significant of our day.

The author, who is one of the most distinguished scholars in the related fields of New Testament and ancient Church History, has attracted considerable attention as the result of his teaching and writing. Since 1938 he has been a professor in the University of Basel and since 1949 as well a professor at the Sorbonne in Paris. Among his earlier works his much discussed *Christ and Time* (1945, 2d ed. 1948; Eng. Trans. 1949) deserves special mention.

The present volume, though marked by an unusual degree of scholarly caution, constitutes a plea to Protestants to take Peter more seriously in the light of his position as a representative spokesman for the disciples of Christ and his later leadership in the Church. Contrary to much traditional exegesis, he maintains that Peter personally is in view in the reference to the "rock" in Matthew 16: 18. He also concludes that "probably Peter actually was in Rome and suffered execution under Nero" (p. 152). Nevertheless, he insists that there is support for the idea of apostolic succession neither in the New Testament nor in the most ancient patristic testimony. And he pleads effectively with his Roman Catholic readers and friends to face this issue more directly than he thinks they have done.

Among the features of the book that do not carry conviction to the present reviewer are his transfer of the "rock" passage to a later setting, his argument that Peter's position of leadership was derived from a special commission from Christ, and his contention that Peter was the head of a distinctly Jewish Christian missionary "organization."

N. B. STONEHOUSE

Westminster Theological Seminary

SMITH, NORMAN KEMP. *New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes: Descartes*

as a Pioneer. Pp. xii, 369. New York: St. Martin's Press (and Macmillan & Co., London), 1952. \$5.00.

The acute intellect and profound scholarship which students of his work on Kant and Hume have come to expect of Professor Kemp Smith are again displayed in this new volume on Descartes. Over half a century ago Kemp Smith published his first book of studies in the philosophy of Descartes, but these new studies are in no sense a mere revision of the earlier book. As the author explains, so much has transpired in Cartesian studies since 1902 that he in effect began all over again.

The new studies comprise some thirteen chapters, the last of which is responsible for the subtitle of the volume. They are so arranged as to take the reader chronologically from Descartes' birth (on page 3) to his death (on page 363). This chronological order reflects the author's great interest in all the autobiographical details and hints which Descartes and his correspondents give us. Professor Kemp Smith, more than almost any other student of Descartes, takes these autobiographical statements at their face value. As a result he is able to discriminate eight stages in Descartes' philosophical development, and to assign fairly precise dates to his various studies and interests; this lends great authenticity to the analysis of his intellectual growth. On the other hand the reader may still continue to suspect that some of the autobiography, in the *Discourse* for example or the first *Meditation*, is literary or philosophical rather than chronological. This is reinforced by Kemp Smith's accusation that in a letter to Princess Elizabeth Descartes is being autobiographically misleading.

In spite of its chronological setting this book is a series of separate studies rather than a single developing study of Descartes. Of particular interest are the studies on his early period and on the last few years of his life. Kemp Smith certainly stresses more than any comparable critic in English the changes in Descartes' thought, and the reasons for those changes. Descartes himself comes to life in these papers, as the improviser who had to fashion basic theories to replace the Thomism which

proved unsatisfactory to him, and who lived to regret some of his basic improvisations. We see him as the more or less reluctant victim of his own philosophy, unwilling to develop the occasionalistic aspects of his theories as Malebranche later did, or the parallelistic aspects, as Spinoza was to do.

More attention is devoted here than is usual to Descartes' developing theology as well as to his physics and philosophy. However the discussion of the proofs of the existence of God is oddly unsatisfactory, as if Kemp Smith were marshaling arguments against an opposing interpretation which is never stated.

Nevertheless, all criticisms aside, Professor Kemp Smith's book is probably the only work on Descartes in English which can justifiably claim to compare with the monumental work of Gilson.

MASON W. GROSS

Rutgers University

MACKINNON, D. M. (Ed.). *Christian Faith and Communist Faith*. Pp. xii, 260. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. \$4.50.

This is a series of studies by members of the Anglican Communion with about half the space devoted to a penetrating analysis of the Communist faith of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and its philosophical implications and the other half to the interpretation of the Christian faith from the Anglican point of view.

It is admitted that the New Testament is not a textbook, nor a handout; neither a system nor propaganda; its documents are difficult to handle and impossible to systematize; its bearing upon any political or social order is not immediate. From its pages have been distilled an apocalyptic Christ, a sublime Christ, a thaumaturgical Christ, a communist Christ, an anti-communist Christ, and so on. Christian dialectic is between now and then, not between here and there; it is temporal not spatial. Although God is transcendent, he cannot be left out of account. The gospel has closer affinities with a faith which assumes the indissoluble connection between spirit and matter than vice-versa. "It is

by no means obvious that the gospel is spiritual rather than materialistic" (p. 124). There is no sermon on sin in the gospel. Sin as an abstract theological term is not in the gospel. The New Testament forbids the identification of any man or group of men with the enemy and the devil. It demands a death to wealth, family, and power and a surrender of the heart to the righteousness of God.

The general conclusions reached are that Communism is definitely a metaphysics, the doing of the truth, an activism manifesting an absolute faith that Communism is directing the progress of humanity. Therefore appeals to mercy, pity, and justice are irrelevant because class struggle is natural law. The Marxist cannot permit the separation of his questions from their metaphysical center and therefore is "pathetically at the mercy of his illusions." The Stalinist believes that he is promoting "the march of God in the world." He has a single coherent philosophy which claims to explain all historical events and all social institutions. He is interested in the rent book rather than in a prayer book. The oppressed are told they will soon move across Jordan into a land flowing with milk and honey, namely, the classless society. It is this escape from reality into a world of fantasy, which is the main appeal in Communism (229 ff.).

The elements common to Christianity and Marxism are found to be materialism, lack of universal and eternal solutions, emphasis on history and on eschatology (91 ff.).

The difference between the two is realized eschatology over against a sinless society; sin as alienation from God over against sin as alienation from fellowmen; Augustinian doctrine of original sin over against original sin as capitalism; mystery and uncontrollable forces over against no mystery and controllable forces (94 ff.).

Toynbee's slight essay of fifteen pages is very disappointing (pp. 194-208) since in it he seeks to escape from confrontation of Christianity with Communism "by flight from reality into the world of fantasy! In the present the idealist . . . is necessarily a counsellor of despair. For he takes away

from men the sense that by ruthless, intelligent action they can master their situation," remarks the editor (235 ff.).

The Communists, we fear, will not be converted to Christianity by perusal of this volume. It ought to convince some Christian "innocents abroad" how close to a draw this war between the two faiths really is.

CONRAD H. MOEHLMAN

University of Southern California

VIERECK, PETER. *Dream and Responsibility*. Pp. 65. Washington, D. C.: University Press, [c.d. 1953]. \$1.50.

In a recent issue of the *South Atlantic Quarterly* Anthony Harrigan nominated Peter Viereck to succeed T. S. Eliot as *arbiter elegantiarum* of the new generation of younger poets. The present reviewer considers it a pleasure to second that nomination. Since 1949, when he won the Pulitzer Prize for *Terror and Decorum*, Peter Viereck has given continuing proof of his major stature as poet and scholar. He combines not only the sensitiveness of a gifted lyric poet, but also the fresh insight of an able and conscientious historian.

Each new work by Peter Viereck gives further evidence of his stature as an outstanding standard-bearer of the tradition of humanistic democracy in an age of crass hedonism. His greatest virtue is his consistency. Again and again he strikes with acid pen against statism and totalitarianism on the one hand and against the old, degenerating bohemian irresponsibility of the so-called avant-gardists on the other. His voice is that of the free individual. Spokesman of an ethics-dedicated "revolt against revolt," he denounces tyranny of any kind (whether red, brown, or yellow), directs shafts of ridicule against those who would keep the artist in isolation, and calls for a genuine human individuality in the search for ethics, beauty, and love. Some may resent his bombastic style as a critic, but none can deny the high personal ethics and the warm love for humanity of this brilliant young American.

In his latest book, *Dream and Responsibility*, Viereck seeks a clearly conceived

poetic ideal by offering a revaluation of the tension between poetry and society. He analyzes four test cases: Stefan George and his circle in Weimar Germany; Ezra Pound and the "New Critics" in America; Hart Crane's "The Bridge"; and the impact of industrialization upon modern literature. He rejects the straightjacket of Marxist materialism on the ground that the intrusion of political responsibility, or fear of being an "irresponsible," degrades art into mere propaganda. At the same time he denounces New Criticism formalism with its accent on didacticism, shallow isolation, and loss of aesthetic magic. The main prerequisite for all civilization and culture, including poetry, is to be found in ethical values, not in narrow political partisanship.

In his concluding chapter Viereck urges the American poet in the machine age to become the mediator between the outward material world and the inner spiritual world. It is not the business of the poet, he concludes, to provide political or economic solutions for the ills of mankind, but, by mediating between the two worlds of machine and spirit, he may inspire in society that bifocal vision which is the prerequisite to any solution. In this way the artist can help man become the master of things instead of things the masters of man.

Throughout this penetrating and provocative contribution to the literature of criticism Viereck emphasizes the goal of human individuality. "What characterizes the human spirit?" he asks. "The earth is a freer place to breathe in, every time you love without asking or calculating any return. It is freer every time you feel spontaneous sympathy for strangers. It is freer every time you make your drudgeries and routines still more inefficient by taking plenty of time out to experience the shock of beauty, whether in nature, poetry, music, or the fine arts" (p. 42).

This is the voice of reason. None but the fool would reject Viereck's world of the free spirit for the totalitarian nightmare of George Orwell's "1984."

LOUIS L. SNYDER

City College of New York

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

THOMPSON, FAITH. *A Short History of Parliament, 1295-1642*. Pp. x, 280. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953. \$4.50.

Miss Faith Thompson has undertaken an incredibly difficult task. An institution is always the product of its environment both past and present and can be understood only in relation to it. Hence the historian of any institution must depict the relevant features of the environment. But Parliament was the central institution of English government, and almost every aspect of English civilization is relevant to it. For the careful and thoughtful reader Miss Thompson has solved this problem very effectively. Three chapters are devoted solely to the civilization that formed the environment of Parliament, and she has succeeded in describing the significant elements in small space. But the reader must be careful. Often a single sentence covers a subject of vital importance if the development of Parliament is to be understood.

Another difficulty in summarizing the history of Parliament is that the subject is an extremely live one among historians. If a subject is dead or at least in a quiet coma, one can frequently say "the generally accepted opinion of scholars is." There are few aspects of the history of Parliament on which there is any generally accepted opinion—the debates are still lively and vigorous. Miss Thompson has mentioned all important views and has used careful judgment in choosing the balance between them. But it will be a rare specialist who will entirely agree with the result. Most will feel that some aspects have been stressed too much and others too little. Miss Thompson has carefully chosen the middle road and hence will be shot at from both sides. For the non-specialist who wants to know what the questions at issue are without worrying much over the merits of the arguments Miss Thompson has performed a signal service.

The story of the origins and develop-

ment of Parliament is told most skilfully. Miss Thompson has the ability to merge effectively broad generalization, careful exposition of detail, and striking concrete examples. A reader with a respectable knowledge of English history will find the book extremely illuminating. No one who is interested in Anglo-American constitutional, political, or legal history can afford to neglect it.

Obviously in a book of this sort any reviewer will find statements that trouble him. The requirement that permission be obtained to build castles was not new in the fourteenth century but was established by Henry I. The Norman and Angevin kings created earls by charters rather than by letters patent. The footnote on page 255 stating that the kings had sold much of the medieval royal forest suggests that all lands included in the forest had once been royal demesne which is, of course, not true. Even less important but rather annoying is occasional carelessness with names. No one lived in the reign of Edward II who could be called John of Richmond, earl of Brittany. A cadet of the dukes of Brittany was called John of Brittany, earl of Richmond. Margaret Beaufort was the mother of Henry VII, but she was never a queen. Finally on page 198 we are supplied with an addition to the English royal house, James IV. Let me hasten to add that Miss Thompson is not a rabid Jacobite—she clearly means William IV. But these are small flaws that will not trouble most readers of this excellent book.

SIDNEY PAINTER

Johns Hopkins University

POLNAY, PETER DE. *Death of a Legend: The True Story of Bonny Prince Charlie*. Pp. xiv, 265. New York: British Book Center, 1953. \$4.00.

This book is an excellent psychological study of Bonny Prince Charles and is as much the story of the death of a man as it is the death of a legend. What a shame that Bonny Prince Charlie did not die in the Highlands in 1745 during his hours of near greatness! If such had taken place, much later grief to the Prince and to his

followers would have been avoided. The legend could have been perpetuated in all its glory. As it was, the "King over the water" became the "Prince in his cups."

Exile is always degrading and in most cases degenerating. Charles II, made of much sterner stuff than his Stuart namesake, illustrated well the moral deterioration of forced expatriates. Charles II however always had hope of ending his travels and returning to his throne. One wonders what thirty years more of wandering would have done to him. Perhaps the Stuart legend would have ended before Bonny Prince Charlie was born.

Fate is a mischievous imp. Never was the poet more accurate than when he pointed out that the saddest words in life are "It might have been." The lost dream, the faded illusion often become a ruinous cancer eating away the souls of men who have no future but only the acrid ashes of the past and the hollowness of the present. With the years the bitterness deepens, the rancor grows. Tried and trusted friends are blamed for not doing their all in the time of crisis or afterwards. Soon the friends drop off—or even worse are sent away—and the man remains alone with his barren emptiness. The bottle, the illicit bed, a mania for collecting, and small and large talk are unsuccessfully called upon to act as opiates. Something that is less than a human being remains. A soul is dead, expiring when hope and faith departed. Without hope and without faith it is easy "to look into the pewter pot, and see the world as it is not."

A few of the very large souls can adjust to the adversity of exile and realize that for them hope for a place on high is ended. Bonny Prince Charlie was not of the stuff of such greatness. In happier times, he might have made a great king, but these were not for the Stuarts' happy times. Unlike his father and brother, the Prince refused to recognize what had taken place in European politics. He could rail at his fate, but he was not even master enough of his destiny to fight it. Shakespeare's Clarence went down in a tub of malmsey. Bottles and bottles of various spirits gave the Prince a false crutch and ruined him and many with whom he came in contact.

According to Mr. Polnay they brought about the "death of a legend."

Basing his study upon various collections of Stuart letters, Mr. Polnay has done his work well. The legend is put to bed, but like all legends it will not stay there. Let us say, however, that this well-written book with a usable index is a fine study of Bonny Prince Charlie, who allowed too much wine to get into his water, and who broke under the buffetings of fate.

JOHN J. MURRAY

Bloomington, Indiana

WINTER, CARL G. *American Influence on Canadian Nationhood*. Pp. 23. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954. \$1.00.

This brief study merits mention on two grounds. It represents a year-old effort on the part of the publishers to furnish a medium (*Annals of American Research*) for the prompt and inexpensive presentation of research results, particularly in the fields of the liberal arts and sciences. Such a series should prove valuable to workers in social science fields where the industry of scholars has traditionally outpaced available publication media. In particular, the study (a condensation of a Stanford dissertation) discusses several episodes of Canadian-American relations, some familiar and some less familiar, as they have related to the attainment of Canadian national adulthood, showing how in this process United States influence has usually, but not always, furthered Dominion progress toward a national goal.

Beginning with the Alaska Boundary dispute, the narrative runs through a series of problems developing between 1905 and 1909, to the Boundary Waters negotiation and the arbitration of the North Atlantic Fisheries question, both in the latter year; it proceeds to consider the North Pacific Sealing Convention and the reciprocity proposals of 1911, the Halibut Treaty of 1923, the establishment of a Canadian Legation in 1926, and the Statute of Westminster of 1931, and it concludes with Canada's exercise of sovereignty in the declarations of war upon Germany and Japan. Each of these is treated from the

standpoint of its influence upon the growth of nationality.

The study's chief contribution is to the history of the years 1905 to 1911, where it brings out as no predecessor has done the significant contribution of Chandler P. Anderson to Canadian-American affairs. The author's picture of the emergence of Canadian nationality is convincing and interesting. His narrative, like most condensations, occasionally achieves brevity at the expense of clarity. The utility of such a study, and of such a series, depends upon casting a balance between the merits of limited exposure of the results of fundamental research as compared with full access to those results; this reviewer votes in favor of limited exposure as an invitation to the interested reader to pursue matters further.

L. ETHAN ELLIS

University of Rochester

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

KUCHEROV, SAMUEL. *Courts, Lawyers and Trials under the Last Three Tsars*. Pp. xii, 339. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. \$6.00.

Within the last century, the history of Russian justice has recorded three quite dissimilar judicial systems. The second of these, introduced by the judicial reforms of 1864 and brought to an end by the October Revolution, provides Dr. Kuchеров with the subject matter of his book. He writes of this comparatively brief period, during which Russia experienced a taste of Western European law, with the enthusiasm of a participant (he was a lawyer in old Russia) and the care of a trained historian.

His thesis, that Russia demonstrated during this period the capacity to fashion viable legal institutions, is a familiar and generally accepted one; but the materials he uses to support his thesis are fresh and unfamiliar to most Western scholars.

The author gives approximately equal attention to three major topics: the courts, the bar, and the political trials. The section on the courts is made particularly use-

ful by a preliminary survey of the pre-reform legal system. The study of the Russian bar is richest in material, which has hitherto not been available outside of sources in the Russian language. And the review of the political trials, while including some which have been covered in other English writings, introduces many about which little has been known in the West.

In bringing these materials together, Dr. Kucherov has been able to demonstrate that for about half a century Russian lawyers did plead courageously, Russian juries did base their verdicts on a passion for justice, and Russian judges did conduct trials with a measure of independence.

Courts, Lawyers and Trials under the Last Three Tsars is an important contribution to Russian legal and judicial history, a field for which the deplorable scarcity of non-Russian literature has been a serious drawback to thorough study. It is an excellent work which, while answering many old questions, evokes many new ones. One wishes that Dr. Kucherov might follow this volume with a series of monographs in which he could give broader consideration to the various special aspects of the subject he has treated here. For the present, it is enough that he has done this much.

SIDNEY HARCAVE

Harpur College
State University of New York

ROSTOW, W. W., in collaboration with ALFRED LEVIN. *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*. Pp. xvi, 282. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953. \$3.95.

This is a very timely and useful book. "What determines the policy of the Soviet State at home and abroad?" "What are the prospects for change in Soviet society?" In order to answer these questions, the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology commissioned Mr. Rostow to correlate the information available in the works of a galaxy of professional scholars in the fields of history, economics, and sociology, of whom eighty are listed in the excellent bibliography. This reviewer would have recommended the addition of

one more, Lenin, and one of his many works—*Materialism and Empiricriticism*. The mention of this title indicates the chief defect of the book, which is its lack of appreciation of the role of philosophy in both form and content of Soviet society.

Mr. Rostow begins by saying, "It is the present hypothesis that the modern Soviet state is to be understood primarily as the consequence of a peculiarly single-minded effort by an extraordinarily centralized regime to pursue two related but not identical goals: the maintenance of its own absolute internal power over Russian society, and the maximization over time of its power vis à vis the external world." In every key decision, the maintenance of power has had priority. In 1917 there may have been a trace of humanitarianism, but Lenin before his death, and Stalin throughout his dictatorship, placed such emphasis on power that, by the time of the Great Purge, 1936–37, the ideological objective was completely subordinated, except as a cloak for those in power and as a sop for the people.

The struggle for succession to power after Stalin's death is well described, with the judgment that there is a sort of truce among the half-dozen chief contestants, who among themselves have conceded to Malenkov the position of *primus inter pares*. Next comes the stratum of higher bureaucrats in army, administration, security police, production, and information, and below them a vast layer of lesser bureaucrats. The possibility of change lies in the unstable balance among these elements, which could be pushed into radical change by a hardening of the bureaucracy in the interest of self-preservation, by Russian patriotism, by continued failure of internal propaganda to change the character of citizens, especially the peasants, or by the desire of the people for less pressure and more food, or by a combination of these factors. There is a wise caution that change would not automatically thaw out the Cold War, and that external pressure to bring about change in Russia, as in the case of Nazi German aggression, might even strengthen Soviet power.

The book is admirably divided into properly headed chapters and sections,

making for clarity, logical development of thought, and balanced conclusions. It is neither propaganda nor counter-propaganda. In this respect, it is stronger than most of the books of defectors or eye-witnesses. On the other hand, it starts with a limited thesis (as quoted) and tends to draw together selected data largely in its justification, thereby becoming a restricted work. Perhaps the Massachusetts Institute of Technology will stimulate the production of another book which will go more deeply into dialectic materialistic philosophy and seek for its antidote, also into the psychology of accommodation and how to overcome it—both with reference to the daily life of Soviet citizens of all ranks. This would help us in preparing for the day desired by the author and by all of us, when there may be free intercourse between the peoples of the Soviet Union and of our own country.

PAUL B. ANDERSON

International Committee of YMCA
New York City

ZENKOVSKY, V. V. *A History of Russian Philosophy*. Authorized translation from the Russian by George L. Kline. 2 vols. Pp. xiv, 465; viii, 469–947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. \$15.00.

This comprehensive survey is a landmark in the study of Russian thought. Comparable in scope to such recent expositions as N. O. Lossky's *History of Russian Philosophy* (New York, 1951) and the symposium *Iz Istarii Russkoi Filosofii* [From the History of Russian Philosophy] (Moscow, 1951) published by the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Moscow, Zenkovsky's work surpasses the former in comprehensiveness and the latter in objectivity of presentation. The Columbia Slavic Studies should be given great credit for making available this important work, which is translated with revisions from the original Russian edition (Paris, 1948–50).

In his introduction, Zenkovsky expresses the view that the moral and historical role of man has been the primary preoccupation of Russian philosophy. It is thus in the philosophy of history and the search for a synthesis of theory and practice in human

existence that Russian thinkers have made their principal contribution. The author rejects the common assertion that Russia has no philosophic tradition because the theory of knowledge has played only a small part in Russian thinking. He replies by pointing out that the theory of knowledge is only one aspect of philosophy, and sets forth the broader view that philosophy includes all efforts "to unify the spiritual life by rational means." He recognizes, of course that Russian philosophy has been under profound Western influence, but notes that one cannot speak of influence unless there is something to be influenced. In no small measure Russian philosophy has been handicapped by Western influence, insofar as Russian thinkers have been drawn away from their own path. This path Zenkovsky believes to be the Eastern Orthodox faith, which in his view offers sounder insights than does the secularism of the West into the problems that philosophy seeks to solve.

Zenkovsky's first volume covers briefly the period to the end of the eighteenth century which was the seedtime of Russian philosophy, and continues with a more extended treatment of the first half of the nineteenth century in which independent philosophic thought began to take form. In the second volume he discusses the flowering of Russian philosophy in the period from the 1870's to the end of the century, when Solovyov, Fyodorov, Lossky, and others constructed original systems of thought, and he concludes with an important section on the twentieth century. He discusses Plekhanov, Bogdanov, and Lenin among the Russian Marxists, but does not consider Soviet philosophy since Lenin to be sufficiently free from political control to deserve attention. He has much to say, however, on the philosophers in exile, notably Berdyaev and Bulgakov, through whom Russian thought has begun to have world-wide influence.

C. E. BLACK

Princeton University

KERTESZ, STEPHEN D. *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool*. Pp. xvi, 273. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953. \$4.75.

The recent book on *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool* by Professor Stephen D. Kertesz is a significant addition to the series of publications by the University of Notre Dame Committee on International Relations, dealing with recent developments in the Soviet Union and its Eastern European orbit. The volume by Dr. Kertesz is not written for public consumption but is oriented toward the specialist of Eastern European politics. It is a penetrating study of Nazi and Soviet take-over techniques applied to Hungary, one of the most reluctant satellites in the Danube Valley. The book is most interesting where Professor Kertesz projects his own personal experiences into the narrative. As a high-ranking official of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs he participated in a number of sensitive negotiations during and immediately after World War II and was instrumental in presenting the Hungarian case to the 1946 Peace Conference in Paris.

Dr. Kertesz weaves in his personal impressions, experiences, and diplomatic recollections and offers the reader a number of vivid and provocative profiles of well-known Eastern European political leaders. Occasionally the author is carried away by personal prejudices and his judgments of leading politicians tend to be biased or uncertain. On the whole, however, his personalized approach to the Hungarian diplomatic scene produces an unusually useful volume.

Having traced the development of Hungarian politics through the climatic developments of the Second World War, Kertesz offers two significant chapters on "Soviet and Western Politics" and "Hungary a Republic." The latter is particularly important in presenting a minute analysis of Communist infiltration techniques. Dr. Kertesz gives here an excellent account of the myth of hopeful expectations concerning a tolerable Russian behavior vis-à-vis the peoples of Danubian Europe. Hungarian intellectuals were especially responsible for nursing the optimistic illusion of a limited and moderate form of Communism for their country. The author's description of Hungary as a Republic offers a valuable counterpart to the

general surveys of Eastern Europe recently published by Hugh Seton-Watson. It indicates the transitional steps and techniques employed to break down the resistance of an unwilling satellite, refashioning it into a willing vassal state and eventually into the image of a people's republic.

Diplomacy in a Whirlpool has elaborate bibliographical references and several significant documents published here for the first time in English. The reviewer deplores the many typographical errors in the terminal notes of the volume and feels that more careful editing would have helped to eliminate certain errors in both text and bibliographical references.

ANDREW GYORGY

Boston University

KING-HALL, STEPHEN. *The Communist Conspiracy*. Pp xx, 239. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$3.00.

Communism in its various forms is the most important political problem of the modern world. It therefore produces a great deal of literature both favorable and hostile. Unfortunately, this also means that the literature is contributed to by persons who, for one reason or another, lack some of the essential qualifications for the serious treatment of so vital a topic. This weakness takes many forms. Perhaps the most surprising of them is a tendency to write anti-Communist works using precisely the same methods, and precisely the same style, that we have come to associate with Communist writings themselves. The mechanical juxtaposition of texts replaces a serious attempt to understand the phenomenon itself, and to elucidate and to suggest methods by which it can be combatted. Mr. Stephen King-Hall's book falls clearly into this category.

Mr. King-Hall is a former British Member of Parliament, who has had a distinguished and varied career and earned the gratitude of all students of democratic government by his share in founding the "Hansard Society." It may be asserted without fear of contradiction that his services to democracy, in this respect, a positive one, are very much greater than those made in his new volume. One is, ad-

mittedly, put on the alert by the title itself. There are, of course, as we have all too good reason to know, Communist conspiracies. But Communism itself is far more than a conspiracy; whether we like it or not, it is a movement. To believe that the whole problem can be dealt with under the heading Conspiracy is like suggesting that because Guy Fawkes conspired to blow up Parliament the Counter-Reformation can be described simply as a conspiracy.

The number of relatively minor factual errors and the lack of accuracy as well as of discrimination in the bibliography are not perhaps very important, nor should we be influenced too much by Mr. King-Hall's historical introduction where remarks are made on such disparate subjects as the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler, and Mussolini, which suggest a highly simplified approach to the problems of that period to say no more.

It is rather, the core of the book, the analysis of Soviet policy and propaganda, and the attempt to describe the Soviet Empire itself and life within it, that raise the greatest objections. In each case, it is not so much that the facts are selected with insufficient discrimination as that they are looked at altogether externally, that they are not related to the development of Soviet society in its various phases, nor to the terrain in which external Soviet propaganda works to-day. If it were as easy to expose Soviet pretensions as Mr. King-Hall believes, there would be no great and menacing Communist Parties in Western Europe, there would be no defectors from the western intelligentsia, and a book like this would not be necessary.

It may well be the case that these inadequacies are due to the fact that, while much scholarly work on Russia is being done in Western Europe and still more in the United States, its results have not yet been assimilated by general students of politics to the point at which they are ready to be presented as a coherent whole. A bad book is a challenge to write a better one.

MAX BELOFF

Nuffield College, Oxford

SHARP, SAMUEL L. *Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field*. Pp. ix, 338. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$5.00.

This volume is quite difficult to evaluate as to its character. Some of its pages are typical journalistic reporting; they are followed by pages which can be recognized as the result of historical research. Other pages, especially those dealing with the American attitude toward Poland in Teheran, Yalta, and later, are an attempt to digest the information contained in at least a dozen memoirs written in recent years by statesmen and diplomats.

The book presents still another dilemma. If it was conceived by the author and his publisher as a book expected to achieve wide circulation, the average reader will certainly reject it as such. He will be confused by the unusual amount of whole paragraphs, sentences, half-sentences, and even single words placed in quotation marks. They make hard reading and even harder understanding. If, on the other hand, the book was intended to be a scholarly monograph on Poland, past and present, then the reader, interested in the author's sources of information, will be disappointed by the fact that most of the quotations are not backed up by the source references. Even a bibliography is missing. These shortcomings for both kinds of readers place Mr. Sharp's book somewhere in the wide chasm between so-called non-fiction and monographs for the scholar and student.

By attempting to combine the journalistic and the scholarly approach, Mr. Sharp lost sight of the basic problems involved in his subject. This becomes obvious from his handling of the reconstruction of an independent Polish state after World War I. He discusses the American attitude in this matter in complete disregard of the moral forces in the Allied camp which brought about the placing of an independent Poland among the major war aims of the Allies, and also in complete disregard of the generally accepted right of a people to freedom and independence. According to Mr. Sharp, Poland's restoration was not the logical result of these two

elements, but instead, he simply states, "she happened" (p. 68). In his cynical approach to the rights of suppressed nations to independence he writes that "sovereignty is the right of a nation to make its own mistakes . . ." (p. 68).

Mr. Sharp obviously dislikes the favorable attitude of President Wilson and Colonel House towards Poland. The President's known statement "that statesman everywhere are agreed that [as a result of the war] there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland," is quite unconvincingly attacked by Mr. Sharp as "incorrect" (p. 264). The discussion of Polish affairs at the Paris Peace Conference as well as the introductory remarks to the chapter dealing with Poland between the two wars, are aimed at proving that the Poland created in Versailles was "impossible" (p. 68). The entire period between the wars is qualified by Mr. Sharp as "a hopeless struggle to defend an indefensible political arrangement" (p. 113). It is quite amazing to find that in this appraisal of the Poland of 1918-1939 Mr. Sharp revives the discarded slogans of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.

In his Preface Mr. Sharp warns the reader that "he may find the book parsimonious in the use of so-called nice words about Poland and the Poles" (p. v). On the jacket to the book the publisher additionally qualifies the book as "hard-hitting." Nobody could object to this approach as long as the author is objective in the presentation of the subject. But the reader will find in the book a painstakingly selected collection of quotations expressing most negative and derogatory opinions on the Poles and Poland up to 1939, whereas favorable expressions, even those originating with the persons quoted, are omitted. It is not possible to describe this manner of presentation as objective and enlightening. Nor is Mr. Sharp's *Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field* a fair account of Poland's changing destinies. It is a hard-hitting book demanding hard-hitting scrutiny.

W. S. SWORAKOWSKI
Stanford University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

ALBERTINI, LUIGI. *The Origins of the War of 1914*. Vol. II: *The Crisis of July 1914 from the Sarajevo Outrage to the Austro-Hungarian General Mobilization*. Translated and edited by Isabella M. Massey. Pp. xvi, 727. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$11.00.

Here is the translation of the late Senator Albertini's second volume of *Le origini della guerra del 1914* (Milano, 1943). Since it closes before Germany's declaration of the *Kriegsgefahrzustand*, the volume under review stops short of the outbreak of war among the great powers.

Yet, despite the incompleteness of the story, Albertini's thesis is clear: The major responsibility lies upon Germany which, after considering (and miscalculating) the risks, not only gave a "blank check" to an indecisive and wavering Austria-Hungary but also encouraged and even urged it to take the steps which made war difficult to avoid. All the powers, however, share some portion of the blame. Russia's decision in principle, on July 25, to resort to partial mobilization, and its general mobilization, ordered on July 30, were fatal steps, neither one of which was taken with full appreciation of its implications. The encouragement of Sazonov by the French Ambassador, Paléologue, who failed to keep in close touch with the Quai d'Orsay but probably acted upon general directions given him by Poincaré, was another significant factor. Without impugning the personal honesty of Sir Edward Grey, but with contemptuous characterization of San Giuliano's aims and policy, Albertini severely blames both men for not taking early enough the action which lay within their power and which might have prevented the outbreak of war. In dealing with the crucial questions from Serbian complicity in the Sarajevo crime to the Austro-Hungarian general mobilization, the author carefully considers the role of individuals and often discovers that there were significant differences of views and misrepresentation of the facts within the councils of governments. Thus he finds,

for example, that after July 26 Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow kept information from the Kaiser and failed to carry out his injunctions fully.

With the aid of Luciano Magrini who completed the text of parts of this volume, Albertini worked upon the origins of World War I for nearly two decades. He not only utilized all the published sources and most of the secondary material but he corresponded with or interviewed many of the key actors in the 1914 drama. Documenting his exposition with copious quotations from both published and unpublished sources, his work at times becomes an annotated collection of sources. Although he failed to draw up general conclusions, his judgments on individual men and events have the freshness, credibility, and vigor that are derived from a thorough grasp of the subject and the experienced and critical approach of a man who himself had participated in diplomacy and politics. If not the last word, this study is a powerful and impressive one that is indispensable for a detailed examination of the subject.

The translating and editing of this English edition has been unusually well done by Isabella M. Massey, whose completion of the third volume will be eagerly awaited by those scholars in the field to whom the Italian edition is inaccessible.

DWIGHT E. LEE

Clark University

BURNHAM, JAMES (Ed.). *What Europe Thinks of America*. Pp. xiii, 222. New York: John Day Company, 1953. \$3.50.

This book does not quite tell what Europe thinks of America, if, indeed, there is a "Europe" which (or should one say "who"?) is capable of "thinking," about America or anything else. It tells what two Frenchmen, two Italians, a Ukrainian, a Belgian, a Briton, and two Poles think about their own countries and about the United States. But the editor straightens this out. His contributors are not "representative." They are "influential Europeans," all "proved friends" of the United States and "good citizens" (three of them exiled) of their own countries. They are "willing to write without diplomatic reser-

vations." They represent "the Center or the Right," who, as Mr. Burnham points out, govern most of Western Europe today. None are Communists, fellow travellers, or neutralists; all are "nonsocialists," and "all or almost all are anti-socialist."

The similarities in these essays will almost convince the reader that there is a "Europe" that "thinks" integrally—a Europe united by a common enemy and also by a common ally regarded with common misgivings. All the contributors write well, with a depth of historical perspective and an understanding of American political processes. They are disarmingly frank in their criticisms of Americans and their own countrymen. (They also have an exasperating tendency to stare unflinchingly into the future and report what they see there as "facts"—and these are "facts" which Americans persist in ignoring.)

Their essays demonstrate repeatedly and convincingly the deficiencies of our habitual "legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems" . . . "the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgment," to use Ambassador Kennan's phrases. And they all ask America to assume the inevitable responsibility of world leadership, and to "fulfill its function with true grandeur."

The semblance of European unity is lost, however, when several writers permit themselves to suggest *how* the United States should implement its role of leadership: increase immigration quotas, lower tariffs, support colonialism, approve trade blocs, intervene to liberate Eastern Europe but guarantee the Oder-Niesse line (no Germans contributed). Each suggestion seems motivated by a particular nationalistic concern.

The essayists are at their best when they leave off politics and talk about people. Then they tell Americans about Europeans, which is after all a more substantial gain than the narcissistic satisfaction of knowing "what Europe thinks of America." For example, the Ukrainian linguist, Yury Šerech describes a permeating Russian value-complex, encouraged by the Soviets, "that it is a shameful thing to have money and to lead a comfortable life." We who

are puzzled by Russian public conduct find this explains a great deal—including why Stalin never wore a necktie.

WILLIAM BUCHANAN
Mississippi State College

BRETTON, HENRY L. *Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles; A Fight for Reason*. Pp. xii, 199. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1953. \$3.00.

This book is a scholarly study of Stresemann's policy of peaceful revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Parts one and two cover Stresemann's life and the formative stage of his policy. Part three, the heart of the research, deals with the war guilt question and aspects of foreign policy in the West. The last part treats the secondary issues of revisionism, minorities, and disarmament. An excellent author's preface, summary and conclusion, notes, and bibliography add to the value of the monograph.

Dr. Bretton based his study on the published collection of Stresemann's papers and those papers of the *Nachlass*, which were found in the captured archives of the German foreign office. This monograph is the first exhaustive documentary analysis of a given aspect of Stresemann's foreign policy and the first attempt to summarize the over-all pattern of revisionism, which was followed by the great diplomat of the Weimar Republic. The author's research is objective, exhaustive, and documented, especially on questions and problems which have been the subject of scholarly debate or government propaganda.

After tracing the nationalistic background of Stresemann, Bretton states that "his political misfortune" in 1918 marks the real beginning of his fight for reason. The author shows how the foreign minister compromised with the German nationalists and socialists on domestic issues without sacrificing his long range objectives or modifying his policy of fulfillment abroad.

The chapter on minorities is a very able analysis of a controversial subject. The author asserts that Stresemann made no effort to further the union of Austria and Germany while his "minority policy" was largely a deliberate attempt to foster irredentism in Polish lands.

This study analyzes only the political significance of the various reparation settlements and omits therefore a detailed account of the economic aspects of the 1929 all-out attack on Stresemann's policy of fulfillment and of revision through conciliation. These anti-Stresemann fanatics were convinced that the Treaty of Versailles was not "a hollow shell." The author does show how the foreign minister separated the principle that Germany should pay reparations from the principle that she should pay all of her reparations and fulfill all obligations before the Allied Troops would leave Germany.

Stresemann's policies did not prepare the way for World War II. He saw clearly, however, that when Russia was ready to raise the question of Poland and the Baltic states "a new era will open up in European history."

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ
Twenty Nine Palms, California

DORWART, REINHOLD AUGUST. *The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia*. Pp. xx, 250. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$4.00.

The century following the Thirty Years' War saw the emergence of public administration in Prussia. Although the rise of the Prussian bureaucracy has been treated by various writers such as Walter L. Dorn, Herman Finer, and Fritz Morstein Marx, there has hitherto been no full-length administrative history in English on this century. *The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia* by Dr. Dorwart, Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, fills the gap and is a scholarly contribution, based upon a careful examination of the primary and secondary German sources.

The period dealt with is largely covered by the reigns of the Great Elector, Frederick William (1640-1688), and of King Frederick William I (1713-1740). Dorwart is especially concerned with the latter, "the most talented administrator" produced by the Hohenzollern dynasty. While the volume is not primarily a biography, it contains much biographical material and presents the king in a fairer light than

Ergang does in his book, *The Potsdam Pöhrer* (1941).

The work is divided into eight chapters dealing with such topics as the ministry of justice, the ministry of spiritual affairs, public revenues and civil finances, and military administration and military revenues. Dorwart shows in detail how medieval institutions, in spite of great opposition, were step by step replaced by modern administrative organizations staffed by centrally controlled professional personnel trained in the cameralistic sciences. Thus in 1713, a collegial ministry of finance was established for all civil revenues. The military administration developed separately, but in 1723 the General Superior Finance, War, and Domain Directory was set up as a collegial body over civil and military functions.

The author has included several useful charts showing administrative organization at different dates, an English translation of the Instruction of 1722 creating the General Directory, a critical bibliography and an index. Students of administrative history will find much of interest in Dorwart's monograph.

ROGER H. WELLS
Bryn Mawr College

DE IONGH, JANE. *Margaret of Austria, Regent of The Netherlands*. Translated from the Dutch by M. D. Herter Norton. Pp. 256. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953. \$4.00.

This charmingly vivid book approaches the familiar characters and events of the sixteenth century from a fresh point of view, that of the life of Margaret of Austria. The gifted and attractive Margaret was a central figure of the century. Daughter of Mary of Burgundy and Emperor Maximilian, married at three to the Dauphin of France and given a polished education in France, married at fifteen to Don Juan, son and heir of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, married for the third time when twenty-one to the pleasure-loving Philbert, Duke of Savoy, Margaret was early experienced in European statecraft and either related to or acquainted with all its principal actors when at the age of twenty-four her father appointed

her Regent of his flourishing provinces, the Netherlands. Her letters and papers show a keen understanding of men such as Henry VII of England, to whom her ambitious father almost married her, of Henry VIII and Wolsey who came to her court, of Francis I, and of her only brother Philip the Handsome and his tragic wife Juana, whose children including the future emperor Charles V, were reared in The Netherlands under the supervision of Margaret.

Margaret was one of the best rulers and cleverest stateswomen of the country, using her charms as capably as Queen Elizabeth of England in the next generation. She manipulated European statesmen in the interests of her beloved Netherlands, to the climax in 1529 when she dictated the important Treaty of Cambrai, that "Paix des Dames" which "was to live in history as the masterpiece of Margaret of Austria and the triumph of feminine diplomacy over masculine force."

This book narrates well, if perhaps too briefly, the course of Margaret's life (1480-1530) and her influence upon her times. Its judgments are sure and show the author's capability for synthesis. Perhaps because it was written while the author was working in the Dutch underground during the war, the book makes too little use of the voluminous correspondence between Margaret and her father the Emperor, and of the state papers of the times, all readily available in published form. The book has a bibliography and good pictures, but no notes or direct references to its sources.

Its greatest value to readers of THE ANNALS at this time is in the perspective the book throws upon present day diplomatic patterns and problems. Without reference to anything beyond the sixteenth century, the author describes a maze of intrigue, bluff, manipulation, and power politics in Europe under allegedly irresponsible kings, emperors, and petty nobles, which sounds distressingly familiar to students of twentieth-century European statecraft. Even a casual reader of today's newspapers will see striking parallels and contrasts.

Margaret is described in 1529 as "using

her talents to restore to an exhausted and moribund Europe a few moments of peace." The treaty "was to restore the illusion of peace to an afflicted Europe." So even "cold war" and "hot peace" have illustrious historical precedents, and Europe has been "moribund" for a comfortably long time.

OSCAR G. DARLINGTON
Polytechnic Institute of Puerto Rico

HISCOCKS, RICHARD. *The Rebirth of Austria*. Pp. xii, 263. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$3.50.

The author of this book, now a member of the faculty of the University of Manitoba, served as British Council Representative in Austria from February 1946 to October 1949 and has since revisited the country. He has therefore had direct contact with many of the personages, events, and problems which go into his sympathetic but objective account of the second Austrian Republic. The brief introductory chapter is the least satisfactory in the book, and neither here nor in later chapters does he deal really adequately with the effects of the German occupation and the reaction of the Austrians to *Anschluss*. The material on the Austrian Resistance Movement is sketchy and hardly sufficient for an over-all evaluation of that movement. The narrative, however, moves surely and clearly in his excellent account of the establishment of the provisional government under the venerable Karl Renner, and through the negotiation of the four-power control agreements under which the Austrian government still functions. How the Russians ever agreed to permit Austrian legislation to go into effect unless vetoed by all four powers within 31 days still remains a mystery, although Hiscocks advances the plausible theory that this was allowed to slip by because the Russians thought all important matters would be the subject of a constitutional amendment, and thus subject to one-power veto.

The establishment of a government and administration which functions throughout Austria, even though limited by four-power action and at times zonal administration, is, of course, the great advantage over con-

ditions in Germany. In contrast to the situation after World War I, when Austria was plagued by bitter party strife, the new Austria emerged with the Socialist and the People's Parties about equal in strength. Under such conditions it was wise not to attempt to form an ordinary majority government with the aid of a few minor groups, but to insist on a "government of concentration" including both of the dominant parties. To rule a country, where class division has split its people into two great camps, "... through one half of the population against the wishes of the other must lead to the jeopardizing and even to the annihilation of democracy" (p. 48). The Russians have never quite recovered from the debacle of the Communist Party in the November 1945 elections. In 1949 the sole Communist included by courtesy in the Cabinet resigned because of opposition to the currency reform law, and he was not replaced.

There are good nontechnical chapters on UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] and Foreign Relief, Marshall Aid and Economic Recovery, Currency, Prices and Wages, Social Change, and an exceptionally interesting account of the Cultural Revival. Concluding chapters discuss the negotiations for a state treaty, Russian obstruction (which is not so onerous in the political as in the economic sphere), and Austria's clear desire to share in various movements of international co-operation. No mention is made of Austria's participation in the European Payments Union or the international attempts at tariff reduction. The author believes that when independence is restored the new Austria will become a viable state thanks to the combination of modernized and expanded heavy industries (result of Marshall Plan aid) and the return of Russian-seized industries and the increasingly important oil fields.

The book is written without footnotes and is meant to be an informative account for the general reader. This the author has provided in admirable fashion. A good bibliography on postwar Austria and several excellent maps are included.

E. C. HELMREICH

Bowdoin College

OTHER COUNTRIES

Economic Development of British Guiana, The. Report of a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of British Guiana. Pp. xix, 366. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953. \$6.00.

British Guiana, long neglected, is suddenly getting a lot of attention. Last year Britain suspended the constitution it had just granted the colony, on the ground that bloody revolution was impending. Now comes this report, written before the suspension, but published afterward. The name of Dr. Jagan, which has become familiar to newspaper readers, nowhere appears in its pages, which give a somewhat rosy picture of progress since 1948. Why the years of relative prosperity were also years of spreading radicalism is not explained.

Doubtless there is a connection between the unrest and the existence of this mission. That unrest was due not only to poverty but to the widespread feeling of being stuck in a backwater and getting nowhere. Whatever Dr. Jagan's motives may be, some voters no doubt backed him only with the hope of shocking the government into doing something. If so, they succeeded. This report was hardly out before the Governor announced a program embodying most of its recommendations.

British Guiana might be called a hopeful mess. Poverty and unrest are widespread, yet the resources for raising the standard of living are there. This report, like the earlier one on Surinam, belittles the immediate possibilities of the interior. The inhabitants will not be hauled out of the coastal swamps in which they are rotting and resettled inland. On the contrary, the acreage of agricultural swamp land is to be greatly increased. Nor does the mission propose any large factories or major industries. This is a modest program for expanding current activities and producing locally some consumers' goods hitherto imported. The biggest expenses are for increasing rice output and rebuilding the dreadful roads. No one will get

rich that way, but per capita income should rise about 1 per cent a year.

The capital is to come mostly from the government and from abroad. Little local capital has been invested locally. Many companies are foreign owned and much of their earnings are sent home. Some merchants, descendants of immigrants from India, have prospered but retain the Indian preference for conspicuous consumption and hoarding rather than investment. The report reveals that the colony's financial institutions invest most of their assets abroad. So foreign capital is needed not simply because of "poverty," but because money saved in British Guiana has not been invested there. Last year's ruckus will discourage private investors and force the government to fill the resulting gap.

JAMES HOOVER

Ankara, Turkey

GEIGER, THEODORE. *Communism Versus Progress in Guatemala*. Pp. viii, 90. Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association (Planning Pamphlets, No. 85), 1953. \$1.25.

During the postwar era while the United States was growing accustomed to a far-sightedness acquired in fighting Communism on the distant shores of Asia and Europe, it seems to have developed an acute case of myopia regarding a growing problem in its own hemisphere. Only the echoes of Communist rumbles in Guatemala, the most populous country in Central America, have caused "Tio Sam" to look for new bifocals to view this new aspect of the Communist threat as it develops in Latin America.

This little book points up the long history of semi-authoritarian government and ineffective economic institutions which has left underdeveloped Guatemala ripe for a Communist harvest. With an economy rather highly dependent upon foreign investment and foreign markets, with the expanding nationalism of a growing and increasingly dissatisfied middle class, and with a dearth of constructive leadership, conservative or liberal, the country was ready for a radical adjustment. Little wonder then that since the end of the

Ubico dictatorship in 1944 a coalition of left wing reform parties has controlled the government. And of greater import, evidence indicates that this coalition has been infiltrated by a numerically insignificant but highly disciplined and politically potent Communist-front party, the Guatemalan Labor Party, the 2,000 members of which have captured the initiative in a government representing over two and a half million people. Surely the goal of the National Planning Association in producing *Communism versus Progress in Guatemala*, so that "the situation in Guatemala and the application there of Communist techniques of penetration might be better understood," is a worthy one, particularly in that the political and economic conditions in other countries in Latin America are not dissimilar from those found in Guatemala.

Unfortunately, this pamphlet, written for the non-expert (and from its tone for the North American and not for the Latin American, to whom it will often sound patronizing), seeks to provide all of the factors in the economic, social, and political environment which led to the Communist successes in Guatemala. This just cannot be done in 90 pages. Not unexpectedly, the attempt to cover a wide scope in relatively few pages leads to oversimplification and to recurring generalizations. Some of the latter deserve footnoting for further consideration, others simply are not valid. For example, on page 18 it is asserted that "specific application under Communist influence" of measures to improve public welfare, health, and education "seriously threatened the future well-being of the country." Or, on the preceding page, that "semi-literate, economically dependent, and politically inexperienced groups are generally predisposed to vote for the administration in power," in Guatemala "as elsewhere in Latin America." Moreover, the lack of a comprehensive bibliography also detracts from the goal of better understanding of the Guatemalan scene.

In sum, this book is a worthy attempt to supply information on an important but until now virgin subject, but in attempting to do too much it fails to do enough. Until

a better study is published, however, it must fill the void.

ROBERT E. SCOTT

University of Illinois

PATTERSON, SHEILA. *Colour and Culture in South Africa: A Study of the Status of the Cape Coloured People within the Social Structure of the Union of South Africa*. Pp. vi, 402. New York: Grove Press, and Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1953. \$6.00.

The Cape Coloured people of South Africa, numbering about one million, have been rather neglected by students of the Union's complex ethnic situation. There have been a few good studies of this population such, for example, as Marais's historical work, *The Cape Coloured People (1652-1937)*, and *The Report of the Commission of Enquiry regarding the Cape Coloured Population of the Union (U. G. 54-1937)*. But the present work by Patterson is the first systematic sociological analysis of this fascinating historic group. The author has achieved her stated purpose of writing a "general sociological reference book about the Cape Coloured group, which might serve as a starting-point for more intensive and detailed studies of this group" (p. 11). The report is based on thorough examination of South African library and documentary material and on field interviews in the Union.

As Miss Patterson indicates, the Cape Coloured people are not physically or racially homogeneous. This heterogeneity in physical type is to be expected, considering the diverse ethnic strands intermingled in their past. In the words of the author, they "are the products of an early series of mixed unions, mainly irregular, between Europeans and slaves, Europeans and Hottentots, slaves and Hottentots. The original hybrid groups have been perpetuated, increased and further intermingled by endogamy and cross-breeding, and by additions from the original strains. More recently, the group has been further augmented and further diversified by European-Bantu, Coloured-Bantu and Coloured-Indian crosses, and in addition

by innumerable casual sexual contacts with Europeans of all nations" (p. 21).

The major portion of the study is devoted to a detailed analysis of the patterns of differentiation and discrimination as they affect these people in politics, law, administration, economic life, social services, education, and the various facets of social relations. In the main, according to the author, these distinctions are based on values associated with color and are designed to secure and protect the economic interests and status of the European as a white man. The burden of the writer's analysis is that the Coloured people, despite their essentially European culture, are socially marginal and subordinate in status. They hover between the world of the Europeans, or whites, to which they are attached in origin, sympathy, and aspiration; and the world of the Africans, with which they have little in common except their color. The impact of present policy is to further isolate them from the European and compel closer identification with the African. They are the victims, according to Miss Patterson, of a policy designed to establish a "colour-hierarchy."

The author notes some signs of protest among the Coloured people against this policy. She suggests that they are being forced into a position of leadership "amongst the dominated out-groups" and anticipates growing solidarity among the non-European elements. While it may be logical to assume that the Coloured people will assume such leadership there is little evidence that this has in fact occurred. The author's analysis of the background, social characteristics and psychological orientation of the Coloured people would rather suggest that they are not apt to play a major role in the racial struggles of the near future. Apparently they are still too divided socially and subjugated psychologically to be capable of this type of collective action.

WILLIAM O. BROWN

Boston University

BARTLETT, VERNON. *Struggle for Africa*. Pp. ix, 246. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. \$3.95.

Mr. Vernon Bartlett, the well-known British journalist, has written a book which may be warmly commended. The bulk of the book is concerned with "black" Africa and its many problems. Mr. Bartlett does not indulge in facile optimism or hasty judgments over the future of Africa. In South Africa, for example, Dr. Malan is faced with a "cruel problem," while "the white settlers of Kenya deserve kinder things than are generally said about them" (p. 171).

In Nigeria and the Gold Coast, the rapid advance towards self-government has created a new and encouraging atmosphere, which has been to some extent cleared of that excessive preoccupation with politics which is the bane of other areas. In Kenya and South Africa, however, the possibility of attaining a satisfactory modus vivendi between the three racial groups is as remote as ever. Mr. Bartlett has the courage of his convictions and supports Professor Keppel-Jones's idea that the Union of South Africa should be replaced by a federation of states each made up of its own racial group. This is the liberal apartheid solution and it deserves the most careful scrutiny.

The weakest part of Mr. Bartlett's book is that dealing with French Africa. The difference between "subject" and "citizen" is hinted at, but no attempt is made to explain the significance of these terms. It would have been valuable also to have learned whether sending African deputies to Paris acts as a political safety-valve, as is often suggested.

In his final chapter the author outlines three possible avenues of profitable advance, if bloodshed is to be avoided. "Two of them are difficult because they deal with mental attitudes, the third demands a sacrifice of national pride" (p. 237). The first is to give credit where credit is due and treat the African as an equal when and where he has shown himself capable and efficient. Secondly, an effort should be made by the African to realize something of the nature of civilization which is so often mistaken and identified with book-learning and the ability to imitate what are merely techniques. Thirdly, Mr. Bartlett

considers that colonization and capital investment should be a Western European affair and not the exclusive domain of the occupying power. It is not clear on what grounds Mr. Bartlett supports his belief that Europeans coming from ten countries might attain that racial co-operation which has hitherto eluded those coming from only four of them. But notwithstanding these minor criticisms, Mr. Bartlett's book should be read as a valuable contribution towards a better understanding of Africa.

GEOFFREY F. ENGHOLM

Makerere College

The University College of East Africa

IZZEDDIN, NEJLA. *The Arab World: Past, Present, and Future*. With a Foreword by Professor William Ernest Hocking. Pp. xiv, 412. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. \$6.50.

The Arab World stands today on the threshold of a new era. The future of this strategically sensitive area is of importance, not only to the 350 million Muslims and Arabs of the world, but also to America and Western Europe. Dr. Izzeddin's book gives an excellent analysis of the forces at work in the determination of the future and political leanings of this region.

The first half of the book contains a fair account of the Arabs and their lands; the rise and expansion of Islam; the civilization evolved and the impact of that civilization on Europe; the conquest of the Arab countries by the Turks; the awakening of the Arabs in the nineteenth century and the beginning of Western intrusions into this area, with the consequent struggle of the Arabs against European imperialism. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco are separately discussed, and the history is vividly brought down to the present: in the political, economic, and educational fields.

The rest of the book, which is both a statement of fact and a challenge, deals with the plans for Arab unity; the part being played by France, Britain, America, and Russia in the Arab World; and the internal forces presently at work in that area. Dr. Izzeddin states her facts and views calmly but clearly and forcefully.

The future of the Arabs depends principally on the use they make of their potentialities, as also on the honesty and fair dealing of the West in their relations with the Arab countries. There is at present much embitterment in the Arab World against the West. For, despite the many good things done by the West for the Arabs, the picture has, alas, been darkened by the Western policies toward Palestine, French atrocities in Tunis and Morocco, so far condoned by America and Western Europe, and the incomprehensibly intransigent attitude of the British towards Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Unless a change is introduced into Western policy towards the Arab countries, which should aim at both redressing the wrongs already made and redefining Western relations with the Arab and Muslim World on a basis of mutual respect and mutual interests, the result may be isolation and estrangement by the Arabs. Voices are already being heard vigorously calling for complete neutrality in the event of a clash between the two rival camps. Dr. Izzeddin would have done well to pay some attention to Islamo-Arab feelings in this direction.

A bibliography would also have aided the reader who might want to pursue the subject further. But this should not detract from the inherent value of the book which should be read by all those interested in the cultural heritage and future of this exceptionally important area, as also in the issue of peace itself.

MUHAMMAD KHALIL

The Royal Cabinet

Benghazi, Libya

JOHNSTON, B. F., with MOSABURO HOSODA and YOSHIO KUSUMI. *Japanese Food Management in World War II*. Pp. xii, 283. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1953. \$7.50.

The techniques for the study of food problems developed so effectively over three decades by the Food Research Institute of Stanford University are here applied with skill and care. Mr. Johnston has a concise and interesting story to tell, and he does it with clarity, objectivity, and careful documentation.

With his main conclusion, that "Deterioration in the quantity and quality of the Japanese diet and the precarious outlook for the maintenance of food rationing appear to have weighed heavily in the decision of the government to surrender in August 1945," one cannot disagree. It should perhaps be noted, however, that the enormous shipping losses and the steady tightening of the Allied blockade, which, as Mr. Johnston accurately observes, gradually brought the importation of food to a virtual standstill in the final weeks of the war, had also, and earlier, brought the importation of vital petroleum (as well as other essentials such as coking coal) to a complete halt, and that the actual lack of fuel probably played as large a role as the near lack of food in the decision to seek an end to the war.

After introductory chapters describing the prewar conditions of Japanese agriculture, trade, and domestic food consumption, Mr. Johnston analyzes the wartime food program, the specific measures taken, and how shortages of fertilizer, labor, and farm implements, and declines in livestock production and in the fish catch affected the Japanese diet and, indeed, the whole wartime economy.

His final chapter, dealing with the post-war period, in which he considers the problems which Japan faces in the years ahead in trying to feed her growing population—now in excess of 87 million—is perhaps the most interesting, and frightening. By 1970 Japan's population will, at minimum estimate be 100 million, at maximum projection, 114 million. While the birth rate over the last few years has been falling, the death rate has been declining even faster. In the 20 years between 1947 and 1967 the number of maturing youths who are seeking employment opportunities will exceed by over 9 million the number who leave the labor force through death or retirement. Will employment expand rapidly enough to absorb this increase? Can productivity in agriculture, after the enormous gains of the last half century which brought food grain yields in Japan almost to the world's highest, be further increased? Mr. Johnston is quite specific in his answer and unfortunately quite pessimistic. "Al-

though future progress in technology may be an important offset to the operation of the principle of diminishing returns in Japan," he declares, "the ratio of farm land to population strongly suggests that a further sizable expansion of the home-grown food supply probably can be achieved only at high cost . . . in general, one is inclined to doubt whether the noteworthy improvements in crop yield achieved over the past half century can be duplicated in future decades." He concludes, as have others previously, that "Japan's own experience during the interwar years, as well as theoretical considerations, point to an enlarged reliance on international trade as the more economical means of obtaining additional food supplies."

JEROME B. COHEN

College of the City of New York

CORRECTION

Dr. Theodor Reik has asked the editors to call attention to the fact that he was erroneously listed as an M.D. rather than as a Ph.D. in the signature to his review of Franz Alexander and Helen Ross's *Twenty Years of Psychoanalysis* in the January 1954 issue of THE ANNALS.

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Edited by

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH, Ph.D.

Professor of Political Science

University of Pennsylvania

President, The American Academy of

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FOREWORD

With the exception of the article by Mr. Tatsuo Morito, the papers in this volume of *THE ANNALS* are addresses presented at the Annual Meeting of The Academy, April 2 and 3, 1954.

Each of the six sessions of the Annual Meeting was devoted to a single subject—the relations between the United States and a particular country or region in Asia. It was not the purpose of the meeting to air disputes between Asian countries, hence the differences between Pakistan and India, between Israel and her Arab neighbors, between North and South Korea, and between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are alluded to but are not elucidated.

Because of the unavoidable absence of Dr. Halford L. Hoskins, his paper was read and discussed by Dr. George A. Coddington, Jr., of the Department of Political Science of the University of Pennsylvania.

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

The War for the Mind of Japan

By HARRY EMERSON WILDES

IN this opening article, I want to discuss the impact of the American occupation on Japan and perhaps something about the impact of Japan on Americans.

I want it to be understood that I am not writing either in praise or in condemnation of any individual. The occupation was not one of individuals: the occupation was a joint enterprise, and a joint enterprise not only of Americans and other members of the Allies but also of the Japanese. It is a firm conviction of mine that the success of the occupation was due quite as much to the remarkable co-operation of the Japanese as to the work of the members of the occupation staff—perhaps even more.

Therefore if I say anything in praise of the occupation, it will include praise for the Japanese, and if I say anything in condemnation of the occupation, that, too, must be shared by all of us.

I should like to point out that in the very beginning we entered Japan under difficulties because the Americans and the others who manned the occupation made very little effort to understand the people whose destinies they undertook to govern. Seemingly, we never knew, we never cared to know, the people whom we ruled. Knowing nothing of their customs, their psychologies, their aspirations, we scorned their prejudices as feudalistic; we considered many of their desires as nothing more than a yearning for an outworn ultranationalism. Happily we had passed beyond the point of thinking that Japan was just a land of cherry blossoms and of geisha, but many of us still weltered in the thought that all the Japanese were vicious gangsters. Because we did not

know and did not care to know their needs, we alienated many who had been our enemies but who wished to be our friends. And this despite incessant coaching from the sidelines.

Japan wanted us to win this war against the Soviets. But when she tried to help, too many of our occupationnaires suspected insincerity. A few occupationnaires even helped the enemy, though by ignorance, ineptitude, and inadvertence rather than by outright sabotage.

INFORMATION REJECTED

We spurned advice from those who tried to help. The Office of War Information, for example, had marshaled expert anthropologists, psychologists, historians, and other social scientists to study Japan's needs, to study her disciplines, her ethics, her modes of thought. It supplied that very remarkable team with stacks of data and afforded its members a free hand to probe the personalities of the Japanese then living in America.

The result was Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, first issued in mimeographed sheets for occupation information, but the occupation threw away its findings as ill-informed and theoretical. Dr. Benedict, the occupation said, had never set foot in Japan.

That sneer was based on truth. Ruth Benedict had worked with Japanese in California and in various relocation camps. She had read widely in the standard works, in manuscripts, and in great heaps of captured documents, but she had never seen Japan. She had, however, analyzed and evaluated, and

her disciplined imagination had taken her deep into the Japanese mind.

AMERICA IN JAPAN

Such scholars as Ruth Benedict, by building on petty and often frivolous incidents, would have found many ways to use Japan's convictions as a force for good, but not the occupation. Scorning the scholarly approach, it saw everything in terms of reactionary plots to bring back ultranationalism. The occupationnaires preferred and trusted unskilled and indiscriminating folk who saw all things American as glistening white, all things Japanese as jet black or blood red. College boys and girls, who lived in American billets, who went in American buses to American offices where they worked only with Americans, who spent their evenings at American clubs or at American movies, who read American magazines and listened to American radio programs, and who, on week ends, went off in American cars to American rest hotels—these were accepted as authorities superior to Ruth Benedict.

Those untrained juveniles—I was among them though not a juvenile—who never saw the real Japan because, in truth, they never left America, controlled all phases of Japan's cultural life. By occupation edict, they could not visit Japanese schools or universities, enter a library, a theater, a music hall, or a movie house, patronize a restaurant, a café, or a hotel, nor, unless in special occupation cars, travel legitimately in Japan. The rule was broken, to be sure, and after four years was relaxed, but only after the occupation, in violation of the orders which created it, had made every effort to prevent legitimate association in Japanese cultural affairs.

In consequence, in warring for Japan's mind, we committed grievous errors for which we have only ourselves

to blame. We started out with every possible advantage. We had an honest message to deliver. We controlled every avenue of communication. We had a captive audience which, contrary to all precedent, was eager to hear our message. We had in Washington a skilled and successful propaganda agency which offered its staff for occupation purposes.

Yet with all this in our favor, we discarded our trumps, played badly, and allowed our adversary to pile up points against us.

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

To put the matter mildly and charitably, poor judgment let the press, radio, and theater get entirely out of control. These, like the movies, pounded Communism incessantly into Japan's ears. We sat idly by, completely unconcerned. More recently, and to the present day, these same mass media are hammering out anti-American themes, representing our boys in Japan as dope addicts, lechers, sadists, criminals, and degenerates. No one within the occupation ranks then or in official position now could possibly be unaware of this wave of Communist propaganda. Our armed forces even on occasion lent their men and their facilities to Red movie makers for such themes. Despite our powerful, though unacknowledged censorship, this anti-American propaganda has swept unchecked over our captive audience. The failure to check it could only have been due to inattention, to indifference, or to unwillingness to stop its spread. An occupation that was so alert to fears of reviving militarism that it suppressed nascent conservatism was strangely reticent and tolerant towards Communism. True, the worst fever burned itself out in time, and on this the occupation preened itself, but the credit lies elsewhere.

The occupation was complacent about our educational affairs. Here the goal was long range, to indoctrinate the adults of tomorrow by instilling democratic principles into the children of today and, as the results could not be known for years to come, we sat by comfortably, assured that all was well. We worried over the contents of textbooks while Communists mobilized the teachers. We deleted harmless ideas that fanned Japan's legitimate aspirations and her patriotic pride, but we allowed the schools to pass out Communist propaganda leaflets. We forced the schools to pole-vault to heights never seen on land or sea, much less in our own school system. The consequence was chaos.

We let the children hear that established law and order was reactionary, feudal, capitalistic, and intolerable but that "progressivism," which many teachers construed as Communism, not only was desirable and democratic but was favored by the occupation.

We crusaded against Communism, but in doing so we committed tactical and strategic blunders. Ignorant of actual conditions, we appealed to Japanese by using the same arguments, often couched in the very words, that we used at home in warning Americans against the Reds.

U. S. FAILURES IN IMAGINATION

Thus, to people who had never tasted freedom, who knew nothing of justice in its Western sense, who had been taught that individualism was evil and that democracy was degeneration, and by whom Christianity was not generally accepted, we warned that Communism periled all those aims.

Japan remained unmoved by revelations of Russian atheism, of Soviet disregard for private rights, of its hampering of representative government, of its suppression of civil liberties—all these abuses so shocking to Americans but for

centuries all too familiar to Japan, left Japan unmoved. Men in military uniform who cherished caste and who, only recently, had plastered Japan with off-limits signs against both Japanese and their own subordinates were ineffective in condemning Russia as undemocratic.

Occupationnaires whose treatment of Japanese officials had been highhanded and whose disregard for Japanese laws and customs had been unconcealed failed to convince Japan that they also would be Russian puppets or to warn against the importation of an alien Soviet culture. Certainly the Japanese were mistaken, but many of them saw but little difference between the Allied occupation of Japan and Russian control of North Korea.

In fact, as Orientals conscious of their Eastern heritage, some of them thrilled at the news that Chinese and Russian armies had driven back American troops. While as Japanese they held contempt for both Chinese and Korean soldiers, the Red victory, however fleeting, proved to them that Asians could stand firm against the whites.

COMMUNISTS EXPLOIT AMERICAN WEAKNESSES

Communist propagandists exploited these opportunities. Pointing to the GI radio programs, to the Westerns, Tarzan, and gangster movies sent by Hollywood for showing in Japan, to comic books, and even to the cowboy suits and toy pistols worn by little boys of the American community, the Reds charged that Americans lacked culture. The arguments would have been laughable had they not been so convincing. The tawdriness, drunkenness, and vice near Army camps, the lack of any real effort to appreciate Japanese culture, the almost insulting assumption that everything American was good and all things Japanese were feudal, worked to Communist advantage.

Not that these accusations were true or that Communists were wholly free from criticism. Soviet soldiers stationed in Japan had been overbearing, grasping, and contemptuous. Their treatment of Japanese employees had been notorious, and their insistence upon Russian superiority had been as constant as it had been loud and boorish. But most of the Soviet soldiers had been withdrawn, and those that remained had segregated themselves. Drunken Russians no longer paraded nightly in the Dai Ichi Hotel corridors chanting "On to Budapest." Red excesses had been forgotten. But GI's continued to stroll hand in hand with pickups on the Ginza or to sprawl, bottle in hand, on cushions of crowded tramcars.

Red propagandists pointed to concrete instances, while Americans preached vaguely about theories unknown to the rank and file of Japanese. We talked of habeas corpus and judicial supremacy, of the Diet as the supreme organ of the state, of equality of opportunity and of the inalienable right of civilians to control the military. But the Reds were quick to point out that we named our housing projects and our movie houses after military heroes and that a huge sign proclaimed that Tokyo's central park was now Doolittle Field, named for the man who had led the firebomb raid on Tokyo.

THE TRAPPINGS OF WESTERNISM

The conservative Japanese strongly resented what seemed to represent the American impact on the Japanese. The fad of Westernism had been indiscriminate; the sense of values was suspended; trappings were more visible than the essentials. To chew gum and drink Coca-Cola, to pet in the romance seats of darkened movie houses, to sing "Buttons and Bows," to wear red shoes and aloha shirts—these seemed important democratic end products.

Aging Diet members and sedate Supreme Court justices sported green paper flowers on Saint Patrick's Day, plodded through square dances, or danced the rumba at the exclusive Esquire Club. A Turkish bath, elaborate to a degree unknown to Istanbul or Ankara, fascinated businessmen who supposed that attractive lady attendants were also available in American establishments.

A virtually new language arose, a fearsome hodgepodge of several tongues, of antiquated slang, of mispronunciation. *Après-guerre* youth, demanding *de-mo-kra-sie* hubba-hubba, dammed all the past and asked for *skoshi* itsy-bitsy hotto-dog and popcorn. And yet in all fairness I should add that even this strange caricature was far superior to any Japanese that I could speak.

Neither the olympian occupation nor the stratospheric Embassy could afford to bend low enough to notice the teenage excesses of the bebop set, but they were singularly silent also in combating Soviet propaganda that the United States was turning Japan into a military base, taking good rice-growing land for baseball fields, mulcting Japan of taxes, and converting free Japan into a colony. None of these charges was true, but we were slow and clumsy in rebutting the untruths.

SOME COMMUNIST BLUNDERS

Luckily for Americans, the Red agents also blundered. They may have been too sure of victory. Had they played their cards well, they might have taken over Japan. General MacArthur was under orders not to interfere with any overturn of government that did not imperil occupation objectives—and Russia was then a full-fledged and equal member of the occupation. But, with incredible *maladroitness*, Communist leaders, by staging riots and disorders at

times when things were running in their favor, sabotaged their own chances. Their encouragement of violence, their plagues of unnecessary strikes, the multiple evidences that Communists who talked so glibly and so convincingly of American colonization were more servile to Russia than loyal to Japan, spoiled their effectiveness as propagandists.

Stupidly, the Reds stressed issues upon which they were at least as vulnerable as the Americans. They ranted against American occupation of Okinawa at a time when Russia held the Kuriles. They raged against American-dictated purges and censorship at the very time the press was filled with tales of Russian thought control. They charged Americans with disturbing the peace while Soviet planes were flying over northern Honshu. They complained of American interference in Japan's domestic affairs at the very time that the Cominform agents were demanding that Japan punish certain Communist leaders for deviationism.

Soviet inconsistencies and blunders, together with the ineptness of Japanese Communist leadership, helped the democratic cause. This was a godsend, since the occupation, by freeing Red leaders and by nursing them into prominence, had given Communists a long head start.

IS IT TOO LATE?

Has that head start been too great? Is the hour now too late? Has Communism won the battle for Japan's mind? Has the occupation's blindness, complacency, and sloth given the Reds a lead that cannot now be overcome?

No one who knows Japan believes that its people favor Communism. The country is not "Red" and does not welcome Red ideas. For more than two centuries it has stood fast against the Russians. It has no love for them today.

But occupation blunders threw Japan into the Russians' arms. We seemed to favor them at first, and though that impression has been clearly counteracted by Washington's more determined stand, we must now, at last, do the work the occupation should have done in 1945 and 1946. We must make clear the fact that democratic policies are not Russian and, for that matter, are not necessarily an American monopoly. We must make clear that the Japanese have also been democratic and not always feudal, an idea that the Potsdam Declaration itself suggested but which the occupation threw aside.

How many occupationnaires made even the slightest use of the magnificent bibliography on Japan's human rights movement which the National Diet Library compiled in 1949? How many even knew that it existed? As propaganda it would have been invaluable, appealing as it did to Japanese patriotism, tradition, and precedent; it won more sympathy than any number of quotations from foreigners of whom the Japanese had never heard. It exerted the same type of appeal as the wartime Office of War Information broadcasts, but was even more effective. Yet the occupation wholly ignored it.

A NEW PROPAGANDA LINE

We must make clear that we do not intend to tell Japan what it must believe. The Russians, whose propaganda has been at least as clumsy as our own, have at least known that they must not force Japan to parrot Soviet slogans. Japanese apologists for Communism believe quite sincerely, however mistakenly, that they can accept Red ideas without losing their own nationality. Americans must convince Japan that her people can be both free-world democrats and Japanese.

We must not condemn everything in

the past as wicked, reactionary, and feudalistic. Much in the past was bad and should be discarded, but much, also, was good. Heretofore we have thrown out the baby with the bath. Japanese customs may have differed from our own and we may not have liked them, but Japan has a right to do her own selecting. No one enjoys being ordered about, and Japan, more than any other great peoples of the world, resents being ridiculed, particularly when the orders and the ridicule are in the name of freedom and the preservation of individual dignity.

Prewar militarist stupidities and post-war American policies somehow unwittingly conspired to identify reform with Russian Communism. The highmindedness that thought it beneath its dignity to notice absurd distortions created a situation where Americanism, capitalism, conservatism, and even liberalism had become synonymous with reaction. Japan is not anti-American, but she is opposed to exploitation, to stagnation, and to militarism, and these, without effective protest from us, have been effectively and unjustly pinned to the Stars and Stripes.

We must strike back with the truth about the Rosenbergs, the Hiss case, the color problem, and our relations with Latin America, and we must do it as forcibly, though honestly, as the Soviets have attacked us on these themes. We have a clean case and a just case, but we have been content to assume that we had no pressing need to defend ourselves. We need effective, forceful, consistent, and, above all, interesting propaganda. To rebroadcast a Presidential speech in English is dignified, but when directed to Japan is all too often ineffective.

We started with advantages which we have tossed into the ashcan. We must begin again under handicaps. We must not sit immobile in an ivory tower ex-

pecting the Japanese to bow before the shrine. We must get out into the arena, not as a caste apart enjoying special privileges, but as friends and neighbors. The GI with his candy bar, which, incidentally, was illicit, did far more for friendship than the general before whose car all policemen stood at stiff attention. The American "dependents" who loaded up their cars with neighborhood kids to take them to the Ueno Zoo did more to help America than all the formal press releases rolled together. In every natural catastrophe the Army pitched in and helped Japan. This Japan remembers long after the impressive parades have been forgotten.

NOT AS MASTERS

We must lend aid but not as condescension and certainly not as a bait or bribe. If we must stay in Japan for her protection, as well as for our own, we must not stay as aristocrats and masters; we must not expect privileges we do not give to aliens in America. We may not like the laws in force but we must not override them. We may not like the customs but we must observe them. We must not curl the lip and act as though all Japanese are dirty and immoral.

America is God's country but so, too, is Japan. Their folkways are as dear to them as ours to us. She has a right to make her own mistakes as well as to exercise her own good judgment.

Japan will not be moved by legalistic proof that the Russians do not cleave closely to the laws of international relations. She will not be swayed, though, of course, she should be, by long-winded exposition of what the Soviets have done to Poland or to Latvia, nor will she be alarmed to hear that Russian spy rings have been active in Ottawa or Guatemala. These matters must be pinpointed to Japan's own life.

1952 AND 1953

For this reason it was unfortunate that in 1952 and 1953 we let golden opportunities go down the drain. A Communist who was a Russian spy was caught red-handed and we let the Russians turn the case into a national agitation against the American counterintelligence agency which unmasked him. A Russian ship captain landed spies and saboteurs, but when he was arrested we let the Communists divert the matter into a complaint against interference with his freedom. A Japanese whom Northwestern University had supported for fifteen years came out into the open as a Communist and, clutching his Stalin peace prize, attacked the nation where he had been befriended, but we

were loath to brand him as an ingrate. A woman who had been deported from America as undesirable spread news that she had been our friend until our wickedness had disillusioned her. But we held our peace about the facts. A high-ranking Russian diplomat in Tokyo deserted to our side and we all but kept the matter secret.

It is high time that we reversed our course in propaganda. We must be truthful and we must be honest. We must not lie nor twist the truth, but we must cease to play the game that helps the Reds prevail. For nine precious years which never can be recovered we have let the Communists carry the attack to us until the score has piled up in their favor. Let us take the initiative and move back to victory.

*Harry Emerson Wildes, Ph.D., is a Philadelphia journalist and writer. He was professor of economics and social sciences at Keio University, Tokyo, in 1924. During World War II he was regional specialist for Japan in the Office of War Information, and between 1946 and 1951 he was in Tokyo with the occupation as chief of the Political and Social Affairs Division, Civil Historical Section, and as a member of the Government Section. He recently served as a Fulbright Visiting Lecturer at the International College of the Sacred Heart, Tokyo, and is author of *Social Currents in Japan* (1927), *Japan in Crisis* (1934), *Aliens in the East* (1937), and *Typhoon in Tokyo* (1954).*

The Place of Japan in a Resurgent Asia

By SADAŌ IGUCHI

IN the conduct of its foreign policy, each nation seeks its own self-interest. To be sure, all nations profess lofty idealism and, indeed, they may be motivated in varying degrees by sincere altruism. But in the very nature of things, in the final analysis, nations have no choice but to act in accordance with their self-interest. Such are the facts of life; such are the realities of international politics.

But in the pursuit of its self-interest, a nation may have a very narrow vision and seek its advantage at the expense of its neighbors, or it may have a broad conception of self-interest and realize that its own advantage can best be attained by contributing to the welfare of neighboring nations and the general welfare of the world. The first of these two alternatives represents traditional power politics, which ultimately defeats its own ends. The second alternative represents the enlightened statesmanship which we must cultivate if the world is to be saved from catastrophe. Modern science has caused the world to shrink, and today no nation can live unto itself alone. It can find its own well-being only by sharing in the general well-being of the interdependent community of nations. Self-interest dictates, therefore, that the nations of the world develop a consciousness of their mutual and interdependent welfare.

I think I can speak with some conviction on this point because of the recent bitter experiences of my own country. But whatever faults we may have, we Japanese are not the people "who learned nothing and forgot nothing." We have learned our lesson. We

have acquired the realization that we can find our self-interest only in the common interest of the world at large, and we are anxious to make our proper contribution to that common interest.

It is in the light of this broad concept of common world interest that Japan today views her position in relation to the new Asia.

As we look at Asia, we see that practically all of the countries of that part of the world are engaged in a great striving for national self-fulfillment. We see a tide of resurgence in which the peoples of Asia are throwing off the impediments of the past and struggling to attain a more complete life of national independence, economic well-being, social justice, personal dignity, and cultural richness. Asia is on the threshold of a revolutionary transformation which will probably go down in history as one of the most inspiring developments of all time.

But because Asia is in the midst of such great change, there is also much confusion. All periods of great change are painful; all periods of great change are accompanied by tension and instability. It should be remembered that only three nations of the Far East—China, Thailand, and Japan—were independent and sovereign states before World War II. All the others—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea—have been recently created as sovereign nations. Such a widespread creation of new nations is a magnificent development, but it is not surprising that the turmoil of creation has not yet all been quieted.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

In this turmoil which besets the new Asia, the most serious aspect, to my mind, is the economic problem. Most of the countries of Asia have rapidly increasing populations which press acutely on the available resources. Modern preventive medicine has reduced the death rates, and the birth rates remain high. Economic productivity has not kept pace with the rise of population. For instance, Asia's production of rice has only within the past few years managed to regain the prewar level. Merely to secure for their people a tolerable livelihood, or even a bare subsistence, entails an almost impossible task for many of the governments of this area.

It has been said that "you cannot teach democracy to a hungry people." Before we can even think of political stability, there must be economic stability; and economic stability requires the attainment of a respectable standard of living by the masses of the peoples of Asia.

Although the countries of Asia are not all at the same stage of economic development—Japan being conspicuously more industrialized than the others—the basic economic needs of all of them are quite similar. All of them must increase productivity and learn to make more complete utilization of their abundant manpower. All of them need more foreign trade—imports to feed and clothe their people and to supply their industries; exports to provide the foreign exchange to pay for the imports. All of them have a crying need for more capital and technical knowledge to develop their unutilized resources.

A CO-OPERATIVE FRONT FOR ASIA

In the face of these common needs, it should be obvious that more can be accomplished by the group working to-

gether in co-operation than by each member of the group working independently. Yet very little has been accomplished in the way of co-ordinated planning by the free nations of Asia. Perhaps it is the heritage of a period of colonialism when most of the countries of Asia were separately linked to different colonizing nations of the West. But the fact remains that the more natural intraregional economic relations among the countries of Asia continue to be relatively undeveloped.

Each nation is trying separately to shore up its own economy, to develop its own resources, to educate its own people, and to meet all the myriad other requirements of progress. At the same time, very little consideration is being given to the needs and potentialities of neighboring countries. Except for the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which is doing some excellent preliminary work directed toward the development of the economy of all Asia, no real attempt has been made to co-ordinate the efforts of the Asiatic nations for economic development.

I think the moral is obvious. The building of a co-operative front among the free nations of Asia is an absolute prerequisite to the successful solution of the problems we have. The co-operation I envisage would involve the defining of common aims and goals. It would include the practical planning of regional economic development, the drawing up of agreements to bring about an expansion of both intra- and inter-regional trade, and the exchange of ideas and knowledge. Of course, all these objectives cannot be attained in a few months, or even a few years. But a start could—and should—be made now.

To such a co-operative common front in Asia, we Japanese believe we can make a useful and constructive contribution. More than any other country in

Asia, Japan possesses industrial technology, managerial experience, and skilled manpower. We have also experience in adapting Western techniques to Asiatic conditions. The industrial economy of Japan is complementary, rather than competitive, to the economics of most of the other Asian nations.

Japan is often called the "workshop of Asia." But we do not believe that the term should be understood in any exclusive sense; all the nations of Asia should be encouraged as rapidly as possible to become likewise "workshops of Asia." But for the present there can be no objections to making full use of what Japan has to offer. Soft goods and utensils made in Japan at prices which the peoples of Asia can afford will contribute to the raising of the standard of living throughout the region. The heavier manufactures of Japan, such as industrial machinery, rolling stock, electrical equipment, and spindles and looms, would help increase the productivity of the underdeveloped areas and would speed the day when all Asia would be one great and prosperous workshop. Food production in Asia would also benefit substantially from the use of Japanese fertilizers, and Japanese agricultural implements have been proved to be particularly suitable for the conditions prevailing in most of the countries of Asia. Japan also possesses many manufacturing techniques, particularly for household industries, which are adaptable to the needs of other Asian countries.

Within our limited capacity, we are willing to export investment capital, although we can only make a small beginning to meet the need. In this connection, the democratic nations of the West could render invaluable help by providing essential developmental capital on the basis of an integrated plan designed to meet the needs of the entire region.

JAPAN'S NEEDS

In all these arrangements, we naturally hope that, as the other parts of Asia prosper, Japan also will benefit. Like many other countries of Asia, Japan suffers from a large and growing population on very limited land. Even more than other countries, Japan suffers from a lack of natural resources. Industrialization and foreign trade are the only means by which Japan can attain a viable economy.

To maintain a minimum standard of living, Japan must import annually well over two billion dollars' worth of raw materials, food, and other necessities. Japan must export enough goods to pay for these imports. But our present trade balance shows a deficit of almost one billion dollars. So far, the difference has been met by the spending of American military forces in Japan and by special procurements for the United Nations effort in Korea, but this source of income is drawing to an end. We must find a solution through the normal channels of international trade.

To expand our foreign trade, we must bring down our present cost of production; for although many Japanese goods are priced at levels which most Asians can afford, other Japanese goods are priced above the competitive range. To bring down our cost of production calls for the modernization of our industrial facilities and of our production techniques, which will require more investment capital. It will also require access to cheaper sources of raw materials. At present many of our bulky imports—such as grains, sugar, cotton, iron ore, coal, and salt—must be brought at great cost from distant and uneconomic sources because sources closer at hand are not open to us. In this connection, it might be noted that in the past our trade with China used to account for about one-third of our

total foreign trade. To compensate for the stoppage of this source, we must find adequate opportunities elsewhere. The expanding economies of the free countries of Asia must provide the solution.

We are, therefore, particularly anxious to sit down with the other nations of Asia to work out agreements to liberate international trade from the artificial obstacles which prevent a healthy expansion in the exchange of goods. Efforts of the United States government toward freer trade among the free nations of the world are most reassuring to us, and I hope that they will soon be enabled to minister better to each other's needs. Incidentally, the integration of Japan's industrial and commercial talents to the task of building up the economy of the rest of Asia would reduce the cost to the American taxpayer of American aid to that part of the world.

I am aware that there will be those who will question Japan's sincerity and reliability. But, as Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida declared on the day the Peace Treaty came into effect, "Our people know that no nation can live unto itself, that no nation can draw dividends unless it invests in the common welfare of humanity." This statement expresses the principle which has come to guide our national foreign policy now.

ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE PAST

I am also aware that Japan is said by some to be taking a course which they characterize as the "reverse course." They imply that Japan is today bent on reversing the course set by the occupation. It should be apparent to any close observer, however, that Japan cannot reverse the course of history, even if she should wish it. And of course she does not wish it. No nation could have experienced war and defeat, and then

the tremendous impact of the occupation, without undergoing an irrevocable change. Japan is today going through a period of readjustment. After eight years of the occupation during which the Japanese were guided in new ways, they must now learn anew to guide their own steps. Because we had been under tutelage for so long and because our economy had been supported by outside aid, it was only natural that our people should have become somewhat less self-reliant and accustomed to having others make our decisions for us. This is no reflection whatever on the occupation, whose lofty aims and valuable achievements are above question.

It is inevitable, however, that, in the nature of things, in striking out for themselves our people should grope for a while to find their true bearings. They must rediscover themselves in the light of their newly won rights and their new freedoms.

If there are in Japan today certain tendencies which appear to indicate a return to the past, I would suggest that it is by no means a simple return to the past. It is rather a conscious attempt to take our new bearings in relation to our past. The most valuable and effective of the reforms instituted by the occupation were those which were built solidly on the foundations of our past. No nation can survive if it is cut off completely from its historic roots. What we are now trying to do is to verify what was valid in our past, so that we may build upon it in the present, to the end that we may attain our true destiny in the future. If Japan is to contribute effectively to the strength of the free world, she in her own way must shape her own life to fit into her historic pattern—enriched, however, by her new and broader understanding of the universal principles of humanity, equality and justice.

Japan's present commitment to the

ways of democracy is rendered all the more secure by the fact that democracy is no new and alien importation introduced to the Japanese solely by the occupation. Japan has had a representative parliamentary government since 1890 which, although faltering at times, nevertheless developed encouragingly until a notable degree of democracy and liberalism was attained by the middle 1920's. The democratic reforms instituted by the occupation have found ready acceptance because they represent a restoration of a spontaneous indigenous tendency which had been only temporarily subverted.

It will yet take considerable effort before all the neighbors of Japan can willingly trust her. But Japan is making every effort to prove her good faith. For example, she is pushing the negotiations over reparations with the claimant nations with the intention of meeting her responsibilities to the utmost limit possible without wrecking her precarious economy. Japan hopes also to foster mutual confidence by promoting an extensive program of international intellectual exchange. This would involve not only the sharing of industrial techniques but also professor and student exchanges, scientific and business conferences and conventions, exchange of experts in the fine arts as well as in the useful arts, and many other possibilities too numerous to mention. We are confident that if we get to understand each other better, we shall be able to work together more effectively.

THE DEFENSE EFFORT

I have said nothing so far about Japan's defense effort. This subject involves a whole complex of problems which I do not have the time to discuss here. Suffice it to say, however, that Japan is committed to shouldering her due share of the burden of defense

against Communist aggression within the limits of her present very modest economic power.

It will be recalled that under the terms of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States Japan is endeavoring to "increasingly assume responsibility" for her own defense. A Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement has recently been signed in Tokyo under which the United States will aid in building up the defense establishment of Japan.

It is modeled after similar agreements between the United States and many other nations participating in the mutual security programs, and is designed to facilitate the planning of a defense assistance program for Japan. It is a manifestation of Japan's alignment with the free nations of the world and marks another step forward in the ever closer relations between Japan and the United States.

But we Japanese believe that, vital as military defense is, military measures are not the final solution to the Communist menace. Formidable as is the threat of Communist imperialism on the march, just as dangerous is intellectual subversion by Communists from within. Communism feeds on poverty and economic instability, and if we cannot unite to abolish poverty and economic instability, the Communist doctrine will exert a tremendous appeal to peoples who can see no other hope for the future.

Defense measures cannot be pushed faster or farther than the condition of the economy of the country will permit; otherwise we court the risk of a political or economic collapse, or both. Such a catastrophe would defeat all our aims.

Therefore I feel justified in emphasizing economic co-operation as the basic prerequisite for solving the problems not only of Japan but of the new Asia which is emerging today. The vision of a resurgent Asia is an inspiring one, but

before the vision can become a reality, the peoples of Asia must join their efforts to attain their common goal. If they do not learn to co-operate, they will succumb one by one to the threat of Communism which lies in wait. A united Asia is a noble ideal, but even more, it is a practical necessity dictated by the enlight-

ened self-interest of all of the free nations of Asia. To that end, the countries of Asia must continue to have the benefit of active American interest and sympathetic effort. Joined together as close partners in the cause of humanity and peace, we can meet with confidence the challenge of our time.

His Excellency Sadao Iguchi, Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of Japan to the United States. After three years' study in Oxford University (1921-1924) Mr. Iguchi held various posts in the diplomatic service, including several in this country. From 1941 to 1946 he served in the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, resigning in 1946 to become an executive of the Taiyo Fishing Company. In 1951 he was recalled to government service as the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in the following year became Japan's Ambassador to Canada, a post he held until his present assignment.

Relations Between Japan and the United States

By ROBERT J. G. McCLURKIN

ARTHUR O'Shaughnessy's Ode, "We are the music-makers," has two particularly famous lines,

"For each age is a dream that is dying,
Or one that is coming to birth."

I have always quarreled somewhat with the use of the conjunction "Or," for in a very real sense each age is both a dying dream *and* a new one coming to birth. A society which has any vitality at all is a complex and continually changing mixture of the old and the new.

Certainly, Japanese society has abundant vitality. Certainly, also, it is a blending of elements from all the social forces—both internal and external, both from the distant past and from the last decade—which have grown from or converged upon the Japanese people. In Japan in the years from 1945 to 1952 the catalytic action of the occupation speeded almost unbelievably the normal processes of social change.

That occupation had to grow out of and build upon the holocaust of war. It was essentially a military occupation, yet in spite of all the difficulties and all the problems, all the excesses and the failures to understand, the net result of the occupation was good.

The political and economic and social recovery of Japan and the place the country occupies in the world today rest upon two fundamental bases—first, the solid and unrelenting efforts that the Japanese people have put forth and second, what the occupation did. The Americans of the occupation, partly because of their pride in American ways of doing things, partly because they were not all-wise and made mistakes,

and partly because American ways were the ways they knew and understood, tried to some extent to create a new Japan in the image of the United States. But six years cannot wipe out the memory and the influence of the thousand which went before. Nor can alien ways completely replace those which are rooted in the native soil. So two years after the Peace Treaty came into force, Japanese society is still in ferment as the new laws and customs and ideas brought by the occupation are being reshaped and modified until they match the fabric of Japanese life.

This process was inevitable, and its results are good. The great strength of Japan lies in the vigor and ingenuity of the people, who for over a hundred years had been struggling to throw off the shackles of an authoritarian society. What the occupation accomplished was to free and strengthen the democratic elements in Japanese life, so that neither militarists nor zaibatsu nor a reactionary bureaucracy could hold them in domination.

However, somewhere in the emotional shock of defeat, the strenuous task of reconstruction, and the eager grasping for something new, something different from a discredited past, the Japanese lost a portion of whatever it was that gave unity of purpose to their society. Now that the occupation is over, the Japanese government and the people are reaching back into the past for the added assurance that comes from doing things in the traditional ways. This does not mean that everything accomplished by the occupation is being upset or reversed, but rather that the Japanese are gradually build-

ing a new and typically Japanese democratic society compounded of elements from both East and West.

I believe that the "new" Japanese society will continue to be essentially democratic because the Japanese themselves want it to be, and because the events of the last few years have made it possible. I believe also that it will be stronger and better because it will not be entirely new but will incorporate much of the best from the rich heritage of the Japanese past.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TIES

United States relations with the new Japan rest first of all upon something intangible—a set of psychological and emotional ties which are not less real because they are not susceptible of precise description and analysis.

I suppose that we have always had a special interest in Japan stemming from Commodore Perry's voyage in 1853 and the treaty of peace and unity (Treaty of Kanagawa) signed a hundred years ago. Probably we assume far too much credit for the opening of Japan to the West, for developments within Japan had progressed to the point where the years of ingrown isolation were almost certain to end soon. But it was Commodore Perry's voyage which signaled the end of the isolation, just as it was his voyage which was an early symbol of our own awakening interest in things going on outside the still undeveloped American continent. For both the United States and Japan have been slow to realize the compelling influences of the world around us and to accept the full responsibilities of living in that world.

Recent personal contacts

The psychological and emotional ties between us have grown enormously in strength and number in the past few years because of hundreds upon thou-

sands of individual contacts between Americans and Japanese. Like Brownian motion, which is the never-ceasing, disorderly movement of tiny particles suspended in a liquid or a gas, there is in and between nations a seemingly helter-skelter movement of individuals of all sorts, both shaped by, and shaping, great events. And to carry the simile one step further, just as the motion of the tiny particles can be greatly increased by an outside influence like heat, so the aftermath of the war was a vast increase in what might be called the Brownian motion of individuals between the United States and Japan.

Not all of the contacts were good, not all were friendly and helpful. However, there were a great many contacts, and increasingly as the occupation went on those contacts became wider and more friendly, and the results were better and better. The American soldiers and civilians of the occupation were not concentrated in Tokyo and Yokohama, Kobe and Osaka. They were in all parts of Japan, meeting in daily contacts Japanese farmers and fishermen, miners and textile workers, teachers and local government officials. And still today—two years after the end of the occupation—there are American soldiers and civilians in daily contact with the Japanese. Some of these are United States government officials, some are tourists, some are businessmen and missionaries; by far the largest number are those who are a part of the United States forces stationed in Japan. In the past nine years, more than two million Americans have been in Japan.

Although many of the bad features of American life show up as they always do, perhaps even more plainly, when they are transplanted from the United States, nevertheless this vastly increased contact between the citizens of the two countries has on the whole bred understanding rather than misunderstanding.

I say this in spite of the fact that last summer there was a flare-up in Japan of anti-Americanism, so-called. Actually the Japanese expression for it is idiomatically translated "fed up with Americans." There have been so many of us, for so long, telling them so much, giving them so much advice about how to run their country, that it is small wonder that they feel some sense of surfeit. Nevertheless, the core of truth is that the lasting results of the contacts are good.

Most Americans who have lived and worked in Japan have learned to respect and admire the good qualities of the Japanese character. They have developed an appreciation of Japanese culture. They have built friendships with the Japanese people. Many of these Americans gave all of their energies for a substantial period of time to efforts to help build a new Japan. Thus they have a personal, emotional interest in what happens to the structure which they helped to create.

Intercultural activities

For the belief that this host of individual contacts must have produced a measurable effect upon the United States, there is plenty of evidence. Scarcely a week goes by that the Sunday editions of the *New York Times* or the *Herald Tribune* or the *Washington Post* do not have special articles on Japan. Other examples multiply—the exhibition of Japanese art which toured the United States last year and attracted such large and appreciative crowds, the short stories and articles in the magazines, the movie *Rashomon*, the success of the Kabuki dance group in this country, the best-selling novel by James Michener. All these things are visible evidence of the pattern of interest that exists.

Nor are the movement and the interest one-sided. There are twenty-three

well-patronized American Cultural Centers in Japan in major cities. When it appeared that some of the original occupation centers would have to be closed because of budgetary cuts, local Japanese authorities stepped in to help keep them open. United States documentary motion pictures, distributed through Japanese local governments at a cost to them of a million dollars a year, have a cumulative attendance of 20,000,000 a month in Japan. Japan is one of the largest foreign outlets for motion pictures produced in the United States. Portions of the Voice of America short-wave broadcasts are rebroadcast regularly by the twenty-two new commercial stations in Japan. And Japanese come to the United States, many of them. Students, teachers, labor leaders, and political leaders come here under the exchange of persons program. Businessmen and industrial technicians come to exchange ideas and to develop associations with American firms. Mayors of West Coast United States cities visited Japan last year, and mayors of Japanese cities returned the visit and toured the United States.

Perhaps the point needs no further belaboring. There exists a deep, abiding, and fully reciprocal bond of sympathy and understanding between the United States and Japan, and all relations between the two countries rest upon and are governed by this fact.

COMMUNITY OF NATIONAL INTEREST

The private bond which exists is amply reinforced by a community of national interest, one important aspect of which is a common recognition of the danger of international Communism.

For Japan the threat is even more immediate than it is for the United States, because Japan is the primary Communist goal in the Far East. The Communists covet Japan because of its strategic position in the offshore island

defense chain, because of its potential military strength, and most of all because of its industrial potential. They believe that if they could bring Japan within their orbit, the whole balance of power in the Far East would shift in their favor, and it would be only a matter of time until the rest of the Far East would fall to them. They may well be right.

Their ultimate aim is domination of Japan—not neutralization but domination—because the Communists agree thoroughly with at least one biblical dictum, "He that is not with me is against me." But they know that they cannot take Japan over immediately, and they believe that once Japan is neutralized, Communist domination will inevitably follow. So for the present they cultivate interim measures aimed directly at driving wedges between Japan and the United States. Almost every day the Peiping radio and Radio Free Japan, the clandestine radio station somewhere in Communist China which is beamed toward Japan, exhort the Japanese people not to accept military assistance from the United States, to throw out of office elected officials who are friendly to the United States, to make the United States forces in Japan go home, to build trade with the Communist mainland of Asia.

When the Communists attacked Korea they were looking beyond Korea to Japan. When they support the Viet-minh aggression in Indochina, they are thinking not only of control over south-east Asia but also of the fact that Japan needs to buy food and raw materials from there and to sell industrial products in return. They are thinking about Japan. The manner of the getting is irrelevant to them, but they want Japan.

We do not have to rely on second-hand evidence as to Communist intentions. They are explicit. This is

Tokuda, secretary-general of the Communist party of Japan, writing in the *Cominform Journal* in 1952:

... we (the JCP) can instigate the people to participate in anti-American and anti-Yoshida movements. . . . In this connection, we must utilize our legal and illegal press to disseminate the spirit of our party's new platform, particularly the concept of armed struggle, so that we can create a public determination to defend peace, independence, and freedom. Now is the time for all the people to think of arming themselves to meet the plot of the American and Japanese reactionaries, who plan to revive militarism for the purpose of aggression.

And this is Malenkov talking to the Supreme Soviet last August, talking about the task of "normalizing relations with Japan":

Serious obstacles are encountered along this path because the United States of America is pursuing a policy of strangling the national independence of Japan, turning it into a springboard for war. The healthy forces of the Japanese nation recognize, increasingly, that it is essential to overcome the obstacles and uphold national independence.

The Communist line in Japan has changed from armed struggle to popular front; but whether it talks about arming the people to seize power or about "healthy forces" which will "uphold national independence," the object in view is the same—full Communist control of Japan.

Japanese defense forces

The Japanese government recognizes that it is not safe to allow Japan to lie defenseless in the face of this Communist threat, and with our help it is now moving ahead with the strengthening of the Japanese defense establishment. Let me emphasize that both we and the Japanese are thinking exclusively in

terms of Japanese forces of a defensive character. Because it is so convenient, people have fallen into the use of the shorthand expression "Japanese rearmament," a term which carries unfortunate connotations of a return to the 1930's. It is especially unfortunate since nothing could be further from Japanese intentions or from ours.

Today the Japanese have a ground force of 110,000 men—out of a population of 87,000,000 people—and small naval and coast guard forces. A year from now they expect to have the beginnings of a three-force defense establishment with a total of about 160,000 men. Although our joint thinking has not gone beyond this year's program, our military experts think that Japan's defense requires it to have eventually a ground force of 325,000 or 350,000 men, a navy consisting mainly of small patrol craft, minelayers, minesweepers, and destroyers, and in time a small jet air force of interceptors and medium bombers for tactical support purposes.

U. S. military assistance

We want to bring our own forces home from Japan as soon as the Japanese have developed their own defensive capabilities to a point where Japan will be safe even though our forces have left. Partly to this end and partly to help build free-world strength, the United States is willing to provide certain military equipment for Japanese ground, sea, and air forces on the same terms and conditions as those under which we are providing similar assistance to other free-world countries. That is the whole meaning of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Japan, which came into effect on May 1, 1954. But despite the assistance we provide and despite Japan's efforts on her own behalf, for the indefinite future in case of an attack upon the Japanese islands

Japan will need naval and air support from the United States in addition to its own defense forces.

I emphasize that United States military assistance to Japan is not a matter of pure altruism—if, indeed, the pure quality exists. Since the safety of one depends upon the safety of all, when we act to help others we are acting in our own self-interest. Nevertheless, the plain fact is that the others are in danger, too. In an excellent speech in New York on March 18 Ambassador Iguchi underlined the common interests of the United States and Japan. He said:

The interests of Japan have come to coincide with the interests of the United States. . . . We help ourselves by helping each other, and by benefiting each other we contribute to the security and peace of the world. . . . In this common endeavor for our mutual self-preservation, Japan is now ready to contribute her proper share.

This clear recognition of the shared danger, which can be prevented only if we act in concert to prepare against it, is another of the factors underlying relations between the United States and Japan.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

A third set of factors is economic in nature, for the economic relations between Japan and the United States have great importance for both countries.

The war destroyed many of the old patterns of Japanese trade, and particularly those in which Japan had, in a sense, a captive market and captive sources of raw materials on the Asiatic mainland and in Formosa. These trade patterns have not developed anew. So far as Communist China is concerned, Japan has been co-operating fully with the free world in security trade controls and has, in fact, maintained stricter con-

trols than any other industrial country except the United States and Canada, which have complete embargoes. This action on the part of Japan has been a major contribution to the defense of the free world.

However, Japan must import nearly all of the principal raw materials of its industry and 20 per cent of its food supply, and in the postwar period Japan has turned to the United States as a major source of supply. In the calendar year 1953, Japan spent 700 million dollars to purchase products in the United States. Japan was our best foreign customer for cotton and soybeans; our second best foreign customer for wheat, rice, barley, and bituminous coal. For all of these products and for corn, hides and skins, capital goods, automobiles, oil, and iron ore, the United States was Japan's principal supplier.

To look at the other side of the coin, the United States was Japan's best foreign customer, buying a wide variety of products ranging from silk and china and tuna fish to toys and gadgets. But whereas Japan bought from us to the extent of 700 million dollars, our commercial trade purchases in Japan amounted to only 260 million dollars.

Japan's trade deficit

Unfortunately that story is generally true of Japanese foreign trade. Japan, which can earn its way in the world only by buying raw materials and exporting manufactured products, had in 1953 a commercial trade deficit of one billion dollars. The reasons are various. Curiously enough to those who remember the prewar period, the Japanese in many fields of manufacture—steel is one of the most important—are priced out of the market because of obsolescent machinery and outdated industrial techniques, the high cost of raw materials many of which must be hauled long distances to Japan, and in-

ternal inflation. In addition, in spite of the present situation there is sufficient fear of Japanese competition so that many nations are reluctant to allow trade with Japan to develop freely. To some degree, this fear and the concomitant reluctance exist within the United States.

The problem of Japanese trade is one which the Japanese and the free world must face. Fortunately we have a little time, because the expenditures of the United States in Japan, most of which will continue for a while and which result chiefly from the presence of our forces there, have been large enough to cover nearly all of the Japanese commercial trade deficit. But these expenditures will not continue forever. If in the meantime Japanese trade does not develop to a point where the Japanese economy can stand on its own feet, there will be a serious threat of lowered standards of living in Japan and economic collapse. And the inevitable result would be a vastly increased risk of internal Communist subversion.

Even if all controls over trade with the Soviet bloc were removed, and even if it were possible for the Japanese to do business on reasonable terms with the Communists instead of having the business and the trade used as a political weapon against them, trade with Communist areas would make up only a portion of the Japanese trade deficit. So most of the answer must be found elsewhere.

A part of the answer is the responsibility of the Japanese themselves. They will need to call upon all of their own reserves of determination and ingenuity and take those rigorous measures which will be effective in reducing costs of production and improving their competitive position. Their "austerity budget" for the fiscal year which is just beginning is a noteworthy step in this direction. In addition, the creation within Japan

of an improved climate for foreign investment would help to overcome the shortage of capital in Japan.

Free world markets

The second part of the answer lies with the rest of us. No matter how great the efforts the Japanese put forth, they will not suffice unless the Japanese are allowed to buy and sell freely in world markets on the same fair and competitive terms as anyone else. One natural trading area for Japan is southeast Asia, and trade with that area has already recovered to prewar levels. But that is not enough. It is only as the co-operative efforts of the whole free world and of the southeast Asian countries produce rising living standards and an expanding economy in that area that the possibilities will be created for southeast Asia to have an expanding and mutually profitable trade with Japan and other free world countries.

However, by talking about Japan's natural area of trade with southeast Asia, the United States cannot shirk its own responsibility. Japan's commercial trade deficit with the United States last year was 440 million dollars, and the United States must do its full part in helping the development of Japanese trade, not only by encouraging others to open their markets to Japanese products, but by giving Japan a fair opportunity to sell its products in the United States.

President Eisenhower, in his recent message to Congress on foreign economic policy, gave special recognition to the necessity of dealing with the problem of Japanese trade with the United States. And in keeping with his message I emphasize the necessity for mutuality in trade relations between sovereign states. The United States and the rest of the free world need Japan as a customer; the United States

and the rest of the free world must therefore buy from Japan.

TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

The prophet Amos asked, "Can two walk together, except they be agreed?" In the world today Japan and the United States are walking together because of a fundamental community of interests. However, the very complexity of the relationships between a nation of 87,000,000 people and one of 160,000,000 makes necessary a full and complete understanding and agreement if the two nations are to continue to walk together in amity and common purpose.

These understandings, so necessary to relations between the United States and Japan, are embodied in many carefully negotiated treaties and agreements. They vary in nature and breadth from the multilateral Peace Treaty to an agreement for the reimbursement of shipwreck expenses. Two of them are concerned with the prevention of double taxation of individuals or businesses who might otherwise be considered subject to both tax jurisdictions. Another one spells out the precise rights and privileges which the citizens of one country will enjoy while sojourning or doing business in the other country. Still another sets the terms and conditions under which military assistance will be provided. And so on and on. These are the ground rules under which the relations are conducted.

A listing of these treaties and agreements in force as of April 1, 1954, reveals something of their scope and variety.

Postwar bilateral agreements between the United States and Japan

1. Fulbright Agreement
2. Security Treaty

3. Administrative Agreement (the detailed implementing agreement for the Security Treaty)
4. Reciprocal Waiver of Non-Immigrant Visa Fees
5. Taxation Relief for Expenditures Made by the United States in Japan under the Mutual Security Program
6. Charter Party Agreement (Agreement re Loan of Naval Vessels)
7. Agreement on Sharing of Claims Costs under Article 18, Administrative Agreement
8. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
9. Civil Air Transport Agreement
10. Copyright Agreement
11. Transfer of Amami Oshima Islands
12. Technical Missions by Japan to Study Production of Defense Equipment and Supplies
13. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements
 - Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
 - Purchase Agreement (with respect to surplus agricultural products under Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act)
 - Agreement Regarding Guaranty of Investments
 - Agreement on Economic Arrangements

Prewar treaties between Japan and the United States, revived or continued in force pursuant to Article 7 (a) of the San Francisco Treaty

1. Treaty Relating to Extradition of Criminals
2. Supplementary Convention Relating to Extradition of Criminals
3. Arrangements for Direct Exchange of Information Regarding Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
4. Arrangement for Exchange of Information Relating to Seizure of Illicit Narcotic Drugs and to Persons Engaged in the Illicit Traffic
5. Convention and Additional Conventions for the Exchange of Money Orders
6. Parcel Post Agreement with Detailed Regulations

7. Arrangements Relating to Perpetual Leaseholds
8. Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors
9. Arrangement Relating to Reciprocal Exemption from Taxation of Income from the Operation of Merchant Vessels

Postwar multilateral agreements to which Japan and the United States are parties

1. Treaty of Peace with Japan
2. Settlement of Disputes Arising under Article 15 (a) of Treaty of Peace with Japan
3. North Pacific Fisheries Convention
4. United Nations Forces Agreement
5. World Health Organization
6. World Meteorological Organization
7. Narcotic Drugs Protocols
 - Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols of January 23, 1912, February 11, 1925, February 19, 1925, July 13, 1931, November 27, 1931, and June 26, 1936
 - International Control of Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of July 13, 1931, as amended
8. International Office of Public Health Protocol
9. Agreement Revising and Renewing the International Wheat Agreement
10. International Rice Commission
11. Amendment of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization
12. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Agreement
13. International Monetary Fund Agreement
14. Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council
15. Fur Seals Agreement (Research Programs in North Pacific Ocean)
16. Universal Postal Union
17. International Civil Aviation Convention
18. International Whaling Convention
19. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
20. International Telecommunications Convention
21. Safety of Life at Sea Convention

International organizations set up before or during the war in which the United States is a member and in which Japan has revived its membership

1. Permanent Court of Arbitration
2. International Bureau of Weights and Measures
3. International Cotton Advisory Committee
4. International Council of Scientific Unions and Associated Unions
5. International Hydrographic Bureau
6. International Union of Travel Organizations
7. International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property
8. International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs
9. International Wheat Council
10. Rubber Study Group

Bases of good agreements

Fundamentally, all these treaties and agreements have three things in common with all other good agreements. First, every good agreement is a fair bargain. It has advantages and disadvantages for each side. Neither side gets everything it wants. Each side is therefore paying a tangible or intangible price for what it gets. Second, all agreements, good or bad, rest upon consent, every bit as certainly as do the relations between a government and its subjects. Agreements are good as long as the parties have an interest in preserving them and as long as the advantages gained seem to outweigh the disadvantages incurred as part of the bargain. As Machiavelli said:

Not only do princes pay no attention to pledges which they have been forced to

give, when that force has ceased to exist, but they frequently disregard equally all other promises, when the motives that induced them no longer prevail.

Third, all good agreements should be written flexibly, so that with the passage of time and the inevitable changes in the specific conditions which existed when they were written, their terms will not constitute a rigid impediment to the peaceful readjustments necessary to meet the changed conditions. This point of view, not new, was developed very effectively in a book written in the 1930's called *War, Peace, and Change*.¹ Unlike many authors, the author of this work subsequently not only had an opportunity to put his ideas into practice in international affairs, but also lived up to the principles he had earlier espoused. The Japanese Peace Treaty, which he negotiated, stands as the living embodiment of those principles.

Nine years ago the United States and Japan were still at war. In the years since, we have developed deep, extensive, and friendly relationships predicated upon a wide range of common interests. I know of no comparable example in the history of nations.

We have many current problems and difficulties, and doubtless we shall find a full quota of new ones in the years ahead. If we can face them with candor and with mutual understanding and respect, the United States and Japan will continue to walk together in international affairs. And if we do so, it will augur well for the future of the world.

¹ John Foster Dulles, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939.

Robert J. G. McClurkin, Washington, D. C., is Acting Director of the Office of North-east Asian Affairs of the Department of State. Earlier government service was with the Board of Economic Warfare and Foreign Economic Administration (1942-45), the Aircraft Division of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, as Deputy Director and Director (1945-46), and the Economic Bureau of the Civil Aeronautics Board, as Assistant Director and Director (1946-51).

Japan and the Two Worlds

By TATSUO MORITO

JAPAN, at present, has completely lost her prewar position as one of the "big three" or "big five" powers. She is now a small state just recovering her independence—an imperfect independence, both politically and economically. However, what attitude she will assume towards problems arising from the existence of two conflicting worlds will be significant not only to herself but to the whole world situation.

First, it will be significant because of her position in the balance of power between the two groups of states. It is true, of course, that Japan, like Germany, cannot take the initiative in post-war international politics. Neither can be more than the object of power politics. However, Japan's geographical location at a strategic point and her industrial potential, due in part to her hard-working, trained, skillful manpower, have made the small state very attractive to each of the two worlds. Accordingly, each rivals the other in seeking to win Japan to its side. It has been said that the final aim of the struggle for Korea was to secure Japan.

In such a political situation Japan can no longer remain passive. Now is the time for her to take a definite stand and to play an active role in world politics. Only by doing so can she prove her real worth. The whole world is watching with keen interest to see what stand she will take.

Second, Japan's position as the decisive factor in the balance of the two worlds means not only that of power or strategy but also that of culture and economy—that is, civilization in general. Therefore, her choice will bring about important consequences in international relations.

Third, which side Japan will choose will influence not only international relations but also Japan's own domestic government, and even her fate as an independent state. As is often said, the foreign policy and the domestic government of a state are closely related to and reflected in each other. But in the case of Japan the relation between the two is unequal, the former having far more weight than the latter. This inequality is due, on the one hand, to the degradation of Japan into a defeated and powerless state and, on the other, to the development of world affairs toward closer interdependence, or even unity, of states.

Thus it is not too much to say that Japan's choice of which world to stand by will determine her future course and fate, both internal and external.

JAPAN'S CHOICE

The more important to the world situation Japan's attitude is, the more resolutely as well as prudently must the Japanese people make up their mind. How, then, should the Japanese people solve the grave problem they are confronted with? What solutions are they contemplating?

My opinion is summarized here. In order to realize the peaceful world order which Japan holds as her supreme ideal, the Japanese people must not fail to take into account the reality of international relations, that is, the reality of power relations among states. However, the Japanese people, and perhaps other Asian peoples also, are inexperienced and untrained in seeing the real state of affairs in international politics. Generalization rather than individualization is more familiar in the thinking

of Asian peoples in general. Therefore, the old-fashioned utopianism which is now outdated in the Western world of socialism is still popular and influential among peace advocates in Japan.

Since it is difficult for the Japanese to penetrate the realities of international power relations, two theories of peace are often proposed as alternatives instead of close and exact investigation into international politics: one is absolute pacifism and the other, Marxism or economic determinism.

Absolute pacifism

Absolute pacifism is based on the traditional belief in human reason. It derives its basic principle from the idea of liberalism, which regards human reason as supreme and almighty and asserts that once the inherent reasonableness of mankind has been awakened, permanent peace can be brought about immediately. Advocates of absolute pacifism are opposed to the view that a peaceful order can be established only after various obstacles to peace have been removed and conditions of peace fulfilled. In other words, they consider the ideal of peace and non-violence not only the goal of a peace movement, but the beginning and the method as well.

If we put aside re-examination of the premise, it seems rather easy for Japan to steer her course in accordance with absolute pacifism.

Economic determinism

Economic determinism develops from Marxian dialectic materialism applied to the evolution of capitalist society. It prophesies the inevitable disintegration from within of the capitalist economic structure. On the other hand, Marxian political theory leads not to the peaceful coexistence of the two

worlds, but to the class struggle, not only domestic but also international. Therefore, Marxian determinism, it seems to me, indicates the direction not of peace but of world-wide class war in the final stage of evolution of capitalist society. However, detailed discussions about Marxian political theory need not be entered into here.

What I wish to point out is the fact that the evolution of capitalist society seems to indicate a movement toward peace and prosperity rather than toward struggle and disintegration. This fact seems to me to prove the fallacy of Marxian theory. Moreover, Marxism advances no definite criticism of the so-called "backward socialism," a term applied to a half-feudalistic, half-agricultural society, while it presents a very elaborate analysis of advanced industrial society. In a backward society that had not been completely released from the feudal regime and accordingly had not fully enjoyed liberalism and democracy, totalitarianism grew influential, and still remains so to some extent even now, as the basic principle of domestic government and world politics. Marxism lacks a clear analysis of the evolution of such a backward socialist system.

Further, it must be pointed out as an evident proof of the one-sidedness of Marxian theory that despite its exaggeration of the warlikeness and aggressiveness of capitalist states neither recognition nor criticism is voiced about the same or more intensified tendencies in the totalitarian camp.

As we have seen above, both absolute pacifism and Marxian determinism present various weak points as the basis of peace and accordingly as a guide of Japan's future international course. However, we must not ignore the importance of human reason as the motive power of historical evolution, nor, at the same time, the contribution of

Marxian theory in analyzing the structure of capitalist economy. What I wish to emphasize here is that neither from the standpoint of economic determinism nor from the standpoint of absolute pacifism is it easy or simple to probe the real international situation precisely and to find Japan's right course in the future.

International realities

Very complicated and difficult though the task is, I do not think it impossible. The antagonism of the two worlds is, in its essence, that of power—of political power in the broadest sense, which is based upon a synthesis of military, political, economic, and spiritual powers. Therefore, it is essential for Japan to analyze correctly the complicated power relations around her and her own political and economic strength, in order to decide which side she should stand by.

We, the people of Japan, are prone to consider the international situation, especially the power relations surrounding Japan, from a single point of view, in other words, to see only the aspect that is hopeful and convenient to us and to ignore the other. Herein lies one grave danger. But there is another danger far more serious. It is the over- or underestimating of Japan's national power by the Japanese themselves.

Such a tendency is more or less natural, even unavoidable, in a state which has undergone an unprecedented catastrophe such as the defeat. Having no exact judgment of the true national power, people make serious mistakes—either having far-reaching ambitions beyond their means or losing their spirit of self-help and independence. In neither way can Japan recover her honorable international status and live respected as a peace-loving, independent state.

JAPAN'S FUTURE COURSE

Various views are advocated as to Japan's future course in an international society divided into two worlds. They can however, I think, be classified into five categories, as follows: (1) Japan should be a member of the group of conservative liberal states; (2) she should be a member of the group of progressive liberal states; (3) she should be a neutral state; (4) she should join the third-power group; (5) she should co-operate with the "peace powers." As applied to the postwar foreign policy and peace movement of Japan, views (1) and (2) insist on "majority peace," that is, Japan's Peace Treaty concluded with the democratic states, while the other three emphasize "over-all peace," that is, a treaty with all states. Such a classification may be deduced not only from the basic theories but also from the line-up of political leaders and peace advocates.

Opinions that Japan should be a member of the group of liberal states are based on analysis of, and respect for, the circumstances brought about by the Japanese Peace Treaty and the United States-Japanese Security Treaty, by Japan's new foreign relations in the political, economic, cultural, and other fields resulting from her defeat and occupation by Allied forces, and by the policy of postwar Japan as contrasted with her prewar course. Such opinions are, of course, to some extent colored by the Americophile and Russophobe national feeling of the Japanese people. Advocates of this view assert that only through membership in the group of liberal states can Japan find the best way not only of achieving her independence and security but also of promoting world peace.

Some assert that Japan should stand by the conservative liberal states. These people put more emphasis on the capi-

talist system of the liberal regime than on the democratic aspect. Therefore, conservative parties which desire the preservation of the status quo are the main advocates of this opinion.

Those favoring membership in the group of progressive liberal states are opposed to these conservatives. They criticize the status quo both domestic and international as incompatible with justice, and intend to reform it gradually by peaceful means. They recognize the political principle and structure of democracy as the means of achieving reformation, or, so to speak, peaceful revolution. They do not stick to the capitalist regime as an eternal and basic political principle of liberal states. Only through membership in the group of such progressive democratic states, they argue, can Japan secure independence and prosperity. This point of view is opposed not only to the conservative one but also to the other three views. It is most strongly supported by right-wing socialists and democratic socialists.

CAN JAPAN REMAIN NEUTRAL?

The following three views were proposed after Japan's desire for a peace treaty with all states proved to be unrealizable as *Realpolitik*. Therefore they are, it can be said, variants of Japan's insistence on over-all peace, and have both the strong and the weak points of their origin. The feature common to all of the three views is opposition to the liberal-state group, some showing anti-American feeling and others pro-Russian and Communistic tendencies.

The first variant of the insistence on peace with all states was the advocacy of Japanese neutrality. According to this point of view, the best way for Japan to secure independence and peace is to remain neutral, never joining either of the two worlds. The idea was suggested originally by General Mac-

Arthur's denomination of Japan as the "Switzerland on the Pacific." Now, however, it has diverged from its origin. It is accompanied by criticism of the unconditional Americophile attitude of some Japanese political leaders.

Advocates of neutrality oppose the rearmament of Japan on the ground that there is no danger of Japan's being attacked or invaded so long as she remains neutral, not allying herself with either of the two worlds. They argue also that Japan, by keeping herself aloof from the two camps, can be free from the influences of either party, and can go her own way—the third and better way of adopting the advantages and improving on the shortcomings of both worlds. Furthermore, they expect that Japan, through her neutral stand, may keep free from involvement in war even if it breaks out. Thus they conclude that neutrality will bring to Japan peace and prosperity.

It would hardly be possible for the defeated Japanese people to find a more attractive course than neutrality. In reality, however, the neutrality theory is, as is generally known, substantially the conceptual pacifism supported by idealistic liberalists and left-wing socialists or the disguised strategy of Communists and their sympathizers.

SHOULD JAPAN SIDE WITH THE THIRD-POWER GROUP?

The idea of the third-power group is an attempt to get over the utopianism of the neutrality theory and to make it realizable. I may be blamed for using the word "idea," for the theory of the third-power group is no longer a mere conceptual idea isolated from the reality of international power relations. It is a definite *Realpolitik* supported by a group of influential states steering neither the liberal nor the Communist course but a third and peaceful course. Those states are India, as the leader

and other Asian and Arabian countries. The theory of the "third powers" is becoming influential even to some extent, it is said, in the Latin American republics and recently in a part of Western Europe also.

Thus the peace theory and movement of the third-power group are more or less influential in every region of the globe, and Japan is no exception. Advocates in Japan, with ready belief in future peace based on the third road, insist on Japan's affiliation and co-operation with the third-power group, instead of the conclusion of military agreement with or the grant of strategic bases to either one of the two worlds.

JAPAN AND THE "PEACE POWERS"

Since Japan has recovered her independence by concluding a peace treaty with liberal states, Communists and their supporters have recently changed their strategy. Formerly they supported the theory of neutrality or the third-power group, which they utilized as disguised instruments for nourishing anti-American and pro-Russian national feeling. However, they have now abandoned such indirect strategy. They have become critical of the neutrality policy and third-power advocacy and have made their Communistic attitude clear. Their new disguise is the banner of the "peace powers" which the General Council of Trade Unions and other pro-Communist organizations in Japan are flying.

It is natural that the Communistic and pro-Communist stand should be incompatible with that of neutrality or the third-power group. With the end of the Allied occupation and the increase of Communistic tendencies in the third-power movement in Japan, Communists and their co-operators were unmasked. They have now quit pretending to support neutrality or third powers. However, they still need a disguise,

lest they should be exposed to the strong anti-Communist national feeling of the Japanese people, and that disguise is the banner of the "peace powers" which they are deliberately flying.

PRESUPPOSITIONS

Which of these five positions should Japan prefer? The answer will vary according to the ideal society the answerer contemplates establishing and his judgment on the political situation, especially the political relations of Japan at home and abroad. I am of the opinion that we, the Japanese people, should rebuild our new Japan on the basis of democracy, peace, culture, and welfare as the new Constitution definitely indicates, that we should steer our new course on this principle as an independent state in international society.

My conclusion, however, presupposes that the antagonism of the two worlds will not be dissolved in the near future, even though it may be weakened to some extent. If the antagonism could be actually dissolved the situation would be utterly different, and the problem of the choice of position would become meaningless. Nor do I anticipate an immediate revolution of Japan's governmental form and foreign policy. If I did, my conclusion would also naturally be different.

The most essential task for us, I repeatedly emphasize, is to probe correctly the status and weight of Japan in international politics. If we fail to do so, any aspiration or policy, however far-reaching and lofty it may be, will not only be a mere conceptual ideal but will also lead our country in a wrong direction.

UTOPIAN NEUTRALITY

Of these five views on Japan's future course, the most attractive to those who are not practical but yet are eager to pursue peace is advocacy of a neutral

Japan. This is proved by the fact that the theory of neutrality is supported by many young people, women, and religionists. However, more and more people have come to realize that however attractive the image of the "Switzerland on the Pacific" may be, in the twentieth century it can be nothing more than a utopia. The reason may be well understood by considering the fact that there could scarcely be a more difficult task for Japan than to conclude a neutrality pact with both of the opposing two worlds; or, if the pact itself could be concluded, it could hardly be observed because of Japan's strategic importance. Moreover, like the security system, neutrality is already out of date now that an organization such as the United Nations and the idea of world government have appeared before the footlights of the international political scene.

Accordingly the advocates of neutrality have changed their project into the third-power system, such as that of India, or the isolation system such as that of Sweden. But it is very doubtful that the proposal of world peace by a separate state can bear effective fruit in an international situation where the antagonism of the two worlds is so intense that the evolution of world history may be determined by it. If it is considered calmly, everyone will deny the possibility. I, too, feel so, especially in the case of Japan, a state not only defeated and powerless, but also suspected by other states as to the validity of her desire for peace because of her foreign policies in the past. Nothing will more endanger the future of the Japanese nation than to embark on such an unstable neutrality policy.

THE THIRD-POWER GROUP

The theory of the third-power group seems to cover the weak point of the neutrality policy, for there will, no

doubt, be formed a third-power group strong enough to meet the power of the United States of America or Russia, if Asian and Arabian states are allied under the leadership of China and India, with Latin American republics and some East and North European states joining in, and if, further, British and French co-operation could be counted on. In fact such a tendency has made its appearance in various regions and to various extents, and even seems to be increasing in strength. These facts, it seems to me, have substituted realizability for the utopianism of the neutrality theory and have inspired it with a new life. In this sense, I have no hesitation in recognizing that the theory of the third-power group deserves our respectful attention as a practical development of the neutrality theory.

We should investigate carefully, not in the light of hope but with a cool head, the plan of *Realpolitik* based on the theory of the third powers. To my great regret, however, there is not space here for a detailed argument, but I shall try to outline the essential points.

It is true that the states mentioned above feel dissatisfaction with the global policies of both America and Russia and have general antipathies to both countries also. Can they then be united in a third group with political power strong enough to check either America or Russia, or perhaps both? Speaking frankly, I cannot help feeling a great doubt in this respect. Can Red China and India, for instance, join hands with each other, breaking away from the Communist group and from the British Commonwealth, respectively, to form a third group? I cannot suppose it. Nor will Great Britain and her dominions, or yet the North European states, leave their democratic league to enter a third camp. The same can be said concerning the Latin American republics.

It may be concluded, therefore, that

as a problem of reality those willing to combine themselves into the third alignment are only the southeast Asian and Arabian states, with India as their head. By themselves alone, can they make an influential third group? The strongest bond between them may be their common antipathy to European and American imperialism. Their inner motive to ally themselves with one another seems not so strong. In addition, the national power of each of them is too weak to cope with the power politics of the two worlds.

Weak points of the contemplated Asian-Arabian third alignment will be understood from remarks of Premier Nehru of India who, being fully aware of the situation of those states, recognizes clearly their lack of power. Further, India herself as a whole will, it can be estimated, remain a member of the liberal group as a member of the British Commonwealth, despite her repeated declaration.

As long as the reality of the third-power group is so uncertain, the peace policy based upon it cannot be stable and reliable.

THE COMMUNIST ALTERNATIVE

Since the peace policy of neutrality cannot be relied upon as practical politics, there is no other way Japan can choose except to stand by the side of one of the two main groups—Communist or liberal. We must abandon the attitude of irresponsible onlookers and have conviction and courage in choosing our way. We must select the practical way, even though it is a next to best, instead of the abstract best.

As a problem of practical politics, Japan cannot choose the way to the Communist group, for it is impossible for Japan to do so. Japan's policies both foreign and domestic throughout prewar and postwar periods prove that Japan is an anti-Communist state. If

Japan with such a historical background should happen to enter the Communist group, it would be necessary for Japan to undergo a revolutionary change in her international and domestic policies. That means a fundamental change not only of Japanese foreign relations but also of her form of government, namely, the abolition of the Tenno rule and the adoption of a totalitarian system in every field, which would entirely destroy, perhaps with violence, the newly born, postwar democratic Japan. Such a drastic revolution of both government and foreign relations can never be easily effected.

Even putting aside these difficulties, conversion to the Communist side is not per se desirable for Japan.

ALIGNMENT WITH THE LIBERAL GROUP

Not only from the viewpoint of her historical background but also from that of the reconstruction of her future, Japan should prefer the liberal group rather than the Communist bloc. I feel that through affiliation with the liberal group Japan is most likely to contribute effectively to world peace as well as to secure her own independence.

The antagonism and rivalry between the two worlds will never cease substantially, I think, as long as the fundamental ideology of Communism remains unchanged. Declarations of peace and coexistence by Stalin and Malenkov cannot be effective in resolving the struggle. The antagonism, however, will not lead to a World War III fought with such destructive weapons as the hydrogen and atomic bombs, so it may be possible to call even such a state of antagonism "peace and coexistence" if people wish to do so. It is lacking, however, in the basic condition of peace, that is, the spirit of mutual understanding, confidence, and co-operation. Therefore, it can be nothing more than a cold peace and accordingly is a cold war.

In such an international situation of cold peace, Japan should stand by the side of the liberal states, strengthen their power, and contribute to promotion of the peace and welfare of mankind. Why? The reasons are as follows:

1. The group of liberal states guarantees far more freedom to member states than the totalitarian group does. It must be recognized, of course, that in the liberal bloc also each member state is obliged to assume responsibilities, large or small according to the circumstances. Surveyed as a whole, however, liberal states can and do enjoy far more freedom than member states of the Communist bloc. This is evidenced by the fact that members of the British Commonwealth, including India, some North European states, and even Titoist Yugoslavia belong to the liberals, and also by a comparison of conditions in Japan and West Germany with those in East Germany.

Economic aid

2. Japan very keenly desires the investment of foreign capital in order to achieve the reconstruction and modernization of her economy, especially her industry, as the accumulation of Japanese capital is limited and poor. Therefore, we must join hands with such a state as will lend the necessary capital, with no ambition, or as little as possible, to hold political sway over our country.

The liberal bloc under the leadership of the United States is, needless to say, superior to the Communist states on the first issue. In regard to the second matter, it may be asserted that the traditional imperialistic policy of advanced Western states has made them less generous than Russia. In respect to this economic foreign policy, it must be observed that a reduction of control over colonies by advanced imperialistic pow-

ers is the general tendency of the post-war international situation. Therefore we should be careful not to consider international mutual aids among interdependent countries in the coming world similar to colonial domination in the past.

As for the Russian attitude concerning economic aid to her satellite states, she not only holds political sway over them but also engages in economic exploitation far more severe than that of the capitalist states. East Germany and Czechoslovakia can be mentioned as examples. It is reported that the revolt which took place in Middle and East Europe last year and other social disturbances there were the result of poverty and the lack of freedom caused by the exploitation and suppression of Communistic totalitarianism in its foreign application.

Remarks of the political leaders of Yugoslavia who succeeded in getting loans from both America and Russia in recent years may be worth listening to. They said that the American way of economic expansion is less imperialistic and less exploiting than any other imperialistic policy; especially as compared with the Russian method that of the United States is preferable. They pointed out that the Russian way of exporting capital usually demands the importing state to accept various feudalistic conditions, such as partial military occupation, political control by bureaucratic and police powers, suppression of democratic tendencies, establishment of a puppet government, and so forth. This may be a good lesson in comparing the attitude toward economic aid of both blocs and may explain the term "Red Imperialism."

Dignity of the human being

3. In respect to ideology and culture also I prefer the liberal world to the totalitarian. In the free world the core

of belief and culture is the freedom and dignity of the human being, even if this ideal happens sometimes to be somewhat deformed. On the other hand, in the Communist world the dignity and freedom of the human being are forcibly suppressed under the pressure of technology and authoritarianism. This situation is due to the hurried construction of socialism in a region where the economic system and belief in human rights are backward. People who have once enjoyed human liberty and human rights can never live desirable lives in the culture of backward socialism.

Fears

Preferable though affiliation with the liberal bloc may be, I cannot close my eyes to some possible dangers. They are, as is often pointed out, that Japan, by joining the group of liberal states, may become a munition factory or a source of manpower in the East, and finally become involved in war, or that Japan may degenerate into a colony, enslaved and exploited, or that the capitalist system in Japan may be consolidated and democratization prevented, so that she comes to play the role of agent for suppressing the emancipation of nations in the East.

These may be, of course, extreme fears. But some of them are not groundless and might develop into reality. However, the dangers would be far graver if we entered the Communist camp.

Progressive growth

How could these dangers for Japan be prevented? I assert, by enlightening the liberal states so that they would not remain conservative, sticking to the status quo, but would evolve toward that progressive international society which can and does apply the principle of human dignity and liberty to ever

changing world affairs. I suggest the following five points to promote progressive growth of the liberal states:

1. Each member of the liberal group should have the necessary minimum armament to defend herself and the group against attack and aggression both direct and indirect by other states and, at the same time, should have no intention of aggression toward other states. In other words, we must hold not to absolute pacifism, but to realistic pacifism.

2. Advanced and wealthy states, not adhering inflexibly to the capitalist régime, should promote the realization of that peaceful social reformation called for by the imperative of social justice. Especially is it essential to help the evolutionary development of states into welfare states.

3. The more advanced states must help reform the systems of government in Asian and African countries, adopting a democratic overseas policy based upon the principle of interdependence and international mutual aid. Through such reformation those advanced states should realize, in peace, the aspiration for political revolution of backward people in those areas.

4. In domestic administration, each member state of the liberal group should fulfill the revolution of humanity, that is, the restoration of the human consciousness to a condition of human dignity and liberty—in fine, the perfect observation of the spirit of democracy. The greatest evil of modern civilization lies in the suppression of genuine humanity by the increased pressure and mechanism of materialism and by the concentration of power in a small part of society. This tendency is not a feature of capitalist society only, but is likewise outstanding in Communist society. In other words, it is the deplorable evil commonly felt in regard to both capitalist and Communist society.

5. The structure of the group of liberal states is different from that of the Communistic alignment. The former is pluralistic and dynamic; the latter, unified and totalitarian. The liberal bloc should express the superiority of its composition.

The perfect realization of the above five points will make the liberal bloc superior to the Communist group. More than that, it will make possible political contact and economic and cultural interchange between the two worlds through the channel of the United Nations and other international organizations, or through treaties and agreements. So long as the superiority of free states can be maintained, the position and prestige of the United Nations will be raised, for the liberal camp is always the eager supporter of the United Nations.

A THIRD IDEOLOGICAL POWER

In the world of the liberal states, the progressive tendency is stronger than attachment to the status quo. Accordingly, the liberal world is far more flexible and elastic than the totalitarian world. This results from the difference of composition in the two worlds. I believe it is possible for the free world to adapt itself to new circumstances.

However, some progressive states of the free world seem recently to have interest in, or even to approve, the proposal made by Premier Nehru of India for the formation of a third region, a proposal which is a revised edition of the third powers. I hesitate to agree with such an opinion, for it entails a

double danger: on the one hand, it cannot make those states powerful enough to cope with either or both of two giants; on the other, it decreases the strength of the free world. The desirable thing at the present state of evolution of world history is, as I have already pointed out, consolidation of the group of liberal states and increase in their progressiveness; dissolution of the cold peace under the superiority of the free world; and the opening of mutual understanding and co-operation between the two camps, as a first step leading to true world peace.

We, at the same time, sincerely look forward to the rise of progressive states in the Communist bloc also. As such progressive powers become influential, the nature of that side will, I hope, change, and a seed of true peace be sown.

In conclusion, the way Japan should go between the two worlds is neither the way to neutrality nor to the third powers, much less the way to the Communist side, but the way to the liberal bloc, to contribute to the promotion of its consolidation and progressiveness. If there is anyone who wishes to use the term "the third" in advocating a peace schedule to secure Japan's independence and safety, he must use it in the meaning neither of a third power opposing the two giants, nor of a third area playing the role of a neutral zone or a buffer state, but of a third ideological power in the countries on both sides of the two worlds pushing the world they belong to towards peace and progress. I mean here by the term "third" a synthesis of both capitalist and Communist ideologies.

Tatsuo Morito is president of Hiroshima University, Japan. Formerly Minister of Education, he is a member of the Japanese National Commission of UNESCO and attended the conference in Paris last year. He has written a number of books on social problems.

A Brief for Korea

By ROBERT T. OLIVER

THE Korean situation has so often been called "difficult and confusing" that I think I should warn you in advance that in my view the basic issues are inescapably simple and clear cut. In my judgment we Americans have tended to label the Korean problem as being difficult to understand when what we really mean is that it is difficult for us to handle and that consequently we should like to disengage ourselves from it wholly if we could. This state of mind did not originate after we became involved in an unpopular war in Korea. On the contrary, it has marked our view of Korea from the first.

To the historically minded, of course, "from the first" is an aggravating phrase. How far back into American-Korean relations do we have to go to get our thinking about the problem firmly and properly oriented?

Koreans go back to 1882, when Korea was first persuaded by Commodore Robert W. Schufeldt of the United States Navy to give up the isolationism of its Hermit Kingdom phase and enter into diplomatic and trade relations with the West. In the treaty with Korea which our Senate ratified in 1883 we promised to use our good offices to assist Korea in case any other nation "should deal unjustly" with her. For two decades American business and American missionaries penetrated significantly into Korean life. We built in Seoul the Orient's first electric street-car system. We developed Korea's gold mines (which produced 3 per cent of the world's gold). Then we became discouraged because of the corruption and inefficiency of the decadent Korean

monarchy and because the eager interest of both Russia and Japan in Korea made it clear that we could only maintain an American foothold there at the cost of what appeared to be an unprofitable effort.

Accordingly, President Theodore Roosevelt took steps to relinquish the obligations we had assumed in the treaty of 1883. He sent his Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, to Tokyo to sign a secret agreement with the Japanese Prime Minister Katsura (on July 29, 1904) to the effect that the United States would not oppose extension of Japanese control over Korea, in return for a promise that the Japanese would not attack the Philippine Islands. When Korea's liberal statesmen, Prince Min and General Hahn, sent the youthful reformer Syngman Rhee to plead with Roosevelt to observe the aid provisions of the 1883 treaty, Roosevelt held Rhee at bay with personal graciousness while the Portsmouth Conference proceeded to award Japan a protectorate over Korea. As soon as this was done, the United States was the first nation to close its Legation in Seoul and transfer operations to Tokyo.

TOWARD KOREAN INDEPENDENCE

In 1919, inspired by Woodrow Wilson's promise of "the self-determination of peoples," the Koreans organized a massive nonviolent "demonstration of independence" throughout Korea and elected Rhee (who by that time had received his Ph.D. from Wilson at Princeton) as President of the Korean Republic-in-Exile. For the next twenty-six years (and especially after the Pearl Harbor attack) this government strug-

gled unsuccessfully to win American recognition. The first constructive step toward the restoration of Korea's 4,300-year old nationality was the pledge at Cairo, on December 1, 1943, by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek that "in due course" Korea's independence would be restored.

The close of the Pacific phase of World War II resulted in a series of concessions to Russia, of which one was the "temporary" establishment of the 38th parallel line across the middle of Korea. Within the next few months it became apparent that the Soviet Union had no intention of withdrawing to permit the reunification of the Korean nation under any government except one dominated by Communists. The United States maintained an American Military Government in South Korea for three years, but in another movement of disengagement we persuaded the United Nations to assume responsibility for the establishment of a democratically elected Republic of Korea. Upon the refusal by the Soviet Union to accept United Nations jurisdiction in northern Korea, the projected election was held "in all areas of Korea accessible to" the United Nations Commission. On August 15, 1948, the Republic was inaugurated, under a constitution affirming its sovereignty over all Korea, and with one hundred seats in its National Assembly reserved for members subsequently to be elected for the northern provinces. On December 12 of that year the United Nations General Assembly approved the election which its commission had supervised as being "fair and free" and declared that the Republic of Korea was "the only lawful government" in Korea.

During the next two years the United Nations maintained a commission in Korea "observing and advising" the development of democratic processes and reporting that under the circumstances

satisfactory progress was being made. The United States provided economic aid through the Economic Cooperation Administration. The Communists maintained a vigorous program of subversion, which resulted in a bloody uprising in November 1948 but which gradually was brought under control and rendered ineffective. In July 1949, the United States withdrew the last of its occupation troops, leaving behind a 500-man military advisory group, which helped develop a constabulary force of 96,300 men but which denied the Korean plea for a regular army on the grounds that an armed force in southern Korea might lead to an outbreak of war with the heavily armed northern Communist regime.

The process of disengagement continued with a speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January 12, 1950, in which he declared that the American defensive perimeter in Asia lay in the island chain extending from the Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines. This process was continued in the form of a directive circulated to American foreign service personnel asking them to prepare to explain the anticipated fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communists, and in a statement by Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that if Korea were attacked the United States could not go to its assistance. On June 25, 1950, the Communists put this policy to the test by launching a heavy attack across the 38th parallel.

WAR BEGINS

President Rhee, in Seoul, had no way of knowing that his government would receive outside aid. He had in mind the example of Poland, which had been promised support in 1938 but which, nevertheless, was abandoned to enemy occupation; and the example of Czecho-

slovakia, which had surrendered to Communist pressure and which in 1950 was still receiving preferred treatment as a "showplace of Communism." Even so, he did not hesitate, but ordered his carbine-armed constabulary to resist to the full the tank-led Communist attack. Within three days half the Korean defensive force had become casualties and southern Korea was left open to invasion without an established front line.

In Independence, Missouri, President Truman was also confronted with the need for an instant and momentous decision. Concluding that to permit armed Communist aggression to succeed in Korea would be a renunciation of the Truman Doctrine which had worked so well in Greece and Turkey and might mark the end of the United Nations (which had been boycotted for six months by the Soviet Union), he moved quickly to assure United Nations sanction and American military support for a "police action" to defeat the aggression.

The first United Nations reaction, which occurred as an astounding evidence of Allied unity and determination, was deliberately ambiguous. The June 27 resolution of the Security Council called upon all the United Nations members for aid "to restore peace and security in the area"; it made no reference to the 38th parallel line. However, after the success of the Inchon Landing, the General Assembly on October 7, 1950, passed a resolution noting that "the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved." "Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly . . . was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea," it resolved that "All constituent acts should be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment

of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea." There have been many assertions that the United Nations "never" intended to reunify Korea by force of arms, but the simple fact is that on October 9 the United Nations armies moved across the 38th parallel and headed, with little opposition, for the Yalu and Tumen Rivers.

When the Chinese Communists entered the fighting in November, General MacArthur declared that this marked the beginning of "an entirely new war," and quickly withdrew his forces down below the 38th parallel. The General Assembly of the United Nations again considered the question and decided that its responsibilities had not yet been fulfilled. On February 1, 1951, it adopted a resolution branding the Chinese Communist armies as "aggressors" because of their presence in Korean territory. In subsequent fighting the Chinese Reds were soundly defeated and, on the authority of Generals MacArthur and Van Fleet, were on the verge of collapse. They were rescued, however, by a hint from Yakov Malik, delivered over the United Nations radio facilities in New York, that Russia would welcome a truce in Korea.

TRUCE TALKS

In retrospect there has been almost universal agreement that truce talks ought not to have been undertaken until after the aggressors had been driven from Korean territory. In the summer of 1951, however, a "truce without victory" was welcomed by all the participant governments except the Republic of Korea, which pleaded urgently for a continuance of the war. The "neutralist bloc" led by India demanded a truce on the grounds that Red China had intervened justly to protect its own frontier and that peace in Asia should be sought not by conquest of the Com-

munists but through recognition and conciliation of Red China. England supported the truce on the grounds that she would never "fight to conquer North Korea for Syngman Rhee." The United States was influenced by the feelings of its allies but was even more fundamentally influenced by the "island defensive perimeter" concept. With South Korea kept free from Communist control, Japan would be safe and the island perimeter could not be breached. No goal in Asia beyond this was deemed important enough to justify a full-scale war with Red China. American observers agreed that the truce was a resounding defeat for the Republic of Korea, but they added that this is just one of the international injustices that have to be tolerated.

The subsequent signing of the truce, the withdrawal of two United States divisions from Korea, and the January 12, 1954, speech by Secretary of State Dulles indicating that American policy henceforth would be developed around the theory of "massive retaliation" (directed at Russia?) rather than the fighting of "Korean-style" local wars, all constitute a further extension of American efforts to disengage ourselves from involvement in Korea.

A partial negation of disengagement was achieved by President Rhee, through his threats to disrupt the truce, in the negotiation of the American-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. But despite earnest efforts by President Rhee, the United States refused to write into the treaty any guarantee to assist in repelling the Chinese Red aggressors from Korea. In the talks between Rhee and Dulles (in mid-July, 1953) Dulles assured Rhee that the truce did not constitute a "surrender" by the United States or the United Nations. "We still stand firmly by our declarations that Korea must be reunified under its own free and democratic government,"

Dulles told Rhee in emphatic terms, "but we shall achieve that reunification by political negotiation rather than through war." Rhee replied in substance, "I agree, provided you will promise me that if negotiation fails you will then resume the fighting with us."

What would happen if negotiation does not succeed, however, was postponed for later decision. The most to which Dulles would assent was to agree to walk out of the projected political conference with the Republic of Korea, if, after ninety days, there was no substantial progress toward Korean reunification. After that, the United States and Korea should jointly consider what further action they would take. The Communists did their best to nullify the effects of the "ninety-day" clause by refusing to hold the conference on October 28, 1953, as they had promised to do; instead, a new date of April 26, 1954, was finally selected. Meanwhile, the Communists proceeded to violate the truce by establishing military air bases in North Korea and by reinforcing their ground armies in that area.

WHY U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA?

This historical review brings our consideration of American-Korean relations up to date, but necessarily has omitted a number of important considerations. The most important one is whether the United States has any real reason for being involved in Korean affairs, or whether the whole situation is not merely the result of fumbling failures, to be written off quickly as an unfortunate development. One of the strongest proponents of this view has been Owen Lattimore, who, on July 17, 1949, wrote in the *New York Post*, "The thing to do is to let South Korea fall, but not to let it look as if we pushed it."

The question of whether the United States has vital interests of its own to

pursue in Korea breaks down into two major subquestions. Are there negative (largely strategic) reasons for preventing the Communists from controlling Korea? Are there positive (largely political) reasons for assisting the establishment in Korea of a genuine democracy? These questions are of vital import, for they not only help us to understand past developments in Korea but also guide us in shaping our future policies toward that country.

There has been endless debate among the military experts concerning the strategic values of withholding Korea from enemy occupation. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the withdrawal of American troops from Korea in 1949 and refused to sanction the build-up of a Republic of Korea army, they clearly indicated their judgment that Korea could be "allowed to fall" to the Communists. In my own talks with many of our American officials, I became convinced that they anticipated the fall of Korea through internal subversion and were not willing to make major efforts to prevent this result. Some light is shed on this policy by the fact that the ECA in Korea refused to spend money to build productive resources (maintaining instead a soup-line relief program) and in successive years turned back unspent a substantial proportion of the funds voted by Congress to be used in making South Korea economically self-sufficient. The slowness of the development of the current United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and United States rehabilitation programs in Korea indicates that this same attitude is still prevalent. In 1949, the policies of withdrawal from Korea were similar in import to the explanations presented in the State Department's *White Book on China* for our stoppage of aid to the Chinese Nationalist government.

Historians have called Korea "the

heart of the strategic triangle of North Asia," bounded by China, Russia, and Japan, and have noted that when Japan secured control of Korea in 1905 it was enabled to move on through that land bridge to the conquest of Manchuria and much of China. But in the aftermath of World War II American and European efforts were devoted to finding a *modus vivendi* with Russia. This led to deliberate efforts in both China and Korea to establish "coalition governments"—presumably on the theory that it is better to join them than to try to lick them.

In Korea, General John R. Hodge, who commanded the American occupation forces, established a Coalition Committee in 1946 and denounced Rhee for his persistent attacks on Communism, which, Hodge felt, interfered with efforts to establish in a reunited Korea a government acceptable to the Soviet Union. A five-year Trusteeship was proposed for Korea, with joint supervision by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China. In early March, 1954, this same approach was renewed by Sir Winston Churchill, who proposed that the reunification of Korea be sought under a pattern of joint guarantees by Russia, Red China, the United States, and Great Britain.

TIME IS ON WHOSE SIDE?

Korean spokesmen have pointed out that if they were willing to submit to a government "acceptable to Russia," they could have had it at any time after Japan's defeat. They need not have resisted the Communist attack of June 25, 1950. They could have had that kind of reunification without suffering two million war casualties, having ten million of their people driven from their homes, or having their entire nation laid waste. They cling to the goal which has also repeatedly been stated by the United States and the United Nations,

namely, that Korea should be reunited as an independent and democratic nation.

The nature of the strategic dispute involves the basic interpretation of the struggle between the Communist and non-Communist governments of the world. One view is that the totalitarian dictatorship of the Soviet Union is so rotten internally that if the free world can hold a firm peripheral line, preventing the dictatorship from successively handing new victories as sops to its deprived and maltreated peoples, the whole Communist structure will eventually break down. This breakdown might take the form of Red China's becoming "another Yugoslavia." It might consist of disruptive revolutions in Eastern Germany and other parts of eastern Europe. It might result from power struggles among Stalin's successors. In any event, according to this view (which appears to be the one accepted by President Eisenhower) time is on our side and postponement of conflict offers hope of avoiding world war.

According to another interpretation, Communism advances best without "hot war." Operating through an international conspiratorial organization, the Communists seek to disrupt governmental and economic processes in free nations (as in Italy, France, and Indonesia), to arouse resentments against "Western colonialism" (as in Africa, the Middle East, and South America), and to stir up localized rebellions that can be represented as internal civil war (as in China in 1949 and Indochina today). Communist propaganda represents the Korean War as a Communist victory, pictures Communism as "the wave of the future," and depicts the democracies as rich but decadent states intent only on maintaining a status quo which is infinitely to their advantage. Negotiation with the Communists is worse than useless, for they seize upon every con-

cession that is offered, give nothing substantial in return, break the agreements they do make, and count confidently on observance of agreements by the free world because they feel democratic opinion will oppose any violation of agreement as a step toward war. (Our strict observance of the truce in Korea even though the Communists have openly violated it is a case in point.) In this view time is on the side of the Soviet Union, which proceeds systematically to "soften up" the free world while building its stockpile of atomic weapons and awaiting the day when it may feel able to launch the final global attack.

Syngman Rhee is a leading proponent of this latter view. He feels (as do Generals MacArthur, Van Fleet, and Clark) that there is no solution in Korea short of a decisive military victory—limited to the definitive aim of driving the Communists back across the Yalu River. He feels that the truce in Korea was another Munich, which encourages the very aggression it sought to deter. He is convinced that Russia is not yet strong enough to win a global war, and therefore will not fight one now—thus giving to the free world a diminishing period of time in which to reverse the course of the cold war, by improving rather than frittering away our vital margin of military superiority.

The answer, then, to the question of the strategic value of keeping Korea out of Communist possession is not universally agreed upon. Every responsible non-Communist would probably agree that the attack upon southern Korea had to be repulsed to prevent the break-up of the United Nations and to safeguard the "island perimeter." The future will have to demonstrate whether South Korea can continue to stand as a "bastion of democracy" without the integration of North Korea into the Republic of Korea. President Rhee feels

that in time the United States will tire of supporting South Korea economically and militarily, and that the Korean people will tire of living on a soup-line economy continually beset by Communist subversion—so that in his view postponement of the issue is tantamount to surrender. The dispute is reminiscent of what was said about China in 1948 and 1949.

KOREAN DEMOCRACY

And that brings us to our second question, for many Americans and Europeans have likened the Republic of Korea to Nationalist China and Syngman Rhee to Chiang Kai-shek. Can we, they ask, properly support a government which is not genuinely democratic? Prime Minister Nehru has gone further and declared that abandonment of Syngman Rhee (presumably even if this meant the communization of all Korea) is required by his view of what constitutes Asian self-determination. Fundamentally the nub of the Korean question is whether the Republic of Korea does actually represent healthy democracy.

This question has many times been answered affirmatively in official statements. The United Nations Commissions in their respective reports have consistently declared that despite difficulties and limitations democracy is being firmly implanted in Korea. United States Ambassador John J. Muccio, who spent four years in Korea, declared on May 30, 1952, that "a workable form of modern democratic government with the classic checks and balances was being molded [up to the time of the Communist attack] out of the crucible of events as they affected Korea." John Foster Dulles, in a speech on July 4, 1950, explained that the Communists attacked Korea because "the society was so healthy that it could not be overthrown from within."

At the same time, many criticisms from private sources have been made against the Republic of Korea, and these need to be examined. Since space precludes their full discussion here, it may be pardonable to refer inquirers to my book, *Verdict in Korea*,¹ for comprehensive data.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea grants full suffrage to men and women and contains an elaborate bill of civil rights. Skeptics have pointed out that so do the constitutions of Nationalist China and of the Soviet Union. However, in Korea, every election has been under the close observation of the United Nations. Campaigning is open and vigorous, and there have always been many candidates with differing platforms for every elective office. More than ninety newspapers are published in Korea, and although foreign critics have charged censorship, readers of them find many criticisms of many phases of governmental administration. Executive domination of the legislature is denied by the running feud which has existed between President Rhee and the National Assembly. The report of the United Nations Commission on Korea dated September 5, 1951, highlighted an important fact when it said:

The Republic of Korea has placed no restrictions whatever upon observation within the country by international bodies. . . . This willingness . . . is a sign of a genuine desire to carry out the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations to the best of the country's abilities.

Many of the charges made against the Republic of Korea for alleged lack of democracy ought, rather, to be levied against its poverty, or low level of education, or lack of a tradition of Lockian equality, or the urgent need for defense against Communist infiltration and subversion. Even in the United States,

¹ State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1952.

which is infinitely safer than South Korea, the power of the police to ferret out hidden Communist connections has been considerably expanded. The "phenomenal fact" in Korea (again to quote Ambassador Muccio) is that the basic civil rights have been so well maintained.

On the constructive side, democracy in Korea has proved so healthy that an average of 86 per cent of all eligible voters have gone to the polls in all the elections. Education has expanded to the degree that four times as many students are in high school as during the Japanese rule, that thirty-nine colleges are in operation, and that illiteracy has been largely eliminated. Women's rights have expanded enormously, not only through gaining the ballot, but in a decided change of social and economic attitudes. The problem of landlord control of the farm lands has been almost wholly eliminated, as Korean farmers have been granted the right, and assisted by government aid, to buy the land they cultivate. Farm rentals now constitute less than 10 per cent of all Korean farm lands.

Constitutional amendment of 1952

President Rhee came under heavy attack from foreign critics in the spring and summer of 1952, when he forced through the National Assembly a constitutional amendment that transferred the power of electing the President from the Assembly to the entire electorate. Admittedly he had to utilize all the pressures at his command to secure the relinquishment by the National Assembly of this vital power. But there is no question that the people of Korea solidly supported the change. All of the Provincial Assemblies voted for it, and 1,400 local Councils (out of a total of 1,700 in all South Korea) adopted resolutions favoring it. The "pressure" exerted on the National Assembly to

accept the amendment largely consisted of the convergence upon it of committees bearing these resolutions. Those critics who charged that Rhee was "violating the Constitution" overlooked the fact that it was being amended, not violated, and that our own concept of democracy demands the election of the President by all the voters, rather than by the National Legislature. Rhee himself feels that the future of democracy in Korea would not be safe unless the essential power of choosing the chief executive was safely implanted in the people as a whole.

Korean individualism

The only dependable safeguard of any democracy is the nature of the people themselves. The Koreans have solidly proved their sturdy individualism. The Japanese occupied Korea for a full generation and sought with all their ingenuity to "Japanize" the population—but failed notably. The Russians tried with all the means in their repertoire to rule the North Koreans, but four millions of them managed to escape into the south; and the communization of North Korea had to be accomplished under the leadership of a Soviet citizen, Kim Il Sung, backed by an influx of two million repatriates from Siberia and North China, most of whom were communized during their generation-long fight against Japan. The Koreans have been christened "the Irish of the Orient." Aleš Hrdlička, who was the chief anthropologist for the Smithsonian Institution and who specialized in Korean anthropology, called them "the white people of the Orient." Missionaries have agreed that Korea is "the most Christian land in the Orient." From my own experience among them, I testify with careful assurance that they are a superior people, wholly capable of managing their own destinies and determined to do so. Their determination, high morale, and

ebullient individualism under all the hammerings of the war have been noted and praised by a great number of highly competent observers. No such people as the Koreans would endure a despotic government at home any more than they would accept a colonial rule from abroad.

SUMMARY

In a general summing up, then, of the relations between America and the new Korea, a number of conclusions emerge, all fitting together into a rather simple and definite pattern.

1. The United States has been reluctant to maintain close relations with Korea (not wishing to be entangled with affairs on the Asian mainland) but has been forced into recurrent commitments because of the strategic importance of Korea for the defense of our own security.

2. In the Korean peninsula have been planted the seeds of genuine Western-style democracy—a fact which may turn out to be the most important, historically, of all the developments in the Far East in recent years.

3. The war in Korea was an essential defense of the free world against Communist imperialism, and it may prove

to be true that we have gravely endangered our own security by our failure to win it.

4. The Korean question was not solved by the truce, but remains one of the crucial issues of the cold war—one that will require decisions in the future fully as momentous as those in the past.

From whatever point of view we may examine the Korean question, its basic simplicity emerges. It is a clear testing ground for the United States and the Soviet Union in the world-power struggle between our antagonistic ways of life. It is a test of the ability of the industrialized Western nations to deal effectively with the emergent nationalism, economic ambitions, and cultural stamina of the Far East. It is a test of the ability of the United Nations to develop a world order based upon law. And finally (remembering the emergence of a massive and modernized Red Chinese fighting force) it remains to be seen whether the Korean War as it was conducted was really a contribution to lasting peace or rather a reproduction of the Spanish Civil War prelude to world war. Any way we look at it, the Korean people are caught in the middle of a vast network of global conflicts. They deserve our sympathy, our understanding, and our help.

Robert T. Oliver, Ph.D., LL.D., State College, Pennsylvania, is head of the Department of Speech at the Pennsylvania State University. During the summer of 1946, he was a guest lecturer in Korea University; he was in Korea as adviser to President Syngman Rhee at intervals from 1949 to 1953 and has also served as adviser to Korean delegations to the United Nations. He is manager of the Washington Bureau of the Korean Pacific Press, editor of the magazine Korean Survey, and author of several books on Korea, including Verdict in Korea (1952) and Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (1954).

The Aspirations of Korea

By YOU CHAN YANG

IT is a tragic circumstance that Korea is at this time and has been since the end of World War II an artificially divided nation.

A new and reunited Korea would mean a great deal to the peace of Asia and the peace of the entire world. Our geographical position is one of great strategic importance. The centuries-old unity of our people is another factor. Our record of never having waged aggressive war is still another—in over 4,300 years our people have never attacked anybody, and we have no intention of doing so. All these things add up to the realization that Korea can be one of the most stabilizing elements in a world which desperately seeks stability.

It may seem a singular thing that my country, which was long known as "the Hermit Kingdom," and later, when the Japanese made our peninsula a vast prison camp, as "the Forgotten Nation," should in the past five years see itself the subject of countless headlines, innumerable magazine articles, many, many television and radio programs, and discussions so continual as to defy enumeration. It is saddening that a people and a nation known for centuries as lovers of peace should have had contemporary history record their activities in letters of blood.

All of this means, naturally, that Korea has had a tremendous impact on the rest of the world, and those of us who believe in human freedom cannot but pray that the sacrifices which the Korean people have undergone and the sacrifices that Americans have made on those faraway battlefields shall not have been in vain. For the enemy who pro-

duced the war in Korea remains our enemy today. He has but one goal and that is the conquest of the entire world and the subjugation of all free peoples to his concept of mankind as the serf of the state. Our concept, on the other hand, is the one which was given magnificent birth in the city of Philadelphia when this Republic emerged.

The difference in the matter of the two ideologies is as pronounced as day and night. Some way, somehow, one or the other must triumph. For better or for worse we—the war-torn and devastated people of Korea—and you, the great and powerful people of the United States, are in this thing together. Whether or not the issue will be finally resolved in Korea, none can say, but we accepted the challenge first—the challenge of Communist aggression—and we should have been overwhelmed, had you not come to our assistance.

If it is thought that our great President and leader, Syngman Rhee, and his embattled countrymen, who believe in his leadership, have been able to be of service to what remains of the free world, I should like to put my own opinion of that service in capsule form, being a physician. Here it is: They have shown everyone with any knowledge whatever of this crucial period of history the folly of appeasement. In so doing, they have been called upon to pay one of the heaviest prices ever paid by a nation.

Syngman Rhee has been termed a stubborn and obstinate old man. Much of this criticism has come from Communist sources; some of it, I regret to say, has come from sources which have been content to rely on snap judgment,

sources which have little or no conception of the profoundly vital issue at stake in my country.

To me, Syngman Rhee is just as stubborn and obstinate as were Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, James Otis, Thomas Paine, and the other great patriots of the American Revolution. Those men knew the issue was very simple. It was freedom versus tyranny. In that long and sometimes hopeless struggle, did they either compromise with the enemy or seek to appease him? Not that I am aware of, and my entire education was in American grade and high schools in Hawaii, and in Boston University on the mainland. No, those men knew that what was morally wrong never could be politically right. And they held to that principle despite the fact that they were confronted by all the might and power of the world's then most powerful empire. Think of it, a little fringe of not more than three million persons strung along the Atlantic coast, standing up and giving battle and finally triumphing over a tyranny able to command the resources and manpower of much of the world. They did not shrink. As a result, people in the United States today are enjoying the privileges of freedom, liberty, and the decencies of life. And that is all our people are asking. Is it a crime to ask for freedom, liberty, and the decencies of life? That is all we want, nothing else. We have no interest in other people's territory.

Syngman Rhee is as stubborn as your early patriots where a moral principle is concerned. That wise old Christian gentleman knows full well and has stated in many of his speeches that "to attempt to compromise with evil is as evil as is evil itself."

A MAGNIFICENT PAST

Somber thoughts must predominate when one talks about Korea these days.

As you know, and as has been said, the past is prelude to the present, and the present is prelude to the future. The Korean people have had a magnificent past—more than forty-three centuries of it on our peninsula. Protected from the mainland of Asia by rivers and mountain ridges, it was possible to develop down through the long corridors of time a culture and a way of life that enabled us to grow from a few hundred thousand into a homogeneous nation of thirty million people. No more homogeneous nation ever existed.

We are an inventive people. Before Gutenberg, we contrived movable type. Long before any other nation, as far as we know, we built the first solar observatory, which still stands in Korea today. Lost somewhere in the dim recesses of time is our invention of the magnetic compass for mariners. Nearly five hundred years ago our scholars evolved the first alphabet of the Orient—twenty-four letters, the existing vowels and most of your consonants. In 1592 our admiral, Yisunsin, used an iron clad type of vessel to annihilate the Japanese invading forces. Even today, Japanese Satsuma ware is Korean made, by descendants of the three thousand artisans who were taken over to Japan and put in the southern part, in the island of Kyushu. All of these things we did by ourselves alone.

Now I recount these things not in a spirit of braggadocio, but so that it may be known what our past has been, and what we have tried to contribute to the march of civilization. Does not an old Korea of this distinction give some hope of what a new Korea may accomplish?

Under the leadership of our great patriot and statesman, President Syngman Rhee—a man of inflexible purpose—the Korean people are in this fight against Communism to the absolute finish. You wonder why? You of the West have taught us the rights of man.

You have brought Christianity to us. Therefore we want to worship God as you are doing today, and we want to be free men and women. Therefore we are determined to fight the despotism of the Kremlin. We would belie our past and forfeit our future if, in the present, we did not show the qualities that enable us to look backward with pride and forward with determination.

Down through the centuries the Korean people have secured not only a good livelihood out of the soil and fruits of the comparatively small peninsula that is our homeland, but also an oversufficiency for our needs. Let me give you an example of what our people can do. In spite of all the destruction that has gone on and of all the young men being taken into the army, our farmers were able to produce enough rice last year so that we can export 600,000 tons. It is fantastic—\$150,000,000 worth to export. It shows the determination of our people.

KOREA AND JAPAN

Korea, standing as a bulwark against any Chinese advance further eastward in the Pacific and equally as a bulwark against any Japanese advance upon the continent of Asia, lived in peace for many centuries. But our dream of perpetual peace was shattered when in 1905 Japan defeated Russia and moved into our homeland. For four decades thereafter we knew the harsh tyranny of alien rule. Yes, we were then "the Forgotten Nation."

American victory over Japan restored to us our liberties in part of our country, and let me say that America alone won the war in the Pacific. You destroyed the massive Japanese military machine and you did it singlehanded. The Russians were Johnny-come-lately's—one week before the Japanese surrender!

I went to Japan as the Korean chief delegate to sit down and settle all the

existing problems between Japan and Korea, to hold hands, make friends, and go forward from there because we have a greater enemy to fight, to protect ourselves and to protect Japan and the whole Pacific. Therefore I tried to talk realistically, but so far we have not got anywhere.

On October 6, 1953, we opened the conference in Japan. On the first day, the Japanese chief delegate made the following five statements:

1. The repatriation of Japanese nationalists from Korea was a violation of international law.

2. The establishment of the Republic of Korea by the United States and the United Nations prior to the Japanese Peace Treaty was a violation of international law. In other words, the Republic of Korea should never have been founded.

3. The Cairo Declaration by the Allied Powers that there existed an enslavement of the Korean people was nothing but war hysteria.

4. The turning over of Japanese property to the Korean government by the United States Military Government was a violation of international law in spite of its being written into the Japanese Treaty, Article IV (b), which clearly stated that Japan had nothing in Korea, and also that Japan made an unconditional surrender.

5. The thirty-six years of Japanese occupation of Korea were beneficial to the Koreans.

Now do not tell me the Japanese were in there for their health. Do not tell me they loved the Koreans so much that they went in there to help them, when they murdered thousands upon thousands of my people under any pretext. I can tell you that they were trying to wipe out Christianity and to transplant Shinto into Korea, and they made our Christians bow before the Japanese

Emperor's picture. Do not tell me that was beneficial to the Koreans.

Think it over, please. I do not mind American aid to Japan, but let us go slow.

Before World War II I used to go around this country telling people, "Japan is going to attack the United States." They said I was a crazy fool. I was not such a crazy fool when December 7, 1941, came around. I was trying to save thousands of your boys' lives at Pearl Harbor. I was operating day and night at the General Hospital there, and thousands of your innocent boys were laid out on the green grass. Think it over, please.

WHAT DOES KOREA WANT?

Uneasy as the present is, we in Korea still yearn and hope to do the things civilized men and women do in other parts of the world. We want to rebuild our homes; we want an opportunity to bring up our children and to educate them without the sound of bombs, shot, and shell. We want to rebuild our schools and our churches. We want to improve our roads. We want—with the extraordinary example of America as an inspiration—to raise our standard of living, to assure every Korean child of the best education possible, and, last but not least, to live in peace. We have proved that we can fight, but we are most proud of our record as a nation of never having committed an aggressive act against any other people. For centuries we have been known as the "Land of the Morning Calm," and our love of peace has been such that the ordinary "hello" and "good-by" and "good night" in Korea takes on an added connotation because we say when we meet a friend or a stranger, "May you come in peace," and when we bid him adieu we say, "May you go in peace." Likewise, when it is time for a good night to visiting

friends, we say, "May you sleep in peace." Yes, we love peace.

Regarding the Geneva Conference which is slated to be held the latter part of April, I should be less than frank were I not to tell you that the Korean people face it with grave misgivings. If the conference should, by any chance, result in a Korean peace and the withdrawal of the Red Chinese from the northern half of our country, we should rejoice. But we have had so many conferences with the Communists, and none has resulted in any agreement. We will never get anywhere with appeasement. In fact, Senator William F. Knowland has, in my opinion, an even better phrase. He calls it "surrender on the installment plan." Meantime, from another appeasement corner you have heard the suggestion that the solution of the Korean War may be found in the "neutralization" of my country. I can assure you that the Korean people will never stand for the emasculation of their nationality. We simply are not made that way. We know the history of neutrality; look at Belgium and Holland as two outstanding examples where, when a great and powerful neighbor decided to overrun their lands, their neutrality perished at once. No, we will never accept the status of an unarmed nation while a madman with tanks, guns, and airplanes is poised on our doorstep.

DEVASTATION AND REHABILITATION

The stench of death still hovers over my country. Put yourselves in our place. Imagine your own community in ruins and silent in the darkness of night. All about you in wreckage. Those who have lived here are gone. The dead remain. Your high buildings are broken skeletons against the light of the moon. Perhaps, if you listen intently, you may hear the cry of a child and if you pursue it—and pursue it you

will, for humanity always hearkens to the cry of a child—you will find a tiny waif of Communist cruelty, hungry, ragged, and homeless. Where are his parents? How did he get where he is? What can be done for him? You must, first of all, feed him, then clothe him, and then find a place for him to live—an orphanage set up by your poverty-stricken government or by GI's out of their modest pay as soldiers.

In this connection I should like to say that the American GI's have contributed nearly \$15,000,000 to save our orphans. Our people are saying, "God bless the American GI." Our Korean people, no matter what happens tomorrow in Korea, will never forget the warm generosity and the kindness of your people and the American GI's. Whether you like it or not, we will always stand by you.

That child we heard is one of nearly 200,000 like him. There are 300,000 war widows in Korea. There are 2,000,000 casualties, civilian and military. Look down, in the moonlight, and you may see a legless man, on stumps, crawling along. We have more than 20,000 of his kind who need artificial arms and legs, or crutches and canes, until they can be fitted for the life of a cripple. Owing to the hardships of war, one-third of our population is afflicted with either incipient or advanced tuberculosis.

Alone and unaided, the task of rehabilitation might overwhelm us, but the American people and their government, as well as other members of the United Nations, have responded with help. In this connection, however, there are some disturbing elements which I feel I should comment on. The bulk of funds expended to date, I regret to say, has been spent to build up the Japanese economy rather than to make our goal of a self-sufficient Korea an attainable goal. Since 1949 we have been asking

for fertilizer plants, which are very essential, power plants, and cement plants, but we still have not got them. Large sums of money have been used to purchase consumer goods in Japan for transport to Korea instead of upon the essential repair and reconstruction of Korean factories so that we might make our own consumer goods. We are asking for help so that we can help ourselves. We do not want to be always dependent upon you or upon anybody else. The sooner we are enabled to earn our own way, the sooner we will cease to be a burden on the American taxpayer. That is our aim: to prove to America that we are deeply grateful by standing on our own feet.

It has never been the policy of America to single out one nation in a world area for such preferential treatment and assistance that the other nations in the same area automatically become dependent on the giant. The American creed, as we know it, is that all peoples, wherever located, should have an equal opportunity to move toward full freedom and dignity.

A FREE AND UNITED KOREA

A new Korea faces a multitude of problems. Foremost among them is the transformation of an agrarian economy to one of industrialization. But there is a hardihood, a stamina, in my people that, ominous as the future may seem at the moment, enables them to hope for a new Korea. In addition, they possess, as they always have possessed, the will to work. They know there *must* be a new Korea, if only for the reason that the old Korea is gone. Modern warfare has virtually wiped it off the face of the map.

But it is inconceivable to any Korean to picture the future of our nation on any basis except complete unity, for north of the hated 38th parallel—hated

because it was imposed upon us as a basis of our division—north of the parallel are hydroelectric plants necessary to industrialization, while the south is our food basket. In far southern Korea, for example, many farms are able to grow two crops a year because of the equable climate.

Now one is entitled to ask: Well, what of the future, anyway? My answer must be blunt, a free and united Korea by force of arms if all else fails, or a nation and people destroyed at the hands of Communist aggression.

You must realize, though, that we do not want to fight because we like to fight, but because thousands of our countrymen in the north are the victims of Communist barbarity. They are our flesh and blood. They call out to us to rescue them from banishment to the remote provinces of Manchuria and Siberia in order that their homes and lands may be seized by Chinese Communist colonizers. Other thousands of them are dying of malnutrition and ill-treatment.

Suppose the Communists invaded and held a portion of the United States, uprooting your fellow-Americans and sending them into the jungles of the Amazon or the frozen wastes of Alaska? Would you respond to their calls for help? Of course you would. You have proven on battlefields in many other places what you would do for freedom. All we ask for now is understanding of the steps we feel we may be forced to take.

We Koreans prefer an honorable death, alone if need be, to the dishonor of Communist slavery. We have learned the immortal words of your great patriot, Patrick Henry, "Give me liberty, or give me death!" and we are repeating those immortal words today. I do not think you can blame us for that. Please be patient with us. We do not want any more war if we can help it. But what are we going to do? What would you do? We will go along, and if the Korean issue can be settled by peaceful means, we are more than willing. But we are asking if the peaceful means fail, then what is your alternative plan? What do you intend to do? Throw up your hands and say, "We are defeated," while your boys and our boys are sitting on the hills of Korea to be shot at like ducks when the Communists are ready? What are we going to do?

We are not the first people to prefer death to dishonor. The pages of history recount others, though none more glorious than the annals of your own Revolution. There were many who thought, in that day and age, that the new America of 1776, which preferred death rather than the loss of liberty, might not long exist. But look at this great nation today—the hope of the free world.

That chapter in your history is the most compelling reason for the Korean people, in their hour of trial and adversity, to know that some day there will be a new and reunited Korea.

His Excellency You Chan Yang, M.D., Washington, D. C., has been Ambassador of Korea to the United States since 1951. Educated in Hawaii and in this country, he practised medicine in Hawaii from 1923 to 1951, and in World War II directed a medical unit under the Office of Civilian Defense. Since student days he has been active in Korean independence movements, and has recently developed a plan for rebuilding South Korean schools and training Korean technicians. He took part in the negotiations for the Japanese-Korean peace treaty which went into effect in April 1952 and also in those of October 1953.

The Role of the United States in the Far East

By ARTHUR H. DEAN

WHAT can we do to bring about a lasting peace in Korea and the unification of that sorely harassed land? First we must decide what we mean by "peace" and second what we mean by "unification."

As most of you know, the people of Korea, although not themselves Chinese, were for many years governed by Chinese kings under a mild suzerainty to China. Following the defeat of China by Japan in 1895 and of Russia by Japan in 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 arranged for Japan to have a protectorate over Korea; in 1910 Japan annexed Korea.

One of the major policies of the Allies in the last war was to restore freedom to the long-suffering people of Korea and to bring about its freedom, unity, and independence. The able and gallant leader of the Korean people, Syngman Rhee, has spent his entire life to achieve this end, first against the Japanese and now against the Communists. For purely military considerations after the U.S.S.R. had agreed to come into the war against Japan in 1945, Russian military authorities were invited to accept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea north of the 38th parallel—a purely fictitious line. Subsequent attempts to bring about the unification of Korea by negotiations with the U.S.S.R. proved futile, and after a plebiscite in the southern part conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, the Republic of Korea, under the Presidency of Syngman Rhee, was set up south of the 38th parallel. A de facto Communist government was set up by the U.S.S.R. in the north.

THE KOREAN WAR

In June of 1950 the Republic of Korea was attacked without warning or justification by forces from north of the 38th parallel, inspired and armed by the U.S.S.R.

Following the adoption of resolutions by the Security Council of the United Nations in June and July 1950, we contributed troops to the United Nations command, along with fifteen other members of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea. The United States took on the unified command of the United Nations' collective effort to put down aggression, and President Truman gave the post to one of our outstanding military leaders, General Douglas MacArthur.

We have reason to be proud of our brilliant achievements in Korea, but after the Chinese Communists came into the war in November and December 1950 we did not unify Korea by military might. Among other things we did prove that armed aggression does not pay, and we stopped the timetable of Red aggression in the Far East.

I shall not dwell on the fighting and the events leading to the signing of the Armistice on July 27, 1953, or on the history of the drafting of Paragraph 60, incorporated into the Armistice Agreement.

THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

The Armistice Agreement was signed by military commanders on both sides. One side—our side—is made up of the sixteen members of the United Nations contributing troops and the Republic of Korea. The other side consists of the

Chinese Communists and the North Korean Communists.

Paragraph 60 recommended "to the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides" that "a political conference of a higher level of both sides" be held by October 28 by representatives appointed respectively in order "to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc."

As a result of the Cairo Declaration in December 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, and the U.S.S.R. declaration of war against Japan, August 8, 1945, the "Korean question" referred to in Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement may be defined as the unification of a free, independent, and democratic Korea. The "withdrawal of all foreign forces" referred to in Paragraph 60 was defined in the Armistice negotiations to mean the withdrawal of "non-Korean forces."

KOREAN GEOGRAPHY

If you will look at the map you will note Korea's geographical propinquity to China and Manchuria on the west, Manchuria on the north, and the U.S.S.R. on the northeast, which surround it like gigantic pincers, and if you will look about 200 miles to the west from Pyongyang, you will find on the Liaotung Peninsula the great naval and industrial warm-water ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, the eastern terminus of the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

To the north of Korea itself are the winding Yalu and Tumen Rivers. North and northwestward lies Manchuria and to the extreme northeast the U.S.S.R. itself fronts on Korea.

The great industrial city of Mukden is about a hundred miles from the North Korean border. South of Mukden and north of the Korean border is the steel

city of Anshan. The important industrial and railroad center of Harbin lies about 250 miles to the north. Just 60 miles to the northeast of the island of Chongjin (Seishin) on the northeast coast of Korea you will find the large Russian naval center of Vladivostok, which is also the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Korea, as you know, is a 525 mile long S-shaped peninsula extending southward from Manchuria and Soviet Russia to within less than 120 miles of the island of Kyushu in southern Japan. It is shaped somewhat like Florida but is very mountainous. Its area of 85,000 square miles is approximately equal to that of Minnesota. The area actually available for cultivation is relatively small.

The east coast of Korea faces the Sea of Japan. To the west across the Yellow Sea lies China. To the south is the Korea Strait and approximately 500 miles to the south lies the island of Formosa, now occupied by the Nationalist Government of China and its intrepid leader Chiang Kai-shek, whom we are supporting both morally and materially in his fight against the Communists.

Then approximately 390 miles farther south are the Philippines. On the mainland south of China and some 600 miles or more west of the Philippines are Indochina, Burma, and Thailand. Further south lies Malaya. To the east of Malaya and south and west of the Philippines lies Indonesia, that is, Borneo, Java, Sumatra, and Celebes, and further south, Australia and New Zealand. To the northwest of Burma lie eastern Pakistan and India.

Korea lies some 5,600 air miles from Seattle and 9,000 miles from our east coast, no further apart in time by air travel than many points in the United States by rail.

Thus you can easily see that it would

not be much of a problem for the other side either to invade Korea or to withdraw non-Korean Communist forces into China or Manchuria, a relatively short distance north or west across the Yalu River. But it is quite a problem for us to withdraw our forces.

A DIVIDED KOREA

Although the statement is an oversimplification, for the most part the hydroelectric power, the electrochemical industries, the manufacturing plants of heavy industry, the mines, and the heavy timber are in the North. South of the 38th parallel the people are for the most part engaged in farming—principally rice, beans, or barley—in woodcutting, fishing, or in light manufacturing—textile or foundry work, pottery, and some glass. At present, we are engaged in a great program of rehabilitation in the South.

The people in all of Korea were remarkably homogeneous and united before the attack, and the economy of the entire country was reciprocal. Under the Japanese rule the economy was geared to Japanese needs, and Korea was an outlet for the Japanese market. Now it is rudely hacked into two parts, with an almost fanatical desire on the part of the Communists to unite the economy of the North with that of China and Manchuria. The South has been relatively harder hit, and it will be much more difficult for it to survive without the economy of the northern part.

The problem, therefore, of what we can do to achieve a free, united, independent, and democratic Korea where the people can live happily and carry on their normal peaceful pursuits and how we can obtain the truly effective withdrawal of the Chinese Communist forces from Korea is exceptionally difficult.

Communist reports are very mislead-

ing, and generally exaggerated; they conveniently omit statistics or compare statistics for unlike periods. But from present Communist reports it would seem that the Chinese Communists with the aid, or at least promised aid, from the U.S.S.R., East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland are doing their best to rebuild North Korea and to incorporate and integrate the economic life of North Korea into that of Manchuria and Communist China to the north and west and to prevent the unification of North and South Korea into a free, independent, united, and democratic Korea.

The much harassed and sorely tried people of Korea deserve a better fate than a divided Korea. Their soldiers fought bravely and gallantly by the side of our own and the other members of the United Nations command and they are eager and willing to learn. No people has ever defended itself more bravely or more courageously.

When you see the terrible destruction in Korea and the hard, grinding, unremitting toil which is the daily lot of the Korean people today, and the happy, bright-faced children trooping to school—most inadequately clad for the rather severe Korean winter—your heart goes out to them and you wish that there were some way you could bring an end to their trial, tribulation, and suffering.

But how?

THE HOPE OF UNIFICATION

President Rhee believes and advocates that properly supervised elections should be held in the North for the seats in the Korean Parliament that are now vacant. He is confident that in free elections his compatriots north of the 38th parallel will choose proper anti-Communist representatives and that he and his party will get the great bulk of the delegates.

But the Communists have now occupied North Korea since the latter

part of 1945. Millions of people have been killed or maimed or have fled southward—and if reports can be believed, many thousands of anti-Communists have been forcibly carried away into Chinese Communist or U.S.S.R. slave labor camps, and Chinese Communist farmers have been moved into North Korea to take their places.

The Communists are fanatical zealots dedicated to their unholy cause, and short of renewing hostilities it is difficult to see what will persuade them to unification. Let us examine the possibilities:

1. Would they willingly allow the government of Syngman Rhee with its well-known hatred of Communism to have complete control of the governmental machinery in the North? Even if we were to offer them abundant economic aid and financial rehabilitation greater than that now offered by the U.S.S.R. and the Communist countries of eastern Europe, what would they gain by it?

2. We certainly do not want a Communist coalition government for all of Korea with Communist ministers et cetera.

3. We certainly do not want to recognize the independence of North Korea.

Chinese Communist desires

The Chinese Communists apparently want at least six things: (1) the complete withdrawal of all United Nations and United States forces; (2) the giving up of our right to station troops in Korea pursuant to our Military Defense Pact; (3) the unification of Korea under Communist auspices or at least the complete retention of the northern part or a coalition government in the southern part; (4) the recognition of their regime by the United States; (5) admission into the United Nations and the expulsion of Nationalist China; (6) the withdrawal of the trade embargo

voted on Communist China and North Korea by the United Nations.

The clear and ringing speech of Secretary of State Dulles on March 29 before the Overseas Press Club, followed up by President Eisenhower's and Senator William F. Knowland's announcements, seems to constitute an effective answer to all of these desires and to indicate that our policy will continue to be one of strong opposition to the Chinese Communist regime.

Coalition government

A coalition government with the Communists is, of course, a fool's paradise, as Jan Masaryk in Czechoslovakia found to his sorrow. The Chinese peasants having received "land distribution" must now give it back to a "co-operative collective." Communist promises have a way of disappearing into thin air. A coalition government would lead to a gradual if not complete paralysis of governmental functions. Neither Korean nor American public opinion would tolerate it—certainly we could not agree to economic rehabilitation of or military aid to a coalition government with Communists.

Unification under appropriate workable and realistic terms is certainly a desirable goal. But we ought not to be confused by words, for unification by coalition with the Communists loses its meaning. Although we should, of course, explore every basis of unification that has a workable chance, we must not surrender the tangible gain of the Korean War for the sake of a so-called "successful conference."

The situation in Korea and on Formosa and in Japan has been changed sharply by the serious difficulties the French and the free Vietnamese face at this truly critical juncture in Indochina where the control of the free world in that area is in so much difficulty.

A PROGRAM FOR THE UNITED STATES

In order to bring about better results and in order to get the complete cooperation of the free world I believe we should do at least nine things in the Far East.

1. We must convince by clear and appropriate action the governments of the Far East, the Communists, and our own sincere friends that we are prepared to deter aggression and infiltration and that we will be able to respond vigorously and ably at places and with means of our own choosing.

2. We must convince them that we are not going to withdraw or become fainthearted or leave our friends in the lurch. This is of vital importance.

3. We must use every means at our command consistent with decent and normal relations between allies, and with due humility on our part, to convince our French allies that it is in their own best interest so to establish the Associated States within the French Union that not only the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian people but others as well are truly convinced they are independent and are fighting for their own independence and not to preserve some vestige of colonialism.

4. This must be done on a cordial, consultative, constructive, friendly basis with the French, the leaders in Vietnam, and if at all feasible with other leaders in the Far East, so that world opinion will accept the political results as the fundamental concept of true independence for which free men can honestly fight. It will be necessary truly to unite local sentiment behind the government and to deprive the Communists of one of their great propaganda weapons—namely, that we are fighting to further colonialism. We must convince the peoples of Asia we are not trying to prevent a people from achieving independence.

5. We must assure the French and the peoples of Indochina, India, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand that we propose to make such efforts as may be necessary to drive the Communists from Indochina on both a political and military basis and that those who are on our side will not be fighting on the wrong side.

6. We must work out in consultation with the French the further training of the Vietnamese army and pave the way for the eventual withdrawal of French forces and their return to metropolitan France.

7. Despite religious and ideological differences, we must do everything within our power to work with the Indians, the Burmese, the Thais, the Indonesians, and others in order to convince them of the terrible dangers of our not being united and of the dangers in a fence-sitting policy.

8. We must work out an economic policy toward this part of the world which is not based on "neocolonialism" but which is unbiased and free from any colonial motive or interest so we can woo them away from believing that Communism is an attractive theory, either intellectually or in practice.

Asian revolution

9. By friendly persuasion and not by domination we must attempt to convince those who disagree with us that we are not completely wrong in our approach to the problem. Prime Minister Nehru, and indeed Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas and to a lesser extent Adlai Stevenson in his recent Godkin lectures at Harvard, if I read them correctly, believe that the revolution in Asia, of which Communism is but a manifestation, cannot be halted; that Communism must be allowed to thrash about in a somewhat irresponsible manner; that given time, patience, and the right treatment, the revolution

in Asia will flow into constructive channels; and that we must evolve the minimum conditions on which we would be willing to live and let live with the Chinese Communists.

This argument continues that the right treatment is not a show of military strength and opposition, as this will only provoke; that the right treatment is economic and technical assistance on as large a scale as can be provided to overcome the hunger for food and land and to restore to the Asian a sense of pride in his own individualism; that he must be treated not as a mere creature of the West, for such treatment makes the Asian turn to the false, facile, and fleeting promises of the Soviet Union; the wrong treatment is for the West to ally itself with corrupt and discredited regimes and to bolster them with military aid, money, and equipment, until they are attacked by people rising in revolt under Communist leadership and then to provide active support of the attacked against the native people.

In a sense, they are, of course, correct that Asian nationalism can be channeled but not dammed, and that promises of a full stomach, of more land and greater yields, and of the reduction of crop loans and interest payments by the simple expedient of killing the landowner, the usurer, the money lender, and the owner of the rice mills have a great ideological appeal to a poverty-stricken and exploited people. The Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asians" had a great appeal for these people, yet some of these countries were overrun by the Japanese and in part liberated by the Communists. Today we are supporting the Japanese and fighting the Communists.

But I wonder how far this argument is correct, for after thirty-seven years the Russian Communists do not appear to wish to work with us. To my mind

it is too simple to say we could better solve the whole matter by being kind to Communists.

I do believe that experts in politics, agriculture, plant disease, fishery, agronomy, biology, agricultural marketing, nutrition, and home economics could work wonders. The problem is not just one of more money and more military aid and more industrialization, important though they may be.

MUST THE U. S. GET INVOLVED IN INDOCHINA?

There are undoubtedly those among you who shrug their shoulders and say, "We cannot save the world; we cannot prevent the inevitable from happening; we cannot bankrupt ourselves; and we cannot promise military aid all over the world." Having just fought and at least temporarily put out the great blaze in Korea, why do we wish to get involved in this new great fire in Indochina?

The problem is admittedly exceptionally difficult. If the Communists overrun Indochina, they may in time overrun Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia, go north to the Philippines, and attack or infiltrate the Philippines and Formosa from the east. Indochina, Burma, and Thailand presently export more food, particularly rice, than they produce, and if the Communists are in control there they can effectually starve Japan or demand her production and the withdrawal of our troops.

It does not seem to me that we can safely regard this situation as inevitable. For if Communism is so extended, the problems of Prime Minister Nehru and the people of India will be sorely accentuated. The free world may not survive an evolution which might take generations.

The problem and its correct solution concerns you, your children, our future as a nation, and all of our lives.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

Today in the northern part of Indochina the Communist Vietminh forces led by Ho Chi-minh are organized, financed, and supplied by the Chinese Communists and are fighting the French and Vietnam forces in a costly and bloody battle at the garrison of Dien-bienphu, located in Tonkin between the Mekong and Red or Tonkin Rivers, west of Hanoi and north of Luang-prabang and east of Burma and Thailand. The Communists have guerrilla forces in many places in the rice paddies and jungles. They also are attacking southward in Cambodia, in the regions of Muongsay and Attopeu.

The fighting is to determine whether the forces of freedom or Communism shall prevail. While militarily, perhaps, the battle at Dienbienphu is not of fundamental strategic importance, nevertheless the defeat of the French and Vietnam forces there may cast a spirit of gloom and lessen the will of the Vietnamese and the French to fight the Communists. Defeat may make the path of the Geneva Conference and the future of the French Union exceptionally difficult.

If Indochina were to fall into Communist hands or if there were a coalition or a Communist government for part of it, our own problems in the Pacific would be made immeasurably more difficult.

FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES

The problem in Indochina is a frightfully complicated one. Many native Vietnamese, who have much to lose if the Communists win, appear either to be supporting Ho Chi-minh or to be fence sitting.

In relation to their population and gross national product, the French in the eight-year war have suffered terrible loss of life and have spent vast

sums of money in Indochina; the vision of endless fighting in its rice paddies and steamy jungles is abhorrent. True, the United States has been most generous in financial and military support. But the fact that we have thought it wise to conclude an armistice in Korea, the dissatisfaction caused by our insistence on the ratification of the European Defense Community, and the French fear of the rise of German militarism—all exploited by the Communists—contribute to the general distaste with which French people view the situation. The French have made enormous strides in developing this primarily agricultural nation and bringing it into the French Union, but the problem of satisfying the native people on colonialism still remains.

The Japanese occupation during the war, the quarrels between the Pétain regime and the Free French, the necessity for British and Nationalist Chinese troops to occupy the country in order to disarm the Japanese, the constant propaganda and infiltration of the Vietminh, the presence of Communist China on the north, the obtaining by Burma of its complete independence from the British, the organization of the Indonesian Republic to the south and east, the policy of the United States in granting the Philippines their complete independence, and the friction of Cambodia and Laos with Thailand, exacerbated by the annexation of some territory by Thailand with the approval of the Japanese during the war—all make it difficult to rally the native people in support of Vietnam and the French Union against the Communists.

WHERE SHOULD THE U. S. STAND?

With brains and courage and determination to stand by our allies and see it through, to prevent any further extension of the diabolical forces of Communism in Asia, I am sure we can make

a greater contribution to the solution of the problem of our present-day civilization by taking affirmative action than we can by standing aloof and allowing the creeping paralysis of Communism gradually to extend over the Far East and southeast Asia.

We must make it possible for these downtrodden and harassed peoples to be restored to a sense of human dignity as creatures of God. We must enable them to believe that they belong in our society as equals and that we are not interested either in exploiting them or in using them to protect our own sons.

We have recently had a very clear and lucid account from the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of the latest explosion of a thermonuclear bomb at Bikini Atoll, of the falling of white ashes on Japanese fishing boats many miles away, and of the subsequent illness of the crew. The papers report that the danger area for the new

tests has been substantially increased. Whether or not we understand all of these details, at least we know that another war using such weapons might wipe out or at least threaten to wipe out a large segment of our existing civilization and our highly concentrated industrial life. Indeed, the question arises as to whether we or our opponent could survive another such war; or, if we survived physically, whether we could ever again gain individual freedom as we now know it, or ever again live orderly, normal, human lives.

Perhaps at last we have come to the point where the weapons science has built are so truly terrible that we shall really have peace from physical war. In any event it behooves us to do our level best to think imaginatively and to strive for a realistic peace and to do everything that we can by negotiation to bring about a peaceful and constructive settlement of the world's problems.

Arthur H. Dean, LL.B., New York City, was Special Ambassador of the United States to Korea, 1952-1953. He was admitted to the New York State Bar in 1923, and has since practiced law in New York City. He is a director of various business firms, a trustee of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and of Cornell University, a director of the Educational Television and Radio Center (Ford Fund) and of the Japan Society, a member of the School of Law Advisory Board of Fordham University, and a member of the Committee on Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations. He has lectured and written on legal, economic, and financial subjects.

The Soviet-Chinese Complex

By ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

THE United States is once more in an area of high tension and great pressure in the Far East. The Soviet Union in close alliance with the Communist government of China has stepped down somewhat its military aggression in Europe but it has accelerated its military effort in the Far East. Though an armistice has stopped active fighting in Korea, the other branch of the Korean War—aggression against Indochina—has been increased. In substance, the Soviet-Chinese military push has been transferred from Korea to Indochina. There, it is clear, the Soviet-Chinese group believe they will find softer resistance, and they are there playing for an immensely more valuable stake.

The American State Department will meet this problem in full force in the Geneva Conference. It does not seem likely that the Geneva Conference can settle anything, and no hopes whatever should be indulged along that line. It does seem possible that a firm position taken by the country may be of help in creating conditions which will end the aggression later on.

The Department of State can take just as firm a position as American public opinion represented in the Congress will let them. Far too little is being done to inform the United States as to the real dangers involved. The fall of southeastern Asia to the Soviet-Chinese complex would be a disaster rivaling the shift of China from the free world to the Kremlin world.

We can afford no more misunderstandings. American policy towards China is not a giveaway to South Korea or to the French empire in Indochina or to anyone else. It must be based on the

cold realization that if the Chinese Communist government in alliance with the Kremlin takes over the Asiatic mainland, the world balance will be definitely shifted away from the West and no "military new look" will be able to change that fact.

But while armies are grinding against each other and while diplomacy is temporarily unable to resolve the questions, it is possible that a bridge can be made to communicating, extraofficially, and to discovering what common ground does exist between Communist China and the West. I think there is an area here which can and must be explored; if this exploration is pursued over the next few years it may be possible to bring the Chinese situation once more into negotiating range.

In the long run, China must either act independently of the Soviet Union, or she must be (as she nearly is now) a Russian province. Her interest is that she shall be independent—and that also is the interest of the United States and of the world. The Chinese problem is peculiarly economic, and it is the kind of problem in the solution of which the United States can assist far more than the Soviet Union. The Chinese choice is much the same as the American: either the problem of world peace will be settled by the force of hydrogen bombs, or it will be settled by the understanding that no nation can be aggressor, seizing other countries by force of arms. This is not a case for eighteenth-century diplomacy or for newly styled negotiation. It is a straight case of convincing the Soviet-Chinese complex that more aggression can only mean war, and that the West

can not afford to surrender more territory to an aggressive combination.

These are the conclusions; the reasoning leading to them follows.

THREE YEARS AGO

Three years ago the American Academy of Political and Social Science considered the problem of American policy in Asia.¹ The Korean War was then less than a year old. The Communist point of view was set out by Mr. Juliusz Katz-Suchy,² representing the Communist government of Poland. He affirmed that the Communist movement was a part of the "irreversible trend of history," and, quoting the words of Prime Minister Nehru of India, that the New China (meaning thereby Communist China) was "a great power to be dealt with on terms of equality by other great powers."³ This writer, for his part, disclaimed any revelation as to trends of history. Instead he went through some painful arithmetic, fully accepting the power and importance of China but coming to a grim result:

The United States, and with her the peace of the world, is endangered by the emergence of any major aggressive Asian power if that power is allied in simultaneous aggression with a major aggressive European power.⁴

THE CURRENT SITUATION

In the past three years, nothing has occurred to invalidate that bitter conclusion. The tide of events has tended to confirm it. The Korean War is not at an end: there is merely an armistice. Prospects even of holding a peace conference are dim, and those of negotiating a real settlement of the contest seem at the moment still dimmer. Meanwhile, part at least of the strategic and mili-

tary resources formerly devoted by China to the Korean fighting have merely been channeled southward and are flowing from China to the war now being conducted in Indochina and somewhat less actively in Malaya.

A secondary adventure, the Communist war to seize the Philippine Republic, carried on under the name of the Hukbalahap rising, appears to be near its end, owing to an apparently decisive military and political defeat of the Hukbalahap faction by the Philippine government under the leadership of President Magsaysay. So, as the score presently stands, Russian-Chinese aggression has been defeated, apparently decisively, in the Philippines. It has been stopped at least temporarily by armistice in Korea. It is proceeding full scale in the larger and strategically more important theater of Indochina.

This is certainly not peace. The United States, whatever hesitation and confusion it may have shown in Asian policy prior to 1950, has recognized the situation as pregnant with grave danger of involvement in global war.

Against this background a diplomatic meeting is scheduled to be held in Geneva on April 26, 1954, at which the three principal West European powers have undertaken to sit down with representatives of the Soviet Union and China. So far as public announcement reveals, neither side has given any ground. On the Communist side, agreement upon the Geneva Conference was the signal for intense fighting, the Chinese apparently hoping to present the conference with a fait accompli. On its side the West has no ground to give. Any concession now would appear to be a one-way ticket to future disaster, just as British concessions to Hitler at Munich in 1938 merely fixed the take-off point for World War II. Actually, the Geneva meeting in April is more dangerous in some ways than was

¹ THE ANNALS, Vol. 276, July 1951.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 48-59.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler at Munich, for Hitler had not completed his offensive and defensive arrangements with the then government of Japan, while at Geneva the Western powers will be faced with a fully matured East-West aggressive alliance—the Soviet Union and China—in being and fully armed. Concession of any territory to that combination threatens the safety at least of the Western Pacific; to make one could easily determine the date and base lines of World War III. Already the Sino-Russian alliance has caused the rearmament of the United States and has occasioned re-examination of the strategy to be pursued. All in all, it is the grimmest Asian complex of circumstances America has faced since V-J Day.

One word of semantic caution.

A good deal has been said about the "New China." This writer has no knowledge whatever of the internal developments in that country. Unhappily this is the situation in which most American observers find themselves. All of us have been treated to a vast amount of speculation about Chinese evolution and probable development. But such speculation is largely impressionistic, and hardly well enough based to use as a guide to policy. We had best, therefore, try to answer the major questions in terms of such solid information as is available. The questions themselves, of course, are clear enough, though the answers are necessarily incomplete. It is not enough to estimate the probable working out of forces there.

SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

First. What are the true relations between the government of the Soviet Union and the government of China? If information on this subject exists in the United States (which is difficult to believe) it has not been given to the

public. But we can state, on adequate evidence, that the Soviet government has steadily moved to support the Chinese Communist regime in all diplomatic matters and that her powerful propaganda machine has unfailingly forwarded the Chinese Communist contentions. We do know that the Soviet government has supplied arms and technical assistance in large quantity to Chinese Communist armies on the march. Thus the Korean War was conducted by Chinese armies with Soviet planes, Soviet ammunition, Soviet armor and artillery, Russian organizing experts, and so forth. We now see substantially the same thing happening in Indochina, where even the pretense that Vietminh troops are spontaneously organized native guerrillas has largely been dropped. The Vietminh forces are large organized armies, supplied from Chinese bases, provided by Chinese transport, using modern Russian-made and Russian-supplied munitions of war, in maneuvering full-scale armed conflict.

There is every reason to assume that, for the time being, the Chinese Communist government is acting in complete concert with the plans and policies of the Soviet Union. The unclear point is whether the Chinese Communist government is in substance a captive of the Soviet government or whether it has attained enough strength to claim a partnership relation.

For what one opinion is worth, this writer would feel bound to proceed on the assumption that the Chinese Communist regime is not Moscow's partner but Moscow's captive. The Soviet Union substantially controls the chief industrialized regions in this "New China"—that at least we do know. Russian organization and Russian forces dominate Manchuria; the Soviet Union has military and naval bases in the Dairen-Port Arthur area and she holds military lines of communication to them.

Without contrary knowledge, it would seem probable that Russian troops are stationed so as to guard these lines of communication and incidentally to exert military pressure on the area should this be expedient. This amounts to an almost complete grip on the slender manufacturing resources and military potential of "New China." The situation may be compared to the situation in which the United States would find herself if the Soviet Union controlled the quadrangle Chicago-Pittsburgh-Buffalo-Detroit and, being located next door to the United States as Canada is, held military lines of communication guarded by armed forces to the principal Great Lakes cities. Actually, no serious move of any kind can be made by the "New China" against the desires of the Soviet Union on pain of economic strangulation. If it be said that the Chinese apparently endure strangulation and starvation without uprising (as they do), it may be added that Russian wishes can open up or shut off the military potential which the "New China" must have either to maintain its internal structure or to carry out any foreign aggression.

I conclude then that for the time being the "New China" is for the moment a huge vassal of the Soviet Union, and that in the light of present evidence it would be imprudent for American policymakers to consider her in any other light.

CHINA AS AN INDEPENDENT POWER

Second. What are the present probabilities of Chinese emergence as an independent power?

Emergence of a really independent China as a great power would constitute a major change in the Asian situation. The reasoning in this paper is based on the assumption that there is an existing Sino-Russian complex, aggressive in nature, and moving together in common

development of policy. Diplomacy to the extent that it can operate at all must therefore treat the area as a unit. Obviously, when the area divides, when the Soviet Union and her interests constitute one factor while China and her interests constitute another, and each can be separately dealt with, the condition of affairs will radically alter.

We are told by some that the situation will change, and that China must be considered as China and not as a part of the Russian complex. Protagonists of this view urge that the Chinese interest in the long run is clearly opposed to the Russian. Also, that Chinese governments have often in history been captured and governed by foreign invaders, as for instances in the time of Genghis Khan and the Mongols, and that always the invading forces have been absorbed, whereupon China has resumed her independent integrity. All this is true. The trouble is that there is no possibility of estimating the time factor. Genghis Khan's conquest of China began in the year 1213. Thirty years later his successor, Kublai Khan, was still operating the complex and Genghis' grandson, Batu Khan, was maneuvering at the head of a Chinese and Mongolian army in Europe, not far from the Iron Curtain line which divides East and West today. It was a matter of eighty years or so before the different elements of the vast empire reappeared as independent factors. It is probably the fact that natural expansion of Chinese population almost certainly will eventually threaten Slavic domination of eastern Siberia, to say nothing of the Slavic grip on Manchuria. But it is one thing to foresee this probability a generation or so from now and quite another to proceed on the assumption that the divergence of interest has reached a point leading China to take any line contrary to the will of the Soviet Union. Unquestionably it would be good Ameri-

can diplomacy to encourage China to do so. It would be sheer folly to assume that the present Chinese regime either can or will strike out on its own in the immediate future. The current evidence is all the other way.

It is rumored that high-level conferences are to take place in Moscow between the leaders of the Chinese regime and Mr. Malenkov and his ministers and that these may reveal the real relationship between the two empires. Even if this is true it is difficult to see that this particular conference will occasion any immediate major change in their relationship. There are plenty of weighty matters to discuss—the mere routine business of running the huge complex is vast and difficult. The economics of the double empire is apparently beginning to be onerous for both countries. The Korean War proved a substantial burden on the resources of the United States, and it must have been proportionately a greater burden on the less developed resources of the Sino-Russian group. The burden was not wholly lifted by the Korean Armistice, since a considerable part of the operation appears to have been transferred to Indochina. It appears probable that the Russian population is beginning to be exigent in wanting consumer's goods. Certainly the Soviet government has been publicizing a policy of giving greater consideration to Russian consumer wants. Quite probably internal considerations may press on Moscow to cut down somewhat on the support she is giving her captive Asian partner. Some vague indications suggest that the total food production of the entire area is deficient and that foodstuffs cannot easily be collected by China and sent to the Soviet Union in barter for armaments and manufactured equipment needed to maintain the Chinese aggressive policy. A fair surmise would be that any conference between the Chinese

and the Russians at Moscow will be devoted not to debating differences but to cutting their common coat according to the cloth they have. Divergence of the two powers, this writer believes, is ultimately certain, but not in the foreseeable future.

ATTITUDE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

Third. Are not the Chinese people essentially peaceful, well-wishers of the United States, and will they not eventually impose a pacific pattern on their government?

Yes, sometime, but clearly not now. Certainly the Chinese Communist government throughout the year 1953 was quite strong enough to conscript armies, to throw them into the Korean War, and to maintain an extremely determined large-scale attack. There is little reason to believe that they are not still in a position to do this.

A little evidence on the other side was provided at Panmunjom. A very substantial number of Chinese prisoners of war, after surrender to the United Nations armies, made it abundantly clear they were determined not to return within the Communist lines. In China, as also in the Soviet Union, it is sufficiently clear that there are considerable elements in the population who will desert Communist leadership at the earliest practical opportunity. In the Korean War, however, they did not prove strong enough to modify the war plans of the Chinese Communists.

NECESSARY U. S. DECISIONS

The conclusion is simple. We have sound historic economic, ethnic, and political grounds for believing that Soviet domination of the Chinese government, and of its policy and armed action, will not continue forever. These suggest lines along which long-range Western policies may be framed. This huge complex is not a monolith; its maintenance

involves plenty of problems. There is not undivided loyalty of Russians to the Soviet regime or of Chinese to the Communist regime, let alone Russian loyalty to Chinese aims or Chinese interest in Russian plans. But, in the year 1954, these weaknesses are insufficient to check the continuance either of Soviet or of Communist aggression, developed according to an agreed-on plan of joint strategy. The plain fact of the matter is that the Sino-Russian impact is able to push armed forces of both countries according to unified strategic plans, and that in Asia the alliance is actually executing a strategic plan of armed aggression now.

The result of that has been to force certain decisions on the United States, and they are in the making at this moment. Because the Russo-Chinese complex has the military initiative, the decisions have to be taken under pressure. They will furnish the bases for the American position at the Geneva Conference. In their implications, they are extremely serious.

In considerable measure they parallel the conditions created in June 1950 when the attack of the North Korean armies forced some very swift decisions on a harried American government. Then it was clear that not to prevent seizure of South Korea would be taken as a plain signal that it had best make terms with the Russo-Chinese force; and the United States, rightly, decided to invoke the aid of the United Nations and to resist. Today an exactly similar thrust on a far larger scale is proceeding in Vietnam and Laos, and failure to meet it almost inevitably entails the ultimate loss of Thailand and a renewed upsetting of the hard-won order which prevails in Burma and Malaya. More than these territories are at stake. The newly won independence of Indonesia has not achieved for that country a solid institutional base. Were southeast Asia

in Communist hands, the fate of that vast archipelago would be in doubt, to put it mildly. Further, control of the strategic materials and the rice production of that area could result in great distress in Japan, to say nothing of its eventual effect on certain needed supplies (notably rubber and tin) used by the West itself. It would be folly to take the view that only some Indo-chinese territory is at stake here.

Defense of Indochina has devolved on the government of France. This, in the writer's opinion, is a historical accident. If the Vietminh movement had been Indochinese and not primarily Russian-Communist in origin, the problem would have been solved now, just as were the problems of India and Indonesia. But it is one thing to recognize that the time has come to give countries their independence, and quite another to hand them over to an aggressive group seeking world empire. One must remember that the Communist attack is parallel in one respect to the attack of Genghis Khan. He too evolved a doctrine—the Mongolian "Order of God"—which gave the Mongols sovereignty over the entire earth. Resistance was rebellion, not self-defense. Communist dogma assumes that everyone not under their empire is enslaved and that their right is to "liberate" all territories, liberation, of course, being complete when the peoples and lands in question are subjected to their rule. What the French ought to do with Indochina is one question, capable of being resolved. Handing over the territory to the substantially mercenary forces of the Sino-Russian alliance is not a problem for France, but a problem for the entire non-Communist world.

It is, I think, weariness rather than principle that has led the Western world to divide, somewhat, on the policy towards China. France has lost more men and expended more treasure in defend-

ing Indochina from her northern neighbor than the United States did in defending South Korea. The British, knowing this, and being uncertain of the American position, have advocated a course of attempting to trade out the problem with Peiping. They have an added incentive to this course in the hope that they may resume their profitable prewar trade with China. They are undismayed by the fact that British recognition of China promptly after the Communist seizure resulted in nothing but a studied series of insults. Britain's associate and our great neighbor, Canada, has indicated through her very able Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, a considerable sympathy with the British view. The United States has said nothing definitive, though a considerable amount of help in the form of money and weapons and some technical assistance has been delivered to the French and Vietnamese forces and more has recently been promised as a result of General Ely's recent mission. Clearly a tremendous factor here is the American position, and that position is now being outlined.

U. S. political scene

At this point, account must be taken of the American political scene. The country has been alerted to the Communist danger from many angles. Practically all elements in American political life have expressed themselves in favor of resisting the march of Communism. Unhappily the group who have appointed themselves leaders in the anti-Communist drive, the McCarthy wing of the Republican party, have likewise been most vocal in demanding that not an American soldier and if possible not an American dollar should be committed to the defense of overseas territory. Having spotted their dragon, these Saint Georges have leaped on their horses and charged, at full gallop, in the opposite

direction. If their professions are to be believed, defense of the free world must be accomplished by investigating committees, and unhappily this seems to suit the armies of the Sino-Russian aggressors extremely well. Secretary Dulles can go only as far as American public opinion and the American Congress will let him. America's European associates understand that, and being in doubt as to the result may be pardoned if they undertake the lead in proposing solutions.

There is, however, clarifying thought. The United States has a way of exhibiting greatest confusion at the moment when it is on the eve of becoming most resolute. So it was prior to the North Korean invasion in 1950; the immediacy of action and of public reaction came as a shattering surprise both to the Kremlin and to Peiping. For what it is worth, this writer's view is that if the loss of southeast Asia appears imminent, the vast majority of this country will demand decisive action at once. If we are having trouble momentarily in emitting a clear trumpet call, it would nevertheless be folly for the rest of the world to assume that the United States might not react like lightning to more dangerous developments.

So much for background. Let us get at the decisions which the United States seemingly must make as a result of the Communist initiative taken through and by the government of the People's Republic of China.

Demands to be met

For we are faced with certain demands, and all of them have to be dealt with. The Russians and the Peiping radio insist that Communist China should be recognized and admitted to the United Nations. No particular *quid pro quo* is offered: they want it. The French would like either all-out support in the Indochinese defense or American

acquiescence in a so-called "negotiated peace" which in practice means a variety of surrender. The British would like to reopen trade with Communist China, hoping that by the combination of recognition and commercial intercourse that country may be won towards a peaceful and law-abiding point of view. The Japanese want larger export markets, knowing that without them the ninety million Japanese in that archipelago will be in serious difficulties. Prime Minister Nehru appears to want Asia left entirely to the Asians, apparently relying on philosophical forces to bring about peace, progress, and order. Mr. Syngman Rhee wants the Chinese out of North Korea. The United States wants a world in which she is not constantly menaced by attack from both Asia and Europe. The Soviet Union wants southeast Asia first, and after that, the rest of the globe to the extent that she can conquer it by the armies of her captive powers, without subjecting herself to attack.

Sorting out these questions, we may tackle them one by one.

RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

First. Should we recognize Communist China?

If the foregoing reasoning is accurate, the answer is no—certainly not at this time. The grounds are rather different from those usually urged.

Nonrecognition, by itself, accomplishes little or nothing. Few countries, especially if they are large, quail or shrivel up because they are not "recognized" and do not send and receive ambassadors. The United States is not materially stronger because it must express its views to and about China through the medium of the newspapers instead of through a direct diplomatic mission. Recognition of a government conveys no expression of approval or disapproval of the internal policies of its

government. Most serious practitioners of foreign affairs do not hesitate to recognize a government however much they may dislike its political practices and philosophy—if anything can be gained by recognition.

But in the present case, it seems, nothing would be gained, while something can be lost. Recognition of Communist China implies not merely establishing normal diplomatic relations, but accepting this captive government as one of the controlling powers in the United Nations. Article 23 of the United Nations Charter names the Republic of China as a permanent member of the Security Council. It is absurd to suggest bringing into the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations a country which has made war against Korea and signed an armistice there, but which has refused to make peace and is at this moment actively prosecuting war in Indochina under the thinnest camouflage.

This is not to say that there should be no recognition at any time, and still less to say that Communist China should not sometime be admitted to the United Nations. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, presently British Ambassador in Paris, recently made a forceful speech which unquestionably set forth his government's position. In his view, United Nations should be universal, and every country in the world should be in it and amenable to its obligations and discipline. If, as seems probable, the Communist regime in China has come to stay for awhile, this theory would include the present government. Sir Gladwyn is right: the bulk of China does belong inside the United Nations, and this would go with recognition. But the present problem is whether a captive China, committed either by her own or by Soviet will to aggression, really means to accept the obligations involved in entering the United Nations. It is

one thing to admit a member to an organization, being convinced that the member will join in and forward its work. It is another to admit a tough, or a gangster, who hammers at the door with a gun butt. A Communist government which would join in fostering and maintaining the peace of the world would be welcome. Any government not prepared to do that is no real member of the group, however sanctified by election and diplomatic acceptance.

It follows that recognition, and with it in all probability membership in the United Nations, should only be granted on very clear conditions, to be established in fact and not by words.

The minimum conditions of recognition would have to be immediate, complete, wholehearted withdrawal by the Chinese Communist regime from the Indochinese war, and from North Korea with real liquidation of the Korean question, and registration of the Chinese-Russian agreements as agreement of collective defense in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. There should also be an understanding that the status quo in Formosa will be preserved for some considerable time to come. But there is not the most shadowy reason for believing, at the moment, that the Chinese Communist government would do any of these things. At Geneva, it is quite likely to demand that the United States pull out of the whole Pacific area. This scarcely leaves any real basis for talking; more harm than good would be done by another negotiation Panmunjom style.

The policy of not recognizing Communist China, nevertheless, ought not to be doctrinaire. As and when anything substantial can be gained by it, there is no reason why recognition should not be extended. The writer surmises that the time will come, in a few years, when recognition may be of

positive use. Apparently nothing can be gained by it now, either for the United States or for the peace of the world. But nonrecognition is an expedient, not a principle.

CHINA AND INDOCHINA

Second. A decision must be taken whether the United States will or will not prevent Communist China from taking all or any part of Indochina, either directly through her own armies or indirectly through the subsidized and maintained armies of Vietnam.

This is a massive decision: the military problem of Indochina has, strategically, at least four or five times the magnitude of the Korean problem. Tentatively, we have already decided to join the Indochina defense. The American government has given arms, planes, technical assistance, and financial help to the defending French and Vietnamese forces. The decision, as far as it goes, seems justified. Passive acquiescence in the seizure of South Korea in 1951 would have signaled to all Asia that they had best make terms with the Soviet Union and its satellite China. Acquiescence in the seizure of Indochina would lead to a caving-in of the entire southeast Asian structure. It is a bitter decision to have to make, but I see little escape from applying the Truman doctrine to Indochina.

This does not mean that we commit ourselves to defend the French empire there. Clear-cut independence for the three Indochinese countries of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia may well prove a necessary step. It means, quite simply, that we commit ourselves to keeping the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist government, or any group acting on their behalf, from taking over. Otherwise southeast Asia becomes part of the Russo-Chinese complex, which in turn has the proclaimed objective of smashing the West whenever it can.

And whatever other complaints we may have about the Soviet-Chinese empire, we cannot accuse them of not attempting to carry out their declared objectives.

I do not, of course, forget Dr. Katz-Suchy's words in 1951. He said that the People's Republic of China had at the foundation of its foreign policy the "possibility and necessity for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world."⁵ Only a few months later Communist China formally entered the war against the United Nations. The propaganda words of Communist diplomats, like Hitler's word in 1938 that he meant to stop after absorbing Czechoslovakia, are worth exactly nothing. The fact is that Communist China probably will not attack surrounding territory if she believes that she can and will be successfully resisted. Perhaps the best service that can now be rendered to world peace is to make it plain that resistance can and will be interposed and to make it absolutely plain that a non-aggressive Communist China need have no fear of attack.

This brings into consideration the so-called "New Look" in military policy. It has been indicated that our military policy from now on will rest less on throwing large bodies of troops into a particular area and defending on the ground, and more on the possibility of long-range air attacks to center. Perhaps so. But, as Mr. Walter Lippmann has recently pointed out, there seems no good reason why the United States should make commitments of any kind now as to scope and methods of military action should that be needed—as every right-minded person hopes it will not. A government like that of China or the Soviet Union which enters on acts of aggression in this hair-trigger balance takes all the risks there are.

There is no point in making threats. Still less is there any point in suggesting to any aggressor that its risk can be estimated, minimized, or limited. If and when military action is required, our country will have to take whatever military action then appears wisest under all the circumstances.

BLOCKADE OF CHINA

Third. There is raised the question of continued blockade of Communist China.

This is not a decision which the United States can take by itself. It must obtain the assent of its allies and the neighboring countries. It is clear that in two cases at least—Great Britain and Japan—governments with which we have to act do not favor blockade. They want, and perhaps need, the trade. So also does Communist China.

This is a case for a flexible policy, working with facts as they are. Admiral Radford is reported to believe that an all-out naval blockade would be a real answer to Chinese aggression, eventually compelling adoption of a pacific course on the part of the Peiping government. In case of all-out resistance in Indochina, this probably will come about. In less pressing circumstances, I personally would like to see a situation in which trade in the non-strategic or less strategic materials was opened with Communist China, giving her people an interest in a state of affairs in which that trade could be maintained. Such trade currents ought to be sufficiently controlled so that at the first indication of continued Chinese supply to aggressive operations—including Indochina—the trade could be shut off. Normal economic operations with the world ought to be available to any peaceful country, Communist or non-Communist. Such relations ought not to be available when and to the extent that they assist in carrying on opera-

⁵ THE ANNALS, Vol. 276 (July 1951), p. 58.

tions of aggression. Operating such a policy is not easy. But it is probably easier than either opening the gates without reserve or closing them on purely dogmatic grounds.

ASIA FOR ASIANS

Fourth. A decision ought to be taken as to the American attitude toward the Indian "Asia for Asians" view.

As has been observed, the great Asian counterbalancing force, if there is one, is India. Indian policy has been obscure, often not well based on fact, and frequently grounded in what appears to Americans an obstinate failure to recognize elementary realities of the present-day Communist governments. We ought, perhaps, to be a little tolerant of the Indians in this respect. Most Americans were quite as obstinately opposed to recognizing the realities of Communist China until the Korean War broke out in 1950. We need not therefore quarrel too much with Indians: their mistake, if it is one, is much like those we made in America from 1945 to 1951.

This is a case where the advice of the Honorable Chester Bowles seems excellent. We had best be friendly and tolerant of the Indian position as far as it relates to India. That vast population will, in any case, go its own way; we could not control it if we wished. We can assist the growth of a strong and vigorous India without swallowing the theories of Indian statesmen—most of which have not stood the trial of events too well in the past three years.

There is absolutely no doubt that the Soviet Union proposes to control India as soon as she can. There is little doubt that the Russian intentions are not to use Communist China as her instrument in India but rather to effect direct organization of an Indian apparatus trained by and controlled from Moscow. Even the Indians will have

to recognize this in time, and indeed some do already. The interest of the United States in India is that it should be Indian and not Russian, just as our interest in China is that it shall be Chinese and not an appendage of the Kremlin. With patience, good will, and good sense, there should be a deepening of the comprehension of common interest. It will take time. But it is a fair guess that we shall have the time.

REALPOLITIK 1954

Thus far we have tackled the problem of Communist China in terms of *Realpolitik* 1954. This is sound: the problems have been presented to us in just that fashion, and both the Kremlin and the Peiping Foreign Offices are *Realpolitiker* to a greater extent than were the Foreign Offices of Hitler and Mussolini. Because they are aggressors, Americans are forced to meet them on their own ground. But the ultimate solution does not lie in *Realpolitik*; the fact is that governments which depend wholly on it have a short run in history. While we are dealing with *Realpolitik* on its own terms, let us remember that any real solution must depend on liberating deeper and more permanent forces.

GENGHIS KHAN'S EMPIRE

In one aspect, the Russo-Chinese complex is following an ancient Asiatic model—the model set by Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century. This empire attained about the extent and substantial power of the Soviet-Chinese complex of today. Some of its doctrines, particularly its almost theological insistence that God and history had given it the earth, are suspiciously close to the theology of Communist extremists now. But the empire created dissolved into fragments in less than a century. Not only did it not leave its organization behind it, but it left only minimal fragments of culture.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PATTERN

A somewhat similar conclusion can be drawn from study of the life history of great revolutions. Characteristically a revolution takes advantage of favorable circumstances; imposes the rule of a small group or class with a strongly held doctrine; emerges as a dictatorship, which in due time becomes a military dictatorship. The power of the central organization strangles the attractive ideas which form the basis of revolution. Presently it becomes a self-perpetuating military-bureaucratic power regime, not seriously interesting the mass of people. Then, historically, it engages in a war, is defeated, and disintegrates. The Communist revolution in Russia is following with surprising vitality this historic graph. The ablest students of the Russian revolution, among them Professor W. W. Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, highlight the growing potential of the Russian armed forces and the progressive weakening of ideological motivation—this after thirty-six years of undisputed power. The Chinese revolution is comparatively younger, but on straight historical grounds we should expect to find the same repetition of revolutionary pattern. Whatever we have to fear, it is not the Communist dogma. The Communist governments will strangle that more effectively than anyone else. It is not accident that the French Revolutionary armies were unbeatable at Valmy and the Russian armies could not be conquered by the intervention of European powers in 1919 and 1920, while, on the other hand, the French armies under Napoleon were decisively defeated in 1813, and Russian soldiers deserted by hundreds of thousands to the Germans in 1941–42. The problem is not what will happen in the long run: we can almost forecast that. Both the Russian and

the Chinese governments will break up. The problem is to assure that the world does not tear itself to a bloody and unrecognizable pulp as history accomplishes its inevitable result.

NATIONALISM

A third consideration is more profound, but more difficult of general understanding. This is the fact that nationalism—the nurturing and preservation of independent sovereign states—was probably logical in the eighteenth century, extremely useful in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, and in mid-twentieth century is beginning to cease to be logical or even useful for many purposes. Only the largest countries can really attain it at all, and even they can only support it with the greatest of difficulty. A comparatively small country with determination, will, and a devoted population handling its economic life without too much reference to the neighboring areas could, two centuries ago, put enough force into the field to stand off even the more powerful neighbors, and could maintain a cultural life satisfying its people and often contributing brilliantly to the world. But mid-twentieth-century scientific progress has shredded the former situation into its component parts.

A small country cannot by itself satisfy the demands of its population for a tolerable standard of living. Even a large one has difficulty in doing so. A small country cannot maintain itself against armies equipped with modern weapons for more than a few days—if that. No nation can maintain a satisfactory interchange of ideas on a wholly nationalist basis: even today the American attempt to cut off exchange of contact with the Communist world—an effort cordially reciprocated—has clearly led to the slowing up of scientific prog-

ress of both worlds. These are only illustrations.

This is not the time or the place to elaborate the emerging principles of what seems to be the order demanded by the second half of our century. Enough to say that each country must apparently be intensely nationalist in preserving certain values assumed by it to be crucial—as in the United States the fostering and developing of individuality and of the unfettered minds and souls of free men appears to be a value without which life itself means little. To maintain its power and right to preserve these values a nation must, it seems, join at least in regional combinations. There must be a regional combination for defense, and some freedom of action must be surrendered to the group. It must join a regional combination for its economic life and health, and some degree of freedom of action must be surrendered to that group too. But the group which must unite in defense may or may not be the same regional group that unites for economic development. To maintain a degree of communication with the rest of the world, a nation must join in still further group arrangements—from the obvious ones which parcel out wave lengths for radio as a condition of any radios being capable of receiving anything to arrangements which permit ships to sail the seas or airplanes to traverse the sky. Finally, if there is ever to be a world at peace, a nucleus of world organization capable of becoming in time custodian of peace and administrator of a degree of law must be built and fostered and maintained—and for this reason if the United Nations were to dissolve tomorrow the world would have to reinvent it.

This means that we need not and indeed cannot be stopped by the perfectly accurate reports of the surge of nationalism in Asia. The accounts of emer-

gent nationalism are entirely accurate as far as they go. The pity is that no one has seriously got to work explaining to the world in general as well as to Asia what nationalism of the twentieth century is and does. Within the American Academy of Political and Social Science are many men capable of doing just that. A first-rate academic statement of the realities of national statehood today would be a powerful force towards the cultivation of peace everywhere, and nowhere more than in the Western Pacific and the Asiatic mainland.

TOWARD COMMUNICATION

Once this is done, or even while it is being done, we can get at the accompanying task of discovering common interest. Terribly, or perhaps hopefully, the Asian nationalist who ties up with a Communist invader has more in common with the United States than he has with the prehensile paw to which he reaches for help. On study it will probably be found that the Asian nationalist wishes to realize personal ambitions as do all politicians: to speak his piece in his own country, to neighboring countries, and, if possible, to the world, as does every American Senator. His less vocal followers want jobs or ready access to substance and a degree of comfort. Americans want the same, and they want it not only for themselves but for others, because exchange with prosperous countries is not only more satisfactory but more profitable. The nation complex wants recognition and participation in the development of world affairs, as do most countries. Probably if a real interchange of ideas on an academic basis were sought instead of inhibited (as current thinking seems to exact) we should be on our way towards a real communication with the great areas of Asia to whom at the moment America and the Western

world is a paper dragon conjured up by Chinese and Russian propagandists. Striking is the fact that wherever there has been such communication, notably in the Philippine Republic and to some extent even in Japan, common ground has been found, often against a background of the bitterest hostility.

The People's Republic of China has closed every avenue it can towards common thought or common study. But there are great avenues it cannot close. For one thing, there are powerful Chinese communities all over the Far East outside of the Bamboo Curtain. They begin as far east as Hawaii, on American soil, and run all the way across the East to India. There is evidence that Communist China is in continuous communication with these groups, some of which include the ablest living members of the Chinese race. There is the Nationalist government on the island of Formosa. There are powerful groups in Indonesia. Any general ideology which can be worked out with these groups will, I think, have eventual repercussions on the Chinese mainland and, especially if the search for a common denominator includes other Asian groups as well, we shall begin to find the organizing principles of eventual peace in the Pacific. Few will argue that by passing a magic wand over China any group of Communist revolutionaries has immunized the minds of a very old people to all ideas save those generated in Moscow.

So while we are holding the *Realpolitik* line—as we must—it is time perhaps for universities, economists, students of political theory, and international lawyers to work out and work up methods of communication with their Asian equivalents in those parts of Asia still open to free communication, and for the United States government, perhaps through the United Nations, to assist in transmitting the fruit of that

work. The events of today will be yesterday's newspaper soon enough. The ideas generated will be causative for a long time.

So, at least, the problem comes down from the distant mountaintops of statesmanship to the grasp of an academy of political science. In brief, on both sides of this divided world the diplomats cannot solve the problem, and the soldiers with their hydrogen bombs do not appear to. But in reason and in strength, in tolerance and in charity, in strength and in forbearance, the intellectuals perhaps have their greatest opportunity.

SUMMARY

In brief, the situation stands as follows:

The United States with the United Nations is committed to the defense of South Korea. The United Nations is committed to the defense of Japan and the Philippines. The question is nominally open as to the defense of Indonesia, but at least tentatively American policy has defined itself sufficiently so that that archipelago too falls within the projected defense area. Only tentatively are we committed to assist in the defense of Indochina, but the circumstances are such that the world had best proceed on the assumption that the commitment is definitive.

Clearly, in handling the defense the United States will expect the support of the United Nations. But with or without support defense will go forward in case of aggression.

The method of defense is not definitely settled: it might be by limited war as in Korea; or by naval operations where that would suffice; or by direct attack to center as contemplated by the "New Look." Choice in this matter rests with the United Nations if the United Nations accepts the obligation,

otherwise with the United States; it need not be made now. But what has occurred through the discussion of military methods is substantially a statement that an aggressor cannot count on being able to make a limited commitment in a little war, or on being able by taking an aggressive initiative to stake out the place, means, and nature of the ensuing conflict. Perhaps that is as good a place as any to leave the discussion, which from here on out belongs within the council chambers of the Department of Defense rather than the debating halls of diplomatists.

We shall press for liquidation of the Korean struggle and simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and Chinese support for Vietminh and other aggressive adventures of that kind. Recognition of Communist China must await the actual fulfillment of these conditions, accompanied by at least reasonable cause to believe that they will not be repeated.

A flexible trade policy ought to be worked out, tending to give support to these conclusions.

No encouragement whatever should be given either to the Soviet Union or

to the Chinese Communist government; otherwise, this writer believes, the results of any parley at Geneva will resemble the conference which sacrificed Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938. For that matter we should feel no particular pressure to go into that conference. Politicians like to say that the door of the conference room is the door to peace. Regrettably this writer must testify that on two occasions—the Munich Conference in 1938 and the Hull-Nomura conferences in Washington in 1941—it proved the exact opposite. The conferring parties, in both cases, stepped out of the conference room on to the battlefields.

In both these cases the aggressor governments considered themselves relatively safe in going forward because they thought their prospective victims were unable or unwilling to meet the issue. There is considerable evidence to support the view that had they understood what would happen Germany would not have attacked in 1939 nor Japan in 1941. At this time, a practical, clear-cut position seems to be the line of greatest safety.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr., LL.B., New York City, is professor of corporation law in the Columbia University School of Law and is also engaged in legal practice. He was Assistant Secretary of State (1938-44) and Ambassador to Brazil (1945-46) and has been United States delegate to many Pan American and international conferences. Besides books and articles on corporation law and finance he is the author of The Natural Selection of Political Forces (1950).

The Real China

By V. K. WELLINGTON KOO

IN face of the intense cold war between the Communist and the free world, a war which will probably continue for a long time, and in face of the further fact that the Peiping regime is the most powerful ally of the Soviet Union, what kind of a new China will eventually establish itself on the Chinese mainland is necessarily a matter of great concern. Its bearing and effect upon the safety and future of the United States is bound to be far-reaching. Before I proceed to analyze the situation, survey the possibilities, and draw a conclusion as to what would serve the best interests of America and the free world as well as the welfare and freedom of the Chinese people, it will be useful to say a word about the present condition of Asia as a whole.

China, by virtue of her vast population, immense territory, long history, and highly developed civilization, has always played an important role in the development of the Asiatic continent, especially in eastern Asia from Korea and Japan in the north to the Philippines, Indochina, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia in the south. In considering the role which a new China can play in Asia and the degree of her importance to America we must take into account the condition of Asia today.

THE DANGEROUS BACKGROUND

What then is the existing condition of Asia? It is clear that while two-thirds of its territory and more than half of its population are already placed under Communist domination behind the Iron Curtain, the remaining third of the Asiatic continent is divided in policy and outlook. India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon have

recognized the Communist regime at Peiping and, with the exception of Pakistan, are all pursuing what is known as the policy of neutralism and cultivating the friendship of Communist China.

The free countries of Asia are unorganized as a group, and the relations among some of them are still hampered by suspicion and distrust born of the past. Some of these countries, having only recently attained their full sovereignty and independence, are preoccupied with their domestic problems of consolidation and development. They are also highly jealous of their rights and exceedingly sensitive in their dealings with the outside world. Few of their statesmen appear to be sufficiently seasoned to take a far-seeing and long-range view of the present menacing situation in Asia created by militant Communism. Their attitude unwittingly plays into the hands of Communist China and the whole Communist camp headed by the Kremlin. It facilitates Communist fishing in the troubled waters of Asia and makes more difficult the task of the free world to check the Communist threat in the whole Asiatic and Pacific area.

It is against this fluid and dangerous background of the Asiatic continent that I propose to discuss more directly the question of America and a new China.

FORMOSA AND MAINLAND CHINA

Now, first of all, it is necessary to know what is meant by a new China. On the surface there may appear to be two Chinas: one the Republic of China with its temporary seat on the island of Formosa, and the other the so-called People's Republic of China on the main-

land, which, as I shall presently show you, is not China at all. Some of you may think it difficult for me in my official capacity to discuss them impartially and even delicate for me to discuss them at all. But let me assure you that I shall endeavor to make my analysis of them as objective as possible. It should not be too difficult to bring out the facts so that even he who runs can see.

TOTALITARIANISM OF THE PEIPING REGIME

Communist China is ruled by the Peiping regime, which is euphemistically described by its sponsors as a democratic dictatorship. This is a self-contradictory term. It, in fact, consists entirely of dictatorship and not at all of democracy. As is known throughout the world, the Chinese Communist party, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, seized political power over the country by force of arms. There have been no elections of any kind, and absolute political power is wielded by a Politburo of the Soviet pattern.

Indeed, the fundamental laws setting up the regime recognize as citizens only those people who are Communist party members and those deemed to be its sympathizers and supporters. All other people, including landlords, the former bureaucratic class, and the so-called "Kuomintang reactionaries" and their "henchmen," are not recognized as citizens but merely as subjects without any political rights. The whole system is a totalitarian rule of the most despotic kind. It is a reign of terror, and the Communist rulers maintain their power by a policy of terrorism carried out in the form of periodic purges of the people and the party itself.

The American Federation of Labor, after a wide survey of the situation, found that at least ten million Chinese were enslaved in labor camps and com-

pelled to work against their will. Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, recently stated publicly that at least fifteen million Chinese have been killed by the Communist authorities. In fact, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment of people by the secret police, mob trials, mass slaughter, forcible transportation to outlying regions, and confinement in labor camps are ordained by the Communist rulers on the mainland as standard methods to keep the people under subjection and control. The time-honored Confucian classics are banned from the school curriculum, and 86 per cent of all the books published in China in the past half century were ordered to be burned. The cherished institutions of the family, filial piety, religion and ancestor worship, and mutual devotion of husband and wife are tabooed as medieval ideas, while the first duty prescribed for every man, woman, and child in the land is to bow to the will of the Communist party and obey the orders of the Communist authorities.

From this brief outline of its nature and policy, it can be readily seen that the Chinese Communist regime is anything but Chinese either in its conception and origin or in the policy and methods which it employs to rule the people and perpetuate its own power. Although it is called the People's Republic of China and officially described as a democratic dictatorship, it is alien to the Chinese both in spirit and in action. It maintains its control over the people only with the help of the Communist army, the secret police, and the vast hordes of so-called Soviet advisers, who are, in reality, gauleiters watching Chinese Communist leaders on behalf of the Kremlin.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In its foreign relations the Peiping regime has followed the ruthless Com-

munist pattern, and the free world has gained some enlightening, albeit painful, experience.

Take the United Kingdom, for example. At the beginning of 1950, shortly after the Chinese Communists set up their regime in Peiping, Britain rushed forward and was actually one of the first countries to accord recognition, in the hope of safeguarding her investments in China. British diplomatic representatives were sent to Peiping to negotiate with the Communist Foreign Minister for the purpose of establishing embassies and exchanging ambassadors. Obviously the move from London was meant to be a gesture of good will to Peiping and to induce a feeling of appreciation conducive to the advancement of the British interests in China.

But what has been the reaction of Peiping? What is the outcome? After four years of waiting, the British representative in Peiping has to this day not been received by the Communist Foreign Minister, and no envoy of any kind has been sent to London by the Peiping regime. Many of the British investments on the mainland, such as docks, warehouses, mines, factories, and newspapers belonging to British nationals, have been confiscated. British firms have been arbitrarily closed by the Communist authorities, and British subjects have been seized and imprisoned or expelled from the mainland. Even though many British proprietors of enterprises in China have been able to leave the country after suffering varying periods of maltreatment in the forms of house arrest, imprisonment, and payment of fines, they are still required by the Communist authorities to remit money to Communist China, ostensibly to pay their Chinese staffs, but in reality to increase the steadily dwindling foreign exchange reserves of the Communist treasury. The arrogant attitude of the Peiping regime toward

the British and its adamant policy of subjecting them to humiliation and brutal handling caused the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, in the characteristic English style of understatement, to declare in the House of Commons not long ago that the British relations with Communist China have been most "unsatisfactory."

The United States has always refused to accord recognition to the Chinese Communist regime, and of course its citizens in Communist China have fared no better. American property, both official and private, has been confiscated, and thirty-two Americans are still pinning away in Communist jails on the mainland. Besides, the American people have come to learn something of the nature and policy of Communist China through their experience in Korea. By valiant efforts to implement the principle of collective security consecrated in the United Nations Charter, the United States, together with its allies, has repelled the Communist aggression in Korea. But Communist China has insisted from the outset that her soldiers fighting in Korea were volunteers, and this deception was at first naïvely believed by the West. Yet she is the real aggressor, masterminded and supported by Moscow. In fact, the aggression of Communist China in Korea has been more than once denounced by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Korean War was a part of the Communist plan to conquer Asia as a step to world dominion. It has levied a toll of half a million casualties, with the United States alone suffering 32,000 dead and over 100,000 wounded.

PRISONERS OF WAR

The cruel treatment of United Nations prisoners of war by the Communists was shocking to the conscience of the free world. Stories of mass slaughter and burying alive are too gruesome to

recount here. Although the bulk of the prisoners taken by the Communist side has been repatriated, over 7,000, including 944 Americans, are still reported to be unaccounted for. The obstinate refusal of the Communist authorities to give further information regarding the fate and the whereabouts of these prisoners illustrates their callous attitude toward human life and their utter disregard of international law and the principles of justice and mercy.

Those who have lived under the Communist rule in China and served in the Chinese Communist army should know the truth. The fact that 14,000 Communist soldiers captured by United Nations forces, constituting 75 per cent of the total number of prisoners of war, deliberately chose not to return to Communist China but to go to Formosa under the government of the Republic of China gives the lie to Communist propaganda that a Communist-ruled country is a paradise.

Thus we can see clearly that the regime on the Chinese mainland internally is a totalitarian dictatorship of the most ruthless type while internationally it pursues a policy of flagrant aggression and constitutes a menace to peace in Asia.

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, FORMOSA

Now let me say a few words about the real China, which is represented by the National government with its temporary seat on the island of Formosa.

This government is the only legitimate and lawful government of China. It is headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the President of the Republic of China. He was first elected to that office in 1948 in accordance with the Constitution adopted by the National Assembly of people's delegates elected throughout the country by direct and secret popular vote. The term

of office of the President is six years, and two weeks ago the National Assembly re-elected President Chiang for another term of six years.

The Executive Yuan, equivalent to the Cabinet in the West, exercises the executive power of the government and is responsible to the Legislative Yuan. The Control Yuan is a constitutional body elected by the provincial legislatures on the basis of regional representation; it exercises the power of supervision and impeachment of delinquent officials. The Legislative Yuan, whose members are also elected by popular vote, exercises a power very similar to that of the Congress of the United States. It makes laws for the Republic of China and approves the national budget submitted by the government. It also has the power to summon the Premier and his Cabinet colleagues for interpellation on questions of national policy or on specific cases relating to the conduct of government officials.

Local self-government prevails in Formosa. Not only the mayors of cities and towns but also the members of the Provincial Assembly of Formosa and those of the city and town councils are all elected by the people. In contrast to the dictatorship of the Communist regime on the mainland, democracy is in full operation on the island of Formosa under the government of the Republic of China.

Now and then we hear criticisms of the National government in Formosa by some politically minded Chinese abroad, to the effect that the process of democratization carried out by the government of the Chinese Republic has not been rapid enough and that greater results could have been obtained in this respect. Of course, to criticize the government is one of the rights guaranteed by our Constitution to every Chinese citizen. Indeed, it is

nothing surprising, as we see political criticisms made by opposition parties in every democratic country.

But in the case of the Chinese government in Formosa, it seems fair and reasonable to point out that this island, together with all the outlying islands under its control, is constantly threatened with invasion by armed Communist forces from the mainland. A state of war exists in Formosa because of this threat. Indeed it may be said to be in the firing line all the time, as the Communist regime at Peiping has repeatedly proclaimed its intention to attack and seize Formosa. Under these circumstances impartial observers, both Chinese and foreign, have often expressed their wonder and amazement that, in spite of the state of war, so much progress has been achieved by the Chinese government toward establishing and developing representative government and democratic institutions in Formosa.

Overseas nationals

I think it is important to add that, besides the people in Formosa, some twelve million Chinese nationals who live overseas in southeast Asia, Australia, the United States, Latin America, Europe, and Africa support, with few exceptions, the government of the Chinese Republic in Formosa. Indeed, even the people on the Chinese mainland wish the same government well and are eagerly looking to it as the only hope for their own liberation from the yoke of the ruthless Communist rule under which they are now groaning and suffering.

THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Criticism is sometimes directed against the existence of the Political Department of the Chinese Ministry of Defense in Formosa. At first sight this setup appears to be unusual, and there

is no precise counterpart in the defense establishments of the Western countries. But in the light of what happened to the government armed forces on the mainland in the struggle against the Communists, this department has been found necessary, especially at the present juncture.

Its work comprises many kinds of duties. One of them is counterintelligence. Another is education, instructing the personnel of the armed forces as to the nature of the Communist menace and the supreme duty of everyone in the armed forces to guard against Communist infiltration, to prepare themselves wholeheartedly to recover the Chinese mainland and liberate their fellow-countrymen from the Communist rule.

Another duty of this department consists of efforts to promote the spirit and morale of the armed forces by attending to the comforts, recreation, and entertainment of the soldiers, sailors, and airmen and to the welfare of their families. These activities take the forms of athletic meets, ball games, theatricals, motion picture shows, and visits to their families. Much of this work in other countries, such as the United States, for example, is done by separate agencies like PX (Post exchange), USO (United Service Organization), the Veterans Administration, and other public bodies; the work itself has been found to be equally essential.

Another important function of this department is to make periodic loyalty checks of the rank and file of the armed forces and to report security risks to the higher authorities for consideration and action. This line of activity has been found indispensable because of the discovery in the past few years of several serious cases of Communist infiltration and espionage involving even some high-ranking officers.

In considering the existence of this

department one must again take into consideration the fact that a state of war prevails in Formosa, which is constantly threatened by the possibility of Communist invasion from the mainland. The necessity of safeguarding the security of the island calls for vigilance and the making of loyalty checks. In other countries the fundamental idea of safeguarding security is not much different. It underlies the practice, in the United States for instance, of checking with the Federal Bureau of Investigation before making or confirming the appointment of a person to a public office in the government or to a military post in the armed forces of the country.

MILITARY STRENGTH

As to its military strength, the Chinese government on the island possesses an armed force of approximately 600,000 men, including a large number of army units, a fair-sized air force, a modest navy, and a marine corps. The personnel of these different branches of the armed forces have been thoroughly retrained and to a large extent re-equipped with the aid of the United States in recent years. There is an American military mission stationed in Formosa, headed by Major General William C. Chase, which has been rendering valuable assistance in the training and reorganization of the armed forces, as well as in teaching them how to handle American equipment.

AMERICAN AID

Economically the United States Foreign Operations Administration maintains a China mission in Formosa with an efficient staff to study, discuss, and work out with the Chinese authorities the most essential programs for utilizing the economic aid granted to the Chinese government by the United States. It is gratifying to know that

the pattern of close and fruitful co-operation which has been developed in Formosa between the Chinese government and the various bodies of American representatives to ensure that every dollar of American aid is spent honestly and effectively has been regarded by our American friends as a good example for other recipient countries of American aid in Asia to follow.

These satisfactory results have been obtained because it has been the determination of the Chinese government in Formosa, no less than that of the United States, that the generous aid given by this country to China should be made to produce the maximum benefit toward ensuring the security of the island, maintaining a sound economy, and promoting the welfare of the people. These are not my personal observations alone. They are also embodied in the published official reports and statements made by various diplomatic, military, and economic representatives of the United States in Formosa and have been confirmed by the statements of eminent American Senators and Congressmen and radio and press representatives who have visited Formosa. For example, Senator H. Alexander Smith, chairman of the Subcommittee on the Far East of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who visited Formosa and other parts of eastern Asia last November, said in a report to the Committee:

As compared to the situation two years ago, we found a marked improvement in political stability and in economic conditions on Formosa. If this progress continues, the Nationalist government will become an increasingly important factor in encouraging disaffection from the Mao Tse-tung government among the Chinese on the mainland. Formosa can serve as a rallying point for their discontent as well as a powerful psychological base for a counter-offensive of Chinese democracy.

He went on to characterize Formosa as "a kind of show place for democracy in the East."

INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

Internationally, by far the greater part of the free world continues to recognize the government of the Republic of China, whereas the Peiping regime is recognized only by the Soviet Union and its satellites and a few European and Asiatic non-Communist countries. It is encouraging to note that no freedom-loving country in the Western Hemisphere or on the African continent has followed the example of the Soviet Union in recognizing the Chinese Communist regime. Of the sixty member states of the United Nations forty-three continue to recognize the government of the Republic of China. And the maneuvers and protests of Soviet Russia and her satellites to unseat the representatives of the Chinese Republic in that world organization and its various subsidiary organs in favor of the Peiping regime on more than two hundred occasions have invariably been defeated.

COMMUNIST CHINA—PRO-SOVIET, ANTI-UNITED STATES

Here then is the whole situation: the Communist regime at Peiping controls the life and liberty of the Chinese people on the mainland. The leaders of this regime are Chinese by race, but their thoughts and ideas and methods of government and their outlook are no more Chinese than those of the thousands of so-called Soviet advisers who now overrun the country.

The Communist authorities on the mainland are doing everything possible to destroy Chinese civilization and Chinese culture. They officially proclaim the Soviet Union as their welcome teacher, and the people are exhorted and even ordered to worship the Soviet

pattern and learn from the Communist Russians. Every important pronouncement from the Kremlin is echoed at Peiping, and every turn and twist of the Soviet policy regarding Asia and the Far East is endorsed by the Peiping regime. The views expressed by *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on important international questions have never failed to be echoed in the Chinese Communist official organ, the *People's Daily News* of Peiping, and in other newspapers under Communist control.

The Red regime, although manned by the Chinese, is tantamount to a branch of the Kremlin. In fact, the Far Eastern Bureau of the international Cominform has its headquarters in Peiping and carries out its schemes of infiltration, subversion, and war in Asia under the general direction of Moscow. Because the Soviet Union regards the United States as its arch enemy in the world and at every international gathering concentrates its attacks on this country, Peiping has organized and proclaimed its so-called "Hate America Campaign." In the schools, in the theaters and press, on the radio, on public platforms and at the officially sponsored mass meetings, the United States is assailed as a warmonger and arch-imperialist. Everything American or of American origin is condemned as tainted with the evil spirit of American imperialism. Hundreds of American-educated Chinese who refused to denounce the United States as ordered by the Communist authorities have been arrested and jailed as agents and spies of American imperialists.

In order to force the people to join in this vicious campaign, literally hundreds of the so-called Sino-Soviet friendship societies which have been established throughout the country also take a hand in organizing meetings and supplying speakers to malign the United States, as well as to eulogize the Soviet

Union. The artificial hysteria engendered by the Peiping regime in trying to make people believe that the United States had resorted to germ warfare in Korea was one of their transparent attempts to arouse mass hatred of America.

Communist China may be treated with greater consideration by Moscow than any of its European or Asiatic satellites, but it is not a free and independent political entity. At best it is only a junior partner of the Soviet Union in the Communist world. To further the Kremlin's plot of world domination Peiping has not hesitated to engage in aggression openly in Korea and covertly in Indochina.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA—INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In contrast with the Peiping regime, there is on the island of Formosa the government of the Republic of China which thinks of the sufferings of the people on the mainland and ponders daily over the supreme task of recovering the mainland and effecting their liberation. While working hard to ensure the security of the island, it has also been exerting its efforts to establish representative government and develop democratic institutions. In thought and action it cherishes the Chinese tradition and fosters the virtues and teachings taught by Confucius and other sages through the centuries.

In its relations with other countries, the Chinese Republic steadily pursues a policy of peace and friendly co-operation to advance the cause of peace. It is a charter member of the United Nations and contributed its part in the writing of the Charter at San Francisco. It is a staunch and consistent supporter of the United Nations, and its delegation has taken from year to year an active part in the proceedings of that world organization. A strong believer in the principles of collective security,

it has not failed to offer its assistance to implement this principle, though such offers have not always been accepted by the United Nations.

In regard to the traditional relations of this real China with the United States, it is a notable fact that throughout the 110 years of official intercourse between the two nations there has always existed between them peace and friendship. While every major power in the world in the past century committed aggression or waged war against China, the United States, like China herself, to our great appreciation and gratitude, has always pursued a policy of peace and friendship toward her. In the two world wars in which the United States was involved, China joined in the conflict to be its ally and co-operated with it closely as allies should. Today the United States, as the leader of the free world against actual and potential Communist aggression, finds the Republic of China pursuing a strong and determined anti-Communist policy in close co-operation with Washington.

Although it might seem that there are two Chinas, there is, in fact, only one legitimate, true China, represented by the government in Formosa. It is a reasonable conclusion from what I have outlined that the continued friendly and co-operative relations between China and the United States can be maintained and developed only with the true and new China which has her temporary capital in Formosa. The Republic of China not only enjoys the support of the eight million Formosan people and twelve million overseas Chinese but also represents the hope of the enslaved 470 million people on the Chinese mainland for their liberation from the Communist rule.

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

With the Geneva Conference, called to discuss the question of Korea and

Indochina, public interest is growing and speculation is rife as to the attitude of the participating powers and the possible outcome of the gathering. Will the Communists show a change of heart on the part of their governments and make a sincere effort to reach reasonable and fair settlements in the interest of world peace and justice? What will be the attitude of the countries of the West? Will they enter the conference with the firm resolve to defend the cause of freedom and uphold the principles of international justice and peace? Or will they be influenced by considerations of expediency and seek a compromise by means of appeasement? Whatever the result of the conference, it will be of far-reaching consequence, as it will determine the future course of events in Asia and eventually in the whole world. It is no exaggeration to say that much uneasiness and apprehension prevails in many countries of eastern Asia. They are anxiously awaiting the outcome of the conference.

My country's attitude toward this conference has been stated by Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, on February 19, 1954. In the view of my government, because of its inclusion of Communist China condemned by the United Nations as aggressor, the conference sets a dangerous precedent, constituting a negation of the principles of the Charter of that world organization. The Chinese government and people cannot recognize the validity of any decision affecting their interest which may be reached at such a conference.

The position which the United States government would take at Geneva was clarified by the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, in a timely and forceful speech before the Overseas Press Club in New York on March 29. He warned in clear and unequivocal language against any further attempt on the part of Commu-

nist Russia and her Communist Chinese ally to impose their political system upon southeast Asia. With equal clarity and emphasis he reaffirmed the opposition of the United States government to recognition of Red China and her admission into the United Nations and gave some very cogent reasons in support of this stand.

In this connection I must also refer to the welcome statement of Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. In an address before the Masons of New York State last week he, too, spoke against recognizing Red China and giving her a seat in the United Nations. His declaration, like that of the Secretary of State, obviously reflects the sentiment of the American people, who, true to their tradition, are strongly opposed to aggression and appeasement of the aggressor.

It is heartening to the freedom-loving peoples of Asia to take note of these authoritative statements of United States policy. They are reassuring, and they will go far to clear the atmosphere of doubt and speculation as to what the stand of the United States will be at the forthcoming conference. They will, I hope, discourage any wavering on the part of other Western powers.

But the policy and attitude of other participating countries on the side of the free world remain a mystery and give rise to much uneasiness. As a student of international affairs I cannot refrain from expressing the view that, in the light of past experience, any attempt to sacrifice fundamental principles of justice and peace and appease the Communists in the hope of getting their promises of good behavior in Indochina and Korea would be a grave mistake of statemanship. Communist bad faith is notorious. Their record of performance in regard to the Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam agreements consti-

tutes an important lesson and a serious warning to the free world.

U.N. MEMBERSHIP FOR COMMUNIST CHINA?

It is conceivable that Communist China, in order to secure the immediate advantages of diplomatic recognition and membership of the United Nations, will not hesitate to deny her sinister intentions toward Indochina and Korea and to sign agreements with the representatives of the free world. For it is a part of Communist strategy in dealing with what they call the capitalist world to launch economic, military, or diplomatic offensives to further their objectives according to circumstances prevailing at a given moment. It may be that the Communists are counting upon the fruits of a diplomatic offensive at Geneva. But Peiping's pledged word can no more be relied upon than Moscow's. In the speech referred to above, Mr. Dulles cited a series of violations of international agreements by the Communists. Stalin himself once said to the representatives of a Soviet satellite that "a treaty is worse than a scrap of paper because you cannot write on it."

Moreover, the Peiping regime, it will be recalled, was denounced as the aggressor in Korea by a formal resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. To admit it into this world organization would be tantamount to putting a premium on aggression and rewarding the aggressor. It would be difficult to imagine an act which would have a more demoralizing effect on the hopes of millions and millions of enslaved people on the Chinese mainland and upon the spirit of the freedom-loving peoples in Asia. In addition, it would further weaken the United Nations, the effective functioning of which has already been greatly impaired by the policy of nonco-operation and ob-

struction on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

It is sometimes claimed by apologists for the Peiping regime that the United Nations must observe the principle of universality and admit all countries into it without regard to their political ideology. Evidently those who advance this thesis forget the basic requirements for membership prescribed in the United Nations Charter. To be admissible a state must be peace-loving and able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter. Could Communist China, in view of its flagrant aggression in Korea and of its aid to the Communist forces in Indochina, be considered as a peace-loving country?

As to Peiping's record of observance of its international obligations, the Secretary of State disclosed in the address already referred to that it has committed at least forty violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

In some quarters it is stated that it would be better to have Communist China in the United Nations, so that its conduct could be more easily watched and it could be called to account in conference and discussion. If this is the reason for giving the Peiping regime a seat in the United Nations, it is only wishful thinking. The Soviet Union is a permanent member of the United Nations. Has this fact prevented it from instigating Peiping to launch a war of aggression against Korea and to conspire against the French and Vietnamese in Indochina?

Those who advocate Peiping's admission into the United Nations seem to be satisfied that this world organization should serve only as an international forum, unmindful of the fact that the primary objective of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security through the organization and application of collective security. The Security Council, whose primary

responsibility it is to carry out this duty, has been paralyzed by the obstructionist attitude of the Soviet Union. If the United Nations is to be generally only a debating society, then the taxpayers of the member states would have a good reason for complaining that its maintenance is too costly, especially since it now provides as much a forum for Communist propaganda as for others.

TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

There are people who urge recognition or admission of Communist China into the United Nations in the hope of doing more trade with it in the vast Chinese market, as if the principles of peace and security and the cause of freedom should be evaluated in dollars and cents and bartered away for economic and financial gains. Those who place trade above all other things must be aware of the fact that the immutable aim of international Communism is nothing short of world domination; it is determined to seek its attainment by all means at its disposal.

It must also be realized that the policy of the Chinese Communist regime today is to consolidate its power at home and build up its prestige abroad. While pursuing its policy of expansionism in the neighboring countries of east and southeast Asia, in Burma and Nepal as well as in Korea and Indochina, it is also pressing forward its program of industrialization, so as to increase its war potential. Any move to lift the embargo on strategic goods and promote trade relations with it would be helping its policy of consolidation and industrial development. Once the Peiping regime succeeds in entrenching itself on the Chinese mainland, not only would the hopes of millions of the enslaved Chinese people be dashed to the ground and the supreme mission of the government of the Re-

public of China to liberate them frustrated, but the task of saving Asia from the Communist grip would become impossible.

The fundamental objectives of United States foreign policy, as I understand them, are peace, security, and freedom throughout the world. Indeed, these constitute the only sound basis for working to raise the standard of living of all peoples and promoting the welfare of humanity. If this understanding is correct—and I venture to believe it is—then every effort must be made to rescue Asia from Communist conquest and domination. For the Communist leaders from Lenin and Stalin down to the present rulers in the Kremlin have always regarded the conquest of Asia with its tremendous manpower, immense resources of food supplies and strategic raw materials, and military bases as indispensable to the success of their plot of world domination. The success of the Communists in consolidating their power in China would portend an ominous future for the whole of Asia, as demonstrated in Korea and Indochina.

HOPE FOR A NEW CHINA

To check this calamitous trend and save Asia for the free world, the government of the Republic of China must be encouraged and supported in its determination to carry out its supreme mission of recovering the Chinese mainland and liberating the Chinese people. Whatever fighting, whatever sacrifices, may be necessary will be enthusiastically undertaken by the Chinese government and people in Formosa. The armed forces under its control today may not be large compared with the Communist army on the mainland, and the population of the island, even with the support of the reservoir of manpower from overseas Chinese, may be limited. Yet the real potential strength

of the Republic of China exists among the millions and millions of the people on the mainland. It is sincerely believed—and intelligence reports invariably confirm this belief—that when the army of liberation lands on the coast of the mainland and establishes a beach-head there, not only the anti-Communist guerrillas but the people of the mainland will gladly rally to its banner and join in the fight to overthrow the hated Communist regime.

Once that is done and the government of the Republic of China moves its seat back to the mainland and starts to build up and develop democracy there, as it is doing in Formosa, a true and

new China will have arisen: true because she will be faithful to the Chinese tradition and reflect the spirit of the Chinese people, and new because her democracy will be based not only upon the foundation of time-honored Chinese society but also upon the pattern of the United States. It is only that China which the American people can soundly and rightly contemplate and work with for mutual interest. It is only that China which will be in the future, as she was in the past, a loyal friend and faithful ally of the United States, to co-operate in the common task of building a world of peace, security, and prosperity.

His Excellency V. K. Wellington Koo, Ph.D., LL.D., L.H.D., Washington, D. C., has been Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States since 1946. Before this appointment he was Ambassador to Great Britain (1941-46) and Minister and Ambassador to France (1932-41). In China, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs (1922-24), Finance Minister (1926), and Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1926-27), and he has represented his country at many international conferences, including the San Francisco Conference. Dr. Koo was chairman of the Chinese delegation to the first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Present United States Policy Toward China

By ALFRED LE S. JENKINS

IN recent years we have often heard it said that more heat than light has been cast on the China question. I am not surprised at the heat, nor do I object to it, provided there is also sufficient light. The fate of one-fourth of the world's population is not a matter which can be taken lightly, and the addition to the Soviet bloc of China's vast material and manpower resources is a matter involving not only the security interests of the United States but those of the entire free world. I do not see how one can help feeling strongly about these matters. We need not apologize that our thinking about China is charged with feeling. National policies are an expression of national interests concerning which there is naturally much feeling, and our policies are an expression both of what we are and of what we want. We are a nation of free people. We want to remain free to pursue in peace our proper national destiny, and we want the same freedom and rights for others.

We do not believe that the Chinese Communist regime represents the will of the people it controls. First capitalizing on the natural desire of the Chinese people to enjoy full recognition and respect for their importance in the world community, the regime then proceeded by its "lean-to-one-side" policy to betray the powerful Chinese longings to stand up straight. It has followed slavishly the leadership of the Soviet Union and attempted to emulate it in all its ways. With the aid of thousands of Soviet advisers it has set about methodically to change the entire fabric of traditional Chinese culture, substituting Communism's materialistic, atheistic

doctrines, wherein the state is the be-all and end-all and the individual its pawn.

The regime at first attracted considerable support, principally through its sponsorship of a land redistribution program, but is now, after establishment of the prerequisite police-state controls, taking the land away from the owners in the same collectivization process which is familiar in other Communist countries and which invariably has brought suffering in its wake. China's much advertised "new democracy" is, of course, in reality "old Communism."

SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

From its inception the regime has proclaimed a lean-to-one-side policy in foreign affairs and has left no doubt about its dedication to the proposition of world Communist revolution under the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. While its leaning to one side has not brought it to the position of complete prostration to one side characteristic of the Eastern European Soviet satellites, there is not the slightest evidence that this indicates any separatist tendencies. The difference in status of Peiping in its relationship with Moscow (as distinguished from that of the Eastern European satellites) is due rather to its having come to power without benefit, except in Manchuria, of Soviet army occupation; to the prestige of Mao Tse-tung, arising from his long history of leadership of Chinese Communism and his literary contributions to theoretical communism; to China's assumption of the role of leadership in the Communist program for Asia; and to the geographical position, size, and importance of China itself. This relation-

ship has been characterized as that of junior partner, and the association has every mark of being a willing, determined, and close one.

Although Soviet officials previous to the Chinese Communist assumption of power were protesting that they did not know what "those independent agrarian reformers" were up to, there was already close co-operation between Mao and Moscow. Despite the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on August 14, 1945, which specified that Soviet "support and aid . . . be entirely given to the national government as the central government of China," the Soviet Union a few months later turned over to the Chinese Communists the Japanese equipment it received in Manchuria. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics instituted diplomatic relations with Peiping only two days after the regime's establishment, and five Eastern European Soviet satellites followed suit within the week. The North Korean regime, the East German Communist satellite, and the so-called People's Republic of Mongolia also established diplomatic relations with the new regime during the first month of its existence.

The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, a mass organization whose aim, according to the Communists, is "to found and consolidate fraternal friendship and co-operation between the Chinese and Soviet people and to develop the interflow of knowledge and experience of the two great nations" was founded in Peiping only four days after the establishment of the so-called "People's Government."

Treaties and agreements

The Mao regime has since concluded with the Soviet Union and other Communist states various economic, mili-

tary, and cultural treaties and agreements. Strong ideological ties bind Moscow and Peiping, and a number of Chinese Communist leaders are Moscow trained. The Chinese Communists also feel the need for close association with the Soviet Union to develop their military strength and striking power. They need Russian military supplies and equipment and Russian technicians and economic aid for the development of heavy industry, which they view as a necessary base for a large military establishment. In exchange, China can furnish the Soviet Union with needed raw materials and foodstuffs and offer the use of the warm-water ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not want a strong, independent China on its Siberian border. It is naturally interested in the survival and growth of a Communist China (so long as it does not grow too strong and independent), and in alliance with a Communist China it is in a far stronger power position than it would be otherwise. The close co-operation and interdependence between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union in the Korean aggression is well known.

Communist China's attitude toward U. S.

As a corollary to Communist China's "leaning" to the Soviet side, she has unceasingly heaped vituperation and all manner of abuse and insult upon the free world in general and the United States in particular—over the radio, in newspapers, at the conference table, and in numerous periodicals in many languages (even including Esperanto), which are sent all over the world.

Aside from the serious implications of policy in this performance, such conduct somehow seems especially shocking coming from the Chinese. For well over a century Americans have had a deep interest in and sincere friendship for the

Chinese people. Our record in supporting China's territorial integrity and political independence is a well-known one. It is a source of deep concern and regret to us that for more than four years we have been cut off from our accustomed close association with the great majority of the Chinese people.

U. S. POLICY ON RECOGNITION

There are some who feel that this unfortunate situation could be remedied if we were to recognize the Peiping regime and if it were accepted as representing China in the United Nations. Actually, even if we considered such action to be morally justifiable, there is not a shred of evidence to indicate that we could expect reciprocity on any satisfactory basis or that it would lead to a renewal of our association with the Chinese on the mainland. During the few months preceding and following the establishment of the so-called People's Government in Peiping, Chinese Communist authorities jailed or otherwise maltreated a number of our official representatives and never recognized their official status. Finally, when the situation became intolerable, we withdrew all of our official representatives, requesting the British to represent our interests. The British have tried to do this to the best of their ability. They are hampered in this endeavor, however, for while they have recognized the regime and have diplomatic and consular officials on the mainland, the Communists have not seen fit to establish diplomatic relations with the British and have refused to accord full accreditation to British officials. The British, and indeed others with fully accredited representation in Peiping, have in vain attempted on our behalf to secure the release of some hundred Americans held in Communist China against their wishes, thirty-two of whom are in jail now, held incommunicado, without trial,

and without even a statement of the charges against them.

The Peiping regime has followed no recognized standards of international conduct. It has repeatedly violated the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement. It has disregarded international rules on the care of prisoners of war. In order to secure sorely needed foreign exchange to carry on its aggressive adventures and its subversive activities in other countries it has engaged in narcotics trade throughout the world, and has directed an extortion racket against overseas Chinese whose relatives on the mainland are at its mercy. In addition to its aggression in Korea and its defiance of the United Nations itself, it has supplied the Communist Vietminh armies with equipment and advisers and trained Vietminh troops on Chinese soil. It has swept aside traditional local autonomy in Tibet and has carried on an active program of intimidation and subversion throughout south-east Asia.

Internally, the Mao regime is a ruthless police state with all that that implies. Millions of Chinese have been murdered or have committed suicide in connection with the phoney land reforms and the campaigns against alleged irregularities of private businessmen. Property of both Chinese and foreigners has been confiscated without compensation. Personal liberty is a thing of the past. The "justice" of the so-called people's courts is subservient to state policies. Movements of individuals are closely controlled. There is forced labor on a large scale. Children are trained and forced to inform on their parents and friends. There is not even freedom of silence, since all must be vocal in support of Communist policies. Mass "brainwashing" is a continuous process through daily study groups and all media of communication. The family unit has become a

special target of the Communist system. The Communists have rewritten history, and attempted to make religion the handmaiden of politics.

In view of all these considerations it is hardly surprising that the firm policy of the United States government is one of strong opposition to the Chinese Communist regime. We cannot recognize this regime, and we shall continue vigorously to oppose attempts to accept it in any United Nations organization as representing the Chinese people. We earnestly solicit the support of the entire free world in these policies. We would view with deep concern a "creeping acceptance" of the Peiping regime by the world community of nations.

We further consider that recognition and acceptance of the Peiping regime would have the effect of substantially weakening the will to resist Communist expansion on the part of other Asian people. The nations and people near the Chinese mainland might under such circumstances erroneously tend to view Communism as "the inevitable wave of the future" and more and more incline their political leanings and economic activities to accommodate this conviction. If the Chinese Communist regime were the only China to which the twelve million overseas Chinese could look, the Communists would have an important, ready-made "fifth column" throughout southeast Asia and in many other nations of the world. They already have the support of some of these Chinese, but their following among them has fallen off markedly since the extortion episode and as the nature of the regime's excesses has become increasingly apparent.

Those who favor recognition of the Peiping regime beg the question by urging us to "recognize reality." We do recognize reality, and much of it we do not like. But it is not in the Ameri-

can tradition to confuse the *real* with the *immutable*. We recognize with concern an increase in the incidence of cancer in recent years, but we refuse to recognize cancer as "the inevitable wave of the future."

U. S. MILITARY POLICY

So much for our political policy toward the Chinese Communist regime. On the military side it is the view of the United States that the way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.

EMBARGO AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA

On the economic side we follow a policy of total embargo against Communist China, and our ships are forbidden to call at Communist Chinese ports. It is realized that every kind of merchandise cannot be considered to be directly helpful on the battlefield. We have felt, however, that the maximum possible economic pressures should be applied against an aggressor engaged in fighting and killing the troops of the United States and other free countries. The aggression in Korea, so far as Communist China is concerned, will not be considered over until its troops are all withdrawn. The Armistice in Korea only stopped the shooting—doubtless because the Communists found the fighting unprofitable—but we have seen no indication so far that the Mao regime has abandoned its aggressive policies. If the time should come when the consideration of lessening economic controls appears appropriate, we shall still bear in mind the effect of such action in regard to Communist China's plans to build a large war potential and its avowed intent to "liberate" all of Asia and eventually the world.

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

We have been committed since signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement last July and the passage of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution last August to seek a Korean political conference. We have patiently sought since early September to arrange for such a conference on terms consonant with the Armistice Agreement and the United Nations Resolution. The Berlin Conference laid plans for a multipower conference at Geneva on April 26 to consider a Korean settlement. This will not be, as the Communists are claiming, a five-power conference. Communist China, far from attending the conference as a great power, will not in our view even attend as a government. At Berlin we secured Soviet agreement to the following statement:

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

The time, place, and composition of the Korean political conference are entirely as we wanted. We do not fear this conference. As Secretary Dulles has said:

There is . . . no reason why we should refuse to seek peacefully the results we want merely because of fear that we will be outmaneuvered at the conference table. . . . Our cause is not so poor, and our capacity not so low, that our nation must seek security by sulking in its tent.

We will not be prepared at Geneva to allow the aggressors to achieve at the conference table what they failed to achieve in battle. This applies not only to territorial considerations but to any "deal" which would, as has been suggested in some quarters, trade a United Nations seat and an end to the trade controls for an agreement by Commu-

nist China to stop supplying the Vietminh. As a recent *New York Times* editorial put it, "There is neither logic nor profit in paying a bribe to the Communists to get their worthless promise not to do again what they had no business doing in the first place."

Whatever the Communist attitude, we will go to Geneva in good faith and do our best to achieve just solutions to the Korean and Indochinese problems. There is the bare possibility that Soviet Russia and its Chinese Communist ally may be sufficiently preoccupied with plans for internal development to cause them at least to desire a period of relaxation in both areas on an acceptable basis. Meanwhile, we are keenly sensible to the Communist habit of waging war by cease fire, and we do not discount the possibility that they might use a cessation of hostilities merely as an opportunity to build up for renewed attacks. In our view, any settlement in Korea or Indochina would have to provide effective guarantees against such a possibility.

U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Certainly we do not contemplate any action at Geneva or anywhere else which would damage the cause of the government of the Republic of China. Our policy is to extend moral and material support to the Free Chinese, and we have no intention of letting them down. This government has been constant in its opposition to lawless imperialism. We do not forget that the government of China under President Chiang Kai-shek, during the long years of its lone stand against the Japanese invader, had several opportunities to reach a seemingly advantageous accommodation with the invading power, but refused to do so. The Chinese government early recognized the true complexion of the Chinese Communists and refused to com-

promise with them. Just as we view the unswerving friendship of the Chinese government with gratitude, we also view its growth in material strength and political appeal with satisfaction. We are prepared to lend our continued support to these ends, but we cannot ourselves fashion them. This, of course, is primarily a Chinese responsibility. The military and economic progress which has taken place on Formosa during the past four years has been heartening. We hope and are confident that the progress being made there will stand in increasingly favorable contrast to the regimentation and oppression of the mainland regime.

We will continue military and economic aid to the government of the Republic of China. We will continue to recognize it as the government of China, and we will support it as the representative of China in the United Nations. We are convinced that even though it is cut off from the mainland, it is far more representative of the will of the Chinese people than is the Peiping regime. It has conducted itself in the United Nations ably, responsibly, and with dignity. The free world can deal with this government on mutually understandable terms. It does not employ the upside-down vocabulary of the Communists.

THE CHINA PROBLEM

International politics, like domestic politics, is in the last analysis an art of the possible. I do not mean by this that a solution to "the China problem"

is impossible. I mean that the solution is not likely to be easy or quick. Time, however, *can* be on our side. The greatest thing the Communists have to fear is truth. This fear erected both the Iron Curtain and the Bamboo Curtain. There is nothing new about Communism, and we know that it is by no means "the inevitable wave of the future." It has been tried for a long time and has proven itself totally incapable of making good on its promises. We are resolved to remain strong in order to have the time to demonstrate, beyond the power of curtains to hide, the simple truth that the systems fashioned by free men can tap the energies and meet the needs of their peoples incomparably better than can a materialistic and cynical system of coercion and regimentation. This truth must yet make millions free who are now enslaved, including the Chinese on the mainland.

The course which we are now pursuing with respect to China may not be easy or quick, but we must never for one moment doubt the possibility of reaching our objectives with honor and with a full sense of our responsibility to this and to future generations. In this let us not seek the counsel either of the timid or of the foolhardy. We feel strongly about the China problem because it affects not only our security but the very values by which we live. If we stand honestly on those principles which have brought us thus far, we need not fear that we shall have to stand alone.

Alfred le S. Jenkins, Washington, D. C., is Officer in Charge of Political Affairs in the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Department of State. Previous to his present appointment he was vice consul at Peiping, Tientsin, and Hong Kong, second secretary and consul at Taipei, Formosa, and international relations officer in the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Paradoxes in the Indochinese Dilemma

By LAURISTON SHARP.

THE war in Indochina—a colonial war to throw off French imperialism, a struggle to contain a dangerous thrust of Communism, a local trouble become global—frightens the West as it threatens to develop into another Asian situation gone out of control. While the two world colossi flex their thermonuclear muscles, men seek some settlement to end these bitter hostilities which came to Indochina with the coming of peace in the Pacific in 1945 and which marked the return of the Free French among the Indochinese peoples who thought themselves free.

The war has been fought so far with conventional weapons, but it is a highly unconventional war carried on in an unconventional manner. The background, development, and issues of the conflict are so disordered and complex that it is small wonder the public is confused, seeing only a blurred or oversimplified picture taken in the capitals of the nations most concerned through lenses of censorship, propaganda, and inadequate news coverage. This picture aroused little interest among most Americans until about 1950, almost a century after the French began to develop their nation's interest in the area, following the example of other European powers in China. From December 8, 1941, Americans generally have been aware of Indochina's strategic importance in terms of its location, its modern capital equipment and services installed by the French (but since badly damaged by American bombings, scorched earth tactics, or misuse), and its realized or potential resources in agricultural and mineral wealth, hydroelectric power, and one of the most industrious popula-

tions in southeast Asia. Only recently, however, have many Americans realized not only that they were being involved in Indochina by containment and economic aid policies, but that developments there were beginning to have very important repercussions on the whole scheme of American strategy in Europe and at home as well as in Asia.

POLITICAL AND RACIAL DIVISIONS

From the point of view of the West, the 28,000,000 people of Indochina are now technically divided among three independent but "Associated States," that is, states associated with France in the French Union: the kingdom of Laos in the northwest; the kingdom of Cambodia in the southwest; and the state of Vietnam which is neither kingdom nor republic although about half of its 22,000,000 population is theoretically ruled, without the aid of a legislative body, by a "majesty," Bao Dai. The Laos are a Thai people culturally akin to the Siamese and, like them, Southern Buddhists, but uninterested in political affiliation with Thailand. The Cambodians, whose ancient kings ruled from Angkor a vast empire, speak Khmer, wholly unrelated to the Thai languages, but share with their old enemies the Thai many cultural traits, including Southern Buddhism. Culturally distinct from either the Thai or Khmer, the Vietnamese, originating in southeastern China and subject to that state from late Han times to the tenth century, are largely Sinicized. Historically, however, the Vietnamese have devoted much of their energy during the past millennium to gaining and maintaining political independence of China.

Included in none of these states but centrally located on the borders of all of them is a vast plateau or mountain region inhabited by a million or two aborigines governed, like a native reservation, under direct French administration. Little is said by the French government regarding the future political status of this region which has some economic and considerable strategic importance.

The complicating factor in the Indochinese situation, of course, is the existence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was established in August 1945 and a half year later was recognized by the French government as a "free state." This is the political entity of some 11,000,000 Vietnamese controlled by Vietnamese Communists led by Ho Chi-minh, recognized since 1950 by the U.S.S.R., by People's China, and by satellite countries as a legal state. It is a government whose people the French call "Vietminh," or more simply, "Viets," and define as being in rebellion against what the free world considers the legal State of Vietnam, developed under French sponsorship after 1948.

As if postwar Indochina were not complicated enough, the situation has been made more complex by the creation by fiat from Peiping in 1953 of a "free Thai state," whose territory comprises a region populated largely by Thai-speaking peoples, including a large section of northwest Indochina or Laos, the southern corner of Yunnan in southwest China, a bit of northern Thailand, and parts of northeast Burma. So far, such a state exists largely as a plan to which might be attracted anti-Vietnamese Thai tribesmen, Laos, Siamese exiles who now have no one to turn to except Peiping, and some of the dissident Shan (Thai) and Kachin leaders from Burma. Presumably such a state would attempt to build on the

Thai pannational interests so widely heralded by the Bangkok regime during the war, but which have been little mentioned since Thailand allied herself with the West in the postwar period. This move perhaps gives some hint of a Communist hope eventually to divest Vietnam of some of its non-Vietnamese and south China of some eight or ten million non-Chinese, who might then be lumped together with other peoples, including possibly the numerically weak Cambodians, to form a new, preponderantly Thai state centering on the rice-rich valleys of the Chao Phraya and Mekong rivers between Burma and Vietnam.

For the present, however, the world's interest in mainland southeast Asia centers on the military stalemate and the resulting political dilemma in divided Vietnam. Some of the realities which lie behind the complex Vietnamese situation and which are frequently too little appreciated may be introduced by listing a number of paradoxes which must strongly influence the outcome in Vietnam.

ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENTS

First. Vietnamese culture includes strong, traditional, and well-entrenched anti-China and anti-Chinese sentiments; yet a Vietnamese government controlling half the population is now allied with China and many Vietnamese must collaborate directly with dominant Chinese.

A unique combination of an original southeast Asian type of culture with Chinese civilization created Vietnamese culture over a period of more than two thousand years. But in the process Vietnamese governments and people fighting for independence from China developed a hearty antipathy for the Chinese and an active fear of political domination by the enormous neighbor

to the north. In this situation the Vietnamese, from north to south, from top almost to bottom, developed a nationalist spirit long before the arrival of the French.

Apprehensions were intensely revived during the nine months following the war, when Kuomintang Chinese troops were sent into northern Vietnam by the Allies to supervise the surrender of Japanese forces there. The Chinese stayed on to loot the country and terrorize the populace, until it became a major aim of both French and Vietnamese to get rid of them. Partly for this end, Ho Chi-minh in March 1946 made a number of concessions to the French, whom he had fought so ardently for so many years; and when compatriots accused him of too easy collaboration, Ho, who had lived long in China, replied that it was better to smell the feces of the French for a little time than to eat Chinese excrement all of one's life.

Since political domination of the Vietminh by China still looms above the fine talk, it may be doubted that the present Vietminh co-operation with China is either enthusiastic or popular among Vietnamese in general, although it is probably rationalized among the collaborators by saying that Communist China is a "new" and different nation which, at least in its relations with the Vietminh, it may well be. However, the paradox still remains of China-fearing Vietnamese being forced to work with China, not necessarily because they fear the Chinese less but because they hate the French more. And the danger remains that the West will assume that a dominant Communist China and a Communist-nationalist Vietnam are inevitably and eternally one in attitude and action. This assumption seems implicit in our willingness to negotiate at Geneva with Moscow and Peiping, which can only force the Vietminh into

continued subordination and subservience to these capitals.

FRENCH APATHY

Second. Although the French move into Indochina beginning almost a century ago was exceedingly unpopular with large segments of the French population, it was nevertheless accepted as a means to provide bases from which French influences could be brought to bear on China; yet China is in a position now to bring what may be overpowering influences to bear on the French, who are still unable to muster much popular support at home for the current Indochinese operations.

Nothing could better exemplify the reversal of the power situation in east Asia during a century's time than this present state in which China is a major threat to the French in Vietnam rather than the French being a threat to China. Formerly, even in the face of the French people's continuing apathy or opposition, French governments could go ahead with their ventures in Indochina, but now it is a question whether they can continue a colonial course without stronger popular metropolitan backing. The French people have never had the direct interest in colonies that was common in England and the Netherlands: for one thing, they tended to put their savings into banks, letting the banks invest their funds at home, in the colonies, or elsewhere; for another, proportionately fewer French would emigrate or make their lives in the colonies. Few were impressed with the promises of national prestige and the wealth of China in treasure or in souls which were to follow the "adventures of the admirals" (the early French administrators in Vietnam), the little wars, or other incidents which created the *faits accomplis* which first involved French governments in the Far East. Even though these developments involved no

threat to their own or the nation's interests, the French public would complain. It is no wonder that now they should complain more after supporting alone for years a war which is "militarily hopeless, politically a dead-end street, and economically ruinous" and which brings them face to face with the massive threat of a powerful China.

IDEAS VS. PRACTICE

Third. France helped educate a Vietnamese elite in the technical businesses of Western culture and in the doctrines of the French Revolution, including the ideals of liberty, equality, and brotherhood; yet before the war no serious consideration was ever given to the possibility of eventual independence from the strong control wielded by Paris in governing Vietnam, formally or informally. Civil liberties and economic opportunities were limited for Vietnamese, while French colonials were supported in preferred positions and in larger numbers relative to the native population than in other colonial areas.

Vietnam was organized by the French into the two protectorates of Tonkin and Annam and the colony of Cochinchina, with the native government reduced to a shadow. Native inhabitants of the two protectorates had the civil status of protégés, while those in the colony and the larger cities were subjects. Only 2,600 of the entire indigeneous population, a minute per cent, were admitted to French citizenship before the war and thus received the political, if not the social, rights and privileges enjoyed by Frenchmen. Opportunities for responsible service in the middle and higher levels of business, government, and the armed forces were practically limited to Frenchmen or natives of other French colonies. No new opportunities were provided to Vietnamese for the practice of democratic representative government (although

citizens have fewer such opportunities in France itself than in some other countries). Indeed, various "representative assemblies" were purely advisory bodies whose suggestions could always be vetoed by French officials.

Capital improvements made in Vietnam, of which the French are justifiably proud, although paid for in part from Vietnamese revenues, provided little profit or convenience to the Vietnamese except for small numbers of the elite. Agricultural and mineral production were increased under the French, but so was population, the increase in people about keeping pace with the increase in goods and low-paid jobs. Industry and hydroelectric power were left largely undeveloped. Modern consumer goods and services were imported almost wholly from France, which had first call on exports. While the country itself was thus enriched and developed, it can hardly be demonstrated that the living standards of the peasant or coolie were improved. Under the French many Vietnamese became acquainted with Western practices, doctrines, and ideals, but had little opportunity to express or achieve these for themselves. During and after the war the French have been reaping this Western whirlwind which they helped sow, as it was inevitable they sometime would.

PARTIES OF REFORM

Fourth. Of many small Vietnamese parties organized for revolution, reform, or gradual amelioration, the Indochinese Communist party was the one hardest hit by the French administration and police from the time of its founding in 1929; yet this meant that during the war they were the native party best equipped by clandestine organization, experience, and motivation to serve the purposes of the Allies in Vietnam and thus to receive their support, and to get

themselves into a position to dominate the power vacuum created there at the end of the war.

The small educated elite in Vietnam were the first organizers of parties or associations which sought to change the colonial relationship between France and Indochina either by force or by political action. During the 1880's revolts might be led by mandarins of the old native bureaucracy trying to maintain the status quo. But after the turn of the century trouble for France came primarily from those educated under French and, later, Japanese or Russian tutelage and oriented to Western political concepts. These leaders attempted to organize from the top down, but only on rare occasions, as in 1930, for example, were they able to guide large mass uprisings from the rice roots—revolts that proved ephemeral, in part because of the efficiency of the French *sûreté*, which was probably more ruthless than were contemporary British or Dutch colonial police.

The Vietminh

Communist parties, with both Stalinist and Trotskyist leanings, entered the scene in the '20's. The former was led, chiefly from outside Indochina, by Nguyen Ai Quoc, traveled son of an ex-mandarin, who after World War I went from socialism in Paris to Moscow to Canton, where he founded the party among Vietnamese exiles and visitors. Briefly in the open during the Popular Front period, the party in 1939 was again forced underground; as Indochina passed under Japanese and Vichy control and uprisings in 1940 and 1941 proved unsuccessful, its members tended to gravitate to southern China. Here in the spring of 1941 Nguyen organized among the Communists and other splinter parties the League for the Independence of Vietnam, the "Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi," or Vietminh

for short. Pressed by local Chinese Kuomintang generals, the Vietminh collaborated for a time under another Chinese-sponsored Vietnamese group organized to work against the French and Japanese in Indochina. During this period the Chinese even threw Nguyen into jail as a "French spy." The rival Vietnamese group, however, proved ineffective. Nguyen was then released from prison and in 1943 under a new name, Ho Chi-minh, received Chungking's blessing and financial and military support for underground work in Vietnam.

While other Vietnamese political leaders lolled in China or collaborated with the Vichy French and Japanese in Vietnam, Ho and his Vietminh League linked up with the guerrillas of Communist Vo Nguyen Giap in north Vietnam, recruited new members, and established new contacts in the country, and soon proved themselves the only pro-Allied Vietnamese group capable of eluding the French and Japanese and of promising effective aid in sabotage, espionage, and the rescue of Allied airmen. While they may have done little useful work, it was nevertheless Ho's Vietminh, sponsored and subsidized by the Chinese Nationalists and the American Office of Strategic Services, which at the end of the Pacific war found itself well organized, well armed, and in a position to use quickly the circumstances which permitted it to take over from the Japanese (who had removed and immobilized all French the previous March) by organizing a de facto government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

By the end of August 1945, though still opposed by some Vietnamese parties, this government was firmly established and seated in Hanoi. It was the ap-

parent heir of a Vietnam declared independent of France and united during the previous six months under the Emperor Bao Dai with the collaboration of the Japanese; for it had received Bao Dai's blessing as he abdicated to become a private citizen (better that "in an independent state than emperor of a subjugated country") and to collaborate with it for a time as "Supreme Councilor." It was supported by and included representatives of a fairly wide range of Vietnamese nationalist interests, including Roman Catholics, some of whom still support the Republic. It was led by "Uncle" Ho, rapidly acquiring a wide and popular, almost magical reputation as "the" nationalist leader. By November this government was in such a position that the French General Leclerc could say: "The best thing to do in order not to lose face is to make a 'military promenade' up to the Chinese frontier. Then we should re-embark as many as possible, and get out. There are no other solutions." And the government of the Republic was guided in the name of the Vietminh by members of the Indochinese Communist party who said nothing of Communism and were soon to "dissolve" the party which the French for almost a generation had done their best to destroy. And the Vietminh itself, to top the paradox, had got its start and developed its position originally under the auspices of the exact forces which are now opposing it.

THE MARCH 1946 AGREEMENT

Fifth. Urged by a combination of events and pressures, France and the Hanoi Vietnamese government represented by Ho as President signed on March 6, 1946, a formal agreement recognizing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a "free state." Yet exactly ten months later, without making any attempt to "capture" or isolate the

Communist leadership of the Vietminh-dominated government of the Republic, France announced its complete repudiation of the agreement, stating that Paris could deal only with the "authentic representatives" of the Vietnamese people.

France, itself recently freed from an occupying power, returned to Indochina with every expectation of reoccupying the territory, of re-establishing the status quo ante and of discussing only then the minor concessions of a reorganization plan for the region hastily announced in March 1945, after the Japanese had suddenly taken over control from the Vichy French. But before French forces could arrive in Indochina, Kuomintang Chinese troops had moved in north of 16° latitude, and British troops south of that parallel, to accept the Japanese surrender and care for prisoners of war as arranged at Potsdam by the Allies in July. The Chinese in the north did not dislodge the government and armed forces of the Republic; indeed, they allowed it to strengthen its situation. In the south, however, the British chased the Republic's representatives out of Saigon and a bitter guerrilla warfare began, soon to be taken up by French forces under Leclerc, the British troops being withdrawn early in 1946.

The agreement of March 1946 was signed in a context including the following elements: The French were established in a few urban centers and held some communication lines in the south. The Republic was established in the north and some forces under its control were fighting in the south. The Chinese were slow in carrying out their assignment, were neutral as regards the Republic, but were ravaging the countryside of the north—both French and Vietnamese wanted to get them out. Many French hostages were in Vietnamese hands. The United States, while aiding the French in France, had

announced an official "hands off" policy in Indochina; but during the war, it was rumored, Roosevelt had stated his opinion that Indochina should be placed under an international trusteeship and not returned to French control and more recently American journalists and Office of Strategic Services personnel had apparently urged Ho and the Vietminh to stand firm for the independence of Vietnam, so that the French felt their position threatened by the United States. Ho announced that the Republic would continue to fight against all French forces unless France promised independence, but the Republic had received no international recognition and was weak. The French public was little interested in Indochina and less in fighting to hold it; the French hoped to use the early March high tides to move troops into the north.

In this situation, France was ready to push for the withdrawal of the Chinese and to recognize the Republic as a free state within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union, stipulating that the north (Tonkin), central (Annam), and south (Cochinchina) regions should decide by popular referendum whether they would be included under the authority of the Republic. The Republic, or rather the top leadership of the Vietminh, for there was strong opposition, was ready to sign such an agreement and to accept French troops in the north peaceably. Details were to be worked out in conferences. But in April Saigon began to speak of indigenous demands for a separate "Cochinese Republic" and on June 1, 1946, the French civil administration in Indochina recognized such a government headed by a majority of Vietnamese French citizens!

THE AGREEMENT REPUDIATED

In spite of this inept move to retain a maximum of French power in the

south, France welcomed President Ho with the highest formal honors as a chief of state when he arrived in Paris shortly thereafter to discuss—quite unsuccessfully for the Republic of Vietnam—details arising out of the March agreement. This treatment could hardly allay the increasing widespread Vietnamese suspicion of French sincerity, heightened by dirty fighting on both sides in the guerrilla warfare which continued in the south and by constant friction and morbid incidents between officials and other French and Vietnamese in the north. Ho returned to Hanoi, still honored by the French (he told reviewing troops he had seen their mothers, wives, and sweethearts in Paris, who hoped for their quick return, as did the Vietnamese), but accused by many of his compatriots of playing the role of a French dupe in still publicly expressing his hopes for a satisfactory peaceful settlement. Starting in Haiphong and Hanoi in November and December 1946, general and open warfare broke out; the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam fled its capital, Hanoi; and in January 1947 France repudiated its agreement of the previous March. Many observers feel that Vietnam was lost to France and the Western democracies during 1946. Whether or not it could have been saved had the French made prompt moves toward unity and real independence while taking key Communists into camp is still a question for the historians to argue.

WAR THAT WAS NOT A WAR

Sixth. With negotiations broken off and fighting become general, France entered upon a war which was not a war, and was supported by the United States without being supported by the United States.

France could not at first admit that

the "rebellion" in Vietnam was a "war" for several reasons: such an admission would tend to affirm the legal status of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; it would open the way for action before the United Nations with possibly dangerous results in North Africa, Madagascar, or other trouble spots in the French Union; certainly for most Vietnamese it would violate the new constitution of the French Republic which states that France will "undertake no war with a view to conquest and will never employ force against the liberty of any people"; and it would require the adoption of rules and conventions of warfare which both sides have chosen largely to ignore in a war of little quarter, few prisoners, Vietminh grenaading of Saigon civilians, and French "strategic" bombing of peasant villages.

The United States accepted the French definition of the struggle in Vietnam as an internal, purely colonial problem, not a "war" with which the United Nations or other nations might properly be concerned. The United States thus maintained officially a neutral attitude. This was apparently a bitter disappointment to Vietminh leaders who were naïve in the ways of international law and who had been so encouraged by some individual Americans or by wishful thinking to believe that aid would be forthcoming from "anticolonial" America that they formally, if fruitlessly, addressed long, serious letters arguing the Vietminh case to Senator Capper, President Truman, and others.

But while technically neutral, aiding neither side, the United States felt it necessary to get rid of quantities of surplus military equipment and supplies in metropolitan France and North Africa, and to do this quickly. Much of this American material soon appeared in Indochina, as was to be expected. This led to accusations by Vietnamese, as well as by Indonesians, Burmans,

and Indians, that America was in fact aiding the imperialist powers in their attempts to regain colonial territories by reconquest. The "reservoir of good will," of which Mr. Willkie had spoken, had begun to ebb.

COMMUNISM AND THE FRENCH POLICY

Seventh. The goal of French policy in Indochina from 1947 on was to decrease or eliminate Communist strength; yet the means used in implementing this policy did just the opposite.

The fear of Communism and of the top Communist leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was a major consideration in the French decision not to deal with, and certainly not to grant independence or make other concessions to, the Republic. Yet they neither offered nor promised any alternative to the Republic which would attract the vast bulk of the Vietnamese people who were either non-Communist or, in smaller numbers, actively anti-Communist, but who at the same time were strongly anti-French in their nationalist desire for independence for Vietnam. The Vietnamese who would not collaborate with the French or sit on the fence could turn only to Ho and his Republic, and many did, thus giving the Communists added strength.

The French, confronted in the country by stubborn guerrillas and uncooperative partisan peasants and finding themselves in the cities on the receiving end of the Republic's brutal terrorist tactics, could see the Republic's power only as coercion and force, to be countered by military action. So Paris voted the military credits (with the help of the French Communist party, which abstained when it could have defeated the bills by voting against them) that put over 115,000 men in the field by late spring of 1947. But military operations against the Republic's forces

seemed only to increase their numbers and stiffen the resistance of Vietnamese who felt themselves fighting for Vietnam against foreigners.

In the early years of the struggle Uncle Ho and his government were not defined by the Vietnamese as Communist or even pro-Communist except among the few who were more knowing. The Soviet-type organization of the civil administration and the army meant little to most Vietnamese. For the majority in those years the Republic was an expression of their own patriotic fervor and its chief goals were the total elimination of the French, unification of the country, and then eventually the improvement of the common man's lot. Just as the French were quite unprepared for the realities they found on their return to Indochina at the end of the war, so they were slow in recognizing the potent magical effects worked by the term "independence" as pronounced early in 1945 by the Emperor, aloof and now absent, so that the magic had become firmly associated with Uncle Ho, who might walk barefoot into the village at any moment through the bamboo fence which proverbially kept the Emperor out.

BAO DAI

Eighth. After later attempts to counter the Vietminh leadership with other opposing leaders or groups, none of them having a strong policy, the French turned finally to the former Emperor, Bao Dai; yet this abdicated royal person was from the start clearly not a figure who could rally a wide, enthusiastic, or loyal following behind him.

The Emperor at best had occupied a rather secondary position in the power structure of modern Vietnam under the French. As for Bao Dai himself, he was already compromised by an appar-

ent willingness to collaborate equally with the prewar French, the Vichy French, the Japanese, and the Vietminh, whom he dropped early in 1946 in disgust, moving to Hong Kong. This highly secular Emperor would receive little respect either from the many modern Vietnamese who had repudiated monarchical institutions, or from the more conservative who saw in Bao Dai's abdication and the rise of the Vietminh a clear indication that he had lost the "Mandate of Heaven" without which he could hardly rule. Even though Bao Dai, as chief of state, has stood firm since 1948 in his demand for a unified and completely independent Vietnam, he has been unable to win many away from Ho, who made this demand first.

HESITATION AND FEAR

Ninth. In recent years both France and the United States have feared that any major intensification of the conflict in Vietnam would correspondingly limit French action in the organization of European defense; yet hesitation born of this fear has actually prolonged and thus intensified the war in Vietnam with a result that French action in Europe has indeed been practically paralyzed.

France and latterly the United States have not been willing to commit to Vietnam a striking force sufficiently large and well equipped to ensure putting a quick stop to the conflict there. This decision may have kept China from more active sudden participation in the war, but it has not prevented the struggle from dragging on with a gradually increasing intensity and an always greater commitment of men and more elaborate equipment on both sides. These developments, of course, have kept the French in a position of weak-

ness and indecision in relation to their European situation.

THE EXPLOSIVE PRESENT

Tenth. French hopes for a military decision which would permit negotiation with the Vietminh from a position of strength have led only to an equal expansion of strength on either side; but since this equality of strength has now been extended from the conventional and local level up to the H-bomb and international level, a negotiated political decision appears to be inevitable even though it can be satisfactory to no one.

Lauriston Sharp, Ph.D., Ithaca, New York, is director of the Southeast Asia Program of the Department of Far Eastern Studies, professor of anthropology, and chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Cornell University. He was a fellow of the Australian National Research Council, North Queensland Expeditions, and lecturer in anthropology at the University of Sydney (1933-35). Associated with Cornell since 1936, he taught during the war in the Army Specialized Training program and was acting assistant chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State (1945-46). He has done field study in many areas, including Thailand (1948-49, 1952-53), and has published studies on Thailand and Indochina.

In an earlier and simpler situation limited to Indochina a political decision could have been reached, at least before 1950 and the Chinese Communist victory, with a good deal more freedom and more room for maneuvering on either side than is possible now. The expansion of the situation, the increase in the parties and forces concerned, has served only to decrease and contract alternative political solutions, while increasing immeasurably the danger of explosions both political and physical. Through it all at the bottom of the increasingly charged spiral are the Vietnamese people, more divided than ever before and more unhappy.

Our Common Stake in Indochina

By PIERRE MILLET

I DO not think it is an exaggeration to say that today the problem of Indochina is foremost in the preoccupations of the free world. For example—every week dozens of letters come to my desk from young Americans asking the Embassy if we can help them to fight for freedom in Indochina. Of course, the only thing we can do is to thank those men for their generous spirit and for their courage, well in the American tradition, and explain to them the reasons why we cannot answer their request favorably. But this fact proves beyond any doubt that the concern about Indochina is not now confined to governments, chanceries, politicians, or journalists—that it is the concern of the man in the street. As far as the American government is concerned, the position of the United States towards Indochina has been made quite clear during the last weeks, especially by the President and by the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, in the speech before the Overseas Press Club of New York.

It is not for me, in any case, to define the American position in this matter or to underline what is at stake for Americans in Indochina. I only wish to mention what comfort and what inspiration we get from the fact that once more in a great moment of history, when the eternal values of mankind are again in peril, the United States and France stand together. Indeed, if it were not for American help Indochina would most probably have been lost today to the Communist imperialists.

Nevertheless, if recently the American position towards Indochina has been made quite clear, I feel that many would

see more clearly still if they knew, surely, where France stands in this matter. They would see more clearly not only as far as Indochina is concerned, but also about the other problems of the Far East—because at this moment all the problems are closely related: the battle of Dienbienphu, the negotiations in Paris about the status of Vietnam in the French Union, and the prospects of the two conferences in Geneva about Korea and Indochina.

FRANCE IN INDOCHINA

I hope that my readers will forget that I am an official. I know that like my compatriots Americans have a tendency to question the judgment of the government they, and we, have freely chosen. But so far, whether we like it or not, there have not been any substitutes for governments in the conduct of public affairs. I will tell you what we—the French—are doing today in Indochina, what are our intentions for the future of that part of the world, and how we envisage Franco-American relations in the solution of this problem with special reference to the conference in Geneva.

In this statement, I will not try to conceal the mistakes my government may have made in Indochina since 1945. Only totalitarian governments think they are always right—and I hope that, in exchange, it will be recognized that we have, on the whole, accomplished a great task in that part of the world since the Japanese surrender. And if this appears to be the case, I am only asking for your judgment, not for your praise. Only history will tell whether

or not France was equal to her duty in Indochina. This is not the time for recriminations but for action, and I find that these words of Winston Churchill in his memorable speech in the House of Commons on June 18, 1940, are relevant to this occasion, "Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future."

First of all, what is the present situation in Indochina? What is France doing there at the present time?

We are defending the newly acquired independence of the three Associated States and in doing so we are defending the whole of southeast Asia against Communist enslavement.

On this second object, I will not expand. Mr. Dulles, in New York, did it far better and far more eloquently than I could ever dream of doing.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSOCIATED STATES

As to the independence of the three Associated States, from 1947 until the present time France has been negotiating agreements to give these countries full independence within the French Union. If this has not always been apparent to the eyes of foreign observers or to the local populations, it is because at the same time France has been engaged in Indochina in a fight against a Communist rebel which has prevented those observers and the local populations from seeing the true extent of the independence which had been granted by France; that war obliged France to limit the exercise of the newly acquired freedom. But, believe me, that independence is not only written in the agreements the French government has signed; you will find it engraved in the hearts of the overwhelming majority of my compatriots. Colonialism is a thing of the past in my country. Frenchmen

at the very time I write are dying in Dienbienphu for the liberation of Indochina and only Communist propaganda can make people think otherwise. If at one time some doubts were possible on this subject, I think it is out of the question since July 3 of last year, when France reaffirmed the complete independence of the three Associated States, opening the way to new and final agreements.

On October 22, 1953, a treaty of association and friendship was signed between France and Laos, in the spirit and in the letter of the Declaration of July 3. A few weeks ago, negotiations were started in Paris between France and Vietnam to reach a similar agreement. Negotiations with Cambodia will follow. But already, through previous agreements, the three Associated States of Indochina have nearly all the attributes of internal and external sovereignty. This fact is still too little known.

In the field of foreign affairs, the three states now enjoy the rights of full sovereignty. They have been recognized by more than thirty countries, and they are free to have diplomatic relations with the governments of their choice. They are members of international bodies, most of them under United Nations control, and in certain cases they belong to organizations—the Colombo Plan, for instance—where France is not represented. May I remind my readers that as far back as September 1951 the three Associated States, through their own representation in San Francisco, signed the Peace Treaty with Japan? The agreement of the President of the French Republic is not requested for the credentials of the diplomatic representatives of the three Indochinese states abroad, nor is it necessary for the accreditation of foreign envoys in Indochina. In this respect the French Union is more liberal than the Commonwealth.

PURPOSE OF THE FRENCH UNION

I have just written, "French Union." Some people say: Why a French Union? Cannot those Asian peoples be left alone? Why should they be associated with a European country eight thousand miles away?

Our answer is this: The reason of such an association lies in the interest of these states. That interest is the cement of the French Union.

The present age has shown the importance and the advantages of great political and economic entities, such as the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Pan American Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, not to mention the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the same spirit the nations of Western Europe are now attempting the political, military, and economic integration of that part of the world. In these concepts and creations, the smaller states have found advantages. This is the *raison d'être* of the French Union, and in the case of Indochina that association has been so far for France more of a burden than a highly profitable enterprise. The French Union, like the Commonwealth, is not a prison. Freedom is its purpose. To prove my point, allow me to read the definition of the French Union as you find it in Article 2 of the recent treaty of friendship and association between France and Laos. The French Union is "an association of independent and sovereign peoples with freedom and equality of rights and duties in which all the associates (and France is but one of them) place in common their resources in order to guarantee the defense of the Union as a whole."

At this very moment, the Vietnamese delegates are trying to find in Paris a formula which will underline the fact that they have freely adhered to the

French Union. In this I feel they are right, and perhaps the French Constituents in 1946 exaggerated the prefabricated aspect of the French Union. One does not like to live forever in a prefabricated house; it is only a temporary dwelling until the real house is built. That house, the French Union, is being built, and its walls will be all the stronger if its tenants have all helped in building them.

To go back to the internal status of the Associated States, they have already—in this field—all the attributes of full sovereignty. The only limitations are those imposed by the war now raging in their countries, for instance, military police and censorship.

There were some restrictions concerning rights of jurisdiction over French and Chinese citizens. For them, mixed courts were created like those existing some years ago in Egypt. Today, this distinction is about to become a thing of the past, and negotiations are taking place to that effect between France and Vietnam. They have already been completed for Cambodia and Laos.

Two figures will illustrate the change in Indochina: in 1939, there were more than 28,000 French civil servants in Indochina; today there are only about 2,000, and they are nearly all serving in the administration of the three Associated States and depend on the local governments, not on France.

NATIONAL ARMIES OF THE ASSOCIATED STATES

And, finally, the three states have now their own national armies, symbol and guarantee of their independence. I shall merely mention Cambodia and Laos, these countries which, until recently, were not involved in the war to the same extent as Vietnam; nevertheless, they have now a regular army of about 20,000 soldiers each.

In Vietnam, the progress has been

striking. France, with far less means than the United States, has been trying to do what your country has done in Korea.

In 1949, the Vietnamese army counted only a few battalions. Today, it is over 200,000 strong. At the end of the present year it will be about 300,000. The Chief of that army is Vietnamese, and there are about 1,000 French officers and noncommissioned officers as instructors or on the Vietnamese general staff.

While I am on this subject of the national armies of Indochina, I think I should deal with the question of the training of those forces. During the last few weeks it has often been said and written in the United States that this training by the French was inadequate and that the French High Command should accept the dispatch of an American training mission to Indochina. Surprise and regret have been expressed, too, at the reluctance of the French authorities to agree to such a plan.

We do not deny that the training of the national armies could be improved, and we do not refuse the help of American experience. But certain factors must be kept in mind. (1) As I have said, to build up a Vietnamese army from a few battalions in 1949 to 300,000 men at the end of this year is not a poor achievement, and I know that many competent American observers think that no other government could have achieved that result in Indochina. (2) The Korean War is vastly different from the war in Indochina. In Indochina there are mostly "guerilla" operations while in Korea there was a regular war with a well-defined front. (3) For the last eighty years, France has had experience with the local populations. The question of language—among other things—plays an important part. (4) So far, the responsibility for the conduct of the war in Indochina is the responsi-

bility of the French High Command. Such a responsibility cannot be shared—or if it is to be, then the conduct of the war must assume a very different character. It must not be forgotten that in Korea, if the Korean army was trained by the Americans, the Americans too were fighting and dying on that field of battle. I am not suggesting, and my government has never asked, that it should be so in Indochina. I am only stating a fact in order to make you understand the reaction of the French High Command.

The French Expeditionary Corps is now over 160,000 men strong, with about 80,000 French metropolitan soldiers and officers. To date, the losses of this Corps have been over 136,000 in killed and wounded. The losses of the metropolitan French alone are over 60,000 (of whom more than 1,500 French officers have been killed or are missing). Since 1951, the losses of the national armies have been over 20,000.

Going back to the degree of independence which has been granted to the three Associated States, I am sure that many readers will wonder why, if what I have just said is true, war is still raging in Indochina.

Many will wonder, too, why the French did not grant to Ho Chi-minh in 1946 what they have given since 1947 to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Those are pertinent questions. I will try to answer them as best as I can, and, as I have said before, in doing so, I will not try to conceal the mistakes we may have made since 1945.

WHY WAS INDEPENDENCE DELAYED?

First, why did we not grant independence to the three Associated States after the Japanese surrender just as the United States did for the Philippines and as the British Government did for India, Pakistan, and Burma?

In answering that question, I will point out that the American government spent twelve years in the process of granting independence to the Philippines and that Britain had been for two or three decades in the process of freeing from British rule the three nations just mentioned.

The French were asked to do in a few months for Indochina—and at the very moment that these areas were themselves reasserting their independence—what the United States and Britain had had years to prepare for. On this point, I will admit our responsibilities. It is true that the French administration before and during the war did not foresee the explosion of nationalism which was to take place after the hostilities and did not in consequence take the necessary measures to prepare the independence of the three states of Indochina. There were, of course, large sections of French opinion which were in favor of such measures, but, as you know, France has had since the war coalition governments—too many of them at that—and those governments were formed by representatives of various parties which did not see eye to eye as far as the solution of the Indochinese problem was concerned. On this subject, I will remind you that even the Communists were represented in French cabinets until April 1947.

From that situation resulted the necessity of compromise towards many problems—the problem of Indochina among them—and what was easy for the British government, a one-party government towards India, was impossible for our government in the case of Indochina. This is not an excuse. It is a fact—which I personally deplore as many of my countrymen do.

FRANCE AND HO CHI-MINH

As to the other question, Why did you give Bao Dai in 1949 what you

refused to Ho Chi-minh in 1946 or, rather, why did you give Bao Dai more than the Vietminh leader asked for in 1946? This question is related to what I have just said.

In 1946, the French government was not prepared and French public opinion was not ready to give off hand to Ho Chi-minh all he was asking for. The main reason is that we knew better than anybody else except Moscow the Communist past of Ho Chi-minh and some of his associates and that we wanted to be sure that their national aspirations—quite legitimate—did not cover Bolshevik designs.

Anyhow, in spite of these misgivings and suspicions, and in spite of the unrealistic attitude of some quarters of French opinion, we did recognize Ho Chi-minh and started to negotiate with him. Those negotiations were broken off by Ho Chi-minh's attack in Tonkin in December 1946.

In the years which followed, we realized in the hardest way possible—through war—the true character of Ho Chi-minh and of the Vietminh. We realized that they were part of a vast Communist conspiracy, the results of which were to be seen in Central Europe, in China, and in Korea. What would be happening today in southeast Asia if we had accepted Ho Chi-minh in 1946 as the master of Indochina? So we went on working for the independence of the three states of Indochina and we refused to deal with Ho Chi-minh. We had to fight against him.

That is why since 1946 French policy in Indochina has been difficult for many foreign observers to understand. On the one hand, we say that we want the independence of that part of the world, and on the other, thousands and thousands of our boys remain there to fight.

They fight for two reasons. First, they fight to defend the independence of the three Associated States against

Communist subversion—against what Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny called in Washington “Communist colonialism.” Second, they fight to defend southeast Asia against the same enemy, a point which was made quite clear by Mr. John Foster Dulles in his speech last Monday.

U. S. AID IN INDOCHINA

The United States government recognized the basic character of the conflict in Indochina when continental China fell to the Communists. When the Mao Tse-tung regime started to give increasing help to the Vietminh, and above all when Communist aggression in Korea took place, the United States government decided to help the French and Indochinese governments with money and matériel.

So the year 1950, which is remembered mostly because of Korea, is also the year when the United States began to take direct interest and an active part in the “new Indochina.”

Four years have elapsed since then. The anti-Communist forces have not been able to achieve a decisive military success in Indochina, and at the French request it was agreed at the Berlin Conference in February that the problem of Indochina should be discussed in Geneva at the end of April.

FRENCH LASSITUDE

The present feelings of my countrymen towards the Indochinese problem are characterized by a growing lassitude. This lassitude, as expressed in the French Parliament and in the French press, has four main sources: (1) military developments in Indochina; (2) the political evolution of the three Associated States, particularly Vietnam and Cambodia; (3) the effects of the Indochinese conflict upon France's position in Western Europe; (4) the Armistice in Korea.

The military situation

After more than seven years of fighting, the French see no prospect of a quick ending of the war. If it had not been for American assistance, I think we should have had to give up the fight. The French people, like the Americans in regard to Korea, naturally want to see the boys back or at least an end of the fighting. Some people in my country say also, If the fight in Indochina is a fight which is of direct concern to the free world, why are we alone, with the Indochinese, to shed our blood for it?

I know that in the United States some people say: Why do not the French pay the price for achieving a decisive victory, as we did in Korea, and send more men—their conscripted men, for instance? Why do they not have a more aggressive and realistic strategy? To that I answer: We have heavy commitments in Europe and in Indochina, we are paying the price, and in that respect we have been living above our means for years. Anyhow the solution of the problem is not to send more French troops to Indochina, although we did it last year in a small way.

The Indochinese conflict is not an ordinary war—like the one in Korea—it is a politico-military struggle and basically a civil war. A civil war to be won in Indochina only by French troops would have achieved no result. That struggle has got to be won mainly by the local anti-Communist armies if the local governments are to win their ideological fight against Communism, that is, to prove that they are fighting for their own independence and not to maintain colonialism under a different name. That is why France, with extensive American help, is building up the national armies. That enterprise may have started too late—but it takes years to achieve such a goal. You may form

a soldier in a few weeks; you need years to form a general staff.

A more aggressive strategy? This is the case with the so-called Navarre Plan, but that plan expects important results only eighteen months from now, mostly because it is based on the formation and instruction of new local forces. Will French opinion keep patient until then? And will Communist China tolerate a defeat of the Vietminh?

Political developments

The second cause of French lassitude is to be found in the political developments in Vietnam, and to a lesser extent in Cambodia. In Vietnam, there is no doubt that the resolution of the national Vietnamese Congress which met in Saigon last October created a very unfavorable impression among my compatriots. This Congress, which met only for a short period, which did not represent exactly the distribution of opinion in Vietnam, and which was led by the most extreme nationalists, passed a motion declaring it was opposed to the inclusion of Vietnam in the French Union. The majority of the Congress promptly realized that they had been outmaneuvered and canceled that motion, passing another saying that the Congress was not in favor of the participation of Vietnam in the French Union in its “present form.”

But, as far as French public opinion was concerned, the harm, a very great one, had been done. The reaction of the majority of my compatriots was, Why should we go on being killed for people who do not want to stay with us? This is a very human reaction. After all, what do we expect in Indochina? Certainly not more than the American position in the Philippines. In short, a guarantee of our economic and cultural interests when we go.

The feeling of lassitude is all the

stronger because there are doubts in certain quarters about the dynamism of some Vietnamese leaders. Vietnam needs inspiration from them. The United States can provide the money and the matériel for this war. France can give her men—but men, money, and matériel will be of little help without that inspiration. Around the battlefield of Indochina, there are too many spectators on the fence who have not been brought to realize that the match is a match to be fought between local teams.

France and EDC

The third reason for the lassitude of French public opinion must be found in the effects of the Indochinese conflict upon France's position in Western Europe. You are well aware of the important part France must play in NATO and in the organization of the defense of Western Europe. You know too about the European Defense Community plan. In spite of the fact that the French government initiated that project, there is a very strong feeling in France against it. A great number of my compatriots, who have not forgotten German aggression, are afraid that because of France's military commitments in Indochina, where we have the equivalent of ten French divisions, Germany will assume the military leadership in the EDC.

Armistice in Korea

The last important reason for French lassitude towards Indochina is related to the Armistice in Korea. Quite a number of people in France think that if the United States did not refuse to talk to the Sino-Koreans and sign an armistice at Panmunjom, she cannot logically object to the French talking to the Vietminh and eventually to the Chinese who help Ho Chi-minh.

THE PROSPECT OF ARMISTICE

Thus I come to the question of the prospect of an armistice in Indochina and the problems which such an armistice create for the French and the United States governments.

In Berlin, last February, the United States government agreed that the problem of a solution of the Indochinese conflict be discussed at the Geneva Conference, parallel to the Korean discussion. I know that opinion in the United States is not too happy about this decision, fearing that recognition of the Peiping regime and a lifting of the embargo on Red China may be the price of a promise by the Chinese Communists of a settlement in Indochina. I should like to remind you what the French Prime Minister said in the National Assembly on January 8:

We want peace, but not at any cost. We must know, as was the case in Korea, how to go on fighting without becoming discouraged as long as is necessary to arrive at a settlement. We shall never lose sight of the fact that France's aims are the independence of the Associated States and the defense of the world on the southeast Asia front.

A short time after the end of the Berlin Conference M. Laniel, with reference to M. Nehru's truce proposal, made quite clear in the National Assembly the conditions on which the French Command and the Associated States would insist for a cease fire in Indochina. These conditions showed quite clearly that France and her Indochinese allies did not contemplate any armistice which would imperil the position, military and political, of the three states.

The difference of opinion between France and the United States on this problem—and it would serve no purpose to conceal that there is such a difference—is that while both governments

are of the opinion that the military operations must go on, the French government thinks that at the same time no occasion must be neglected to ascertain if a solution can be found by negotiation. In this respect Geneva will be the testing ground of Communist intentions.

IF WAR MUST GO ON . . .

If it appears in Geneva that there is no hope of finding a solution of the Indochinese conflict by peaceful means, then there is no doubt about it, the whole conduct of this war will have to be reconsidered by all the parties concerned on the anti-Communist side. Having in mind, among other things, the problems of European defense, any government in Paris will have to find out what alternative there is. We shall have to ask our allies by what practical means they can lighten our heavy burden and how the limits of "joint action" are to be defined. As you probably know, Communist propaganda has adopted the slogan, "The Americans are ready to fight to the last Frenchman in Indochina." I well know the odious character of such a slogan, but its effects must not be underrated.

Do not forget that the failure in Geneva to find a solution or the beginning of a solution in Indochina would mean the return to the same kind of long, indecisive war for many months to come, at least until 1956. Let us not be led astray by such formulas for victory as Give the Indochinese the feeling they are fighting for themselves and not for French colonialism. In this respect the limit has been reached, and the French troops in Indochina know already that whether they win or lose, France will be out of Indochina. Still, even with that knowledge, the men of Colonel de Castries in Dienbienphu fight and die day and night.

Do not forget that apart from the

United States no other nation since the war has been fighting more relentlessly against Communism at home and abroad than France, while she had at the same time to face a colossal task of reconstruction and rehabilitation in many fields.

We welcome the criticisms, we ask neither for praise nor mercy, we know we are fighting the good fight for freedom in Indochina. But there, France is

fighting not only against Ho Chi-minh, but against Communist China, the Soviet Union, and its satellites.

The men, Indochinese and French, who are fighting and dying now at Dienbienphu are fighting the war of freedom, but should not the responsibilities be shared more equally if what is at stake now in Indochina is not only the freedom of that country in southeast Asia but freedom itself?

Pierre Millet, Washington, D. C., has been Counselor of the Embassy of France since 1950, in charge of its Far Eastern affairs. He has been in the diplomatic service since 1938: in the French Embassy in China, chargé d'affaires in Thailand, and head of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs in the French Foreign Office. He was a member of the French delegation at the San Francisco Conference.

The Indochinese Question Mark

By PHILIP W. THAYER

AS this article is being written, the new Indochina is a question mark. With approximately half of the country and a like proportion of the population under control of the Communist-inspired Vietminh forces, torn by a fluid war of uncertain outcome, no one can say with assurance what the future may hold for the newly created states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the troubled picture which presents itself one thing is nevertheless sure: the question of the preservation of Indochina is a fateful one for the entire free world.

Indochina constitutes a connecting corridor between China and the countries to the south and west. Burma and Thailand are immediate neighbors, and the Malay peninsula stretches beyond, separated by no great distances from the islands of Indonesia and of the Philippines. Throughout this immensely rich and promising area the vital need of the people is time; time in some instances to consolidate the unfamiliar fruits of sudden independence, to consider the numerous and complex problems which have been attendant on an abrupt transition from colonial to sovereign status; and time in all cases to re-establish and develop their economies in the aftermath of the retarding and often disastrous consequences of wartime occupation by the Japanese. Preoccupied with these questions, the countries of southeast Asia are in no position to withstand powerful forces of external aggression. For Indochina to fall into hostile hands, therefore, would mean inevitably the loss of Burma, Thailand, and Malaya, probably of Indonesia, and conceivably of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and the Philippines.

The present situation, in which there is the gravest danger that the Associated States of Indochina may be overcome by the Communist-inspired troops of the Vietminh, poses problems far exceeding in critical magnitude those of Korea.

Since the surrender of the Japanese, developments in Indochina have been characterized on the one hand by the efforts of the French to recapture their former position of dominance, although on a substantially modified basis, and on the other by the growth of a spirit of nationalism which has been capitalized by Ho Chi-minh for other purposes. Ho Chi-minh has posed as a patriot and a nationalist leader. He has fooled and continues to fool a great many people, chiefly among his own countrymen. Actually, however, there is not the slightest doubt in the minds of those familiar with his personal background and with the record of his past activities that he merely has been making very clever use of prevailing anti-colonial sentiments and legitimate nationalist aspirations to play the Communist game. The familiar pattern of Communist techniques is clearly discernible in all that he has done. Indeed, since the success of the Communists in China in 1949, there has been little attempt to conceal the real nature of Vietminh propaganda. Speaking at the inauguration of the Lao Dong (Workers) party in 1951, Ho Chi-minh was on orthodox ground in referring to Americans as "leaders of the world's imperialists and reactionaries," and in sprinkling his remarks freely with such terms as "lackeys" and "running dogs." The following year he characterized Comrades Stalin and Mao Tse-tung as

"the most clear-sighted, the most worthy elder brothers, friends of mankind." Even Ho's own people are beginning to see through his nationalist pose. The ruthless tactics of oppression and destruction used by the Vietminh in the areas under their control have been opening many eyes.

THE FRENCH IN INDOCHINA

The French for their part, returning after the war to bring peace to the country and to protect their own interests, have found themselves forced gradually into a position where they have become guardians of one of the most important bastions of the free world. This is a position which they did not seek and for which they have no particular liking. There is little doubt that the French have made mistakes during the last eight years. At a time when we are more concerned with the present and future than with the past, it would be futile to labor these. Mention should be made, however, of the failure of France to appreciate the full extent of nationalist feeling in its desire for independence and sovereignty. At no point apparently had French plans for Indochina envisaged anything approaching the status of Burma or even of the countries within the British Commonwealth. At the most, they looked toward a limited freedom of action under French leadership. It is noteworthy that all matters affecting the interests of France or of more than one state were subject to review by boards in which France had the right to block or to veto. Similarly, France kept a tight control over foreign affairs, foreign trade, justice, and finance. When concessions have been made, they unfortunately have had the appearance of following on the heels of French reverses. The declaration of July 3, 1953, for example, indicating that France was prepared to transfer to the three Asso-

ciated States various functions hitherto under French control, was not issued until after the unhappy campaign of 1952-53. Even the original agreements of March 8, 1949, taking the first steps toward a limited self-government in Indochina, came at a time when the struggle with Ho Chi-minh was not going favorably and when the Communists were on the verge of triumph in China. In the result, instead of getting credit for magnanimity, France has fallen under the odium of acting only under compulsion or force of circumstances.

Like observations would be pertinent in regard to the French conduct of military operations. It could be noted, for instance, that the final decision to expand the Vietnamese army was a belated one, and that the French have been remarkably persistent in keeping officer control down to the noncommissioned level.

Notwithstanding these comments, sight must not be lost of the fact that the situation of France in Indochina is closely tied in with her political position in Europe. However clear-sighted her military commanders and statesmen may have been in facing up to the realities of the fighting in Indochina, they have been at all times severely handicapped by the constant play and counterplay of sensitive forces in the home government. Recent pronouncements from Paris and developments within the French Cabinet are a powerful reminder of the ease with which an ever delicate balance may be disturbed.

It also must be remembered that France has an overwhelming stake in the economic life of Indochina. The French own all the shipping, all the mines, and all the rubber. In addition, they control almost all the banks, practically all industry, and about two-thirds of the rice. Confronted thus by both political and economic factors of a remarkably complex and far-reaching

nature, it is not surprising if the French have found difficulty in making decisions.

VIETNAMESE DISTRUST

The ordinary Vietnamese, sitting in the midst of these conflicting claims and interests, with a phony patriot on one side and a grudging savior on the other, perhaps may be pardoned if he has failed to understand the score. Circumstances have combined to make it exceptionally hard for him to determine, if he is a friend of nationalism and independence, whether his aims would be better achieved by fighting with or against the French or by remaining on the sidelines. Of one thing he is sure: that he has had enough of colonialism and wants no more of it. In his mind the French have been and continue to be identified with colonialism, a fixation to which the French themselves, in the persons of too many of their countrymen resident in Indochina, unfortunately contribute by their treatment of the Vietnamese as an inferior race. In the final result therefore the common people of the towns and fields are likely to view the spectacle of the French in shining armor with some distrust and to be disinclined to give them active support. This attitude is exemplified in the lack of conspicuous success which has attended the development of the so-called "light battalions" (*khin quan*) among the Vietnamese. These battalions, numbering at present about sixty, were conceived as forces easily mobile, able to meet the enemy on his own terms, and useful in pacifying conquered territory. In the event, however, they have seemed apathetic and notably deficient in the fighting spirit which is essential.

As stated earlier, the preservation of Indochina is of the utmost importance to the free world. The question therefore is, how can that objective be ac-

complished in the light of present conditions?

BASES OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Since the date of the Korean Armistice there has been persistent talk of a negotiated settlement in Indochina. Only a glance is necessary to note the complete dissimilarity of circumstances. Inasmuch as Premier Laniel himself has indicated the possibility of such a move, it is nevertheless worth while to explore the suggestion, particularly in the light of the conference at Geneva. A negotiated settlement would appear to involve bases either of partition, of coalition, or of an over-all nature bringing in general Far Eastern questions. Although partition offered a natural solution in Korea, the nature of the conflict and of the interests involved makes it entirely impracticable in Indochina. A line of demarcation was readily at hand in Korea which represented more or less accurately not only the fighting line but also the distribution of population. This has not been true at any time in Indochina. The fighting has been of an extremely mobile and opportunist character. So great has been the ability of the Vietminh forces to appear at unexpected places, to disappear when opposed in strength, and to reappear elsewhere, that the French have seemed often to be combating an army of ghosts. No particular section or sections of the country have been consistently involved. Territorial acquisitions have been for the most part of an ephemeral character. Given positions have been one day in the hands of the Vietminh and on the next day back in the camp of the French, with no sureness at any point as to the real sentiments of the inhabitants. Partition on lines of any logical or satisfying significance appears therefore to offer problems of the utmost difficulty.

Coalition is equally implausible. As

matters now stand, it is difficult to conceive of a coalition government in which Ho Chi-minh and his supporters would not be represented either directly or indirectly. Such a development would be fatal and hence unthinkable.

Finally, should a negotiated settlement take the form of a local arrangement within the framework of a general Far Eastern picture, problems arise of an even more perplexing nature. No settlement of this kind presumably could be effected without a *quid pro quo*, and a *quid pro quo* in this connection inevitably would mean a concession. Could consideration be given, for example, to the recognition of Communist China as the condition for a satisfactory settlement in Indochina? Or to the withdrawal of aid from Formosa? Or to a like cessation of aid in Indochina? Any or all of these possibilities, as well as others equally unpleasant, are almost sure to receive mention at Geneva. Their mere recital is enough to demonstrate the dangers inherent in this type of settlement.

PROLONGATION OF FIGHTING

There remains for consideration the question of continuance of the present armed struggle. Previous forecasts concerning a successful outcome and the time element involved have not been so accurate as to inspire much confidence in current guesses. It will be remembered that as long ago as 1951 eighteen months were mentioned by General de Lattre de Tassigny as the outside limit for triumph. During the intervening years the French have enjoyed an overwhelming preponderance of material advantage. They have had virtually complete control of sea and air, they have held the principal cities and ports, have kept access to the principal producing areas, and have enjoyed the use of greatly superior combat equipment. Numerically, it has been estimated that the

French and Vietnamese forces have outnumbered the Vietminh by as much as five to three and have inflicted approximately five times as many casualties. Notwithstanding the favorable inferences which might be drawn from these facts, the fluid character of the fighting, already described, has postponed a clear-cut decision. It may be assumed that the contributions which so far have been made by this country, the recent promise of an additional \$385,000,000 (bringing the figures to a point where the United States is paying roughly sixty per cent of the over-all cost of the struggle), and current conversations looking toward further assistance, indicate definite hopes of a not too remote success. In any event, it would appear from present trends that at the very least a continuance of the war will improve the bargaining position, that even a stalemate has the elements of victory, and that the conclusive defeat of the Vietminh is not beyond belief. Local engagements, such as the present struggle at Dienbienphu, should not be permitted to distort this picture. Dienbienphu does not necessarily have great over-all significance. It is doubly unfortunate, therefore, that the situation should have been so built up in the popular mind, possibly as a bargaining point at Geneva, that the moral effect of victory or defeat may be out of all proportion to the actual significance.

Successful prosecution of the fighting, however, presupposes a change of attitude on the part of the majority of the Vietnamese, a change from the hesitancy, the indecision, the apathy, even, which have been so marked in the mass of the population. Only the French can accomplish this transformation, for it involves implanting in the minds of the Vietnamese a clear conviction that the French are in earnest when they talk about independence and are not merely trying subtly to perpetuate their

former position. Undoubtedly, France is more in a mood for sincerity at this moment than she has ever been. It is devoutly to be hoped that the negotiations now in progress in Paris may accordingly result in an agreement which will bring genuine independence to Vietnam and not merely a hollow semblance. The hour, however, is late, perhaps even now too late.

COURSES OF ACTION

The foregoing observations have attempted to set forth the gravity of the situation which confronts the free world in Indochina and to enumerate the possible courses of action which may be suggested by way of solution. It is manifest that no one of these courses of action carries with it the assurance of success; on the contrary, all of them leave much to be desired. As tensions mount, however, and as the time approaches when pressures will be increasingly applied in the light of such

tensions, clear thinking on the basic issues becomes of paramount importance. Only by firm adherence to principle can the United States remain faithful to its avowed purpose of assuring to the three Associated States the opportunity to develop their rich potentialities along lines freely chosen by their peoples. If, as has been emphasized, the French should relinquish full sovereign rights to the Associated States and leave Indochina, as the British have gone from Burma and the Dutch from Indonesia, this does not mean that the members of the free world should stand idly by while they are driven out by the forces of Communism. No effort, no sacrifice, would appear too great to carry the present struggle either to the point of successful conclusion or to a stage where satisfactory settlement may be possible. In the words of Secretary of State Dulles, if we wish to avoid the greater risks of tomorrow, we must be resolute today.

Philip W. Thayer, LL.B., Washington, D. C., has been dean of the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University since 1948. From 1920 to 1931 he was in the Far Eastern export-import business, and for part of this period was also research supervisor on foreign trade at the Harvard School of Business. He has been professor of international commercial law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1933-42), acting assistant chief of the Division of World Trade Intelligence in the Department of State (1941-42), special assistant to the United States Ambassador to Chile and cultural relations attaché (1942-45), and expert consultant on legal affairs to the Secretary of the Army (1948). He was editor of Southeast Asia in the Coming World (1953).

Ups and Downs in Indo-American Relations

By NORMAN D. PALMER

THE Republic of India and the United States of America are today respectively the most populous and the most powerful of the democratic states of the world. Each came into existence as a result of a long struggle against British rule. The leaders of the Indian National Congress gained encouragement and inspiration from the American example, and from the stirring words of the Declaration of Independence and other great documents of American freedom. Many Americans followed the course of the Indian independence movement with sympathetic attention, and read the writings of Tagore and Gandhi and Nehru with absorbed interest.

Until 1947, however, relations between the United States and India, on both official and unofficial levels, were for the most part remote and indirect. Since 1947 Americans and Indians have discovered each other. Unfortunately this period of discovery has been an uneasy and trying one, and Indo-American relations have been inescapably colored by the course of world events and by internal as well as external complications. During this period, for obvious reasons, the United States has been forced to concern itself with the defense of the free world in the face of real and present danger, while India has been primarily concerned with the improvement of conditions within her borders and with other grave problems of survival. Basically, because of the similarity of interests and goals, relations between the United States and India have been fairly good; but Americans and Indians alike are distressed by the many points of friction which have

arisen between their two countries, and their feelings toward each other have gone up and down like a Yo-yo since 1947.

Many times in India I was asked why Americans have suddenly taken such an interest in Indian affairs. Sometimes this question seemed to reflect suspicion of American intentions, but more often it seemed to be asked simply out of curiosity. The answer to this question is, I think, quite clear. Until 1947 India was a part of the British Empire; her foreign relations were controlled by the British government and largely by Englishmen, and the states of the world had few formal diplomatic contacts with her. Until World War II the United States was not heavily involved in Asian affairs, and her Asian interests, to the extent that they existed, were concentrated rather in the Far East than in the Indian subcontinent. World War II marked the end of the long period of European dominance of Asia; it ushered in a new and troubled era in Asia, in which the growing aspirations of countless thousands of people whose life conditions are among the worst in the world and the survival of many new independent states are threatened by pressures from without and from within and by the generally unhappy course of world events.

The war also projected the United States into a conspicuous position—one might say an embarrassingly conspicuous position—on the world's stage and saddled it with interests and responsibilities which encompass the globe. For better or for worse, the United States is involved in Asian affairs at a time when Asia is becoming an increasingly impor-

tant factor in international relations. In the new Asia, India is playing a major role. "If India fails," said Mahatma Gandhi shortly before his death, "Asia dies." The United States clearly has a vital stake in India's efforts to improve the lot of the masses of her distressed people and in her survival as a democratic state. Thus the great interest of Americans in India is a reflection of the new position of both India and the United States.

MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING

Any American who visits India is impressed on the one hand with the staggering misconceptions and distortions of America and the suspicions of American policies and intentions and on the other hand with the friendliness and good will which the Indian people show toward Americans personally and with the lively interest in the American scene. Any Indian who visits the United States can testify to the existence of the same attitudes towards his country and his fellow-countrymen. Much of the mutual misunderstanding is based on an ignorance of each other's history and values. This ignorance is understandable, if deplorable; but the time has come when India and America must try to learn more about each other. Americans have a special responsibility in this respect, for they are largely a literate people and they can no longer take refuge in the belief that what they do not know cannot hurt them. One does not have to subscribe to the "East versus West" fallacy to assert that the world looks quite different when viewed from different parts of it and through the eyes of people whose life conditions, cultural values, and experience differ greatly.

"It is probably true," stated Robert Trumbull, veteran correspondent of the *New York Times* in India, in a recent article, "that the Indians understand the United States somewhat better than

Americans understand India." In view of the vast differences in educational and material progress between the United States and India, this statement may startle many Americans, or perhaps even make them indignant. But it is indeed "probably true," and it should serve as an incentive for us to make amends as quickly as we can. We must realize at long last that the history of the world is not synonymous with the history of Western civilization; it never was, in fact, and it will become increasingly less so in the future. There are marked differences between Western civilization and Hindu civilization, as Arnold Toynbee and others have pointed out. India is the home of one of the oldest and most advanced civilizations; as a continuous civilization it dates back some 5,000 or 6,000 years. The excavations at Mohenjo-daro in Sind and at Harappa in the western Punjab have demonstrated, in the opinion of no less an authority than Sir John Marshall, that "India must henceforth be recognized, along with Persia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, as one of the most important areas where the civilizing processes were initiated and developed."¹ Well before the beginning of the Christian era India had produced great rulers, great lawgivers and statesmen, great works of art and literature, and some of the greatest of epics.

WORLD UNKNOWN

How many Americans are in any way familiar with the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*, the great Hindu classics? How many have even read the *Bhagavad Gita*, a work which has had a profound influence on Indian life and thought for many centuries? A few months ago a considerable controversy raged in some Indian newspapers over this question: Who was the greater,

¹ Quoted in Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York, 1946), p. 59.

Kālidāsa or Shakespeare? The question was obviously a silly one, and the judgment of the correspondents would in no way detract from the recognized greatness of both writers. But how many Americans could discuss such a question intelligently? In fact, how many have even heard of Kālidāsa? Yet Kālidāsa, who probably lived in the fourth century A.D., has often been called the Indian Shakespeare—or perhaps it would be just as appropriate to call Shakespeare the English Kālidāsa!

Coming to more recent times, how much do Americans know about modern India, say of the past century or so? Aside from Tagore and Gandhi and Nehru, what other Indian names are familiar to them? What do they know of Ram Mohan Roy or Vivekananda or Aurobindo or Tilak or Gokhale or Mrs. Naidu or scores of other great figures in modern Indian life? In fact, aside from Nehru and his sister, Madame Pandit, what living Indian political leaders are known to them?

The general lack of knowledge of India's history and culture is obviously a great handicap for Americans who are seeking to understand India today, and especially for those in policy-making positions who need to have a profound understanding of present conditions and trends and of the mainsprings of Indian behavior and attitudes. Another difficulty comes from the magnitude and complexity of India, and from the many facets of Indian life. As Arnold Toynbee has said: "India is a whole world in herself; she is a society of the same magnitude as our Western society." And, as has been pointed out, it is a complex and different society. "The fissures in the Indian soil," wrote E. M. Forster, "are infinite." No visitor to this bewildering country can hope to do more than gain some insights into the complex pattern of developments and attitudes which characterize the Indian

scene. Even persons who have lived in India for fifteen or twenty years or more admit that they cannot fathom many aspects of Indian life and thought. In fact, Nehru himself, who has probably seen more of his country than any other living person, is frank to confess that much of India eludes him. There are depths within depths in Indian society which make it at once intriguing and baffling.

PROBLEMS FACING INDIAN GOVERNMENT

A few months ago a well-known Indian magazine asserted that "all American reports on India, official or nonofficial, have been results either of wishful thinking or superficial observation." I believe that there is at least a measure of truth in this assertion. Most of the information we get on India is probably misleading to a certain degree, and even if it is accurate in itself it may be difficult to place it in proper perspective. Most of the reports from India are either overly optimistic or overly pessimistic. There is danger from both kinds of distortion, but I think we should beware especially of the glowing reports. Certainly it is easy to be pessimistic about India's present conditions and about her future. It is by no means certain that she can cope with her vast problems, the full dimensions of which have to be seen at first hand to be appreciated, or can survive as a democratic state. The threat of political disintegration or of a lapse into extremism of the Right or the Left is real. The political situation is confused and uncertain, and the great unanswered question of "After Nehru—who?" haunts the minds of all who are thinking of the future. Many unhealthy forces and pressures are operating in the Indian scene. Americans, I fear, do not appreciate the gravity of these forces and pressures, or how much

they circumscribe the actions of the government.

The magazine from which I have quoted holds that

The threat to democracy in India grows out of the cultural tradition and the prevailing intellectual atmosphere. . . . by and large the cultural tradition of India remains mediaeval and authoritarian. . . . we have in India a formally democratic government, but it is neither good, nor efficient, nor stable.

This magazine refers specifically to the rapid growth of unemployment, the absence of popular support for the Five Year Plan, the deterioration of the administrative machinery, corruption and inefficiency, and "the indifference of the middle class to the democratic values of life." "The siren call of Communism," it declares, "reaches the Indian masses through the educated middle class." The problem of the educated unemployed is often mentioned as one of the alarming problems in India, for a discontented and unemployed educated group is always a danger, especially so in a new and still politically unstable democratic state.

Not long ago the most important newspaper in India, which is generally a supporter or at worst a friendly critic of the government, referred to "the difficult food situation, the disquieting rise in unemployment, the soaring cost of living, the hunger for land, the failure of the Five Year Plan, the educational morass"; and it charged that instead of bending its best efforts to coping with these tremendous problems the Indian National Congress was concentrating on internal squabbles, "with the sickeningly familiar charges of nepotism, corruption, and maladministration." "In other words," stated this newspaper, "the Congress is out of touch with reality. It does not know what ails the people, what their real problems are, and how best to tackle them."

Criticisms of this sort are commonly heard in India today. One can easily paint such a gloomy picture of present-day conditions and prospects. I cite some of these charges not for the purpose of criticizing the present government of India, for I believe that on the whole it is a good government and that almost any conceivable alternative would be infinitely worse, but rather to remind you that such criticisms are commonly heard in India today and that they do raise some questions about the present situation and the future. We should ignore these danger signals and warnings at our peril.

PROGRESS IN INDIA

Fortunately there is another and brighter side to the Indian picture. Dr. Paul Appleby, an American expert who made a special study of public administration in India, declared about a year ago: "What the government is trying to do here is, I think, the most important effort in the world today." And great progress has been made. Indeed, a friendly outside observer will probably be more impressed with the record of genuine progress under adverse circumstances than he will be with the criticisms which he will hear on all sides. The partition of India, less than seven years ago, was accompanied by economic, social, and political dislocation, by riots and massacres, by one of the greatest refugee problems in this century of the homeless man. India has made great progress in dealing with the problems attending partition, although thousands of refugees still live like animals in the cities and although relations with Pakistan are still strained.

Within a few months after independence, thanks largely to the efforts of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, some five hundred Indian states were integrated into the Union of India. Less than two

and a half years after independence, India became a Republic, under a new Constitution. The work of constitution making is an epic in itself. In late 1951 and early 1952 India held the first general elections in her history, and the largest democratic elections ever held in any country. Some 106,000,000 valid votes were cast. The elections were free and passed off without violence. In a country which had never known nation-wide free elections and where more than 80 per cent of the electorate are illiterate, this was a tremendous achievement. In 1951 the Five Year Plan was launched, and it was made final in December 1952. It is now well under way, and in spite of many criticisms and a disturbing lack of popular support it is helping to transform the face of India. Unfortunately, even if its goals are realized, India will not be much better off than it was when the plan was launched, for each year nearly five million new Indians come into the world and the resources of the country do not permit of the kind of effort that is really needed.

But India is making real progress in increasing the food supply, in providing water and land to the people, in developing its mineral resources, in industrialization, in health and social welfare, and in many other ways. The community development projects and the great multipurpose river valley development projects are truly exciting experiments in India today. In spite of all the propaganda about the progress in China since the Communists gained control, it is probable that the Indian record of actual achievement is more impressive—although less well publicized. Furthermore, this progress has been made in a democratic way and has not been imposed by a ruthless totalitarian regime at great cost of human life and human freedom.

These are impressive achievements,

and they tax the resources of India to the limit; but India must make even greater strides if she is to develop the bases of a tolerable existence for the masses of her people. Even if her leaders were less addicted to their policy of "independence" or "nonalignment" and even if there were greater realism and less escapism in popular attitudes toward life in general and world affairs in particular, India still would not be able to be a bulwark of strength in any co-operative military alliance. The United States should realize that India and the other nations of the uncommitted world cannot be expected to enter into the kind of relationship for the defense of the free world which is represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or by the Rio Treaty or various bilateral security arrangements. This does not mean that these uncommitted countries are pro-Communist in orientation or are any less concerned than the United States and its "allies" in the defense of freedom. For in this respect all non-Communist nations are "allies," whether they associate themselves in formal defense arrangements or not.

INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION

A more realistic attitude for the United States to take toward a country like India was suggested some time ago by H. Stuart Hughes:

In certain border areas the United States need not require ideological uniformity or a full alliance from those nations to which it gives economic aid and which it regards as its friends. Indeed, to do so would be to undermine their value to the Western coalition. . . . Within the United Nations the existence of a loyal opposition . . . offers the only convincing answer to the allegation that that organization is nothing more than a screen for United States policy. This sort of opposition India, under Nehru's leadership, provides. If Nehru did not exist it would be necessary to in-

vent someone resembling him. Only through some such formula as his will there be even a remote chance of reconciling the leaders of Asian nationalism with the former colonial powers. To push Nehru hard, to try to force him to adhere more closely to the American line, is to invite disaster. Americans need to appreciate more fully Nehru's problems at home and the pressure he is withstanding from the more extreme anti-Westerners among his own followers. The policy he is currently pursuing is oriented just about as far West as he can safely go. If Nehru, through too close an adherence to the Western line, should succumb to his own extremists, then surely we should have lost our best hope not only for a reconciliation between Asia and the West, but also, ultimately, for the peace of the whole world.²

We show a complete misunderstanding of the Indian temperament and of present Indian foreign policy when we criticize Nehru and other leaders of the government of India for their lack of appreciation of the crisis of our time and for their refusal to make specific commitments to programs of mutual defense. The best we can hope for from India is that she will survive as a free state and will gradually gain vigor and unity so that she will be better able to cope with any emergency, from within or from without. Chester Bowles, former American ambassador to India, expressed this point of view very effectively in his inspiring book, *Ambassador's Report*, a book which every American should read. Mr. Bowles wrote:

If I were given a single wish for the future of our relationship with India and Asia, I would wish to see India and the other new nations of Asia succeed in achieving economic and political stability within the framework of freedom, regardless of what they may think of America.³

² "Containment Reconsidered," *The Nation*, December 11, 1950, pp. 564-66.

³ *Ambassador's Report* (New York, 1954), pp. 233-34.

George V. Allen, Mr. Bowles's successor as American ambassador to India, expressed a similar point of view in these words:

America's interest, in one sentence, is that India, which has achieved full sovereign status, shall retain that status completely, and that the faith which the vast majority of the Indian people have in democracy's ability to give them a better and fuller life be sustained and fortified.⁴

FLUCTUATIONS IN INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The ups and downs in Indo-American relations have been particularly marked in the past eighteen months, although I fear there have been more downs than ups. For the sad fact is that these relations have deteriorated sharply in this period. This was particularly true early in 1953, at about the time the Eisenhower administration came into power, and unhappily, after some evidences of improvement last year, the relations are now at a low ebb, due largely to the announcement of American arms aid to Pakistan.

Some of Eisenhower's statements during the presidential campaign, notably his reference to "liberation" and to "Asians fighting Asians," were widely misunderstood in India and caused real alarm. These alarms increased after the Republican victory in November 1952. Many Indians seemed to believe that Republicans were more warlike than Democrats, and they took a dim view of a professional military man in the White House. Toward the end of 1952 rumors that the United States was trying to persuade the nations of the Middle East and Pakistan to join in a Middle East Defense Organization and a very unpopular Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations

⁴ Address to the India League of America, New York, April 1, 1953.

had adverse effects on Indian attitudes toward the United States. Some of the early statements of Eisenhower and Dulles after the Republican administration assumed office on January 20, 1953, added to Indian apprehensions.

The recall of Ambassador Chester Bowles was another unpopular move. During his eighteen months in India Mr. Bowles scored a great personal and diplomatic success. At a difficult and delicate period in Indo-American relations he promoted the true national interests of his own country and contributed mightily to friendly understanding between the United States and India. He liked India, and Indians liked him. To Indians he represented the best traditions of the America they admire and respect, at a time when they sometimes wonder whether America is living up to her own best traditions. His recall was a matter which many Indians could not understand. It was useless to try to explain that when a new administration of another party comes into power in Washington, the top diplomatic representatives in most countries, especially the political appointees, are usually changed. Mr. Bowles's recall was regarded by many Indians as another evidence that the Eisenhower administration was not truly concerned with Indo-American understanding.

The reduction-in-force program of the new administration eliminated a few of the ablest members of the American mission in India, greatly lowered the morale and reduced the effectiveness of those who remained, and seriously curtailed some of the most effective programs which the United States was carrying on in India. The transfer of the technical assistance program from the Department of State to the new Foreign Operations Administration, largely for purposes of more efficient administration and co-ordination with other

foreign aid programs, seemed to confirm the suspicions of many Indians that the United States was interested in aid to underdeveloped countries solely as a part of its efforts to combat Communism and to provide for the military defense of the non-Communist world.

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Now, on top of these and many other unpopular moves, the United States has decided to give military assistance to Pakistan. While this decision can be justified on many grounds and is in keeping with the policy of the United States to help those free nations which seek American assistance in their efforts to strengthen themselves in a dangerous world, it is bitterly resented in India and has imposed new strains on Indo-American relations. Prime Minister Nehru has warned that the United States-Pakistan pact will have the opposite effect of Washington's intention and will create "a wave of uncertainty" and increase tensions between India and Pakistan. Last year Secretary Dulles declared that closer relations between India and Pakistan were a prerequisite to the strengthening of anti-Communist defenses in Asia. Now the United States has embarked on a policy which will increase the tensions between the two new nations in the Indian subcontinent and which will thereby probably weaken rather than strengthen this part of the non-Communist world.

Apparently it is hard for Americans, even those in high places of responsibility, to realize the gravity of relations between India and Pakistan or the effect of a move such as this upon those relations. Feeling on the Kashmir issue in both countries, and particularly in Pakistan, is strong and bitter; and as long as responsible political leaders as well as other molders of opinion in Pakistan continue to speak so belliger-

ently on the Kashmir issue, it will be impossible to convince Indians that substantial military aid to Pakistan does not increase the danger of military action against India, thereby forcing India in turn to divert even more of her limited resources to unproductive purposes of defense.

FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS

Fortunately not all of the developments of recent months have contributed to a worsening of Indo-American relations. Many of India's worst apprehensions of the Eisenhower administration have proved to be groundless. The President's great address of April 16, 1953, in which he expressed the genuine American interest in peace and called for steps to lessen international tensions, had a salutary effect in India. The truce in Korea gave the lie to those critics who maintained that the United States had to keep the Korean War going because it was geared to a war economy. Eisenhower's dramatic proposal to the United Nations General Assembly for an international atomic pool was hailed in India, as elsewhere, as a constructive step. The agreement of the United States to participate in the recent Berlin Conference on Germany and in the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina indicated that the American government had not closed the door to negotiation with the Soviet Union and that its policy was less inflexible than many of its critics charged.

The interest of the Republican administration in India was shown by the visit of Secretary of State Dulles and Director of Foreign Operations Stassen in May. This visit by two key figures in the new administration was greatly appreciated, and both Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen made a fine impression. Mr. Dulles' report on his trip to that part of the world showed that he had gained a greater apprecia-

tion and understanding of problems and attitudes in the countries he visited. The visit of Adlai Stevenson to India shortly after Messrs. Dulles and Stassen left was also helpful. If Indians had decided the American election, Mr. Stevenson would now be in the White House, and they were happy to welcome him as an unofficial ambassador of good will. The more recent and official visit of Vice-President Nixon also had a good effect. Mr. Nixon was roundly cheered when he told members of the Indian Parliament that when he returned to the United States he would "inform doubters in the United States that any impression that India is leaning toward Communist ideology is completely erroneous." On the occasion of Mr. Nixon's visit Prime Minister Nehru told American newspapermen that there was "no basic chasm" between India and the United States, and "no ill will by the Indian people toward the American people." These reassuring words are, I believe, far more than polite phrases or diplomatic platitudes. "They suggest that in spite of all surface differences relations between India and the United States are basically good. As Nehru told the United States Congress in 1949: 'Friendship and co-operation between our two countries are . . . natural.' This is the rock on which I think we should stand when we attempt to appraise the state of Indo-American relations."

DIFFERENCES IN WORLD POLICY

In the January 1954 issue of *Foreign Affairs* an Indian writer who signed himself simply "P" warned that "there is a growing difference between South Asian opinion and the United States in matters affecting world policy." On three issues, in particular, the differences are great and disturbing. These issues are: (1) ways to peace, (2) the seriousness and reality of the Soviet threat, and (3) policies toward Communist China.

Ways to peace

We may assume, I believe, that Americans are just as interested in peace as Indians, although many Indians do not appear to accept this assumption. But the American people cannot be blind to the facts of life in this atomic age. Reluctantly and only after sincere efforts to co-operate with the Soviet Union the United States has been forced to conclude that in this dangerous world it must keep its defenses strong and must negotiate from strength and not from weakness. It has therefore placed emphasis upon national security and collective security arrangements, of which NATO is the outstanding example. This policy is viewed with real alarm in India, and the alarm is shared to some extent at home as well as abroad. George F. Kennan, for example, in a lecture at Princeton University in late March 1954 declared that many Americans have now become "wholly absorbed with power values to a point where they were impatient of any discussion of international affairs that tried to take account of anything else—inclined to dismiss references to any other problems as frivolous and inconsequential." Yet these "other problems" are precisely those which the countries of the uncommitted world regard as paramount and pressing.

In a two-day debate on foreign affairs in the Indian House of the People on March 23 and 24 Prime Minister Nehru made two significant restatements of India's approach to world problems. He blamed both the United States and the Soviet Union for the unhappy state of international relations. "Each side," he said, "is afraid of the other. . . . Because of this fear, armament is going on in both countries. . . . If this process continues, the world is heading toward disaster." He charged that the emphasis of the United States on collective

security arrangements has created "insecurity, uncertainty, and instability" in Asia. He said that there were "two approaches to the question of war and peace": to consider war inevitable and to prepare for it; or the course he chose to follow, to consider that war "must be avoided if not at all costs, almost at all costs." India, he explained, was determined to remain aloof from power alignments and to continue in her policy of advocating "any step to avoid war." "There is no question," he declared, "of India leaning to this side or that."

The Soviet threat

It is obvious, therefore, that while India and the United States are both seeking ways to peace, their approaches to this goal differ fundamentally. Part of the difference may be explained by their varying interpretations of the Soviet threat. Most Americans, mindful of the bitter lessons of the past decade and before, do not need to be convinced that this threat is real and serious. A recent report of a special study mission of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives, which traveled some 30,000 miles to investigate the situation in the Far East, summed up the prevailing sentiment in this country in these words: "The Communist danger cannot be overestimated." Contrast this view with that voiced by "P" in his article in *Foreign Affairs*:

Why, then, this difference of approach to the external menace of Communism? Primarily, it is because India is not satisfied that there is such an external menace. . . . We may be stupid or completely blind, but where we do not see the menace, we cannot pretend to do so, merely because we are so advised by no doubt wiser people. . . . It may sound strange to American ears, but nonetheless it is a fact that the leaders of India and Burma, and perhaps of other South Asian countries (excluding Siam),

do not feel themselves threatened by Communism.

This does indeed "sound strange to American ears," and it may in fact sound strange to some Indian ears as well; but it does reflect a basically divergent appraisal of the nature of the contemporary world crisis.

Policies toward Communist China

The differences of viewpoint regarding Communist China are well known. India was one of the first non-Communist nations to recognize the new regime in China and has been the leading advocate of the admission of that regime into the United Nations. Dealing with the Central People's Government on the great issues in which that government was involved, declared Mr. Nehru on March 23, was "not a question of liking or not liking," but of "facing facts." The United States, on the other hand, has refused to recognize Red China, or to forsake the remnants of the Nationalist regime on Formosa, and it is opposed to the admission of the Central People's Government into the United Nations or any other international organization. This position was emphatically restated in late March in the report of the Congressional study mission to the Far East and again by both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles.⁵

Americans should give serious thought to the attitudes of other free peoples, but it does not necessarily follow that when they find themselves in the minority they are wrong. Possibly they exaggerate the nature and extent of the Soviet threat; misunderstand the nature of the relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union; place too much emphasis on "containment," "building situations of strength," "col-

lective security," and "mutual defense"; rely too much on their own strength; do not give sufficient consideration to the feelings and attitudes of other peoples; and so tend to exacerbate the very evils they seek to avoid. But, on the other hand, it is by no means certain that their interpretation of the Communists' motives and intentions is wrong, or that any other policies than those they have supported would secure better results. It is possible that whereas they exaggerate the nature of the Soviet threat, others may underestimate it; that whereas they tend to take too harsh a view of the Chinese Communists, others may be too lenient and in their desire to promote friendly relations with the "New China" may serve as dupes and tools of those to whom friendship as they conceive it has little meaning.

Americans have good reason to take exception to one prevalent Indian attitude. Chester Bowles, in his answers to questions by Indian journalists on the eve of his departure from India in March 1953, defined this attitude and his reaction to it:

Americans are puzzled and disturbed . . . when some Indians who are personally devoted to democratic ideals, refer to the present unfortunate world conflict as a "struggle between two power blocs, each . . . any implicit on world domination." . . . a charge of a "plague on both your houses" seems to us not only wholly unwarranted but also dangerously unrealistic.

This thesis of two power blocs, both equally bad, is a dangerous and misleading one, but it is the stock in trade of many Indian foreign policy analysts. That it is still prevalent and finds expression in high places is indicated by the following excerpts from a special dispatch to the *New York Times*, dated New Delhi, March 24, 1954:

The United States and the Soviet Union shared equally today in an assessment by

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of the blame for current world unrest. . . . Considering the expression of the Indian Parliament as a whole, the United States has come out on the short end again.

It should be pointed out that many Indians deplore this tendency to equate the United States and the Soviet Union, and to speak in terms of two "power blocs." Writing in *The Statesman* (Calcutta and New Delhi) in January 1953 in criticism of a resolution on foreign policy adopted by the Indian National Congress, Mr. A. D. Gorwala, a respected public figure in India, declared:

To talk in these circumstances as if it was a question of a dispute between similar contending parties is to be not only unrealistic but also immoral. And the immorality is emphasized when it is noticed that . . . it seems to make no difference at all that the aggressive side consists of some of the cruellest and most despotic though efficient police states the world has ever seen, while on the defending side are ranged real democracies, paying in their daily conduct, except for very occasional lapses, due respect to freedom, the rights of the individual and the rule of law. The disintegrating power of fear can seldom have seen to better effect than in this spectacle of a professed democracy equating wrong with right, tyranny with freedom.

SHARED ASPIRATIONS

We should not allow honest differences of opinion to make us forget the fundamental beliefs and aspirations which the United States and India share; nor should we forget that by giving sympathetic understanding and concrete assistance to India we are promoting our own national interests and enhancing the prospects for peace and freedom in

the world. Fortunately the leaders of the United States, after a considerable amount of blundering and hesitation, are giving signs that they have at last reached the solid ground of common interests. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Walter S. Robertson, recently stated:

I feel that nowhere more than in Asia, where so many are struggling against such heavy odds for one-hundredth part of the rewards we take for granted, will assistance from us be productive of important returns for all mankind.⁶

And in his report to the American people on June 1, 1953, after his trip to the Middle East and South Asia, Secretary Dulles said:

These peoples we visited are proud peoples, who have a great tradition and, I believe, a great future. We in the United States are better off if we respect and honor them. It profits nothing merely to be critical of others. President Eisenhower's administration plans to make friendship—not fault-finding—the basis of its foreign policy.

These statements suggest that the spokesmen of the Eisenhower administration have found the right words; now let us hope they will find the right policies. One can ask no more than that the present government of the United States will make a renewed effort to live up to its own promises and to the best traditions of the great country whose destinies it is now guiding. In these efforts, I believe, it will have the support of the American people and the appreciation of freedom-loving peoples everywhere, including the citizens of the Republic of India.

⁶ Address to the English-Speaking Union, New York, February 18, 1954.

Norman D. Palmer, Ph.D., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is professor and former chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He was visiting Fulbright professor at the University of Delhi in 1952-53. He is the author of *The Irish Land League Crisis* (1940) and coauthor of *Fundamentals of Political Science* (1952) and *International Relations* (1953). He and Mrs. Palmer have written a book based on their experiences in India, to be published in September.

⁵ For a particularly strong statement of this same position, see the article by Alfred S. Jenkins in this issue of *THE ANNALS*.

India and the United States: Democracy East and West

By GAGANVIHARI L. MEHTA

RELATIONS between different countries are of vital importance in the world today. Without a harmonious relationship not only peace but economic development is impossible. Such relations are determined by a country's conception of its own interests and its immediate and distant objectives. Until the beginning of this century, what mattered most was relationships between different countries of Europe, many of which had far-flung empires with sources of raw materials and markets abroad. The United States of America was preoccupied with its own economic development and with preventing interference and domination by European countries on the whole of this continent. It was only after the emergence of Japan that the existence of Asia came to be realized; and it was not until after the two world wars and the attainment of independence by several Asian countries that the importance of Asia as a factor in world politics began to be gradually, if somewhat reluctantly, recognized. While the problem of the relationship between the Asian continent and the United States is of vital importance in the present conditions, the maintenance of amicable relations between the United States and India is a matter of the highest significance.

TWO BIG DEMOCRACIES

America and India are both large countries, although India is only about one-third of the size of the United States; they are practically on opposite sides of the globe. Each has a large seaboard and is richly gifted by nature

—with minerals and metals and a variety of agricultural products. No doubt, India's resources have yet to be fully developed or even completely surveyed, but there is little doubt that, given a period of peace and stability and the application of co-operative endeavor, organization, and technical skill, India's economy has the capacity for immense development.

India is an ancient land with a historic tradition and a cultural heritage that go back to 3,000 years before Christ. The United States is a modern nation. And yet, in a certain sense, India is also a young country. Her political independence was achieved less than seven years ago. We observed the centenary of our railway system last year and our textile industry celebrates it this year. The steel industry in our country is less than fifty years old. But India has for centuries had domestic and cottage industries and handicrafts for which she is justly famous. Nevertheless, as a united, democratic state with a national economy in the modern sense, India is in the initial stages of development.

Incidentally, in one other sense also there is a similarity between the two countries. India, like the United States, has a conglomeration of several races and communities with different religions and creeds. But just as the United States has been welding this large concourse into a national entity, so too through the cultural unity of ages, the framework of a national Constitution, and the elements of an industrial structure, India is also a united nation today. The United States is the largest

democracy in the West (population 161,000,000) while India is the largest democracy in the East (population 360,000,000). They have different systems of representative government but the essence and the spirit are the same. Both our countries believe that governments must be based on the consent of the governed; that no man should be punished except after due process of law; that economic well-being is basic for national development and should be achieved by democratic processes. The Constitution of India has derived some of its inspiration from the Constitution of this country, including the Bill of Rights. We have a written Constitution with a federal structure of government and an independent judiciary. No doubt there are many divergences, as is only to be expected, but all I want to stress is that the basic objectives of the two Constitutions are the same. One important feature of our Constitution which has earned widespread appreciation is the absence of any discrimination against a citizen on grounds of religion, color, or caste. India is a secular state.

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

During our national movement, we derived inspiration from the early history of the American fight for independence, and we had the moral sympathy and support of many leaders of public opinion in this country. The principle of national self-determination enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson during World War I gave a stimulus to the movement for political emancipation in our country as in several other lands. During the interwar years, and particularly during the war period, the cause of Indian independence was supported by several eminent men and women in this country, including leaders in the Congress and in the administration. This co-operation has continued in the political, economic, and technical

spheres during the last seven years when a new India has been in the making.

TRADE AND MANUFACTURE

There has been growing economic interdependence between the two countries. Before World War II, the total trade between the United States and India was valued at about 200 million dollars per annum; it now runs to roughly 700 million dollars. Previously, India's trade with the United States was about 7 per cent of its total foreign trade; it is now nearly 20 per cent even after excluding import of foodstuffs. There have been significant increases in exports from the United States to India in cotton, machinery, oil and oil products, vehicles, and minerals such as sulphur. On the other hand, India supplies nearly 40 per cent of the manganese used by the steel industry in this country, 80 per cent of high-grade mica and a considerable quantity of castor oil (important for lubrication of high-speed aircraft), ilmenite (used for manufacture of special quality pigments and paints), cyanite (for making refractories), chromite, short-staple cotton, burlap, and shellac, as well as tea. It is of interest to know that both in 1952 and in 1953 the United States imported sufficient manganese from India to make 54,000,000 tons of steel, about half the total annual production in this country.

Again, during the last five years about twenty-five American firms have started or expanded manufacturing activities in India. These include the American Cyanamid Company, the Union Carbide and Carbon Company, the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Remington Typewriter Company, Otis Elevator Company, and other chemical and engineering concerns. Some of them are participating financially in Indian enterprises, others are collaborating technically, while still others are operating

entirely on their own with American capital and management. The total American capital invested in India is about 100 million dollars. The most important example of this economic co-operation is the establishment of two oil refineries by the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and the California Texas Oil Company, the former in Bombay and the latter in an eastern part of India, Vizagapatam, on the Bay of Bengal. As soon as these oil refineries are ready, along with another being built by the Burmah Oil Company of the United Kingdom, India will produce practically all the petroleum products that it requires. Although crude oil will be imported for the present, it is possible that in future such oil might be obtained in India itself as a result of drilling operations to be undertaken by the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company in collaboration with the government of India. This is probably the first instance in which an oil company of this importance has entered into a direct partnership with a foreign government. Merchant ships of both India and the United States are engaged in carrying important and often strategic goods between the two countries.

TECHNICAL AID

During the last four years, India has also been an active participant in schemes of technical co-operation and has received technical assistance from the specialized agencies of the United Nations and particularly from this country. Under the Point Four program, 101 Indian technicians have received training in this country and 105 American experts have gone over to India to assist in programs of agricultural extension, irrigation, health, education, fisheries, and so forth. In 1951, when India was faced by a serious drought, the United States gave a loan of two million

tons of wheat of an aggregate value of 190 million dollars. I might add that India has already paid the full 7 million dollars of interest due on this loan by the end of 1953. Money realized by the sale of this wheat in India has been utilized for development projects, particularly for agriculture and irrigation. Let me also add that the amount of interest realized by the United States is going to be spent for educational purposes in India.

Moreover, because the United States has been conscious of our community of interests and aware of the vital importance of India's economic development, an Indo-American Technical Co-operation Agreement was made in 1952, under which a total of 160 million dollars has been allocated, principally for community development projects. Important private organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have also been extending material and technical help. Such assistance is a truer expression of co-operation between the United States and India than pious resolutions of mutual good will and treaties of "eternal friendship." I must point out, however, that the foreign aid we receive, although invaluable, is marginal and supplements our own efforts. Development programs are formulated by Indians themselves in consultation and co-operation with experts and technicians from abroad, where necessary; and the main financial burden of operating them is on the people themselves. Foreign aid can be acceptable to India if it is given with the object of furthering her economic development and not as an instrument of cold war. In order to produce the best results, it is important that economic aid and technical advice be given without creating a sense of inferiority in the recipient country or engendering any suspicions about the motives and objectives of such programs.

DIFFERING POLICIES

It will, therefore, be evident that there has been close relationship and growing co-operation in various spheres between India and the United States. And yet, if we read newspaper headlines and follow radio commentaries and listen to stray conversations, we hear only of differences and misunderstanding between our two countries; the inference would be that we are drifting apart. Why is this so? We must face this question frankly but calmly, without passion or prejudice. I do not expect to carry full conviction to you in what I am going to say, but it is enough if you appreciate to some extent at any rate India's point of view. Understanding of a different viewpoint does not necessarily imply agreement. What we want is more light and less heat.

I have already referred to the large area of agreement and understanding between the two countries. Our differences have arisen mainly in the international sphere and in respect of the choice of a foreign policy that would be most appropriate for the promotion of peace, particularly in Asia and Africa. These differences arise not because of any clash of interests or any struggle for leadership. Indeed, India does not aspire to any leadership even in Asia, nor has she any economic and territorial ambitions in any part of the world; the policies of the United States also are not designed with a view to building up an empire. Nor do our differences arise from any divergence of "ideological" approach. We believe in democracy both in spirit and as a technique for political and economic progress. We also agree that we should seek to prevent the disaster of a third world war and that all efforts should be directed to this end both in the United Nations and outside. But it is in the manner in which we should ensure peace and

reduce tensions that there is a divergence.

Asian aspirations

Indians are of the view that there is inadequate recognition of the importance of Asia in the counsels of nations and we are distressed when we see attempts being made to settle Asian problems by ignoring the wishes and feelings of Asian countries. Asian countries no longer want to be the instruments for the ends of powerful nations. No lasting solution can be reached, whether it be in the Middle East or the Far East, if it does not take fully into account the aspirations and sentiments of the people of these lands. India desires nothing more than to bring to the consciousness of the Western world the new forces which are pulsating in Asia and Africa and which can be ignored only at peril to international peace and stability. This is no exclusive cult nor any trans-continental doctrine of "Asia for the Asians"; it is only a desire to develop our own systems and economies without domination from outside. We want to be friends, not satellites. Independent countries must be accepted as such, not as "camp followers" of countries with immense military and economic power. Enlightened opinion in this country recognizes this feeling and stresses the fact that the United States wants allies and partners. However, the attitude and policies of important Western countries are not always formulated in the spirit of what is called the "free world." Important Asian countries are often ignored in the United Nations and at conferences convened to discuss problems in Asia. Decisions so reached can only be regarded as impositions, which go against all the canons of freedom.

Colonialism

Closely related to this is the attitude to be adopted towards colonialism and

racial discrimination. If colonialism is supported, perhaps for ulterior reasons, and undemocratic and unpopular regimes are bolstered up, how can the moral support of the peoples of such countries be elicited and their energies mobilized for democratic progress? Because of our struggle for freedom, people in our country have an instinctive sympathy with similar struggles in other countries, particularly in Asia and Africa. No structure for world peace can be built on the denial of freedom to countries and large masses of people. It is not without significance that countries like India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which achieved independence after World War II, have successfully resisted subversive activities within their borders and are building up their own economies, while those countries which have been denied freedom are in a state of chaos and fall an easy prey to extreme doctrines and movements.

Who is the enemy?

The differences in the policies of the United States and India arise mainly from the fact that whereas to the United States the fight against Communism is the supreme issue to which all other problems should be subordinated, India holds that the real enemies of mankind are economic and social evils such as poverty and hunger and disease, racial discrimination, and domination and exploitation of weaker peoples by the powerful nations of the world. These problems would confront us even if the teachings of Karl Marx had not influenced Lenin and even though Mao Tse-tung had not been the ruler of China. As Mr. Lester B. Pearson, the distinguished Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, has observed, "The conflict [between forces of Communist imperialism and free democracy] may not seem so simple to people who are

preoccupied with the struggle for self-government and economic progress, millions of whom live under the recurring threat of starvation and who may be pardoned for thinking that hunger and servitude are worse enemies than Marxism." India's government and leaders, therefore, give the highest priority to "freedom from want." Mr. Chester Bowles, the former United States Ambassador to India, mentions in his *Ambassador's Report* that Sir Gerald Temple, the British general in charge of the war against guerillas in Malaya, told him: "Give me a hundred more divisions and I still couldn't destroy the Communists without the necessary reforms. My job is only 10 per cent military. The remaining 90 per cent is political and economic."

In other words, the theory and practice of Communism have to be studied as a historical process rather than as a malignant germ to be merely exterminated. So long as countries are not aggressive and have no extraterritorial ambitions or militant programs under ideological masks, no harm is done by peaceful coexistence and competition between different political and democratic systems. We believe, therefore, that the sounder method of ensuring stability and progress in the East is to give the common man the hope of a better and a fuller life, rather than to strengthen military defenses and put up bases which may only succeed in increasing tensions or even creating dissensions between countries in that area. In this connection, I cannot do better than quote what a distinguished American, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, said the other day in the last of his Godkin lectures at Harvard University. After pointing out that much of the world in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East was "trying to telescope centuries into decades" in the "drive" for industrial and technological development, he empha-

sized that a policy based on anti-Communism and military potency was not in the spirit of this drive and "will win few hearts." The challenge, he said, was "for us to identify ourselves with this social and human revolution, to encourage, aid, and inspire the aspirations of half of mankind for a better life, to guide these aspirations into paths that lead to freedom."

Military thinking

In this imperfect world of ours no country can afford to neglect its armed defenses, but it is well to remember that modern weapons have become so destructive that war has now ceased to be, if ever it was in the past, a solution of the differences and dissensions of nations. Two world wars have shown that war is no instrument for the attainment of social and economic objectives or even for the annihilation of systems which are regarded as evil. But now, the way to war is the surest path to disaster. It is, therefore, of vital importance that while military preparations are made, as a guarantee of self-preservation, everything humanly possible be done to ensure that such preparations do not produce the opposite effect by bringing us nearer to war. In other words, the climate of peace should be cultivated and extended by every means possible. The consequences of military thinking dominating political considerations are almost as disastrous today as those of neglecting essential military defense. As Mr. John Foster Dulles, the distinguished Secretary of State of this country, has observed in his book *War or Peace*, "Military needs are important, and a strong military establishment is a necessity. But we shall fail in our search for peace, security, and justice unless our policies, in reality and also in appearance, give priority to the hopes and aspirations for peace of the peoples of the world."

LACK OF UNDERSTANDING

The worst impediment in the way of full understanding and co-operation between our two countries is, I repeat, not any clash of interests or any differences in ideologies, not any subtleties of Oriental psychology or wiles of Occidental diplomacy, but plain lack of understanding. Indeed, during my stay in this country, extending over a year and a half, I have found that the American and Indian characters are similar in some ways. We are both informal, friendly, and hospitable—and also apt to be sensitive. But there are sharp differences too. The American mind is essentially an engineering mind: it is positive, constructive, and believes in continuous experiment, innovation, and action. The Indian mind is more contemplative: it is reflective, somewhat cautious, slow in tempo, believing in eternity rather than in a few seconds! There are radical differences in economic conditions between our two countries, and we have divergent traditions and customs. Both our peoples would benefit if each could imbibe some of the traits of the other. In India, there is great admiration for the high standards of life in America and there is eagerness to learn the techniques which have made this remarkable progress possible. In this task of improving the lot of our peoples we do not and shall not shut out light from other lands or reject the helping hand of a friend.

CONFIDENCE A SLOW GROWTH

Relationship between nations is a sensitive plant, never more so than today when there is frequently a tendency to treat any difference of opinion as almost an act of defiance. Mutual confidence is a slow growth, particularly between a country which has just achieved independence and has, therefore, par-

donable sensitiveness and a country which is the most powerful in the world today through its immense financial and technical resources and which feels aggrieved that its unparalleled generosity in assisting the rehabilitation of countries from the ravages of war and in the development of economies of poorer lands is not adequately appreciated. What will maintain and promote good relations between our two countries is not gifts of money nor aid of arms but

a sense of equality of status and a sharing of common objectives. It is only natural that Indo-American relations should be subject to all the strains and stresses which characterize relations between two free, independent, and friendly countries. But so long as the spirit of idealism which inspired your founding fathers and your great leaders guide you and so long as we are true to our cultural heritage and our faith in democratic values, we have nothing to fear.

His Excellency Gaganvihari L. Mehta, LL.D., Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of India to the United States. He was assistant editor of the Bombay Chronicle (1923-25) and manager of the Calcutta office of the Scindia Steam Navigation Ltd. (1928-47). Following India's independence he has been at various times president of the Tariff Board, member of the National Planning Commission, chairman of the Tariff Commission, president of the Indian Chamber of Commerce and of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce, member of the Constituent Assembly, member of the Indian delegation to the International Conference on Trade and Employment, Geneva, and on the Governing Body of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. He is the author of The Conscience of a Nation (1932), From Wrong Angles (1935), and Per-versities (1942).

American Policy Toward India and the Security of South Asia

By JOHN D. JERNEGAN

THE subject of the relations between the United States and India is of deep interest to many of us and of great importance to us all. It is, of course, a subject of special concern to the Department of State.

First let me say that whenever troubled relations between ourselves and the Indians exist, this is no cause of concern to the Communists. There is little they would like better than to see friction between the two countries develop. They would like to see India and America alienated completely from each other. They are trying to accomplish just that right now. The Kremlin today is using all the propaganda devices in its possession to make the Indians feel that we are their enemies; that we represent a new imperialism; that we intend to dominate their economy; that we are bent on involving the whole world, including India, in a new world war; that what we hope to do and see in the area of the Middle East and South Asia is carefully calculated to go against Indian national interests.

These themes, let us admit, have not been selected at random. They have been chosen with the utmost care by the Soviets because they believe that these are the lines which are most likely to be believed in India.

What the Communists do and say, however, is not likely to have any very serious effect on United States-Indian relations; their strength in India is not sufficiently great. But we must frankly admit that today American relations with India are not so completely cordial as we should like to see them. There

are various reasons for this. Partly it is a case of mutual misunderstanding arising out of the differing backgrounds of the two nations. Partly, however, our differences arise out of ordinary disagreements over the best ways to handle specific problems. We have, for example, disagreed over the attitude which should be adopted toward Communist China. Likewise, it took us a long time to reconcile our positions in regard to the Korean truce negotiations. Nor have we seen eye to eye over action to be taken in the United Nations regarding French North Africa and other questions involving dependent areas. I could name other instances of disagreement. The list might seem formidable and discouraging, but I hasten to emphasize that a similar list could be drawn up for almost any other major country in the world. Even with our best friends, and sometimes especially with our best friends, we are bound to have arguments.

MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

Many of our disagreements with India are now past history and, I hope, in the process of being forgotten. There is, however, one current problem which deserves special attention. It is the most recent to arise and a main source of concern in our mutual relations at the present moment. That is the American decision to extend military aid to Pakistan.

We made that decision for reasons well known to Americans, but sometimes misunderstood abroad.

This country and many others be-

lieve that our way of life is critically endangered by a predatory power which recognizes that the greatest threat to its existence is the very presence of democracy. Soviet Communism seeks to destroy us all, and we have ample reason to believe that domination of the Indian subcontinent is a part of the Soviet objective. It bears repeating that the actions of the Soviet Union prove beyond a doubt that it will use every means at its disposal, including war, to enslave us. Unless adequate measures are taken by the free nations acting together, it will succeed.

As the Kremlin's intentions became clear, the United States, as you know, in co-operation with other free nations, took far-reaching steps to meet the threat. These security measures included the North Atlantic Treaty and comprehensive arrangements in the Pacific area.

It has become apparent, however, that a power vacuum exists in the Middle East and South Asia. The countries of this region, largely lacking the resources necessary for a strong military posture, are also torn by other strains and stresses which sap their strength. Thus, we have the conflict between the Arab states and Israel, the Egyptian dispute with the United Kingdom over the Suez region, the tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In addition, in many countries of the Middle East the economic and political situations have resulted in acute internal instability.

At the same time, this wide area remains of immense importance to us. It contains nearly a quarter of the world's population. It has tremendous resources, including oil, many of which are as yet untapped. It is a vital, strategic land, sea, and air route between East and West.

If this part of the world is to live in freedom, if it is to retain the capacity to develop its economy to its own best

interests, and if its political institutions are to mature within an independent framework, we believe that it must have the ability to defend itself against aggression. The threat of aggression is ever present.

You will recall that early attempts to create a sound military system in the area failed. Both the idea of a Middle East command and a Middle East defense organization came to nothing for one good reason: both were born of initiative supplied by outside powers. As Secretary Dulles said when he came back from his trip to the Middle East a year ago, no collective security system can be imposed from without. "It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common danger and common destiny."

Until very recently, time stood still as far as defense of the Middle East was concerned, but various hopeful signs have begun to show.

First, the government of Pakistan asked the United States for grant military aid. This was a request which had to be taken seriously. The government and people of Pakistan are strongly anti-Communist. They have indicated their desire to stand and be counted with us in efforts to forestall the Kremlin's imperialism. In World War II, the history of the fighting forces from what is now Pakistan was a glorious one, as was that of the troops from what is now India.

India's fear

We were well aware, however, that the Indian government would dislike United States military aid to Pakistan. Its objections were carefully weighed. On balance, after considering them, it seemed clear to us that the consequences of this action feared by India would not develop. Indeed, we believe that as time passes India herself will see that

her apprehensions on the subject were not justified.

During the lengthy debate in India while this matter was being considered by us, it became apparent that one motivation for India's opposition stemmed from fear that United States arms aid to Pakistan would be used against India. Therefore, when the decision was made by President Eisenhower to give military aid to Pakistan, he made it absolutely clear in his public announcement and in his letter on the subject to Prime Minister Nehru that the arms we would give could in no way be used in aggression without his taking appropriate action immediately, in accordance with his constitutional authority. The government of Pakistan has indicated to us that it accepts fully the definitive provisions limiting the end use of the aid.

Furthermore, we believe that if the military strength of the subcontinent is increased, it will serve to deter aggression from the outside.

A mind turned from war

Now on this point we differ with the Indian government. It has expressed the opinion that by this act the cold war is brought directly into the subcontinent. Very recently, in addressing the Indian House of the People, Prime Minister Nehru said:

There are two approaches to this question of war and peace. One is the approach of the feeling that war is almost inevitable and therefore one must be prepared for war. The other is that war must be avoided at all costs, if not at all costs, at almost all costs. The two approaches differ as everybody will see. Of course, nobody wants war—or very few people. And yet many people may well say, "We do not want war but how are you going to prevent it? War must come and therefore we must do this and do that."

That is a legitimate approach. And yet if you lay stress on war coming you lose the battle for peace, and war is likely to

come because your minds have succumbed to the prospect of war coming in.

That is the danger of the situation: not that people want war, but many people seem to succumb to the idea of the inevitability of war.

Again, in the past, Prime Minister Nehru has put forward the idea of a "no war" area, of which India and presumably the neighboring countries, and perhaps others, would be a part.

I believe the reasons behind this attitude are many, and it is not possible for me at least to say which carry the most weight. They seem to include the following: (1) A feeling that India can best tackle her pressing internal problems if she avoids becoming involved in the "cold war" and that her influence can most effectively be exerted if she is not committed to either side. (2) A conviction that she only stands to lose by putting herself at least potentially in a position which might offend either the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, particularly the latter, and, at the same time, a reluctance to disassociate herself from the West. (3) A deep-seated fear and hatred of colonialism and imperialism and an identification of these with the Western powers, plus an awareness of the implications of Communist totalitarianism. (4) A feeling that moral weight exerted against war will present it from coming.

There are no doubt other motivations, and it may appear that contradictions exist in those I have just listed, but it seems to me that these, in varying degrees of importance, may help to explain attitudes and expressions which appear puzzling to many of us.

U. S. belief in collective security

We in the United States believe the cold war is already on the subcontinent, as it is in every other place in the world. It is there not through any-

thing we or the other free nations have done, but through the actions and intentions of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the other satellites.

One cannot lightly dismiss the lessons of aggression in Poland or Czechoslovakia or Korea. It could happen in the Indian subcontinent. If it does how will India defend herself—alone, or in the strong company of others who believe her independence should be guarded?

Collective security is the keystone of our foreign policy. In that concept, we think, lies the only hope of preventing another Poland or Czechoslovakia or Korea.

While the United States had under consideration the question of military aid to Pakistan, Pakistan and Turkey had been holding talks which resulted on February 19, 1954, in an announcement that they intended "to study methods of achieving closer, friendly collaboration in the political, economic, and cultural spheres as well as of strengthening peace and security in their own interest as also in that of all peace-loving nations." An agreement on these lines was signed at Karachi on April 2. The United States warmly welcomed this development, and its decision to extend military aid to Pakistan was made within its context.

Now, these matters have not made relations between the United States and India easy. On the problems of security, it may not seem that the two countries are likely to reach agreement in the near future. We believe we are right, and I am sure that the Indian government believes it is right. Indian leaders are as entitled to their opinions as we are to ours, and it is not profitable for either of us to try to impose our viewpoint on the other. But I do not concur with those who say that friendship is being destroyed between us. India and the United States are two

great democracies. We have more in common than we have in disagreement.

INDIA AFTER PARTITION

Following the partition of the subcontinent, India was faced with tremendous internal and external problems. There was the problem of unifying the nation into a single political entity from more than five hundred separate states. There was the problem of an already over-taxed economy being thrown further off balance by the partition itself. There was the problem of internal Communist activity. And finally, there was the problem of India's relations with her newly created neighbor, Pakistan.

While the new India moved quickly and effectively to meet some of its most pressing internal problems, the challenges were obviously too great to be overcome immediately. Further, there were and are forces trying to move against what the present government of India considers its peoples' best interests.

The Communists, for example, both those in the Kremlin and those in India taking their orders from the Kremlin, do not want a unified India. In India, as in other countries where they seek to gain power, they strive for disorder, disunity, and discontent.

We find, for instance, that the Communists consistently take the part of those who would weaken the power of the central government. They continually berate the concept of India's Five Year Plan. They belabor the slowness with which its benefits come. They, as happened in our own country during the depression, use the issue of unemployment to advance their aims.

However, Prime Minister Nehru's government has moved steadily forward to the solution of its problems. He himself has taken a strong anti-Communist position. It is clear that he recognizes

the threat the Communists are to his country. At one time, he had about 7,000 of them in jail.

The general elections of 1951-52 which were held to form the government were a model of democratic procedure. About 106,000,000 people voted. Unlike the Soviet system, the Indian system gave them a wide range of parties and candidates to choose from.

Unification of the country, which many described as an impossible task, was accomplished swiftly and efficiently.

Faced with a fantastically low living standard, a desperate agricultural situation, the Indian government has taken bold steps to increase food production, to stimulate industry, and to increase India's foreign trade.

While progress has been made, there is a great distance left to travel. If the present economic program is successful, all well and good. If, however, the disruptive forces within the country gain strength and totalitarian efforts meet with increasing local successes, the countries of the free world will have cause for alarm.

U. S. SUPPORT OF INDIA

This possibility brings me to the heart of our feelings toward India. Regardless of our differences on foreign policy and security matters, what the United States is most interested in is a free, independent India following the route of her own choosing. It would be a major disaster if the freedom of India's government and people were taken away—a disaster from which the rest of the free world might never recover.

On our part, there are no hidden reservations or limitations in our relationship with India. We stand ready, as in the past, to help India where we can and in ways that she may desire. We shall do everything in our power to ensure that our relations produce nothing but friendship and mutual benefit.

We are confident that this is India's desire as well.

You will remember that the United States has long given aid and encouragement to India. In 1941, well before Indian independence, the two countries exchanged representatives. In 1942, Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's personal representative with the rank of ambassador, participated in the unsuccessful efforts to work out agreement between the British and Indians on India's political future. Subsequently, the United States made known to the British government its views concerning its support of steps which might be taken toward fulfillment of Indian nationalist aspirations. At the same time, we made great efforts through the exchange of information, exchange of persons, and other formulas to ensure that America and our way of life be known to the people of India.

We welcomed wholeheartedly the measures taken toward real independence and the establishment in 1946 of an interim government and a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution. In October 1946 the two nations exchanged ambassadors.

Following partition in August 1947, and as India began to exercise the rights and responsibilities of independence, the United States increasingly welcomed her active role in world affairs. We have been, for instance, happy to see the active part she has played in the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies—although we have not at all times agreed with her position.

Economic relations

We have, further, taken a strong interest in the tremendous economic problems which face India. The average life expectancy is thirty-two years. About

75,000,000 each year suffer the debilitating and often fatal effects of malaria. India has a population density of 308 per square mile, compared to 54 in the United States, and her population is increasing at the rate of 5,000,000 a year. Her crop yields are desperately low. Famine is an ever present danger.

To help avert a desperate grain shortage in 1951, the United States Congress loaned India \$190,000,000 to purchase 2,000,000 tons of wheat. Since 1951, our programs of technical assistance and special economic aid have been directed to supplementing the extraordinary steps being taken by the Indian government through its Five Year Plan to raise the living standards of its people. In 1952, our programs amounted to almost \$53,000,000, in 1953 to \$44,300,000, and in the present fiscal year to \$89,000,000. Altogether, in grants and loans, the United States government has made about \$390,000,000 available to India. We expect to continue this assistance. Under it, the United States is providing technical advice to India's Community Development Program, which is reaching 14,000,000 people in 22,000 villages. Indian leaders and technicians numbering in the hundreds have been brought to the United States for specialized training. Supplies and equipment are being provided farmers who cannot afford to purchase them. In addition, our funds are being used for direct assistance in economic development, industrial as well as agricultural.

Private American foundations are also playing an important part in these efforts. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations are actively involved in helping improve living standards.

Thus, many, many Americans today are working daily side by side with Indians in the fundamental tasks of improving the lives of India's millions.

American private investment in India

is substantial and contributes to a sounder Indian economy. Within the past year, for instance, we have seen a multimillion dollar oil refinery started in Bombay by an American company. India, in turn, has much to offer us economically. From India, we purchase large amounts of important industrial materials, including mica and manganese.

CULTURAL EXCHANGES

Outside the economic field, we find the ties of friendship being strengthened in other ways. A host of India's students and teachers and many of ours are continually being exchanged. These boys and girls and men and women, through the experience of daily living with their hosts, contribute greatly to good will.

India has a great cultural and spiritual heritage on which we can draw. As our two countries know each other better we can benefit more and more in nonmaterial as well as material ways. It has become a cliché to say that the West can learn as much from the East as the East from the West, but it is worth repeating nevertheless.

AREAS OF AGREEMENT

But what gives us the most hope for the future of our relations with India is the fact that there is no basic difference inherent in our respective philosophies of government. India has given the spirit of democracy a new strength. She has given, in the life of Gandhi, a new rallying point to all those who believe in the dignity of each individual. Both nations believe in freedom, in the individual, in his rights as an individual, in the commitment of democratic government to protect those rights. Our concept of democracy is the same. The necessity for protecting that democracy

is mutually recognized. The way is open to friendly co-operation in efforts to build a better, more peaceful world.

Looking at the broad picture of our relations, there is much more to cheer than to induce despair. So long as we do not succumb to the doubtful luxury of carping and exasperation, the future is a bright one. The chief task is to build upon those areas in which India and the United States are in agreement and to strengthen them. We do not expect to agree on every issue. There are bound to be differences of opinion between two democratic states, but the

basic principles on which we agree remain.

Let me repeat what I have already said: What the government of the United States wants above all is a free, independent, and democratic India. If it is an India which also agrees with the American outlook on international affairs, so much the better. We shall certainly work hard to reconcile our respective points of view, but it is the freedom, the independence, and the democracy of India that we consider essential and that we shall strive to support to the best of our ability.

John D. Jernegan, Washington, D. C., is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. He has been a career Foreign Service officer since 1936, when he was appointed vice consul at Mexico City, serving also in Barcelona and Tehran, and as consul general in Tunis. During a tour of duty in the Department of State (1946-50), he was assistant chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, chief of the division, and director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs. He attended the Moscow Conferences of Foreign Ministers of 1943 and 1945.

The Quest for Security in the Middle East*

By HALFORD L. HOSKINS

AMONG the more notable developments in international affairs during recent years are two which, taken together, give considerable character to the contemporary international scene. One is the evolution of what may be called a "new" Middle East. The other is the rapid growth of interest in the countries comprising this area on the part of the United States. It will appear, as we look into these developments, that American concern for this area is quite as new as any of the features which are characteristic of the new Middle East.

If we apply the expression "Middle East" to the lands adjacent to the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea and extending thence to the borders of the subcontinent of India, we are referring, from the point of view of human culture, to the oldest countries in the world. Yet in several ways they are now to be counted among the youngest. Their newness is not to be measured by the elapsed time since they achieved independent status, even though this interval has been brief in every instance. It is rather to be gauged by the degree of maturity exhibited by their political and social institutions; by the type of judgment displayed by their political leaders in formulating and in executing public policy; by the extent to which genuine national patriotism has succeeded in uniting the various elements of the populations and in creating modern, viable nations. In terms such as

these, the Middle East is young indeed, and for the most part still conspicuously immature.

THE "NEW" MIDDLE EAST

Evidences of newness abound on almost every hand. They appear in Egypt, where a monarchy nearly a century and a half old, without external support, could not survive a bloodless military *Putsch*, the authors of which yet govern *sans* constitution, popular mandate, or even mutual confidence. Similar evidences are to be observed in Syria, where for some years one military clique has succeeded another at frequent intervals without material advantage to the country. The royal regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia have still to find practicable ways in which to apply great petroleum resources to the social and economic improvement of their peoples. Even in Kuwait, where a paternalistic sheik aims at the uplift of his indigent subjects, only a species of parasitism has been achieved. It is not yet clear what degree of sagacity the Knesset of Israel can bring to bear with sufficient promptitude on a series of problems whose solution is vital to that country's survival. Indeed, in the entire Middle East area only Turkey has reached the stage of political maturity requisite for stability in dealing with a difficult economic situation at home and with pressures from abroad due to its exposed position adjacent to the Iron Curtain.

Thus, except for a hard outer shell in Turkey, the countries of the Middle East must be described as essentially soft in a world—and especially in a strategic area—where softness is a con-

stant temptation to great powers which regard aggression as a fitting instrument of state policy. "Softness" in the Middle East is the result of several contributing causes. Some of them are products of the physical environment. Not too much in terms of economic strength, political development, and material progress can be expected of a country much of whose area is inescapably arid, as in the case of Syria, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Iran, or mountainous, as in Lebanon or Yemen. Sudden wealth in the form of oil cannot quickly atone for the lack of other natural resources, such as arable soil, adequate rainfall, or deposits of the hard minerals of industry. Not a little of the underdeveloped character of parts of the Middle East is the result of centuries of Ottoman rule—a regime in which individual enterprise was regarded as subversive. To these factors might be added the influences of climate, age-old poverty, fatalistic philosophy, and even the external environment. For considering the position of the Middle East with reference to great power relationships, it is clear that the peoples of the area cannot hope to be left to develop their institutional life unhampered—or perhaps unhelped—by one or more of the powers whose interests are global in scope.

BARRICADE OR BARRIER

It is the position occupied by the countries of the Middle East quite as much as any intrinsic need for technical assistance or economic aid that accounts for the present interest of the United States in these underdeveloped nations. In a world where two power alignments of states are essentially at war, the Middle East forms either a barricade or a barrier to both power groups. In so far as the area serves to prevent access by the Soviet Union to the Mediterranean and the Persian

Gulf—that is, to the sea lanes reaching to South Asia, southern Europe, and the greater part of the African continent—it figures as a barricade in defense plans of the free world. To the extent that it inhibits—or in time of war may inhibit—uninterrupted access of the Western powers to the southern shores of Asia, the eastern shores of Africa, and the British Commonwealth countries in Australasia, the Middle East is a potential barrier. It may well be observed, too, that the maintenance of dependable lines of free world communications through this area is not less essential in an air age than in one confined to surface travel. Even if Middle East refueling bases were not required, permission to cross national boundaries still is requisite. Few features of a strategic concept for the free world are more fundamental than maintaining a balance of influence throughout the Middle East.

OIL

The securing of lines of commercial intercourse with parts of the Middle East is not less consequential than the maintenance of other lines of communications, because of the part which petroleum plays in contemporary international relations. It is conceivable that in time to come atomic forces may in part supersede those now derived from petroleum. Meanwhile the industrial scene is dominated by petroleum derivatives. We represent an oil culture. Oil in the contemporary world is power. In a state of world affairs where war on a restricted scale now is in progress and one of unlimited scope might occur at any moment, oil as the first among the sinews of war possesses a significance beyond measurement in ordinary terms. Any optimistic outlook for the free world, in fact, rests on the availability to the United States, as the leader of the free world, of adequate supplies of

* In considerable measure this article is based on parts of a book, now in press, entitled, *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics*, to be published by The Macmillan Company.

petroleum at all times and under any circumstances.

It is the greatest of good fortune, therefore, that more than one-third of the world's oil resources, according to current estimates, lie within the Western Hemisphere and presumably—although not altogether certainly—will be constantly available to this country in time of peace or war. The satisfaction to which this circumstance might give rise, however, is gravely compromised by other considerations. One lies in the fact that even now, in time of relative peace and with no unusual handicaps on oil production, the United States consumes approximately two-thirds of all the oil used anywhere in the world. Undoubtedly in time of all-out war it would require more.

Another major consideration consists in the oil needs of Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which the United States was one of the principal architects, was created on the assumption that the defense of Western Europe is vital to the survival of the free world in the struggle with Communist totalitarianism. In this struggle European industry is counted on heavily to supplement that of the United States and Canada. But Europe does not rank high among the oil-producing areas and must be supplied mainly from extra-European sources. Inasmuch as the necessary quantities of oil cannot be drawn from Western Hemisphere sources without overtaxing those producing fields, the responsibility for European supply since 1948 has fallen principally on the sparsely populated oil-producing countries of the Middle East, whose minimal local oil needs and slight industrial development have represented complementary rather than competing demands.

In the uninterrupted continuation of the westward flow of Middle East oil the United States thus has an extremely im-

portant interest. This can be summed up in syllogistic form. The United States bears the principal responsibility for the security of the free world. The Atlantic Pact nations of Western Europe constitute the first line of defense of the free world. They can serve as a bulwark of defense only so long as they are well supplied with the sinews of industrial and military strength, one of the most essential of these being oil products. Oil in sufficient quantity for these needs, under conditions presently existing in the world oil industry, can be had only from the Middle East. Thus, in the interest of free institutions and possibly even its own survival, the United States faces the problem of establishing and maintaining in the Middle East conditions under which the defense of the area can be assured within reason and the flow of petroleum and petroleum products made secure under any easily imaginable circumstances.

U. S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST

It cannot be said that the United States has displayed a great deal either of ambition or of aptitude for the task of making sure of the westward orientation of the nations of the Middle East. Until World War II brought this country into some contact with Iran, Egypt, and North Africa, Americans generally knew and cared little about the area. The inevitable consequence was, on the one hand, an almost complete absence of interest and, on the other, a severe dearth of personnel fitted by training and experience to deal in a statesman-like manner with Middle East questions as they might arise in the course of foreign relations. Inasmuch as the Middle East had occupied an important place in British foreign policy for at least a century and a half, there was much reluctance on the part of American officialdom, even after the close of World War II, to assume any direct re-

sponsibilities in this British sphere of interest.

Only as the decline of British imperial power and the importance to free world security of the Middle East came to be realized did the United States arrive at a more or less reluctant willingness to assume a measure of responsibility in the area. This was first manifested in relieving Britain of the burden of extending aid to hard-pressed Greece and Turkey. While this action proved to be of inestimable utility at a moment of crisis, it was clearly only a stopgap measure at a single crucial point in a contest that already had grown to global proportions. Free world security could on no reasonable grounds be regarded as having been attained by the setting up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the defense of Europe or by assistance to Greece and Turkey. Security being indivisible, it would manifestly be of similar consequence to bring the Arab states, Iran, and Israel into a mutual defense system or at least to make sure of a preferential leaning toward the West in countries so strategically located.

For a task of this nature, as has been observed, the United States was poorly prepared. The measure of its unpreparedness is to be seen in the belief, prevalent but a few years ago and not by any means wholly dissipated today, that a spirit of mutual trust and interdependence could be induced, in countries so lacking as those of the Middle East in the elements of Western material culture, by means of the generous application of the Point Four concept. In keeping with this idea, programs of technical and financial assistance were developed and in due course were put into effect on a contractual basis in most of the Middle East countries. It is not requisite here to undertake an appraisal of the Point Four scheme as a means of improving conditions of life

in so-called underdeveloped countries. In some parts of the Middle East the program undoubtedly has conferred benefits of one kind or another. It is essential to note, however, that in view of many of the circumstances prevailing in the area at the period when Point Four was launched, it could not justifiably have been expected to produce the attitudes anticipated in what we may call the political sphere within the critical period of a few years. A brief review of the main factors which have exercised a circumscribing influence on efforts to bring all of the Middle East within the range of a free world security system will help to explain the lack of important progress thus far.

BRITISH INTERESTS

In taking over certain of the responsibilities formerly regarded as lying within the British range of interest, the United States found itself heir to situations resulting from the long-time activities of Great Britain in the area. For many years Britain was the champion of the Ottoman Turkish regime. Parts of the Ottoman Empire—the sections now comprising Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel—for a varying number of years following World War I had been under direct British occupational or mandate control. British relations with Iran and with the princely houses of Arabia amounted to vested interests, some of which have not yet been surrendered. During the latter part of World War II Syria and Lebanon were beholden to Great Britain, having been freed from the Vichy French by British military action. Great Britain has been the internationally recognized protector of the Suez Canal, the principal member of the condominium for the Sudan, the liberator and sponsor of Libya. It still enjoys special privileges, including military base rights, by virtue of treaties with Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Libya.

At the same time, Great Britain was one of the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and on this and other grounds was an indispensable partner in any scheme of defense of the free world. For these reasons, as well as for the sake of some measure of diplomatic collaboration from experienced hands, the United States, in establishing its own relations with Middle East governments, has been under the practical necessity of respecting the position still maintained by Britain in any part of the Middle East area. The inevitable consequence has been the transfer to the United States of a large portion of the suspicion and dislike that was attached to Great Britain as a "colonial" power by peoples still very conscious of their recent emancipation from British leading strings and hypersensitive, as are all young states, to any traces of influence of an imperialistic or restrictive nature. Thus the United States has been unable entirely to avoid involvement in some aspects of the British-Egyptian controversy over methods of closing out the Sudanese condominium and of making arrangements for Sudanese statehood. Similarly, this country has found it necessary to occupy the position of an interested party in the dispute resulting from Great Britain's refusal to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone, which it has occupied under rights acquired by treaty in 1936, on demand by Egypt. The acquisition by the United States of a major air base near Tripoli during the period of British military control of Libya also has been viewed askance in some of the Arab states.

Whereas the problems arising from association with Great Britain were inherent in any direct approach by the United States to the states of the Middle East and could not have been avoided altogether, others, perhaps quite avoidable, have sprung from United States behavior with reference to certain

other situations and developments within the area. The part played by the United States government at the inception of the Zionist state of Israel, in the heart of the Arab world, is an instance particularly in point.

ISRAEL

In Palestine, Jews, Arabs, and miscellaneous Christian elements had lived together in comparative amity for many centuries under the various regimes that successively were ascendant in the lands east of the Mediterranean. The rise of serious internal discord in this Holy Land, ironically enough, followed the first stages in political emancipation from the rule of the Ottoman Turks. Under British administration, after World War I, it was the fate of both Jews and Arabs in Palestine to find themselves segments of two much greater groups already politically conscious of their religious and ethnic inheritances and imbued with nationalistic urges. Zionism, on the one hand, and pan-Arabism, on the other, inspired disorders within Palestine which came to assume international dimensions. The events of World War II, which created the need for the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of European Jewish refugees and further contributed to the rise of independent Arab states in the Middle East, rendered it essential, no doubt, that Palestine should be partitioned in some fashion into Jewish and Arab segments. It was one of the great misfortunes of the contemporary world, however, that this could not have been accomplished by the British mandatory regime or by the United Nations in a peaceful and orderly manner. The instant recognition de facto by the President of the United States of the state of Israel proclaimed by Zionist leaders upon the voluntary termination of the British mandate on May 15, 1948, the defensive strength subsequently mani-

festated by Israeli forces in the Arab war already in progress, and the annexation by Transjordan of the remainder of Arab Palestine brought an end to the issue of partition. At the same time these developments gave a large measure of fixity to one of the most bitter of all international feuds—kept alive by the plight of more than 800,000 homeless, stateless Arab refugees driven from their former homes in Palestine, and marked by frequent instances of border violence and by a close Arab boycott of everything pertaining to Israel.

In this extremely unfortunate situation the United States on its own account is deeply involved and committed. In an over-all sense, it is involved as the power most responsible for the security of the free world. But in the Arab-Israel controversy, which has a direct bearing on that security, it is committed as a partisan not only by sponsorship of Israel at the time of its inception but also by extensive financial support thereafter, without which the Zionist state could not possibly have continued to survive. Consequently, with respect to the building up in the Middle East of a security system related to that which now applies to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, the United States is compelled to proceed under a major handicap.

OTHER DIFFICULTIES

The Israel-Arab imbroglio is by no means the only serious obstacle to the building up of a security system in the Middle East beyond the confines of Turkey. Numerous other influences have contributed to the growth of an unpromising situation in the area. These include attitudes toward the West engendered by the grafting of modern nationalist sentiment on the ancient trunk of Islam. They spring from memories of earlier forms of European exploitation. In some measure they result from

envy of the advantages derived by Western countries from the utilization of Middle East oil resources. They stem, in part, from the countenance given by the United States and other members of the NATO group to France, for the sake of strategic air bases in North Africa, in its harsh efforts to restrain the nationalist aspirations of the Arabic populations in Tunis and Morocco. All of these and other difficulties less fundamental in character add up to the fact that most of the Middle East outside of Turkey cannot presently be counted upon to co-operate actively with the security system projected by the leading Atlantic Pact nations. Whether or in what way these handicaps can be overcome at all is a moot question.

INEPT DIPLOMACY

The elements touched upon as components in this unpromising situation are serious enough, but all too frequently they have been aggravated by inept diplomacy, the usual accompaniment of confused policy or no firm policy at all. It is not quite true, as critics occasionally have suggested, that the United States, influenced by but often disinclined to be guided by British policy, has had none of its own applicable to the Middle East. From the beginning of American interest in Middle East oil in the 1920's, if not earlier, there was something of an embryonic policy relating to the area. This waxed and waned in succeeding years according to the vagaries of political administrations at home and the incidence of crises abroad. After World War II there came a relatively rapid expansion of interest. From aiming broadly at the support of economic interests in the area, United States policy came to embrace political objectives, such as keeping a watchful eye on the activities of Communist agents, encouraging the strengthening of local governmental regimes, giving counte-

nance to Zionist aims in Palestine, and, latterly, inaugurating aid programs not altogether innocent of political motives. Unfortunately, these aims have not always been consistent with one another and hence have not been parts of a whole. Indeed, down to the present, there has been no clear evidence that each of the American aims in the Middle East has entered as an integral part into basic United States foreign policy.

ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY

In recent years, Great Britain has been in no position to make up for whatever deficiencies there may have been in American foreign policy. With the loss of control over the Indian sub-continent and the relinquishing of one position of vantage after another in the Middle East, coupled with serious economic problems at home and culminating in the surrender of a large measure of initiative to the United States, British policy in the Middle East has been halting and unsure. While British and American interests in the area now are fundamentally much alike, there has been considerable divergence in the methods chosen by the two powers for serving these interests. Absence on a number of occasions of a solid, united front has tended to undermine the really constructive programs jointly or severally undertaken in the area and to lower the confidence of Middle East political leaders in the wisdom and foresight of Western statesmanship. The lack of well-integrated allied policy—policy that does not appear to have arrived at a definite decision as to the course to be pursued should the presently uncommitted Middle East states refuse, at any stage in a defense emergency, to cooperate with the Atlantic Pact nations—goes far toward accounting for security problems in the Middle East area.

There is some evidence as time passes of an increasing measure of Anglo-

American agreement on Middle East questions. As far as it goes, this is an excellent augury, for the Arab-Iranian states are not as yet definitely lost to the West. Temporizing cannot be continued indefinitely, however, without great risk of the dissipation of Western influence beyond recovery. Since neither Great Britain nor the United States is in a position to "go it alone," joint policy decisions of a consistent and enduring nature are called for and are not the less needed because they must take into account the diverse interests of other governments outside of the Middle East. But if time for decision still remains, what kind of decision is called for? What course is there but to continue to temporize—to hope that the "soft" nations of the Middle East will recognize their exposed position in time and that, in the interest of self-preservation, they will wish to have the United States or perchance Great Britain serve as their champion?

THE PRESENT TASK

It can only be answered that hope is a poor policy, or no policy at all, when time may be running out and when even the providing of economic and technical aid and conditional promises for the supplying of arms and armaments have failed to make partnership attractive. Possibly some formula has been overlooked that could win over the Arab nations, in particular, to the point of willing co-operation with the West. Thus far, search for that formula, because of the haphazard nature of the search, has been largely in vain. Obviously any attempt to make headway through the avenue of power prestige only undermines belief in the sincerity of any forms of aid supplied, whereas zealous efforts to build up friendly relations through forms of economic and social service or willingness to withdraw from positions of military strength only

give the character of bluff to spasmodic demonstrations of power. Attempts to combine the two naturally savor of hypocrisy. So it is clear that those in whose hands lies the responsibility for the shaping of foreign policy face an unenviable task in the translation of long-range security calculations into policy for the Middle East. Any departure from more or less makeshift procedures requires decision in principle; decision in keeping with foreign policy as a whole; decision acceptable not only to the electorate at home but also to allies abroad.

Problems encountered in the contemporary Middle East thus constitute a challenge proportionate to the relationship of that area with its resources to the requirements for world security. That this fact is coming to be appreciated in the United States at last is suggested by a statement in the half-yearly report of President Eisenhower to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program under date of June 30, 1953. It said:

From the standpoint of defensive strength in the area of the Near East as a whole, the Mutual Security Program has achieved substantial, if partial, success. The substantial success lies in the greatly strengthened posture of Greece and Turkey. . . . The success is only partial because, although the area is still free of actual Soviet occupation, it cannot by any means be considered safe for the free world.

While the President's report was instinct with faith that the continuation of a program of good works and avoidance of any unwanted interference in Middle East situations, "so filled with high emotion and incendiary nationalism," would be likely to establish stronger ties with the free world, the absence of any specific allusion to that possibility might suggest a growing measure of uncertainty as to the outcome.

POWER POTENTIALS

While they are wary of the ways in which it may be applied, the peoples of the Middle East are extremely sensitive to the power factor in the outer world. They are not unique in this respect: power and its potential application invariably provide a basis of regard among nations when vital interests are at stake, but nowhere does this apply more illustratively than in the Middle East. The retreat of Great Britain from one position and another under nationalist pressures, the decline of enthusiasm for a common front among some of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the degree of apprehension displayed by the United States at the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, all have contributed to a strong belief that the West has no monopoly in power. Since Middle East attitudes reflect not only current estimates of power potentials but quite as much the readiness to employ these potentials, the emphasis placed by the NATO powers in the past on purely defensive arrangements has tended to dim the Arab view of schemes proposed for a Middle East defense organization. Conceivably the "New Look" in United States military policy will modify this attitude in the Middle East.

Thus far, in undertaking to establish situations of strength in the Middle East, neither the United States nor Great Britain nor the two of them together with France, Greece, and Turkey and the African and Eastern Commonwealth nations have been prepared to move sufficiently from strength. Whatever may be the power potential of the United States and its NATO allies and associates in and beyond the Mediterranean, it cannot take the place of integrated, constructive, and consistent policy with respect to the Middle East. Even under the best of circumstances

the allies will be hard put to maintain a substantial margin of favor and influence in the militarily "soft" yet strategically vital states of the area. The Middle East is so situated relative to the principal habitable parts of the world and bears such an important relationship to the balance of power among nations through its resources in petroleum that inevitably there will continue to be keen competition among rival power blocs for priority of influence in its constituent countries. In view of the fundamental needs and deficiencies of these countries, such competition almost certainly will continue to breed confusion

and hesitation among the peoples of the area. Considering their long experience with the methods employed by great powers bent on consolidating their positions and advancing their national interests, there is little occasion for wonder that most of the states in this group, skeptical as to offers of friendship and protection and uncertain as to where the greater danger lies, prefer at the present juncture to seek refuge in neutralism. In seeking to provide for its own security as well as that of the rest of the free world, the United States thus is confronted with a challenge of a major order.

Halford L. Hoskins, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., has been senior specialist in international relations in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress since 1949. He has taught history at Trinity College (now Duke University) and Tufts College, was dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1933-44) and director of the School of Advanced International Studies (1944-49), which he helped to organize, and during the war was consultant in the Department of State on matters relating to the Middle East. Recent works among his extensive writings are The Atlantic Pact (1949) and Middle East Oil in U. S. Foreign Policy (1950).



The Arab Commonwealth

By ABDUL MONEM RIFA'I

I SHOULD like, first of all, to set down here my deep gratitude and sincere appreciation for the letters that reach my office from American groups and individuals expressing their real interest in Arab views. Some write to me saying: "We are constantly hearing anti-Arab views, publicity, and propaganda, in the press, on radio and television, in the movies and at clubs and theaters, but the Arab voice is silent. You people seem to feel that as your cause is just and right, it needs no expression." As to this particular point, might I say parenthetically, "Yes, we still believe that right is its own defense." Actually there is no better mode of expression than to let the facts speak for themselves, especially when the press and the available publicity channels are reluctant to publish what these good Americans seek. Facts are the indisputable, concrete evidence of what is happening and what has happened in recent years in the Arab world, and these factual events form the very basis on which I am building my article. This article is not written by a professor or even by a student, but by a man who has witnessed facts and tries to describe them as they are.

However, an unrestricted discussion of the Arab countries or the Middle East, covering the various aspects of current life there, would greatly exceed the space allotted me in this volume. It may be advisable, rather, to present the major events in that part of the world and note their general indications and main features, and then to comment on the situation as a whole, a situation which is drawing the attention of the entire world. I shall naturally omit the

long history of the Middle East with all its national developments and political movements, with all its rises and falls, with its huge background and its treasures. My intention is to concentrate on a new Middle East and on the main factors in its recent formation. Unfortunately for my speech and unfortunately for the present outlook in the Middle East, the situation is dark and gloomy. I should, in fact, prefer to write about the charm of the Middle East, the tranquillity of its life, the beauty of its nature, the purity of its sentiments, the nobility of its traditions, and the idealism of its morals and ethics. I would rather write of these things, of their importance and their effect upon civilization and humanity; or of Middle Eastern arts and their influence; or even of the economic possibilities and the opportunities for social reforms; but I am faced with pressing, bitter events that shift the direction of my thoughts. Therefore, let us come out of the bright American atmosphere, at least for thirty minutes, and live in the present atmosphere of the Middle East.

Developments in the new Middle East are characterized by several striking features.

AWAKENING NATIONALISM

First is the dominant will to attain freedom. The people of the Middle East are descendants of nations and races whose great empires and wide civilizations flourished throughout the world. They have great reservoirs of national pride and self-respect. Freedom to them is a fundamental principle of their life.

I still recall May of the year 1945,

when I was in Damascus, one of the oldest cities in the world, a city that has witnessed a long chain of conquests and glories. I still recall the seething masses of people, young and old, men and women, rushing from place to place; in revolt now against foreign colonial authorities and now against their own government, struggling desperately to attain their full freedom. The halls of the capital of the glorious Omayyad Caliphate echoed with the vehement voices of the crowds shouting for independence and liberty.

I was frequently reminded of that scene of Damascus in one of its awakenings during the last three years which I spent in Iran. There again I realized how deeply nationalism was entrenched in the people and how sincere and serious they are about it. There again I saw tens of thousands of people streaming through the streets and squares of Tehran calling for the realization of their national aspirations. That genuine desire for national sovereignty is dominant all over the Middle East, vivid and impressive wherever you go.

In Egypt, we all know how determined the Egyptians are to end the military occupation of the Suez Canal Zone and how the twenty-two million Egyptians are united in this national aim.

In Tunisia and Morocco, we are aware of the struggle for national freedom against the restraint of imperialism. I still remember on my visit to Tunis in 1947 how a man took me by the arm and said, "Brother, since you are visiting our country, do not forget to visit the tomb of our young national poet." I went to the tomb and to the humble little house in which the twenty-four-year-old Tunisian poet had lived, and I started reading, with great admiration, his excellent Arabic poems—poems that are memorized by the new Tunisian generation. It might be interesting to American scholars of political science to

read one of these poems, translated from Arabic:

Oh my people!

I wish I were a forester to fell the trees
And leave the roots to perish in the sun.
I wish I were a flood to bare the graves
And clear them of their tenants one by one.
I wish I were a storm that I could roll—
And rage aloud the tempest in my soul.

Oh my people!

I will take me to the forest's solitude
And pass my days in desolate despair.
I'll rid your very image from my mind
And in forgetfulness I'll live and perish there.

I shall forget—and lose as much of you as
I am able;
You don't deserve to taste my wine or even
share my table.

Oh my people!

You are weak—asleep—you dwell in darkness,
Somnambulant you move not toward the light.

Therefore I leave to sing my songs
To birds that understand my plight.
For singing birds know better the words of
Freedom's story,
And winging free they realize—awakening
is glory.

THE ARAB NATION

The second significant feature in the Middle East is the tendency towards unity—unity among the Arab countries in particular and closer co-operation among the Middle Eastern countries in general.

The Arabs are in effect one nation, and unity among them is natural. For that unity, as well as for liberty, they rose up in 1916, and since then events have made them realize more and more the significance of their unity. Most of their states are, at present, members of the Arab League, an organization bound by a pact designed to develop further unities among its members. They are also associated in a collective security pact.

might contribute substantially to international peace and stability.

PALESTINE

It is impossible to speak of the Arab countries in particular or the Middle East in general without mentioning the tragic problem of Palestine. The influence of this problem on the attitude of the Arab countries has a major effect on the stability of the Middle East. For us, it is a drastic fact that the Arabs of Palestine were driven out of the homeland in which they had lived continuously for fifteen hundred years. Recollections of violence and brutality rankle. The presence in neighboring Arab countries of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees leading a wretched existence at an almost subhuman level is a constant irritant and focus of resentment. Furthermore, the Arab world believes with strong evidence that Israel is planning further expansion and is making military preparation to this end. The Palestine problem, therefore, should be solved on the basis of equity and justice for the purpose of attaining security and peace in the Middle East.

U. S. POLICY

These are the real factors in the development of the Middle East, and it is not possible to make an accurate appraisal of the situation in the Middle East without fully understanding them. They are, to be sure, generally well known by all students of international relations, but the role they play has often been distorted or misinterpreted. An interested group in America with substantial control over much of its information media has been successful in molding the views on the Middle East of a considerable portion of the American public, and has affected the formulation of government policy. What has been frustrating to most of the people of the Middle East is the striking ab-

The Syrian Constitution states in its first article that Syria is an Arab state and that its people are a part of the Arab nation. The Jordanian Constitution states also in its first article that the people of Jordan are a part of the Arab nation. Every now and then we hear appeals from Arab governments and leaders for an Arab federation.

As there are social, political, and national motives toward unity within the Arab countries, similar factors motivate the Middle Eastern countries to strengthen co-operation and friendship among themselves. The countries in the Middle East, existing in one geographical zone which extends from the heart of Asia along the shores of Africa to the Atlantic Ocean, react uniformly to whatever fortunes and misfortunes may befall any one of them. I recall the huge and impressive demonstrations of the Pakistanis in Karachi in 1951, lasting several days, as they reacted sympathetically to the struggle that was taking place in Morocco. The countries of the Middle East form, as I see it, one social unit, developed, so to speak, into a "Middle Easternism" or even a "Middle Eastern nationalism," if the scholars of political science accept such a term! The solidarity of that area appears in endeavors to establish various forms of co-operation: a Moslem League, an Islamic High Governmental Meeting, an Islamic National Conference, an Inter-Islamic Economic Conference, a Middle Eastern Pact, or an Arab-Asiatic bloc.

This vast region, with its natural resources, strategic position, geographical association, and with all the other political, social, cultural, religious, and historical factors that unite its people, is bound to form sooner or later the third great political entity in the world, which will contribute more and more to the welfare of mankind and the progress of humanity. In fact, such a development

sence, in America's Middle East policy, of its traditionally high principles with regard to the Arab national case, those principles which made America famous all over the globe and which are the basis of its international relations. It is essential that in order to succeed in building strong ties of friendship with the people of the Middle East the same lofty principles should be applied with regard to their problems. Unfortunately, however, the solution of the major problem, that of Palestine, is being directly hampered by United States aid to Israel, which increases the tension and complicates the just solu-

tion of this problem. However, no attitude shall be decisive in determining the dynamic growth and future development of the Middle East except that of the Middle East itself. The Arab countries with their fifty million Arabs, their extensive area, their substantial natural resources, will continue to progress and prosper, in spite of attempted disparagement.

In view of all these facts, it is in the interest of the United States of America to reconsider in part its Middle East policy, for the mutual advantage of the American people and the people of the countries of the Middle East.

His Excellency Abdul Monem Rifa'i, Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States. Prior to his present appointment he was for three years Minister in Iran and Pakistan. He earlier served as Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Chief Secretary of the Jordan government, and Acting Chief Secretary to the late King Abdullah.

The United States in the Changing Middle East

By N. SAIFPOUR FATEMI

ROUGHLY, the region of the Middle and Near East stretches from the western border of Egypt to the western border of India and from the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea on the north to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean in the south. This large and important area is today very vital to the defense of the free world. Its importance must be considered from three aspects.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

The Middle East is a corridor between serfdom and freedom. It is also a bridge between three continents and has been through the ages a springboard for conquerors moving from west to east or coming from the east to conquest in the west. Its strategic position was as important in the time of Alexander the Great as during World War II. Throughout history, control of the Middle East has been the aim of practically every great empire. The area is a barometer of dynamic world forces. It was Peter the Great who believed that anyone who ruled the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea would rule India and Europe.

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century this region has been between the devil and the deep blue sea. British, French, and Russians plagued it all through the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Since the end of the war, the United States, in order to stop Russian aggression, has become the champion of the independence of the Middle Eastern countries. She has established air bases in North Africa, in Turkey, in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein. She has sent military mis-

sions, arms, and munition to several of the governments of that region.

In August 1951, President Eisenhower told the Senate's Armed Services Committee:

Turkey is only part of the great Middle Eastern problem—we should try to bring in the Arab world on our side. As far as the sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no more strategically important area in the world than the Middle East. This area is tremendously important in terms of what it could contribute for our whole effort. We should use our resources, our power, our organizational ability and above all, our leadership—to get some kind of organization that would rally all of them to go in with us.¹

ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE

Since 1908, when for the first time oil was discovered in Masjid-i-Sulaiman, in Iran, the British, Germans, French, Americans, and Russians have tried their best to obtain oil concessions in different parts of the Middle East. It is believed that its potential oil reserve is 80 billion barrels, 63 per cent of the world's known petroleum resources. The oil industry of one country, Iran, is as large as the entire estimated reserves, production, and refinery capacity of Russia and her satellites.²

The oil fields in that area produce enormously and at low cost. The wells drilled forty years ago in Iran are still able to produce at a rate of 8,000 barrels per well a day. In Iran eighty wells in 1950 produced 30,000,000 tons of

¹ *New York Times*, August 8, 1951.

² Mohammed Nemazee and S. Nakasian, *The Oil Forum*, March 1952, p. 93.

oil. In Iraq the average per well a day is estimated at 8,500 barrels and in Saudi Arabia at 12,000 barrels. It is interesting to compare this with the 11 barrels per well a day in the United States and 210 in Venezuela. It cost the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company less than \$0.15 to produce a barrel of crude oil, against \$0.70 in Venezuela and \$1.70 in the United States.

All these wells of the wealth in the Middle East, are owned by five American companies—Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil Corporation, Standard Oil of California, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, the Texas Company; two British companies—the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Royal-Shell Company (there is also some Dutch interest in this company); and one French company. These eight companies, which enjoy a monopoly of production, refining, transportation, and distribution, send every day about 2,000,000 barrels of oil to markets all over the world. In terms of dollars the income from the oil in that area is well above 1,500 million dollars.

PEOPLE

Last and most important of all is the human interest. In this area from North Africa to the Indian border we have nearly 180,000,000 people. It has been called by Arnold Toynbee the heartland of Islamic civilization and its events reverberate from the rock of Gibraltar to the jungles of India, the steppes of Central Asia, and even the isolated plantations of Java and Sumatra.

U. S. INFLUENCES

Americans first came to this area in the middle of the nineteenth century, as educators, doctors, nurses, businessmen, and preachers of the gospel of truth and freedom. They helped the people and encouraged them in their fight

against foreign exploiters and native despots, in their struggles against poverty, ignorance, disease, and tyranny. During the Iranian revolution of 1905-9, several young American educators fought on the side of the revolutionists and one of them gave his life for the freedom of the Iranians.

The American University of Beirut, Robert College in Istanbul, the American University at Cairo, the American Colleges in Tehran and Baghdad, dozens of high schools, and many hospitals, clinics, and libraries throughout the area are monuments to the lofty ideals of American humanitarianism.

In 1910 for the first time the Iranians turned to the United States for financial advice. The next year President Taft sent W. Morgan Shuster and five other American experts to Tehran to help the Iranians put their house in order. They accomplished such an excellent job that both the British and Russians were alarmed; they considered the work of the Shuster Mission harmful to the interests of their empires in Iran and, as a result, forced the mission out of Iran. On his return Shuster wrote his great book, *The Strangling of Persia*.

Then came Woodrow Wilson and his "Fourteen Points." He was called by the people of Eastern Europe and the Middle East "the Messiah of the West." His promises of self-determination for the colonial countries, of sovereignty, independence, democracy, and an end of the era of power politics, gave new life to an old world. His sincerity, honesty of purpose, and championship of the cause of oppressed nations undermined European imperialism and turned the tables on Communism. He strengthened nationalism and told the people of the Middle East that national sovereignty and independence, not Communism, would be the decisive factor. He condemned both European and Red imperialism and instructed his Minister

in Tehran to tell the people of Iran that he was as much against the Anglo-Persian agreement as he was against the Russian invasion of the northern provinces. To him foreign domination and imperialism were intolerable. He could compromise neither with the British nor with the Communist exploitation and domination. This made him a savior in the eyes of many Iranians, Egyptians, Iraqis, and Syrians who were fighting for their freedom.

With the end of the Wilson era and the abandonment of the League of Nations by the United States, the Middle East was forgotten by the American people. Apart from Christian missionaries, a small group of businessmen, and a few oil companies, the people of the United States regarded the Middle East as a land of antiquities, of the Arabian Nights, of strange and backward people.

AFTER PEARL HARBOR

Then came Pearl Harbor. With the Japanese attack and Hitler's declaration of war against the United States, the Middle East became a vital area to America. Thousands of soldiers, technicians, pilots, and diplomats moved in. A Persian Gulf Command was established with headquarters at Khorramshahr and Tehran. At one time there were more than 70,000 American soldiers in Iran. By means of Iranian roads and railways, the Americans sent more than 6,000,000 tons of lend-lease goods to Russia. It was this help which saved Russia. During the Tehran Conference Stalin told Roosevelt, "If it were not for your help I do not know where we should have been by now."

Incidentally, rumors in Tehran were to the effect that in one of these meetings when President Roosevelt told Stalin that he could not send more lend-lease goods to Russia and that already he was under fire of some willful

Republican senators, Stalin asked him how it was possible to be in power for ten years and yet have some Republicans in circulation. He was much astonished that they were not all liquidated.

Roosevelt's visit to the Middle East was a great experience for him. He could not conceive that people in a potentially rich region could be living in such abject poverty. He instructed General Patrick Hurley, his special envoy to Iran, to study the country's prob-~~lem~~ and report directly to the White House. In compliance with the President's instructions General Hurley prepared a comprehensive plan for economic and financial aid to Iran. He told the President how for the first time the resources of Iran could be developed for the benefit of the people of that country. He added that Iran had been exploited to such an extent that even the lend-lease goods coming from the United States had been sold to the Iranians by the English company, "United Kingdom Corporation," which "was keeping the money." Hurley asked the President for an independent American foreign policy in Iran. He believed that if Iran's two neighbors left her alone she could be encouraged to develop a "pattern of self-government and free enterprise."

Roosevelt replied to General Hurley:

I am thrilled with the idea of using our efforts in Iran as example of what can be done by an unselfish American policy. If we can get the right kind of American experts who will remain loyal to their ideals I feel certain that our policy of aiding Iran will succeed.

You are right that the distribution of lend-lease supplies throughout the Middle East should be taken over by our own people and I have let the Secretary of State know my views in this regard.³

³ N. Saifpour Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran* (New York: Whittier Books, Inc., 1954), p. 210.

Subsequently there arrived in Iran from the United States a number of economic advisers, army officers to train the Iranian army and gendarmerie, and a few agricultural and health experts.

THE RUSSIANS IN IRAN

As long as the Western Allies were involved in the war against Germany and Italy they tolerated and even backed the highhanded Russian policy in Iran. With the end of the war the rift between the free nations and their strange bedfellow, Communist Russia, became clear. In Iran the gap became very wide, and it was there that the American "tough policy" towards Russia originated. When the Russians in 1945 set up the puppet government of Azerbaijan the American government protested, and at the Moscow Conference, Secretary Byrnes told Stalin that he was "seriously disturbed" at the prospect that the issue of the Russian evacuation of Iran and the separatist movement in Azerbaijan would be raised at the first meeting of the United Nations. He added that it was

exceedingly important that the great nations keep their pledges to the smaller powers. If Iran raised the issue at London it would be unfortunate. . . because, under the facts as we knew them and in view of our solemn pledge, we would greatly regret having to oppose the Soviet Union in the very first meeting of the United Nations and I hoped, therefore, that we could take action at Moscow that would forestall this possibility.⁴

Despite this threat and the complaint of Iran to the Security Council, the Russians kept their troops in Iran after the deadline provided in the Tripartite Pact. Following the withdrawal of the British and American troops the Russians sent some new troops to Iran and even

⁴ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 119-20.

threatened occupation of the capital and overthrow of the government. All the pleas and protests of Iran and of the British and Americans were ignored, and the Soviet government made clear that it was not going to leave Iran alone.

By March 15, 1946, Washington, London, and Tehran were very much worried. No one could fathom the mystery of Russian intentions. No one could understand why the Russians were applying such pressure against Iran while the two main problems, the evacuation of Russian troops and the fate of the Azerbaijan government, remained unsolved. The great question everywhere was, What can the United Nations do to solve the Iranian problem?

There was no answer to this question even in Washington. The State Department, frightened by the turn of events in Iran, had instructed the Tehran Embassy to be ready to leave Tehran for the southern part of the country at a moment's notice. There were rumors that the government had decided to transfer the capital to Isfahan. In London the British government saw no solution to the problem.

The Russian conduct in Iran and Eastern Europe, at this time, convinced President Truman that the schism between Russia and the West was not bridgeable and that the United States could not compromise the principles for which she had sacrificed hundreds of thousands of her citizens. Therefore on March 21 he sent an ultimatum to Stalin, asking him to withdraw his troops from Iran or the "United States would put some more people in there."⁵

The Russian reaction to President Truman's ultimatum was prompt. At a time when many people expected the occupation of Tehran by the Russian troops, the Soviet government an-

⁵ Fatemi, *op. cit.* *supra* n. 3, p. 235.

nounced that Iran would be completely evacuated within six weeks.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLICY

Then in 1947 came the Truman Doctrine concerning Greece and Turkey. The changes resulting from World War II and the support given by the United States encouraged the nations of the Middle East to revolt against Britain and France. Syria and Lebanon received their independence. The British were thrown out of Palestine. Iran, Iraq, and Egypt asked for the revision of their concessions and treaties with the British. Unfortunately, British concessions as usual were too little and too late. England did not understand the seriousness of the nationalist movement in the Middle East. She did not fathom the consequences of Iran's victory over Russia, the Truman Doctrine, the events in Palestine, the loss of India and Burma, and the effects of Point Four on the exploited and impoverished people of that area. Here for the first time a great power announced to the millions of poor people in Asia that she was prepared to help them without expecting anything in return. So far the people of the Middle East had experienced exploitation, concessions, domination of their countries by foreign loans and military pressures. After a hundred years of foreign exploitation the average income of the area is \$75 per capita per annum, and in many countries 60 per cent of the people are illiterate. Point Four to these people is a continuation of missionary work with government support.

Britain did very little to readjust her policy in the postwar period. She did not heed the warnings and the advice of the Americans. The Iranians nationalized the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the Egyptians pressed hard for the evacuation of the Canal Zone. The good offices of

the United States failed to dam the flood of nationalism and to bring about a solution of Iranian or Egyptian problems. It was from here on that the United States government was caught in the Middle Eastern dilemma. On the one hand the people of the Middle East blamed her for failing to help them against Britain and on the other the British censured American diplomats for interference in their area of influences.

The area is undergoing fundamental and rapid changes. It wants absolute freedom from the British economic and political domination, but the United States, which at one stage encouraged them to defy and resist Russian aggression and Communist imperialism, now is advising them to wait and not to upset the status quo, because any radical foreign or domestic change might play into the hands of the Communists, who are the immediate enemy. To the Middle East American foreign policy at this point looks like schizophrenia. The situation is well illustrated by the story of an Irish Municipal Council which voted three resolutions at one meeting.

They were: (1) Because the old jail is inadequate and collapsing, the jail should be torn down and rebuilt. (2) For the purpose of economy, the old materials in the jail should be used in the rebuilding. (3) The prisoners should be housed in the old jail till the new one is constructed. This is an exact description of what is happening in the Middle East.⁶

It looks as if the prisoners would have to stay in the old jail for the time being.

TODAY'S PROBLEMS

The United States today faces five vital problems in the Middle East: (1) the revolt of the people of North Africa

⁶ Edwin M. Right, *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism*, edited by G. Grove Haines (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 306.

against French colonialism; (2) the Anglo-Egyptian dispute; (3) the Arab-Israeli conflict; (4) the Anglo-Iranian dispute; (5) the poverty and backwardness of the area.

I shall not here elaborate on these problems or pretend that I have a solution to all these troubles, some of which have plagued the life of the people for fifty years. But before closing, I should like to make a few general remarks.

Most countries in Asia and Africa are going through two revolutions: one political and the other social and economic. The political revolution is against foreign domination, the social revolution is against interwoven poverty, disease, ignorance, and a corrupt ruling class. In the political revolution, nationalism, not Communism, is the decisive issue. Even the Communist groups in the area have to work under the guise of nationalism; otherwise nobody would listen to them.

The free world cannot be safe while vast reservoirs of poverty and colonial exploitation persist in Asia and Africa. For her own sake, just as much for the sake of those continents, the United States must find ways of solving the problems which threaten the peace and prosperity of the whole world. The old imperialism is certainly on its way out, and a new world quite different from that of the old is in process of being born. The revolutions, violence, pains, and pangs are indications of this new birth.

A CHALLENGE TO U. S.

The people of Asia and Africa expect understanding, help, and fair treatment from the United States and the Western European powers; reform, social justice, and consideration from their own ruling class. All Asia and Africa need a land program that calls for the breakup of feudal estates and their sale to the peasants, along the

lines of a plan developed by the Shah of Iran. The rich people of these countries must be taxed and their capital used for the development of their countries. The land and income tax problems are the heart of the difficulties of Iran as well as of other parts of the Middle East.

The Western powers by now must have realized that stability in the Middle East can be achieved neither on the basis of military and economic pressure nor by an alliance with a few politicians who represent the groups defending the status quo, the feudal group, the landlord group.

As long as the changes in Iran and other parts of Asia are not extended to the masses of the people and as long as the grievances of these nations against the colonial powers are not redressed there can be no stability and security and no defense system in that region. Behind the defense system would stand hostile, ignorant, impoverished, and exploited people, to whom defense of democracy "is meaningless abstraction as long as it fails to cure or alleviate a basic malady—hunger." The events in China and Indochina must serve as an example of what may happen if the nationalist movements are not properly channeled and if something drastic and urgent is not done for the masses of the people.

The modern Middle East is a challenge to the United States and Britain. The new governments in Iran and Egypt have gone a long way toward co-operating with the British and even toward meeting some of their unreasonable demands. The Shah of Iran is doing his best to improve the lot of his people and is loved and admired by them. He has divided some of his estates among the peasants. He has devoted his untiring energy to reforms and improvements, but so far he has received very little support from outside or co-opera-

tion from the ruling class. The Shah presents an opportunity—an opportunity that is rare. He deserves the support of the people of the free world in his fight for economic freedom and in his struggle for reform and improvements in his country.

The strongest ground on which the United States and the free world can operate in Iran and the Middle East is by settlement of disputes through creation of a partnership and a common interest which will serve the interests of the people of the area first and foremost.

The people of the Middle East also expect the United States to develop an independent foreign policy in that area. They hope that you will speak to them in the language of Jefferson, Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Eisenhower. They are tired of the language of Palmerston, Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, Curzon, Jules Ferry, and Delcassé. They request that the United States in her relations

with the Middle East avoid the pitfalls of British and French power politics. They pray that no foreign power will influence your high ideals and lofty principles. Your system of government and your way of living can win the hearts of the people of the Middle East, provided that you approach them directly and without the influence of your imperialistic friends and allies.

Let me remind you in conclusion of the words of a great revolutionist and an excellent reformist, Thomas Jefferson, who said:

I have no fear but the result of our experiment will be that men may be trusted to govern themselves without the masters; should the contrary of this be proved, I should conclude either that there is no God, or that he is a malicious being.

Let us all help to prove that Thomas Jefferson was right and that the people all over the world can be trusted to govern themselves without Russian, British, or French masters.

N. Saifpour Fatemi, Ph.D., Teaneck, New Jersey, is a member of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures, Program in Near Eastern Studies, at Princeton University. He has at various times served as editor of a leading newspaper in Tehran, member of the legislature in Isfahan, Mayor of Shiraz, Governor General of Fars, and member of the Parliament of Iran. He has also represented his country in the United Nations—as delegate to the UNESCO Conference in Cleveland, member of the Mossadegh mission to the Security Council, member of the Iranian Delegation to the General Assembly, and adviser to the Iranian Permanent Delegation. He is the author, among other works, of A Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923 (1952) and Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran (1954).

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ASIA

FAIRBANK, JOHN KING. *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854*. Vol. I, text, pp. xiii, 489; Vol. II, notes, pp. 88. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$7.50 each volume.

This is an excellent account of the establishment of modern treaty relations with China from the first Anglo-Chinese war to the inauguration of the "foreign" inspectorate of the maritime customs. A distinctive feature of the volume is its attention to the Chinese documents and to the interpretation of events "in Chinese terms."

Within the brief period of twelve years the early treaty and treaty port system reached the point of breakdown as had the Canton system before it. The author does not follow the new difficulties to the second war; he ends his account with the inauguration of the inspectorate which he regards as the key institution (p. 462) in the new relations which were being worked out.

The general reader, if he can be induced to look into a work that seems highly specialized, will be rewarded by a beautifully drawn picture of the early negotiator for the Manchu Court, Chi Ying, whose effort

was to bring the British barbarian under civilized control by a real sugar plum or two (p. 105) but chiefly by the sugar plums of trade. He will find, also, a neat exposition of the double hypocrisy of the opium trade of the time and may reflect upon the difference in the blinders worn by the Chinese and the British officials. He will find a lively description of the confusion at Shanghai during the Taiping rebellion.

The historian who undertakes to deal adequately with early Chinese-Western relations must be more than historian; he must be anthropologist, sociologist, political scientist, economist; and he can hardly avoid, if he has any imagination, an excursion into the philosophy of history as well. He must perform services of analysis and generalization beyond any narrow call of duty. The author accepts this with good courage, and his generalizations demand attention especially in the present state of Sino-Western relations.

He finds his significant generalizations rather in the fields of politics and diplomacy rather than in that of trade. There is, for example, a tantalizing reference (p. 297) to the extension of tea production in China but no examination of the nature of the industrial or economic organization which was soon to prevent China from meeting

Indian competition in a growing world market. The general effects—and possibilities—of trade are not explored, which may be accepted as further evidence that the chief importance of the early trade lay in the diplomatic and general international relations of the country.

The Chinese imperial system, which the author rightly considers one of the world's great political achievements, was the empirical fact and the theoretical concept into which, from the Chinese viewpoint, the new relations with the West had to be fitted. This was done, as the author sees it, by taking the Westerner into the system. The adjustment to the Manchu-Chinese dyarchy took the form of the inspectorate of customs and a "synarchy" came into existence. The institutions of the Chinese system were, and may still be, tough and adaptable. Thinking along these lines leads to the conclusion that the theory of imperialism is "not the only avenue of approach" (p. 468) to the problem.

Generalizations of quite a different sort seem at times to be on the point of formulation. There is reference (pp. 22, 468) to a landlord-gentry-scholar-official league against the peasantry in an agrarian-bureaucratic state. This seems to point in the direction of class struggle and to be inconsistent in its implications with the powerful traditions of the Chinese system. If these powerful political traditions may be called Confucian, the current situation may be put into some such questions as these: Is a neo-Confucian solution of the political, social, and economic problem of China a possibility? How might China's relations with the West and with Russia fit into such a solution? By these questions exactly a century is spanned, from 1854 to 1954.

C. F. REMER

University of Michigan

SWISHER, EARL. *China's Management of the American Barbarians: A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, with Documents*. Pp. xxi, 844. New Haven, Conn.: Far Eastern Publications, Yale University (for the Far Eastern Association), 1953. No price.

This handsome volume, the second monograph in the series sponsored by the Far Eastern Association, breaks new ground in the study of Sino-American relations and prepares the way for Western research on a new level of sophistication and control of the sources. One of the pioneers in the American study of nineteenth century China through Chinese sources, Professor Swisher here presents translations of 546 Chinese documents, most of them *in extenso* and few of them ever before available to the non-Chinese-reading researcher. They make available from the archives of the Manchu emperors the basic and originally secret documentation of the Chinese side of Sino-American relations in the fateful decades from 1841 to 1861. Though published in a photo-lithographed edition of the originally secret imperial compilation in 1930 and since then referred to by many scholars, the content of these documents has never before been so fully laid forth in English.

Professor Swisher's introduction gives the fullest account yet available of how these documents came into being and how they are related to other Ch'ing archives and publications. Of these 546 documents he finds that 19 have hitherto been available in English and that less than 200 of them are available in Chinese in other collections than the special one on foreign affairs which is here translated (the *I-wu shih-mo* series). Mr. Swisher began the process of selection and translation at Harvard in 1933, and continued it in Peking in 1937-38 and again in 1947-48. The results as now published, with a full complement of the necessary scholarly apparatus, form a landmark in the long and arduous process of understanding Chinese institutions and their functioning in foreign affairs.

Professor Swisher contributes three initial chapters on the handling of Chinese foreign affairs, the Chinese personnel involved in dealing with the United States, and the attitudes of Chinese officialdom toward this country in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. He then supplies introductions to the fourteen chapters in which the 546 documents are arranged, followed by a glossary of Chinese personal names with

biographical notes (55 pages), foreign names with their Chinese equivalents (18 pages), geographical names identified (18 pages), and a full bibliography and index.

These research materials could have been made available only through extensive subsidy as well as unflagging persistence on the author's part. They give us for the first time a rough equivalent of the documentary publications from Western government archives which have formed the basis of so much research in international relations. Until further similar volumes can be made available to Western scholarship, it will remain impossible to bring China fully on to the Western academic stage. Political-scientists and students of modern China and American foreign policy now have at hand a really significant segment of Chinese archival material, of sufficient bulk and scope for fruitful analysis.

J. K. FAIRBANK

Harvard University

ALLEN, G. C., and AUDREY G. DONNITHORNE. *Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan*. Pp. 292. London: George Allen & Unwin (distributed in the U. S. by The Macmillan Company, New York), 1954. \$4.50.

The authors of this book have set forth a running account of the part played by Western enterprise in the economic development of China and of Japan and have drawn some interesting contrasts in the response of these two countries to the Western intrusion. The greater part of the book is devoted to China and to a description of the course of Western enterprise from a primary interest in trade for the sake of obtaining special products from China to the subsequent emphasis on the import into China of Western goods and the gradual development of ancillary enterprises to obtain and regulate the export products. Finally, an account is given of the attempt to modernize not only the industries, but the banking, the shipping, other transportation, and mining, and to establish public utilities. It details the political obstructions and the innate Chinese resistance to the invasion of Western enterprise and describes the defeats and fail-

ures encountered. Much detailed research has gone into this part of the book, but, as the authors have said, the greater part of their data has been obtained from Western sources. The problems are thus seen through Western eyes, and no new light is thrown on the enigma of why China resisted so tenaciously and Japan entered so eagerly into Western ways. The emphasis is upon the Westerner and his difficulties, and not upon the Chinese problem and the destructive impact of industrialization upon what had been a very highly developed economy. The result is a rather unsympathetic treatment of the Chinese scene.

The second part of the book describes the rapid modernization of Japan, the significant but relatively small part played by the foreign merchants in the reorganization of Japan's trade and industry, and the vital part of the government in initiating the change and creating the atmosphere in which Japanese enterprise was able to grasp control of its own industrialization, utilizing the "expertise" of the foreigners without being dominated by them. The section on Japan is the better analysis of the two. It is written with more sympathy and with much more understanding than is the Chinese section. This difference is probably due to the senior author's more intimate knowledge of Japan.

The authors plan a second volume on this theme covering Malaya and Indonesia, thus providing a number of mutually contrasting environments in which to study the impact of the West and the policies pursued in these so-called "undeveloped" regions.

JOHN E. ORCHARD

Columbia University

KIRBY, E. STUART. *Introduction to the Economic History of China*. Pp. ix, 202. London: George Allen & Unwin (distributed in the U. S. by The Macmillan Company), 1954. \$4.25.

This book by Dr. Kirby, Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of Hong Kong, is described by its author as follows, "the present treatise does not purport to give an account or narrative of the Economic History of China, but only to assess the importance

of the subject, the position it has reached, its problems and perspectives of development. Incidentally, it presents a very wide bibliography of the subject" (pp. 62-63). As such, it is the first work of its kind in a Western language. The Introduction also contains a sound basic thesis, "that China must be viewed in terms of the interplay of a large number of forces," internal and external (p. 166). In contrast, the reader is repeatedly warned against the dogmatic interpretation in terms of class struggle.

The main contribution of the book lies in its summary of a considerable number of Japanese studies on the economic history of China. The extensive references even include Japanese translations from the Chinese and Western languages. The bibliography in these non-Japanese languages, however, is much less comprehensive and not always up-to-date. For instance, I find references to my early articles in Chinese up to 1937, but no mention of my more recent publications in English. The section on the last millennium is particularly disappointing. The author fails even to mention such leading economic historians as Ch'üan Han-sheng on the Sung dynasty (960-1279), and Shimizu Taiji and Liang Fang-chung on the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). In addition, the book is marred by occasional erroneous or misleading statements concerning historical facts, and by numerous mistakes in the romanization of Chinese characters. Thus the usefulness of this *Introduction* is appreciably reduced.

Referring to the periodical *Shih Huo* ("Food and Money," published 1934-37) which was devoted to Chinese economic history, Dr. Kirby remarks, "The contributions are very varied, but the magazine was under Marxist auspices and influence from its inception" (pp. 16-17). As a contributor to the periodical, I never heard anything about its Marxist auspices. Actually, it represented a trend to turn away from Marxist influence because its emphasis was on documentation rather than schematization. This misinterpretation probably arose from a lack of knowledge regarding the whereabouts of its editor, T'ao Hsi-sheng, who is in For-

mosa, because, in another place (p. 24), T'ao is cited along with Kuo Mo-jo as an outstanding example of present leaders of Marxist thought in Communist China. This kind of misrepresentation appears careless and irresponsible.

LIEN-SHENG YANG

Harvard University

MURPHEY, R. *Shanghai—Key to Modern China*. Pp. xii, 232. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$4.50.

This timely and well-documented study, enriched by the author's personal knowledge and experience, tells the story of the rise of Shanghai from a fishing settlement in the fourth century A.D. to one of the world's greatest cities and ports. When it fell to the Japanese in 1937 the population was estimated to exceed four million, and in tonnage entered and cleared the port ranked sixth or seventh among the world's ports. Although fortunate in suffering but little from either bombing or destruction by land forces it has since remained, if not at all times in a state of siege, at least cut off from the great channels of international trade which gave it birth and sustained its greatness.

In nationalist hands for four years from 1945, the Communist armies took Shanghai on May 27, 1949, and found themselves in possession of a great western-type city, the chief manufacturing center of the country, and its main gateway to the outside world. At first there was clearly an intention to reorient the city's life—that it should look inland. Signs are not lacking that second thoughts have prevailed and Shanghai is being refaced (witness the gardens along the Bund) to present a model of Chinese Communist enterprise to the outside world.

The author concludes, in a study singularly free from any political, national, or racial bias, that this former bridgehead for the penetration of China by the West is more likely to grow than to decline because of its new function as a catalyst in the changing economic relations between China and the world.

Shanghai's modern skyscraper office-blocks and hotels are built on concrete rafts replacing former pile foundations. Underneath are a thousand feet of alluvium; to

the east Whangpoo Creek connected with the great Yangtse River forms a natural and dredgeable, if restricted, harbor. It matters little that the village once on the seaward margin of the great delta is now the city from which the open sea becomes sixty feet farther away every year. The story of the complex foreign settlement on Chinese soil, a western outpost in an eastern world, is a fascinating one. From Treaty port (1842), British settlement, French concession (1849) to famed International Settlement Shanghai had the best and the worst of the West. Law and justice attracted immense numbers of Chinese residents, but prostitution and vice flourished. All that is now history.

L. DUDLEY STAMP

London School of Economics
and Political Science
University of London

THOMAS, S. B. *Government and Administration in Communist China*. Pp. v, 150. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953. \$2.50.

The research program of the Institute of Pacific Relations has presented studies on the development and features of Communist movements in Asia since the end of World War II. Reports have been published on Japan, India, Indochina, and Malaya. The Institute now adds *Government and Administration in Communist China*, written by S. B. Thomas, a Research Associate of the Institute and a graduate of the East Asian Institute at Columbia University. This well-footnoted and timely book contains chapters on the rise of the Chinese Communists to power, the return to the cities and the United Front policy, the formal program and constitutional structure of the "People's Republic of China," the role of the army, "Middle Parties," mass organizations and impact of the Sino-Soviet tie, the local government network and developments in national minorities, land reform, "suppression of counter-revolutionaries," and the major movements of 1953. The Appendix includes a report by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on "Struggle for Eradication of the Passive Attitude and Unhealthy Conditions in Party Or-

ganizations" and an editorial from a leading North China newspaper, "Our Thanks to the Soviet Union for Her Great Help."

The author asks some sagacious questions in an effort to assess the future of communism in China. To what extent will the land reform program give the Communists continued support from the peasantry? Can the Communists rapidly train capable technical-economic cadres in numbers large enough to meet the needs of a growing modern industrial economy? Can Moscow furnish sufficient technical aid and material support for this expansion? What will be the fate of the private businessman after the "struggle for nationalization" of all enterprises? Will the "old type" intellectual find it possible to co-operate with a regime hostile to his way of living and thinking? Will the Communists be successful in forcing their dogmatic ideologies into the minds of the tolerant Chinese? How much resistance will be offered by the devotees of ancient Chinese culture? Will there be an eventual emergence of a specific "Chinese Communism"? Will the Communists be able to reconcile Chinese nationalism with the more recent "proletarian internationalism"? And lastly, how will the strength of the new government and its hopes for industrial modernization be affected by military commitments, as laid down by the planners in the Kremlin?

Some of these questions have been answered. Others have been left for the muse of history to contemplate.

THOMAS E. ENNIS

West Virginia University

WRIGHT, ARTHUR F. (Ed.). *Studies in Chinese Thought*. Pp. xi, 317. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. \$4.00.

Made possible financially by a grant from the Ford Foundation, this beautifully printed and relatively low-priced volume is at the same time an outstanding example of sound scholarship. Most of the eight authors are American born and trained. The book is, therefore, happy evidence of the recent advance in Sinology in the United States and a welcome augury of still better things to follow.

The book is made up of essays which

cover much of the vast range of Chinese thought. Through the first five of them is to be had a more than cursory introduction to the course of the philosophy of China. Other essays deal topically with various aspects of the subject, including the types of symbols which display the influence of philosophy and religion in Chinese art and the problems of interpreting Chinese thought in categories familiar to the Western mind, of translating Chinese terms into Western language, and of putting Western thought into Chinese. The longest essay is a sketch of the history of Chinese thought by Professor Derk Bodde, translator of Fung Yu-lan's *History of Chinese Philosophy* and a specialist in his own right. The survey is from the novel interpretative approach of the interplay of harmony and conflict throughout the centuries. There is a fresh study of Neo-Confucianism. This is followed by one on "knowledge" and "action" since that stimulating mind of the Ming, Yang Yang-ming, which article pays especial attention to Chang Hsüeh-ch'êng (1738-1801), heretofore little noticed by American scholars. The second longest chapter, quite properly, deals with the more recent scene and the tensions produced by the inroads of thought from the Occident.

The volume makes no pretense of being a well-rounded account of all the vast range of Chinese thought. For example, only incidental mention is made of the massive Chinese Buddhist literature and the reaction of the Chinese mind to that faith, a field in which the editor has unusual competence. However, no better single volume on Chinese philosophy has been written in this country.

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

Yale University

BELOFF, MAX. *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951*. Pp. viii, 278. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$4.00.

Similar in approach to the author's earlier work (*The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941*), this book provides a chronological account of Soviet policies in East and Southeast Asia from the Yalta Conference to the fall of 1951.

About one-third of the study is devoted to Soviet relations with China and the Chinese borderlands (Outer and Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang). The remainder deals in chapters of about equal length with Soviet policies in Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Joseph Frankel, a specialist on the countries of Southeast Asia has written the latter section (covering Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines) and has assisted the author generally with the analysis of Soviet and other research materials.

Mr. Beloff has been careful to maintain scholarly objectivity in his day-by-day account. Even when discussing as controversial and hotly debated a subject as the Soviets' role in the Communist seizure of power in China and the current relationship between the two regimes, the author is remarkably free of parti-pris. He considers it his primary task to present in logical sequence all the available factual evidence, leaving to the reader the task of synthesis.

In some respects, however, the writer has gone beyond this self-imposed role of chronologist. A brief introductory chapter raises some of the issues facing anyone who attempts to analyze Soviet strategy in Asia. In the process, Mr. Beloff has occasion to dispel some widely held misconceptions about Soviet policies. He neither believes in the existence of "a single master-plan conceived in advance for expanding the area of Soviet control to cover the entire Far East" (p. 1), nor, on the other hand, does he hold the notion that Soviet policy-makers operate entirely independent of Communist illusions about the external world: we must expect Soviet policy "to have its own inner logic and coherence" (p. 3).

Mr. Beloff and Mr. Frankel have carefully gathered the many small pieces of evidence from Soviet and other literature. But the author would be the first to admit the inadequacy of available Soviet source materials, especially in so far as factual information is concerned. On many vital questions several equally valid theories can be maintained. There is not sufficient evidence on hand to establish clearly the nature of the relationship between the Chi-

nese Communists and the Soviet government, nor can we, with any degree of certainty, assess the relative importance of the several factors which may have entered into the decisions to strip Manchuria of its industrial potential or to launch the Korean attack.

Despite these obvious limitations imposed upon the author by circumstances, he has provided us with a very useful and much-needed book. The publication of new materials, in the future, and the completion of specialized studies (such as those devoted to the Russian-trained Asian Communists) may eventually further illuminate some of the problems under discussion. For some time, however, Mr. Beloff's study will remain indispensable for the student of Soviet and Asian affairs.

The value of the work is enhanced by a selection of appended diplomatic documents (regarding China, Mongolia, and Korea) and an index. A map would have been desirable.

PAUL F. LANGER

University of Southern California

KOLARZ, WALTER. *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*. Pp. xii, 194. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. \$4.50.

In Russian the term "Potemkin's village" is used to denote an impressive façade masking a far-from-imposing reality. No term could be devised which would more accurately describe Soviet policy toward national minorities. Granted on paper a considerable measure of autonomy, these minorities are in reality ruled by a Moscow-centered trinity of party, bureaucracy, and secret police.

This generalization is especially applicable to the Soviet Far East—the region lying east of Lake Baikal. The enormous distance of the Far East from European Russia and its adjacency to the North Pacific, once dominated by a hostile Japan and now by a hostile United States, guarantee it the closest supervision from Moscow.

The general nature of the steps taken during the past fifteen years toward the control and development of the Soviet Far East are well known: the establishment of military and industrial bases, the double-

tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the building of other lines, the development of the Northern Sea Route along the Arctic coast, the efforts to render the region more nearly able to feed itself, the encouragement of immigration, and the like.

Somewhat less known is the impact of these trends upon the non-Russian peoples—Yakuts, Buryat Mongols, Chinese, Koreans, and others—most of whom inhabited the region before the advent of the Russians three centuries ago. In *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East* Walter Kolarz, a journalist and recognized authority on Soviet affairs, has subjected this impact to a highly critical examination. Drawing on a wide range of Soviet writings, he demonstrates the existence of a program of sovietization much more thoroughgoing, although perhaps less crude, than the Russification in effect under the Czars. An officially sponsored immigration of Russians has inundated the indigenous peoples and has virtually robbed them of their cultural identity and of their political and economic liberty.

Unlike many writers on Soviet Far Eastern policy, Mr. Kolarz appears to have taken some trouble to familiarize himself with the Far Eastern context of his subject; he presents, for example, an able summary of the Sovietization of Outer Mongolia. A very minor slip is the introduction of a notorious quondam warlord of Manchuria, known to English-speaking students as Chang Tso-lin, by the Russian form of his (Chinese) name, Tchan-Tso-Lin (p. 133).

Mr. Kolarz deserves great praise for his treatment of an obscure but important topic.

HAROLD C. HINTON

Georgetown University

WHEELER, MORTIMER. *The Indus Civilization*. (*Cambridge History of India*, a Supplementary Volume.) Pp. xi, 98. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. \$3.75.

When the first volume of the *Cambridge History of India* was published in 1922, it contained nothing about the Indus civiliza-

tion. The discovery of that phase of Indian history, so revolutionary of our knowledge, was first publicly announced by Sir John Marshall in the *Illustrated London News* of September 20, 1924, and was based upon excavations at Harappa in Southwestern Punjab and Mohenjo-daro in northern Sind. Since then these two sites have been further excavated, Chanhudaro in central Sind has had a season of excavation, and various exploratory surveys have been made in western and southern Sind, Baluchistan, parts of the Punjab, and western Rajasthan. There has been a large volume of scientific publication of materials, discussion of the various cultures discovered, comparison with other known cultures of the third and second millennia B.C. in Western Asia, and comparisons and contrasts with later Indic materials.

This volume is a summary and appraisal of our knowledge by Sir Mortimer Wheeler, formerly Director General of Archaeology in prepartition India, later archaeological adviser to the Government of Pakistan, and himself the excavator at Harappa for several seasons, where he made notable amplifications of our knowledge. The book is meant to be, and is, a factual account of the Indus civilization—that is, of the most important of the cultures discovered there, called the Harappa culture. It has an ordered discussion of chronology, climate, the villages of the hills, and the cities of the plain, and it endeavors to give a picture of agriculture, commerce and industry, defense, arts and crafts, religion, and finally the dating.

So far as we can say now the maximum opening-date is 2500 B.C. and the closing date is the arrival of the Indo-Aryans, for which Sir Mortimer is willing to accept a time around 1500 B.C. This would give the Harappa civilization a life of a millennium, which may possibly be pushed farther back in time if it ever becomes possible to reach virgin soil at the principal sites. The author rarely goes beyond his data to speculate; for example, he treats more circumspectly than some other archaeologists the references to forts and the fort-destroying deeds of the god Indra which appear in the Rig Veda. He stays practically neutral on the two tiny statuettes

found at Harappa, whose period has been widely debated. He has not, it happens, noted the charming bronze dancing girl found at Chanhudaro belonging to the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, not mentioned in Mackay's published report. The script he flatly, and rightly, considers still unread. He resists well the temptation—irresistible to some others—to give over-interpretations to the religious material.

The book is a well-written lively, reliable description, a much-needed addition to the great *Cambridge History of India*.

W. NORMAN BROWN

University of Pennsylvania

VIVEK. *India Without Illusions*. Pp. viii, 216. Bombay: New Book Co., 1953. Rs. 4.4.

One of India's greatest national assets is her family of newspapers. Two or three of the English language dailies must rank among the twenty finest in the world. Readers of the Indian press will discover a rare freshness and vigor of analysis and a standard of prose excellence that compare favorably with the world's best. Columnists, editorial writers, and reporters often come from the ranks of the higher civil service, the universities, executive levels of business, and professional literary circles. The result of their combined efforts in news writing is first-class journalism.

The book under review contains a series of articles written by "Vivek," one of India's most distinguished scholar-journalists. The columns appeared in the *Times of India* (Bombay and New Delhi) between December 1950 and June 1953. A new series by the same author (now using his proper name, A. D. Gorwala) will be found currently in the *Statesman* (Calcutta and New Delhi). The Vivek collection has been divided into two sections: one containing articles stressing issues in foreign affairs; the second dealing with matters of domestic concern. Although each statement is short, the compendium read as a whole has a unity of constructive criticism that points out the social philosophy of the author.

Vivek will never be accused of being reticent to speak his mind. Indeed, if any-

thing, he reflects a capacity for unveiling political and economic weaknesses, whether at home or abroad, with a brilliant, brittle, epigrammatic style that must annoy those actually charged with governmental responsibility. As a former civil servant of acknowledged experience and skill, Vivek knows whereof he speaks when dealing with the process of translating aspirations into laws and laws into action. It may be for this reason that the articles on domestic affairs carry with them more of an aura of authenticity than those that concern themselves with international relations.

However, Vivek propounds a thesis on foreign affairs relating to India that should be read along with the pronouncements of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Vivek feels that India has erected a democratic political philosophy in her Constitution that demands not only domestic fulfillment, but also support of democratic ideals abroad. These ideals may manifest themselves in the encouragement of self-determination among colonial peoples; India's Constitution also implies a devotion to the cause of freedom that would bar giving aid and comfort to totalitarian regimes—of whatever variety and wherever found.

There are insights of significance on every page of this small book. It is best suited for those who have a grasp of the main outlines of contemporary Indian affairs. For them, Vivek's book is always provocative and is often wise.

RICHARD L. PARK

University of California
Berkeley

BRECHER, MICHAEL. *The Struggle for Kashmir*. Pp. xii, 211. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$5.00.

We are indebted to a young Canadian scholar for this useful guide through the many ramifications of the Kashmir question—the central problem in dispute between India and Pakistan and one of the great uncomprehended controversies in contemporary international relations.

Nearly one-half of the book is devoted to an analysis of the discussions on the Kashmir question in the Security Council of the United Nations, and of the proposals

of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, of General McNaughton as "informal mediator," and of the two mediators appointed by the Council, Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Frank Graham. From the beginning the UN efforts to assist in the settlement of the dispute went awry. For example, as Dr. Brecher points out, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (not for Kashmir, be it noted) "laid the ground-work for much future misunderstanding by obscuring the issues in its practice of endless clarification." Such insights are happily frequent in this book; but they are seldom presented with equal facility of expression.

The response of India and Pakistan to the various UN efforts, Dr. Brecher reminds us, "was determined by their basic outlook on the origin and nature of the dispute," and by "the basic disagreement on first principles." He makes some half-hearted suggestions for future UN action, but he sees more hope in direct negotiations between the two countries immediately concerned.

Dr. Brecher's survey of the situation in Kashmir before and immediately after partition is brief and rather superficial. His chapter on "The Importance of Kashmir to India and Pakistan" might be read with profit by those who wonder why the two nations are so concerned about this remote area. His final chapter sets the dispute in the broader context of general Indo-Pakistan relations. He has some interesting and rather uncritical comments on fundamental changes in the State of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. He attaches great significance to the land reform program, which was indeed spectacular and sweeping; but he does not even question whether the program has achieved the results claimed for it.

Although he refers to events as recent as the riots in Jammu in March 1953, he gives no hint of the political crisis, already bubbling beneath the surface, which led to the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah five months later. In his opinion most Kashmiris "favour the continuation of the present pro-Indian Government." He notes "the universal respect and admiration for Sheikh Abdullah" (at least,

as he did not add, in the Valley of Kashmir), and he reports that many Kashmiris told him that "where the Sheikh goes, we go." Well, "Sheikh Sahib" is now in "protective custody." His fall from power must be an added source of confusion and bewilderment to thousands of the humble folk of Kashmir who thought of him and the "New Kashmir" as one.

Dr. Brecher has written an intelligent and objective book, based on a careful study of the pertinent documents and on first-hand observations in Kashmir, and in India and Pakistan. Unfortunately the book is unattractive in appearance and bears an outrageous price.

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

BISSE, T. A. *Zaibatsu Dissolution In Japan*. Pp. xi, 314. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954. \$5.00.

The term Zaibatsu has been variously defined to mean "money clique," "oligarchy of wealth," "concentrated business wealth," and so forth. It is the term applied to leading Japanese families, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Sumitomo, Asano, and others, which had very extensive holdings in banking, industry, and trade until 1946.

Over three centuries ago Mitsui, Take-toshi, renounced his samurai status to open a pawnshop and sake and soy-sauce brewery in Echigo during the Genwa era (1615-1623). In 1722, the house of Mitsui developed a written set of rules and regulations, which with occasional revisions, controlled the actions of the eleven Mitsui families until it was abrogated in 1946. Under this code, the personal as well as the business lives of Mitsui members were subjected to regulation by a family council dominated by the head of the main family. Marriage, divorce, adoption, and other personal matters were so controlled, no less than the handling of corporate investment, savings, and profit distribution or reinvestment. A vast commercial and industrial empire grew out of the pawnshop and sake plant, encompassing banks, mining, shipbuilding, manufacturing, and an extensive network of world trade. At its peak the Mitsui combine employed 1,800,000 persons

in Japan and about another 1,000,000 in the Far East and the rest of the world.

T. A. Bisson tells the story of the Occupation's efforts to dissolve these combines. His study outlines the position held by the Zaibatsu families and their methods of controlling their business empires. It examines the alternative policies open to the Occupation in dealing with the all-pervasive combines. It shows how the Occupation authorities finally arrived at a dissolution policy and how this—the most ambitious antitrust operation in history—was carried out. Finally, it summarizes, up to 1952, the results and implications of actual decrees and legislation.

The question of these semi-feudal business oligarchies posed a significant question for United States policy. Was it possible to transfer to Asia the free enterprise climate of the United States? The United States decision to break up the entrenched system of concentrated business power represented one of the most ambitious projects of the Occupation. How successful was the experiment?

In Bisson's judgment the U. S. policy decision to dissolve the combines was unrealistic from either an economic or political point of view. From an economic point of view, dissolution and fragmentation meant less efficiency, higher production costs, less ability to compete in essential world markets. From a political point of view Bisson holds that nationalization would have been a preferable policy to dissolution. Nationalization, he believes, would have preserved the advantages of large-scale operation, and it would have had the organized political support, which the dissolution policy lacked. He indicates that the Social Democrats favored nationalization rather than dissolution. "In choosing dissolution instead of public ownership . . . the Occupation weighted the odds against the one party through which liberal political as well as economic change might have been achieved."

Just how nationalization would have fared in the face of the split between Right Wing and Left Wing Socialists and just why transferring the bulk of Japanese banking and industry from the Zaibatsu to the Kanbatsu ("official cliques," or "entrenched

bureaucracy") would have advanced the cause of democracy in Japan, Mr. Bisson nowhere explains. In surveying the results under the course the Occupation followed, he finds "disturbing questions about the effectiveness of dissolution," and notes that "by 1952 the combines were again emerging. Dissolution of the top holding companies had struck at the networks of subsidiaries, but the blow was not fatal."

JEROME B. COHEN

College of The City of New York

BLAKESLEE, GEORGE H. *The Far Eastern Commission, A Study in International Cooperation: 1945 to 1952*. (Department of State Publication 5138, Far Eastern Series 60.) Pp. v, 239. Washington, D. C., 1953. 70 cents.

When an eminent historian and expert in international relations is associated with the making of political history by serving in his country's government and subsequently, with access to all documents, prepares a comprehensive review which is published by his government, we are likely to have a document with unusual authority on the one hand, and the kind of objectivity we expect from historians on the other. Dr. George H. Blakeslee's record of the work of the Far Eastern Commission is such a document. He was political adviser to the Chairman of the Commission, member of the United States delegation to the Commission, and United States representative on its Steering Committee throughout the life of the body from 1945 to 1952. Hence the authority of the study; of Dr. Blakeslee's place as a historian nothing need be said. His aim is to give an account of the Commission from the point of view of international cooperation. He does not hesitate to bring out clearly the strains and stresses which developed.

The Headquarters of the Commission were throughout its existence in Washington. It paid only one visit to Japan in December 1945—January 1946. It never achieved satisfactory liaison with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and as time went on and the viewpoint of the United States with regard to the Oc-

cupation changed, friction between the United States and the members of the Commission was frequent.

The Commission's terms of reference represented a compromise between the views of the United States and of the other Allies. It had authority to formulate policies. On the other hand the United States government had special rights and privileges. The Supreme Commander was American and "the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan," tending as Dr. Blakeslee says "to act in accordance with the views of the United States Government." In the Commission the United States could veto any policy with which it disagreed. Moreover it could issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander on "urgent matters," an elastic concept which was embracing. These directives were subject to review by the Commission, but this right was abridged by delays in submitting them. "The broad rights of the Commission and the specific rights of the United States government together created a condition of political instability." Friction became serious from the time when the Japanese Constitution began to be discussed.

Nevertheless, Dr. Blakeslee records that in the First Period, during approximately the first two years of the Commission's history, the United States and the Commission as a whole worked well together. Forty-six policy decisions were made by the 11-nation Commission, mostly unanimously. This was a period in which the United States and other members were in agreement on the Occupation, and the United States government respected the rights of the Commission. In the second period the United States government had changed its position: Japan was to pay no reparations and, in view of the delay in a peace treaty, should be given rights it would have obtained by the treaty. These positions were opposed by other members of the Commission. Dr. Blakeslee says "The task of passing judgment on . . . the respective positions . . . is rendered perplexing by the fact that judged by development of events and provisions in the Treaty of Peace, the United States was in general correct in the positions it took

since these were later accepted by other members of the Commission." It is sometimes necessary to accept what cannot be changed.

A. VIOLA SMITH

New York City

ELSBREE, WILLARD H. *Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 to 1945*. Pp. vii, 182. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (for Institute for Pacific Relations), 1953. \$3.25.

The Japanese developed in their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere policy what they justly considered a brilliant scheme for harnessing the nationalist, anti-colonial movements of Southeast Asia to their war effort as well as for extending their own empire. In order to win this support, however, they were compelled to unleash nationalist forces which in the end turned—or would have turned, if not for the end of the war—as surely against themselves as they had been against the Western powers. Thus while the Japanese thought of themselves as using the nationalists for their own purposes, in the end it was the nationalists who had used Japan to advance their own goals of independence and unity.

How the Japanese came to be the used instead of the users is analyzed by Mr. Elsbree in his stimulating and readable volume through an examination of the course of the Japanese Occupation of the colonial countries of Southeast Asia. The book would have gained a good deal if Mr. Elsbree had had available to him as adequate materials for the other countries as he had for Indonesia, his most detailed case example. Also, some important perspective might have resulted from a parallel treatment of Thailand, which is significant for the very reasons it was excluded from the analysis, namely, that it was not under the direct control of a Western power and that its nationalism was not necessarily anti-Western. However, it is to be hoped that Mr. Elsbree and others will deal with these problems with the fullness they deserve at some other time.

The Japanese plan ultimately failed for

several reasons. First, the Japanese themselves were not of one mind in their approach and ultimate intentions in the area. The nationalists were able to exploit these differences—between Tokyo and the field, between higher and lower headquarters, between politically and militarily-minded officials—for their own benefit. Thus the Japanese were never able to apply a uniform, monolithic pressure on the native peoples. Second, in order to win their support in the first instance against their Western masters, it was necessary to make concessions to the demands and aspirations of the nationalists in the fields of government employment and responsibility, armed forces, education, and mass media expansion which, in the end, developed the skills, organization, self-confidence, military power, and *esprit* that enabled them to stand up to the Japanese as well. Third, as Allied pressure on the Japanese increased, the Japanese came to need the Southeast Asians more than the Southeast Asians needed them, and they had to make increasingly greater concessions for continued support or even non-opposition.

Although the nationalist leaders for their part differed enormously in their estimate of and attitude toward the Japanese (some believed in Japan's "destiny," some believed her good intentions, some hoped to use them, some were motivated only by hatred of their colonial overlord or of the white man or of the West) they all followed a course of pressing on the Japanese for more and more freedom and sovereignty. In the light of Mr. Elsbree's analysis, the differences between the "puppets"—the Ba Maws and the Laurels—and the "anti-Fascists" take on the proportion of tactical rather than principled issues. Finally, towards the end of the war, the nationalist forces proved strong enough to assist in expelling the Japanese and to challenge the return of European rule with varying degrees of success.

There is much that the West can learn from the experience of the Japanese in Southeast Asia. Many Americans have come to know by now that the problems of the Occupier are pretty much the same all over the world, whether it is the Japanese in Southeast Asia or the Ameri-

cans in Japan and Germany. We shall also have to learn that however steady and powerful a pressure we exert on Southeast Asia—in spite of our undoubted moral rightness—the end historical result will be conditioned, if not largely determined, by the needs, aspirations, understanding, and character of the Asians themselves.

HERBERT PASSIN

Ohio State University

LEACH, E. R., and RAYMOND FIRTH. *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure*. Pp. xii, 324. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. \$7.00.

Professor Leach has written an important book based on his contacts with the Kachin peoples of northern Burma from 1939 to the end of World War II. The first seven months of this period he spent in the village of Hpalang in the Namkham-Bhamo area doing anthropological research and mastering the Jinghpaw language. His first hand observations were supplemented later by wide reading in European language sources. The author breaks new ground not only in describing the confused social organization of a people hitherto little known, but also in his methodology. He rejects the idea of hypothetical norms prevailing in an assumed stable social structure in favor of reporting actual behavior in concrete situations. He discovered that social structure among the Kachins varied widely from community to community and from time to time in the same community and that the inconsistencies present were the essentially significant aspects in explaining Kachin society.

Traditionally, the hill-dwelling Kachins supplemented their meager livelihood from *taungya* cultivation by levying commercial toll or military blackmail against their more prosperous and less belligerent Shan neighbors. From time to time a Kachin chief (*duwa*) established hereditary predominance and attempted to imitate the feudal-type domination of the Shan chief over a limited valley area capable of wet-rice cultivation, and in rare instances a *duwa* actually turned Shan. Almost in-

variably, however, such a presumptuous Kachin chief alienated his restless followers, who having plenty of hillside room in which to roam threw off his incipient feudal yoke and reverted to a primitive semi-anarchistic order which recognized no class distinctions or hereditary clan superiority. Kachin society thus tended to oscillate between the loosely organized democratic (*gumlao*) structure and the better integrated hereditary feudal-type (*gumsa*) system of dominance by a chief possessing ritualistic and lineage claims to superiority. Mr. Leach cites the multi-tongued (9 languages among 130 family units) village cluster of Hpalang as an example of an unstable *gumsa* community rent by factional rivalry, which was deterred in 1939 from reverting to *gumlao* status only by the marked preference of the British administration for the more orderly chief-centered *gumsa* system.

Although the Kachin situation seems to be fairly comprehensible on political and geographical grounds, the author has buttressed his interpretation by a plethora of technical anthropological data. In fact, Mr. Leach labors his sectarian arguments with professional opponents almost to the point of annoyance. The book will nevertheless stand a long time as a scholarly and realistic contribution to the understanding not only of the Kachins but also of the political and social institutions of old Burma. Particularly noteworthy is the similarity between the authority of the *gumsa duwa* and that of the Burman *myothugyi*; the systems of land tenure are similar and also the overriding importance of social status and symbols of rank. Leach challenges Luce and other Burman experts by questioning the assumption that successive waves of Tibeto-Burman peoples have migrated into the Irrawaddy valley in historic times. He thinks that the Burmese are probably the descendants of the ancient Pyu (second and third centuries A.D.) and that the Kachins have resided in northern Burma for many centuries.

JOHN F. CADY

Ohio University,
Athens, Ohio

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

MACMAHON, ARTHUR W. *Administration in Foreign Affairs*. Pp. 272. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1953. \$3.50.

This book is the outgrowth of a series of lectures which Professor Arthur W. Macmahon, Eaton Professor of Public Administration, of Columbia University, gave at the University of Alabama under the auspices of the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration.

The first chapter deals with "The Concert of Judgment," "the ultimate concert of advice as it bears upon and emerges in decision." High among those who affect this concert are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are given power by Congress, not as militarists, but due to our deep worship of the expert, government being "believed to be incurably amateurish" by comparison. It is noted, nevertheless, that there can be "defensive militarism." The increasingly powerful role of the national Security Council and the minor influence of the Cabinet are described.

Recent developments in our "Department of Foreign Affairs" trace the expansion of units for economic analysis and negotiation, for the council diplomacy of the United Nations, "intelligence" research and the operation of informational and economic programs. These functions seem to Macmahon to belong in the State Department, and he is not persuaded that the 1953 Reorganization Plans which established a separate Foreign Operations Administration to handle most of them are the last word.

The chapter on "Field Structure for Foreign Programs" contains excellent discussions of the administrative aspects of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the very powerful United States Special Representative in Europe, the European Coal and Steel Company, the European Defense Community, and other regional developments.

There is a penetrating discussion of the complex subject of interdepartmental coordination and a final chapter on Personnel

for Foreign Affairs, which considers the arguments for and against maintaining the traditional separation between the State Department and the Foreign Service. Problems of personnel selection are examined, including the need for area training.

These lectures reveal a deep knowledge of the intricate processes of public administration which should delight the expert in that field. They are at the same time easily readable by the layman. There are apt figures of speech and touches of Macmahon's urbane humor, as well as illustrations useful to the general student of foreign affairs.

D. F. FLEMING

Vanderbilt University

MANGONE, GERARD J. *A Short History of International Organization*. Pp. ix, 326. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954. \$5.00.

This is an important contribution to the teaching literature in the field of international relations. The author, who is on the political science staff of Swarthmore College, brings a fresh approach to his subject in that he concentrates his attention on the broad historical factors which impel the seventy-odd states of the world to associate with one another in formal international organizations.

Despite the historical approach, the work should not be mistaken for a history in the strict sense. In fact it is this reviewer's opinion that the book is mistitled; its reception may suffer accordingly, since most courses in international organization are planned for a functional approach. Actually the work is well suited to text use in such a course, or in a broader course in international relations (in which some supplementary reading might be required). The historical material is chiefly found in the first four chapters, dealing with international organization before Napoleon, in the nineteenth century, and with international law. The remainder of the book is almost exclusively concerned with the contemporary pattern of world organization. There is a chapter each on the League of Nations, the United Nations, International Administration, Regional Or-

ganizations, and the Future of International Law and Organization.

Following each chapter, the author has included a brief appendix, which includes extracts from germane documents. This material has been selected with great care and the extracts carefully edited to compress the most meaningful passages within a limited space. Although the average documentary appendix for a given chapter is only about five pages in length, the author has managed to give the reader a look at some 33 documents in all.

A colorful style and a practical notion of the limitations on international organization characterize the book. Well-written throughout, it repeatedly emphasizes the role of power politics in relation to organized efforts to cope with the many problems of modern world society.

OLIVER BENSON

University of Oklahoma

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. *Major Problems of American Foreign Policy, 1954*. Pp. x, 429. Washington, 1954. \$2.00 paper; \$4.00 cloth.

The most significant feature of this volume is its approach rather than its subject matter. The authors treat each problem as a government official responsible for policy formation would deal with it, considering the relationship of the immediate problem to the total world situation, to domestic conditions in the United States and elsewhere, and to the basic principles and objectives of American foreign policy, and analyzing and weighing alternative solutions in the light of these factors.

Illustrative of this approach is "A Problem Paper on the Soviet Threat," which presents a "predecision analysis," designed to "demonstrate a method of preparing the ground for decision," by including material which "breaks off with an analysis of issues and alternatives" (p. 347). Thus the student is encouraged to follow the process normally pursued by policymakers but is left to make his own choice among possible courses of action.

Substantively, Part One deals with key developments in international relations from July 1952 to September 1953 and surveys "the form and substance of pos-

sible negotiations" between the West and the Soviet Union. Part Two reviews the influences which frustrated efforts to preserve the unity of the wartime allies and traces the evolution and crystallization of the principles and objectives of American foreign policy, showing how attempts to apply them to specific situations are conditioned by domestic and foreign pressures. Part Three explores major problems confronting American policymakers at the beginning of 1954, first in the realms of politics, economics, military affairs, relations with the United Nations, and the Cold War, and second by regions and their national components. The text closes with the problem paper on the Soviet threat.

The impact of Soviet expansionism on American postwar actions, and even on the evolution of fundamental American principles, objectives, and methods, is apparent throughout the book. The authors regard 1954 as a potential turning-point, at which "the Soviet Union, either by design or in consequence of internal pressures created by Stalin's death, appeared to be seeking to relax international tension," thus confronting the United States with "the possible need to re-examine over-all relations with the Soviet Union" (p. 110) and other powers. Washington bears also partial responsibility for determining whether the United Nations is to be "a coalition of the free world" or "a universal organization of states" (p. 181).

The authors have provided excellent bibliographical guides to both primary and secondary sources.

AURIE N. DUNLAP

Lehigh University

VISSCHER, CHARLES DE. *Théories et réalités en droit international public*. Pp. 467. Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1953. 2,500 frs.

Urging the friends of international law to face frankly the extensive political elements within it, Professor Visscher in this volume roundly condemns theoretical systems like those of the Vienna School which divorce law from politics. He advocates instead that every effort be made to integrate our constantly growing knowledge about international politics with the tradi-

tional doctrines of the law. The former Judge of the International Court of Justice (1946-52) strikes a number of chords familiar to Americans who quite frequently in recent years have heard and played the symphony of "realism" in international relations. Reality to Prof. Visscher, however, does not prescribe jettisoning international law because it functions poorly. He condemns equally the legalist who divorces international law from politics and the specialist in international relations who "sins for his part by failing to understand . . . [that] law is a normative discipline; [that when] one speaks of norms, he speaks of precepts, and that precepts should never be confounded with facts" [translation by reviewer].

He urges his colleagues not to devitalize the law by cutting it off from either the facts of international life or from the "moral inspiration" which alone can raise the conduct of international affairs out of the jungle. He recognizes that an international community does not yet exist, but he speaks of it as one of the "civilizing ideas" which operates slowly and despite eclipses as a positive force generating social and political change. So too he characterizes the embryonic European Defense and Political Communities as "premature" and void of adequate spiritual and political bases, but he still sees in federal principles great possibilities for organizing international life in the future.

This treatise is in four parts. Part One describes international power politics and how the state system has developed since 1648 and treats historically and analytically theories of the state and international law from Machiavelli to Kelsen. Part Two considers the general relations between power and law in international affairs and how ideas of "sovereignty" and "vital interest" hamstringing the United Nations and prevent the international community from developing. In the third and major portion of the work the author examines the principal rules of international law, effectively demonstrating in how few areas states are prepared to abide by detailed codes and how often international legal prescriptions are unrealistic. Finally, M. Visscher describes and deplores the limited

role the international Courts have played in settling international disputes.

This treatment of international law will not make happy those "legal theoreticians who ensconce themselves in a purely juridical vision of the world" or "certain writers who abandon themselves . . . drunkenly to a totalitarianism of politics." It will, however, challenge those who believe that there is a place in reality for values, law, and organization and a place in law for reality.

RICHARD N. SWIFT

New York University

VAN DER VEEN, GAEL. *Aiding Underdeveloped Countries Through International Economic Co-operation*. Pp. 200. Delft: Naamloze Vennootschap W. D. Neinema, 1953. No price. Written in English.

Heer Gael Van der Veen has undertaken the important task of tracing the evolution of "outside" aid to underdeveloped areas from the fifteenth century to the Colombo Plan and Point Four. This University of Amsterdam study succeeds in calling attention to the real difficulties inherent in attempting to implement what the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1951 recommended to the United Nations as a moral duty.

This moral duty flows from the "legally qualified duty" of the less advanced nations to bring to fuller development economic possibilities in their territories. Dr. Charles Malik, the Lebanese delegate, put this question to the Council during its eighth session: "If the international community was of the opinion that the economic backwardness of a given region constituted a real danger, was it not in duty bound to intervene in the interest of the country itself as well as in the interest of the world-community as a whole?" (pp. 12, 169). An affirmative answer might serve as a rationalization for the unilateral imperialism of the First (fifteenth to eighteenth century) and Second (eighteenth to twentieth century) Periods of imperialism. The author has recognized this possibility in his conclusions with respect to each Period. (He finds that during the First Period the West European states did not even take the trouble to rationalize their

motives. Their ideas of national interest were enough. Only Vitoria, Gentili, Grotius and a few others were in open opposition).

The author hopes that technical and financial assistance will be based increasingly upon moral principles. Most states have abandoned laissez-faire in undertaking tasks of rehabilitation in the social field within the state. "But regarding the extent of this state-task there is often a wide and fundamental difference of opinion" (p. 174). How much more so in the international field? Point Four appropriations have been small; they have been cut, and they have been infused with military aid. The program is no longer "new" and it never has been "bold."

Space does not permit more than mention of the special case, of Japan (whose development created an international menace), the impact of Wilsonian self-determination, the mandates system, and the history of the slave trade. Heer Van der Veen has important observations in these and other related fields.

The study is exceedingly well documented. Over two hundred titles are included in the Literature. There are 631 citations. Frequently used abbreviations are listed, from Bank to WHO. There is a minimum of statistics. Almost half of the study is a history of ideas concerning international co-operation, international law and cultural diffusion.

ROBERT ROCKAFELLOW

University of Rhode Island

Humanism and Education in East and West: An International Round Table Discussion Organized by UNESCO. Pp. 224. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1953. \$1.50.

As part of its program of developing closer intellectual and moral ties between East and West, UNESCO, at its Fifth Session, authorized an international round-table discussion among thinkers and philosophers. The conference was held from December 13 to 20, 1951, at Parliament House in New Delhi. The government co-operated fully in the arrangements, and

prominent Indians took a leading part in the deliberations. The heart of the conference was a round-table discussion in which twelve eminent scholars from various countries participated.

The volume under review constitutes a report to the public of the deliberations that took place. It includes: a succinct review of the round-table discussions together with a summary of the conclusions and recommendations; the major addresses delivered by the Indian notables; and a series of essays, written by the participating scholars, incorporating ideas expressed in preparatory papers and views developed in the round-table discussions. The appendix contains a clearly formulated "basic document" which was drawn up by the UNESCO secretariat as a guide to the discussions and which provides an analysis of underlying problems.

The essays written by the participants in the round table form the main part of the book. These scholarly presentations provide a good introduction to the philosophical and religious systems of the Eurasian world. Hardly any aspect of Indian, Moslem, Classic, or Christian philosophy is left without some reference to it. Although to some extent the old stereotype of the East as representing high-minded contemplative spirituality and of the West as reflecting an aggressive scientific materialism finds an echo, the general trend is to emphasize the common ethical, philosophic, and religious aspirations within the variety of cultural systems. A number of the writers stress the fact that today the differences within each cultural system are greater than the differences between the East and the West as a whole. One point is repeatedly brought out—that the catastrophes of the twentieth century did not arise as a result of conflict between the two types of civilization but from "uncivilized minorities within a single culture." Dr. Radhakrishnan, in his opening address at the round-table conference, did not miss pointing out that Marxist Communism and the opposition to it were both characteristic products of Western civilization.

Besides the general question of the relation between the civilizations of the East

and the West, two issues in particular occupied the attention of the participants of the round table: the significance of the scientific movement and the impact of democracy on life and education. Here, too, vestiges of traditional views as well as strong defense of the modern outlook were in evidence. One statement went so far as to decry science as responsible for all the evils of industrialism and militarism. But most of the speakers pointed out its importance for the improvement of living conditions in Asiatic countries. And there was even one speaker who defended science as an avenue to spiritual truth! In discussing democracy a European "brahmin" joined with a philosopher of the East in expressing skepticism of the ability of "the new masses" to absorb higher education. One Indian speaker exhibiting "a somewhat Platonic fear of democracy" sketched an ideal community of three classes along lines of *The Republic*—or was it a reflection of the caste system? But there were others, from India as well as from other countries, who emphasized the importance of a common education for the people and who recognized the significance of equality of educational opportunity in the development of a democratic social order. A point that received emphasis was the part that universities could play in the training of teachers for the common schools.

Seen in the perspective of the complex economic, political, and ideological problems that must be dealt with in the effort to advance East-West unity, the UNESCO conference seems, perhaps, no more than a wisp of straw in making the bricks for the edifice of world peace. But in these troubled times, surely, we should welcome every action, even if it is but a gesture, that may lead to closer co-operation.

I. B. BERKSON

College of the City of New York

CALVEZ, JEAN-YVES. *Droit international et souveraineté en U.R.S.S.* Pp. 299. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1953. 800 fr.

The title of this book gives an insufficient idea of its scope. It is in reality a treatise on the various theories of inter-

national law current in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since the Russian Revolution, and an analysis of elements of Soviet practice to indicate what positions have been taken. The author explains that he selects "sovereignty" for emphasis only because since the emergence of Vyshinsky it has been the keystone of Soviet doctrine. In its name various positions have been taken on the international scene. The author then discusses a good many of those positions.

Being in the nature of a treatise, the book discusses the Soviet views on sources of international law and correctly indicates the Soviet predilection for treaties. The author notes the reliance of Soviet diplomats on the nineteenth-century principles of international law, but points out that this is not a mark of conservatism but rather of the usefulness at the present stage in Soviet development of those principles in seeking to obtain the ends of Soviet foreign policy. He understands the influence of dialectic materialism upon Soviet conceptions. He considers that to a Soviet jurist the old form may appear changed when used for current purposes.

One may quarrel not with basic facts but with emphasis. For example, there seems to be underemphasis of the political factors in the discussion of the 1944 grant to Soviet republics of the right of foreign representation. The Yalta record is referred to as indicating political considerations, but the whole operation is considered as an "original" development in international law. The Stettinius memoirs leave no doubt that no one argued international law, but that Stalin wanted a group of votes in the new United Nations organization then in process of formulation, and Roosevelt countered with a compromise, under which only two of the Republics received seats even though the legal status under the Soviet constitution was made the same for all sixteen.

The errors of fact are few, largely in the description of individuals. The author confuses the two Trainins. One was the director of the Institute of Law and the legal theoretician, while the other has been a leading criminologist and in that capacity attended the sessions establishing the char-

ter for the Nuremberg tribunal. The author calls the voices which began to appear in print in the 1940's "young voices." He mentions Krylov and Durdanevsky in particular along with Kozhevnikov. The latter was young at the time, but the other two were well on in years, appearing as new voices only because they had previously been in eclipse because of what seems to have been considered to be a lack of complete Soviet orientation.

In summary, this book presents an accurate account of theory and a valuable compendium of information to place alongside such general books as those of Taracouzio. There is some stimulating speculation in the conclusion. The author understands the role Soviet international lawyers are called upon to play in advancing the cause of their country's foreign office. For those foreign authorities who have failed to understand this relationship the book will be especially valuable.

JOHN N. HAZARD

Columbia University

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

HOLCOMBE, A. N., et al. *The Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on the Constitution of the United States, 1940-1950*. Boston University. Pp. x, 541. Boston: Boston University Press, 1953. No price.

This distinguished potpourri consists of the ten Bacon lectures on the Constitution delivered at Boston University from 1940 to 1950. Six of the contributors are political scientists, two are historians, one is a practicing lawyer, and one is a former Supreme Court Justice. There are as many approaches to the Constitution as there are commentators, but perhaps the most striking characteristic is the number of contributors who do not go on the assumption that the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is. In several of the lectures the Supreme Court is scarcely mentioned. This healthy trend is exemplified in Leonard White's fascinating picture of the formative practices in public administration under the

Federalists, or Louise Overacker's study of presidential campaign funds. Again, Carl Swisher in the 1947 lecture discusses the postwar Constitution, not in terms of Supreme Court decisions, but in terms of the broad trends in relations between Congress and the President, and the developing powers of those "rivals of government," business corporations and labor unions.

Inevitably, however, the Supreme Court does receive its due. Two pieces deal in judicial biography. Henry S. Commager contributes a masterful vignette of Joseph Story, and Charles Fairman draws on his research into the life and times of Justice Bradley in an attempt to answer the question, what makes a great Justice? Former Justice Roberts comes closer to the present with a review of recent tendencies which he suggests have taken us far from the original constitutional "blueprint" towards a condition of "statism."

Two of the lectures may have more relevance to present problems than the rest. While much has happened since 1943, when Robert Cushman lectured on some constitutional problems of civil liberty, what he has to say on free speech, the Negro and the Constitution, and the Japanese evacuation is illuminated by his usual good sense and clear thinking and is still good reading.

The 1950 lectures by Harrison Tweed offer some explanation of the American Bar Association's current effort to amend the Constitution relative to the Supreme Court. Their proposals, which have now reached the stage of congressional discussion, would fix the size of the Supreme Court at nine, compel retirement at 75, disqualify any member of the Court as a candidate for President or Vice-President until five years after leaving the Court, specifically confirm the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, and guarantee the Court's appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution. The goals sought by these proposals will probably be approved by most students of the Constitution, but there will be less agreement that a constitutional amendment is required to freeze a present consensus into the Constitution. The American Bar Association's ill-starred venture with the

Bricker Amendment has left its competence to advise on such problems somewhat in doubt.

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT

University of Chicago

CAHN, EDMOND (Ed.). *Supreme Court and Supreme Law*. Pp. ix, 250. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954. \$4.00.

Crisis and contempt are not strangers to the Supreme Court. In the course of its career that tribunal has known the pain of self-inflicted wounds, of which the deepest was the Dred Scott decision. More than once it has weathered the defiance of the Executive. President Roosevelt's threat to "pack" the Court in 1937 is the most memorable instance. On that occasion cynics observed that a switch in time saved nine. A distinguished federal judge was reminded of Jonathan Wild, who, Fielding relates, would have ravished a certain damsel "if she had not, by a timely compliance, prevented him." The President's popular following was large, the damage to the Court's prestige was measurable, but the moral of the tale lay in its ending: the public rallied to the Court's support.

Here was a vivid illustration of the public's respect for the Court—a respect which sometimes, among laymen at least, borders on reverence. Indeed, in the survey of prestige ratings for professions and occupations, conducted by Professor Hatt several years ago, Supreme Court Justices took first place.

This prestige of the Court rests upon its extraordinary power of judicial review. It was in *Marbury v. Madison*, decided in 1803, that the Court first asserted that power and established itself as the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution. Nor is it new learning that causes this celebrated case to be denounced as usurpation by some and welcomed as a national blessing by others. Only four years ago one of the Justices, writing in a law journal, spoke of the case in these hallowed tones: "Upon this rock the nation has been built." More recently a leader of legal education hailed the case as "one of the

most significant and dramatic developments in the history of our country."

Denouncer and enthusiast alike will agree that the sesquicentennial of *Marbury v. Madison* is an appropriate time for appraisal and stock taking. This book is a symposium dedicated to that end. It is an interesting and worthy contribution to the subject of judicial review. The contributors are, and speak the language of, lawyers, but all readers may pursue these pages with pleasure and profit, though they may disagree with many of the views expressed. Justice Hugo Black has expressed warm praise for this work.

There are six contributors, all authorities in constitutional law. Five are teachers in our law schools: Bishoff and Cahn, New York University; Frank, Yale; Freund, Harvard; and Hurst, University of Wisconsin. The sixth is Mr. Charles P. Curtis of the Massachusetts Bar.

In the first part of the book are found six short papers, read at meetings at New York University Law School, together with the spontaneous and unrevised discussion following each paper. The second part of the work is comprised of four comprehensive articles, one by each of the last four contributors named above. Each article, like each paper, is addressed to a particular phase of judicial review. An informative historical introduction (Chapter 1), supplied by Mr. Cahn, the editor, completes the undertaking.

One of the items here mentioned is the growing tendency of the Justices to pick up their pens and write off in several directions. The "spawning" of dissenting and concurring opinions proceeds at an alarming rate and weakens confidence in the Court. Of the 92 cases decided in 1952, for example, there were unanimous opinions in only 23.

Current interest in civil liberties makes Mr. Frank's article on Review and Basic Liberties (Chapter 5) very timely. Those who regard the Court as a champion of civil rights will find challenge in some of the conclusions here reached, not the smallest of which is the assertion that "courts love liberty most when it is under pressure least."

BERNARD F. CATALDO

University of Pennsylvania

TUNC, ANDRÉ, and SUZANNE TUNC. *Le Système constitutionnel des États-Unis d'Amérique*. Vol. I: *Histoire constitutionnelle*. Pp. viii, 507. Paris: Éditions Domat Montchrestien, 1954. 1,800 fr.

Rarely does an American historical scholar pick up a foreign book about his country without fear and trembling, and more rarely still does he put it down with a feeling of complete satisfaction. So few and far between are volumes like Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* or Lord Bryce's *American Commonwealth* that when one receives a study of their distinction, one is overjoyed. It is no exaggeration to state that the work before us belongs to a very select class.

André Tunc, Professor on the Faculty of Law at Grenoble, and his wife spent several years in the United States studying the American legal system and acquiring experience in the service of the International Monetary Fund. To say that they have a command of their material would be a gross understatement; they have mastered it to such an extent that they produced a synthesis of American constitutional history which is an important contribution to the subject. For French readers this work is of especial importance, for nothing of its kind is presently available to them. Furthermore, this volume contains excellent bibliographies of American history in general, as well as of American law, and it has an index which will serve as a useful guide to those Americanisms which are so baffling to foreigners. I know from experience how important it is to have ready definitions of "yellow dog contracts," "featherbedding," and "scalawags."

SHEPARD B. CLOUGH
Columbia University

HARRIS, JOSEPH P. *The Advice and Consent of the Senate: A Study of the Confirmation of Appointments by the United States Senate*. Pp. xii, 457. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. \$5.00.

This admirable book is one of those rare studies of American government which will make a reader wonder why nobody ever

did this before. At any rate, nobody will have to do it again soon, for Professor Harris and his research assistants seem to have gone into every conceivable aspect of the problem from Washington to Eisenhower.

This book is also one that needed to be written, both because of the intrinsic importance of its subject and because it is the best study so far to appear of the amendment of the Constitution by custom and usage. All students of American government are familiar with the fact that the Senate has in reality (though not in words) amended the Constitution to restrict the President's power to nominate, with some exceptions, to those persons who are recommended to him by the senators from the state of the nominee's residence; but surely few can be familiar with the widespread ramifications of the practice. "Senatorial courtesy" began in Washington's administration, and it has carried down to date. It has helped to preserve the Byrd and other machines. It has kept some of the very best nominees from confirmation.

Where senatorial courtesy is not involved, it is apparent from Professor Harris' study that strong Presidents have generally had the most trouble in getting their nominees consented to; that persons of pronounced convictions who have written or spoken on public questions "are likely to face difficulty in being confirmed"; that "several of the most sensational contests in the Senate have risen over the nominations of Jews to high office"; that pressure groups are often able to stop a nominee they do not like in the Senate, when the President can resist their efforts; and that the Senate will refuse confirmation for strictly partisan reasons: "In the 1948 session, when the Republicans were confident of victory at the forthcoming election, 11,122 nominations were returned to the President without any action by the Senate."

The five chapters in this book on the cases of Louis D. Brandeis, David Lilienthal, and Leland Olds would stand alone as case studies in American politics. These cases also show that any man must really be devoted to the public service to risk the ordeal that these men went through.

Perhaps the nadir of advice and consent was reached when Senator Bilbo spent hours of the Senate's time, and filled up pages of the *Congressional Record*, with his objections to the nomination of a judge who had, years before, sentenced Bilbo to prison and to a fine of \$1,000.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN
University of Colorado

WHITE, LEONARD D. *The States and the Nation*. Pp. xi, 103. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953. \$2.75.

The Latin maxim, *multum in parvo*, aptly characterizes this slender volume by Leonard D. White. Originally given as the Edward D. White Lectures on Citizenship, *The States and the Nation* has now appeared under the imprint of the Louisiana State University Press.

The temper and theme of this book is set by its frank avowal that "A federal system implies a partnership, all members of which are effective players on the team, and all of whom retain the capacity for independent action. It does not imply a system of collaboration in which one of the collaborators is annihilated by the other." Three trenchant sections or individual lectures sustain this argument. The various lecture titles carry their own impact and suggest their individual scope: (1) The March of Power to Washington; (2) The Strength and Limitations of the States; (3) The Next Quarter Century.

Along the way specific policies looking towards the attainment of a dynamic federalism make their appearance and receive forthright presentation, dispassionate yet positive in tone and language. So far as Professor White has a program to offer it compasses these chief points. The states can recover their early role in the federal union if it should be found possible to return to them some functions and activities now carried on or financed in whole or in part by the federal government. Conditions now attached to federal grants-in-aid may be modified so as to afford the states greater freedom as to ways and means of action. The states might help themselves by wider and more effective use of interstate compacts. Lastly, they might

avoid further limiting federal legislation in emerging policy fields, says Professor White, by vigorous and energetic use of those powers they now possess.

Fundamentally judgment of any book must proceed from the purpose and objective to which its author sought to dedicate his work. In terms of his own basic premises, Professor White has done a competent job. His argument has been set forth clearly, and can scarcely be mistaken for that which it is not. Absent is a sense of fanatical fervor—either panegyric or diatribe—while realism infuses his presentation and makes mature consideration of his specific proposals essential. At the point of acceptance or rejection of these suggestions, each person of course becomes a free agent. But *States and the Nation* should be read.

CHARLES W. SHULL
Wayne University

MCCORMICK, RICHARD P. *The History of Voting in New Jersey: A Study of the Development of Election Machinery, 1664-1911*. Pp. xii, 228. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953. \$5.00.

The search for more effective ways of determining the voters' verdict is an unending one, and if the details of election procedure seem tedious to the non-specialist, the search itself is vital to the functioning of representative government. In our federal system, valid generalization on this as on many subjects is impossible without careful studies of individual states; such a study Dr. McCormick has now provided for New Jersey.

The book is divided into seven chapters: the proprietary period (1664-1703), New Jersey as a royal colony (1703-1774), the Revolutionary era (1774-1788), the early national period (1789-1838), the four decades from 1839 to 1876, the late nineteenth-century years of corruption and reform (1877-1899), and the Progressive era (1900-1911) culminating in the election measures of Woodrow Wilson's governorship. On each period Dr. McCormick gives us a little of the economic and political setting, a description of the election machinery and the changes made in it, and

some indication of the way it worked in practice. Statistical tables show the number of voters who went to the polls each year from 1789 to 1900, and their proportionate relation to the total electorate.

The contrast between today's highly regulated election machinery and the casual methods of the eighteenth century is illuminating. Election officers might close the polls arbitrarily to favor their own party, voting places were sometimes as much as sixty miles distant from outlying areas, the polls were kept open for days at a time, and voice voting rather than the ballot was the rule. Yet the system worked smoothly on the whole, and New Jersey's freehold suffrage was liberal for the time.

Since colonial days, there have been two main lines of development: "the extension of the suffrage to ever wider segments of the population," and "the gradual emergence of an ever more detailed body of regulations" to govern the actual conduct of both general and primary elections. In the process political parties, originally ignored by the law, came to hold a highly regulated and therefore a thoroughly official position.

Dr. McCormick finds that the motivations for these changes were much more practical than theoretical. Lawmakers almost never attempted to justify particular suffrage requirements on the basis of principle, and in the long struggle to make the voting process efficient and convenient, motives of honest reform and partisan advantage were inextricably mixed.

RANSOM E. NOBLE, JR.

Pratt Institute

HYMAN, SIDNEY. *The American President*. Pp. 342. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$4.00.

This is a very interesting and almost unique publication. It is not a traditional or legalistic discussion of the powers of the President as outlined in the Constitution nor is it a development of these powers. It is more of an exposition of the political process involved in the election and activities of the President as well as the relations of the President to the people and the other divisions of the government. It might very accurately be called the un-

written constitution of the Presidency. It deals with matters not treated in other publications on the President and too little known or understood and possibly more vital than the dry bones of the constitutionality of the powers of the office of the President.

It is in this field of extraconstitutionality that the author makes a significant contribution. It is the red-blooded President as the director of the greatest nation on earth in both foreign and domestic affairs that is discussed and not the grand-mama type of Whig King misnamed by the Constitution. It is not the titular type of executive which the Whig scheme of political organization provides for and which is really its chief contribution to practical politics but a world figure exercising semi-royal powers with almost the destiny of the free world as his responsibility. Whereas Jefferson said there would come a time when all Europe would be interested in the election of the American President, it is now mankind. So it has happened that a President of a string of loosely associated provincial states along the Atlantic Coast has become practically a popularly elected monarch of a unified nation whose foreign policy materially involves the peace of the world. While it was once Rome and later Britain that ruled the civilized world, it is now America, with this important difference—that its object is peace and self-government for all peoples.

The President as a candidate to succeed himself as well as the candidate of the opposition is discussed in all of the ramifications of a presidential campaign. The pros and cons of the various proposals for nominating presidential candidates as well as the different suggestions as to the methods of electing presidents are considered in a fresh and convincing manner.

The two-party system as an agent of democracy in phrasing and settling political issues and finally uniting the nation in a *modus vivendi* is especially emphasized as the most practical and satisfactory political process that has yet been devised. But for this system the nation would undoubtedly fall apart. The party system possibly does more than the Constitution to maintain national unity.

The President as an artist is presented in a contrast between Jefferson and Madison. Madison, whose work in the Federal Convention made him famous, who was quite as much the father of the Republican party as Jefferson, who had had eight years of experience in executive matters as Jefferson's Secretary of State, and who in his Federalist papers showed a most thorough understanding of the problems and workings of modern governments, when confronted with the task of the presidential office was almost, if not actually, a failure. Which is more important as a qualification for the office of President—to be an artist in politics or a scholar? Was this the difference between Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt? Anyway, this is an interesting basis for the comparative study of American Presidents.

The President's roles in self-defense, as manager of social justice and prosperity, and as director of war and peace are shown to be important roles of his office. The reorganization of the executive is critically examined, and important suggestions are made. This book is an informative supplement to the literature on the Presidency.

C. PERRY PATTERSON

University of Texas

WEBSTER, NOAH. *Letters of Noah Webster*. Edited by Harry R. Warfel. Pp. xlvii, 562. New York: Library Publishers [c. 1953]. \$7.50.

To later generations of Americans, Noah Webster came to be known as the man who set the pattern for the American language, and made his name synonymous with the word "Dictionary." But to his contemporaries he was something far different. They knew him, to be sure, as a man who was uncommonly conscious of his importance as a lexicographer and grammarian, with a special penchant for disposing ruthlessly of all critics and criticisms. But they knew him also as rather more than an amateur scientist, one who wrote and published *A Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential Diseases*, as the author of a *History of the United States*, as editor of a revised version of the Bible, and above all as a commentator on politics who wrote letters,

generally unsolicited and sometimes unappreciated, to such individuals as Samuel Adams, James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Timothy Pickering, Thomas Jefferson, Oliver Wolcott, Rufus King, John Jay, and Daniel Webster.

In politics Noah Webster was a conservative of the first magnitude; furthermore, he identified his opinions with high principle, and felt called upon to castigate his opponents as unmitigated rogues. His letter to Thomas Jefferson, written in October 1801, expressed well the sentiments of extreme anti-Jeffersonians; but with hardly a change it would have satisfied anti-Jackson men equally well in 1829, or anti-Roosevelt men in 1933. Webster's unofficial definitions of the words Republican and Democrat still make interesting reading. "Republicans," he said, are "the friends of our Representative Governments, who believe that no influence whatever should be exercised in a state which is not directly authorized by the Constitution and the laws." But a Democrat is "a person who attempts an undue opposition to or influence over government by means of private clubs, secret intrigues, or by popular meetings"; or, more simply, just "an opposer of administration generally" (p. 208).

These letters supplement and reinforce Warfel's biography of Webster, published in 1936. They range the whole gamut of Webster's interests, his efforts to obtain copyright laws, his theories about the yellow fever, his views on history, education, agriculture, manufacturing, and the reform of the alphabet, his replies to his critics, and his political observations. His long letter to John Pickering should be of interest to all students of language, and for the social and political historian nearly every letter has a point. The editing is painstakingly done, and is reinforced by both an index of words and a good general index.

JOHN D. HICKS

University of California

BETTS, EDWIN MORRIS (Ed.). *Thomas Jefferson's Farm Book: With Commentary and Relevant Extracts from Other Writings*. Foreword by Francis L. Berkeley, Jr. (Facsimile 179 pp.). Pp. xxiii,

552. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953. \$15.00.

Thomas Jefferson, while a man of many interests, was both a Virginia plantation owner-operator and a countryman of distinction. He loved his ancestral acres, his home, and the environment in which he was born, lived, and died. However, he was much more than a farmer in the ordinary sense. Monticello, as a place where new ideas were being tried out and Arthur Young's *Experimental Agriculture* was carefully studied, was perhaps more than any other farm or plantation of its time the forerunner of agricultural science and the agricultural experiment station of today. Jefferson's remarkable imagination, curiosity, and scientific instincts, coupled with his capacity for careful observation and accurate record-keeping and note-taking, make him very important in our history of scientific agriculture and rural life. Thomas Jefferson for more than fifty years kept two notebooks close at hand in which he carefully recorded or casually jotted down observations and notes about horticulture and farm management.

Thomas Jefferson's *Farm Book* is a companion to the previously published *Garden Book*. Both were edited by the same author and published by the Princeton University Press under the auspices of the American Philosophical Society of which Jefferson was at one time president. This volume begins with a brief but excellent introductory essay by Francis L. Berkeley of the University of Virginia Library, which gives the historical setting and the significance of the *Farm Book*, particularly in relation to plantation economy of the time. The major part of the volume naturally divides into two parts: First, a facsimile of Thomas Jefferson's *Farm Book*, and, second, "a commentary and relevant extracts from other writings." For a period of 32 years, 1774-1826, Jefferson jotted down in clear, legible handwriting all kinds of notes and memoranda such as inventories, accounts, bits of handy information, and so forth, in connection with his two plantations, Monticello and Poplar Forest. The facsimile reproduction is excellent and for all practical but non-sentimental purposes the general reader or the meticulous

scholar might just as well have the original in his hands. The second part, which contains the "commentary and relevant extracts from other writings," is of great significance and importance.

The *Farm Book* standing alone is fragmentary and incomplete and does not have much of value except as source material for the research scholar. Dr. Betts, the editor, is professor of biology at the University of Virginia and is the foremost student of the agricultural and horticultural phases of Jefferson's life and activities in Monticello. He has carefully examined all the available letters and other material of Jefferson. He selected and organized this material under topical headings which relate it where possible to the *Farm Book*. Each topic is introduced by a critical explanatory statement.

This edition of Thomas Jefferson's *Farm Book*, with the letters and commentary, is both an important source book and a contribution to biography. It will be of particular interest to students of the life and personality of Jefferson, to agricultural and other historians who are concerned with plantation agriculture, and with the emergence of scientific agriculture. To the "countryman" this is a classic for those who live in the country and enjoy and appreciate its historical literature.

M. L. WILSON

U. S. Department of Agriculture
(Retired) Washington, D. C.

ROOSEVELT, THEODORE. *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*. Vols. VII and VIII *The Days of Armageddon, 1909-1919*. Edited by Elting E. Morison et al. Pp. xiv, 816; viii, 817-1621. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. \$20.00.

This is the fourth and the last two-volume set of Theodore Roosevelt's letters to appear under the editorship of Morison and his associates. During the period the editors were preparing their earlier volumes, all the unpublished letters from Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge were closed, but later Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. made available to the editors the letters written between 1884 and 1906. Lodge and Roosevelt were the closest of life-long

friends, and they were constant associates in politics, excepting only the Bull Moose years. It would seem, therefore, that until the full correspondence between Roosevelt and Lodge has been made available to scholars, there will remain a great deal to be revealed concerning the influence of these two men upon each other and of their tactics and strategy in relation to other men and the issues.

The letters published in the two volumes under review represent perhaps less than one tenth of the total available for the period covered, but scrupulous and painstaking care in their selection and extended and illuminating comment in the editor's footnotes, including explanations of the matter on which Roosevelt was writing, give the selections high value. In them Roosevelt reveals himself as an eager, joyous, and successful big game hunter, a fairly prolific contributing editor, candidate for President (1912), a hater and often an unfair critic of Woodrow Wilson, a champion of the Allies long before the United States entered the First World War, a would-be division commander in that war, an inordinately proud father (his four sons and son-in-law were in the service, and his son Quentin was killed), and a skeptic regarding world organization and peace plans.

By no means the least significant contribution of these volumes is found in Appendix V, "A Note on Method and Materials," by John W. Blum. The note evaluates the principal sources in such a manner as to be of the greatest possible aid to other Roosevelt scholars and students of his time. Furthermore, the author supplies an additional aid by indicating certain collections which one might assume to be sources but which, in fact, are not rewarding. The Manuscript Collections, some two hundred, are listed in Appendix VI, those being italicized that proved most useful to the editors. The editors would be the first to agree that the basic Roosevelt scholar must go beyond these eight volumes of letters, to the materials the editors combed and other sources, for definitive study of one of America's most versatile and engaging men. But the scholar will nevertheless find the Morison collection of great value, and the general

reader and student will find it revealing, interesting, stimulating, and at times amusing.

CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON

State College of Washington

PRESSLY, THOMAS J. *Americans Interpret Their Civil War*. Pp. xvi, 347. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. \$5.00.

Professor Pressly has written an interesting and valuable book. It is a survey of the literature relating to the origin and character of the Civil War. In the first third of it there is laid a good foundation in a detailed study of what the protagonists themselves had to say about the war both during its course and after it was over. Upon this is built an account of the subsequent treatment of the subject by the historians both amateur and professional. The turning point in the story is reached with the work of James Ford Rhodes and the rise of academic historiography. In this Professor Pressly very rightly sees the prevalence of a nationalist school of thought. But its conclusions have subsequently been challenged by students dominated successively by the influence of political radicalism, a revived Southern sectarianism, and an extreme abhorrence of war. Professor Pressly thinks that today there are signs of a new synthesis; and his books ends with a discussion of the extent to which this has been achieved by Professor Nevins in his study of the *Ordeal of the Union*.

It is, of course, extremely difficult at so short a range to see things in a true perspective. And it may be that not all those whose work is here discussed will look in the long run as large as they do now. It is the case, to an extent greater perhaps than Professor Pressly allows, that historical interpretation is cumulative. It does not follow, because historical understanding is relative and not absolute, that all we can look for is a mere fluctuation of equally valid but incoherent versions of past events. To accept this would be to make less than full use of a familiar and well-established scientific procedure. No hypothesis comprehends all the evidence. Every pattern has its discards. But every scrap of evidence discarded is a challenge to the ade-

quacy of the accepted pattern; and historical, like scientific, progress consists in enlargement of the hypothesis to comprehend more of the facts. In this point of view a charge, hinted at on page 299, may be preferred against a good deal of recent work that it has consisted too much of debate and too little of investigation. For it is to be expected of new viewpoints not merely that they should put in a new light what is already familiar, but that they should make intelligible some of the evidence that has hitherto been left aside.

H. HALE BELLOT

University College, University of London

WOODMASON, CHARLES. *The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve of the Revolution: The Journal and Other Writings of Charles Woodmason, Anglican Itinerant*. Edited with an Introduction by Richard J. Hooker. Pp. xxxix, 305. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953. \$5.00.

Charles Woodmason spent only about two decades of his life in America, yet in that brief span he managed to live two almost opposite lives. From 1752 until December 1765, Woodmason was a fairly successful planter, land-speculator, and minor office holder. From the fall of 1766, at the completion of his visit in England, until late in 1774, he was an Anglican clergyman. Most of his clerical duties were performed in the backcountry of South Carolina. His private journal, for parts of the years 1766, 1767, and 1768, three of his sermon books, a few letters, and numerous miscellaneous writings have been preserved. They are here collected and published for the first time.

This volume consists of an introductory essay and three parts. The first section contains the *Journal*; the second, Woodmason's miscellaneous writings on "Society and Institutions of the Backcountry"; and the final part includes the writings of this frontier clergyman in regard to the South Carolina Regulator movement. Here again can be noted an interesting ambivalence. In the first two sections, the reader is almost overwhelmed by the bitterness with which this Anglican clergyman denounces the Baptists and Presbyterians, exposes the

lack of morality among the frontier people, and reveals the barrenness of life in the Carolina Piedmont. In the last section, however, Woodmason is the apologist and defender of the political rights of these same people. More than any of his contemporaries, he verbalized the situation and fought for a redress of grievances.

Professor Hooker has done a laudable job of editing these documents. His introductory essay evidences a staggering amount of research into the life and activity of Woodmason. He presents the result of this labor in such form that the reader senses the importance of the material that is to follow and becomes interested in the writer. The introduction to part three—the Regulator Documents—is a superb essay which explains the movement, establishes its place in our national history, and clarifies the way in which the South Carolina Regulators differed from their more famous namesakes in North Carolina. Throughout the sources, explanations and cross references abound.

He who reads this volume must, of course, balance Woodmason's violent language with a knowledge of his intense prejudice. Having done this, with the editor's help, many readers will find that they have gained new insight into frontier conditions and problems. In addition, it seems safe to say, many readers will have been intrigued by the personality of Woodmason and by the passions and the contradictions which drove him with such intensity toward frustration and unhappiness.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

Cornish Flat, New Hampshire

PATRICK, REMBERT W. *Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border, 1810-1815*. Pp. x, 359. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1954. \$5.00.

Among the components of the United States of America which have a Spanish background none is more venerable than Florida (unless Puerto Rico is included). Yet Florida's history has probably been less explored than the histories of Texas, New Mexico, and California. Capable local historians are industriously writing Florida history, however, as this and other recent works on the subject demonstrate.

Professor Patrick's thorough and well-written volume deals with the efforts of the United States government and its frontier citizens to seize Florida from Spain—or rather the Floridas, for at this time there was both an East and a West Florida. The efforts failed, but they are no less interesting on that account. West Florida was occupied during the period, but was not ceded by Spain until East Florida was also ceded by the Treaty of 1819, ratified two years later.

Professor Patrick roundly condemns the United States for most of its Florida policies. "For more than a quarter-century," he declares, "the United States used diplomacy, intrigue, chicanery, force, and war in its march on the Floridas. . . . The encouragement and consequent repudiation of eager, patriotic George Mathews was indefensible. In their cavalier treatment of him the president [Madison] and secretary [Monroe] acted as autocrats casting aside and denouncing a faithful servant to save themselves embarrassment. By invading the territory of and making war on a friendly power [Spain] without the consent of Congress, President Madison followed in the steps of Old World dictators. The ideals of the young American republic were forgotten as his desire for the Floridas overcame his sense of justice" (p. 303).

It is well to remember, however, that the United States was not only suffering injury from the Napoleonic Wars but was also gravely disturbed by the fear that its security would be threatened by the seizure, sooner or later, of these adjacent Spanish possessions by England or some other strong European power. And it should also be recalled that national unity had long been threatened by the machinations of Spain, England, and France in the Floridas and in the Old Southwest. Approval of these Florida policies and procedures not only by Madison and Monroe but by Thomas Jefferson, Henry Clay, and many other leaders of the time may not justify them, but it tends to create a presumption in favor of their reasonableness in view of the grave circumstances in which they occurred.

It was the United States Senate that re-

jected the policy of territorial acquisition by aggression and checked Madison, Monroe, and their advisers in their plans of conquest. "Eventually," says Professor Patrick, "the United States acquired the Floridas by fair negotiation. Title to the provinces resulted from a negotiated treaty and not from trickery and force" (p. 304). But the garrisons of the United States were never withdrawn from West Florida after 1814, and Andrew Jackson invaded East Florida in 1818. Spain may be said, therefore, to have negotiated under duress and to have ceded these provinces very reluctantly, after pleading in vain for British support.

The author has used a great variety of sources, both published and in manuscript, and has told his story with evident zest. Two secondary works which he does not refer to in his notes or mention in his bibliography, Frank Updike's *Diplomacy of the War of 1812* and J. Fred Rippy's *Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America*, might have given him a firmer grasp of the broader diplomatic aspects of the problem; and a map would have enabled the reader to follow the details of his narrative with greater ease.

J. FRED RIPPY

University of Chicago

ALDEN, JOHN RICHARD. *The American Revolution, 1775-1783*. Pp. xviii, 294. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$5.00.

This volume is the second in "The New American Nation Series" edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris. It contains in a clear, concise style many of the findings of students of the American Revolution during the half century since Claude Van Tyne's volume in the original "American Nation Series" edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.

In keeping with recent trends in scholarship, Dr. Alden finds that George III was not a monstrous tyrant, discovers no hard and fast line between the Radicals and Conservatives, praises the Second Continental Congress for its achievements, and is inclined to believe that the Articles of Confederation were mostly good. He seems

definitely convinced that Silas Deane sold secrets to the British, doubts that a Conway Cabal ever existed, believes the number and intellectual importance of the Loyalists have been exaggerated, and omits the Galloway Plan for colonial administration and conciliation.

Although it appears hard for him to do so in some passages, he confesses the movement for independence was inarticulate before the fall of 1775. He admits that the philosophy of the American Revolution was based on earlier philosophies and precedents. Yet, in his opinion, the Americans combined them in a way that made them liberal—even progressive. Consequently, Jefferson's Declaration, the supreme summation of their views, has revolutionized history.

Dr. Alden is prudently cautious in following the lead of writers who have seen in the land reforms of the Revolutionary generation the development of a more equitable distribution of land. But he seems a little too exuberant in his statements about more liberal voting laws when the colonies became states, and he errs in stating that a Virginian had to own five hundred acres of undeveloped land to possess the ballot. The amount was fifty acres, the same under the state government as under colonial law. Dr. Alden probably is also on shaky ground when he implies, at least, that the western population of Virginia was more equitably represented in the new state government than it had been under the colonial regime.

The most disappointing feature of the book is, in my opinion, its scant and oversimple treatment of revolutionary propaganda and of the intellectual, moral, social, and economic phases of the period. Its most excellent aspect is its splendid description of military campaigns, analyzed mainly from the standpoint of commanders and strategy and, consequently, not overly burdened with detail. The undocumented statement that Massachusetts instructed its delegation in the Continental Congress to vote for independence in January, 1776, is rather startling, since Elbridge Gerry wrote a letter to James Warren, dated March 26, 1776, in which he suggested that the General Court of Massachusetts send such

instructions. Gerry was one of the representatives of Massachusetts in the Congress. Disconcerting, too, are the assertions that the delegates of South Carolina and Georgia were sent similar instructions by their governments on or before April 5, 1776. Leading historians of those states have not mentioned such forwardness in the independence movement.

ROBERT L. HILLDRUP

Mary Washington College
University of Virginia

MOORE, GLOVER. *The Missouri Controversy, 1819-1821*. Pp. xi, 383. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1953. \$6.00.

The Missouri Compromise is imbedded in American history as thoroughly as George Washington or Christopher Columbus, and it has come to be considered as much a matter of fact as either of these. Therefore, what could there be new about these Missouri Compromises (for there were really two, or even three, before the question was settled), and why should one write a whole book on the subject? Would it not be retelling a twice-told tale? Professor Glover Moore, who teaches history at Mississippi State College, thought that the story was worth a book and that in fact the whole tale had never yet been told. And anyone who will read this interesting and well-written book will likely agree with the author.

The first debate over the admission of Missouri in the early part of 1819 produced little or no comment outside of Congress, and only by propaganda meetings designed to induce Congress to prohibit slavery in Missouri was the question made mildly exciting to the country as a whole. As the question became more involved during the next two years, the country began to take more notice; but even so, people in general were still more concerned with what could be done about the hard times produced by the Panic of 1819. So, though the dispute sounded to Thomas Jefferson like "a fire bell in the night," and it seemed to John Quincy Adams like "a title-page to a great tragic volume," yet the general public failed to take alarm.

But Professor Moore would not have it

understood that the Missouri Controversy was not important. Indeed, it was of vast importance, for it was not a flash out of a clear sky; it brought to the surface a tension which had long been growing between the North and South. And it also gave almost perfect proof that from that time to the outbreak of the Civil War there was to be little or nothing new under the sun in the American political struggle over slavery; for in this controversy appeared the clear outlines of the abolition crusade, the secession threat, Seward's higher law doctrine, Douglas' squatter sovereignty panacea, the Wilmot Proviso, and the threat of political parties based on geography.

Professor Moore has bolstered his book with the results of an impressive amount of research upon a couple of dozen collections of manuscript correspondence, more than a hundred newspaper files, and various pamphlets and books.

E. MERTON COULTER

University of Georgia

MOORE, GUY W. *The Case of Mrs. Surratt*. Pp. xi, 142. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. \$3.00.

Although this small volume of little more than a hundred pages, which examines the truth of the complicity of Mrs. Surratt in the assassination of President Lincoln, is distinctly a piece of historical research, it should make a wider appeal than merely to scholars of the Civil War period; it should hold interest for the students of political science, and, indeed, for all lovers of justice.

Interest in the case cannot, of course, be as keen today as it was at the time of the conspiracy trial, or immediately thereafter when doubts began to be entertained as to her guilt. However, it is never too late to try to establish the truth, and, as far as history can do it, to right a wrong.

Unfortunately, the author is able to reach no definite conclusion in regard to the justice of Mrs. Surratt's execution. He is properly careful and objective in weighing evidence, recognizes that second-hand evidence is difficult to evaluate (p. 10, note 42), has checked statements from one source with other sources wherever

possible, and accepts the fact that secondary evidence is not definitive. The conclusion reached is cautious: "there was and is a reasonable doubt" (p. 105), and again the author explicitly speaks of "the death of a woman whose guilt was never more than a guess" (p. 118).

Many questions, which would naturally arise in the mind of the reader, even if the author did not raise them, are still left unanswered, and there is little likelihood—barring the improbable event of the discovery of further documentary proof—that further research will resolve these questions. The author has made a thorough investigation of all available materials, both manuscript and printed, as is attested by the footnotes and bibliography.

The organization is simple and straightforward: the background and life of Mrs. Surratt is given briefly and the *dramatis personae* of the group in her boardinghouse on H Street in Washington introduced. The involved, protracted controversies ever since her death are reviewed and the evidence produced at the trial painstakingly weighed, upon which evidence the conclusion—so far as a conclusion is drawn—is based.

The style is simple and clear and touched with dramatic vividness. Several illustrations are used to dramatize a book so filled with drama that it scarcely needs such a gruesome illustration as the Execution of the Conspirators (facing p. 84). For those who can enjoy the newspaper account of the actual execution, a photograph of the *Constitutional Union* for July 7, 1865 is reproduced (facing p. 116), though in so small a type as to be difficult to decipher. A map of Washington to show the relative location of her house to Ford's Theater and other key points in the drama is mildly helpful.

ELLA LONN

Goucher College

DORRIS, JONATHAN T. *Pardon and Amnesty Under Lincoln and Johnson*. Pp. 460. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953. \$7.50.

Almost thirty years ago Professor Dorris began his study of amnesty and pardon in the reconstruction period. The his-

torians of that period have waited with anticipation for his promised book on this tremendously important subject. If it has been a long time coming, Dr. Dorris can plead, in addition to the usual professorial excuse of the press of other duties, that he had to perform a truly massive job of research. He can also say that he wanted his book to be, when it appeared, as nearly definitive as he could make it and that definitive books on significant subjects are not made in a few years. And he has produced what should stand as the classic account for a much longer period than it took him to complete his research.

Here is the story, told with as much detail as even the specialist could ask for, of pardon and amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson and of the long struggle of the former Confederates to regain their rights and privileges. By far the greater part of the book is concerned with the policies of the two Presidents and with their radical opponents, but the narrative goes down to 1898, when the last disabilities imposed during reconstruction were finally removed. Among the topics treated by Dr. Dorris are: political prisoners, military oaths, pardon attorneys, pardons for the rich, pardons for civil leaders, presidential and congressional amnesty, and pardon and amnesty in the courts. Wisely he decided to highlight his essentially legal account by relating case histories of representative Confederates who sought pardons: Lee, General Ewell, General Howell Cobb, John H. Reagan, Clement C. Clay, and others. A chapter is devoted to Jefferson Davis, who refused to ask for a pardon, although others interceded for him.

All of the subject matter in this book, it should be noted, is difficult and tricky stuff. This is constitutional and judicial history, hard to research and digest and harder to present in comprehensible terms. Dr. Dorris' volume is not one to curl up with for a long evening, but it is as readable and as interesting as a book of this kind can be. Much of its human interest results from the fact that the author had access to the revealing and intimate letters in the Amnesty Papers in the National Archives. He seems to be the only historian who has used them.

Professor Dorris is sympathetic to the South and to the Southern view of reconstruction, perhaps overly so. Nevertheless, he concludes that the clemency of the government during and after the war was in the best tradition of American justice and democracy.

T. HARRY WILLIAMS

Louisiana State University

WENDT, LLOYD, and HERMAN KOGAN. *Big Bill of Chicago*. Pp. 384. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953. \$4.00.

REID, ED. *The Shame of New York*. Pp. xii, 235. New York: Random House, 1953. \$3.00.

These tales of two American cities in the twentieth century will not make any American proud of the record of our municipal government. The first book is history, the second an account of contemporary New York, with the vice, crime, and crooked politics there portrayed still presumably continuing.

Big Bill Thompson has been dead these ten years. He left, at the age of 77, over two million dollars, two-thirds of it in old-style currency stuffed into safe deposit boxes. Where he got that money has never been explained. He left more, however: an immense city debt, a record of astonishing corruption, gangsterism, and demagoguery. At the height of his power, he and his political mentor, Congressman Fred Lundin, had such a thoroughly organized political machine that it was called the Thompson Tammany. While Thompson ranted about King George, Lundin from his hotel room took care of graft, patronage, and strategy; until the break came between them, Lundin hoped to make Thompson President, and the William Hale Thompson Republican Club had a war chest of over \$100,000 for this purpose. As it was, not only was the government of Chicago in their control, but Governor Len Small and other state officials were their men as well.

Persons who are today horrified at the attacks on schools, teachers, textbooks, and libraries might well remember that it was William Hale Thompson who showed this way to get votes. One of the chief issues in his third (and successful) campaign

for mayor was his attack upon the schools and their "un-American" textbooks. While Thompson shot off his verbal fireworks about the schools, Thompsonites on the school board were robbing the schools of millions of dollars. Although he succeeded in his immediate objective, Thompson's attack on the schools plagued him for the rest of his life and made "Chicago the object of ridicule and laughter all over the world." This may be cold comfort to the victims of current attacks, but it is still something to hope for.

Somehow the account of the antics of Thompson does not seem as funny or as sympathetic as the same authors' *Lords of the Levee* on Hinky Dink Kenna and Bathhouse John Coughlin. His clowning now seems disgusting, his corruption merely repulsive. The voters who, over and over, re-elected him deserve a share of the blame for those incredible decades of Chicago politics. Their behavior seems today depressing.

Anybody who thinks that, with Thompson gone, it can never happen again should read Reid's book on New York. Here are the same vice and crime, the crooked police, the political tie-ins, the gangster-selected judges—all the elements of the scene in Thompson's Chicago except for the blatant demagoguery. The political and gang murders in New York seem to be about as numerous as those in Chicago, but they appear to be committed less spectacularly. Probably the amount of graft has been just as great; Reid says that the Brooklyn police received twelve million dollars a year over several years in gambling protection alone. Much of what Reid recites is familiar to people who followed the Kefauver and other investigations of recent years. Much of the rest is unsupported—perhaps unavoidably—by anything except the author's own assertions.

Both of these books suffer from the newspaperman's dislike of documentation. A hundred times a reader may wonder, "How do they know Thompson thought that, back in 1927?" The most complicated conversations of conspirators are put down word for word as if the authors had been sitting in the room, not merely taking notes, but accompanied by a court

stenographer who got every name, initial, and dollar figure. It is not always possible to tell what is real and what is merely possible or hypothetical, to distinguish what was said from what might have been said.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN

University of Colorado

FREIDEL, FRANK. *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal*. Pp. 320. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1954. \$6.00.

This second volume of Dr. Freidel's biography covers from January 1919, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt was still Assistant Secretary of the Navy, through his attack of poliomyelitis in 1921, his long uphill fight for health, and finally his election in 1928 as Governor of New York State. In smooth, colorful narrative, derived from diffuse and complex materials handled with critical selectivity and sustained perspective, Dr. Freidel has closely interwoven biography and history.

After F.D.R.'s resignation from the Navy and his subsequent defeat in November 1920 for the Vice-Presidency, he entered every activity which might bring him advantageous recognition, including work on national Democratic party policy. Dr. Freidel asserts that the number of causes he espoused, the mass of his methodically prosecuted correspondence from New York with party figures over the country, and his prolonged championship of Alfred E. Smith for the Presidency—all reflect his own fixed purpose to become President. He fortifies this interpretation by following the movements of Louis McH. Howe, F.D.R.'s secretary and member of his household, a wily, indefatigable political manipulator, obsessed with making F.D.R. President.

Dr. Freidel, no hero-worshiper, emphasizes F.D.R.'s apparently discreditable handling, as Assistant Secretary, of disputes with high naval officers concerning penal and other problems affecting Navy personnel; exposes his ethically questionable appearance as a lawyer before the Navy Department representing a concern for which he had formerly, as Assistant Secretary, procured favorable departmental action; and discloses some weird financial

ventures and promotions in which F.D.R. invested time and money.

But, throughout, F.D.R. is contagiously alive, warm, and appealing; immature and superficial, even into his forties, about public questions, yet intuitively, if shrewdly, pursuing justice and decency; in domestic affairs, a dualistic disciple of both Carter Glass and Al Smith, and in foreign relations, a follower of the Woodrow Wilson vision.

Dr. Freidel gives us gripping drama in the preludes and scenes of the 1924 national Democratic convention, where Smith, pushed by F.D.R., deadlocked with McAdoo on the issues of religion and liquor control, so that John W. Davis was nominated. The final chapter's stirring account of how F.D.R., the cripple, was dragooned by Smith into running for the New York governorship in 1928 and gallantly won his "Victory by a Hair's Breadth"—the definite upward turning point in his career—leaves us eager for the next volume. If, in the four still to come, Dr. Freidel can hold the quality of this one, we can well expect the work to have permanent pre-eminence.

LOUIS B. WEHLE

New York City

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

BURNS, ARTHUR F. *The Frontiers of Economic Knowledge: Essays*. Pp. xi, 367. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press (published for the National Bureau of Economic Research), 1954. \$5.00.

This volume is a collection of essays, all of which have already appeared in one form or another. Those of Part I have been published as the Annual Reports of the *National Bureau of Economic Research* for which Dr. Burns was responsible from the time he succeeded the late Wesley C. Mitchell as Director of Research of the Bureau in 1945 until he was granted a leave of absence in 1953 to become chairman of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisers. Those of Part II consist of eight items made up largely of

prefaces to earlier Bureau publications, journal articles, full-dress book reviews. The latter group of papers range in time from Dr. Burns's essay on "Long Cycles in Residential Construction" originally published in the *Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell* in 1935 to his review of J. R. Hicks's *Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle* which came out in the *Journal of Political Economy* in 1952.

No formal development is to be expected in a miscellany of this sort. Nonetheless an essential unity and coherence is given by the cumulative effect of repetition of two or three leading ideas which make the book a treatise on the scope, method, and achievements of empiricist economics, as well as a convenient source of otherwise scattered writings.

The underlying leitmotif is methodological. To push the frontiers of economic knowledge beyond their present limits, what is needed, according to our author, is emphasis on the painstaking collection and organization of facts prior to the elaboration of explanatory systems. The lifework of Wesley Clair Mitchell, to whom a moving tribute is paid, and the continued labors of the Bureau, particularly on business cycles, exemplify this procedure at its best. Notable progress has been made in defining the phenomenon of business cycles in realistic terms—all this in the hope that out of the close and ingenious study of empirical data, somehow a satisfactory theoretical elucidation will come, at least a more satisfactory one than that given by Keynes or Hicks, for example, whose models are vitiated by assumptions, such as that of a practically constant consumption function or that of a constant investment coefficient, for which there is no empirical justification. It is, however, to be observed that Wesley Mitchell, for all his heroic labors, never got beyond the first half of his program, which he was wont to symbolize in the Marshallian phrase, "The Many in the One," but neither his work nor that of his associates and successors has yet given us a clue to "The One in the Many." Perhaps a little more attention to Alfred Marshall would help, particularly to Mar-

shall's admonition that while "the economist must be greedy of facts, . . . facts by themselves teach nothing." Not that Dr. Burns is unaware of this, for the principle is clearly invoked in his penetrating review of Dr. Nourse's *American Capacity to Produce*.

The National Bureau of Economic Research is to be commended for republishing Dr. Burns's recent papers, for their value as a collection lies not only in the methodological and analytical developments of interest to the economist, but also in the discussions relating to economic policy which are of interest to the political scientist and to the bewildered citizen seeking to clarify current issues.

WILLIAM JAFFÉ

Northwestern University

BENNETT, M. K. *The World's Food: A Study of the Interrelations of World Populations, National Diets, and Food Potentials*. Pp. vi, 282. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$4.00.

Reviewing a thousand years of population growth, Bennett concludes: "I hope that I have shown convincingly that consumption levels had risen over a large fraction of the population, that calorie consumption per capita cannot have fallen, that, again over a large fraction of the population, diets had become more diversified in composition, that famine from natural causes had fallen from its status as a nearly universal risk to a status of risk to a much diminished fraction of the swollen population of today."

Part II deals with the American national diet and how it has changed since the years just preceding World War I, and Part III reviews the food consumption in the various parts of the world today and food management as it was developed during the recent war.

The United States spends nearly one-fourth of total disposable personal income for about 1500 pounds of food per person per year. Since the days before World War I, the total poundage has risen but calorie consumption has fallen by about five percent. The consumption of carbohydrates and of proteins has been reduced, but the consumption of milk, vege-

tables, fruit, and eggs, and thus of calcium, iron, and the major vitamins has increased. Grain products and potatoes together provide about 27 per cent of our total calories; formerly they provided 42 per cent.

Part III deals with international comparisons. Here Bennett makes extensive use of the Food Balance Sheets which have been assembled by FAO (the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), though he challenges the accuracy of many of the figures which are contained in them, as well as the standards from which deficiencies are measured. He insists that large proportions of the world's population were not short of calories before the war or in recent years. A part of the disagreement is due to the use of different standards. Bennett is concerned with the point at which bodily weight can be maintained; the FAO standards on the other hand are concerned with diets which will promote health. He finds that per capita national income tends rather strongly to determine the degree of national dependence on cheap, starchy staples, though dietary habits and preferences play a strong role as well.

With a persistent search for the facts and a skeptical approach to generalizations, as well as to the bridges which have been constructed over the many gaps in the existing body of facts, he presents in highly readable form the results of many years of painstaking research. He has no causes other than getting at the facts; he scorns the emotionalism that surrounds much current discussion of the relations of population and food supplies and what to him is the "sterile arithmetic" of projections of present trends into an indefinite future. He offers no solutions to the problems of feeding the world's growing population. But his contribution to the thinking about these problems comes from the clear presentation of these problems, of his point of view, and of his findings.

CONRAD TAEUBER

U. S. Bureau of the Census

CHAMBERLAIN, NEIL W., and JANE METZGER SCHILLING. *The Impact of Strikes: Their Social and Economic Costs*. Pp. viii, 257. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$4.00.

In an earlier study, *Social Responsibility and Strikes*, Professor Chamberlain of the Labor and Management Center of Yale University devised a method for measuring the cost of strikes in terms of their impact upon the various publics affected, including consumers, industrial users of the struck product, and suppliers of the struck firm. The procedure thus worked out is reproduced in this volume, which applies the technique to seventeen strikes in the coal, railroad, and steel industries and obtains comparative scores for each strike.

In thus attempting to reduce the effect of strikes to quantitative terms the authors must make a number of assumptions at critical points, as they must often fall back upon impressionistic judgments because no data are available. Nevertheless they have sought to get the most reliable figures available, and have shown considerable ingenuity in combining the various effects of strikes into a mathematical formula. The authors take account of the cultural necessity of the product, the period of time that existing stocks will last, and the extent to which other products can be substituted. From all these an urgency rating is derived; and this in turn, in combination with the number of persons affected, yields a score for the strike. Each strike is rated as of a particular day, usually the last day that it was fully in effect.

The authors are greatly concerned with the implications of their findings for public policy. They conclude that some strikes are serious, not because they withhold final products from consumers, but because they deprive employees in related industries of employment income. They criticize the drawing up of lists of industries in which strikes are forbidden or in which government is empowered to intervene—typically on the ground that the products or services are vital to consumers—as a limited and faulty approach to the problems presented by major strikes. They argue for administrative flexibility in the control of strikes, and offer their strike rating procedure as an aid to sounder judgments than are presently made.

This volume represents an important contribution to the study of strike effects.

Both in its method of analysis and in its effort to quantify, it marks a substantial advance over the mere listing of industries whose continued operation is thought vital enough to justify governmental intervention.

JOEL SEIDMAN

University of Chicago

HARBISON, FREDERICK H., and JOHN R. COLEMAN. *Working Harmony: A Summary of the Collective Bargaining Relationships in 18 Companies*. Case Study No. 13 in series "Causes of Industrial Peace under Collective Bargaining." Pp. xii, 64. Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1953. \$1.00.

This is an excellent summary by Frederick H. Harbison, Executive Officer of the Industrial Relations Center, University of Chicago, and John R. Coleman, Assistant Professor, Industrial Relations Section, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. As in all of these studies by the National Planning Association, the principal question is, what makes collective bargaining tick? And the answers are found in the attitudes of management and unions toward one another; attitudes of trust, of accommodation, of informality, and of constructive collective bargaining. There may be fighting, but it is principally the conflicts of conference and debate.

The reader will be swayed by alternate feelings of optimism and pessimism; optimism when he sees peaceful relations growing and their beneficial effects upon both companies and unions; pessimism when he notes upon what fortuitous circumstances peaceful relations come about, and upon what slender threads they continue to be maintained. Since harmony does not come about naturally, and, in fact, there are powerful pressures moving both sides toward the area of struggle, the reader is struck with what appears, at first, to be the inconsequential things that ultimately have important effects. Take, for example, the joint union-management safety committees in plants. These committees perform an important service in safety work, but the most important effects are indirect, in that they teach the parties to work together, and they grow to know one another better. So it is with other joint com-

mittees; the principal benefits are indirect. Or take the example of harmonious relations between management and the principal officers of a union; at first sight this appears ideal, but the very circumstance of harmony may lead to a revolt within the union, with charges of class collaboration, however unwarranted, against the incumbent officers. The settlement of grievances is another example; the formal contract procedures are not so important as is the development of informal communication and consultation in the area of problem-solving.

Throughout the summary, the reader is impressed with the highly significant role of management in the development of harmonious relations. The initiative on many points is with management. The unions' requests are basic in the presentation of problems, but it is most frequently from the side of management that the suggestions of co-operation, informal consultation, and of accommodation initially arise. This may be a product of fairly recent history in which many unions were struggling for existence; in any case, the burden appears to be thrown upon management, in very considerable degree, to have the ideas, the imagination, and the initiative, to move into the realm of harmonious industrial relations.

FREDERICK L. RYAN

San Diego State College

FLORENCE, P. SARGANT. *The Logic of British and American Industry: A Realistic Analysis of Industrial Structure and Government*. Pp. xvi, 368. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press (and Routledge and Kegan Paul, London), 1954. \$5.00.

The reports of the various Anglo-American Productivity Teams which visited the United States in recent years stand as a landmark to the thoroughness with which members of these groups surveyed American manufacturing processes and managerial procedures. The competence with which the investigators summarized their findings is indisputable, yet the Teams' recommendations have not had wide implementation in Great Britain, largely because of important differences between the

British and the American working climate, business philosophy, and management technique. Although the work of the Productivity Teams continues, now under the aegis of a new body, the complex question of how to introduce the best and most adaptable production and management methods in Great Britain remains relatively unsolved.

This dilemma, solution of which has vital reference to British prosperity, has been analyzed recently by several economists. Probably the most detailed consideration of the subject to date is presented by Professor P. Sargent Florence in his study, *The Logic of British and American Industry: A Realistic Analysis of Industrial Structure and Government*. An American citizen, Professor Florence has been Professor of Commerce at Birmingham University since 1929, and in 1940-41 he served as Consultant to the United States National Resources Planning Board.

After presenting pertinent information concerning the prevailing size of industrial firms and the pattern of industrial location in Britain and America, Professor Florence interprets the facts in basic terms, such as technical requirements and consumer habits. The contrast between the two countries is discovered mainly in certain social attitudes and motivation, while unexpected similarities are found in industrial structure and government. A wealth of statistical material is presented in easily digested tables.

In what Professor Florence calls the political science of industry, certainly one of the most important issues discussed is how to educate and recruit outstanding young people for business management. "Educational institutions," he argues, "should make it possible for the fittest of the new generation, whatever their class, to prepare for the profession of business government, and thus allow inborn ability plus training plus experience to supply leadership for a new, more efficient, more logical industrial order."

This argument is sustained by a recent editorial in *The Times* which stated, in part, "British business needs a larger share of the ablest men and women trained by the universities whether as technicians or

as managers and directors." Reference should be made to Colonel L. Urwick's brilliant discussion of the whole problem in the report he wrote for the British Specialist Team on Education for Management. Many able observers of the contemporary scene contend that business and financial procedures cannot improve in conception and execution in Great Britain, and indeed in the Commonwealth, unless the range of the managing director, the industrial accountant, the personnel administrator, and the works manager is expanded by higher education.

Professor Florence's book explores this topic in a highly professional manner, and affords adequate discussion of many questions involving labor-management and company-government relations in Britain and America. It should stimulate thought and research on both sides of the Atlantic. The reviewer recommends it especially to those persons whose interests lie in the organization and function of business enterprise, and in the implications of industrial growth and efficiency for national prosperity and international security.

MARY E. MURPHY

Los Angeles State College of
Applied Arts and Sciences

HARRIS, MARSHALL D. *Origin of the Land Tenure System in the United States*. Pp. xiv, 447. Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1953. \$7.50.

The author of this study feels that there is a "serious lack of usable information about the forces that influenced the evolution of the present tenure system" in the United States, and that no adequate study exists of "how basic tenure principles were developed." He offers this study which is intended to help "to determine the processes through which the land tenure system of the United States became what it was at the time of its emergence, just prior to 1800." He is concerned with the "changes made in the land tenure system prior to establishment of the national government"; and the "forces, factors, conditions, and situations that brought about these changes and finally secured their recognition." Despite these statements it is clear that the author was more interested in bringing

together material from various scattered sources than he was in re-examining this enormously complex problem.

The book is made up of twenty-one chapters arranged as follows: One chapter is devoted to a discussion of the nature of land tenure, two discuss the English feudal system, and two more are required to examine the national claims in American and colonial charters in general. Four chapters are then given over to a discussion of the several types of English colonial organization, followed by a chapter examining the relation of the original grants to the colonial tenure systems. The acquisition of title to Indian lands is disposed of in the next chapter. This is followed by six chapters which summarize the various means by which title to land was transferred to individuals and the nature of such titles. The remaining four chapters consider the emergence of the national land system, the factors which influenced the land system, the impact of the Revolutionary War, and the relation of the colonial developments to the United States land policies.

Students of American history will find here very little that is new. The book is legalistic, synoptic, slow-paced, sometimes not wholly clear. The acquisition of land engaged the lively, unremitting, and often scheming attention of hosts of colonists and of many of their countrymen at home, but the author manages quite successfully to keep his book from reflecting anything of this ceaseless, often passionate, pursuit. However, within the limits suggested, he has provided an orderly and usable handbook on the origins of the American tenure system.

VERNON CARSTENSEN

University of Wisconsin

NURKSE, RAGNAR. *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries*. Pp. vii, 163. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$3.00.

Ragnar Nurkse's very readable book discusses the underlying economic realities of capital formation and points out that, whether the institutional framework be capitalist or socialist, development requires that some economic resources be used not

for immediate consumption but to increase capital equipment, that is that society "save" and "invest." To Nurkse the presence in the underdeveloped countries of much underutilized manpower makes theoretically possible an increase in total output—hence a development regimen in which consumption is held constant, with the increased manpower engaged in expanding productive capacity, rather than the more Spartan regimen with consumption actually reduced, as under the classic assumptions of full employment and no technological change. But Nurkse oscillates between a static equilibrium analysis, which highlights low consumer demand as an important obstacle to capital formation (because it deprives the individual businessman of the inducement to invest), and a more dynamic treatment of the development process in which high consumer demand becomes an obstacle to capital formation.

Since development is a process which itself generates within business the demand for capital as well as the supply of funds initially from within business (under socialism investment and savings are even more intimately joined), the reader is led to ask, whether it would not be more fruitful to focus on the sociopolitical forces which in fact condition the initiation of the development process rather than on the surface reflection of this process in current saving and investment.

Nurkse, recognizing that underdeveloped countries often have a cultural environment less conducive to the emergence of economic enterprise, accords greatly expanded functions to the state. But the state is, after all, the product of the same cultural environment (so it too needs a metamorphosis). Furthermore the governments of underdeveloped countries are subject to great pressure to expand immediate consumption. Nurkse attributes this pressure to growing awareness of advanced living standards but still thinks it possible for the state to undertake saving, that is to limit consumption, while leaving much of the actual process of investment in private hands. But, even if such a procedure were to accelerate development, would such a distribution of immediate sacrifices and

privileges be politically viable in the era of the welfare state?

Nurkse gives underdeveloped countries sound advice on the necessity for complementary action on the home front if foreign loans are to be effective, and he helpfully clears away many familiar misconceptions regarding commercial policies in relation to economic development. Unfortunately, Nurkse's bland view of the nature of imperialism may lead readers in newly sovereign countries to dismiss this useful book.

HELEN LAMB

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

CZERWONKY, HUGO E. *Freedom from Insecurity*. Pp. ix, 198. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954. \$3.50.

Mr. Czerwonky, an engineer, who since 1933 has been employed by various federal government agencies, has given us a panacea for a multitude of economic evils. This book is reminiscent of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* to the extent that the solution is simple and is based primarily upon a tax scheme.

The solution, according to Mr. Czerwonky, is the creation of "a society wherein widespread work opportunity persistently prevails." This society would be brought about by the adoption of the maximum-jobs principle of taxation, two-way bargaining, and amendments to the Federal Reserve Act.

Under the maximum-jobs principle of taxation, the federal government would rely almost entirely upon a manufacturers' sales or excise tax on all finished consumer goods. This tax policy would maximize the private savings available for investment, thereby creating maximum work opportunity and competition between employers for the services of wage and salary workers. In such a climate of ever-widening industrial activity, our present labor relations structure would be unnecessary. All labor relations would be governed by individual contracts of employment, a system which is labeled two-way bargaining. The workers, management, and the public would all be protected "because of the umbrella of widespread work opportunity which would continuously prevail." The Federal Reserve Act would be amended so that the

Board of Governors could synchronize the flow of dollars to the flow of consumer goods, thereby eradicating instability within our economic system.

If his program should be adopted, he recommends abolition of unemployment insurance, placing old age pensions on a pay-as-you-go basis, and the allowance of a credit for charitable contributions to the full extent of the federal estate tax. He claims that the adoption of his program would, among other things, eliminate the need for minimum wage legislation, eliminate the discrimination in pay between men and women, eliminate racial discrimination, bring about lasting peace, and make the farmer permanently prosperous.

Although the arguments advanced are supported principally by the repetition of commendatory expressions and promissory representations, Mr. Czerwony points the finger of "economic illiteracy" at the Congress, the entire nation, and even at the economists. Naturally, it is claimed that the fault lies with our educational institutions.

ROBERT L. PATRICK

Louisiana Polytechnic Institute

BULEY, R. CARLYLE. *The American Life Convention, 1906-1952: A Study in the History of Life Insurance*. 2 Vols. Pp. xxx, 680; viii, 681-1397. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. \$15.00.

It is hard to believe that there exists no book on the history of America's biggest business, life insurance. All we have are some books on the history of individual companies and on certain phases of life insurance. Therefore, the two volumes by the Indiana University professor, R. Carlyle Buley, fill a gap and are highly welcome, because the American Life Convention, holding almost 97 per cent of the legal reserve insurance in force in the United States and Canada, "plays a vital part in the study of all phases of life insurance, in the influencing of practices and policies, and in the protection of more than 90,000,000 policyholders."

Part I, in its 247 pages, contains a clear history of life insurance from its beginning, about 2,000 years ago, up to the organization of the American Life Convention in

the year 1906, almost 100 years after the first commercial company in the United States for life insurance business exclusively had been organized and about 75 years after our life insurance was on the eve of its first great advance by mutuals.

In contrast to the highly concentrated first 247 pages, the following 885 pages, covering the years 1906-1952 of the American Life Convention, offer an abundance of details. The list of papers read before the Convention covers 110 pages, the index almost 100. Also the bibliographical notes are excellent. The same is true of the statistical data, year by year. Much of the association's business is conducted in the annual meetings. Thus, the author had to present the volumes to a large degree as a chronicle.

Founded for the betterment of business methods and the protection of common interests and common rights, the American Life Convention's sphere of activity is much broader. It is an organization to "accumulate facts, disseminate information, further education, abolish abuses, eliminate unsound competition, adjust controversies, establish good will, promote confidence, expose frauds, safeguard investments, prevent venal and misguided legislation, and protect policyholders." Furthermore, the American Life Convention played an important part in "one of the most constructive accomplishments of the century in the field of life insurance," the construction of modern mortality tables. The various sections of the Convention show the great variety of problems life insurance has to deal with: economy, law, taxation, actuarial science, medicine.

It is to be hoped that the two excellent volumes will put an end to the deplorable fact that life insurance is ignored by writers of American history books, even when presenting our economic and social development.

ALFRED MANES

St. Petersburg, Florida

CHILDS, MARQUIS W., and DOUGLASS CATER. *Ethics in a Business Society*. Pp. x, 191. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$2.75.

This little book was inspired by the several studies arranged for by the Depart-

ment of Church and Economic Life of the National Council of the Churches of Christ of the United States of America. These studies covered in general and very broadly the relation of religion to economics. The authors state in the Foreword: "What we have written . . . is not a part of the study series itself but rather our interpretation and reflection on all the materials we have used. We have undertaken to present in as readable a form as possible some of the results of the churches' effort to relate the seemingly unrelated parts of our society."

Ethics in a Business Society is more than a summary or digest of the Church series. The authors have drawn from other sources, have added valuable historical perspectives, and have given more unity than was possible in some of the Church series. They paint in broad perspective the really serious problems facing us today, such problems as the following: growing insecurity; the problem of freedom and individualism in an age of giant business; the achievements, real and spurious, of machine technology; the churches' attitude toward imperialism, slavery, and poverty; Marx's "fake religion"; the character and incentives of business leaders; and the alleged spread of corporations and of monopoly. The authors' view of our present status is judicious and properly not very optimistic.

This little book, with all its religious side lights, might well be called "social economics." It is well and interestingly written—one of the most significant books I have read recently. It would be most worthwhile reading for students, and, I venture to assert, even for most economists.

JOHN ISE

University of Kansas

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

GILLIN, JOHN (Ed.). *For a Science of Social Man: Convergences in Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology*. By Howard Becker, John Gillin, A. Irving Hallowell, George Peter Murdock, Theodore M. Newcomb, Talcott Parsons, and

M. Brewster Smith. Pp. vii, 289. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$4.00.

This book contributes importantly to the co-ordination of theoretical positions among the behavioral sciences. The seven authors are evenly divided between anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Each writer is already noted for his cross-disciplinary contributions. Each is asked to consider the relation of his discipline to one or the other of the three fields of inquiry. No brief review can do justice to the richness of the resulting papers. Unlike many compilations that result from solicited contributions, this volume has coherence and consistently high quality.

Murdock, as an anthropologist, believes that sociology is methodologically and scientifically more sophisticated than anthropology but "that the total body of verified theory which has resulted from sociological research compares unfavorably with anthropology in unity, generality of application, in sheer quantity and in potential significance for the integrated human science of the future" (p. 26). M. Brewster Smith as a psychologist provides a penetrating discussion of the interplay between his field and anthropology, a sharp appraisal of culture and of personality as concepts, and the directions from which convergence between the two fields may be expected. Parsons presents views that bear on the theory of action that has become associated with his name and which embraces major notions derived from psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Becker and Hallowell are respectively concerned with scholarly historical resumé of the interplay between sociology and anthropology and between psychology and anthropology. These are useful statements although somewhat less creative and imaginative than the other contributions. With a clarity that is relatively rare in the theoretical writings of social scientists, Newcomb presents a model for constructive collaboration between the sciences of social man that avoids dangers of reductionism but does not reject the idea of levels or of specialization. Gillin, in addition to a foreword, has written the final chapter. It summarizes and restates the position of

the authors in terms of the human organism, human behavior, grouping, culture, social structure, personality, symbolization, and communication. It also enters a plea for more rigorous theory building in the social sciences and for better teaching of the "theory of theories" in the logico-ductive-empirical system of thought.

As might be anticipated, the authors are on the whole singularly without crotchets. They build constructive bridges between disciplines and deal rigorously with meaningful problems. This book is not easy reading, but it is a must for anyone concerned with the theoretical frontiers of that science of man whose development in the last decade has been so rapid and fruitful.

CORA DU BOIS

Institute of International Education
Washington, D. C.

CHRISTIE, RICHARD, and MARIE JAHODA (Eds.). *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality": Continuities in Social Research*. Pp. 279. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. \$4.50.

The subject of this second volume in the *Continuities* series is the unwieldy but seminal book on prejudice and personality by T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford (Harper, 1950). After an introduction by Miss Jahoda that places the book historically, chapters by contributors follow in neat "con" to "pro" order. The argument runs, in caricature, something like this: The California investigators should have studied something different in the first place (E. A. Shils); their methods were totally inadequate for what they did study (H. H. Hyman and P. B. Sheatsley); yet their principal findings have in the main been confirmed in subsequent research (R. Christie). Harold Lasswell's chapter, which follows, is more concerned with his well-known schema for political motivation than with the authoritarian personality, but he apparently accepts the California findings without criticism. In the concluding piece, Else Frenkel-Brunswick considers the book and subsequent related research from the standpoint of a participant.

In his chapter "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left,'" Shils is obsessed with a valid point: that "right" and "left" no longer pose the polar antithesis that ordered the ideological politics of the nineteenth century; that, specifically, if Fascism and Nazi Germany were authoritarian, so are Communism and Soviet Russia. He finds serious fault with the study in that it was not designed to expose the authoritarianism of the left. Undoubtedly the research bears the marks of a pre-Cold-War intellectual climate rather than a post-McCarthy one. But arriving at its focus on the pre-Fascist mentality from an initial and continuing concern with American anti-Semitism, it could hardly have been expected to throw much light on Communist authoritarianism.

The detailed methodological critique by Hyman and Sheatsley, on the other hand, is exemplary as an intellectual exercise in the analysis of research design and inference. One might wish that the authors did not take such relish in their double-barreled critical volleys, but one can only admire the virtuosity of the performance. They prove their case: that *The Authoritarian Personality* did not prove its case.

Christie judiciously assesses several of the book's principal themes in the light of evidence since accumulated. Verdict: While the exact nature and dimensions of authoritarianism remain obscure after the wealth of research stimulated by the book, its conclusions are probably pretty close to the mark for a first approximation. But situational and group membership factors, he holds with Hyman and Sheatsley, are more important than the California authors thought.

One has only to read Frenkel-Brunswick's final chapter to grasp what may have seemed elusive in the earlier sections, why the book created such a stir and warrants this symposium. Here are the same qualities of theoretical subtlety and research imagination that marked the best of the earlier volume. Granted that *The Authoritarian Personality* falls short as definitive research, how much the richer it has left the whole field of social behavior!

M. BREWSTER SMITH

New York City

MEAD, MARGARET (Ed.). *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*. Pp. 348. New York: Columbia University Press (for UNESCO), 1953. \$1.75.

Programs of Technical Assistance potentially open opportunities for social scientists to guide cultural change. This manual demonstrates the eagerness of some social scientists to assume such guidance, the relevance of their interests for the task, and the present immaturity of their knowledge.

The book reflects differences among three groups: (1) the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, anxious to induce rapid economic development in "under-developed" countries; (2) the World Federation for Mental Health, sponsor of the book, aiming to improve "mental health" among all peoples; and (3) anthropologists espousing a doctrine of cultural conservation. Differences among these three groups are most evident in the introduction and conclusions of the book.

Between introduction and conclusions, however, are three chapters of independent worth. First come studies of "whole cultures"—Burma, Palau, Tiv of Nigeria, Greece, and Spanish Americans of New Mexico. The last two are written from new materials. Next follows a summary of some 300 reports on success and failure in efforts to change agriculture, nutrition, child care, health, industry, and education in various other cultures. Finally there is a brief catalogue of psychodynamic processes likely to operate in situations of induced change. None of these three chapters is closely connected with any other or with the initial or concluding generalities.

Since the generalities of the book are but slightly connected with each other or with a body of fact they sometimes express conflicting biases. The anthropological introduction argues, for example, that cultural integration should be preserved at all cost. Any change liable to affect traditional values should be made with caution. Values are said to give "continuity" and "meaning" to life; change of values is difficult for individuals, producing tension and mental illness. But psychological statements in the book indicate that tradi-

tional values in a culture may conceal "obsolete" and psychically "harmful" practices. "Sometimes," the psychologists warn, it may be necessary to alter "the whole structure of belief." Momentous cultural changes may be induced with psychic ease if motivations are correctly manipulated.

These and other apparent contradictions blunt the advice of the book and obscure its wisdom. It may be doubted, too, if the patronizing views put forward concerning the elites of the underdeveloped countries will encourage those elites to request the assistance of social scientists. As an exposure of current chaos in social scientific fact and opinion, the book may rather serve as a challenge to the social scientists themselves.

McKIM MARRIOTT

University of California
Berkeley

VERNANT, JACQUES. *The Refugee in the Post-War World*. Pp. xvi, 827. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. \$6.00.

The refugees are distinctly a modern phenomenon. In earlier eras, exile was the fate reserved for the political elite; only the leaders, by choice or compulsion, found it necessary or desirable to leave their homes in the aftermath of unsuccessful war or revolution. Even the greatest disturbances in the wake of the revolutions of 1789 or 1848 produced relatively few emigres.

Since the First World War, however, displacement of a vast part of the civilian population has been an accepted consequence of war. The settlement of 1918 left hundreds of thousands unable or unwilling to return to the places of their birth; and the peace of 1945 brought the numbers of such displaced persons to the millions. In part, these displacements were due to the impact of nationalistic ideas, often tinged with racism; in part they were the product of a political situation in which the masses were more consequential than ever before in determination of the control of the state. Even in countries in which democracy did not prevail, new circumstances forced commitments on thou-

sands of people from which they found it difficult, under altered conditions, to extricate themselves. As a result, the problem of the refugee has assumed ever larger proportions and presents a continuing challenge to modern society.

A long tradition of "asylum" has offered some sort of privileged status to political fugitives. Refugees, furthermore, have exercised a claim upon the humanitarian sentiments of the West; these displacements, like famines or earthquakes, have customarily been occasions for the display of international solidarity. And the refugees, by their numbers and their connections, are a strategic factor of no mean importance. For all these reasons, their fate has been a subject of concern to the League of Nations, the United Nations, and other international organizations.

The present study undertaken on behalf of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees by Jacques Vernant, with the aid of a Rockefeller grant, is the indispensable handbook for understanding the problems of the refugee. It contains a meticulously accurate summary of all the available information on the question. It focuses its attention upon the period since 1939 and particularly upon those groups under the care of the United Nations; but it covers also the surviving groups of displaced persons from the First World War. By its comprehensive scale and its thoroughness, this study supplants all others.

The work opens with a general consideration of the international problem and of the agencies involved. It proceeds to an analysis of the various groups of refugees, by nationalities. The most substantial section of the volume then follows: a place by place analysis of 39 countries in which refugees are presently found. Under each country is included a history of the immigration, an analysis of the legal and administrative position of the newcomers, and some consideration of their economic and social situation.

As might be expected, the book is more valuable for the information it contains than for the tentative conclusions it reaches. Given the marked differences of circumstances, generalizations as to the state of the newcomers must necessarily be

tentative and circumscribed. Nevertheless, this does not in the least diminish the utility of the work, which will serve students of international migration for years to come.

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

COHEN, ELIE A. *Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp*. Translated from the Dutch by M. H. Braaksma. Pp. xvi, 295. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953. \$5.00.

The author of this volume is a Dutch physician who was a war prisoner of the Nazis from August in 1942 until liberated by Americans in 1945. He was held in the concentration camp Amersfoort, Netherlands, for nearly two months, transferred to the transient camp for Jews at Westerbork, Netherlands, and then shifted to the notorious concentration camp Auschwitz, Poland, where for some fifteen months he experienced all of the horrors that accompanied the extermination program that was carried on there, involving gassings and other forms of extermination of Jews that appear to have run as high as 500,000 a month.

This book, however, is not a personal narrative nor an emotional indictment of German treatment of the prisoners. It is, rather, an objectively analytical study of human reactions to camp existence, devoid of any trace of sentimentality, although illuminated from time to time by personal references that have direct bearing upon the data that are presented. One of its contributions is the systematic presentation of relevant materials that have been carefully combed by the author.

There are four major divisions to the work. An initial chapter provides a documented background concerning the organization, administration, and purposes of the concentration camps, with attention to the devices of extermination that were used. Then follows material on medical aspects of life in the camps, mortality, nutrition, diseases, and sections on medical experiments on prisoners. There is a wealth of carefully correlated material. The longest section, and by far the most valuable, is on the psychology of the prisoner: the

stage of initial reaction, the process of adaptation, and the stage of resignation. The pages bristle with hypotheses many of which, as the author would admit, call for further research analysis. The importance in the adaptation process of the previous conception of life in the camps is stressed, and especially significant appear to be the hypotheses with respect to the role of "spiritual" values, broadly defined, in survival. In all of the analysis, the author draws heavily upon the concepts of Freud and interprets the prisoners' behavior in the light of them.

Having described systematically the behavior of the prisoners, Dr. Cohen seeks to understand the psychology of the S.S. members who administered and largely policed the camps. A quasi-cultural approach to the problem mingles with an interpretation of group psychology that is not entirely convincing or satisfactory. Yet the attempt to apply Freud's principles is carried through consistently. In any event, the human reactions are minutely described, and these descriptions have value for social science; even the interpretations may lead to more adequate explanations of the observed behavior. Certainly the mechanisms that are involved are not circumscribed by the electric fences of the concentration camp. It is the larger relevance of Dr. Cohen's material to the every-day world in which we now live that gives the book especial significance.

MALCOLM M. WILLEY

University of Minnesota

ROGOFF, NATALIE. *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility*. Pp. 131. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953. \$4.00.

This is the most significant study on occupational mobility since Davidson and Anderson's *Occupational Mobility in an American Community*. The primary contribution of this work is methodological, for unlike most earlier studies, an attempt is made to measure the amount of occupational mobility which occurs independently of the mobility caused by changes in the occupational structure. The significance of the study is heightened because trends in occupational mobility and origins (from

fathers' occupations) are studied for two periods (1910 and 1940) in a rather representative industrial city (Indianapolis). Despite limitations imposed by the source materials (marriage licenses which asked for applicant's occupation and that of his father) certain trends are clear:

(1) There has been almost no change in a generation in the chances of avoiding occupational inheritance; (2) The most probable occupational destiny of males is their father's occupation; (3) Occupational destiny depends increasingly on the worker's social origins or his father's occupation; (4) The barrier between white-collar and manual work is the most difficult to penetrate over a generation; (5) Least amount of occupational inheritance is found among sons of skilled workers; (6) Sons of farmers find it increasingly difficult to become white-collar workers; (7) Occupational inheritance is lowest among Negroes since, irrespective of origin, they are usually forced into unskilled or service occupations; (8) Sons of foreign born suffer little or no job discrimination; (9) Younger men are increasingly less inclined to be occupationally mobile.

Rogoff's findings that deal with older workers, sons of foreign born, and farmers must be considered tentative because these groups are not adequately representative of similar groups in other communities. Further, Rogoff displays a tendency to overstate the differences between her findings and those reported by earlier studies. Despite the significant methodological refinement, one is struck more with the replication of findings. The most important criticism of this excellent study is the general lack of interpretation of the findings. No attention is given to changes in the general social structure of the United States or changes in the industrial structure which may account for changing patterns of occupational mobility. Failure to do so limits the general applicability of the findings, or a consideration of probable future trends in occupational mobility.

WILLIAM H. FORM

Michigan State College

SPELLMAN, HOWARD HILTON. *Successful Management of Matrimonial Cases*. Pp.

ix, 306. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. \$5.65.

There is a belief in some quarters that "respectable" lawyers shy away from divorce suits in much the same manner that respectable police officers avoid petty disorderly-conduct cases. In both instances the feeling persists that such interpersonal wrangles are beneath the dignity of the law—that there is much more important work to do; let us get on with it and leave the domestic squabbles to be handled by those with nothing better to do. Mr. Spellman's book does much to discredit this point of view. The author feels that "The greatest personal tragedy in our modern society is divorce." But he feels just as strongly that the state has a vital interest in every divorce proceeding. Between these two often-conflicting perspectives—the wishes of the litigants and the interests of the state—a balance must be struck, and it is here, says the author, that the divorce lawyer is instrumental. And the stakes are high enough to concern all of us.

Mr. Spellman does not criticize existing divorce laws, nor does he preach for an extension of the family court—and on these two counts alone his book is marked as "different." Written for the general public as well as for lawyers who handle divorce cases, the volume is incisively presented. It is likely that practicing lawyers will find in it a wealth of practical material, since, in effect, the author has written a procedural handbook rather than a routine legal reference work. However, it is just as likely that the general public will find it no more intriguing than other books dealing with specialized law.

Social scientists interested in the family field—especially those who, though dissatisfied with current divorce philosophy, are not convinced that the family court is a necessary panacea—should find the volume rewarding, and irritating. Rewards lie in the author's repeated and crystal-clear statements as to what the divorce law is and what the law means. Collusion, connivance, condonation, and recrimination are thoroughly covered, as are separation agreements, pleadings, and preliminary motions. The section dealing with the in-

vestigation of marital "misconduct" is the best this reviewer has yet come across, even though a disproportionate amount of space is devoted to the loops and twists of the New York State adultery requirement. On the other hand, estoppel, interlocutory decrees and rights of remarriage, appeals, and out-of-court settlements are largely ignored. Throughout, the author annoyingly uses the term "foreign" to refer to out-of-state divorces. It is also somewhat disquieting to discover, upon checking citations, that side by side with scientific and legal references are several alluding to *The Ladies Home Journal*, *Colliers*, *Look*, and *Cosmopolitan*.

All in all, the author's approach is refreshing. To anyone who is at all familiar with actual divorce proceedings, it will be evident that what divorce lawyers actually do in the handling of divorce suits is many leagues removed from what Mr. Spellman says they should do. He says they should follow the spirit of the law as well as the letter. He says it forthrightly and without apologies, thereby imparting a sense of dignity to the legal aspect of divorce—a dignity which apparently the legal practitioners would sell down the river.

WILLIAM M. KEPHART

University of Pennsylvania

GLASS, D. V. (Ed.). *Introduction to Malthus*. Pp. x, 205. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953. \$2.75 (London: Watts & Company, 1953. 10s 6d).

The core of this little book consists of three short papers which, though separately rather self-contained, form a unity in that they are concerned, respectively, with the background, the essence, and the modern implications of Malthus' theory of population. The papers are: "The Historical Context of the Essay on Population" by H. L. Beales; "Malthus and the Limitation of Population Growth" by D. V. Glass; and "Malthus in the Twentieth Century" by Alan T. Peacock. These papers are followed by a classified bibliography, "A List of Books, Pamphlets, and Articles on the Population Question, published in Britain in the period 1793 to 1880," compiled by J. A. Banks and D. V. Glass. The list "is intended to cover the

genesis and course of the Malthusian controversy in Britain. While the list is extensive, it does not claim to be complete.

... The period covered begins with Godwin and ends shortly after the establishment of the Malthusian League" (pp. 81-82). Perhaps partly because the bibliography closes with 1880, the paper by Peacock at the close of his article lists some citations of recent works on the economics of population.

The volume ends with reprints of two compositions by Malthus that are seldom seen. "The first is *A Summary View of the Principle of Population*, originally published in 1830, and consisting of the larger part of Malthus's article on 'Population' which appeared in the 1824 Supplement to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. . . . The second is Malthus's *Letter to Samuel Whitbread*," the first edition of which was published in 1807. In this letter, "Malthus stated in clear and explicit terms his views on poor relief, views which, both his supporters and his critics agree, powerfully influenced the course of Poor Law reform and coloured the attitude to the social services in general for a century or more" (p. ix).

The purpose of this book is of modest character. "It is not the purpose of the three introductory papers to do more than serve as a stimulus to further study. The reader will not therefore find in those papers a general analysis of the development of population theory or of the relationship between theory and policy. Certain broad views of the writers are, however, evident. First, population theory cannot be discussed without reference to the nature of a particular society, for population is not itself an independent variable. Secondly, to believe, as we do, in the importance of population as a factor in economic development does not thereby involve subscribing either to Malthus's theory as a statement of long-run principles, or to his proposals for social and economic policy. Finally, if there are no grounds for complacency—especially in considering the short-run relation between population growth and economic progress in under-developed countries—... [neither] is there justification for hysteria" (p. x). CLYDE V. KISER
Milbank Memorial Fund

STOTT, D. H. *Saving Children from Delinquency*. Pp. x, 266. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. \$4.75.

The main concern of this essay, as the author names it, is explicitly to set forth the fact that delinquent behavior is engendered most largely by emotional disturbances and frustrations. He is a psychologist primarily interested in the personality development of children. As a Research Fellow having a grant from the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, under which he earlier published *Delinquency and Human Nature*, his aim, he states, is to bring about greater awareness of what he himself has learned about the emotional health needs of children—awareness on the part of social workers, probation officers, and others responsible for the care of children, including parents.

Though Stott's thesis, written in terms of a common-sense approach, is sound, valuable, and to a considerable extent applicable everywhere, his outlook is narrowly insular. In repeatedly speaking of "a new science of personality psychology" he gives credit to no earlier exponents of the points he stresses and he seems unacquainted with the great volume of research and other material which, over many years, has been contributed in this country to his main theme. Then, he curiously omits even mention of the noteworthy London Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency—this perhaps because he may regard the work there as being tinged with what he scornfully terms Freudian occultism.

After chapters on generally recognized principles that should in family life and in the school and the community offer bases for the prevention of delinquency, considerable space is devoted to the treatment methods of the Approved Schools. These methods, the results, and the backgrounds of boys committed to such Schools has been the subject of a special research study by Stott, from which he has learned much that appears in his book, but he fails to give any information whatever concerning the organization of these Schools and their unique place in the British scene.

(For the sake of the American reader who is handicapped by this lack of back-

ground material, the reviewer can supply some orienting facts gained for the most part during a study of the remarkably fine Borstal system for the treatment of older youthful offenders. In Britain there are no institutions corresponding to our state correctional schools for juvenile delinquents, but, developed largely from many old small endowed institutions for the care of needy and delinquent children, there are about 150 now-designated "Approved Schools." These vary considerably in size, and the equipment of some—for example in trade training—is very good. They are all under private and often capable management, but the Home Office keeps close supervision over them and grants considerable subsidies. They receive delinquents from the ages of 8 to 15, all of whom are committed by the lay judges of juvenile courts, whether or not always for definite terms one is not sure. Nowadays, the allocation of cases is not, as formerly, left to the judge, but rather is undertaken according to ages and needs by three classification centers, of which Stott writes approvingly.)

Stott gives sound suggestions for Approved Schools' personnel regarding treatment and better understandings of emotional health needs, suggesting that the 50 to 60 per cent of satisfactory after-conduct could be greatly increased.

In an appendix he offers, as a necessary preliminary to treatment by psychiatric social workers and probation officers, criteria for diagnoses to be made by them. They really should be practicing psychologists, he says, utilizing the principles of "modern personality psychology." The diagnostic criteria are related to the primary human needs for emotional attachments and acceptance and for recognition as an individual with a status. These and the sub-heads of reactive tendencies are not newly formulated. Though in much of this a certain naïvete is revealed, we can believe that many a probation officer might profit by reading the book. The trained psychiatric social worker will find it rather unrewardingly elementary.

WILLIAM HEALY

Clearwater, Florida

RUCHAMES, LOUIS. *Race, Jobs, & Politics: The Story of FEPC*. Pp. xi, 255. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. \$3.75.

Fair employment practice legislation may receive its first real test if the present "recession" becomes a depression. Seven states, beginning with New York and New Jersey in 1945, followed by Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Washington, and Oregon, and several cities, including Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, have passed legislation with sanctions. To date, these state and city fair employment practice commissions have been able to assist the integration of Negroes and other racial, religious, and national origin minority peoples in a wide variety of occupations in business and industry. The commissions have relied almost entirely on private "conference, conciliation and persuasion." They have handled more than 5,000 cases, and only about five cases have reached the public hearing stage.

In his preface the author states, "The purpose of this study is to present a comprehensive picture of the effort to achieve fair employment practices through government intervention. It includes a description of the origins, history, and impact upon discrimination of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, created by the late President Roosevelt in 1941; an evaluation of state and municipal fair employment practice legislation; an analysis of the relationship between fair employment practice legislation and other social problems; and the history of the movement to achieve permanent fair employment practice legislation on a national level."

Of the four aspects listed above, Ruchames has done an excellent job on the President's wartime Committee. Less than one-fourth of the book, however, deals with the three other topics. The book is weakest in its treatment of state and municipal commissions. The fifteen-page discussion of these bodies is superficial. The analysis of the last two topics is adequate.

The greatest importance of the Presi-

dent's Committee, as Ruchames states, "lies in the stimulus it gave to the movement for permanent FEPC legislation." By his thorough examination of the President's Committee, the author has made a signal contribution to our knowledge of the struggle of Negroes and other minorities for an equal chance. Although in recent years discrimination in employment has been reduced, it is still a tragic fact of American life that millions of Americans—Negroes, Jews, Mexican-Americans, Oriental-Americans, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, and others—are subjected to one of the worst kinds of injustice, job discrimination.

Gunnar Myrdal in *An American Dilemma* called for a great educational offensive against discrimination and segregation. During the 1940's that offensive began to gather force in employment. With so much to be done on other fronts—housing, schools, churches, and public accommodations—we can ill afford any slackening of effort on the basic job front.

FRANK S. LOESCHER

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J., and RUTH ALBRECHT. *Older People*. Pp. xvi, 415. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953. \$5.00.

Older People represents the first attempt to present an integrated statement of the characteristics, situations, and needs of America's older adults in what the publisher appropriately calls an introduction to social gerontology. Following an identification of the problems peculiar to older people and a chapter on attitudes toward them, the book deals with their happiness, health, economic security, work and leisure, family relations and living arrangements, friends, and participation in organized community life.

Part I, the first half, describes the older population on the basis of national data with somewhat more detailed analyses based on material collected in Prairie City, a small midwestern town which was the subject of intensive study. Part II is a more thorough presentation of Prairie City data. Instruments for measuring public opinion toward the roles of older people,

the roles played by older people, and older people's attitudes and adjustments are presented and discussed in three appendixes. Data collected by the University of Chicago's Committee on Human Development from various samples of older people with the aid of these instruments are used with good effect in both the national and local analyses.

Perhaps the principal conclusion one obtains from the book is that there is tremendous variation in society's attitudes toward older people and their proper roles and in their own interests, circumstances, and adjustments. In general, society appears to approve continued activity even to a greater extent than do older people themselves. A curious circumstance revealed by the Prairie City data is that many older people withdraw from activity even though activity and good adjustment are positively correlated.

There is also evidence that popular thinking is ambivalent or in a stage of transition with regard to such matters as family relationships and responsibilities, continuance in the work force, acceptance of financial assistance from the community, and persistence in political leadership roles.

In the chapter "A Personal and Social Philosophy of Old Age" and running through the book there is strong implication that the later years should become a period of increased personal satisfaction to be achieved largely through broadened social consciousness and citizenship responsibility, and that community attitudes and facilities must provide an environment that encourages good adjustment and continuing usefulness.

CLARK TIBBITTS

U. S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare

MEANS, JAMES HOWARD. *Doctors, People, and Government*. Pp. viii, 206. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1953. \$3.50.

Among the numerous publications on social organization of medical care, Dr. Means's book stands out for two reasons. It is a statement of convictions gained in almost thirty years of experience as hospital physician, teacher of clinical medi-

cine, and research worker. It is written for the general reader in an effort to "stimulate the formation of an enlightened public opinion" on the problems to be solved in improving and extending medical care.

Like a number of earlier writers on this subject, Dr. Means believes that the American people are entitled to the best possible medical care at the lowest price consistent with high quality and that they "are not now getting it." He advocates prepayment plans "which afford benefits directly in the form of comprehensive service," compensation of physicians by salary, and group practice of medicine; endorses "government aid to both education and research" as indispensable to continued progress; and makes a strong plea for "a threefold attack from a very broad base embodying government, private, and community elements." These are ideas which have been advanced and debated time and again ever since the publication of the classic report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care in 1932. How they can be translated into a practicable plan of action by evolutionary process is a question yet to be answered.

Although Dr. Means has no new suggestions to offer, he has nevertheless made a noteworthy contribution to the literature on the social and economic aspects of medicine. He has assembled widely scattered material and presented it in a clear and readable manner. He has analyzed the available facts with a discerning mind and a keen eye for basic issues. And he has stated his conclusions with sincerity and courage. His book has all the earmarks of a crusade. It is certain to be attacked by those who refuse to listen to honest opinions and criticism. It should be studied by those who are genuinely interested in the continued adaptation of medicine to social needs and uses.

FRANZ GOLDMANN
Harvard University

MILLER, PAUL A., and ASSOCIATES. *Community Health Action*. Pp. 192. East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1953. \$3.00.

The general public is more and more concerned with problems of medical care,

whether the need for the extension of health facilities or the pressing problem of how to meet the rapidly increasing cost of medical care. This little book focuses on community endeavors to develop health facilities. It deals with the attempts of citizens in small communities to acquire hospital facilities and public health services, and to a lesser degree with co-operative prepayment plans for medical care. It contains a factual report of what really happened when people in small communities co-operated to secure better medical care for themselves. Six regions of the United States were studied to compare the differences in community action.

The study was based on carefully drawn up and tested questionnaires sent to local health departments in communities of less than 7,500 population where community action had been initiated since 1940. These were followed by field visits by a research team to five carefully selected communities in different regions.

The book is about an idea—that health is, in part, an enterprise of a community. It is also a book about a process—that of employing community resources for gains in good health.

Perhaps it is not strange that there was more interest in hospitals (and more successful efforts to acquire hospitals) than in either public health services or in prepayment plans. Credit was given to the financial support from federal resources under Hill-Burton legislation. Undoubtedly this aid and stimulation has helped tremendously in the efforts to secure good hospital facilities in small communities. Businessmen in the communities studied were certainly more interested in hospitals than in public health services or prepayment plans. There were 218 successful community efforts to acquire hospitals, recently organized local health departments, and evidence that 18 co-operative prepayment plans will be employed in the communities covered by the questionnaires. Prepayment plan organizations apparently required longer periods of discussion before any action was initiated.

This book gives clear evidence that to move from an idea to an accomplishment requires that some one or some group

channel community readiness into purposeful action. Discussion of the variety of sponsorship, the conflicts encountered, the organizational methods used, public relations techniques, the ways of persuading key people, and the contrasts between projects should prove helpful to other communities embarking on similar undertakings. The findings of the study serve to stake out some guidelines for future planning toward major health goals in small communities.

MARIETTA STEVENSON

School of Social Work
University of Illinois

BALLOU, RICHARD BOYD. *The Individual and the State: The Modern Challenge to Education*. Pp. xxviii, 305. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. \$4.50.

The morale of American education has been so shaken in the past half-dozen years by concerted attacks from demagogues and similar self-appointed saviors that it is of special importance to have books such as Dr. Ballou's widely read by parents, prospective teachers, and others likely to be disturbed by the present babble of tongues.

For Dr. Ballou takes his stand squarely on the side of the finest traditions of an enlightened democracy, and of the crucial role which education plays in their preservation and development. The heart of his interpretation lies in his analysis of three interrelated problems, all of them as old as educational philosophy itself, yet each as indispensable as it ever was: the meaning of human knowledge, the nature of human purpose, and the components of personality. Despite occasional concessions to eclecticism, the author for the most part offers a naturalistic and liberal solution to all three problems.

His conception of knowledge opposes absolutism and finality, and supports an experimental approach that insists upon the self-correcting and tentative character of truth. His discussion of the role of dissent, as basic to this approach, seems unnecessarily general, however. He never deals forthrightly with the heart of the issue today, which is, of course, how far and under what conditions we should allow educators to maintain heretical political

views in both words and actions. A careful reading of the policies of, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Association of University Professors might have benefited Dr. Ballou.

His insistence upon the need for strong and clear purposes is a healthy corrective to an overemphasis on process and method which have been fashionable among liberal educators. Here, again, the argument could have been made more definite: the *kind* of future that education ought to strive for, especially those sociocultural dimensions adequate to a technological and revolutionary age such as our own, is paid only the most cursory attention. Nevertheless, it is gratifying to find a stress upon the future at all—a needed counterbalance to another recent overemphasis by liberal educators upon the past and present as the chief foci of education.

Dr. Ballou's theory of personality reveals the strong influence of Gestalt psychology. Three aspects are developed: the biological, the aesthetic, and the psychical, each fused with the other two. The only serious question to be raised here is whether anything like enough attention has been paid to the social pole of the personality equation. The influence of pioneers like George Herbert Mead in social psychology or of Alfred Kroeber in cultural anthropology seems to be negligible in the author's thinking.

After assessing the strengths and weaknesses of American schools over the past fifty years, the book concludes with an overview of "critical perspectives for educational institutions" and "the promise of the future: insights for teachers." Here Dr. Ballou offers many suggestions for improving both policy and program, all of them admirable if also largely familiar, sometimes vague, and occasionally overcautious.

The title of the volume is perhaps unfortunate. A great deal of attention is properly paid to the individual, but too little to the theory and practice of the modern state. Only a few words are devoted to such questions as federal aid and control of education, to the growing pressures of organized religion upon the state and its schools, to the conflict between national sovereignty and world govern-

ment, or to other thorny problems of current political philosophy. The subtitle, however, is entirely relevant, and Dr. Ballou is both earnest and praiseworthy in his effort to measure up to it.

THEODORE BRAMELD
New York University

CANTOR, NATHANIEL. *The Teaching-Learning Process*. Pp. xvi, 350. New York: Dryden Press, 1953. \$2.90.

The title of this book is an artifice or an expedient. It actually deals with only one method and one that is applicable to only a fraction of the curriculum and not with the teaching and learning process as the title implies. In spite of this semantic exaggeration it is a challenging and possibly an important book.

The formal requirements of the school situation tend to foster insecurity, fear, dominance, and hostility in the minds and hearts of teachers. In spite of any possible justification for these attitudes they tend to provoke similar responses from the pupils; consequently teaching and learning are often frustrated. How can the situation be changed? One partial answer is for teachers to recognize their contribution to this frustration. By using group therapy Professor Cantor has demonstrated that teachers can be led to recognize their culpability, confess their guilt, and alter to a considerable extent their attitudes and practices. Since this book is a mirror that reflects pedagogical blemishes, the careful reader can also participate in this soul-cleansing process. In fact, it is probable that teachers who read this book appreciatively will treat their pupils more humanely. By stressing feelings rather than intellect, attitudes rather than knowledge, and freedom rather than authority the author writes in the tradition of Rousseau and thus becomes also a liberator of children.

The book suffers from two faults all too common in educational writing—the implication of newness and the straw-man device. Long ago St. Augustine observed that talking, even when it eventuates in communication, is not teaching, and listening is not necessarily learning. Professor

Cantor has arrived at the same conclusion. He is not content merely to pull out the worm of truth; he accompanies the act with cackles of discovery, splutters of excitement, and cluckings for attention, admiration, and agreement.

After a pointless introduction by Professor Stephen Corey, the author takes over and wages a furious battle with "disconnected subjects," "unrelated data," "isolated facts," and other non-existent enemies. He refers to "genuine" and "actual" learning in such manner as to imply that there are two categories—"learning" and "actual learning." He draws up an indictment of twelve or fifteen counts against parents, schools, and teachers. After this arraignment it is rather easy to agree that whatever the author proposes will be an improvement over the situation as described.

Pages and pages are devoted to the meanderings, confessions, and testimonials of Lila, Mabel, Stella, Cora, Harry, Gregory, Philip, Bert, and a dozen other seminar participants. They rejoice over the absence of imposed assignments and exult in the uniqueness of their experience. "The kind of thing we are doing isn't done in colleges" (p. 8). They slowly rid themselves of self-consciousness, become accustomed to the rare atmosphere, and confess their personal and pedagogical sins. Through discussion and contemplation some of them achieve humility, patience, and high resolves, virtues that are transferred to their classrooms.

In spite of these faults and some vain repetitions of the obvious, the book is a fresh, vigorous, and helpful demonstration of one method of dealing with one segment of teaching. Stodgy, formalistic, and aggressive teachers should read this little book and consider its moral.

EDGAR B. WESLEY

Stanford University

The Teaching of the Social Sciences in the United Kingdom. Pp. 140. Paris: UNESCO, 1953. No price.

Described in its preface as a guide for prospective students and visitors to British universities, UNESCO's booklet opens with

a chapter by Sir Ernest Barker on "The General Organization of Universities and of other Institutions for the Promotion of Higher Learning." This is followed by five chapters on the teaching of economics; political science; sociology, social anthropology, and social psychology; international relations; and on legal education, which is largely outside the universities. A four-page "Universities Reference Table" which is appended lists the principal curricula and degrees offered in each field in each institution.

Most American students and scholars will learn with some surprise that "only six of the [nineteen] British universities (and four of these six in Scotland) are anterior to the nineteenth century," and that nine of the nineteen are "creations, in their present form, of the twentieth century."

Since about 1920 British universities have offered advanced degrees, usually with the title of doctor of philosophy; but according to the author of the chapter on economics "first class" standing in the honours examination for the B.A. degree is still generally regarded as a stronger qualification for an academic post than possession of the Ph.D.

Sir Ernest remarks that "there has been an uneasy stirring of late . . . reflected in a demand for what is called 'synthesis'"—a revolt against traditional specialization paralleling the current American demand for "general education." "However, the specialization which has characterized British higher education appears to be something different from the vocational orientation which is common in this country. For example, although a diploma in public administration is offered by many universities, we are told that this does not signify 'specialist qualification.' A competitor for entry into the Civil Service must stand on an equal footing with candidates whose degrees are in other fields.

A student looking for courses to meet his particular needs, interests, and capabilities will not find in this booklet the detailed information he requires; nor will a reader in search of more than superficial understanding of the organization, philosophy, and methods of British social science teaching. But both will find here a very

helpful introduction to the educational institutions and curricula of another country.

ELBRIDGE SIBLEY

Social Science Research Council
Washington, D. C.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

JASPERS, KARL. *The Origin and Goal of History*. Pp. xvi, 294. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. \$4.00.

To review in brief compass this work of compressed meaty essences by a world-renowned existentialist is impossible. Apart from expressing gratitude that it has been made available with unusual speed by translation from the German original of 1949, I shall therefore confine myself to noting its general scope and content. In time it runs from the uncertain distances of prehistory to the indeterminate reach of the future. Analytically its range is from technology to deity. Its themes are simple. The first major leap of humanity toward self-consciousness and historical consciousness took place in the Axial Period. That sudden and inexplicable spring forward took place independently yet along the same lines in three different regions and cultures, which founded the great world philosophies and religions in a brief span of centuries preceding the Christian era.

Thereafter in the West a peculiar rationality and confidence in life led to a special development which, though one-sided and incomplete, produced both political liberty and science and technology. The outcome, the industrial order, places us at the beginning of the second great period, universal and unified in space as well as in concept: the factual, as well as the conceptual, unity of mankind today is inescapable. Its effective ordering is imperative. The alternatives are world conquest marked by force and fear, or world organization under federal law. Unfortunately, the corruptions of rationalism, the positivist debasement of technological insights, and the inadequacies of spiritual and humanist vision tend to sap energetic courage and to hamper the concomitant realization of a universal ordering together

with liberty and human dignity. Aware of history, we tend to look backward on it, rather than to project it. We need a conscious penetration and depth whereby to unite tradition, present, and future; and, conceiving real unity, to create it. We need proper awareness of the primacy of the person, the nature of God, and the meaning of man. We need awareness also, through history, of the limits of history and of the need to overcome history, by means of the open society of questing and confident human spirits.

Such, in bare bones, are some of the theses, almost caricatured by compression, of an enormously rich and suggestive work, which casts light not only on the meaning of man's historical adventures and on issues metaphysical and ontological, but also on the root social and political problems of our day, on the meaning of the alternatives confronting us, and on the potentialities of a great human future in which the second great step in the realization of humanity may be fully taken.

THOMAS I. COOK

Johns Hopkins University

HARDING, D. W. *Social Psychology and Individual Values*. Pp. 184. London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1953; New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954. Text \$1.80; trade \$2.40.

Concise and modestly written, this excellent and judicious English volume will, I earnestly hope, be widely read in our country. Its arguments are sustained by the admirable temper of "animated moderation." In it, all that is valuable in the skills of English moral science is lucidly brought to bear upon the vexed intricacy of the interaction between persons and the groups in which they enjoy or suffer membership. The emphasis is not merely upon mechanisms and typologies, but invariably also upon moral costs and opportunities.

The following appear to me to be timely and refreshing features of Harding's essay. A revindication of man's social nature is attempted; in the main, I think it succeeds by neat refutations of all attempts to "deduce" social behavior from nonsocial roots. Especially refreshing is the rejection

of the "straw man" theory of instincts so often flogged in American texts without any espousal by Harding of the view that moral conduct is all "learned" or "imposed" upon amoral "needs." Crucial effects of childhood training and the cultural variability of socialization processes are freely recognized without drawing the unwarranted consequence that moral validity and innovating responsibility are thereby nullified. Cultural variability is correctly appreciated as settling no normative issues but as supplying only possible alternatives whose costs and compatibility upon proposed borrowing must be faced. A sensitive discussion of the services of subgroups goes far to quiet the fears inspired by those who obsessively speak of the horrors of undifferentiated mass society. With a sure hand, the frequent neglect by social scientists of the study of the conditions of creative autonomy is demonstrated. The calm discussion of the ways in which social feeling and sentiment can and must often be frustrated is balanced by an equally calm appreciation of the advantages of industrial society for the average man, advantages so often cavalierly contemned by the reforming, literary intelligentsia.

No effort is made to evade the need for social invention in the areas of status, leadership, and competition, for the obsolescence of old institutions in these areas cannot, as Harding points out, prevent the emergence of "analogous problems even in the welfare state. A brilliant discussion of the meaning of normality (in many ways the best thing in the book) in terms of irrelevance of motive and coherence of personality is ethically evaluated with precision and tact. Everywhere there is perceptive notice of the required maximizing or minimizing or mediating procedures for dealing with the inevitable conflicts of two or more social desiderata.

Harding's book is both stimulating and tranquilizing for any social scientist. This reviewer would look forward to the author's comments, in a later edition, upon the related work of S. de Grazia, Parsons, Weber, the American game theorists and economists who are interested in the quantification of maximization and minimization problems of human choice, and upon the

newer French cultural philosophers who often write discerning social psychology under the head of "metaphysics." As for the general American reader who has recently been acutely interested by the books of Kinsey and Riesman on related topics, Harding's book will do much to save him from the dilemma of a façade of calculation combined with moral dullness or aesthetic vision in which fantasy tends to replace rational estimates.

HENRY A. FINCH

Pennsylvania State University

WOOLF, LEONARD. *Principia Politica: A Study of Communal Psychology*. Pp. 319. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1953. \$5.00.

This is the third volume of the series originally entitled *After the Deluge* and prompted by the author's shock at the First World War and his failure to understand its causes. He sought understanding in an historical analysis beginning about 1789. At the year 1848, however, his subject matter became history of which he himself was a part. Instead, therefore, of continuing the chronological method, he shifted in this volume to the analysis of ideas, mainly of freedom and authority and the corresponding modern institutions of democracy and authoritarianism.

Woolf considers the important changes in his time to be changes in the material environment, the intrusion of politics into everyday life, a marked increase in social instability, and vigorous challenges to traditional values. It is the last of these which is Woolf's special concern, with reference, of course, to the other three. He isolates and dignifies such concepts as "individual freedom and initiative, humanity, cooperation for social ends, justice and social equality, truth and reason," and shows that such values, first worked out both in theory and practice by the Greeks, are the very meaning of democracy: they define the value of democracy's free and rational individual. They also define civilization. They are values which are "there," they are objective, and they are discerned and chosen by all men free to discern and choose.

Further, "the ordinary man is right in

judging implicitly that the happiness which he gets from the free enjoyment of his ordinary and private process of living, his way of life, is the thing which privately, socially and ethically has intrinsic value. And the value is in life and living . . . not in myths, nightmares and abstractions. It will be found in the thoughts and feelings of individuals, in their reactions to cricket or truth, to football or beauty, in their homes or among their friends, not in the state or churches or 'society' or work or sin or salvation."

Woolf's theme is not new, nor is it demonstrable, as he well knows. But if he is not right, so much the worse for mankind. And if he is right, it bears constant restatement. Woolf's contribution lies in his particular and very able examination of traditional Western rationalism and idealism in relation to modern irrationalisms and authoritarianisms, whether political or religious. "The values in an authoritarian society are fundamentally wrong and the longer it exists the more corrupt they become." Consequently totalitarian dictatorship is not a viable form of government for the twentieth century—the viability of democracy requires a fourth promised volume.

My one criticism is of Woolf's failure to consider the value potential in the organic type of state. Russia doubtless is an authoritarian state with a strong force component, but it is also somewhat an organic state.

LESLIE M. PAPE

Pennsylvania State University

LONG, EDWARD LEROY, JR. *Conscience and Compromise: An Approach to Protestant Casuistry*. Pp. 166. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954. \$3.00.

Compromise is here interpreted as a form of casuistry. The author recognizes that casuistry is in bad repute. But this disfavor is due to certain evil uses of casuistry, notably by Jesuits and pharisees. The Jesuits used casuistry to evade moral demands, says the author, while the pharisees tried to specify every requirement of the moral law down to details fitted to every situation. These mistaken practices must not blind us to the moral necessity of

interpreting high ideals in such a way that they can guide conduct in concrete situations where the practical alternatives of action cannot possibly conform perfectly to the ideal. Such interpretation is what the author means by compromise or casuistry.

Mr. Long is not concerned with ethics and moral conduct in general but with Christian living. "We are interested in that dialectic of Christian experience by which a person comes to terms with the Christian imperative on the one hand and the situation in which he lives on the other" (pp. 15). The standard by which the Christian lives has not been set up by human wisdom nor discovered by the human mind, says the author. It is given by God and "cannot be . . . watered down." Yet the Christian imperative cannot be dismissed because it seems impossible of complete attainment. Men must do what they can to live by it in each concrete situation. This is the problem to be solved by casuistry.

Love is the moral imperative for the Christian, says Mr. Long, and this love is to be measured by the teaching and example of Jesus who made the neighbor's claim for love as great as the self's claim and the claim of God greater than both. "Christian love is the unstinting love of every possible neighbor for the sake of service to God, a love that seeks its only reward in the joy of faithful obedience to God. Such a love can love even those who persecute it and can rejoice even when falsely maligned by those whom it seeks to serve" (p. 47).

The reviewer is compelled to question this claim, which runs through the book. Can anyone love another out of obedience to a command, for the sake of service to God and for the joy of obedience, and not because of what is lovable in the neighbor? I have seen people trying to go through the motions of love in this manner. It did not seem good to me.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN
Houston, Texas

SMYTH, F. HASTINGS. *Sacrifice: A Doctrinal Homily*. Pp. ix, 149. New York: Vantage Press, 1953. \$2.75.

In these times many Protestant Christians are looking for ideas that will hold their faith together. They are being invited by those who work from the background of the Protestant Reformation to consider such unifying ideas as "the old and new covenants," "the apostolic preaching," and "the biblical philosophy of history."

It might be well for such Protestants to look at the volume under consideration here. Father Smyth is an Anglican with deep Catholic convictions. To him the central unifying idea of Christianity is the idea of "sacrifice," an idea which reached its culminating expression in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son of God. The author begins with notions associated with sacrifice in primitive religions. Everywhere men have sought "to prepare something within their world which is desirable and worthy . . . to be conveyed to their god." The god has then been believed to respond by returning something of the gift with his own life infused into it, revitalizing his worshipers for their tasks.

The Law of Israel reveals the quest for sacrifices without physical blemish; and the Prophets reveal the quest for sacrifices without moral blemish on the part of the donors of the gifts to God. But because of the Fall, all human sacrifices were infected by sin. They were never able to penetrate the barrier between man and the Holiness of God. They "bumped, as it were, against the floor of heaven and recoiled upon men to spread a sense of failure and disaster."

This impasse was broken in the fullness of time by Christ, whose unique accomplishment was that He offered himself as a sacrifice without defect or imperfection. He presented Himself deliberately for crucifixion; and the Resurrection and Ascension were the marks of His breaking through the barrier which hitherto had separated man from God.

The Church is the socially extended body of Christ upon earth, made possible by His ascended life, and His presence now at the right hand of God. The Church's vocation is to continue His sacrificial mission of taking the things of earth and offering them to God. To take the material things of

this world, offer them sacrificially to God, and then use them in co-operative love for one's fellowmen becomes the vocation of the individual members of Christ's body.

Father Smyth believes that this kind of Christianity contains the only answer to the materialistic propaganda of Marxism. True Christianity to him has always been more materialistic and more communal than the Christianity of the Reformation.

JUSTIN WROE NIXON
Colgate Rochester Divinity School

LEE, E. G. *Christianity and the New Situation*. Pp. 157. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1954. \$3.00.

More adept at raising issues and problems than at solving them, this is an interesting book even though not a particularly satisfying one. The author, who is the editor of *The London Inquirer*, begins his discussion by pointing out the present day coexistence of the religious and secular orders. This coexistence is the "new situation" in which the worldly world with its values lives side by side with the religious world and its values. This live-and-let-live condition contrasts with the previous situations of the Church in the world.

The subsequent discussion is the author's proposed prescription for exploiting this new situation for the benefit both of religion and of the secular order. But nowhere does the discussion really get to the crucial issues. It comes out rather as a further analysis of the general human situation made from a self-styled point of view which, valuable as it may be in its own right, is difficult to relate to any of the main streams of interpretative thought found today in either the secular or the theological thought worlds.

To be sure, the alert reader will find in this book many helpful insights and many suggestions which reflect ideas generally part of the current scene, but the reflection is unconscious rather than articulate. There is a good treatment of the relationship of meaning and historic fact, one which is essentially in agreement with contemporary theological thought. There is a similar treatment of the relationship of cultural symbol and religious reality and a valuable

analysis of the breakdown of lawful standards in contemporary culture. There is a call to belief in God made on what actually are existentialist grounds. Yet nowhere is the real nature of secularism understood nor the relationship of secular to religious knowledge carefully examined, nor the respective roles of each defined.

Perhaps the failure of the author is a result of his having set for himself too prodigious a task; yet we should hope it is not an altogether impossible one. What the author calls for is at least a conversation, if not actually a rapprochement, between secular learning and religious thought. Such a union can come, of course, only if secular learning ceases to be guided by an alternative secular "faith" and listens to religion and if theological learning takes adequate account of autonomous secular knowledge and resists current efforts to make of itself an esoteric system divorced from communion with the world of earthly knowledge. This book does not see these issues as explicitly as we must in order to develop the kind of working unity for which it rightly calls.

EDWARD LeROY LONG, JR.
Blacksburg Presbyterian Church and
Virginia Polytechnic Institute

MOODY, JOSEPH N. (Ed.). *Church and Society: Catholic Social and Political Thought and Movements, 1789-1950*. Pp. 914. New York: Arts, Inc., 1953. \$12.00.

As the editor explains in his introduction to this volume, its scope is "strictly limited." Its theme is "the relation of Catholics to the major secular forces of the period 1789-1950." Two of these forces are explicitly considered, namely, the modern secularized state and the modern economic system. The treatment is organized on a geographical basis. The editor and a dozen collaborating authors discuss their theme, first in relation to the papacy, and then in relation to seven specific countries or groups of countries. As the title promises, both Catholic thought and Catholic movements are included. Official statements by popes and bishops, declarations by various groups and organizations, as well as the writings of individual authors,

serve as sources for the exposition of Catholic social thinking. Most of the sections of the book end with an appendix of documents, giving excerpts from important sources. Many significant social movements are considered, but it is interesting to note that Catholic labor movements are singled out for particular emphasis. The editor is a professional historian, and most of his collaborators have followed his lead in placing their material in its relevant historical perspective.

Collaborative works usually show a certain unevenness of treatment, and this one is no exception. Edgar Alexander's section on Germany runs to 259 pages; with its own introduction and table of contents, it amounts to a book within a book. In contrast, Spain has only ten pages, and Italy receives only incidental treatment. Belgium is included, but Holland is not. There is a section on Latin America, but nothing on Canada. Within each section, too, there are noticeable differences of treatment. Thus the section on the United States is confined to a discussion of the Catholic contribution to the American labor movement, whereas the section on Germany is very full and comprehensive. The book as a whole is thus selective, rather than inclusive. Within its limits, however, it is an excellent book. Its authors are competent, and they write clearly and interestingly. They try to be objective, and they make no obvious effort to gloss over the more unflattering aspects of Catholic social history. Probably most readers, like the present reviewer, will disagree with their interpretations here and there. Yet all in all they do succeed in showing how the Catholic attitude toward the modern economic and political situation has crystallized since the time of the French Revolution; and this, after all, was the original purpose of the book.

PAUL HANLY FURFEY
Catholic University of America

NOBLE, VERNON. *The Life & Times of George Fox: The Man in Leather Breeches*. Pp. 298. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. \$6.00.

The Society of Friends celebrated its Tercentenary in North England in the

summer of 1952. As a part of that celebration, Vernon Noble was asked by the British Broadcasting Company to prepare a dramatic presentation for the air. In the course of duty his interest was sufficiently captured by the founder of the Society of Friends, George Fox, that he went further in his studies and has produced this interesting and valuable addition to Quaker literature. It has the great advantage of being written by someone who is not an adherent of the Society and who comes to the topic with a freshness but with an active interest.

As a good dramatist, he sets his stage well for his characters. The divine right of kings was being challenged. Who was the true head of the church—the King, or the Archbishop of Canterbury, or the Pope, or the Presbyterians, or the Baptists, or the Independents? Besides these "respectable" groups there were such extremists as the Grindletonians, the Anabaptists, the Ranters, the Muggletonians, the Behemists, the Manifestarians, the Sabbatarians, the Millenarians, the Traskites, the Fifth Monarchy Men, and others.

It was into this political and religious climate that the Society of Friends was born. The founder, George Fox, was the son of a workman, himself a craftsman, who lived largely by the work of his own hands. Naturally introspective as a growing lad, he consulted with his priest but got most unsatisfactory advice. The use of physic was proposed; marriage was suggested. All the while he himself was reading the New Testament and comparing the teachings of Jesus with what he saw going on among churchgoers about him, and feeling deeply disturbed. The author places emphasis on the young convert's reaction to religious and political practices about him more than he does on the influences of the mystical sects whose teachings and literature he knew. Jakob Boehme, Hans Denck, Brethren of the Common Lot, and Theologia Germanica—all products of earlier mystical sects—have been shown, especially by Rufus M. Jones, to have deeply influenced George Fox. He was a part of the mystical strain of Christianity in contrast to the institutional and clerical emphasis of the church.

In the face of bitter persecution for heresies, the sect Fox founded increased to nearly 60,000 during his short life and played no small part in the struggle for religious liberty in England and America.

CLARENCE E. PICKETT
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

LE BOURDAIS, D. M. *Nation of the North: Canada since Confederation*. Pp. x, 270. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. \$5.00.

After disposing of the history of the preceding century in two introductory chapters, Mr. Le Bourdais divides the period subsequent to confederation into three eras, each dominated, in a way that would be impossible in the United States, by an outstanding statesman. Macdonald, Laurier, and King had, all three, a steadfast determination not to allow any consideration whatever of principle or emotion to deflect them from policies essential to the preservation of Canadian unity. This story of their success is, therefore, concerned in the main with political history.

Mr. Le Bourdais, journalist rather than trained historian, presents a compact, yet comprehensive and readable narrative. It includes many shrewd appreciations of the *dramatis personae* of Canadian life. The author has his likes and dislikes. Particularly in respect of the later years, when the account becomes more and more journalistic, he writes as an observer "indebted only in a very general way to other writers."

The proportions are good, though slightly distorted by interest in boundary disputes and distaste for problems of constitutional law. It is too optimistic to say that "nothing has been set down which cannot be documented." For instance, the people whom the author describes as Hindus were excluded by Orders-in-Council, sometimes of doubtful validity, and not by an amendment to the Immigration Act.

Omissions are inevitable, yet some are curious: the Chinese Immigration Act stopping immigration from China; the part played by Mr. Meighen in persuading

Britain to terminate the Japanese alliance; Canadian insistence that the Statute of Westminster should not enable Canada to amend its constitution; the Rowell-Sirois Commission; wartime friendliness with Russia and its eclipse in the spy trials.

Mr. Le Bourdais is to be congratulated on his sincerity, his fairness to others, and the frankness with which he discloses his predilections. But the sum of these qualities is not objectivity. Is it entirely consistent to reproach Great Britain for a timid appraisal of the risks of hard bargaining with the United States over boundary questions in 1783, 1814, and 1903, or with Russia in 1825, and then to disparage imperialism and approve Canadian reluctance to support its quarrels in other parts of the Empire? Is it quite fair to contend that conscription was unnecessary and unwise in Canada in World War I because the United States, which did conscript, could produce the necessary soldiers?

H. F. ANGUS
University of British Columbia

FALARDEAU, JEAN C. (Ed.). *Essais sur le Québec contemporain*. Pp. 260. Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1953. No price. 6 chapters in French, 6 in English.

In June 1952, a group of scholars met for two days at the University of Laval to discuss "*les répercussions sociales de l'industrialisation dans la province de Québec*." This volume represents the results of their deliberations. As in all such collections of papers by different authors, there is no central theme running throughout this book, yet it nevertheless has a surprising sense of unity which reflects the careful planning of the original symposium and the skillful bringing together in the final chapter by the editor of the main conclusions of the various papers.

Beginning with the chapter on the history of industrial development, the papers seek, perhaps more than anything else, to show how what is happening today in the province of Quebec is related to the general economic development of the North American continent. The insularity of the society of French Canada is recognized, but an attempt is made to see it in perspec-

tive. Industrialization is not something wholly antipathetic to the social values and institutions of the local society, a development which inevitably must result in destroying all that is precious in the culture of the French Canadian. As Falardeau shows in his chapter on Changing Social Structures, industrial growth is resulting in far-reaching adjustments in the social institutions of French Canada, but the local society is not a passive partner in the changes which are taking place. Commerce and industry have roots deep in the history of Quebec, and, if modern large-scale industrial organization is making demands upon the society very different from the kind made by earlier, simpler forms of industry, the problem of the society of French Canada is not essentially different from that of the society of North America as a whole.

Space makes impossible any examination in detail of the views set forward in the various papers. This reviewer could readily find some things to quarrel with. But any such criticism would be intended to give emphasis to the general excellence of this volume. It marks a distinct contribution to an understanding of one important sector of our North American society. One can look forward to further detailed studies of problems which here could only be discussed in general terms.

S. D. CLARK

University of Toronto

CAIGER, GEORGE (Ed.). *The Australian Way of Life*. Pp. xvi, 158. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. \$3.00.

This volume is one of the first of a series being prepared under the auspices of the International Studies Conference, at the request and with the financial assistance of UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). It includes discussions of the Australian family, educational systems, political, economic, and religious institutions, and foreign policy. Unfortunately, however, these separate contributions do not add up to the Australian way of life.

Though one can hardly agree with Sir Frederic Eggleston that Bernard O'Dowd is the greatest of Australian poets, this is a

minor criticism of a contribution which starts the book at a level of brilliance it never again reaches. There are insights, as at the end of Mr. Henderson's article on religion, but we must first travel through much detail. There is Professor Alexander's competent essay on foreign policy; but these do not redeem the whole. The bare bones of factual outlines are there, but little interpretation.

However, this lack of depth may be a reflection of the subject. Some of her writers, particularly the poets, have explored the spiritual dimensions of Australian life, but the average Australian does not share their curiosity. In the social realm there is a similar aimlessness. And growth is stunted by the hardened conflicts of labor and management.

At the conclusion of his description of economic institutions, the late Professor Wood poses the question whether the Australian-managed economy will achieve "ever-normal and equalized material rewards." It is interesting to note that the objectives are not greater productivity and a higher standard of living, but normalcy and equality. And he goes on to assert that Australian economic institutions are now almost adequate for these purposes.

But others in Australia, notably Sir Douglas Copland and Sir Frederic Eggleston, have different opinions. They have asserted that administration has not proved equal to the tasks laid upon it. They deplore the failure of the state to devise methods of administration involving a devolution of authority. And they note that where adequate delegation was made, as in some of the earlier Victorian State enterprises, pressure groups have been successful in breaking down their independence and, by asserting parliamentary control, have inhibited enterprise.

Yet, there is encouragement in Mr. Henderson's comment that "the nation is aching and agonizing for social reconstruction." Habitual attitudes must, he says, be broken by "heroic personalities trying to create a new situation out of apparently nothing." It is time, he concludes, to turn both outwards and inwards, to wider social loyalties and greater spiritual depth, from the cultivation of gregariousness to the de-

velopment of personality. This is a new theme for Australia, and its appearance may be a sign of a transformation of ideals—from a level mediocrity to a varied maturity.

EDWARD LITTLEJOHN

Detroit, Michigan

BAILEY, SYDNEY D. (Ed.). *The Future of the House of Lords. A symposium*. Pp. 180. London: Hansard Society, 1954. 10/6d.

This is an extremely lucid and valuable little book which will be especially welcomed by teachers of political science. Its comparative survey of second chambers, its descriptions of the opening of Parliament, of the giving of the Royal Assent to legislation, of prorogation, of procedure and standing orders, and of the place and function of the House of Lords both as the second chamber of the legislature and as the highest court of appeal for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are models of brevity, clarity, and precision. This book also has the merit of printing in its appendix the forms of parliamentary writs in current use, the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, and excerpts from committee and conference reports on House of Lords reform since 1908, which are not easily available elsewhere.

The editor admits in his introduction that his distinguished group of contributors (Lord Campion, Sir Albert Napier, Lord Pettrick-Lawrence, F. W. Lascelles, Walter Elliott, P. C. Gordon-Walker, Viscount Hinchinbrooke, and the Archbishop of York) have not, for the most part, written about the future of the House of Lords, and it is indeed true that many readers would wish to learn more of various schemes of reform and their prospects of future adoption. Nevertheless, perhaps the best lesson to be derived from the perusal of these essays is an appreciation of the possibilities of the adaptation of this institution to varying conditions from age to age within its ancient framework of hereditary privilege and ecclesiastical pre-ferment. The saving grace of today's House is that most of its less competent members stay at home and its ecclesiastical

members do not attempt to be politicians. In a truly "reformed" House, every member, "representing" something either by election or appointment, would, whatever his abilities, be in constant attendance, and, if any ecclesiastics were admitted, they could hardly express the Christian conscience on the great problems of the day with the force, authority, and dignity which historic tradition gives to the present bench of bishops.

There are many delightful and useful tidbits of information scattered through this symposium. Temporal peers may sit in but not speak from the bishops' benches on the right of the Throne, a rule once forgotten by the late Lord Birkenhead much to the amusement of his friends. We learn how the determined opponents of the admission of women to the House successfully marshalled their forces to prevent that issue from being considered separately on its merits apart from the broader issues of general reform. We are reminded that the Lord Chancellor's sole function as presiding officer is to put the question from the Woolsack, that he may speak like any other peer (but not from the Woolsack), that he has a vote but no casting vote, and that the House keeps itself in order by virtue of its Order of 1626 on "asperity of speech" in which "all personal, sharp, or taxing speeches" are to be "for-born." These and other usages dear to the House testify to the force of tradition. Nevertheless there is hope; the house has just changed its ancient rule by which a tie vote meant failure of any motion, whether framed positively or negatively. Henceforth, no proposal for the rejection or amendment of a bill shall be agreed to unless there is a majority in favor of such rejection or amendment (p. 91).

HOLDEN FURBER

University of Pennsylvania

RICHMOND, HERBERT. *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727*. Edited by E. A. Hughes. Pp. 404. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. \$12.00.

In the field of maritime history the work of Admiral Mahan has exerted an influence far beyond the borders of his own country

and the span of his own lifetime. The impact of Admiral Richmond's learning on the world is less evident and significant; for one thing his books were a slower and less inspired creation and lacked, moreover, the drama of a new approach. Nevertheless, the lessons Richmond taught on the meaning of sea power based on materials not always available to Mahan are certain to outlive the battleships in which he served. Richmond was that rare kind of seaman (and a distinguished seaman) who obtained, by hard service in library and record office, that disciplined judgment and technical skill which go to make up scholarship.

The Navy as an Instrument of Policy is a straight narrative history (a large part of which has been told before) of military operations at sea, designed to reveal the development of the Royal Navy as a decisive instrument of national power. Military strength forms the main thread of the argument, and the battle is vital to the theme; but the author strengthens his conclusions by emphasizing the contributions of politics, diplomacy, and land operations to the final result. The narrative begins in the days of Henry VII, when the Navy's primary function was to assure safe passage of the Army to France. The Elizabethan Age provided a period of gradual education; statesmen were slow to grasp the importance of controlling sea communications in the interests of national security. Drake's organized offensive against the Spanish overseas Empire illustrated how naval warfare might affect the result of a struggle on the European continent; and on the basis of Mediterranean operations during the period of the early Stuarts, Richmond contends that English statesmen were beginning to perceive, dimly perhaps, that the Navy was "an instrument capable of affecting the course of European affairs by means other than warfare upon commerce" (pp. 67-68). He confesses that his evidence "is as a straw only, showing a breath of wind in a new direction . . .," and he might well have argued that the statesmen of the Commonwealth were the first to glimpse, during the First Dutch War, the full implication of mastery of the sea. In his view, however,

only during the Second Dutch War (following the Restoration) did the elimination of the main enemy fighting force become the basic naval strategy of England. Yet, he admits that the English fleet was "expressly specified" as Tromp's primary objective in 1652 (pp. 105, 110), and Tromp's basic principle of smashing the enemy's main fleet certainly inspired not only an equally offensive spirit, but a strategy of concentration on the part of the English.

There is a brief and cogent discussion of the rise of French naval power under Richelieu and Colbert. France, because of the demands of her army, possessed at sea neither the audacity nor the recuperative powers of Holland, and although the material loss inflicted at La Hogue in 1692 was not greater than that suffered by the English at Beachy Head (1690), France abandoned finally her policy of command of the sea and proposed henceforth not to use her navy to crush the enemy's fighting forces but to employ it in squadrons against English commerce.

Full and accurate footnote references were never Admiral Richmond's forte, and an editor's eye, however eagle-like, could hardly discover every error or omission of name, place, and date, of which there are many. (One of the more obvious slips is the repeated spelling of Captain Vetch as 'Ketch'—pp. 353-354.) Both the list of sources and the index are flimsy, but only a very ill-conditioned reviewer could refuse to rejoice at the posthumous publication of the last work of a master.

GERALD S. GRAHAM

University of London

MABILEAU, ALBERT. *Le Parti libéral dans le système constitutionnel britannique*. Pp. viii, 354. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1953. 1,100 fr. No. 47, "Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques."

The author, a French admirer of British democracy, tolerance, and individualism, has analyzed the decline of the Liberal party which was long their chief exponent. The first section of his book, which covers the years 1906-1922, dates the decline from the great electoral triumph of 1906, because it also brought the Labour party to

the House of Commons. Then war, for which liberalism was ill-adapted, led to feuds and a disastrous split; it left the Liberal party no longer on equal terms with the Conservative and even surpassed by a new rival for whose rise to power it was in large part responsible. It had prepared the way for the Labour party's progress by the Parliament Act of 1911 which breached a fortress of tradition; the payment of members of Parliament and the permission for a political levy on trade unionists made Labour financially viable; the democratization of the suffrage in 1918 provided the potential Labour voters. It spoke well for British honor that a party should abandon political advantages in the national interest, but in the two-party system, as the Liberals discovered in 1922, there was place for only one party of movement. The author contends that these social and constitutional facts, rather than the Lloyd George-Asquith feud, destroyed the Liberals as a party of government. He does not speculate as to what might have happened had they possessed a Sir Robert Peel to provide the leadership and program demanded by the situation.

The last two sections cover thirty years of steady decline. The constitution operated against the Liberals, for power bypassed the center party and alternated between the greater rivals to right and left, while the system of single-member constituencies caused it, the minor party, to suffer disproportionate loss in the electoral returns. The Labour party's wisdom in refusing alliances was vindicated by the fate of the Liberals, whose unequal bargains and coalitions with the Conservatives resulted in heavy losses. Since the election of 1935 the party has been only a "party of opinion" with a handful of members in the Commons and a steadily weakening organization in the country. In dying, however, the Liberal party enjoys a triumph of a kind; the author examines the major parties and, except for a bit of class consciousness here and there, he concludes that both are "liberal," and that, since liberalism has become a national tradition, the party has lost its reason for being.

CARL F. BRAND

Stanford University

COLLIER, ADAM. *The Crofting Problem*. Pp. xv, 191. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. \$5.00.

The crofting problem of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland is that of a sparse, old subsistence agricultural culture of 130,000 souls situated on the fringe of a heavily populated industrial country. The terrain is, by the general standard of Britain, poor and forbidding, and social organization is not developed to the urban level of much of Britain. Public administration which originates from urban conditions is largely incompatible with the needs of a relatively primitive, communalistic culture. The clan system broke down in the eighteenth century; no other effective leadership has taken its place. Rapidly rising population up to 1840 (and in the Outer Hebrides till 1911) caused many problems and much hardship. The subsequent rapid fall in population has brought its own problems, social and economic. Standards of husbandry and diet have deteriorated; the desire for a higher standard of living is strengthening. That is the crofting problem.

Adam Collier was a Scottish economist with a reflective, sociological turn of mind. The present book, full of meat and admirably edited by A. K. Cairncross, represents Collier's much interrupted attempt to investigate the problem with thoroughness and in a scientific spirit. He was killed in a mountaineering accident in 1945, so he neither finished his book nor satisfied his own curiosity.

Collier's chapters on the New Economic Revolution, the Role of the State, the Regional Income of the Highlands in pre-War Years, will stand for a long time. Nobody else has reached such authentic quality in these fields; his chapter on the Decline of Population is accurate as a summary but has been superseded by a much more detailed study by R. S. Barclay in the West Highland Survey, 1944-50, a body which the reviewer directed and in which it was hoped that Collier would have participated in major fashion. *West Highland Survey* is at present in the press; although it represents a much fuller investigation than Collier, as a one-man outfit, was able to tackle, it is complementary

to this remarkable work of one man and will not in any way swamp it.

The chapter *What can be Done?* shows Collier's lively interest and curiosity in fields which were not his. If he was perhaps a little too optimistic and believing, the fault should not be set against him, for he died a young man. Collier in due course would probably have brought anthropology into the study of economic problems of marginal peoples. Here, he was just feeling his way, and the reviewer feels sure that experience would have caused him to modify his thoughts. The strength of the book is in Collier's firm grasp of refractory data.

The map appearing as an end paper is inadequate to the needs of the book.

F. FRASER DARLING
Malmesbury, Wiltshire, England

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

FLORINSKY, MICHAEL T. *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*. 2 vols. Pp. xvii, 628, xxiv; viii, 629-1511, xxv-lxxvi. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. \$15.00.

There have been a sufficient number of bad short histories of Russia in recent years for one to be grateful when a good one appears. Professor Florinsky has spent many years on the study of Russia's history since he left the country in which he grew up. He writes from personal understanding of both Russia and the Western World, as well as from knowledge of written sources in both Russian and Western languages. This book deserves a wider circulation than its high price is likely to give it, not only in America but in Europe and Asia too.

At a time when historical studies are more overshadowed by political passions than they have ever been since serious historical study has existed, the author has bravely maintained scientific standards of honesty. This is even more necessary in the history of Russia than of other countries. The attempt to project the controversies of the present into the recent and distant past has, in the case of Russian

history, assumed almost Orwellian proportions, and this, it must unfortunately be admitted, not only behind the Iron Curtain. We have the increasing chauvinism of Soviet historical writing—for which it is important to blame not the historians themselves but the Party bosses who force them to write as the Party wishes. We have the view, so popular with some German and Germanophile writers, that there is throughout Russian history a continuous tradition of aggressiveness, different in kind from the aggressiveness of other nations, and that in the present century the two World Wars were the work of Pan-Slavism. We have the view, widespread in Western Europe, that the Russians are barbarians "incapable of valuing liberty." Whether put forward by sorrowing liberals, pitying the poor irredeemable savages, or by haters of liberalism, contemptuous of "the masses" in Russia or elsewhere, the result is similar. Professor Florinsky does not subscribe to these or kindred theories. At the same time he escapes another snare for historians, that of Olympian superiority to moral considerations. Moral factors are as relevant to history as other factors. In writing for example of Ivan the Terrible, Professor Florinsky shows himself fully aware of this. That it should be necessary to commend Professor Florinsky for observing standards which a few decades ago were taken for granted by western historians is distressing. But the commendation is deserved.

This long book is readable and clear. Most book reviewers nowadays assume that the reading public is not capable of absorbing more than about one fact in every fifty pages, and that any author who fails to provide his readers with prefabricated ideas on every page is failing to do his duty. Whether the majority of readers really have such tastes, the present reviewer doubts. And if they do, then authors should ignore them. Readers of Professor Florinsky will have to use their mental facilities, but the task is made as little arduous as is compatible with scholarship.

The relative emphasis to be given to different periods and different factors in the history of a great nation is a matter

on which few can ever agree. Professor Florinsky has made his own choice, and his long experience and knowledge entitle him to respect. Some may argue that the Middle Ages do not receive enough space. The first five hundred of Russia's thousand years of history get only one tenth of the space. But as the interest of the author and of most of his readers is likely to be in more recent periods, this can be excused. More serious is the very scanty treatment given to the Orthodox Church and to religious dissent and sects, especially in the last centuries. Among the factors which moulded the Russian intelligentsia, from which in time the radical and revolutionary leaderships emerged, surely the Orthodox cultural tradition was one of the strongest. Another gap is the problem of nationalities. In the nineteenth century about half (at the 1897 census 56 per cent) of the population of the Empire were non-Russians. The national movements of the subject peoples receive only a few scattered pages or paragraphs, and the social and political problems within the non-Russian areas are barely mentioned at all. On the other hand some subjects seem to be treated at too great length. The Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 has 40 pages. It has been exhaustively discussed in the books of Sumner, R. W. Seton-Watson, Rupp, and others, and Mr. Florinsky has no essential new contribution to make. The First World War, up to the February Revolution, gets 70 pages. This too has been fully treated before, not least in Mr. Florinsky's own work *The End of the Russian Empire*.

These are however matters of opinion. They are criticisms of an admirable enterprise, which can be warmly recommended to those who wish to learn some Russian history.

HUGH SETON-WATSON
University of London

STEVENS, LESLIE C. *Russian Assignment*. Pp. xv, 568. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1953. \$5.75.

This large and delightfully written book by Vice Admiral Stevens, our Naval Attaché for a little more than two years in Moscow when the cold war was just be-

ginning, is an important addition to the fast growing body of literature on the Soviet Union. Written in the form of memoirs, the book is replete with keen notes and observations on the multiple phases of Soviet life: literature, theater, play-writing, book-printing, museums, moving pictures, fishing and flying, living conditions, concentration camps, women's lot as laborers, and of course the life of the diplomatic corps in that "golden land" held firmly "in the golden hands of the people."

At the present juncture of world affairs, however, the book is most important in its graphic, almost daily account of the tests and trials of our embassy personnel. The author could have had, as subtitle, the "decline and fall of our prestige in the Soviet Union," for while arresting and informative details of many significant events are given, yet all through it this disturbing fact, the sudden—almost catastrophic—fall of our prestige overshadows all else. For instance, the embassy quarters are leased on an annual basis, "but the renewal of leases is always a time of troubles." Every Russian employee of the embassy is required to report back to his government "on everything he can regarding foreigners—their interests, their characters and abilities, and what they are up to" (p. 20). When an official of the embassy is jailed and we try to elicit information about the case, the Soviet Foreign Office "would not even discuss the case with Durbrow [our Minister-Counselor]" (p. 98). The embassy has difficulties in importing supplies needed there. And when permits for importing are issued, then the imported articles are held in customs house. Next the embassy is informed "that everything which has been piling up for the last eight or nine months must be cleared out within ten days or it will be confiscated" (p. 253).

General Carter, our Military Attaché, and several assistant attachés were watching some planes practicing. Red Air Force officers told them that they could not do that. Our attachés were told to accompany them to the airfield headquarters; General Carter refused, and Red officers kept his diplomatic card. Subsequently it took several weeks to make an appoint-

ment with proper officials "to discuss the matter" (p. 350). At the end of a year in Moscow Durbrow told the author that 1937 was regarded as the worst year for foreigners in Russia, but that this past year (1948) "far surpasses it." Finally, in mid-1949 when his tour of duty was over the author could say (in Lermontov's words):

"Farewell to you, unwashed Russia,
Land of slaves, and land of lords."

The Admiral knew the Russian language and made very effective use of it at all times. His book, along with General Deane's *Strange Alliance* (1947), and General Smith's *My Three Years in Moscow* (1949), should have a distinct and deserving place on any selected list of books on the subject.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
The Library of Congress

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC. *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921*. Pp. xii, 540. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. \$6.00.

The Prophet Armed is the third in an ambitious series of biographies of Stalin, Trotsky, and Lenin, undertaken by Isaac Deutscher. One book on Stalin's life and one on the effect of Stalin's death made clear the framework of Mr. Deutscher's political thought and approach to his three protagonists. The present volume tells the story of Stalin's great opponent, from Trotsky's birth in 1879 to his apogee in 1921, when, as the powerful Commissar of War, he had just brought the Civil War to a triumphant end. A sequel, *The Prophet Unarmed*, will recount Trotsky's downfall and murder. A biography of Lenin will complete the trilogy.

In the two Stalin books Mr. Deutscher made clear his belief that the Russian Revolutions of 1917, particularly the Bolshevik seizure of power, were historically necessary and progressive. His criticisms of Joseph Stalin were made in general human terms ("cruel," "despotic," "barbarous"), but these methods were "forced" upon the dictator by the backwardness of his land and people. Only "totalitarian

methods" could have industrialized, modernized, and collectivized Russia's industry and agriculture. Moreover, by his methods, Stalin so raised the level of Russia's economy and mass culture that, by the time of his death, he had made Stalinist totalitarianism historically unnecessary and outdated.

In *The Prophet Armed* Mr. Deutscher no longer argues but takes for granted the soundness of this approach. The minority seizure of power in November 1917, of which Trotsky is the hero, was only the "necessary" sequel to the overthrow of czarism in March. All those who thought otherwise—liberals, democrats, and democratic and agrarian socialists—are treated by the author as wrongheaded, base, perverse, historically myopic. The author is aware of the fact that minority seizure of power and holding of power against the will of even the peasants and workers made totalitarianism inevitable, but both the seizure of power and the totalitarian methods are "justified" by history. Only the "utopian illusions" of Lenin and Trotsky that they might use democratic methods or be bailed out of their dilemma by a revolution in the West are subject to Deutscher's criticism, since the hindsight, which comes from having lived longer, enables him to see that these were illusions. But it is these illusions which make Trotsky into a tragic hero.

Despite this unpromising moral and intellectual framework, *The Prophet Armed* is a moving and compassionate book. The cold reluctance of Deutscher's apologetics for Stalin are forced upon him by the dogmatics of his political position. But his life of Trotsky is done *con amore*. The writing takes on deeper dimensions. The research is more thorough, his protagonist more self-revealing. The tragedy of the conflict between the protagonist's dreams and the consequences of his deeds is deeply felt and ably presented. Only at the very end does the cold apologist return to hint that "when next the Prophet Unarmed is contemplated, the question will arise whether a strong element of victory was not concealed in his very defeat."

BERTRAM D. WOLFE
Brooklyn, New York

WARTH, ROBERT D. *The Allies and the Russian Revolution from the Fall of the Monarchy to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk*. Pp. vii, 294. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1954. \$4.50.

This book produces a rather strange effect of simultaneous remoteness and nearness of the events it relates. Basically there is little that this book adds to what we already know; yet I consider the work a valuable contribution, for it deals with a subject that deserves continuous repetition since public memory is short lived. The subject of this work is the year of turmoil in Russia, March 1917 to March 1918, and the diplomatic fiasco which the Allies suffered in their futile endeavor to tame the events. Since western diplomacy can easily repeat the same follies it becomes absolutely necessary to refresh periodically our memory by reading a book such as this one.

To illustrate, take, for instance, the ill-famed "forgotten peace" of Brest-Litovsk. The subject has been adequately covered by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett. Warth devotes to the same subject a graphic chapter; it contains no startling revelation, yet by reading the account one regains useful insights into Communist tactics and policies. The overtones of the cold war are easily detected on every page.

The book serves other purposes: it reminds of the importance of understanding the peoples to whom we appeal through means such as the Voice of America, urging them to follow our way of life. It revives the memory of Allied blundering policies during the fateful four months following the November revolution, due to the abysmal lack of intelligent information. One cannot escape a sense of remorse at the staring poverty of imagination which the world press or the Allied leaders had demonstrated in evaluating the November revolution. Leading newspapers presented the occurrence as a "freakish happenstance" which would be remedied when "reason" and "sanity" reasserted their rightful heritage in the affairs of man." According to the press the revolution was carried out by "fanatics and anarchists" led by Lenin whose real name was Zederbaum, his comrades a mere handful of German-Jews in

the service of the Kaiser. One magazine traced the entire affair to the "cabals of Geneva and Stockholm."

Gullible Allied statesmen were ready to buy sensational documents that presented the crudest forgeries, such as the Sission documents. It is a source of melancholy thought that a student of history such as President Woodrow Wilson should have been easily persuaded by Mr. Creel to accept the obvious forgeries as authentic sources. Dr. Warth aptly cites an "impeccably anti-Bolshevik commentator" who summarized the episode as a reminder that a state of war and a paralysis of critical faculties seem to march together.

Dr. Warth's book should be the desk copy of our policy-forming officials. It should be read by many Americans who seek to form intelligent political opinion concerning many of our crucial problems emanating from the presumably "passing incident" that occurred on November 7, 1917, when the scum came to triumph, as the *Journal des débats* had reported the November Revolution.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR
Stanford University

CAROE, OLAF. *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*. Pp. x, 300. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. \$5.00.

Soviet Empire, which deals with a very important part of Asia and of the Soviet Union, is composed of three essential parts. The first two treat of "The Muslim Period and the Tsars" and the transition, 1917-1924, from czarist control to Soviet domination of Central Asia. Part III, which is of special interest, deals with the contemporary scene, under the general title of "Soviet Pressures." It is concerned with the problems of Nationalism and the Soviet Colonial Empire, Russification, Collectivization and the Suppression of Nomadism, Industrialization and Public Works, Soviet Central Asia during World War II, and the general problem of Deviationism.

Sir Olaf's volume is not a product of personal experience or of profound original research, but it is an important volume because the author has brought con-

veniently together into a single volume a great deal of material from the appropriate and available sources—what should be known about this highly important area. Readers will find of special interest, perhaps, his remarks about the problem of self-determination and the so-called “higher right of the dictatorship of the proletariat” in Communist jargon on this subject. But the other material in the volume is of equal interest—such as that on industrialization in Central Asia and the economic exploitation of the Turki and other elements in the area. Moreover, the chapter on World War II is of particular interest because of evident attitudes in the area, as reflected by the surrender of thousands of Red Army soldiers from Central Asia and the Nazi attempt to exploit these people.

Sir Olaf's volume is not only very well written, it is also well documented, with an extended bibliography of materials from Russian, Soviet, and Turkish sources, among others, for assistance in further research and study on this problem. In addition, there are four black and white maps which indicate the physical characteristics of the area, trace the Russian advance in Central Asia, mark the railway network, and demonstrate the linguistic distribution. It may well be hoped that the volume will have a wide reading.

HARRY N. HOWARD

Arlington, Virginia

LEITES, NATHAN. *A Study of Bolshevism*. Pp. 639. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. \$6.50.

Four years ago Dr. Nathan Leites of the Rand Corporation published a slim volume entitled *The Operational Code of the Politburos* (McGraw-Hill, 1951), as part of a study undertaken for the United States Air Force. He sought, in the tradition of Machiavelli, to reduce to general precepts the political strategy and tactics of the power-holders in the Kremlin. The effort was unsuccessful. Machiavelli as a practical diplomat was concerned with what Princes do. Leites, as an ivory-tower scholar, is concerned with what they say and write, with little regard to their acts or to the arena of their deeds. In a futile

effort to reduce Communist ideology to Communist strategy, he failed to illumine either.

In the present volume, compiled with Gargantuan labor and suffocating documentation, he has expanded his earlier effort into a mountain which brings forth not even a mouse. His titles are intriguing: “Push to the Limit,” “If Pays to Be Rude,” “Avoid Adventures,” “The Denial of Accidents,” “The Irrelevance of Truth,” “The Danger of Vagueness,” (37 “dangers” are listed), “The Profits of Pressure,” “The Legitimacy of Retreat.” Each section consists of small quotations strung together from Communist classics and Russian literature, embellished with brief comments.

The result, alas, is wholly unreadable, uninformative, and stupefying. Every quotation is quoted out of context and is therefore meaningless, save to the reader who happens to know the context. The resulting jumble is utterly lacking in analytical or predictive value. This is a pity, for Dr. Leites is an earnest and intelligent researcher, trying seriously to grapple with an important problem of analysis and interpretation. It is a sad commentary on the “social science” here exemplified that its practitioners cannot distinguish between ideologies and policies and succeed in reducing both to nonsense and boredom. The effort is comparable to explaining the politics of the medieval Papacy by verses from the New Testament, the diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire by excerpts from the Koran, or the military strategy of Napoleon by quotations from Rousseau and Voltaire. This effort “to portray the spirit of the Bolshevik elite” portrays nothing, reveals nothing of any spirit save pedantry, and tells us nothing of value about the Bolshevik elite. Fortunately, it is not representative of contemporary social science but only its *reductio ad absurdum*.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Williams College

GERSON, LOUIS L. *Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1920: A Study in the Influence on American Policy of Minority Groups of Foreign*

Origin. Pp. xi, 166. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. \$4.00.

The subtitle of Mr. Gerson's book promised a study of the little-known effects of activities of pressure groups on American foreign policy. It is too bad that this promise was not fulfilled. Of the 137 pages of text only six (pages 60-66) deal *stricto sensu* with the subject. The documentation of this part is limited to a few items from the Wilson archives and some earlier published documents. The rich material buried in the archives and libraries of the Polish National Alliance of America and the Polish Roman Catholic Union of America (both in Chicago) still remain untapped. Any serious study of this subject should not omit them. This omission makes Mr. Gerson's presentation incomplete: the work shows, in a quite fragmentary manner, the reaction of Wilson to the political pressure of the American Poles without indicating the strength of this pressure, the efforts behind it, and the means through which it was applied. Thus, an evaluation of causes and effects, of successes and failures of this pressure is impossible.

This, however, is a comparatively minor deficiency in Mr. Gerson's book. The bulk of the volume deals with a characterization of the large group of Americans of Polish descent and the internal politics of this group during World War I, and with the diplomatic history concerning Poland during this period. The author has brought out the crucial role of President Wilson and Colonel House in these events. He has also attempted to deal with the intricate problem of changing political orientations among the Poles in their homeland. Lack of knowledge and understanding of this subject, evident from erroneous use of source materials, is responsible for the essential errors in Mr. Gerson's book. For instance, by confounding “a certain Doctor Paderewski,” mentioned in Pilsudski's writings as a representative of the National Democratic Party, with Ignace Paderewski, Mr. Gerson produced an utter confusion in the presentation of events (pp. 105-106). A more careful study of the sources would have prevented the confusion and the erroneous conclusions. Out

of this mistake arose another: Mr. Gerson in several instances presents Ignace Paderewski as a representative and mouthpiece of the National Democratic Party, to which the artist and prime minister never belonged.

Another error exemplifying negligent research and lack of knowledge of contemporary Austro-Polish developments is not less damaging to the book: on page 20 Mr. Gerson quotes an excerpt of a document annexed to the Bilinski diaries. The document in the Bilinski book contains a printing error: its date, instead of 1918, should read 1916. The text of the document is preceded by a reference to the page of the diary where it is discussed. A better knowledge of Austro-Polish developments and a glance into the text of the diary would have saved Mr. Gerson from repeating the error and from drawing an incorrect conclusion. Another Bilinski document was also quoted without consultation of the diary and led to additional false conclusions (p. 20).

Mr. Gerson had a good idea in replacing the usual bibliography of the subject by a *Bibliographical Essay* (pp. 140-146). However, the books discussed prove that he did not exhaust the available sources. The books on the American Poles are limited to a few monographs in the English language and a single book in Polish. The other pertinent writings in the Polish language, especially those originating during, and dealing with, the years 1914-1919, are completely ignored. He writes, “There are no works which deal exclusively with the Polish problem at the Peace Conference.” Then he goes on to quote, “for the Polish point of view,” a single volume by Smogorzewski. He is unaware of the existence of a four-volume collection of Polish documents relating to the Conference (*Acts and Documents concerning Poland at the Paris Peace Conference*, Paris, 1920-26, in Polish, parts in French and English) and an excellent book by the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation, Stanislaw Kutrzeba (*The Congress, the Treaty, and Poland*, Warsaw, 1919, 198 p., in Polish). There exist still other titles referring to special questions at the Conference.

Lack of space makes it impossible to bring out here all the errors, misinterpretations, and other shortcomings of this volume. It is amazing to see how these deficiencies could have been overlooked in a Ph.D. dissertation and unobserved by the publishers of a serious historical series.

W. S. SWORAKOWSKI

Stanford University

VUCINICH, WAYNE S. *Serbia Between East and West: The Events of 1903-1908*. Pp. x. 304. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954. \$4.75.

Through the use of the primary (also secondary) sources in several languages, especially the much neglected Serbian materials, Professor Vucinich has given us a significant picture of domestic political changes in Serbia during the period under study, and the impact these changes had upon the foreign policies of the Great Powers of Europe as well as upon Serbia's own foreign relations. This book, the product of years of painstaking effort and meticulous scholarship, represents an important contribution to historical research in a field which has received little attention in the English-speaking world. In distributing this careful study it is evident the volume Serbian revolution of 1903 was

rily a struggle between two dy-

Arlington the conspiracy to assassinate the

Queen and the plan to restore

ageorgevich dynasty did not origi-

LEITF in Karageorgevich circles. Popular discontent with and hostility toward King Alexander Obrenovich was widespread, especially after his marriage to Queen Draga, a widow and a commoner, when not "a single general was willing to accept the post of war minister in the cabinet." His father had admonished Alexander that should he go through with his marriage plans "the dynasty could never recover from it," adding that he would be "the first to cheer the Government which shall drive you from the country, after such a folly on your part."

Professor Vucinich devotes considerable space to a discussion of Serbian politics and government in the period following the assassination of the childless Obrenovich

royal couple and the coming to the throne of Peter I in 1903. From these pages there emerges a picture of a developing democratic parliamentary order, characterized by freedom, dynamic political parties, and a constitutional monarch. This is a long forgotten or little appreciated fact. By comparison with Tito's tyranny, the Serbia of King Peter I was a model democracy.

Also, in these pages one finds a detailed account of the "divide and rule" policy practiced in the Balkans by the Great Powers. Although Austro-Hungary seems to have excelled in this respect, Russia apparently was not far behind. And some British actions are not free from censure. In treating this whole problem, the author presents significant data on a number of Balkan questions (e.g., Macedonia), together with a great deal of historical information on the developing Great Power controversy in the Balkans during the years preceding the period with which this work is primarily concerned.

Last, but not least, note should be made of the first-rate documentation which characterizes this book, together with its excellent bibliography and the detailed index.

Experts may disagree with some of the author's conclusions, but they cannot deny that this work is a real contribution to historical scholarship.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH

Vanderbilt University

KOUSOULAS, DIMITRIOS G. *The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953*. Pp. xi. 210. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1953. \$4.00.

Those who love the cradle of democracy should read this small book—a concise and good summary of the foreign and domestic affairs of modern Greece during the most trying period of her existence. Dimitrios Kousoulas, who in his teen age lived in Greece and took part in the underground fight against the German invaders as well as in the civil war against the Communists, unfolds a terrible story of international rivalries focused around his beloved native Greece as well as around the other

Balkan countries—Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

For a hundred years after her emancipation from Turkish domination in 1830 Greece was plagued by internal dissensions and international complications. Not unlike her own mythical Sisyphus, this modern nation with ancient glory was rolling a huge stone—the "Great Idea" of the restoration of the medieval Byzantine Empire under the scepter of the modern Greek King—up to the top of the steep hill, and always it escaped her hands and rolled down to the bottom again. At last, in 1930, her great statesman, Eleutherios Venizelos, had the courage to scrap the whole idea; and, after five centuries of enmity, Greece and Turkey became friends as well as neighbors.

During those later years the Greek people had to cope with a domestic military dictatorship, the unsuccessful Italian fascist aggression, the successful subjugation by the German Panzer Divisions, the ravishes of the various underground resistance groups that fought with frightful brutality less against the German invaders and more against one another for supremacy, and, after its liberation from the German occupation, a bloody civil war between the Communists and the anti-Communists.

Yet, thanks to the Churchill-Stalin "Percentage Agreement"—providing that Great Britain should have 100 per cent predominance in Greece while the Soviet Union should have only 75 per cent predominance in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania—the subsequent intervention of the United Nations Organization, and especially the Truman Doctrine and American help, Greece managed to preserve her independence.

Disclaiming the intent to express sympathy for authoritarian regimes of any form, the author momentarily departs from his remarkable impartiality in order to praise the dictatorial regime of General Metaxas, which was established by royal decrees abolishing the political parties, dissolving Parliament, and suspending the constitutional Bill of Rights—although admitting at the same time that the said Regime of August Fourth (1936) was unpopular with the liberty-loving Greek peo-

ple and that the apparent weaknesses of that regime virtually invited the Italian fascist aggression.

Moreover, the author has no sympathy for Greece's two-party system, the Liberal party (Venizelists) and the Populist party (Monarchists). He blames the latter for having undermined the efforts of the great Venizelos to bring about the realization of the "Great Idea" and the Liberals for having discredited the great prestige of the Greek Government-in-Exile during the German occupation and thus frustrated the Greek territorial claims at the peace parleys.

It seems to this reviewer (a United States citizen of Bulgarian origin, who had in his teens a gruesome experience with such "Balkan politics") that these charges are baseless and unfair, for the author himself gives plenty of evidence that the reaching for the Byzantine rainbow in the 'twenties as well as the achievement of the Greek territorial claims in the 'forties was beyond Greek control. History teaches us that a state, great or small, invites disaster if it is divided against itself into two factions, "patriots" and "traitors."

THEODORE I. GESHKOFF

New York City

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

PÖLNITZ, GÖTZ FREIHERR VON. *Fugger und Hanse: Ein hundertjähriges Ringen um Ostsee und Nordsee*. Pp. xiv. 236. Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1953. DM 11.50.

Professor Götz von Pölnitz, whose brilliant two-volume biography of *Jakob Fugger* was reviewed in these pages in January 1953, gives in his present book the first authoritative and comprehensive survey of the Fuggers' struggle with the Hansa over economic power in its economic-political "Raum" in northern and eastern Europe. The conflict lasted from 1500 to 1600 and spanned the most interesting years in the life of Jacob the Rich (d. 1525), the time of Anton Fugger (d. 1560), his nephew, and of the latter's suc-

cessors in "the epoch of the decline" of both the Fugger company and the Hansa.

Von Pölnitz devotes roughly half of the 132 pages of text to Jacob Fugger's successful penetration of the Hanseatic sphere of interest. The principal elements of this early phase of the Fugger-Hansa struggle he outlined in the biography of his hero. But in this work the author has fully expanded the account on the basis of the rich material contained in the "Sources and Explanations" of the second volume of the biography and of other hitherto unpublished documents. For the period after 1525, covered in the second half of the text, von Pölnitz has drawn on materials which he and his collaborators have so far collected for "the history of Anton Fugger." As the author makes clear, the entrance of the Fuggers into the maritime trade in the Baltic and the North seas was part of the sixteenth century expansion and of wide encroachment of southern German business firms upon the Hanseatic sphere of influence. But when Jacob Fugger first penetrated this area the classic period of the Hansa's power was long past; it now concentrated entirely upon preserving the position already achieved. The Fuggers were the most successful challengers of this monopoly; through their extensive system of "political finance" they secured the support of the Church and the ruling princes against the Hansa, which enabled them to invade its "powerful economic strongholds."

Fugger und Hanse is not purely economic history, however; it is essentially a study of the political and cultural development of sixteenth-century Germany and Europe. And the Fugger-Hansa conflict is discussed within the context of this development which embraced the great religious schism (Reformation), the rise of national states and economies, the virtual disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, and the shift of the center of political power to the Atlantic coast, particularly to England. Von Pölnitz shows with admirable lucidity how these momentous changes in the political and cultural structure of Europe perniciously affected both the Hansa and Fugger interests, ending in the simultaneous descent of the contestants.

As a study of Fugger business activities in a specific area, the volume makes a welcome addition to the meager number of such investigations and thus enriches the literature on this famous Augsburg family and its unique business organization. Moreover, it is an important contribution to the history of Europe in the sixteenth century. The book contains 19 pages of bibliographical notes, an 8-page index of persons and places, and 17 selected documents which are published here for the first time. Also, it should be noted that the work appears in a new series of studies on the Fuggers which is being edited by Professor von Pölnitz.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER

Washington, D. C.

SCHACHT, HJALMAR. *76 Jahre meines Lebens*. Pp. 692. Bad Wörishofen: Kindler & Schiermeyer Verlag, 1953. DM 19.80.

76 years of my life is Schacht's autobiography, first published in *Revue*, a German illustrated weekly. The book's easy style, the often jovial approach of its author, and the many illustrations are sure to make it popular. Schacht portrays himself as an earthy type, a rugged individualist who was always ready to speak his mind.

Great intelligence, an excellent education, and ambition were the main ingredients which enabled Schacht to rise. He is at his best when he illustrates his exceptional ability to reduce economic principles to simplicity and when he describes his readiness to apply them to the root of the problem despite the opposition of special interests. His roles as currency administrator at the end of the inflation and later as Reichsbank President gave him ample opportunity for a stalwart course.

Schacht entered politics as one of the founders of the left-of-center German Democratic Party. Later, his more conservative and nationalistic views led him to oppose the Weimar Government's policy of fulfillment. Schacht resigned from the Reichsbank presidency in 1930, primarily because of his opposition to the payment of reparations and the unsound policy of

foreign loans received by German communities, but returned to his old post under Hitler. He was acquitted at Nuremberg, and then held by German courts awaiting his denazification. Now the head of his own banking firm, Schacht is again the financial expert called upon by many governments.

Schacht's historic role will continue to arouse moral judgments which differ from his own. He was quite obviously attracted to Hitler. An ambivalence of loyalty and opposition to the Führer expresses itself long after he recognized Hitler's duplicity. This cleverly written book could not convince this reviewer that Schacht was not rationalizing his participation in the Hitler cabinet when he says that he tried to exert a moderating influence from within. Surely Schacht must have realized that his role in Hitler's government not only furnished it with the financial know-how it needed, but also lent it prestige and a camouflage of moderation. To Schacht's credit, it should be noted that he was on occasion outspoken and courageous in his opposition to Nazism and Hitler's war policy. His attitude finally led to his detention in concentration camp after the July 1944 coup. But he does not explain convincingly why he continued as a Minister without Portfolio when dismissed from his old post in 1939. Similarly, in 1937, when every minister received the Nazi Golden Party Emblem, he accepted that decoration, though he had by that time set his course against Nazi rowdyism. Another minister (Eltz v. Rübenach) returned his and resigned.

Toward the end the reader is estranged by Schacht's dependence on the *argumentum ad hominem*, his distortion, and vindictiveness against those whose views of his part in Hitler's rise differ from his own. For those who cannot so glibly dismiss the disastrous consequences of the Hitler holocaust over Europe, Schacht's oblique treatment of the basic moral problem makes this book another in a series of sad commentaries on our time.

ERIC H. BOEHM

Historical Abstracts
Vienna, Austria.

WHEELER-BENNETT, JOHN W. *The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945*. Pp. xvi, 829. New York: St. Martin's Press (distributors for Macmillan & Co., London), 1953. \$12.00.

If you have time to read only one book on modern Germany and on the Germans, it should be this one. Not only is it a brilliantly written history and one of the best examples of Wheeler-Bennett's scholarship; it is also a guidebook for those who are seriously interested in preventing another German rearmament from once again losing for us the battle of the peace. A center of interest in this dramatic story of twenty-seven years is the German mind, and particularly the German military mind. The unraveling of the plot should aid considerably in answering the perplexing question: Why have the Germans contributed so greatly to western civilization and at the same time destroyed so much? How could the nation which produced Heine and Goethe and Hindenburg tolerate the "beasts of Buchenwald"?

The story begins—and ends—with unconditional surrender. For those who have lived intimately with the Germany of this period, dramatic moments such as the ill-fated Kapp *putsch*, the blood-purge of 1934, and the poorly planned attempt by certain army leaders on Hitler's life, in 1944, stand out as high spots in the tragedy. But even the narrative and analysis of less dramatic events and more plodding years are made alive. One of the most historically decisive periods is objectively analyzed in the chapter on the von Seeckt period, during the early Weimar regime. For when Kaiser Wilhelm II and his entourage crossed the Dutch border in 1918, the Army which had owed loyalty to its Emperor alone lost its political independence. Into this vacuum came General von Seeckt, who successfully avoided parliamentary control over the Army by the Socialists and who instead made of the Army the most powerful political factor in Ebert's and Stresemann's Republic. The first political step led to the second as von Schleicher, the intriguer, followed von Seeckt and as the Army looked on Hitler

as one who could convert the worker from socialism to nationalism. But it was not long, as we see, before the Army's use of Hitler became Hitler's use of the Army.

The conclusion is inevitable that the German army aided greatly in the ascendancy of Hitler and the National Socialists and in the revival of German nationalism. Some of the parallels in the periods after 1918 and 1945 are ominous, and Wheeler-Bennett's masterpiece is required reading on current problems.

RALPH F. BISCHOFF

New York University

ANDERS, WLADYSLAW. *Hitler's Defeat in Russia*. Pp. xviii, 267. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. \$4.00.

Excellent introduced by an expert on Germany and the Second World War, Colonel (retired) Truman Smith (former United States Military Attaché to Berlin and German specialist in the Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff from 1941 till 1945), this book shows thorough experience of modern strategy in the broadest sense of the word. Colonel Smith states, obviously with justification, that "General Anders attempts to answer in the present analytical study of the Russo-German war a number of questions and succeeds to the full, with amazing clarity and unanswerable logic." Based on seven maps, Hitler's military blunders and the German army's defeats are recalled. But far beyond being a technical book, it gives the hitherto unwritten story of an astounding misuse of military possibilities by stupid and criminal psychological, that is, political warfare. The chapters "German Policy in the Occupied Territories of USSR," "Treatment of Soviet Prisoners and of the Population of the USSR plus Partisan Warfare" disclose facts, which the writer of this review, then a German soldier in Russia, witnessed or learned about after the war.

Anybody interested in modern mass psychology should not miss the chapter about the "Eastern Volunteer Formations on the German Side," which amounted to more than 800,000 soldiers. He will agree with the author's remark, as does the present

reviewer (who met these soldiers in action): "This movement was one of the strongest ideological movements known in modern history." The picture is rounded by indispensable chapters on "Western War Supplies to the USSR," "the Results of Western Bombing of the Reich," and "the Tying up of German Forces in the West." The Conclusion gives the author's excellent estimate of the "Communist Strength in 1953" and a Bibliography, in which anybody who wants to deal further with this grim story will find, if not all, at any rate the most recent and important foreign publications.

It seems probable that Wladyslaw Anders will be counted one day among the great names of a free and independent Poland, as are Thaddeus Kosciuszko and Prince Jozef Anton Poniatowski. The reviewer would like to express the feeling that this sober study may one day be regarded as one of the beginnings on which Polish-German understanding can be rebuilt. This seems possible only in the very climate the book offers, rising above the understandable hatred resulting from the events of 1939—the unjustified German aggression toward Poland and the treatment of the vanquished Poles. The consequences of these days are still with us.

AXEL VON DEM BUSSCHE

Bonn am Rhein, Germany

GRAYSON, CARY TRAVERS, JR. *Austria's International Position, 1938-1953: The Re-establishment of an Independent Austria*. Pp. xvi, 317. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1953. 15 fr. s.

The chief "text" for *Austria's International Position, 1938-1953* by Dr. Cary Travers Grayson, Jr., is from the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, by the British, Soviet, and American governments: "Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination." The book is divided into five Parts: "The Austrian Question (1918-1938)"; "Under German Rule (1938-1945)"; "Allied Planning (1943-1945)"; "Under Allied Occupation (1945-1947)"; and "Victim of Cold War (1947-1953)." Except for certain pas-

sages, the first two Parts are mediocre or worse. It is inexcusable, for example, to include inaccurate dates (pp. 10, three instances; 24); to present an incorrect account of the immediate origins of the civil war of 1934 (p. 10); and to characterize L. Kunschak as a member of the "peasant wing" of his political party (p. 43).

On the other hand, because of the continuing efforts to distort and falsify historical fact, Grayson merits warm thanks for reminding his readers of the record of three former Chancellors of Austria. Seipel's influence was "anti-democratic"; he "encouraged" the Fascist *Heimwehr* (p. 7). Dollfuss "crushed socialism and democracy [and] created a Catholic-Fascist Austria" (p. 11). Schuschnigg helped Seipel and Dollfuss and became a "virtual dictator" (p. 11). Possibly of equal importance is the author's suggestion that if Schuschnigg had decided to fight Hitler in March 1938, "even if only on a small scale . . . Austria, at the end of the war, would have been" considered and treated like other fully liberated and "guilt-free" nations (p. 34).

The remaining Parts of Grayson's study were read by this reviewer with steadily rising enthusiasm. Any reader with interest in international affairs will find a compact account of many aspects of them—why Austrian resistance to Hitler has "been generally undervalued" (p. 50); why the decision at Potsdam to include German assets in eastern Austria among Russia's share of such assets was "absolutely contradictory" to the intent of the Moscow Declaration to re-establish an Austria "capable of finding economic security" (pp. 68, 79); why the author concludes that "Both East and West seem to realize that the complete collapse of Allied co-operation in Vienna would signify world collapse" (p. 172); and others. Specialists will particularly appreciate the reproduction of documents (pp. 180-300). Most praiseworthy of all are the author's masterly analysis of the diabolical cleverness and the brutal cynicism with which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics utilized the Potsdam decision about "German assets," and his explanation of the justness of the

Austrians' plea to be "liberated from their liberators."

CHARLES A. GULICK

University of California
Berkeley

SCHLESINGER, RUDOLF. *Central European Democracy and Its Background*. Pp. xiv, 402. New York: Grove Press, 1954. \$5.00.

The title of Mr. Schlesinger's competent work is not quite appropriate. Mr. Schlesinger's discussion of *Central European Democracy and Its Background* is essentially limited to but two of the several democratic forces that influenced democratic trends in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia during the period under consideration, 1848 to 1938.

The book, learned as is the presentation, makes sorry reading. In spite of the libertarian spirit of the Central European political movements in the nineteenth century and of the high-powered ideological theses of German socialist theoreticians, the social structure of the Central European countries, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, escaped their impact and remained basically unchanged. The "sham constitutionalism," to use the author's term, as applied after World War I, was nothing more than an artificial framework without economic and social content.

The embryonic labor movements of Imperial Germany and Austro-Hungary battled against lack of political consciousness, for they themselves lacked political orientation; they were confused about their aims and uncertain of their place in a semi-industrial society. Ideological struggle among socialist leaders corroded the unity of the labor movement, and the trade unions were torn between the wings of radicals and mild reformists; thus, disunited and uncertain, they had to face the strong hand of the well-entrenched combination of Prussian junkers, the military and the industrial magnates in Berlin, and the ultraconservatives in Vienna. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire the labor movement suffered, in addition, from the contradictory national interests of its various components. When the pacifist convictions

of the labor movement in Central Europe were put to the crucial test in 1914, they broke down for the cheap price of mere existence. Slogans on "the defense of the Fatherland" compromised its ideological standing and brought further confusion into the ranks of the socialist parties.

The story of impotence in leadership continued in the interwar period, now in the new setting of postwar opportunities. Ground between the millstones of right-wing and fascist political parties on one side and the unscrupulous agitation of Communists on the other, the democratic labor movement once again lost sense of direction. When the events in Germany in the early 1930's and in Austria in 1933-34 led to the inevitable clash between the forces of democracy and fascism, once again the democratic labor movement and organization succumbed.

Mr. Schlesinger concludes the story with the catastrophe of 1938, when the last democratic stronghold, Czechoslovakia, fell, though in this case the blame was clearly to be found not on the scene of home politics, but in Western Europe. If his study had included recent developments, he would undoubtedly have to add to the aggravating list of socialist failures the fact that the socialist parties in all countries west of Germany offered little resistance to the Communist onslaught and were completely absorbed by the Communist parties.

Thus we see confirmed once again, as we have during the past fifty years of the socialist movement, their perplexing inability to face history's challenge with adequate means.

It would be, however, one-sided to overlook the achievements of democracy in Central Europe, as it would be unfair to put the responsibility for its failures on any single party or movement. The international factors appear to have played a considerable, if not decisive, role in the debacle, though Mr. Schlesinger does not give them a proper place. A full appreciation of his book presupposes knowledge of the complex political, economic, social, and national picture of Central Europe as it developed during the last hundred years. As a specialized study, sometimes narrowly

conceived, it is to be highly appreciated for its research value in the little known area and even less known problem.

JOSEF KORBEL

University of Denver

OTHER COUNTRIES

WILGUS, A. CURTIS (Ed.). *The Caribbean: Contemporary Trends*. Pp. xxvi, 292. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953. \$4.00.

Not counting the Foreword and Introduction, this volume consists of twenty papers delivered at a conference in December 1952 under the joint auspices of the University of Florida and the Alcoa Steamship Company. These are grouped in five parts: economic 5, social 2, literary and artistic 4, political and diplomatic 4, and peace and security 5. A break-down of authorship shows the following distribution: by nationality, 7 Latin America, 1 Great Britain, 12 United States; by occupation, 12 government, 5 academic, 3 business. No one could complain that the coverage is not broad.

The character of the volume is better indicated by the word "trends" in the title than by the word "problems" which is stressed in the Foreword and occurs several times in the table of contents. When problems are discussed, the discussion is unilateral and long-range; little attention is paid to controversies that have been making the headlines, and there is no argument over pros and cons. For example, the index has only three entries under "Communism"; the only direct reference to the central problem of Guatemala, which has been shaping up rapidly since 1944, is an unexplained allusion to "the Guatemalan Government's harassment of the United Fruit Company" (p. 48); and the main discussion of United States investment and enterprise in the Caribbean area occurs in a paper characterized by its descriptions of Venezuela as "a shining example of the open door to private enterprise and foreign capital development" and of the record of the

United States oil companies in Venezuela as "spotless" (pp. 50, 51).

While all twenty papers have something of interest and value for readers curious about the Caribbean area, the two groups that average highest in caloric content are those dealing with economic and social trends, for most of these come to grips with specific long-range problems of the Caribbean area. Particularly noteworthy in this respect are the papers by Miron Burgin on economic development, Gilberto Loyo and Raúl Ortiz Mena on underdeveloped areas, Carl C. Taylor on land, and Francis Violich on urbanization in Venezuela. Papers of the same type in other groups are those by Fernando Rivera on the civil service and John and Mavis Biesanz on "Uncle Sam on the Isthmus of Panama—a Diplomatic Case History." Other papers which are of high quality do not possess this specific appeal in the same degree. For example, the excellent paper by R. S. Boggs on Caribbean ballads deals with the period of the Spanish conquest, and the papers by Harold Davis on political philosophies and by John C. Dreier, Luis Quintanilla, and Misael Pastrana on peace and security deal primarily with themes of general inter-American or Latin American interest and secondarily with the Caribbean area.

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania

KOTB, SAYED. *Social Justice in Islam*. Translated from the Arabic by John B. Hardie. Pp. viii, 298. Washington, D. C.: American Council of Learned Societies (Near Eastern Translation Program, No. 1), 1953. \$3.00 paper; \$4.00 cloth.

The highly useful project inaugurated by this volume promises to do yeoman service for our knowledge of the modern Near East. The language barrier here is particularly formidable. Neither the best informed Western works nor even a prolonged stay in the area itself can put students who do not know Near Eastern languages in touch with the true thinking and feeling of the people and acquaint them with the "grass-roots," attitudes of Near Easterners toward their problems. Now,

this series of translations sponsored by the ACLS can be expected to form a ready source of information on all shades of Near East intellectual activity.

Political and sociological scholarship in the Near East is frankly polemical and intensely partisan. Sayed Kotb's book, first published about 1945, is no exception. It is no objective exposition of the subject of social justice in Islam from the historical or sociological point of view. The author's purpose is to disprove frequent accusations that the contemporary Muslim religious authorities are opposed to social progress. At the same time, he intends to show that within its traditional framework Islam provides the basis for a perfect solution of all the social problems of the day.

Specifically, Sayed Kotb is concerned with the chronic problem of the grossly uneven distribution of wealth in his native Egypt. His solution, constituting the controversial nub of the work, is an attempt to prove that, according to Muslim legal thinking, "the property belongs to the society and is merely administered by an individual, so that when his stewardship is over the property reverts to its original ownership, the community (p. 106)." In this connection, the author emphasizes his opposition to Communism. He maintains that Islam is a force to be reckoned with in the political struggle between Communism and the West. In his opinion, the ideologies of both Communism and the West are identical, and both groups are united in their materialism. The spiritualistic ideology of Islam, he believes, remains the only possible alternative.

Throughout the book and its many interesting discussions, the Western reader will constantly ask himself two mutually related questions: Is this Islam? And is this kind of thinking influential in the Near East? In connection with these questions, it should be kept in mind that the recognized sources of Muslim law and theology are immensely rich in all kinds of sociological reflections and, in addition, are rarely satisfied with presenting just one side of any given problem. Sayed Kotb uses those sources skilfully and reinterprets them against a background that

is more strongly molded by the ideals of the French Revolution than any other more recent current. His Islam never existed before the nineteenth century, but it is a legitimate reinterpretation of a great religion which is very much alive. Its influence may be minimized by many Near Easterners who have an entirely secular outlook. However, Sayed Kotb's ideas represent a definite continuity with the past and speak the language which the majority of Near East people still understand best. Thus, their actual and potential appeal must not be underestimated by anybody interested in the present and future of the Near East.

FRANZ ROSENTHAL
University of Pennsylvania

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AMERICA THROUGH FOREIGN EYES

Edited by

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor of the Sociology of India and Pakistan

University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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FOREWORD

WE should not, and by and large do not, expect that the United States will stand as virtue incarnate throughout the world. Leaving aside the often remarked tendency of the American tourist to covet and solicit approval and adulation, our foreign policy begs the more modest tribute of being understood. We pin our faith on the intrinsic merits of our way of life, and feel assured that we will be admired once our faults and achievements are counterbalanced. Our consistent emphasis upon international understanding, our rejoicing in the expansion of the media of mass communication as a means of cultural contact, indicate our belief that the American national character is a desirable and perhaps exportable commodity in the world market.

Whether or not we feel that other countries would do well to model themselves after our institutions, we are sure that if we are rightly understood, the frictions and obstacles in the course of our national policy will disappear. The degree of sophistication or naïveté with which this policy is pursued may vary, but the premise is the same. We have chosen as a cardinal element in our foreign policy the promotion of amity. We spend huge sums of money abroad trying to tip the scales of public opinion in our favor. Our "information and education" programs direct their efforts toward presenting an objective picture of the United States—a school day in Connecticut, a farmer's life in the Wheat Belt, small town democracy in action. We want not only our way in foreign affairs but also continuous reassurance from abroad of the moral integrity of our actions. For America the ends of power have been made to fit the means of persuasion.

It is in this light that the present volume directs its attention to the images of the United States held by foreign nationals. The reflections will delight no American Narcissus. What appears is a bewildering variety of pictures, which illustrate the idiosyncrasies of individual viewers rather than the character of the America they are looking at. None of the images is wholly laudatory; nor are they so hostile, disdainful, or patronizing as the more flamboyant among our public commentators would have us believe. What emerges is not a single stereotype but a series of alternative stereotypes which are selected and accepted by foreign peoples to meet their own national and cultural needs. To be sure there are a few national traits which are ascribed to us by almost all foreigners: friendliness, inventiveness, industriousness, materialism, immaturity. The more secure in national status is the country viewing the United States, the more likely is it that we will be seen in terms of separate character traits, each standing on its own merits. The newly emerged national states and our recent or current enemies tend to have an over-all assessment into which are dovetailed the individual traits they see in us.

The countries herein discussed obviously do not represent a geographic or a typological sample. For instance, South America, Africa, the Muslim world, Southeast Asia, China, the English-speaking world, the satellite nations, are important omissions. Those that are included, however, illustrate types of viewers, each substantially different in its cultural setting and in its historical and current relations with the United States. Russia represents the Communist countries, a totalitarian state where public opinion is largely subject to the manipulations of

state policy, and a nation with little historical or current contact with the United States. Germany and Japan represent a European and an Asian power recently under military occupation by the United States. The survey of European countries includes nations who experienced a good deal of contact with the United States historically, are currently allies, and to a certain extent are dependent economically and in foreign affairs upon the United States. The Scandinavian countries and especially Sweden represent countries with national status higher than or at least equal to the United States, with a long history of amicable relations and striking cultural similarities. India represents the countries recently emerged from colonial status, endowed with rich cultural histories, having little direct historical contact with the United States, and apprehensive of final commitment in the East-West struggle. And Mexico represents a strongly nationalist country with intimate, continuous contact with the United States, standing in mid-passage from an underdeveloped society to an urban, industrial one. These differences in objective position among the nations are accompanied by sharp differences in the characteristic images which they hold of the United States.

A word should be said about a further mechanical division of the volume. The initial sections are concerned with general national images as they are found in the home countries. In the wake of historical relations and self-perpetuating stereotypes images of the United States have developed which are largely transmitted through the media of mass communication. The second half of the volume is composed of articles, paired by countries, which catalogue and analyze the images obtaining among foreign students who have studied at American universities. The first article of each pair describes the images formed by students while they are still in residence in the United States, and the second presents the images held by students who have returned to their home environment and have become reimmersed in their own culture and their own national viewpoint.

Seven of the eight articles describing the attitudes of foreign students are based upon the results of studies sponsored by the Cross-Cultural Education Committee of the Social Science Research Council during the year 1952-53, and were made possible by grants from the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The article by Ruth and John Useem which discusses the images held by returned Indian students is based upon research conducted in India during the year 1952-53 under the sponsorship of the Hazen Foundation. Each of the studies was much broader in scope than might be indicated by these focused articles. They were primarily attuned to problems of adjustment and assessment of the educational benefits involved in cross-cultural education. More extensive monographs incorporating the full results of the studies are in preparation for publication elsewhere. In the case of the Social Science Research Council studies, more specialized research projects dealing with critical problem areas in cross-cultural education are now under way.

We wish to thank Pendleton Herring and M. Brewster Smith of the Social Science Research Council, Cora DuBois of the Cross-Cultural Education Committee and the Institute for International Education, and Paul Braisted of the Hazen Foundation for assistance and direction in these studies. Special gratitude is owed to the late Wendell C. Bennett who, as chairman of the Cross-Cultural Education Committee, was primarily responsible for initiating and planning these studies.

RICHARD D. LAMBERT

How Others See Us*

By WILLIAM BUCHANAN

O wad some Power the giftie gi'e us
To see oursels as ithers see us!
It wad frae monie a blunder free us,
An' foolish notion:
What airs in dress an' gait wad lea'e us,
An' ev'n devotion!

ROBERT BURNS, "To a Louse, on Seeing One
on a Lady's Bonnet at Church"

EVER since World War II the American family, worshipping at the altar of democracy, has been aware of covert glances and titterings from the rest of the congregation. Is our own devotion not inspiring our pew-mates as it should? Is it their irreverence? Or is something "lousing up" our own appearance?

Any discussion of this problem leads eventually to the use of the phrase "stereotype of Americans." How do foreigners come by this stereotype? Is it accurate? Does it harm us? Can it be altered? How? The concept of a stereotype, though originating in the political arena, has been taken over by the social psychologists for two decades and has been the subject of dozens of investigations. Some of them may help to answer these questions.

WHAT IS A STEREOTYPE?

Though the dweller in Plato's cave had to construct his picture of reality from shadows cast against the wall, the term "stereotype" to describe this process is a modern one, being derived by

* The writer wishes to thank Mr. Jan Stapel, director of the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion, for the use of original material gathered by that organization and also the American Institute of Public Opinion for material gathered by Gallup affiliates in France and Italy.

analogy from one of the processes in the production of newspapers for mass circulation. In the 1870's a thin "stereotype" plate was developed which could be sent through the mails, and the age of "boiler plate" was upon us. In 1877 some 1,100 of America's 1,400 daily papers could put before their readers the same political cartoon more cheaply than they could write and set their own news. "Stereotype" began to have something more than a technical meaning.¹

The figurative connotation of the word acquired its wide currency from Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion*. Our political world, he said, is "out of reach, out of sight, out of mind." Man is learning to "see with his mind" vast portions of the world with which he has had no personal experience.² His opinions must be "pieced together out of what others have reported and what he can imagine."³

There are few occasions for personal interaction or intimate acquaintance between the individuals long distances apart who are, now vitally dependent on each other. Instead, "we notice a trait which marks a well-known type and fill

¹ A. M. Lee, *The Daily Newspaper in America* (New York, 1947), pp. 117, 130.

² Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922), p. 29.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

in the rest by means of the stereotype we carry about in our heads. . . . We are told about the world before we see it."

Of course, thinking in terms of types, classifying, and abstracting are inevitable economies of time and thought. The danger is that when "we assume that the world is codified according to a code which we possess, we are likely to make our reports of what is going on describe a world run by our code."⁴ Thus when the fixed stereotype governs perception, rather than being governed, corrected, and adjusted by it, our behavior becomes disoriented from the real world around us.

Lippmann's striking description gave prominence to a concept which lent itself well to experimentation. It bore on a problem of American life that was of particular concern to the social psychologist—the presence of minority groups in the society and the necessity of accounting for and, hopefully, alleviating prejudice against them.

The psychologists have generally considered a stereotype as a special case under the more general classification of attitudes or frames of reference. It has been called an "intense and rigid attitude";⁵ an "ethnic attitude" which is "relatively stable" and modifiable only through "traumatic personal experience, intensive re-education or major social change";⁶ a "highly standardized perception of all members of a class of objects or, especially, a class of people";⁷ and a widespread "image or representation" of a national or racial group "usu-

ally oversimplified in content and relatively unresponsive to objective facts."⁸

EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

The existence of stereotypes was early demonstrated when subjects were confronted with a series of newspaper photographs of a bootlegger, a Bolshevik, a financier, a senator, a labor leader, and others, and asked to match the scrambled titles with the pictures. A group of students and a group of Grange members tended to associate the same pictures with the same titles. Although the matching got better-than-chance accuracy, an exception was a striking tendency to identify the Bolshevik (actually the Soviet minister to France) as an American senator because he sported a wing collar and a kempt Vanduyke beard.⁹

The most useful experimental technique has been the word-list method, in which subjects are given a list of adjectives or adjectival phrases and asked to say which of them best describe each of a list of national or racial types. This has been done with college students and small groups, using long lists of 80 to 100 words, and in mass surveys, using lists of 12 to 24 words. In the first such experiment, on Princeton students in the early 1930's, there was a pronounced tendency to ascribe certain characteristics to certain groups: Ne-

⁸ Otto Klineberg, *Tensions Affecting International Understanding* (Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 62, New York, 1950), p. 93, and David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Psychology* (New York, 1948), p. 171.

⁹ For more complete summaries of this experiment and the others mentioned here, see the texts cited in notes 5 through 8 above, and also the following: R. T. La Piere and P. R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1949), Chap. XII; *National Stereotypes and International Understanding* (International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 3, Autumn 1951, Part I), pp. 497-590.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

⁵ Muzafer Sherif and Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Ego-Involvements* (New York, 1947), p. 26.

⁶ Eugene L. and Ruth E. Hartley, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (New York, 1952), pp. 695-96.

⁷ Theodore M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1950), p. 213.

groes were "superstitious," "lazy," and "happy-go-lucky"; Germans, "scientifically minded" and "industrious"; Jews, "shrewd" and "mercenary"; the English, "sportsmanlike" and "intelligent"; Chinese, "superstitious" and "sly"; Japanese, "intelligent," "industrious," and "progressive."

These tendencies were confirmed in other experiments with students throughout the United States, and also by British experimenters. Even Negro students were found to share the current stereotype of Negroes, though accentuating the attractive or neutral and deemphasizing the unattractive characteristics. Japanese students showed a comparable tendency.

UNESCO inquiry

By shortening the word lists, the Office of Public Opinion Research adopted the technique to the mass survey, and in 1948 this procedure was utilized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in an inquiry into international tensions. A list of twelve adjectives was presented to a cross section of about a thousand persons in each of eight countries: Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States. In all eight surveys respondents were asked which adjectives best described the Russian people, and in seven of these countries "domineering" was in first, second, or third place. In seven countries respondents were asked to describe the American people, and in six of these "practical" and "progressive" were among the first three adjectives chosen. In three countries respondents were asked to describe the Chinese people, and although fewer adjectives were selected, "hard-working" and "backward" were among the first three in each country. In two of the three surveys in which the French were described, "intelligent" and "conceited"

were among the top three adjectives, and in two out of three the British were characterized as "intelligent" and "self-controlled."¹⁰

These results indicate not only that stereotyping is a widely prevalent process, but that the content of most stereotypes is approximately the same throughout the Western world. Certain other generalizations about stereotyping may be made from these studies.

Change

While there seem to be certain stable elements in each stereotype, there are also some notable instances of change. Teachers who were running experiments on successive classes in the 1940's noted that after Pearl Harbor the stereotypes of the Germans, Italians, and Japanese had altered for the worse. When the original classroom experiment of 1931 was repeated on a similar group of Princeton undergraduates nineteen years later, they appeared to be more aware of the fallacy of stereotyping and less consentient in their stereotypes.

The most striking instance of change is in the American public image of the Russians between 1942 and 1948. Of the twenty-four words on the list used by the OPOR in 1942 there were seven which reappeared on the UNESCO list in 1948. While differences in length and content of the lists may have had some influence on the results, they cannot account for the obvious reversal of direction of the stereotype (table, p. 4).¹¹

In view of these demonstrations that stereotypes do fluctuate, earlier defini-

¹⁰ Full tabulations for all nations will be found in William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other* (Urbana, Ill., 1953), Chap. V, hereafter referred to as "the UNESCO survey."

¹¹ It is apparent that in 1942 a third to a half of the American public had a favorable impression of the Russians. How many would admit today that they held such views at that time?

CHANGE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE
RUSSIANS BETWEEN 1942 AND 1948

	1942 Per cent	1948 Per cent
Hard-working.....	61	49
Intelligent.....	16	12
Practical.....	18	13
Conceited.....	3	28
Cruel.....	9	50
Brave.....	48	28
Progressive.....	24	15

tions which stressed the stability of stereotypes are being altered.

Accuracy

A question repeatedly raised is whether stereotypes correspond in whole or in any part with the "facts"—whether they contain what has been generally called a "kernel of truth."

In one sense, as Lippmann suggested, stereotypes *must* be incorrect, since they impose a typology upon a group of people which contains (as reason would tell us even if the anthropologists did not) a wide variety of individuals with diverse characteristics. Any stereotype is incorrect in the sense that "all generalizations are false."

It is also agreed that stereotypes are erroneous to the extent that nonphysical attributes assigned to any race or nation are considered hereditary, fixed, or immutable.

The question remains, however: Are there national norms of conduct, even though culturally transmitted and hence alterable in the long run, which distinguish one nation from another? The answer is not yet definitive: "The existence of different personality norms for modern nations as wholes has not been established, and the development of objective techniques which might be used for the study of national character has barely begun."¹²

¹² Ralph Linton, "The Concept of National Character," in A. H. Stanton and S. E. Perry (Eds.), *Personality and Political Crisis* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951), p. 144.

In certain instances where objective standards of behavior were available, stereotypes of particular minority groups have been demonstrated to be quite false. One notable instance is the stereotype of "Armenians" held by residents of a section of California where a group of first- and second-generation Armenian immigrants had settled. The prevalent stereotype was unfriendly, centering about the beliefs that Armenians were tricky in business dealings, had an inferior code of morality which frequently got them in trouble, and were parasites on the local community. A check of records showed, quite to the contrary, that their credit ratings were about average, that they were involved in only a fourth as many police court cases as one would predict from their proportion in the population, and that they produced less than the expected number of hospital and social work case records. Certainly it is not safe to conclude that the mere *existence* of a commonly held image of a certain group or nationality is *of itself* evidence that the view is correct.

American researchers have generally leaned in the direction of considering stereotypes as both false and dangerous. In the interests of alleviating international tensions or diminishing minority group prejudice, they may be excused for considering hostile stereotypes to be unsupported by fact until they are proved otherwise. Our present purpose is somewhat different. A leap to the conclusion that all images of Americans held abroad are foolish, fanciful, and unjustified by our own behavior might do us a real disservice.

Direction

"A pattern of stereotypes," Lippmann said, "is not neutral." It is rather "highly charged with . . . feelings."¹³

¹³ Lippmann, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

The earliest experiments with students showed that peoples who were described in favorable terms (that is, in adjectives deemed by a panel of judges to represent desirable qualities) were those who were ranked highest in terms of preference for association. This relationship between friendliness and stereotypes was demonstrated to exist for nations as well as individuals in the UNESCO survey. Where a large percentage of the sample in one country picked a particular nation as the one toward which they were "most friendly," this nation tended to be stereotyped in favorable terms.

Genesis

The habit of making judgments about people or groups is formed in childhood, when judgments of friends, neighbors, and parents are accepted. Thus stereotypes are "culturally transmitted." Experimenters found the customary stereotype of Negroes developing between the fourth and the eleventh grades. The first responses were hostile, but the description was vague. Specific content items appeared later, negative qualities before positive ones. The stereotype seemed to "jell" at about age twelve. By high school the adult image was approximated.

Interviews with Swiss schoolchildren by Piaget and Weil are particularly revealing, since they show how a child's sense of his own nationality develops simultaneously with the attribution of different characteristics to other nationalities. Five-to-eight-year-olds express preferences for one place or another according to their fancy of the moment: "I like Italy. It's a nicer place than Switzerland . . . they have the loveliest cakes," or "I like Switzerland because it has such pretty houses." Asked about the difference between peoples and countries they give such responses as: "There isn't a lake every-

where. . . . People don't all have the same voice and they don't all wear the same pullovers." Their picture of the world is still in terms of personal experience: "Well, the Americans are stupid. If I ask them where the rue du Mont Blanc is, they can't tell me."

At eight or nine years, the basis of nationality is still egocentric, but something beyond the child's immediate experience is involved: "I like Switzerland because I was born there," or "My mummy and daddy are Swiss, so I think Switzerland is a nice place."

During this intermediate stage stereotypes are forming with a vengeance. Their source is apparent in the following protocol:

What do you think of the French, for instance? Do you like them or not? Try and tell me as much as possible.

The French are not very serious, they don't worry about anything, and it's dirty there.

And what do you think of the Americans?

They're ever so rich and clever. They've discovered the atom bomb.

And what do you think of the Russians?

They're always wanting to make war. . . .

Now look, how did you come to know all you've told me?

I don't know . . . I've heard it. . . . That's what people say.

At twelve or thirteen years these starkly simple evaluations are replaced, at least for some children, with a genuine idea of "reciprocity." "There are some very nice Swiss and some very nice French people; that doesn't depend on the country. . . . All people have their good points," or "There are all types of people, intelligent and stupid, good and bad."¹⁴

¹⁴ Jean Piaget and Anne-Marie Weil, "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other Countries," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn 1951), pp. 561-78.

Perceptual Basis

Another recent experiment with children, one in which stereotypes were "artificially induced," bears on the process of stereotype formation.

The experiment involved four "friendship clubs" of little girls who met at a settlement house. Pairs of clubs were co-operating on benefit performances to buy themselves club sweaters. The experimenters set the dress rehearsal of the co-operating "Gems" and "Daytons" on a meeting date of the "Melodies," who were required, to their great disgust, to serve as an audience. A pitched battle ensued when "Dayton-Gems" accused "Melodies" of sabotaging their performance and tried to eject them from the hall. Later all participants, including the "Melodies'" partners, who were not involved, were asked to check the usual adjective lists. It is not surprising that the girls found their co-operators more trustworthy, helpful, careful, attentive, skillful, orderly, and clean than their competitors, and less headstrong, tricky, selfish, domineering, slovenly, and so forth. In addition, the tendency to make extreme judgments, favorable as well as unfavorable, was found to be much less pronounced in the case of co-operative than conflictual interaction. Stereotypes of conflicting groups were more distinct.¹⁸

We cannot say of such induced stereotypes that they are "true," for all four clubs were drawn from a homogeneous population and any differences in personality would be due to chance. On the other hand, some of the adjectives selected may be said to describe with fair accuracy the behavior displayed in their relationships.

¹⁸ Rosette Avigdor, "Étude expérimentale de la genèse des stéréotypes," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, Vol. XIV (1953), pp. 154-68.

Source

These experiments tell us something about how stereotypes appear and when they appear, but little of where the content of national stereotypes originally came from.

One source, obviously, is the folklore, whence came some of the ideas of the Swiss children. Content analyses have documented the recurrence of stereotype items in the mass media, especially in fiction. From Shylock to Stepin Fetchit, from Sam Weller to Hercule Poirot, stereotyped national, racial, and class types have drawn such ready applause that we must conclude that stereotyping meets a psychological need, probably that of ego inflation.

In 1950 Graham culled a list of phrases used in British literature and the press to describe Americans, and asked English respondents to check the most applicable. Phrases current before 1860 were, on the whole, more popular than more recent ones, suggesting that "frequency of response depends chiefly on continued and consistent usage over a long period of time."¹⁹

THE NATIONALISTIC BASIS FOR STEREOTYPES

Deutsch proposes a functional definition of nationality in terms of a "wide complementarity of social communication . . . the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders."¹⁷ He suggests as one test of this quality "predictability from introspection"—the extent to which you may predict another's

¹⁹ Milton D. Graham, "An Experiment in International Attitudes Research," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn 1951), pp. 525-39.

¹⁷ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953), p. 71.

behavior by "putting yourself in his place." "Here is one of the most important bases for the notion of a people, for that 'consciousness of kind,' of familiarity and trust, which we have for people whom we understand, and whom we even understand to be like such excellent people as ourselves."

This "predictability from introspection" is based on "analogy of structured habits" and is thus superior to "outside" observation of behavior of foreigners in only a limited range of situations, even though these observations, as in the case of an experienced diplomatic observer, may have extended over a long period of time.¹⁸

It may be suggested that the absence of this "predictability from introspection"—the failure to really understand the motivations of foreigners—is what makes stereotypes so attractive. Lacking the opportunity to communicate frequently over a wide range of subjects, we cannot "put ourselves in their place." We may do one of two things: dismiss them as "unpredictable" or find a satisfactory explanation for their behavior in the attribution to them of certain characteristics. "They behave in this unexpected fashion," we might say, "because they are a sly, treacherous people."

Stereotypes or images of another people, then, appear to have two components. The first of these may be called the "preconception," since it is based on second-hand material lying about in the literature and folk culture and would exist even if the individual never saw one of these people in the flesh and never had to reach any conclusions about them on his own. The holder begins to form this image in childhood as he learns what his own nationality means and why his kind of people are superior to others. For they always are superior—no studies have recorded

a more flattering picture of the out-than the in-group.

The second component of the image we may call "perception." This is what gives it purpose. "To bridge the gap between his inability to make accurate predictions of the behavior of others and the necessity for his doing so, the modern individual commonly resorts to stereotyping."¹⁹ This component is introduced as the individual tries to organize the incomprehensible, unpredictable behavior of foreigners—particularly those actions which he thinks may affect him personally—into a comprehensible, predictable whole. Under conditions of great stress—in wartime, for example—this process can lead to great alteration in national stereotypes. This perceptual part of the operation may be just as biased as the preconceptual if the observations embodied in the stereotype happen to be irrelevant to the use that is made of it, as, for example, when a Frenchman assumes that the Congress of the United States will act like a group of GI's or tourists in the Louvre.²⁰

INFLUENCE OF STEREOTYPES

Some psychologists have concluded that unfavorable stereotypes may predispose a people toward hostility, and

¹⁹ La Piere and Farnsworth, *op. cit. supra* (note 9), p. 204.

²⁰ The "stereotype" concept seems sometimes to have been confined to the first—the preconceptual—component. This leaves it more or less static, random, and purposeless. We must account for the fact that stereotypes have direction; that both content and direction do change, and with apparent cause; and that some potential content items lie sterile while others reproduce and multiply. By making "stereotype" roughly synonymous with "generalized image" we avoid making it "bad" or incorrect by definition. Since the word-list technique brings out a great deal more than the first component, we also bring the definition more in line with "what the test measures."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

thus become a contributing cause toward strained diplomatic relations. The evidence collected here suggests instead that unfavorable stereotypes are symptomatic rather than causal. Confronted with inexplicable and hence presumably malevolent behavior on the part of another nation, observers then organize the latent elements in their cultural surroundings into a lifelike, believable picture of an inherently "bad" people—the sort of people who could behave just this way.

Stereotypes are probably more dangerous, both to holder and to object, because they may lead to irrational action, to measures which might never be taken if the actors thought through their implications rather than acting on a plausible oversimplification. For example, it has been suggested that if Hitler and his advisers had not been infused with ideas of the "decadence" of the British and the "internal weakness" of the Russians, he might never have risked a two-front war.²¹ An example closer home concerns our own conduct of the war in the Pacific. Leighton tells how statistical analyses of prisoner-of-war interviews and confiscated diaries indicated to his branch of the Office of War Information that Japanese home-front morale was weak enough in May 1945 to make surrender a real possibility.²² This analysis conflicted with the stereotype, then prevalent among public and policy makers as well, that the Japanese "people" were fanatics who would not surrender. The current estimate was that the war would last until 1946 at least. This stereotype, we may recall, was not entirely

²¹ See Otto Klineberg, "The Scientific Study of National Stereotypes," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn 1951), p. 505.

²² Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World* (New York, 1949), Chap. VII.

fanciful, but was based on the "evidence" of kamikaze pilots and banzai charges.

This view of the situation actually was not abandoned until after Hiroshima. Had it been revised earlier, that fateful event might never have occurred. Had it not been revised at all, the war might well have continued until invasion and attrition on the mainland had pulverized Japan. In this not inconceivable event, the stereotype of the Japanese people would have been "proved" correct—a "self-fulfilling prophecy."

The influence of stereotypes is ordinarily less dramatic. Graham found, for example, that the fusion of reactions to Americans known personally or casually encountered in the streets with reactions to policies of the United States government led to such composite simplifications as "the GI's were generous, the Americans have a Yankee shrewdness, therefore the Marshall plan arose from mixed motivations of generosity and self-interest."²³

Individual perception has been shown to be an extremely complex process. What we see is to such a large extent what we want to see, what we expect to see, or what we are used to seeing that under certain conditions experimental subjects "see" very strange things indeed. They cannot tell whether they are looking into a square or a very lopsided room. They "see" walls where there are no walls. They "see" their friends expand or contract before their eyes.²⁴ "National perception," which is the basis for governmental action, involves the synthesis of a great many individual perceptions of complicated and distant events, so there is no cause for surprise when it is even more distorted.

²³ Graham, *op. cit.* *supra* (note 16), p. 539.

²⁴ See F. P. Kilpatrick (Ed.), *Human Behavior from the Transactional Point of View* (Hanover, N. H., 1952).

TABLE 1—IMAGES OF AMERICANS, RUSSIANS, AND DUTCH AS REVEALED BY SURVEYS BY NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION*

From the list of words on this card, which seems to you to describe the American people best? Select as many as you wish, and call off the letters and words that go with them. If you have no particular feelings one way or the other, just say so.

Now go over the list again and select the words you think best describe the Russian people. And now select the words that best describe the Dutch people.

	AMERICANS				RUSSIANS				DUTCH			
	1948	1954	Ad-justed 1954 ^b	Diff.	1948	1954	Ad-justed 1954 ^b	Diff.	1948	1954	Ad-justed 1954 ^b	Diff.
A. Hard-working.	49	40	44	-5	36	29	36	0	62	63	66	+4
B. Intelligent.	33	26	29	-4	8	5	6	-2	49	41	43	-6
C. Practical.	61	56	62	+1	6	4	5	-1	36	35	37	+1
D. Conceited.	15	16	18	+3	10	8	10	0	14	12	12	-2
E. Generous.	40	29	32	-8	3	2	2	-1	23	25	26	+3
F. Cruel.	2	2	2	0	53	46	57	+4	—	1	1	+1
G. Backward.	1	1	1	0	43	32	39	-4	1	1	1	0
H. Brave.	25	23	25	0	21	13	16	-5	37	36	37	0
I. Self-controlled	16	15	17	+1	3	5	6	+3	36	29	30	-6
J. Domineering.	16	18	20	+4	50	45	55	+5	5	4	4	-1
K. Progressive.	57	58	64	+7	15	10	12	-3	43	51	53	+10
L. Peace-loving.	40	37	41	+1	6	7	9	+3	68	62	64	-4
(Total percentage traits)	355	321	355		254	206	254		374	360	374	
Cannot characterize.	10	9			13	17			8	5		
Number in sample	942	1262			942	1262			942	1262		
Adjustment: 1954 percentage multiplied by:			1.11				1.23				1.04	

* Source of 1948 figures, UNESCO survey cited above; of 1954 figures, NIPO survey of late January 1954.

^b The adjustment increases the percentage selecting each adjective by a constant proportion (the "adjustment factor" given in the last line) in order to bring the "total percentage traits" up to the 1948 level. This makes possible comparisons of the relative strength of each adjective, holding constant the over-all tendency for respondents in 1954 to select fewer adjectives.

THE IMAGE OF AMERICA: CONTENT AND CHANGE

The image of America revealed in the UNESCO survey of 1948 is generally favorable. We were considered "practical" and "progressive" by most Europeans. "Generous," "hard-working," and "intelligent" were midway down the list. Favorable adjectives which were not applied to Americans were "brave," "self-controlled," and, significantly,

"peace-loving." Unfavorable adjectives selected were "conceited," applied by Australians and British, and "domineering" by the French. "Cruel" and "backward" were seldom selected. By contrast, the Russians were generally considered "domineering," "cruel," "hard-working," and "backward." Other important components of the stereotype which were not represented on this list of twelve adjectives, of course, could not be elicited. Graham,

for example, found in England that "friendly," "informal," "enterprising," and "gregarious" were among the favorable adjectives most frequently chosen, and "cocksure" and "noisy" among the unfavorable. A study of European leaders at the same period by a somewhat different method also disclosed a generally favorable climate of opinion, accompanied by a few widespread views which complicated relations: Americans were "too materialistic," they were "guilty of persecuting the Negroes," and United States policy was "too changeable" and "dominated by Wall Street."²⁵

These findings do not differ in substance from the more specific and detailed reports of correspondents and observers, visiting students and travelers. What such mass surveys lack in completeness they make up in perspective. They evaluate the strength of different viewpoints. They indicate which of two conflicting content items is numerically stronger. They reach the inarticulate and inaccessible people and give numerically proportionate weight to their ideas, however sketchy or uninformed. Most important, they permit comparisons of countries, as in the UNESCO survey, and accurate evaluations of change over a period of time.

The Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion pioneered in demonstrating the utility of this technique for trend studies early in 1954 when it repeated verbatim the UNESCO question of 1948. The Dutch impression of Americans is given in Table 1, along with comparable stereotypes of the Russians and the Dutch themselves.²⁶ An adjusted figure

²⁵ Common Council for American Unity, *European Beliefs Regarding the United States* (New York, 1949).

²⁶ The tendency to apply to one's own countrymen the favorable adjectives and attribute the unfavorable ones to others is not confined to the Dutch. All nations surveyed in 1948

which allows for the smaller total response in 1954 is used in computing the change over time.²⁷

All in all, the Dutch image of Americans has changed very little during the intervening five years. Americans are somewhat less likely to be regarded as "generous"—a change probably not unrelated to American policy. We are somewhat more likely to be considered "progressive," but this change may be appraised at less than face value, since the image of the Dutch altered in the same direction.

Recent surveys made by other Gallup affiliates show that the stereotype of Americans in France and Italy is also about the same as it was in 1948.²⁸ We are less likely to be called "generous" in France. On the other hand, "domineering," which had pulled an unusually high percentage in France in 1948, had dropped to the level of other countries. The French were more likely to consider Americans "peace-loving" in 1954 than in 1948. If, as seems reasonable, this change has occurred because the French are now themselves directly involved in the East-West conflict, it would be an interesting instance of the *American* stereotype altering because of *French* behavior. The Italian survey showed an image of the American people that was considerably more favorable than the public estimate of United States diplomacy.²⁹

showed the same proclivity—Americans worst of all.

²⁷ Differences of more than 4 per cent from 1948 to 1952 are statistically significant at the 1 in 20 level.

²⁸ See *Bollettino della DOXA*, Vol. 8, No. 3-4 (Milan, February 15, 1954), p. 21. The French and Italian findings are based on lists which were not the same in 1948 and 1952, and adjustments similar to that in the Dutch survey were made to allow for this. Hence these conclusions should be taken as indicative rather than definitive. The actual percentages are not given here for lack of space.

SOME IMPLICATIONS

Americans often wring their hands about the "misunderstanding" of our character and motives that exists abroad. Do the data marshaled here suggest anything we might do to change or improve these stereotypes?

To the writer they do, but it must be made clear that these are his own interpretations, and not the *only* interpretations that may be made from the data.

First of all, we might hold the consoling thought that stereotypes of Americans, as of all foreigners, exist and will continue to exist, for the simple reason that they *are* foreign, and hence unpredictable. In this connection, we might remember that the image of Americans, in Europe at least, was a rather favorable one just after the war, and that, though it has not improved substantially since then, it certainly has not deteriorated a great deal.

Second, it appears that the image itself, and the minor changes it has undergone, are to some extent related to our own behavior. Our actions, far more than our words, will serve to sustain this favorable impression. For example, though we know in our hearts we are not *really* a conceited people, we might examine our own behavior for reasons why we might *appear* conceited to others.

Third, we might expend a little more effort to determine, in quality and quantity, just what these foreign images are, how widespread they are, and what effect they actually do have on international affairs.

Fourth, we might bend our efforts toward making the stereotypes not neces-

sarily more favorable but more realistic. This can be done over the long haul by increasing the opportunities for communication and common action, by Americans in concert with others. In focusing on the "mass media of communication," we often fail to take advantage of the "mass media of transportation" which make possible mutual association in a great variety of endeavors, not only political but economic, recreational, medical, educational, social, philanthropic, agricultural, and commercial. Personal contact in a wide variety of circumstances might better enable others to "put themselves in our place," and to see us as we are.

Fifth, for the millions here and abroad who still could not participate personally in such interaction, we might try to keep the channels for second-hand communication as clear as possible. Provisions for foreign observers to travel in America widely and report what they see, good or bad, in their own fashion, would at least tend to counteract sweeping generalizations and oversimplified images of Americans.

Finally, since the image of Americans appears to stem in part from the actions of the United States government, we might try to conduct these relations as straightforwardly as possible, so that our policies, even when they must be unpalatable abroad, could at least be consistent and predictable. Explaining the internal political basis for certain otherwise inexplicable actions might allay some unnecessary apprehensions.

Like the lady in front of Burns, we may have attracted too much attention to our hat and our devoutness, and distracted it from the sermon.

William Buchanan, Starkville, Mississippi, is assistant professor of government and political psychologist on the staff of the Social Science Research Center at Mississippi State College. A former newspaper reporter, he has been publicity director at Roanoke College, associate director of the Bicentennial of Washington and Lee University, and assistant in research with the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton. He is co-author of *How Nations See Each Other* (1953).

How Americans See Themselves: Studies of American National Character

By REUEL DENNEY

ONE way of approaching the topic broached in the title is to survey the "national character" studies of Americans, by Americans, of recent years.

Clearly, this is not the only way to answer the question. It limits our answers to those given by specialized students of "national character"—and these compose only one among many of the groups that have something to say about how Americans see themselves. Moreover, since the concept of "national character" is beset by technicalities of definition, the answers will be framed generally in some highly conceptualized view of social structure and culture. They will not necessarily be the answers that might occur to a majority of educated Americans. They will certainly not be expressed in quite the same language that such a group might use.

There are other limitations on this discussion. Not all students of how Americans see themselves are satisfied with the "national character" approach. Why they are not satisfied tends to emerge only after a close look at what national-character analysis claims to be getting at. Therefore, such a look is a necessary part of this paper. This leads immediately to recognition of the diversity of viewpoints in the field.

We can begin by asking whether observers of the American national character agree with each other in ascribing certain traits to that character. They do. A variety of specialists, despite their differences in aims and methods, arrive at overlapping conclusions. At first sight, the overlaps may be not

at all obvious. In the "learned behavior" of Americans—call it their national character—Mead¹ has found a tendency toward watchful waiting; Benedict² a high capacity for the moralization of industrial rationality; Adorno and Frenkel-Brunswik³ a tendency toward political dependence on large power structures; Erikson⁴ an insistence on adolescent plasticity; Ruesch (and the British-born Bateson)⁵ a tendency toward the collectivization of intimate aspects of life; and Riesman⁶ a long-range tendency for moral sanctions to migrate from origins in parents to origins within the social organization of people of one's own age. These sampled conclusions do not entirely overlap. In some cases they quite disagree. What is more, it

¹ Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, New York: William Morrow & Company, 1943.

² Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934.

³ T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

⁴ Erik H. Erikson, *Children and Society*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1950.

⁵ Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1951. See also other papers by Bateson as listed in the bibliography of *The Study of Culture at a Distance*, *infra*, note 9.

⁶ David Riesman, with Reuel Denney and Nathan Glazer, *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950. For further remarks by Riesman on American character and culture, see his *Individualism Reconsidered*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954.

is clear that some of the ascribed traits might also be true, to a greater or lesser degree, of the character of other nationals; and therefore not distinctively American. Nevertheless, there are some grounds for agreement on traits (1) seen in Americans by most of the observers and (2) seen by the observers as more characteristic of Americans than foreigners.

As we read our sociological students of American character, they appear to agree that American character is (1) much engaged by the need to internalize the human meaning of industrialism, (2) organized in such a way that adolescence is more of a crisis in the life cycle than in many other cultures, (3) concerned with ambiguity of sexual roles arising from the industrialization of women, and (4) engaged in playing out some sort of this-worldly mysticism that resembles, but is not the same as, the moral materialism of early British industrialism. That is to say, the American character is historically unique in the way in which it disposes its attitudes about male and female, work and play, youth and age. If one asks whether these conclusions answer the question "How do most Americans see themselves?" the answer is that they do not. The point of most of our contemporary researches of this sort is that national character is what makes nationals see themselves as they *think* they are. Presumably, it takes time for scholarly appraisals of national character to acquire popularization, and thus domesticate themselves in a national belief system.

The term "national character," of course, contains semantic hazards that easily stimulate basic questions from literate Americans not sure of the scope of the term.

The specialist finds it easy to respond, up to a point, to many such questions. National character he defines as some-

thing quite different from, though related to, moral character. Character appears *in* attitudes, but is not fully revealed *by* attitudes. Conclusions about national character may be documented by references to the assertion that such and such a child-rearing practice appears to be national in its scope and differential in its effects. National character, he says, is subject to ambiguous definition. The term can refer to group traits A, B, and C, which everyone has some share of, though not equally. It can refer to the preponderance of types A, B, and C in the population, types not universal, but statistically noticeable. It can refer to norms of character toward which all nationals feel themselves drawn, no matter how various their success in modeling themselves on these norms. The specialist is likely to add that while it is important to understand these distinctions, it is stultifying to overwork them.

There is, of course, a great variety of traditions in American writing on the American national character. There is no space in this discussion for the approaches suggested by observers earlier than 1900. It is sufficient to say that many of the sharpest formulations of these years either came from foreign observers or were based on American self-analytical reactions to the remarks of foreign observers. It is possible to speak here only of the self-observation that began at about the time of America's intensified contacts with other nationals during and after World War I. Again, there is no room here to report the weathermen, medical men, journalists, politicians, advertisers, publicists, professors of history, and many other professionals who have had their say on American national character—even though their intuitions or phrases have often suggested to workers in the behavioral sciences the direction in which to look.

ASSUMPTIONS OF NATIONAL CHARACTER STUDIES

By far the most useful history of recent interest in national character studies on the part of behavioral sciences is by Margaret Mead, in her essay "The Study of National Character."⁷ She shows there how World War II stimulated policy makers of the United States to study more concretely than they had ever been studied before the contrasts that appear to distinguish American national character from that of others. What is more to the point for this discussion is her lucid summary of the approaches. Some writers, as she shows, have emphasized the impact of American child-rearing expectations and practices on the adult—to be especially noted here are Kardiner, Gorer, and Erikson. Others have emphasized the subordination of national "character" to a general pattern of culture—a pattern in which only some of the results are characterological: such a student is Ruth Benedict. Benedict's remarks on American character tend to emphasize the selectivity of American culture in giving preferential nurture to certain psychological types and certain attitudes toward life.

Still other approaches employed in recent years put other questions and get other answers. British-born anthropologist Bateson's emphasis on the types of social interaction between roles and individuals in the culture comes close to being a "structural" rather than a "characterological" approach. Yet it yields most promising formulations for getting at differences, for ex-

⁷ In Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell (Eds.), *The Policy Sciences*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951; a Hoover Institute Study. See also Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1945; Abram Kardiner, *Psychological Frontiers of Society*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

ample, between the tones of British and American child-parent relationships. In reviewing these and other angles of attack, Miss Mead suggests that there are three general methods at work. One approach emphasizes the study of the patterns of culture in two or more cultures that have had similar historical experiences but appear to display differences in patterning. Another emphasizes the relation between the motivations imparted to the child and the rest of the culture. A third emphasizes the study of key "role-relationships" in the culture. It might well be asked by some readers whether all of these are studies of "national character"; or whether some of them are studies chiefly in noncharacterological variables in social organization.

To return to the definition offered earlier in these remarks, it will be assumed here that "national character," whatever it may mean in a wider sense, denotes specifically the total "learned behavior" of the people who are the object of its study. To speak of national "character" in these terms may mean, as the British psychologist Ginsberg said, to speak either of (1) common traits generally distributed or (2) recognizable patterns of behavior in the group as a whole—or to speak of both at the same time. In this paper, as in *The Lonely Crowd*, the attempt will be made to hew closer to the first definition. While it is conceded that data about "culture pattern" and "social structure" are indispensable in discussing "character," "character" itself is taken as a unique variable. This position is clearly dependent on three important assumptions.

The first assumption is that we are not talking about constitutional personality types, nor about their national distribution. To be able to talk about the presence or absence of given personality types—whether one uses ty-

pologies suggested by Freud, Jung, Adler, or others—is nevertheless indispensable to the task. It is the necessary condition for discriminating these relatively "unlearned" aspects of the person from his "learned" or characterological aspects. The second assumption is that a certain homogeneity over space and time can be found in the learned behavior of the nationals of a given country. Oceans of ink have been spilled over the shape and degree of that homogeneity. The position taken here is that such homogeneity need not add up to very much to make its point. National character is not studied with the hope of proving vast difference between the nationals of countries A and B; it is undertaken with the hope of finding (or conscientiously not finding) marginal differences between many, perhaps most, of the nationals of countries A and B. The third assumption is that this "certain homogeneity" is composed of actualities that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to noncharacterological concepts of the society such as social structure, culture, world view, and so on.

It should be noticed that we possess a most coherent statement of the approach that emphasizes the distribution of certain types of "personality" in the society, in Ralph Linton's essay on "The Concept of National Character."⁸ Linton makes it clear, in this paper, that he and Kardiner, in their co-operative investigations, distinguish between the "total personality" of an individual and what they call his "basic personality." It is the latter term that they use to denote the general coherence of personality throughout cultural types,

⁸ In Alfred H. Stanton and Stewart E. Perry (Eds.), *Personality and Political Crisis*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951. Compare the approach of Margaret Mead, in articles listed in the bibliography of *The Study of Culture at a Distance*, *infra*, note 9.

or a whole culture, which can also bear the name "national character." This approach, like all the others, tends to turn up data that are best expressed in its own vocabulary. This itself makes more clear truisms which should be almost glaringly obvious by this point. The terms "the individual" and "the society" are complementary terms; either of the two tends to get defined in terms of the other; national-character studies can be discriminated from each other in terms of the way they manipulate emphasis on one complementary term or the other, in their vocabulary.

AMERICAN CHARACTER AND INDUSTRIALISM

If we think of the research position having been stated in this way, we might imagine that "the American being studied" might rejoin as follows: "I am quite aware, from my reading of the newspaper, radio listening, television viewing, and so on, that American character seems disposed toward distinctive definitions of male and female, work and play, youth and age. In fact, my everyday experience, matched against whatever I can learn about non-Americans, makes me sure that this is so. What more is it that you have found out that I do not know?"

The answer might run along the following lines. All of us, as Americans, accept the machine so readily that we do not realize the unique qualities of our historic encounter with it. We were the first nation for whom the machine did not mean an accumulation of new amounts of that oldest of miseries: overwork on top of undernourishment. We have paid for this triumph by meeting the machine at a higher and different level of encounter. It did not differentiate us into "powerful" and "powerless"; it conformed us into the "powerful-powerless." A strain

of anxiety about industrialization is involved in our anxiety about conformism in all social levels of the United States, among both men and women, among both young and old. The basic imagery of this point is amply demonstrated, I think, in Rhoda Métraux's study⁹ of the interchangeability of terms used to describe the human being and the machine in the United States. It could be documented further by a study of advertising imagery, with the man-shaped machines of Artzybasheff at one end of the scale of hybrids and the Absorbine Jr. puppet-man at another end.

Of course, this means a variety of things. It means that the American winces if he sees a man doing a machine's work—as when he sees a Chicago Negro hand-shoveling coal for lack of a portable conveyor belt. It means also, at the other extreme of viewpoint and the business cycle, that the American sometimes winces if he sees a machine doing a man's work. This is true of some business executives who visit Massachusetts Institute of Technology and see computers making some of the kinds of decisions that they have been accustomed to make. It means that some machines are outmoded while those who know no other way of making a living than tending them are still alive and in need of jobs. And it means that some kinds of jobs and workers are suddenly ennobled by new machine applications—as when the street sweeper rises to glory by being presented with the wheel of a \$15,000 automatic machine as fine as the ones that labor aristocrats like "cat skinners" use. In a country where children are as a matter of course trained by

science fiction to use machines that have not yet been invented, many of the sixty million work force live at the edge of a technology which is destroying their occupational role by building their skills into machines.

If this seems a long cry from conclusions about the American character arrived at by the specialists I have mentioned, let us look more closely. Erikson has made the point that the American male is strenuously taught to "leave home." He adds the point that a little boy's play with machines (Huck Finn's fantasy of being a steamboat captain) is a part of this process. Both Max Weber,¹⁰ a German observer, and Ruth Benedict have made the point that the American's high capacity for the moralization of the Puritan ethos and industrial teamwork is connected with his belief in the ultimate "rightness" of rapid capital formation. Mead's study of the strain of watchful waiting and calculated risk-taking in the American is at least related to the domination in our public imagery of mechanical metaphors. Gorer,¹¹ a British observer, has made the point that the machines, services, and products of the market tend to acquire a symbolic aura in which biological and mechanical function are overlaid. Riesman has concluded about American child rearing that it teaches children, in effect, to regard themselves as interchangeable parts of a social process, as commodities possessing some of the "substitutability"—and "marginal differentiation"—of goods in exchange. This, to be sure, was part of a wider view which saw American character today as a reflex not merely to industrialism but to industrial abundance.

⁹ Rhoda Métraux, "Resonance in Imagery," in Margaret Mead and Rhoda Métraux (Eds.), *The Study of Culture at a Distance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 343-64.

¹⁰ See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

¹¹ Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1948.

AGE GRADING AND CHARACTER IN AMERICA

When F. Scott Fitzgerald said that "there are no second acts in American lives," he was probably referring to a schema like this: Act One, Adolescence; Act Three, Success or Failure. The European drama might be summarized as Act One, Youth; Act Two, Success or Failure; Act Three, Gravy or Regrets. As for this emphasis in America on youth—or else, a good deal of anthropological attention has been paid to the question of whether the so-called storminess of American adolescence is unique. It has been argued by so good an authority as Margaret Mead that, in effect, the American adolescent is stunned by the miseries of the American sexual system, both in fact and in prospect. This may be true. American adolescents tend to betray surprise that their parents have any guts left in them at all and this may be an unconscious tribute to what they imagine to be supertoughness on the part of their parents in surviving a life experience with the American love and money game. On the other hand, successive generations of American adolescents have a way of palming themselves off as cool in comparison to their parents, and thus induce in the older generation the suspicion that if *they* were stormy, they were fools.

The argument is, generally, that while many other cultures make puberty crisis a crisis, Americans know how to make it a nightmare. It is argued that class aspects of the public school and social mobility system, neurotic patterns in the American middle-class family, the prospective industrialization of adolescent women, the feminine protest mother, and a variety of other factors add up to a conscientious pursuit of unhappiness where adolescent life is

concerned. Talcott Parsons,¹² for example, has shown that the American girl starts, in her early years, with a high sense of identity and then is forced to forsake some of the identity and its status; while, on the other hand, the boy starts with a very vaguely defined sense of himself and then comes into a large, sudden wind-fall of prestige when he puts on long pants and becomes defined as a prospective free agent and all-round-doer. Again, it has been effectively argued that the ambiguity of social and occupational roles in prospect for adolescents in a society that keeps them out of the labor market for a long time, is influential.

Without being sure how this all adds up, it is possible for a student of American character to say, as he usually does, that the American is more American in his adolescence than at any other time in his life. Another way of saying this is to say that in later life the American is most American when he shows traces of an adolescence not left behind.

To this observer, most theories place perhaps too much importance on institutional details. The observers of adolescence are, after all, the nonadolescents. The age pyramid shows that there have been more and more of these, living to riper and riper years, for the last couple of generations. Taking along with this the consideration that most youths seem in retrospect misspent, there have been more and more people to think more and more about it this way than ever before. This sets up a communication pressure in which it is unlikely that any youth will claim to be happy while he stands a chance of getting something out of

¹² Talcott Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 7 (October 1942), pp. 604-16.

appearing to be unhappy. The audience is too good to resist.

If one is tempted to ask what this has to do with national character, then the answer might be given in somewhat the following terms. National character, by most of the definitions we have considered, sees people of different cultures as structuring their life expectations, and their age-graded attitudes, in distinctive ways. Some of these traits might best be studied by acquiring greater knowledge of how the age and kinship system works. Some might best be studied by viewing them as aspects of ideology, rather than behavior in response to social structure. In either of these cases, one could neglect character as a dynamic variable up to a certain point. In the last analysis, however, the student of national character would insist that the expectations spoken of here do not exist as mere structural or ideological reflexes. They are "interpreted" in some way, by individuals and by groups—and the way in which they are interpreted shows that they are interpreted by "character" going about its work. The dynamism of "character" helps to explain things that cannot be explained by references to ideology, culture, social structure, and the total personality of individuals.

SCHOLARLY SOURCES AND POPULAR VIEWS

It should be quite apparent from these remarks that these specialists in the behavioral sciences who have shown an interest in American national character are working with concepts that are far from being completely diffused in American public opinion. How do Americans at large see themselves? They seem to see themselves through their reflection in primary group life with the family, and through the reflections that come back to them from the wider institutions of their social life,

including the media. They see themselves, of course, through the spectacles of ideology and of differential social perception—in the first instance seeing things as they ought to be and in the second as they think they must be, in fact. The degree to which the general American public asks itself the self-identifying questions asked by the specialists mentioned in this paper is largely a function of the media, and of the public's education. The work of the behavioralists in national-character studies has been rather well reported, as a whole—but not widely and intensively reported. It is fair to say that the more popularized approaches to the national character in recent years have been a rather narrow selection of what the scholarly world offers.

Let us take, for illustration, a quick view of some of the popularly distributed theories of national character. A prime example might be found in the popular "diaper-ology" of Philip Wylie. His well-known and widely known emphasis on the dubious aspects of the mother-son relation in the United States has been a most popular source of self-interpretation for Americans in the last ten years. Still another popular source of folk notions about the national character might be said to exist in such a self-selling piece of fiction as Ayn Rand's *The Fountainhead*. Here we find a kind of popular diagnosis of American national character as suffering from a lack of respect for individuality and genius—a best seller that fictionally dramatizes the strain of conformity in American national character. On still a different front, we have seen the United States, during the last fifteen years or so, subjected to large-scale campaigns for tolerance. The assumption about national character that appears to lie behind these drives is not easy to condense in a few words. Nevertheless, they seem to assume that

Americans will respond to preaching for tolerance because of a trained distaste for unfair play, because of a rationality about welfare losses occasioned by prejudices—and because of considerable reserves of social guilt.

Such a quick view of certain popular mechanisms of self-estimation and self-definition is not intended to sharpen distinctions between "expert" studies of national character and the national character studying itself. The identities in concern are more interesting, perhaps, than the disparities. In the social history of the last twenty years, indeed, one can discover, if one wants to, a converging of the tones of the intellectual, on the one hand, and the general public, on the other, on the theme of national character. Neither are quite sure that such a thing exists in some highly definable sense. Both are sure that it is "better" than many intellectuals thought it was two decades ago. If there is such a thing as national character, then intellectuals today seem to be partaking of some of the faith in it that nonintellectuals have evinced, most of the time, during this troubled century. Along these lines, certain theoretical formulations have been and may continue to be important.

Consider, for example, the emphasis on historical change in *The Lonely Crowd*. This study suggested that one of the more important things about American character was its tendency to change. Instead of searching for modes of social identity and learned behavior that are constant on the American scene, it suggested systematic shifts from one mode to another. Much of the argument could be expressed in cultural or structural or institutional terms. It was insisted, however, that character is a distinct and dynamic variable. To be burdened with something called a national character is not so threatening if one is under some

persuasion that it contains the possibility of change.

There remain to be suggested a few points about the intellectual origins of character studies, and about the shape they are taking now, in a less pressured stage of development than that during World War II. Back of national-character studies loom the figures of Kant and Hegel, along with such folk nationalists as Herder. Students of characterology have traced certain aspects of the interest in national character to that originally German, and later Continental, interest in "viewpoint" suggested by Kant's subjective categories. The study of national character is a tension point in the study of the relations between the individual, the culture, the society, and the state. Despite its late nineteenth-century tendency to degenerate into international and inter-ethnic abuse, it appears, in the twentieth century, to have added an item of flexibility to the vocabulary of the behavioral sciences.¹⁸ American interest in the application of national character theories to America itself could be taken as a determination to attempt deeper self-identification than has been open to, or desired by, Americans of past generations.

Some of the formulations of recent years have, indeed, the quality of social science becoming myth—in the good rather than the bad senses of that term. Miss Mead's remark that all Americans are "third generation," for example, has the force of an epic formulation. Is it true? Is it true that even the descendants of the oldest settlers feel themselves suspended in a generational identification which is no more deep and mature than those who are strictly of "the third generation"? Frost says,

¹⁸ See the work of Otto Klineberg, especially "A Science of National Character," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 19 (1944), pp. 147-62, for helpful formulations offered a decade ago.

"The land was ours before we were the land's." Is it true that American society is not divided as a third-generation person such as myself thinks it is into two "moieties"—the "old" and the "new"? Are we *all* that new? If so, no wonder our national character surprises us so much. No wonder it is a topic that so much appeals to us, outside of technical talk, as an opportunity to talk, not only about what we are, but about what we might be.

Reuel Denney is associate professor of social sciences in the College of the University of Chicago. His major interest in the social sciences is the field of leisure and entertainment, and he has published articles and reviews on sports, the mass media, and related topics.

Themes in the Interpretation of America by Prominent Visitors from Abroad

By ARVID BRODERSEN

THROUGHOUT its written history America has been the goal of visitors from abroad, and few countries have so provoked a recording of their observations and interpretations. One of the foremost questions typically asked of the foreigner by the American himself is: What do you think of this country? And when he returns home, the visitor is again met by this query: What do you think of them now? In consequence, any literate visitor becomes an interpreter of America to a smaller or larger public. A complete collection of such interpretations probably by now would fill a medium-sized library. A small sample, representative only of some more notable commentaries, was selected and published by Professor Commager in the volume *America in Perspective*.¹

The perspective in which the foreign commentator sees America is not always that of a student bent on understanding the country and the American people in their own terms and for their own sake. More often, in fact, the perspective is one of partisanship with regard to issues in the commentator's own country or beliefs in his personal philosophy, and in some cases his interpretation of America is but a convenient language in which extraneous views and prejudices can be expressed with impunity. Hence the liberal's picture of America is apt to differ radically from the conservative's, the socialist, working-class picture from that of the mid-

dle class, the artistic and literary person's from that of the businessman.

Each sees America in his own perspective, and some will for their own reasons praise America for her freedom and democracy—or condemn her for them; some will perceive the cultural creativity and the spirit of idealism in America, others deny its existence; some will admire America's industrial and business enterprise, others deplore it as materialism. All these views are recurring themes in the image of America as it has emerged in the perspective of foreign visitors over the last two hundred years. They sprang from the minds that produced them as much as from the subject, and whatever truth they contain therefore nearly always refers to two realities, in part the reality of the perspective, in part that of America.

In exploring some major themes in the interpretation of America, I propose first to discuss the writing of three well-known commentators of the past. Two of the three—Tocqueville and Bryce—rank first in fame and influence among all the authors who have dealt with the subject. The third, less well known for his interpretation of America, is the eminent German sociologist, Max Weber. Secondly, I propose to examine some of the views which appear, from a recent study, to be salient in the minds of foreign visitors in the present period of American and world history.

The visits of Tocqueville and Bryce fell in very different periods of this nation's history. The former saw America still in a preindustrial stage, with a population of 12,000,000, mostly farm-

¹ Henry Steele Commager, *America in Perspective: The United States Through Foreign Eyes*. New York: Random House, 1947. Abridged paper-back edition in Mentor Books.

ers, craftsmen, and traders; the latter when she had grown to a great industrial nation of 62,000,000 people. Tocqueville was the first observer to form a comprehensive view of American civilization—not just random “opinions,” but a systematic interpretation of America, seen as a whole. Bryce was his true successor in this respect, and while their images differed in some ways, the continuity and the fundamental agreement in their interpretations of American democracy remain a most remarkable fact.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

In 1831–32 Alexis de Tocqueville, twenty-six at the time, spent nine months traveling in the United States on a commission from the French government to report on the American prison system. The fruit of that visit (aside from the prison report) was the first great study of American society and culture ever written, the four-volume work *De la démocratie en Amérique* (Vols. I and II, 1835; Vols. III and IV, 1840). Few books have won such immediate and widespread fame.

In Tocqueville's interpretation of America one grand theme governs the entire analysis of sociopolitical institutions. This theme, in one word, is equality. What really motivated Tocqueville's passionate interest in the study of America was not the problem of democracy in general, but that of a new society founded upon equality among its members. He saw the movement toward equality as a universal historical trend, the manifest destiny of his own people. His perhaps most urgent concern in studying America was the charting of the inevitable future course of France. He wrote in the introduction to the first volume, “It appears to me beyond doubt that, sooner or later, we shall arrive, like the Americans, at an almost complete

equality of conditions.” Tocqueville himself was deeply rooted in the other, aristocratic type of society and did not welcome its passing; but being convinced that this was “a providential fact” at this stage, he proceeded to find out, in America, what good could possibly come of it.

The latter part of *Democracy in America* (Vols. III and IV), generally considered the more profound, presents in many variations the one theme that the human mind under conditions of social and political equality will develop a new and specific creativity, new and specific modes of social actions and attitudes differing from those of an aristocratic society, but of a certain value if considered in their own terms. This is in fact the counterthesis to the often expressed view that “real culture” (philosophy, art, and literature) is possible only in the old type of society, and that consequently “America has no culture”—a view which seems to be held as strongly in some quarters today as it was almost universally a hundred years ago. Tocqueville has, by virtue of interpreting the American mind in its own terms, the power and also the right of critical evaluation, and while he is as often negative as positive in his judgment, the Americans themselves could not but accept him and learn from him. He has harsh things to say of their “passion to get rich,” of their crude tastes, and their lack of intellectual refinement. On the other hand, he is struck by “the extreme equality of social relationships. The plutocrat and the lowly worker shake hands in the street.” And he confesses to envying America her moral climate, the people's respect for the law, and their faith in human equality, in wisdom and good sense, in man's perfectibility, and hence in universal education. The themes that dominate the first part of *Democracy in America* relate

primarily to the subject matters of government and politics. In the following I shall be able to point to but some of the major motifs.

Decentralization

In the first place, Tocqueville affirms that egalitarian democracy as government by the people—by all the people—is possible only through the people's active participation in their own local affairs. Such participation, however, can become politically effective only under a system of administrative decentralization, that is, one diametrically the opposite of the French centralized system of his time, in which all major decisions were handed down to the local communities from the capital ruling power at the center, and no policy-making authority was vested in the so-called “provincial institutions.” While admitting that the American system has its weaknesses, Tocqueville eloquently pleads in its favor. Decentralization he considered one of the most important lessons he derived for France from the study of democracy in America. If his arguments failed to sway the rulers and people of France, they greatly impressed an influential reader in England: John Stuart Mill later confessed in his autobiography that he “owed his rescue from a thoughtless belief in centralization to Tocqueville's book. . . .”²

Tocqueville found the American federal system a particularly happy construction just by virtue of its combination with local self-rule. This dualism he considered “one of the greatest inventions known to political science,”³ since it permits the American people to enjoy the “happiness and freedom of small nations” while simultaneously

wielding “the power of great nations,” or in other words, “combining the different advantages which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations.”⁴ It should, however, be kept in mind that in making this statement 120 years ago, he did not anticipate a world situation in which America would become a great military power. On the contrary, his assumption was that the “American Union . . . placed in the center of an immense continent . . . is almost as much insulated from the world as if all its frontiers were girt by the ocean,” and consequently “has no great wars to fear.”⁵ Nor did he perceive the explosive potentialities of the domestic issue of slavery which already was looming ominously on the American horizon.

Candidates for public office

An aspect of American democracy which Tocqueville studied with interest was the selection of men for public office, on the policy-making as well as administrative level. In his view, partly because the most distinguished individuals would keep away from public affairs and partly because the electorate itself would by “the natural instincts of democracy . . . reject distinguished citizens as their rulers,”⁶ equality tended to favor mediocrity. The lack of an established civil service, with its social order of prestige and status as well as security of office, made—in Tocqueville's opinion—for a poor selection of talent and an unfortunate instability and discontinuity of administration: “No one cares for what happened before his time; no methodical system is pursued.”⁷ His criticism was con-

⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, revision by Francis Bowen of the translation by Henry Reeve (7th ed.; Boston: John Allyn, 1882), Vol. I, Chap. VIII, p. 206.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Chap. XIII, p. 256.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

² George Wilson Pierson, *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 772.

³ Pierson, *op. cit.*, p. 776.

cerned mainly with the technical efficiency and intellectual standard inherent in American administrative practices, rather than the problems of political ethics.

"The tyranny of the majority"

Tocqueville's principal criticism of American democracy, to which he devotes two full chapters, is summed up in one phrase, "the tyranny of the majority." The irresistible and absolute rule of the majority which he observed on the American scene was based—according to his analysis—upon a system of government which was no longer genuinely representative, but rather a direct rule of public opinion through agents elected for very brief terms and acting under continuous control of the people in its majority. "A proceeding is becoming more and more general in the United States, which will, in the end, do away with the guaranties of representative government: it frequently happens that the voters, in electing a delegate, point out a certain line of conduct to him, and impose upon him certain positive obligations which he is pledged to fulfill. With the exception of the tumult, this comes to the same thing as if the majority itself held its deliberations in the market-place."⁸ Tocqueville with these and numerous other observations demonstrated the tremendously important difference between representative and direct democracies, and again contemporary political thinkers like John Stuart Mill acknowledged their debt to him.⁹ Later observers, stressing other aspects of the American system (especially Lord Bryce), could not agree with Tocqueville's diagnosis of a trend toward direct democracy. More recently, however, it appears that the introduction of new techniques of mass communication, mainly radio and

⁸ *Ibid.*, Chap. XV, p. 325.

⁹ Pierson, *op. cit.*, pp. 771 f.

television, into the political process, may well have promoted the development he predicted.

JAMES BRYCE

James Bryce visited America, mainly for the purpose of studying her political institutions, more than fifty years after Tocqueville. His subsequent two-volume work, *The American Commonwealth* (1888), ranks second only to *Democracy in America* as a political and philosophic treatise on its subject, and second to none as a systematic analysis and interpretation of American government. It is a classic in the world literature of political science, and is currently used as a textbook in many countries. No book better serves serious students of American politics. Its influence, nonetheless, could but be less profound than that of its great predecessor, for it is largely descriptive and factual, its political message being—British style—carefully understated, rather than eloquently and imaginatively elaborated, as in Tocqueville. Bryce in some important respects carried forward into the present time Tocqueville's fundamental conceptions of American democracy. Simultaneously, he contributed significant new features to the total interpretation. Again, only a few major motifs can be mentioned here.

Bryce shares and restates many of Tocqueville's views regarding the strength and weaknesses of American democracy. Like Tocqueville, he praises the people's spirit of legality and obedience to the law; the reliance on law rather than officials; the restriction of official authority; the simplicity and consistency in public affairs; and the people's faith in liberty and in their own institutions. In addition, Bryce emphasizes certain characteristics which are hardly or not at all to be found in Tocqueville's analysis, since they had not yet developed in the America of the

1830's. The extraordinary stability of the national community; the fundamental unity of the people; its ability to close ranks, on which Bryce comments, became fully visible only after the acid test of the Civil War. The relative freedom from political class struggle, which he emphasizes, became a truly remarkable feature only through the tremendous industrial growth of which Tocqueville saw only the faintest beginning but which fifty years later had produced an unmistakable cleavage in terms of socioeconomic classes in American society.

Bryce lists a third feature among the positive characteristics of the Americans: he says democracy has taught them "fraternity," and defines it as a certain "kindliness, a sense of human fellowship, a recognition of the duty of mutual help, owed by man to man . . . the natural impulse of every citizen . . . to respect every other citizen." Of course, Tocqueville had made similar observations. Yet there seems to be a difference in the feeling tone. Bryce feels closer to the Americans, and occasionally calls them "the English of America." Tocqueville in his time perceived American social manners as "grave, deliberate, reserved,"¹⁰ rather than cordial, and human relations as almost devoid of real pleasure: "They laugh mighty little on this side of the Atlantic."¹¹ Bryce on the contrary refers to "the humorous tendencies of the American mind." The spirit of fraternity which Tocqueville saw was a certain simplicity of heart ("If their demeanor is often cold and serious, it is never haughty or constrained")¹² rather than a genuine kindliness and fellowship.

It is hard to tell whether the differ-

¹⁰ Pierson, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

¹² *Democracy in America*, Vol. II, Chap. II, p. 207.

ence here lies in the minds that observe or is due to changes in the object observed. Charles Dickens, who visited America ten years after Tocqueville and forty years before Bryce, voiced a curiously ambivalent view. In his *American Notes* he describes the Americans as "by nature frank, brave, cordial, hospitable, and affectionate," while at the same time finding in them a spirit of "Universal Distrust," a lack of "lightness of heart and gaiety," and a generally "prevailing seriousness and melancholy air of business." Was this a true reflection of an America different from that of the two famous observers just discussed, or a subjective view conceived by a different temperament?

Weaknesses of American democracy

In describing the weaknesses of American democracy, Bryce again follows Tocqueville in important respects. His criticism concerns the level of political life in America, the intellectual standard of leadership, and the technical efficiency of government. Like Tocqueville, he finds a certain commonness and lack of dignity among the people's representatives (they "behave as ordinary men"), as well as lack of knowledge and judgment in legislative and administrative matters. The best talent does not enter the field of public affairs, and in consequence government in all its branches is below the level to be expected in a nation like the United States. "In no country is the ideal side of public life, what one might venture to call the heroic element in a public career, so ignored by the mass and repudiated by the leaders."

Bryce points to two defects of American democracy which had received little or no attention in Tocqueville's analysis: the corrupt and unethical practices occurring in party politics and in city governments, and the formidable power of wealth in America. Not only did

Bryce penetrate much deeper into these problems as such (Tocqueville's treatment of party politics was one of the few rather weak parts of his study), but he was also, of course, confronted with a political situation in which a merely technical, moral judgment was no longer meaningful. Both corruption and big business had become inescapable issues in the America Bryce studied. He condemned the cynical selfishness and venality of many politicians and branded the system of machines, rings, and bosses as "the ugliest feature" in American politics. He attributed it to historical causes, and believed that it would decline when people, particularly the masses of new immigrants, learned more and developed an active sense of political responsibility. Civil service reform and better ballot and election laws would also help.

Unlike Tocqueville, Bryce did not consider a "tyranny of the majority" a danger inherent in American democracy. "The features of mob-rule do not appear in her system, whose most characteristic faults are the existence of a class of persons using government as a means of private gains, and the menacing power of wealth. Plutocracy . . . has shown in America an inauspicious affinity for certain professedly democratic institutions." Yet Bryce was convinced that American democracy was strong enough to avert this menace and to overcome any other weaknesses. Toward the end of his life he wrote: "No Englishman who remembers American politics as they were half a century ago, and who, having lived in the United States, has formed an affection as well as an admiration for its people . . . will fail to rejoice at the many signs that the sense of public duty has grown stronger, that the standards of public life are steadily rising, that democracy is more and more showing itself a force

making for ordered progress, true to the principles of Liberty and Equality from which it sprang."¹³

MAX WEBER

Approximately a quarter of a century later, Max Weber turned his keen mind to an examination of American democracy and the American people. Weber in 1904 was already near the peak of his career as an outstanding German social scientist. The occasion of his visit was an invitation to lecture at a congress held in conjunction with the Universal Exposition at St. Louis; the more important motivation was his desire to see the country which long had been a main object of his scholarly interest. At that time he was concentrating on the great problem of the nature and sources of Western industrial and business civilization, the historical phenomenon referred to as capitalism; on the eve of his departure he had sent to the publisher the first part of what was to become his most famous work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.¹⁴

To Weber, America was the society of modern capitalism, the country where the original sources of capitalism could be studied as nowhere else. What interested him primarily was not the spirit of capitalism itself, not the spirit of business enterprise, hard work, and money-making, often called materialism, but rather its deeper roots which he discovered in the ethic of Protestantism. From that religious source originated, in his view, the particular discipline of

¹³ *Modern Democracies* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921), Vol. II, Chap. 45.

¹⁴ *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, later edition in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Vol. I, Tübingen, 1934. Partial English translation in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

mind and the methodical way of life which created modern capitalist civilization. He demonstrated this thesis with a rich material, not the least of which was from American thinkers, especially Benjamin Franklin, whom he considered a prototype of the Protestant translating his religion into a code of capitalist practice.

America to Max Weber was the stage upon which the drama of the modern world was enacted in its purest and most consistent form. In his St. Louis lecture he characterized the American farmer as a businessman, "an entrepreneur like any other,"¹⁵ in contradistinction to the Old World peasant who exists in a precapitalist relationship under the dominance of traditional ruling classes. This meant to him that America was as yet a society without an aristocracy. He was not certain that it would remain so, and at the end of his lecture predicted that America might experience a structural change in the distant future, and develop its own form of nobility based on land monopolies, as an effect of the power of capitalism.¹⁶

Years later, in one of his political essays of the First World War, Weber returned to this theme with a remark in passing: "Unlimited political 'democracy' in America, for instance, does not prevent the growth of a raw plutocracy or even an 'aristocratic' prestige group, which is slowly emerging. The growth of this 'aristocracy' is culturally and historically as important as that of plutocracy, even though it usually goes unnoticed."¹⁷

¹⁵ "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany," translation in Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

¹⁷ "Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland," in *Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Munich, 1921), translation in Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

Bureaucracy

Another major theme heralded in the St. Louis lecture is that of bureaucracy and its role in modern societies. "The importance of the stratum of state officials is and must be much greater in Europe than in the United States." The much more complicated social organization makes a host of specially trained officials, employed for life, indispensable in Europe. In the United States only a much smaller number of them will exist, even after the movement of civil service reform shall have attained its aims.¹⁸ This relative freedom from the bureaucratically formalized type of administration was, to Weber, one of the most valuable aspects of American democracy. Its main strength, however, he saw in the positive use Americans made of that freedom. The lack of formal organization did not mean to Americans an organized individualism, as people abroad, and particularly in Germany, often believe, but on the contrary, a fuller and richer type of community life: "In the past and up to the very present, it has been a characteristic precisely of the specifically American democracy that it did not constitute a formless sand heap of individuals, but rather a buzzing complex of strictly exclusive, yet voluntary, associations."¹⁹ This sentence, written in 1906, sums up what was perhaps Max Weber's crucial experience and his main orientation point during the American visit. The voluntary associations of free men in clubs, religious sects, and other groupings of all kinds which he

¹⁸ "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany," translation by Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

¹⁹ "Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus," 1906, in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Vol. I, translation in Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

found flowering in this country were to him the heart and core of American democracy, and a topic to which he returned again and again in speech and writing for the rest of his life.

After 1917, when America had entered the war and Weber realized far more clearly than most of his compatriots that Germany inevitably would be defeated, he worked feverishly on ideas for the establishment of a new, democratic government and way of life in his country. In two important respects he presented American democracy as a model. He pointed to its pattern of voluntary associations, the club system, as a type of social order within which human freedom and creativeness could thrive in spite of the progressive bureaucratization of modern society. And he proposed the adoption of the American practice of electing the chief executive by direct vote of the entire nation, a provision which in fact was embodied in the Weimar Constitution of 1919. His idea was that the President of the German Republic should, like the President of the United States, be vested with the powers of national leadership based on popular vote, and not merely the powers of formal authority. He wanted to safeguard German democracy against the danger of becoming a bureaucratic establishment, a mere *Beamtenstaat*; as a direct "plebiscitarian democracy" it would give rise to genuine political leadership. By a bitter paradox of history, this feature of the Weimar Constitution became one of the avenues upon which, fourteen years later, a very different type of leaders marched to seize power in Germany. The reasons for this tragedy were many. One of them Max Weber could not have foreseen: the development of a new technology of mass persuasion, by radio and sound amplification, against which the German people,

in its embryonic state of democracy, was helpless.

U. S. as a world power

One important trend which Weber predicted with certainty was the ascent of the United States to world-power status. Long before America entered the war "he saw that sheer prolongation of the war would bring world industrial supremacy to America."²⁰ At the end of the war he remarked that America's political supremacy was now, after the German defeat, as inevitable as that of Rome after the Punic War, and he added: "I hope America is not going to share it with Russia." He had long seen America and Russia as the two great centers of gravitation in the modern world, and as early as 1906, still under the impression of his American journey, he wrote: "Irresistibly the point of gravity of the population of Western civilization advances toward the great inland areas of the North American continent on the one side and of Russia on the other. This happened once before, in late antiquity."²¹

CONTEMPORARY VISITORS

We have noted some of the major themes in the views of America expressed by three famous visitors in the past. Turning now to contemporary visitors and inquiring what their image of America is, we have a choice of two approaches. One is a content analysis of some or all books and reports on America published in recent years by well-known foreign observer-visitors such as Harold Laski, D. W. Brogan, Geoffrey Gorer, André Siegfried, Raymond Aron, and Simone de Beauvoir. Another method is that of a direct interview survey of a selected sample of in-

²⁰ Gerth and Mills, "Introduction," *op. cit.*, p. 39.

²¹ Max Weber, quoted *ibid.*, p. 72.

dividuals. Having recently conducted such a survey (as yet unpublished), I propose here to report briefly some of the principal relevant findings thereof. The persons interviewed were individuals in positions of leadership from many countries in Europe, Asia, and the African continent, visiting America a year or so ago, all for the first time and each traveling individually. They were interviewed here upon arrival, with the aim of establishing their preconceptions of America before direct exposure, that is, as derived from books, movies, and other communication sources, and from ideas circulating in their home countries.

When the foreign visitors who were the subjects of this study arrived in the United States, they carried in their minds a fairly well-defined image of America and the American people. Certain components of this image were universal, in the sense of being taken for granted by all, and were also central and persisting, in the sense of being highly salient and of dominant influence upon the organization of the individuals' beliefs and attitudes regarding America and things American. Clustered around these central components or "grand themes," and related to them in various ways, were collateral themes of a less universal and less persisting nature.

Of grand themes we found four, in shorthand terms describable as world power, bigness and wealth, technology, and big heart. Of collateral themes there were many, and most of them indicated an evaluation, favorable or unfavorable. In the political image there was, for instance, "young and forceful nation" as well as "young and inexperienced nation," "democracy" as well as "race relations impair democracy" and "the civil liberties issue endangers democracy." In the economic image there were themes like "opportunities" as well as "insecurity," "mal-

distribution," and "small-group rule (Wall Street)." In the social and cultural image there was stress on a variety of positive and negative collateral themes, such as "technical skill and efficiency," "well-integrated multinational society," "materialism," "competitiveness," "success orientation," "indifference toward nonutilitarian values," "rushed tempo of life," "hard work," "violence," "continuing change." In the image of Americans as human beings the main theme was "friendliness and openness in human relations" (big heart) with collateral themes such as "strong," "youthful," "juvenile," "skillful," "active," and "insensitive to non-technological cultural values."

U. S. in international affairs

An elaboration of these general findings presents an image of the world role of the United States envisaged by Max Weber, for one of the central and persisting components of the visitors' image of America, taken for granted by all and frequently referred to, was America's status as a world power. In explaining how she came to occupy this role in international affairs some mentioned the great strength of the country, a theme which was further elaborated with regard to economic resources. Interestingly, there was not a single reference to atomic energy as a basis of American power. Others explained America's ascendancy in terms of a historical process involving the decay of the older nations that formerly held world-power status. The comments on America as a world power reflected a variety of opinions and attitudes, from enthusiastic confidence to sober acceptance of the fact, and from skepticism to hostile rejection. One of the more important reservations, which also was discovered in other areas of the study, concerned the level of ma-

turity and experience of America as a "young" nation in world affairs.

In contrast to the universal consensus regarding the status of the United States as a world power, the respondents did not for the most part comment on any policy involving the exercise of American leadership in world affairs. The most striking omission concerned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which drew only one brief comment from a visitor from a non-NATO country, while the group included visitors from eight countries participating in the organization. The policy of economic aid to foreign countries was commented on by a number of respondents, and only favorably. Otherwise there were references—mostly indifferent or unfavorable—to a variety of foreign policy issues, like the East-West conflict, Korea, Germany, foreign trade, and American-Arab relations.

Democracy

When asked to define their general concept of democracy the visitors stressed the principle of equality as applied to economic and educational opportunities, and the principle of liberty as embodied in freedom of speech, thought, and worship. Freedom of economic enterprise, never specifically mentioned, may have been implied in occasional references to "individualism." About half of the group stated unreservedly that they considered America a real democracy in terms of their own definitions. From the remainder there were comments expressing reservations with regard to certain issues, mainly race relations, civil liberties, corruption in politics, and citizen participation in political affairs. While there was little evidence of strong prejudice against American democracy, there was also little indication of the deeply emotional faith in it as a model for other peoples which was typical in former times.

Some of the respondents considered certain other countries like Britain and Scandinavia more democratic than modern America.

Bigness and wealth

"Bigness and wealth" was the most firmly and universally established theme of the total image of America. Like the world-power theme it was taken for granted by all and was referred to very frequently. While the group was generally impressed by the great economic opportunities in the United States, there was a feeling on the part of some that the social distribution of wealth and opportunities compared unfavorably with that of certain welfare-oriented European countries. There were also frequent references to the belief that a small, financially powerful group (Wall Street) controls American economy. The total evaluation of American economic life—prior to observation and on the basis of spotty and superficial information—was as ambivalent as that of political democracy: universal recognition of the bigness and wealth, but at the same time a certain skepticism regarding the distribution of wealth in the national economy and, as a consequence, doubt of America's perfection in terms of democratic ideals.

Social climate

Many comments were made on social groups and relations as well as on characteristics of the general "social climate" of America. Dominant themes were race relations and the multinational composition of the population, the latter being the more salient of the two. Curiously enough, the subject of social classes and class relations received very little attention, but the American home and family were commented upon more frequently. The respondents' preconceptions in regard to this important area of American life

were about evenly divided between positive and negative.

In the area of social climate three themes were predominant: the tempo of life, the role of violence, and social change. With regard to the "tempo" theme it was observed that visitors from foreign countries, especially Asiatics but also many Europeans, are often affected by the difference in rhythm and tempo of everyday living, the different time consciousness, the stricter time economy, in this country as compared with their own. Many visitors are prepared in advance to find these features here and arrive with a definite, frequently negative opinion about them. The theme indicates a genuine cultural contrast bound to affect the foreigner's total attitude toward American culture and society. As for the "role of violence" theme, many respondents stated that Hollywood movies had created in their countries a conception of America with violence and brutal force as predominant features. They recognized that this was a distortion, yet seemed somewhat affected by these unfavorable popular views. The comments on social change were all favorable, with a stress on growth and progress. In most cases respondents seemed to think of American social change in terms of economic or technological innovations, "new things," rather than new social conditions and new institutions. This means that they expected change and further improvement in regard to matters about which most of them had expressed themselves favorably, rather than in matters about which they had been critical.

Cultural life

Respondents from all countries represented in the sample, except France, commented on cultural life in America. The most striking feature was the general emphasis on American achieve-

ments in science and technology. This, in fact, was a central component of the total image of America, on a par with the "world power" and the "bigness and wealth" themes described earlier. While all comments on this third of the grand themes were favorable, the statements also pointed toward a rather serious limitation in the evaluation of American culture as a whole, in the sense that areas other than scientific and technological, such as the fine arts, were believed to be relatively underdeveloped. There were a few comments, however, all favorable, on education in America, and some evidence of interest in the subject. The visitors often reflected on what they believed to be the general goals and value orientations characteristic of American cultural life. The major themes here were "materialism," "success orientation," and "overcompetitiveness." The conception of materialism seemed to be specifically related to the "tempo of life" theme, both of them being aspects of the same fundamental conception of American society and culture, emphasizing scientific and technological superiority. The full pattern of the three themes combined produces an image of a powerful and technically advanced progressive industrial civilization, moving forward by the force of restless effort and struggle, primarily oriented toward goals of material gains and successes.

Character of the people

All but three of the respondents gave their views of the character of the American people. The one grand theme which stood out here was that of friendliness and openness in human relations, the "big heart" theme, which ranked on a level with the three central and persisting themes described before (world power, bigness and wealth, and technology). It should be noted that how-

ever critical some visitors may have been of American democracy in certain institutional and material aspects, there was universal agreement that the American people is psychologically a democratic people, natively endowed with a great ability for friendly and easy human relations among themselves, and hospitable toward the foreigner.

Other collateral preconceptions regarding characteristics of Americans were "unspent potential strength" ("youthfulness") and "practical efficiency" ("skillfulness"). The notion of a juvenile or even "childlike" character was related to certain themes in the respondents' political and cultural image of America, such as lack of historical maturity and experience. The efficiency theme fitted into the pattern

of technological superiority. Beliefs regarding the typical value orientations of the American people repeated the pattern of positive-negative reciprocity, stressing notions such as "hard-working," "active," and "energetic" as well as "materialistic," "ambitious," "rush all the time." In addition there were statements describing quite different goals and ideals, like "Americans love freedom," "love what is right and just," "are interested in education."

In sum, it appears that in the contemporaneous view of America the themes of political power, economic wealth, and technology predominate, and that the earlier theme of democracy has receded into the background and is now mainly connected with the image of Americans as human beings.

Arvid Brodersen, Ph.D., has been since 1949 professor of sociology on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, New York City. From 1946 to 1949 he served with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris, in charge of the Department of Social Sciences, and from 1936 to 1940 was assistant professor of sociology at the University of Oslo, Norway. He is author of Thorstein Veblen as a Sociologist (1937), Science and Politics in Max Weber (1937), The Political Elite (1945), and The Political Machinery (1945), all in Norwegian.

America in European Eyes

By JACQUES FREYMOND *

IN FRENCH EYES

What is America for a Frenchman? First of all, it is the land of liberty, the country for whose independence Lafayette and his French volunteers fought in a battle which announced and prepared the Great Revolution. Without any doubt, the War of Independence and the Bill of Rights exerted a great influence upon the Revolution of 1789. Franklin was, in French eyes, a great man, and America was to remain during the nineteenth century an example of real democracy. "Where could we find greater hopes or greater lessons?" asked Tocqueville in his "Avertissement" to his famous book *De la démocratie en Amérique*. Alexis de Tocqueville, the aristocrat, was not isolated in his country. To the French Democrats of 1848 America appeared a living symbol of the liberation of mankind from the political chains of reactionary regimes, an asylum where many victims of intolerance found an opportunity to begin a new life.

But this picture of the America of the Statue of Liberty, with Jefferson and Lincoln its main representatives, Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt its modern exponents, could not stand alone in the minds of the French. On the eve of the twentieth century a new America was born, highly mechanized, rich, and mighty; preoccupied with efficiency and rationalization, this America brought with her a new age, her own age of mechanization and mass civilization. For a France whose industrial revolution had gone at a slow pace, for a country which, as it grew older, was more inclined to put the price of life and the value of civilization in refine-

"AMERICA in European eyes." Everyone who begins a study in public opinion is well aware of the difficulties of such a task. What is this "European" view? How is it expressed? How is it possible to choose among all the opinions that are held in the various countries, to assess their relative importance? Can we admit that there is such a thing as a "national" point of view on America? Should we not, on the contrary, assume that opinions will vary according to the social position, the ideology, and the prejudices of those who express them, as well as with the type of America they have in mind? For the diversity of the pictures given of America depends not only on the multiplicity of the approaches, but also on the diversity of a multifaced and ever changing continent. There is hardly a foreign traveler who, having spent more than a month in the United States, has not been struck by the contrasts which exist behind the apparent simplicity and uniformity of American life.

Nevertheless stereotypes exist. Where they come from we do not always know. They just emerge from past and recent history, grown out from an important event or, more prosaically, from long usage. Molded by a multitude of travelers, diplomats and soldiers, writers, journalists, all in search of images and slogans in which to sum up their feelings, they slip, right or wrong, across the ocean, defying time and critics, transmitted from man to man, from one generation to another.

* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. Thomas J. McIntosh and Mr. Angelo Husler for their great help in the preparation and the translation of this study.

ments and subtleties, this new world was at the same time imposing and disquieting. The great democracy had become the land of capitalism. Materialism was invading the idealistic America of the Founding Fathers. This country which had fought colonialism and slavery seemed itself to be bent upon imperialistic adventure and dollar diplomacy.

World War I—and after

World War I and American intervention on the side of the democracies reinforced the bonds of an old friendship. Pershing's words, "Lafayette, we are here," expressed the feelings not only of the Americans, but also of their French allies, who never disdained a certain self-complacency. Wilson, arriving in Paris, was greeted as the messenger sent by the New World to bring peace and a better life to Europe; for a while it seemed that the future of mankind hung upon the presence of this crusader and his ability to sway the politicians of the old school. But only for a while, and then the stubbornness with which he met France's claim for security, his narrow-minded moralism combined with his failure to keep promises, left the French with a sense of frustration. America was still a friend, but a friend whom it was difficult to understand and get along with. There was resentment at having been abandoned by an ally very generous indeed, but one whose leader's idealistic and moralistic approach to the delicate problems of international politics was all the more embarrassing for his associates as it now weighed in the balance for what was deemed a well-smitten Germany and *against* what was considered a petty, land-greedy France.

From then on, the feelings of the French toward America were mixed and the images more confused. Although they knew how much they needed the

support of the United States in their struggle for security, although they admired the great success of the American economy, they could not help criticizing that "American way of life" which was presented as the secret of happiness.

The more they knew about the civilization of the New World, the more they seemed to be convinced of the wisdom of their own way of life. As always happens, a superiority complex came to compensate for the sense of inferiority which had developed because of the tremendous growth of America's economy. The success, therefore, of Duhamel's *Scènes de la vie future* need have occasioned no surprise, for Duhamel merely expressed an opinion which was widespread in his country. The America he described had exactly that type of civilization to which the French were most strongly opposed, and the Wall Street crash of 1929 confirmed the French view that a solution to the world crisis was not to be found in a country which had forgotten the measure of man but in a new appraisal of the heritage and wisdom of the Old World. "Does this unheard-of mastery over earthly things lead in the end to a higher civilization?" had asked André Siegfried at the end of his book on the United States, published in 1926. Since then, of course, events had demonstrated that the "mastery" was far from complete. American capitalism had fallen from its throne. Although the opening of the Roosevelt era, with its tones familiar to French ears, reconciled France with America, the conviction remained that French civilization was superior.

World War II

World War II which, after a break, brought the two nations together in the same camp again, did not alter very much the French impression of the United States. In 1945, America was

still the powerful democracy without whose help Europe and the world would not have been liberated from the domination of Nazism and totalitarianism. But the new victor was greeted with mixed feelings. The demonstrations of sincere joy and gratitude did not prevent the French people from remembering past mistakes and criticizing present ones. The fact that France had been relegated, by the defeat of 1940 and the occupation, to the position of a second-rate nation, the unskillful treatment she had suffered from her American ally, the negative attitude adopted by Roosevelt toward de Gaulle, exacerbated French pride and served to raise a new wave of criticism against American civilization as the French saw it.

Let the liberators go home

In 1944, the GI was welcomed in France and elsewhere in Europe as a liberator. The emphasis at this time was put upon the community of interests of the peoples gathered in the Great Alliance. Praise of Western civilization, to which America belonged as well as France, was one of the favorite themes of all speeches. In 1954, the moral climate seems to have changed completely. American soldiers are not treated as cheerfully as they were ten years ago, but are frequently greeted with a "go home" not always coming from the Communists alone. And allusions to the "Western community" are today usually criticisms which insist less upon the cohesive force of that idea than upon the elements of discord at work among its members. Opinions are contrasted and contradictions are highlighted until the area of agreement, the area of common values, becomes perilously circumscribed.

This change of attitude is at first glance difficult to explain. It seems incredible that America's generous acceptance of the onerous tasks of political

leadership should be rewarded by such ingratitude. The tighter the political and economic bonds, the stronger the social and intellectual opposition! But there is, after all, nothing unusual in this; indeed, it may well happen that more frequent contacts between men or nations do not bring them closer. In this case at least, the contacts did not lead the French to a better understanding of their allies, but simply brought into the open sharp differences, both in methods and in respective ways of life.

Who were the Americans whom the French met? GI's, tourists, students, the traditional diplomats, and the numerous officials of the new international organizations. Everyone knows that soldiers and tourists are not always the best representatives of their country. No wonder a somewhat distorted image of the United States was formed, largely upon the impression conveyed by eccentric tourists or GI's enjoying too openly the pleasures of life abroad. But the French had many occasions to travel in the United States, and did not miss them. Numerous were, for instance, the journalists or the intellectuals who spent a few weeks, or even months, in America. One might suppose that these travelers would have brought back new impressions of the United States, helping thus to complete and amend those other impressions gathered in France through contact with Americans abroad. Cases of genuine discovery were, however, all too rare. A cursory study of the abundant literature—books and articles—of the type *retour d'Amérique* published in France during recent years reveals a rather wide consensus of opinion. The America these writers discovered was not very different from the one which they expected to find: rich, powerful, optimistic, evidently proud of its material successes, but unable to give an answer of positive value to those who

are seeking a solution to the spiritual crisis of our time. Here was a mass civilization, highly mechanized and rationalized, in which men could admittedly find a certain amount of material comfort. Yet beyond the satisfaction of the senses there was no place for the development of personality. Individuals were sacrificed to the mass, compelled to conform to usages and habits more compulsive than the laws. "A dictatorship without a dictator, exercised by everyone over everyone else," wrote Albert Béguin in *Esprit*.

The intellectuals

No wonder the intellectuals were isolated and without great influence upon this nation. In the universities, even in the best of them, culture had to give way to a triumphant technique. André Siegfried pointed to this *mégalo manie de la technique* in 1950: "Culture properly speaking, with its highly personal character, has been eclipsed by technics and gadgets." The result is a "civilization turned more and more toward collective undertakings where the individual acting alone counts for nothing." And, speaking of the universities, Siegfried said: "The humanities are practically abandoned. Insofar as they survive, they are relegated to a special curriculum which is vaguely suspect as fit only for students of a somewhat unhealthy refinement." More and more the chief concern seemed to be the training of the future specialists who, taken in hand during their early years, are nursed until their entrance into the active life "without ever having made event the most passing acquaintance with the great problems of the soul."

Materialism, lack of culture. These Americans who seem so satisfied with themselves are really overgrown children whose optimism can be explained by their ignorance of the deep sense of life. They do not feel that *inquiétude*

which the French consider the true stimulant of an intellectual life. A critical mind is for the community a source of fear, but of a healthy fear which is, by its nature, diametrically opposed to the neurotic hysteria of the witch-hunt. For behind American optimism subsists a feeling of insecurity which comes from the perpetual and too rapid movement of life and eventuates in psychic disturbances such as McCarthyism.

One could retort that these stereotypes are the products of intellectuals and do not reflect exactly the views of the French people. There is an element of truth in such an assertion, for we cannot ignore the great part played by intellectuals in the framing of images. Besides, it should be noted that many of the intellectuals who show a keen interest in America are oriented to the Left, hence influenced in the main by what we might call an anti-capitalistic prejudice. The reading of *Temps Modernes*, *Esprit*, *Témoignage Chrétien*, *L'Observateur d'Aujourd'hui* and *Le Monde* is very instructive in this regard. There are, of course, other segments of the French nation which neither share these views nor accept these stereotypes. It is evident that there are people in the French bourgeoisie, among the workers, and even among the intellectuals who do not bother about the *redoutable absence d'inquiétude* of the Americans, and take a more optimistic view of the dynamic side of their society.

But *la République des Lettres* is a power in France, and its views are all the more imposing as they fall upon a soil intellectually prepared to receive them. It is perhaps unnecessary to invoke the time-honored opposition between French Cartesianism and Anglo-Saxon pragmatism. But, on another level of experience, have not the very circumstances of recent French life fa-

vored the spread of these gross notions about an America smug in its power and naive in its materialism?

Fear of U. S.

France savored only for a moment the full joy of liberation. Then, with almost tragic insistence, *fear* returned to plague the moral climate of a sorely tried people. The old fear of weakness confronted by strength, however, was now compounded with a new and more humiliating fear, that of the protected in face of his protector.

America was called to the rescue because her aid was indispensable. Yet the recipients of this aid live in fear of succumbing under the mighty weight of America's friendship. Since her aid cannot be entirely disinterested (indeed, why should it be?), apprehension is felt lest the United States take advantage of the weakness of its former competitors by conquering markets, imposing American ways, and, in short, by supplanting with a new civilization that older one to which the French people are bound by ties not only of time and tradition, but of love.

The Frenchman fears, then, "American economic imperialism." He fears "Americanization." Finally, he fears being victimized by the blunders of a nation which, for all its good intentions, seems to him politically maladroit and lacking in experience. The fluctuations of American policy, the hesitations and contradictions of her diplomacy, the errors of Yalta and Potsdam along with the reversals which followed, congressional debates and commentaries in the American press—these are just so many elements which have served to keep the Frenchman in a state of excited suspense. Will America do enough? Will she go too far? These questions occur to him almost simultaneously and reflect his deep fear of involvement beside an America whose policy, he thinks,

vacillates incoherently between extremes of isolationism and aggressiveness.

In fact, the average Frenchman is disturbed not only because he appreciates his own weakness, but also because he lacks confidence in that great nation upon which history has bestowed the conduct of affairs. He feels very superior to the American; again, this superiority complex is all the more marked as, during recent years, it has been called upon to compensate for a very real sense of inferiority.

Center of the world

In spite of its political bankruptcies and its disastrous wars, Europe, and France in particular, persists in regarding itself as the center of world affairs. It is all well and good for philosophers, historians, geographers, and statesmen to expatiate upon "the European crisis," to discover new worlds in Asia, America, and Russia, even to improvise deft variations on the theme "We civilizations, we know now that we are all mortal. . . ." The fact remains that neither those who insist upon these truths nor their readers have as yet accepted them with resignation. For in a world still ruled largely by European criteria, it is hard to admit with grace that beyond this Europe, beyond this Mediterranean heartland, other civilizations may blossom and flourish.

It is with a certain indulgence, then, that the Frenchman regards the American. No one questions the latter's technical superiority, nor his flair for organization. America's doctors, engineers, bankers, businessmen, even her generals have demonstrated on more than one occasion their amazing "know-how." But their talent is above all, in the words of Duhamel, a *génie de l'application*. This *génie de l'application*, continues Duhamel in a text which expresses a typical European attitude, "can be exercised successfully for a long

time on the basis of laws discovered by Western European investigators since Descartes and Bacon." *Le peuple de l'efficacité* may give themselves and their neighbors illusions regarding their scientific supremacy, but neither Duhamel nor his canny countrymen are going to be duped by mere appearances, "for we know well that the fundamental thoughts all come from France or England or Germany, anyway, from Europe."

ENGLISH-AMERICAN KINSHIP

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which these feelings are shared by other Europeans, for history has left predisposing marks upon each nation.

Again, as was the case with France, the American Revolution is at the base of American relations with England. Here, however, instead of establishing ties of good will, the Revolution opened a breach, and was disagreeable in the extreme for England, since it constituted one of the few real failures in her history. But a breach between two such realistic down-to-earth peoples could hardly be total or irrevocable; indeed, a common language saved the two peoples from each other, and proclaimed anew the moral kinship which war had destroyed. Paradoxical as it may seem, these sometime rivals have ignored history on the one hand, tastes and dispositions on the other, to join hands in a profound community of interests. While the increased frequency of international contacts may have served only to illumine the opposition between Frenchman and American, with the Anglo-Saxons it has, on the contrary, testified to the power of those familial relations analyzed with such understanding by Denis Brogan.

There is disagreement, though, in all but the closest of families. This is true with special force where traditions, milieux, and even climates are perma-

nently present as factors of differentiation, troubling an otherwise harmonious consanguinity.

The English are particularly concerned about the "pace of life" in America. To them, it seems that Americans are always hurrying—making money, changing things, always "on the go." Revolutions, fanaticism, and dogmatism are but remote echoes in the Englishman's history; in any event, they are superseded in significance for him by a tradition which is less a sacred cow than an active element of the good life. He looks on in consternation as the Americans try to settle problems the minute they occur; this seems to him not a human triumph but an indirect admission of weakness. The American is so impatient to live that life passes him right by. And this impatience is the source of certain faults, in particular of those faults of taste which shock the English. "These Americans have no self-restraint, no sense of privacy!" They lay bare their own private lives as freely as they pry into the lives of others. Well, at bottom they have nothing to hide, for they are a lot of simple plebeians.

This is another case, then, of that superiority complex so characteristically British and European, as well as French. If the Englishman refrains from criticizing, with the French intellectual, the American's "fearsome lack of concern," he is nonetheless prone to regard Americans as overgrown children and America as the "kid sister" who must be taken by the hand and led. Neither the political errors of a Europe where Great Britain was always present, directly or indirectly, nor the extraordinary success of the American Experiment has banished this feeling of superiority. On the contrary, weakness has served here, as in France, to stiffen national pride. And this pride has, in turn, been buffeted by certain attitudes adopted by

the United States: intrusion in Britain's colonial sphere, steadfast refusal to share atomic secrets, tendering of unsolicited advice. The grievance on this last score is particularly rankling, as the advice is thought to come from a callow youth who, instead of disseminating his semi-finished opinions, should himself be taking counsel with the old masters who, though weakened, are hoary with experience.

American immaturity

So America is an overgrown child, rich, happy, and generous, but not always able to decide what to do with her wealth and power. Is America disliked because of her wealth? Not at all, except perhaps on the left wing of the Labour party, where the intellectuals and the firmly anticapitalist Bevanites predominate. Of course, the general European caricature of American capitalism finds a place in the British stereotype, even though it is not much to the fore. It is taken for granted, for example, that all Americans have ample means and a relatively high propensity to consume. On the whole, they are regarded by British shop- and hotelkeepers as "walking inflation."

But the most widely accepted image of America is that of an impulsive nation, composed of decidedly immature people. The rumblings of public opinion, the bickerings of Congress, and the contradictory speeches of members of the administration are all regarded as so many signs of instability and lack of civic spirit. How does one go about explaining McCarthyism, if not as a product of fear, the child of ignorance? On this last point, the English do not perhaps go as far as their French neighbors, who see in McCarthyism a nascent American fascism. The English take a more sanguine view of the capacity for resistance of the American social body. Still, they are disturbed

by a phenomenon which has grown steadily more powerful and which, until recently, seemed to have no antidote. In England, and in Europe generally, McCarthyism has gradually become one of the most freely accepted notions about America. For the traditional picture of a land of refuge and liberty has been substituted that of a country in which nonconformism has become tantamount to treason.

ITALIAN TOLERANCE AND AFFECTION

To judge by certain evidences, Italy might constitute a partial exception to this general condemnation of McCarthyism. This is not to say that Italians approve of the Senator's antics; quite the contrary. But Italians are inclined to be the most skeptical of Europeans. "The witch-hunt is an organic necessity for America, which couldn't live if she didn't have some witch to hunt . . .," said the *Corriere della Sera*. "A few years ago the witch was fascism; all those who complain about McCarthy today forget the McCarthys of yesterday, more stupid and more bullying, whom we saw going about their work in Italy at the time of liberation. Before fascism, the witches were alcohol and prostitution. . . . Each of these witches has had its McCarthy."

This difference is to be noted, however, only among certain segments of the population. The Left, and the Communist Left in particular, finds in McCarthyism a useful element of propaganda. This is only one success among many, for the Communist party has, for example, organized a news network in the farming regions thanks to which it can spread, even more effectively than in the cities, its crude image of an America entrenched in a capitalism which is the source of all evil and all woe.

Yet Italy is one of the few countries in Europe in which Americans are re-

garded with genuine affection. Naturally, there are the traditional lamentations over the plight of the cultivated European confronted by American "barbarism"; Niccolò Tucci furnished a good-humored description of this situation in a recent issue of *The Atlantic Monthly*. But beyond these prefabricated notions, which circulate as freely in Italy as elsewhere, one will find here work of more positive value. Books such as those of Luigi Barzini, *Gli Americani sono soli al mondo*, and of Guido Piovene, *De America*, evidence a desire to see Americans as they are in America rather than as they are thought to be in Europe. This is perhaps why the two essential factors of movement and mass are analyzed and set forth here with more precision than is generally the case in European commentaries on America.

According to an inquiry made by the *Istituto per le ricerche statistiche e l'analisi dell'opinione pubblica*, of which the results were published in the Institute's Bulletin of February 15, 1954, the majority of the Italian people have a rather favorable opinion of Americans. The Americans are generous and practical-minded; they are clearly more likable than English, French, or Germans; their aid aims at strengthening resistance to Communism, but it is inspired too by generosity. American diplomacy is too simple in its conception, and contradictory. The fact that a woman was named as Ambassador at Rome does not seem to trouble the Italians. Finally, if Italian tastes have been modified by American influences, that is not necessarily bad. Such are, in substance, the conclusions of this inquiry.

Here it is clearly not a question of images properly speaking, but of opinions and feelings. These are precisely the elements, though, of which images are made. In this case, we see the im-

age of the expansive, openhearted, and open-minded American "kid" which is going to please the Italian by virtue of those very elements in its make-up which call forth reserves in England. Finally, the average tourist or GI will be likely to tally with this image of wide-eyed and carefree youth.

We must not forget the influence exercised by the numerous Italian colonies in America which have kept alive their ties with the "old country" through families which are almost clans and whose members are in constant correspondence. Thus the Italian maintains a more intimate contact with the United States than the Frenchman; his notion of America will accordingly be a direct and human one, in which intelligence and political considerations will play a smaller part than affective reactions.

SOURCES OF EUROPEAN IMAGES

The author has given here only a series of impressions, gleaned from reading, travel, and conversation. Going deeper into the subject would have entailed a long inquiry, condemned in advance, like all public opinion surveys, to yield only fragmentary results.

The above impressions may seem pessimistic. The images Europeans form of America and Americans are very often caricatures from which it would be all but impossible to reconstruct the model. This is the result, as we have pointed out, of circumstances, state of mind, and angle of approach. In fact, the stereotypes of America differ not only in relation to national prejudices and political ideologies, but also according to the mental cast, so to speak, the frame of mind. Beside the French, British, or Italian images of America, there will be, for example, a Communist image, clearly defined in relation to a political policy. But there is also a socialist image, a bourgeois image,

and even an intellectual image. If one were to seek a common origin for all these European Americas it is altogether probable that he would find such an origin in the basically human disposition to judge others according to one's own personal criteria. Tocqueville knew

what he was about when he warned, "Take care not to judge new societies according to the standards of older orders which have come and gone. Such judgments would be unjust, for these societies are so radically different as to be incomparable."

Jacques Freymond, Ph.D., Lausanne, Switzerland, is professor of modern history at the University of Lausanne and at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. Among his publications are Lénine et l'Impérialisme (1951), De Roosevelt à Eisenhower: La Politique étrangère américaine de 1945 à 1952 (1953), and articles in the fields of modern history and international politics.

nopoly position, which corresponds to the political and economic monopoly of the Soviet elite, has some corresponding disadvantages. The Kremlin, even more than the upper echelons of the elite in general, has to fight to prevent itself from being isolated and insulated from reality. But thus far the Kremlin has solved this problem with surprising success. It has developed a political, economic, military, and psychological policy which combines exceptional stability of ends with great flexibility of means. The methods by which this result has been brought about are not very well known and cannot be analyzed or described here, but one important ingredient is certainly the extreme sensitivity of the Soviet rulers to problems of information and intelligence.

A SLOGAN FOR EACH PERIOD

While holding firmly to the over-all end of maintaining and expanding the area of direct Soviet administrative control and of strengthening the tentacles that project out into the non-Soviet world, the Kremlin adopts a "general line" for each historical period, and to a certain extent for each political situation and for each geographic and cultural area. On the basis of extensive information, and by using the "collegiate" or "collective" method of decision making at the very top, a balance of conflicting claims is arrived at. We know much less about this process than we should like, but it is striking that there are main themes, even slogans, for each historical situation. These are of course subject to change without notice.

During World War II much of Soviet policy was summed up under the constantly repeated slogan "everything for the front." As the war came to an end, two other slogans became especially important. One was "the moral and political defeat of fascism," which

served as the rationalization of a policy of installing "democratic" forces in authority wherever Soviet military and police power could be applied. Closely related was the demand, which alarmed discerning foreign observers in Moscow in 1944 and 1945, for the strengthening of the "military economic might of the Soviet Union." These slogans reflected the realization in the Kremlin that the period in which international alignments pivoted around the "Anglo-Soviet-American coalition" was coming to a close. I have dealt with this period and the early stages of the cold war elsewhere, and shall not attempt even to summarize them here.³

The "Truman Doctrine," the Marshall Plan, and the tense excitement of the Berlin blockade and the Korean War all belonged to the next period, described by the late Andrei A. Zhdanov in his speech at the founding of the Cominform as that of the struggle of "two camps." Of course the most important event of this period was the first attempt by world Communism to extend its power, in direct collision with the United States, by naked military power. It is my belief that the Korean War was a major Kremlin blunder. Its most important consequence, in an extremely complex pattern, was not so much American resistance as two other factors: the threatening and impressive economic and military mobilization of the United States and, above all, a general sense of alarm and resolve in the Western world to resist Soviet Communist aggression. This is of course not the place to attempt to answer the

³ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Image of the United States* (New York, 1950). On the use of the right "line" for the given historical situation, see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh* (Moscow, 1953), Vol. I, p. 517. Although the reference is to the beginning of the New Economic Policy ("Nep"), in 1921, it expresses a basic rule of Soviet behavior which is still followed.

question as to why the Communists made this particular move. The victory of Communism in China probably had a great deal to do with it. The apparent inability of the West to cope with this disaster perhaps led to overconfidence. At the same time, growing optimism about the prospects in the whole "colonial" world, which had been increasing since 1945, also played a part. However, the fall of Dienbienphu and the failure of the Western powers effectively to counter Chinese and Soviet tactics in Indochina and at Geneva threaten to restore or perhaps to more than restore what the Communists lost in Korea.

THE KOREAN WAR

The atmosphere generated by the Korean War created extreme alarm and tension in the Soviet Union. It may be stated as axiomatic for Soviet propaganda that irrational appeals calculated to secure mass domestic support are utilized most lavishly when the regime feels most worried about the possibility of foreign conflict. It seems unlikely that the Kremlin ever fully or even to any considerable extent really "feels" the sentiments that it attempts to arouse in periods of crisis among the Russian and other Soviet peoples. However, it manipulates very convincingly the symbols of patriotism and defense of the fatherland against foreign threats. The use of the symbols of Russian nationalism was first attempted on a large scale by the Bolsheviks during the war with Poland in 1920, when the Soviet government made the famous Czarist General Brusilov chairman of a Special Military Conference.⁴ Always latent, the elements of Russian patriotism which could be manipulated by the regime were exploited to the full during World War II.

⁴ D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton, 1944), pp. 210-11.

During the Korean War, particularly in the Lenin Day speech of January 21, 1951, by the veteran propagandist P. N. Pospelov, the United States and the American people were denounced in flaming terms as ancient foes of the Russian people. The tone of Pospelov's speech and of much Soviet propaganda in the months immediately before and after it indicated that the Kremlin was thinking in terms of a widening of the Korean conflict. This speech was full of positive patriotic symbols such as "Russia," and of negative symbols expressing a zoological hatred for the United States, including "bloodsucker," "beast," "cannibal." To this period also belong the fantastic Soviet and Chinese Communist bacteriological warfare charges. The propaganda of the Korean War was designed to mobilize the Soviet, Chinese, and satellite populations to a fever pitch for all eventualities. Like so much Soviet propaganda, it had a preventive and anticipatory character. Its minimum aim was to reinforce the image of United States "barbarism." Secondly, it was intended to prevent American use of air, atomic, or bacteriological weapons against China. Finally, it would justify ultimate Chinese or Soviet use of superweapons.

Armistice negotiations

Probably the beginning of negotiations for an armistice in Korea marked the beginning of a new phase in Soviet policy. Statements made at the Nineteenth Party Congress, in particular Stalin's article "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," and his farewell speech to the foreign Communists, confirmed and outlined the new tactics. Stalin expressed confidence that the "contradictions" among the capitalist powers were more likely to bring about a war within the capitalist world than between it and the Soviet bloc. Thus he selected from the arsenal of

doctrines those applicable to the policy of the time.

"RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS"

But the full development of the Nineteenth Congress line did not come until after Stalin's death. Despite numerous zigzags and zags, it seems at the time of writing in June 1954 that, by and large, the period since the death of Stalin forms a unit as far as Soviet policy toward the United States is concerned.⁵ Stalin's successors have operated under the over-all slogan of a campaign for "relaxation of international tension." This is the key slogan of the period in which we are living, and it is directed of course against the United States. At times other formulations are employed such as "the world campaign for negotiations."⁶ Toward the end of the period under discussion, the Kremlin displayed greater confidence and increased its pressure against the wavering West. A vital indication was omission from the May Day slogans for 1954 (*Pravda*, April 21, 1954) of the 1953 assertion that there was no question which could not be settled by negotiation. In the remainder of this paper I shall attempt a brief analytical survey of post-Stalin application of the "negotiations" theme to, and against, the United States. One of the first major Soviet applications of this thesis was the *Pravda* editorial for May 24, 1953. This vitally important document, which covered the entire front page of *Pravda*, replied to Prime Min-

⁵ There was an important "hardening" of Soviet policy after the fall of Beria, but it is impossible to say whether or not there was a real difference of foreign policy between Beria and his enemies.

⁶ *Pravda* editorial for June 24, 1953, used this expression but at the same time warned that the use of force against any "national liberation movement" could lead to "a new hearth (ochag) of war."

ister Churchill's speech in the House of Commons advocating negotiations between Western leaders and the new Kremlin rulers. While welcoming Churchill's initiative and contrasting his attitude favorably with that of President Eisenhower's statements of April 16 and May 20, this *Pravda* editorial rejected Churchill's suggestion of a new Locarno. Churchill's German concepts were wrong because they envisaged continued dismemberment of Germany and because the "Locarno idea" gave no guarantee of security to Germany's neighbors, France, Belgium, Holland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The editorial was artfully calculated to play upon differences between the United States and Britain. Although critical of the substance of Churchill's proposals, it welcomed his call for a meeting of the great powers at the highest level. It contrasted this appeal with the "vague appeals for international understanding" of other Western powers.

The above editorial contained sharp criticism of the Anglo-French and American Conference of Foreign Ministers, which had already been planned by that time. After this conference had taken place, *Pravda* commented on it in an editorial of July 23. One of the main lines of the July 23 comment was that the three Western powers had demonstrated by holding it that they were attempting to bind the fourth power, the U.S.S.R., by arrangements worked out "behind its back." This editorial, and other statements made during the summer of 1953, argued that it was the will of the people that a genuine four-power conference be held. This popular will had compelled Secretary Dulles to agree to an eventual four-power conference. While making this statement, the Soviet press also argued that the Western powers, led by the United States, were doing their best to "prevent a real

easing of international tension." From such editorials and from subsequent statements a major element of the Soviet propaganda "grand design" emerges. The Soviet "negotiations" campaign is only the 1953-54 version of the old but powerful Bolshevik strategy of attempting to pin the onus for aggression on the leaders of the "capitalist" world. More specifically, the Soviet propaganda attempts to exploit the situation which resulted from the finally successful Korean peace negotiations and other factors connected with the post-Stalin international configuration for the purpose of demonstrating that if only the United States would display good will and understanding, there would be no need to continue the cold war. Moscow is attempting to cast Washington in the role of "obstructor of peace."

SOVIET PROPAGANDA—1953 AND 1954

Soviet propaganda on all the major international developments of 1953 and 1954 thus far fits into the above framework very neatly. Of course what the Kremlin really wanted was a return to great-power conferences of the Yalta and Potsdam type. They hoped to use such meetings to slow down Western defense measures and to drive wedges among and within the non-Soviet countries. Refusal to hold them has been branded as a "reactionary" policy designed to keep up the arms race and the profits of capitalists. The Soviet press and diplomatic machines and the apparatus of international Communist-front organizations, particularly the World Peace Council, went into high gear to demand this type of conference. The Soviets had been demanding great-power conferences, and also a "pact of peace," of the United States, Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., and Communist China even long before the death of Stalin. What was new, and insidious, after Stalin's death was the

scene shifting by which Moscow made it appear that a new era would dawn if only Washington would display an attitude of understanding and meet Moscow's desires for "relaxation of international tension" half way.

Space is lacking to discuss or even to list the numerous subsidiary measures undertaken by the Kremlin to create an impression conducive to the success of its new propaganda. Among those which should be mentioned are the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, the withdrawal of certain arbitrary and outrageous demands previously made by the Stalin regime upon Turkey, the granting of visas to the Soviet wives of several American citizens, and, probably most important and effective of all, enticing gestures and a few actions looking toward resumption of a more normal pattern of cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Malenkov even devoted a paragraph of his very important speech of August 8, 1953, to cultural relations. Characteristically, he reproached the United States for allegedly making it impossible for a Soviet chess team to come to this country and suggested that in this as in so many other fields, alleged American obstructionism was frustrating the positive and constructive efforts of the U.S.S.R.

U. S. WAR PLANS—PRE-STALIN AND POST-STALIN

But as has been suggested in connection with the "relaxation of tension" theme, the old problem of war and peace still underlay Soviet propaganda toward the United States. A much more extensive analysis than can be offered here would be necessary to compare the pre-Stalin and post-Stalin Soviet image of the "American threat" as Moscow sees it or pretends to see it, but it does seem clear that the post-Stalin attitude is, outwardly at least,

one of greater security and less tension and urgency. A rough check is furnished by comparing Malenkov's speech of October 5, 1952, with his major address of August 8, 1953.⁷ By whatever method of qualitative or quantitative analysis one may care to employ, one finds that the theme of danger of conflict and of external aggression was noticeably muted in the 1953 as compared with the 1952 document. In this as in other data sampled, there is, as between the post and pre-Stalin periods, a sharp falling off of the most offensive and inflammatory symbols, such as "aggressor," "warmonger," "cannibal," "bloodsucker," so prominent in the vocabulary of Soviet foreign policy of the late Stalin period. By and large, one can say that while before the death of Stalin, as late as the Nineteenth Party Congress or even later, the United States was accused of plotting or even planning war against the Soviet Union, the major emphasis now is upon the alleged role of the United States as obstructing the settlement of outstanding international questions, such as the German problem, the position of China among the great powers, and the war in Indochina. But from time to time charges are still made that the "ruling circles" or the "reactionary forces" of the United States are planning a new war. A spate of such charges followed the Berlin Conference, not immediately, but in connection with emerging outlines of United States policy for the Geneva Conference, as interpreted in Moscow. *Pravda* for March 26, 1954, for example, violently attacked Secretary Dulles in one of its rare special front-page editorials.⁸ The editorial was

⁷ See *Pravda* for October 6, 1952, and for August 9, 1953.

⁸ Ordinarily, the usual single front-page Soviet editorial is a "boiler plate" affair, but occasionally important special editorials are devoted to current developments.

entitled "Sowers of Fear and Inspirers of Military Hysteria." It attacked Mr. Dulles' statement of March 19 in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and also his speech of January 12 at the Council on Foreign Relations. Among other things the editorial stated, "Dulles' statements are nothing more than attempts to inflame war hysteria in the United States, to satisfy the extreme aggressive circles of the U.S.A., who were dissatisfied by the results of the Berlin Conference. . . ." The "sowers of fear" theme was continued in an article on March 31, claiming that Mr. Dulles' "hysterical shrieks" had hurt the American government at home and abroad. They had not scared anyone, said *Pravda*, and to conceal this "defeat," the American "bourgeois" press had been silent about the Soviet reply. Such items, however, are relatively mild in comparison with the prevailing tone of Soviet international relations comments before the Nineteenth Party Congress.

Such attacks are one aspect of a two-pronged offensive. The other aspect is promises and maneuvers designed to prove to the peoples of the world, and also to wavering elite and governmental elements in Europe, that there is no longer any need for the division of the world into alliance systems and military blocs. The prime example of this tactic thus far has been Molotov's proposal that the Soviet Union be permitted to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

U. S. MILITARY POLICY

This sketch of the current Soviet image of the United States would be seriously incomplete if it failed to deal with American military policy as seen from Moscow. Throughout the whole post-Stalin period there has been a steady stream of denunciation of United States bases abroad. A characteristic

statement was made by Marshal Bulganin in his May Day address last year when he said, "But because up to now there are no signs of the United States relaxing the arms race, or of curtailing the broad network of military bases which they have flung over the territories of many states in Europe and Asia, particularly in territories bordering on the Soviet Union, our government will in future devote the effort necessary to guaranteeing the defense and the security of our Motherland. . . ." Malenkov in his August 8, 1953, speech laid considerable stress upon the security of Soviet frontiers, particularly in the Middle East. More recently there have been sharp criticisms of American negotiations with Spain, Pakistan, and other countries regarding military bases.

Another important military theme is Soviet accusations that the United States is equipping, training, and supporting foreign troops. Particularly important is the campaign, so prominent in Molotov's statements at the recent Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference, that the United States is seeking to create a new German *Wehrmacht*. During the fall and winter of 1953-54, the Soviet press abounded in carefully slanted news items regarding meetings of German war veterans, and similar items were published with respect to Austria. Another rather prominent theme which might be mentioned in this connection is that German industrial and military circles are planning a new *Anschluss* with Austria.

Not unnaturally, but in highly inflammatory and distorted forms, the Soviet statesmen and propaganda organs have continued to hammer away at the theme of "vigilance" against agents of the "imperialist" powers actually or potentially menacing the Soviet Union. There has been nothing like the hysterical

⁹ *Pravda*, May 2, 1953.

"vigilance campaign" of the months before Stalin's death, but the theme is kept alive by such events as the accusation leveled in late March 1954 against four members of the American Military Mission in the U.S.S.R. that they had committed espionage while traveling from Vladivostok to Moscow. It is possible that this was the Soviet countermove to the escape of the MGB (Ministry of State Security) agent Rastvorov in Japan, which may have been highly embarrassing to Moscow. From time to time, attacks are made on alleged United States plans for recruiting Soviet citizens for subversive work in the U.S.S.R., usually with reference to funds voted in the Mutual Security Act for assistance to refugees from Iron Curtain countries.

Attacks on aspects of what has been called the "liberation" policy reached their height for several weeks after the East German rebellion of June 16 and 17, 1953. The rebellion was a severe shock to the Kremlin and is probably connected in an important way with the fall of Beria. We cannot do justice to this important event here, but it should be emphasized that the Soviet reaction was both alarmed and devious. The Soviet propaganda of course attempted to play down the genuinely popular elements in the uprising. It was attributed to "Fascist hirelings." Among other things, the Soviet press charged that the "Berlin adventure" had been organized by the American "Intelligence Service." More recently Soviet leaders have charged that the United States was recruiting agents to subvert Soviet rule in the Ukraine.

U. S. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Even so brief a survey as this cannot omit Soviet discussion of American economic and political systems. The heart of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on inter-

national relations is the thesis that the foreign policy of "imperialism" flows inevitably from forces generated by the capitalist economy. There has been no relaxation of Leninist orthodoxy on this crucial point. The glimmering of a deviation from the archaic Leninist image of capitalist social relations contained in Eugene Varga's notable book, *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War*, did not survive the postwar ideological reconversion and, to the author's knowledge, there is nothing in the post-Stalin period to indicate any movement toward a more sophisticated and realistic outlook. Therefore it is not surprising that *Pravda* and other publications have presented the same old line regarding increasing impoverishment of the American workers and farmers, moral and cultural degeneration, and all of the other corollaries of the Leninist myth.

Similar orthodoxy has been displayed with respect to American domestic politics. Quite typical was an article by I. Philippov in *Pravda* for August 11, 1953. Philippov mildly criticized President Eisenhower for allegedly attempting to present the activity of the 83rd Congress "in the most favorable light." According to the Soviet journalist, the new Congress could not differ from the old one. Its policies had not changed because its class composition was the same. It consisted of lawyers, businessmen, journalists, rich farmers, and a few reactionary labor leaders. It had simply continued the Truman program. Thus the Soviet image of American domestic politics differs in no essential way from that which prevailed before the change of leadership in both the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Even the treatment of Senator McCarthy and people of like mind has not changed much. Relatively little attention has been paid to McCarthy. A mixture of

slanted reporting and satire has been applied. There are also numerous quotations from American and Western European sources critical of McCarthy. Apparently, the Soviet press has attempted to treat "McCarthyism" not as in any sense an answer to Soviet policy or the problem of Communism but as a manifestation of pathological tendencies in the American social and political system.

Throughout the entire period under examination, Secretary of State Dulles has been overwhelmingly the major target of Soviet attack. He is often referred to as the "leader" or the "mouthpiece" of the "most aggressive American forces." In contrast, President Eisenhower is seldom attacked directly and even then relatively mildly.

ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS

I have reserved for the last one of the most important features of the post-Stalin Soviet image of the United States. There have been rather startling new developments in the Soviet attitude toward atomic, hydrogen, and other "superweapons." The main feature of the new Soviet attitude is a much greater freedom of treatment, of course only by the regime itself in its monolithic press, of such matters as Soviet and American capabilities in these weapons. The new trend was probably inaugurated by Malenkov's statement in his speech of August 8 to the effect that the United States no longer had a monopoly of the hydrogen bomb. Malenkov, Molotov, and Bulganin made direct or "oblique" statements in mid-March 1954, "implying that Russia could reply in kind to any nuclear attack."¹⁰ These statements probably represent the increased

¹⁰ Harry Schwartz in *New York Times*, March 18, 1954. Since March several additional and stronger statements on this question have been made in Moscow.

feeling of strength and security of the Soviet regime in view of its progress since 1949, when President Truman announced the first Soviet atomic explosion. But the statements, and in particular the background of attribution of aggressive intentions to the United States against which they are made, represent a facet of the over-all Soviet manipulation for Kremlin political purposes of the distorted image of America. In particular, Moscow has seemed since Malenkov's speech last August to be attempting to turn against the United States alone fear aroused by the existence of weapons which, on the American side, were developed as a major element of protection against the potentialities of Soviet advantages in population, geographic position, and other factors.

President Eisenhower's proposal at the United Nations General Assembly for a pool of fissionable materials to be contributed for peaceful purposes was not at first rejected, but was commented upon on the front pages of Soviet newspapers on December 22, two weeks after it was made. The comment, like the earlier Soviet reporting of the proposal, omitted the most significant of the President's revelations regarding the destructive powers of superweapons. It was evasive and revolved largely around the idea that such prohibitions on the use of weapons of mass destruction as the Geneva Protocol of 1924 on chemical and bacteriological weapons might produce "positive results." Such statements perhaps were intended to pave the way for the ap-

parently final Soviet rejection of the President's plan early in May.

PRESENT SOVIET LINE SUMMARIZED

What does all this add up to? On the whole, Moscow's post-Stalin presentation of the image of the United States seems designed to create the impression that the world situation has changed and that a new Soviet Union without the dread figure of Stalin is prepared to be co-operative but that an inflexible and obstructive United States refuses to meet Moscow half way. In the meantime, Moscow has returned to the slogan of the "international solidarity of the workers of all countries."¹¹

One could sum up the Soviet line now as Soviet nationalism at home and, abroad, a paradoxical but not unsuccessful attempt to identify Moscow with nationalism and with revolution and internationalism wherever these forces can be used to weaken United States influence. A good deal will depend upon the comparative ability of Moscow and of Washington to effectively formulate and clearly project to the various world audiences images capable of establishing identifications and evoking responses.

¹¹ Slogan two of November 6 slogans in *Pravda*, October 25, 1953. This slogan, typifying the new emphasis on "proletarian internationalism," replaced its 1952 counterpart denouncing the "warmongers." Sergius Yakobson in his contribution to *Language of Politics* (New York, 1949) has shown how useful a study of these slogans can be in diagnosing the Kremlin's foreign-policy attitudes. The 1954 May Day slogan in first place, significantly, was "Raise higher the banner of proletarian internationalism."

Frederick C. Barghoorn, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is associate professor of political science at Yale University. He was press attaché at the American Embassy in Moscow from 1942 to 1947. He is the author of *The Soviet Image of the United States* (1950) and of articles in *The American Slavic Review* and other journals.

America and American Occupation in German Eyes

By NORBERT MUHLEN

GERMAN¹ opinion of America today, as reflected in and reinforced by its mass media, is ambivalent, insecure, full of misunderstandings and misgivings, and often contradictory. While this opinion is based on the varying and petrified impressions of the past century, a series of new observations and emotions was added by the close, often personal contacts of the past eight years, when Germans met Americans in their quickly changing roles of enemies, victors, rulers, educators, secret allies, and finally open allies—and, in addition, as individuals in and out of uniform. These age-old stereotypes and new impressions often received new emphasis from the acute situation confronting the Germans in the past five years: Should Germany join America in defense against the Soviet threat so close to her borders, or should she "go it alone" and remain neutral between the big powers? Dependent on this choice and the decision finally taken, the image of America as it developed was often merely a rationalization of the role desired for Germany in the future. Many Germans who tended to be neutral (for quite different reasons) often justified their attitude by developing an image of America as displeasing, if not as dangerous, as that of Soviet Russia. On the other hand, many Germans serious in their will to resist the Soviet threat and knowing that without

American leadership it could not be resisted tried to like and understand America, and often discovered that its main values, purposes, and interests were similar to those of Germany herself.

GERMAN EMIGRANTS TO U. S.

For more than a century, America had been in German eyes a country far away and fabulous. Lacking the more direct relationships and experiences, antagonisms and sympathies, that brought England historically close to America, Germany imagined America as the land of noble savages and wide wilderness, a country without history and without despots. The letters from America which German emigrants wrote home in the nineteenth century, passed from hand to hand and printed in local newspapers, confirmed the benevolent picture of "a young, free country." Exactly because America enjoyed all the freedom that Germany lacked it became more fabulous and faraway than ever. On occasion, a German poet wrote an ode in praise of the distant country, but when the poet Nikolaus Lenau emigrated to America to be a free man on free soil, he soon returned in melancholy disappointment; freedom among the pioneers, he found, was shockingly different from the dream.

Toward the end of the century, America changed in German eyes into "the country of unlimited possibilities" and "the country of unlimited contradictions," as the two then most popular slogans put it. Still a fabulous land where people got rich quickly, America was often looked upon with some condescension, in a way far removed from

the American stereotype and self-image of oppressed Europeans coming to its shores in search of freedom and a better life. Germans (like other West Europeans) saw these emigrants rather as adventurers, runaways, and ne'er-do-wells; the officer who had to quit the service for some dishonorable act, the boy who had got with child the family cook, the employee in a merchant's office who had embezzled a petty sum—these seemed to be the people who escaped to America, "the Promised Land of failures." The very fact of emigration appeared somewhat suspicious to Germans, who have a saying, "Stay at home and make an honest living." It was "the German urchin in America"—after the title of a runaway's autobiography which was very popular in Germany and helped to shape the image of America from the turn of the century to our day—who later returned as "the rich uncle from America." These Americans, and their country, were viewed with a mixture of respect for their money and disrespect for their past. As late as 1948 a "Primer on America for German Adults" explained ponderously that "the emigrant is for him [the American] not to be pitied or to be scorned [as he is for Germans] but to be revered."² Many Germans looked down from their solid superiority on these shady emigrants, whose boasts, in turn, helped to strengthen the stereotype of "materialistic America," where mammon was idolized and multimillionaires ruled supreme over a people of millionaires, millionaires-to-be, and derelicts.

"GOD'S OWN COUNTRY"

The next stereotype which received almost general currency among Germans was that Americans were convinced that the United States was

"God's own country." In Germany this slogan became (and still is) as current a foreign word in talk of America as, more recently and more passingly, *Herrenrasse* ("the Master Race") in American usage for Germany. Ironically, both slogans became more popular abroad than at home. For America to consider itself as "God's own country" revealed an unbearably hypocritical chauvinism, Germans thought. This stereotype was intensified by disappointment in President Wilson, who, Germans felt, had betrayed Germany by offering the self-determinationist Fourteen Points as a peace program only to abandon them in the imperialist Versailles Peace Treaty. The legend of American hypocrisy that developed in contradiction to the historical facts of the case was accepted as reality by most Germans.

"AMERICANS ARE CRAZY"

A third stereotype of the American character, widely believed (in France, Italy, and recently England as well as in Germany) and seemingly rather hostile, is actually less hostile than the other two. Paradoxically, it is the notion that "Americans are crazy." What it stems from and what it reveals is that Europeans have come to find the thought and behavior patterns of the transatlantic "strangers" (meaning simply foreigners) so different from their own, so "strange" and "outlandish" indeed (in both words, the statement of facts has become a value judgment in modern English usage!) that Europeans could not understand them. To call Americans "crazy" supplied Europeans with a pleasant feeling of superiority, and at the same time relieved them of the task of attempted understanding. Yet the stereotype of "these crazy Americans" contained only a minimum of marked hostility; hostile people prefer to see specific sinister traits and

¹ The material in this article is limited to West Germany, as the situation in East Germany differs so greatly that it would require a separate discussion. On East German opinion of America see Norbert Muhlen, "German Anti-Americanism, East and West Zones," *Commentary*, February 1953; also, *The Return of Germany* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 270-75.

² Margret Boveri, *Amerikafibel für Erwachsene*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1948.

purposes, if not a plot, rather than merely strangeness in what they cannot understand. There was little hostility as long and in so far as the Germans had no reason to be afraid of America. When the United States decided to intervene in World War I, most Germans considered it a rather hilarious joke.

PLUTOCRATIC AMERICA

In Germany's Red Decade, the 1920's, when—as in America in the 1930's and early 1940's—much of the intellectual and cultural life of the country was influenced by Communists and their unwitting followers, the stereotype of America was further and deliberately made to appear unattractive. America, the bastion of capitalism, had then as now to supply the dark contrast to the glowing Great Experiment of the Soviet Union. From most German books and reports on America published at the time there again emerged the stereotype of a country dominated by the dollar, sadly lacking in civilization, backward in terms of culture, social progress, and human decency. The same picture was portrayed again by the Nazis, whose propaganda depicted the plutocratic, racially contaminated, brutal and greedy American. But in secret opposition to the Nazis, a small minority of intellectuals developed an underground cult of America and everything it had and did.

U. S. AS AN OCCUPATION POWER

After 1945, with America turning into an occupation power and a military government with relation to Germany, new images of America were born in German eyes, and old ones strengthened. They reflected—and frequently misinterpreted—the contradictions, uncertainties, vagaries, and intentions of American policies; often they also reflected German feelings of inferiority,

insecurity, resentment, and guilt projected onto the powerful victor.

As conquerors

The Americans had come, in the words of their commander-in-chief, "as conquerors, not as liberators." These were the years when "fraternization," or, to be more exact, the expression of human politeness, kindness, and decency toward the defeated was unlawful for an American soldier; when a few Americans—well fed, often luxuriously well housed—announced that in their billets Germans and dogs were not admitted, and secretly bought precious family heirlooms from homeless, half-starved Germans for a carton of American cigarettes or a pound of American coffee; when an American general in charge of information control forbade the playing of music over a German radio station, to bring home to the Germans that there was no reason for them to enjoy life. During these years Germans whose fathers had been executed by Hitler's hangmen for participation in the plot to kill the dictator, Germans who themselves had suffered for years the agony of Nazi concentration camps because they resisted Hitler, young people who had been three years old when Hitler came to power and fifteen when he fell—all were told by occupation officials that to their conquerors all Germans were alike and they must bear the punishment for the crimes committed by the Nazis. To be tough with the Germans appeared as a soldierly and patriotic virtue to a number of Americans, and their toughness sometimes included, as the Germans observed, an infamous imitation of infamous Nazi methods. "The Americans are just as bad as the Nazis were," some Germans began to whisper among themselves in these first postwar years.³

³ This attitude was mainly and most articulately expressed in popular German fiction,

This analogy, more often wrong than right even in individual instances, and all wrong as a generalization, provided a release from uneasy consciences for many Germans who felt either guilty or helplessly ashamed of what the Nazis had done. It supplied a new facet to the German stereotype of America—the facet of American toughness and brutality, if not cruelty, strengthened by popular memories of "the Wild West" and "Chicago gangsters," and further strengthened by some American movies, crime books for adults (Mickey Spillane) and children (crime comics, and so forth), and the reports of crime and juvenile delinquency in the United States.

1947 to 1949

When from 1947 to 1949 the tough American policy of conquest was softened by a wavering, confused, half-hearted policy of co-operation, help, and reconstruction, the old stereotype of American hypocrisy was strengthened again, and combined with the new one of toughness. The Americans who before had played the role of conquistador now turned into an uneasy and implausible mixture of conquistador and social worker. While they ruled Germany by force of arms, they set out to educate her to democracy by force of argument. After first being "conquerors, not liberators," they now pretended and tried to be conquerors and liberators simultaneously. A pseudo-hermaphroditic figure, the Military Government suffered in peacetime from its double nature, the military one ruling by orders and requests and the democratic governmental one expressing the

will of the constituents. In addition to being a purely military, security-conscious army organization, the Military Government remained the very opposite of democratic government, since it at first combined the executive, legislative, and judiciary functions without division of powers and later retained the supreme right to veto these functions when performed by the Germans.

INSTABILITY OF U. S. POLICY

What seemed so hypocritical to many Germans was the apparent contradiction between the realities and the appeals made by America. It was indeed difficult for them to understand—and to accept—the underlying reasons, partly changes in American politics, partly changes in world politics, and partly fundamental beliefs as well as passing fallacies prevalent in American thinking. In their minds, it was the idea and the conception of Military Government which stuck, even after 1949 when its name as well as its functions was changed into the inoffensive and tactfully restrained High Commission for Germany. In the period of High Commission rule beginning in 1949 the politics of conquest were quietly shelved and replaced by the politics of alliance, or at least of winning the Germans for an alliance. As the United States needed the active good will of the Germans, the conquerors suddenly became missionaries, teachers, propagandists.

This change, pleasant and profitable as it was for the Germans, did little to improve their stereotype of America. On the contrary, new unfavorable sidelights were added, and old negative stereotypes seemed confirmed. Were not Americans "crazy"—superficial, fickle, unprincipled, extremely naïve at best? Most of the principles which two years ago they had enthusiastically advocated and many of the principles which they had requested the Germans to accept

especially the national best seller: Ernst von Salomon, *Der Fragebogen* ("The Questionnaire"), Hamburg, 1952; also, Hans Hellmut Kirst, *Sagten Sie Gerechtigkeit, Captain?* ("Did You Say Justice, Captain?"), Munich, 1952.

seemed forgotten overnight and replaced by opposites. Where, as late as 1947, the Americans had not permitted the Germans to publish anti-Communist books translated from the Russian, now they themselves encouraged their publication and distribution among Germans. In 1945, to get an American license to edit a newspaper, Berliners had had to prove they were friendly to Communism, and in Frankfurt and other cities Americans had insisted on the appointment of Communist editors on newspaper staffs; in 1948 the Americans fired the same Communists and demanded proof of anti-Communism from their licensees. It was the same in German officialdom and labor unions, in fact, almost everywhere. Since the Americans failed openly to admit and to explain their own reversal, the Germans concluded that "you can never know what the Americans are up to next." This stereotype seemed particularly valid when they compared American occupation speeches of 1946, proclaiming that no German should ever bear arms again, with American occupation speeches of 1951, scolding the Germans who never wanted to bear arms again.⁴

Many Germans, it is true, recognized that this seeming American instability and fickleness originated less with the Americans than with the Soviets. But they also saw that almost every American change in attitudes and policies toward Germany came about only in reply and as a reaction to a Soviet move; in German eyes, as a matter of fact, American policy in Germany seemed dictated by Soviet Russia. In the first stage, America made every concession to the Soviets that the Soviets requested; after 1946 America began taking defen-

⁴ This "salto mortale" became the source of countless jokes, cartoons, skits, indicating an officially somewhat subdued, yet strong public reaction.

sive countermeasures against the Soviets and their aggressions; after 1948 America made concessions to the Germans in order to "contain" the Soviets. In other words, the Americans seemed never to have an independent political purpose of their own, and no insight into what they should do in Germany. To many Germans, Americans appeared as a people sadly lost on the international scene, unable to perform their part in foreign politics, lacking either the power or the experienced understanding—or perhaps both—needed for world leadership. The United States seemed to be pushed in this direction and that in a helpless defensive against the aggressive, power-hungry, politically shrewd Soviets, while it propagandized its ever changing political practices by preaching never changing eternal principles to the Germans in its program of education, or "re-education."

THE EDUCATION PROGRAM

Whether the education program did more to help or to hinder better understanding of America in Germany is open to dispute. A semantic misunderstanding based on deeper differences between the two cultures from the very beginning contributed greatly to making many Germans resent the program. "Education" in a literal translation, the term generally accepted in Germany for speaking of the education program, is *Erziehung*, which smacks of the three R's—the elementary schooling given to children, colonial peoples, and illiterates, with the use of the rod, while "education" in American usage means many things, including *Bildung* (for which there is no term in English). Many Germans agreed that political education, *politische Bildung*, was badly needed in their country, but that they should be *erzogen*—educated as well as trained—by their conquerors, seemed an arrogant attempt to treat them as

illiterate children and to teach them with authoritarian sternness. Shades of "God's own country!"

Some phases of the education program seemed indeed to fit into this hostile stereotype. Some American "re-educators" resorted to the methods that had been used successfully at home to change "backward foreigners" into democratic citizens, americanizing the immigrants with evening classes, adult schools, and literacy and citizenship courses while their younger generation was kept from delinquency by playgrounds, boy scoutism, and similar things. By presenting the German adults with a deluge of free lectures, evening classes, free libraries, pamphlets, and so on, and establishing baseball teams and playgrounds for the German youth, these backward people were to be kept from crime and elevated to the level of American ways, or, as the much-abused magic word was, "democracy." While hordes of visiting lecturers, writers, impresarios of all sorts explained to the Germans the miraculously good, efficient, and beautiful thing called democracy, to Germans it soon seemed that Americans were suffering from an obsession endlessly to talk about that verbal fetish, democracy. Living in a country which was not democratic, in which there was little opportunity for the citizens to act as democrats, and where the very representatives of democracy ruled in an autocratic way—a system of government Germans called jokingly *Demokratatur* ("democratotorship," half democracy, half dictatorship)—their democratic education was bound to fail, if not to backfire. To some, it seemed to reveal again the hypocritical nature of the Americans, as well as their overly complacent arrogance. To others, democracy painted in such wonderful colors appeared as something very great

and beautiful indeed—yet foreign to, and unobtainable for, Germans.

"There is a broad sense in which anything antitotalitarian is *ipso facto* democratic. In that sense, there is no difference between our negative and our affirmative program, and democracy is simply there once totalitarianism is done for. But in the common sense of the term, democracy is one of several types of polity incompatible with Hitlerism. . . . And since there were several possible antitheses to Hitlerism, it seemed to many Germans that it was for them rather than for us to choose between them. In point of fact, so it seemed to them, it was the negative part of our task [de-Nazification] that was the legitimate part; the affirmative [democratization] exceeded our mandate," William Ernest Hocking observed correctly.⁵ In fact, "antitheses" to totalitarianism such as a Catholic republic in Bavaria, with religious textbooks in schools as they were wanted and approved by the overwhelming part of the population, were denounced and fought as "antidemocratic" by American occupation officials before 1950 (when George N. Shuster became United States Land Commissioner and established an excellent administration).

Cultural offerings

In addition to political education in democracy, a vast program of nonpolitical offerings was presented by the occupation to create good will, understanding, love for America in Germany. The offerings of American singers, dancers, actors, American music, ballet, paintings, books, American lectures on American national parks, American

⁵ William Ernest Hocking, *Experiment in Education: What Can We Learn from Teaching Germany?* Chicago, 1954, the best analytical critique of the United States occupation in Germany, especially its educational phases.

wildlife, American photography, as they were showered over Germans, left the impression among many Germans that Americans, as is typical among the *nouveaux riches*, were throwing away their money boastfully to show off their newly acquired culture. That Americans were desperately eager to be admired and that they wasted their money to buy admiration seemed more conspicuous than the authentic great values of their civilization clumsily presented. To most open-minded Europeans, and to Germans in particular, the real greatness and achievement of America lay in the spirit and technique of its social structure. The architecture of American society appeared in the eyes of thoughtful Germans more admirable, more exemplary, than the architecture of American skyscrapers and mansions; American freedom in everyday life seemed to them a greater work of art than, say, American symphonies. Yet except for the few who had experienced it in America itself—in the very successful Exchange Program through which selected Germans are invited to visit the United States for several months under guidance of the Department of State or, ironically, as World War II prisoners of war—or those who had carefully studied it, this culture could hardly be shown convincingly at a distance—particularly not to people conditioned to be skeptical about such claims.

In the first place, the Germans tended to be skeptical of all government propaganda in general since their recent experience with Hitlerism and their present one with the Soviets. In the second place, American government propaganda tended to be especially self-contradictory and therefore self-defeating; in this program, "the American way" of freedom, with its resistance to bureaucratic entanglements and state power, was advertised by the state on

a noncompetitive, bureaucratic basis; and the immensely varied, many-faced, pluralistic American reality was distorted by the selection of this or that feature, this or that facet of America which seemingly was provided with an official stamp of government approval. In the third place, America's propagandistic self-introduction to Germans had by nature to lean heavily on the presentation of creative American works; yet many of these books, plays, and essays, in the best American tradition of national self-criticism (usually social criticism), taken out of their context and transplanted into alien surroundings, were accepted as accurate, typical descriptions of American life rather than one artist's or writer's voice of personal protest. They seemed to confirm all the anti-American, stereotyped prejudices held by many Germans—a tough, hypocritical, materialistic, arrogant, uncultured, dollar-ruled country. Self-criticism, as an experienced American official remarked sadly, cannot be exported, yet we have to export it unless we stop trying to familiarize the Germans with America at all.

Successes in intercultural education

Two periodicals published for German audiences under American government auspices—the *Neue Zeitung*, a daily newspaper combining the better features of American and German journalism (unfortunately published only for and in Berlin since 1953, when its West German circulation was suddenly stopped for reasons of economy), and *Der Monat*, a monthly magazine bringing international thought and life close to the Germans and generally respected as one of the leading European intellectual magazines today—succeeded in overcoming German resistance against understanding America; they greatly helped to establish a new, friendly relationship toward its culture. In this

writer's opinion, only these two publications, in addition to the United States Exchange Program, can be considered genuine and important achievements in the vast American effort of intercultural education in Germany.

ROOT CAUSES OF RESENTMENT

What was often the root cause of the strong German resistance against American "re-education" and of the German acceptance of clichés and generalizations antagonistic to America was the underlying fear that America wanted to remodel the whole world, including and especially Germany, in its own image, with "God's own country" as the blueprint according to which all the other countries and cultures were to be shaped. Irrational as this fear was on the whole, or rather, as it became while occupation and its educators learned their lessons of realism, it contained an actual kernel of truth. In the definition of the United States Department of State following the report of a United States Educational Mission, published in 1947, "the task of changing the German mind . . . involves a total transformation of basic German beliefs, folkways and attitudes."⁶ Many American experts who came to Germany to advise the Germans that from now on there must be a total transformation of their beliefs, folkways, and attitudes (a thing impossible to achieve even had it been desirable, which it surely was not), that they should forget all their traditions and customs, took it for granted that things in Germany should be done the American way; only by this could the country be transformed into a democracy. I know of a visiting professor of journalism with all the credentials and backing of a Special Governmental Expert who decreed that German

newspapers should be written, edited, and made up exactly like American newspapers. In another case, an Educational Adviser suggested that German university students should address their instructors by their first names rather than by the stuffy title of *Herr Professor*, to break down the authoritarian attitudes of youth! (In this context, we can disregard Communist officials, especially numerous in the Information Control and Decartelization Branches of Military Government in the first postwar years, from which they were removed by and large by 1950, who—under guise of "Americanization"—systematically sabotaged the healthy reconstruction of German organizations and institutions.) As late as 1951, a public controversy was resentfully conducted against the American attempt to change the German hunting and fishing regulations (considered "feudalistic") for the American pattern (considered "democratic" by United States officials), although it was evident that German and American regulations corresponded well to the very different conditions prevailing in the two countries.

A second root cause of the willing acceptance and development of anti-American stereotypes consisted in the resentment against the shift in power and prestige which suddenly seemed to elevate America far above and beyond the nations of Europe which liked to call themselves "the older nations." If this was a mood prevalent throughout Western Europe, in Germany it came into sharper focus since American domination was here a *de jure* and *de facto* situation, while America in its relations with other European nations went to some lengths to demonstrate diplomatic equality and sovereignty. With the national self-respect of Germany, which had been badly shattered after

⁶ Department of State Publications, No. 2783 (August 1947), p. 62.

the war, slowly growing again, this mood of resentment was bound also to grow to some extent.

PERSONAL CONTACTS

If there were added many friendlier colors and more pleasant features to the picture of America in German eyes, they came in the main from personal contacts Germans had with Americans (as a substitute for contacts with America itself). Especially when they were able to speak the German language and were not completely alien to and uninterested in the ways of German life, as many Military Government and High Commission personnel were from the top levels down to minor employees, these Americans often contributed to a more balanced, better image of America. Chance contacts with, and observation of, a number of military occupation members had similar effects. After "fraternization" was fully permitted (which happened only in 1950, when uniformed personnel received permission to frequent German public places), "der Ami," the abbreviation which became usual for *Amerikaner*, the young man in an American uniform was conspicuous in German life and, quite naturally, judged by Germans as a representative product of America's people and civilization. The fact that most of these young men turned out to be kindly, generous, and often poor, without class consciousness, not behaving as overbearing victors, usually ready and willing to help, impressed many Germans favorably.⁷ Negro GI's, whom a prevailing positive German stereotype soon took to be more warmhearted, more humane, and less tough than their white comrades, were on the whole especially well liked.

⁷ On such incidents in detail cf. Norbert Muhlen in *The New Leader*, New York, February 4, 1950; *The Reader's Digest* (May 1950), pp. 95-98.

Those strongly prejudiced tend to see, of course, what they want to see, and for them it was not difficult to see quite a few *Ami's*—a small minority, yet more conspicuous than the more typical large majority—who misbehaved in almost every way conceivable, on occasion in quite serious matters. Yet seen against the background of the Soviet Union, its traits and its occupation, as many Germans saw the *Ami's*, the Americans in general, and America itself, were preferred by the majority. Their value judgments tended often to rationalize their personal choice.

PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES

"Which of the four occupation powers do you prefer?" the EMNID (*Institut für Marktforschung und Meinungsforschung*) Institute of Public Opinion in Bielefeld asked a representative sample of West Germans in the fall of 1951. While 12 per cent refused to give an answer, 1 per cent expressed preference for the Russians; 1 per cent for the French; 8 per cent for the British; and 33 per cent for the Americans. Almost one out of two questioned, or 45 per cent, said they did not prefer one power to the other. The latter group has, however, decreased since then to approximately 30 per cent, and almost 50 per cent now prefer the Americans.

In 1952, the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy asked a stratified cross section of the German people (including refugees from East Germany) about their experiences with the Americans since 1945. Of this cross section, 36 per cent had seen little of the United States troops; 15 per cent had had pleasant experiences; 32 per cent had had unpleasant experiences; and 17 per cent very unpleasant experiences. While the British rated somewhat better and the French considerably worse in the same test, all three evoked incomparably better memories than the Soviet

occupation. Only 5 per cent had seen little of them or had had pleasant experiences, while 24 per cent had had unpleasant—and 71 per cent very unpleasant—experiences.

In November 1953 EMNID conducted a very careful and thorough study of opinions and attitudes of Germans in the age groups between fifteen and twenty-four. To the question "Can we Germans learn something from other peoples?" 65 per cent answered in the affirmative; when this answer was followed up by the question "From which people can we learn most?" the answer given most frequently was: "From the U.S.A." Of the total youth sample, the United States was named by 23 per cent; England by 10 per cent; Switzerland, 7 per cent; France, 5 per cent; Sweden, 3 per cent; Russia and Holland, 1 per cent each. The subjects to be learned from America were, in frequency of mention as listed, its economic and social order, technological and scientific progress, tolerance, readiness to help, and habits of free living.⁸

SUMMARY

To sum up, "anti-Americanism" of the violent, obsessively prejudiced type is very rare in Germany, and usu-

⁸ EMNID-Institut für Meinungsforschung, *Jugend zwischen 15 und 24; Eine Untersuchung zur Situation der deutschen Jugend im Bundesgebiet* (Bielefeld, 1954), pp. 313-17.

ally to be found among the "lunatic fringe" of unreconstructed Nazis and Communists, comprising together less than 3 per cent of the total population.⁹ The number of passionate and unqualified pro-Americans seems hardly to be much bigger—mainly among intellectuals and very young people. Between these two extremes, on the wide and varying scale of images determined by individual, economic, social, educational, and political factors, it may be said that we find most frequently attitudes which tend to express feelings of cultural superiority, political and moral distrust, personal and national resentments toward what is supposed to be America—a picture that often conflicts with American realities, yet much more often than not accepts America as "the lesser evil" in comparison with Soviet Russia, and accepts it increasingly often as "a necessary evil" to support Germany in her defense against the Soviet evil.

⁹ L. L. Matthias, *Die Entdeckung Amerikas Anno 1953* (Hamburg, 1953), a violently anti-American work, was successful neither with critics nor with the public, while Simone de Beauvoir, *Amerika Tag und Nacht* (Hamburg, 1952), and Robert Jungk, *Die Zukunft hat schon begonnen* (Stuttgart, 1952), more temperate and seemingly more balanced yet unfairly critical books on America, were very successful. On the other hand, none of the detached, nonstereotyped, and friendly travelogues from and reports on America by German authors published over the last years has been given attention by critical and public opinion.

Norbert Muhlen, Ph.D., New York City, reports from abroad for American and British magazines, and from the United States for German and French magazines, dividing his time about evenly between this country and Europe. After leaving his native Germany for political reasons in 1933, he lived in Switzerland, Saarland, and France before coming in 1941 to this country, of which he is now a citizen. He is author of *The Return of Germany: A Tale of Two Countries* (1953), *Schacht, Hitler's Magician: The Life and Loans of Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht* (1939), and other books.

Indian Students and the United States: Cross-cultural Images*

By RICHARD D. LAMBERT and MARVIN BRESSLER

THE emergence of India as a major world power, sympathetic but uncommitted to the West, has created a measure of self-conscious curiosity, sometimes anxiety, in many Americans concerning the reactions of Indian leadership and public opinion to the United States. It is inevitable that the image of the United States conveyed to the Indian public should be somewhat selective and distorted, inasmuch as the Indian media of mass communication concern themselves largely with American foreign policy and neglect broader sociocultural aspects of the American scene. Such information on the United States as is exported characteristically fails to provide a substantial corrective—neither the superficial frivolities emanating from Hollywood nor the excessively grim realities of the protest novel are capable of transmitting a representative picture of the United States.

The nature of this picture formed at a distance is illustrated by the preconceptions entertained by Indian students upon arrival in the United States—a stereotypical, indistinct, and limited image composed of uncorrelated fragments. They had anticipated that the United States would be a land endowed with abundant natural resources and wealth, whose inhabitants worked feverishly and constantly to command a whole host of mechanized wonders, whose cities were

dominated by skyscrapers, whose ethos was scientific and rationalistic to the neglect of the spiritual, whose social relations were marked by casualness, rudeness, and violence, frequently institutionalized in the person of the gangster, whose social system was equalitarian except for discriminatory practices directed against colored peoples; and whose labor force contained a disproportionate number of cowboys. The students were aware that some of these images were oversimplified, bordering on caricature, but in essence these grotesqueries constituted almost the whole of their expectations.

One expression of official concern with this naïve and unflattering stereotype takes the form of encouraging Indian students to attend American institutions of higher learning with the expectation that these foreign visitors, having observed the "American way of life," will return to their home country prepared to convey a more favorable image of the United States. The exchange-of-persons program reflects a basic confidence in the capacity of American institutions to arouse admiration: there seems to be some assumption that the sustained and intimate scrutiny implied in the process of guided culture contact will foster accurate perceptions which confirm the excellence of American institutions and thereby create the basis for favorable attitudes to the United States.

The actual mechanism of image formation and the development of favorable attitudes toward the United States appear to be considerably more com-

plex. It is quite obvious that at the very minimum the student's personality, life history, preconceptions, experiences en route and in the United States, and anticipation of return all contribute to the content of his perceptions and to a generally favorable or unfavorable appraisal of the United States. However, our data indicate that the primary determinant of image formation involves a process by which American institutional areas are perceived and interpreted in the context of their relevance to Indian culture, history, and aspirations. This mechanism of cultural reference is operative among all students and is applicable to all institutional areas over all points of time, whether or not images of American life are derived from the media of mass communication or from direct observation. Other personality and behavior dimensions not specific to the Indian culture usually assumed their chief significance as superimpositions on this basic process. The emphasis of this article, therefore, is upon cross-cultural links; how the "Indianness" of the student affects his image of the United States.

We have chosen three important areas of American life¹ illustrating three different types of cultural reference which the Indian student brings to bear on his American experiences: family practices, political behavior, and race relations.

The Indian student's perception of American family practices indicates the operation of two basically antithetical frames of reference among Indian intellectuals: the traditional family of India's ideal culture and the Western liberal-humanitarian ethic with its strong emphasis on the emancipation of women

¹ The images of American educational practices will be treated fully in a forthcoming article by the authors in the *Journal of Higher Education*.

and suppression of status inequalities. Political behavior is perceived and measured by the extent to which a given political philosophy implicitly suggests sympathetic kinship to doctrines justifying India's struggle for freedom and her current political policy. The perception of American race relations not only occurs within a context of historically rooted racial grievances, but also includes strong individual involvement arising out of fear of personal discrimination and status deprivation. This image is accordingly much more complex, personality oriented, and subject to gross distortions of perceptions.

It should be emphasized that an overall orientation to a foreign culture is more than a simple summation of discrete images. The concluding section will be devoted to a brief discussion of an additional set of processes resulting from the students' confrontation with Americans' image of India, and the way in which these processes influence his over-all assessment of America.

THE FAMILY

The comments of the Indian student about the American family system tended to cluster around three areas: (1) the family's restricted function and interaction; (2) the role and status of its various members; and (3) family emphasis upon the gratification of personality needs rather than societal ends, with a resulting general orientation of capriciousness and frivolity in family institutional practices.

Restricted function and interaction

The Indian joint family is a unit comprising several degrees of kinship and several generations organized communally and usually living in the same household. It is an economic unit, a graduated status system with clearly defined roles, a vehicle for ritual and the observance of religious practices, a

*This project is part of a program sponsored by the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council and supported by grants to the Council from the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

common commensal unit, a dormitory arrangement, and a sphere of relationships within which primary psychological needs are met.

Family roles are hierarchically stable, clearly defined, and reciprocal duties and obligations take precedence over individual motives. The effect of any act on other members of the family may be anticipated and therefore conflicts can be kept to a minimum. To be sure, intrafamily clashes do occur, but many of these are institutionalized, culturally acceptable, and thus do not constitute a serious disruptive force. For instance, quarrels between the sisters-in-law and between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law are a culturally required part of joint family living, even though the outcome is predictable and the victors never vary. These and other sporadic conflicts can be resolved by a final arbiter, the patriarchal figure. The individual spends his life in some joint family. If for any reason a joint family splinters it breaks into segments, but seldom involves the departure of isolated individuals. The occasional mobile member, not essential to the family welfare at the moment, can leave to pursue his own ends, but the price of his freedom is a willingness to return in the event of family need.

The joint family so described was widely admired among the Indian students for ensuring stability and performing most of the functions necessary to individual members, and for providing a satisfactory, conflict-free psychological setting. The admiration persisted in spite of the fact that none of the students identified his own family as fulfilling all the requirements of the ideal type.

In contrast to the satisfying and benevolent despotism of the joint family the Indian students perceived in America a loosely knit structure providing for

limited interactions and restricted functions. The simple quantitative fact of a three-, four-, or five-person household limited to two generations provides a striking contrast to the emphasis on the intimate relationships among the members of the joint family. While several commented that the complexity inherent in large numbers is reduced in the American small family, the net effect is diminution of the responsibility, warmth, and serenity associated with the orderly relationship of the extended group. From the standpoint of the Indian student, there is ample evidence of the lesser importance of the home in American life. For example, lack of elaborate family ritual at meal time, restrained rather than demonstrative greetings at family reunions, the brittle casualness of the chic middle-class mother in dealing with her children, ready divorce, serial monogamy, and the increasing vogue of the psychiatric couch and the marriage clinic.

Role and status

The Indian student is not likely to become sufficiently intimate with any one American family to observe the subtle interplay of "real" family relationships. Few American families can resist the temptation to display the "typical American family at home," a dramatization which frequently results in an exaggerated caricature of the official norms. Consequently, the perceptions of Indian students tend to be influenced by consistently overplayed family roles. The specific roles which impress themselves most upon Indian students are the role of women and the role of the aged—those most markedly different from the Indian pattern. The traditional literature, current folklore, songs, and moving pictures depict a vast number of heroines who embody an ideal role for women which is widely accepted by all segments of Indian so-

ciety. She is to be docile, patient, submissive, a paragon of housewifely virtues, but at the same time full of charm, a companion, and wise in the ways of beauty. Above all, she should be modest and show continued awareness of the double standard by observing rituals of inferior status, and by exhibiting proper embarrassment and constraint in interactions with men. While in actual practice, of course, woman's role is considerably more complex and ambivalent, nevertheless this ideal image served as one standard by which all women, and consequently American women, could be judged.

In addition, the Western liberal-humanitarian system of values which is opposed to all immutable status distinctions, including those pertaining to women, has been internalized to a varying extent by all of the Indian students. In general the inferior role assigned to women jars against the Western ideals of equality of individuals and greater emphasis on achieved rather than ascribed status. Indians apply the emancipation ethics fully to certain isolated women—brilliant women in the professions, arts, and politics—and favor such lesser commitments to emancipation as disapproval of "cruelties to women" such as suttee, prohibition of remarriage, complete dependence upon males.

In view of these contradictory philosophies—the Indian ideal woman and the Western emancipation ethic—the student sometimes finds himself in favor of the role-status structure of the American family when he perceives it in equalitarian terms, but opposed to the same characteristics when he views them in the context of the ideal role assigned to Indian women. However, American family life is presumably characterized by so much of this allegiance to the humanitarian individualistic ethic that it excludes cherished values still present in the Indian social

framework and still held by our subjects. It would be possible to marshal an impressive array of quotations to illustrate this feeling among the students, but the following passage will suffice to show the attempt to reconcile the contradictory philosophies.

I might say something regarding the social life of the people, absolute equality among the two sexes and how the women also help the family by supplementing the income, how these ladies are also educated, they can talk on public affairs. . . .

I mean it has its advantages to some extent, I thought, that the woman is independent and she can look after herself. If she has some work or something important and if the husband is not at home or nobody is at home, she could do it herself. Now in our society she wouldn't know what to do because she wouldn't have been taught.

I should say, the freedom you allow your women, I was very much struck by it. I should say that in my experience it is more than what the woman deserves. Women we consider to be something delicate and feminine. She must distinguish herself in dress, manners, and everything, which is not the case here. She wears blue jeans and walks like a tractor truck. In that case I can't appreciate the femininity of women.

Old people

There were considerably fewer data indicating contradictory feelings concerning the role of the aged in the American family. All Indian students who had occasion to speak to this subject disapprovingly noted the comparatively inferior status of old people. As they recalled India, it seemed to them that:

. . . there is greater affection and love between father and son, because there they regard that it is the sacred duty of the father to look after his son during his infancy and it is the sacred duty of the son to look after their older parents.

By contrast:

Here we find that people have greater individuality, and they will not like the fathers or grandfathers to live with them because that interferes with the development of individual personality.

There was very little disposition to dismiss this particular status pattern as one of those inevitable cultural differences which are likely to distinguish one nation from another. Characteristically, the student felt obliged to determine the causes of the relegation of the aged to an inferior status—it was seldom mentioned without accompanying analysis. Those students who were troubled by this question, but whose tact or approval of the United States forbade wholesale condemnation, struggled to explain it by appealing to the authority of some larger, more acceptable value, such as individual responsibility. More commonly, so fundamental a violation of what they consider to be a basic and universal ethical imperative implied deeper revelations about the spiritual basis of the entire social structure. The lack of respect for age sometimes confirmed latent suspicions that the student was observing a culture which was devoid of real ethical principles and which was dominated by a complete and all-embracing utilitarian complex.

Self-gratification and capriciousness

The supremacy of group values as a governing principle in Indian family life leads the Indian students to consider American emphasis on individual gratification and sexual compatibility to be misguided. They perceive in the American institutional pattern an acceptance of hedonistic pursuits unrestrained by the "higher ideals" which alone are capable of ennobling the marriage relationship.

Critical statements included not only disparagement of American family

values but also the paradoxical assertion that even individual happiness is not so well achieved as by the Indian model, whose social arrangements provide personal satisfactions only as a peripheral by-product. So even though in India

the marriage takes place before you are independent enough to think of selecting your own partner . . . I think I am very happy, and these marriages are generally happier than the marriages which are by choice of the partner.

Closely related to the contention that there were defects both in the dominant value system and in the familial institutional structure is a less clearly defined, but apparently intense feeling that Americans as individuals have a common failing; namely, they lack the proper high moral seriousness in their approach to family life. The Indian students discerned an element of light-headed frivolity and capriciousness in courtship and family behavior. This view was sometimes expressed in the sternest moralistic terms as in "embracing and kissing and these things I take to be just the road for going into debauchery or the lack of morals." At other times it was contained in the assertion that the slightest irritation or weariness was apt to be accompanied by divorce in contrast with the Hindu practice where, in the higher castes, divorce is forbidden, and where in fact it is largely unnecessary, "because the girl who marries a boy is very much faithful to the boy . . . she is always so much devoted to the husband and the husband to the wife." On still other occasions this feeling is implied in the discovery of such terms as "boy friend," which is not as one might expect, "that one whom she would actually marry, but she would at any time drop him too . . . if she comes across a better or someone whom she likes

later much more, she would drop." Or to summarize the complex more explicitly, "I mean, to me it is not bad at all to go with a girl, but the only thing is that I think to go you must be serious. It shouldn't be just one of those things."

The impression should not be conveyed that the Indian students perceive American family life as entirely uniform or that their reactions were wholly unfavorable. The "what were your first impressions" or "what struck you most" type of question which is inevitably present even in the most nondirective interviews tends to bias responses toward generalizations emphasizing perceived differences rather than toward those elements mutually present and approved in both cultures. The interviews indicate that the students are sometimes aware that although there may be customary patterns and practices which tend to distinguish the entire social structure, various social strata and groups in the United States exhibit pronounced differentials in their behavior. Thus there were some comments on the greater simplicity, refinement, and spirituality of family life in religious homes, especially among the Society of Friends. There was also some recognition of rural-urban and regional differences. Nevertheless, the differences were perceived as minor variations on a common pattern, and it was the common pattern which figured in comparisons with India.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Indian students are much more attentive to politics than are their American counterparts. The political intricacies of a long nationalist struggle made complex political ideas and parliamentary practices commonplace knowledge among Indians. The visiting students are thoroughly conversant with detailed political histories of a vast number of

Indian political figures and recall as part of their shared experience years of highly emotional political involvement. The Indian student's image of American political processes is best understood against the background of the nationalist movements which have engaged the energies of Indians and other Asian peoples throughout this century. The logic which underlies nationalist movements demands that the aspirations of the struggle include more than the mere transfer of power and authority from a set of foreign functionaries to their native counterparts. Slogans of liberation included more than opposition to "imperialism" and "foreign oppressors." They also promised that with liberation would come redress of domestic inequities and grievances. Consequently the Indian intellectual tended to be identified both in foreign and domestic affairs with intense humanitarian sympathy. Except for the special interest groups such as the landlords and princes, there is now virtually no vocal conservative group in matters economic and political. Conservatism in India takes the form of urging the return to a pristine religious state. There is no significant segment among the Indian intelligentsia which feels the need to resolve the conflict between individual liberties and governmental planning implied in the term "creeping socialism." Among those who are politically effective the extreme rightist position is somewhat left of center in the normal liberal-conservative continuum.

It follows that as members of the intellectual class at home the Indian students in the United States tend to respond sympathetically to political movements which seem to be dedicated to the interests of the "masses" and the "common man." They perceive in terms of a symbolic vocabulary which makes generous use of slogans carrying

strong emotional connotations in India. Their general approach is often supported by detailed knowledge. Nevertheless, the students are judging American political processes in terms of an abstract liberal ethic which is concrete and relevant in its reference to India, where political necessity at this stage of development demands emphasis upon nation building, uplift of the masses, social planning, and an educated electorate. It is in this context that the liberal-humanitarian standard applied to American political life should be understood.

AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT THE STUDENTS SAID

The images described in the following sections are brief composite summaries of common sentiments revealed in student responses. Those sections outside of the quotation marks are paraphrases of statements in the interviews; those within quotes are the actual words of the students.

Interest groups

Ideally the democratic process should give every individual equal access to power—the greater the diffusion of power in a society the more nearly does it approach the democratic model. The United States deviates considerably from this ideal because there is “control by a party, rather than an individual—and when it comes to elections you have to please every boss. It is not exactly on principles.” The existence of lobbies accentuates the concentration of power because legislative bodies are sensitive to the wishes of small groups which do not represent the wishes of the people as a whole. The small groups with the greatest influence are likely to be “financially strong interests” because they “can organize themselves better.”

The one restraining influence on ir-

responsibly wielded power is the recognition on the part of the bosses and lobbyists that ultimate veto power resides in the people, whose dormant disaffections may occasionally be translated into effective political protests against the more cynical practices. This consideration requires a continuous assessment of the limits of public patience and some concessions to the popular will. However, such restraint should not obscure the fact that the American political structure is characterized by dominant power groups whose existence “is not consonant with the spirit of democracy.”

Mass communications in politics

On the whole the American people are reasonably well informed on current affairs because they have ready access to information media such as the press, radio, and television. On the other hand, news is presented in a provincial and superficial manner, overemphasizing trivia and matters of local interest. Moreover, the media of mass-communication are concentrated in the hands of the “wealthy section,” who control public opinion for the benefit of right-wing political elements. As a result the universal literacy of Americans is not always a guarantee of a high level of information or of a considerable degree of political sophistication. The American is especially untutored in foreign affairs, and his ignorance of India is “no less than colossal.”

Political parties

It is frequently difficult to discern the differences “between the so-called Democrats and the so-called Republicans.” They do not disagree on fundamentals, and there are men in each party who seem ideologically more appropriate to the other. However, the Democrats more nearly “symbolize the close identity with the great mass of

people, with the laboring class, with the farmers, with the Negroes . . . it symbolizes more a party for the common man than the Republican party.” Likewise in the sphere of foreign policy the party of Roosevelt and Truman can be expected to be more ungrudgingly internationalist in outlook than the Republicans. The Republican party by contrast tends to be dominated by the wealthy and the powerful, who have an excessive allegiance to anachronistic conceptions of laissez-faire capitalism. If they pursued their own inclinations, they would transform government into a subsidiary of “big business.” The selection of candidates in the presidential election of 1952 was indicative of Republican-Democratic party orientations. It is unfortunate for the United States that Mr. Stevenson did not become the President, for his administration would have been more humanitarian and more germane to twentieth-century realities than Mr. Eisenhower’s.

Political atmosphere of the United States

The predominant fact of current American political life is an excessive fear of Communism.

I mean, the fear of Communism, it is a sort of craze . . . I mean sort of hysteria in this country, and actually, as a matter of fact, I didn’t think that this American society is being threatened by Communism. Communism can never ruin this society. I mean for many years to come.

Obsessive anti-Communism has unfortunate social consequences because in its name even gradualistic social changes are assailed. While the implementation of welfare measures under government aegis may depart from traditional capitalist practice, “a certain degree of socialism is healthy,” or at least inevitable. However, capitalism as it exists

in the United States modified by the New Deal philosophy is basically healthy and has produced “economic wonders.” American capitalism is by no means decadent nor has it reached “maturity.” In view of the essential soundness of the American socioeconomic structure there are no compelling domestic reasons to justify the prevalent anti-Communist preoccupation in the United States.

In foreign affairs there should be no fear of direct Communist military aggression against the United States. Moreover, Communism is making fewer inroads in other nations than Americans suppose. In India, only a very small percentage of the population is cordial to Soviet doctrine. Hence the existence of “anti-Communist hysteria” may best be interpreted as an opportunistic attempt to find a scapegoat, “something like Hitler or Pakistan,” and as a capitulation to the most irresponsible elements in American politics.

The chief victims of the current political climate are “liberals.” When even General Marshall is publicly maligned it is obvious that less influential men will be reluctant to engage in free discussion of controversial social issues. Militant anti-Communism constitutes as great a threat to democracy as do the few adherents of the Communist party.

I oppose Communism because it represents fear, curtailment of political freedom, and so on. I cannot see any difference between McCarthyism and Communism in this respect. It is, however, encouraging to see that some of the greatest intellectuals and biggest newspapers are rallying against McCarthy.

NEGROES IN AMERICA

The area of white-Negro relations tends to elicit images which once again seem to lie within the anticipated and familiar context of the liberal-humanitarian orientation. However, this ele-

ment of the liberal syndrome differs from other expressions of humanitarian good will and outrage in the degree of intensity with which it is held, in the extent of the personal involvement which it entails, and the fullness of the preconceptions about this area prior to the arrival of the students in the United States.

Most Indian students were not conspicuously well read on American life upon arrival, yet a surprising number of them were conversant with Myrdal's multivolumed *American Dilemma*, were shocked by its contents, and sympathetic to its thesis. Several revealed detailed knowledge of the legal niceties connected with the approaching Supreme Court ruling on educational segregation in the South, while one or two knew of isolated cases of racial violence in several small American communities.

Personal experiences of discrimination

Much of the intensity of interest and feeling concerning the role of the Negro in the United States is in part a result of the latent and sometimes overt color tension which lay beneath the surface of British-Indian relations prior to Indian independence and which still exists between Western and Asian nations. A more immediate explanation lies in the fact that of all the values incorporated in the American social structure the existence of discriminatory practices based on color was most capable of jeopardizing the status of the Indian students during their stay in the United States. Color was a potential disqualifying factor in the acquisition of desirable housing arrangements, in comfortable tourist mobility, and the accessibility of desired social contacts.

There were in point of fact a number of instances in which students experienced situations in which they reported personal inconvenience and em-

barrassment. One student was advised by a friend not to visit a New York night club because he might not be served. Another was served with a separate set of utensils at a restaurant. Still another sensed that he was giving offense when he "danced with a white girl." Such incidents did not occur frequently but they were constant reminders of the possibility of recurrent humiliations.

It is not surprising that certain individuals departed from an otherwise balanced approach to America to display a color sensitivity and a distortion of experience almost pathological in nature. To cite one of many examples: a student who was not selected to accompany a tour to Hyde Park sponsored by his orientation center gave this account of the incident:

There was a competition between a number of candidates for going to Hyde Park and there was a limited number of tickets. I went to the place from which we were to leave for Hyde Park right on time, I think before the time, but I was not selected for being taken. I don't know what criterion was adopted and, rightly or wrongly, it led me to the feeling that it might have been prejudice against the colored people since they are not taking me and they are taking people from other lands.

However, the greater number of the Indian students never experienced any manifestations of real or fancied discrimination because much of their time was spent in the company of fellow nationals, American students, and Americans especially sympathetic to foreign students. This circumstance may contribute to the fact that for the most part the Indian students' perception of race relations in the United States lacks anecdotal substance and is generally vague and symbolic. The students are seldom indignant about general economic deprivation, poor housing, and dirty neighborhoods; they reserve their

most bitter remarks for "the white man's complex," "social discrimination," "white chauvinism"—all presumably artificial barriers to social intercourse unworthy of the American creed.

Race and caste

One may suspect that the existence of the alleged "white superiority complex" provides some sense of gratification for the Indian students. The recognition of what seemed to them an indisputable vulnerability in the American ethic seemed to mitigate criticisms of practices in India. If American treatment of the Negro is so conspicuously poor then it must follow that India, faced with problems of greater proportions, should not be condemned for her failure to solve them.

Negroes follow your dress. They follow your manner. I mean they are not much different. They may be inferior mentally in some cases, but they are not given an equal chance. So I said naturally you must take less time to wipe off the differences; whereas we must take relatively more time to do away with the caste system. But we are progressing better than you have progressed.

Whatever the merits of this line of reasoning it appears clear that from the perspective of the Indian student an America which countenances differential treatment of the Negro must forfeit much of its claim to the moral superiority which should characterize the most powerful leader of the democratic West.

THE SENSITIVE AREA COMPLEX

It is difficult to determine the extent to which perceptions of major but segmental aspects of American life contribute to the development of an overall "favorable" or "unfavorable" attitude toward the United States. Else-

where² we have advanced the thesis that visitors from low-status countries develop their attitudes towards the United States not so much on the basis of their reactions to American life, but rather as an end product of a "looking-glass" process based on their perception of the American image of their home countries. The process of temporary international migration characteristically impels the visitor to reappraise his own culture appreciatively and is usually marked by a heightened identification with his own country and an increased sensitivity to its status. Very early in his visit the Indian student perceives an American image of India which contains elements appearing to him to imply low status for his home country and by extension for him. Americans, in talking with him about India, allude to certain specific subjects (such as caste, untouchables, population expansion) which are associated with colonial status and reactive nationalism and thus have become "sensitive." The mere mention of these subjects even in a neutral or favorable context will cause the visitor to feel that Americans are hostile to India, a condition which will in turn predispose him to a general negative view of the United States.

If confirmed by subsequent research, the implication of this thesis is that so long as Indian students and visitors from other "low-status" countries correctly or incorrectly perceive that Americans hold an unfavorable image of their home countries even extravagantly favorable assessments of American life will be largely irrelevant to the formation of "friendly" attitudes toward the United States. Therefore, our foreign policy and public pronouncements with respect

² Richard D. Lambert and Marvin Bressler, "The Sensitive Area Complex: A Contribution to the Theory of Guided Culture Contact," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Fall, 1954.

to countries recently emerged from colonial status must carefully avoid these emotion-laden areas of cultural conflict.

For amity, contact is not enough, especially if protracted contact serves only to accumulate a series of assaults on the self-esteem of nationals of low-

status countries. Among other things, friendliness is a function of both personal and cultural security, and only after the viewer has a minimal feeling of security can the hostile elements of an image surrender to a more objective assessment.

Richard D. Lambert, Ph.D., Philadelphia, is assistant professor of the sociology of India and Pakistan at the University of Pennsylvania, where he has taught since 1947. Since 1951 he has held a position jointly in the South Asia Regional Studies and the Sociology Departments. As a fellow of the Social Science Research Council during 1949-50 he conducted a survey of the causes of Hindu-Muslim riots in India and Pakistan, and he has been adviser to Indian students for several years. He is assistant editor of THE ANNALS.

Marvin Bressler, Ph.D., Philadelphia, is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, where he has taught since 1948. As a fellow of the Social Science Research Council in 1950 he completed an analysis and reconstruction of W. I. Thomas' unfinished study of Birtil Brief. In 1952 he served in various capacities with the Institute of Urban Studies. At present he is director of a project in the sociology of the nursing profession, conducted under a grant of the American Nursing Association.

Images of the United States and Britain Held by Foreign-educated Indians

By RUTH HILL USEEM and JOHN USEEM

THIS account concerns the way a sample of Indians educated in the United States and the United Kingdom appraise American and British character and assess certain aspects of American and British life. It also includes the consequences of these attitudes for the foreign-educated Indians and for the immediate social world in which they live.¹

Our information is based on the life histories of a sample of Western-educated Indians who reside in the small towns and cities of Bombay State, located in the central-western section of India. The cases include persons who were trained in the West both before and after India attained its independence (1947). The majority are currently employed in colleges and universities, the government, business and industry; a few are unemployed; and the rest are engaged full time in political affairs, as editors of newspapers, and in the social services. They stem from a variety of social classes and subcastes; most rank now as members of the middle classes in their communities.

By comparing the attitudes toward the two nations, we can discern which of the images held are common to Western countries and which are confined in particular to the United States and to the United Kingdom.

When a person looks at another society, certain factors bias what he ob-

serves. He usually makes comparisons with the individuals and patterns known to him in his own society, for the only standards he has for interpreting what he views abroad are those of his own social world. What he notices are more likely to be the contrasts than the similarities between the foreign country and his homeland. Furthermore, the social functions of human behavior within institutions may be missed and the discrete forms used as a basis for interpretation, and from fragments of the whole a model of social life imputed.

SOCIAL STRENGTHS OF THE WEST

Seen through Indian eyes, the most visible sphere of foreign life is the behavior of people in "public" situations.

To understand what they see and how they interpret it, it is necessary to give some background on "public" relations in India. Social interaction in India, outside of the family and community, tends to occur in a kind of "no man's land." It is an area of social life in which not only do contacts take place with "outsiders" who do not "count" because they are strangers, but also the contacts are with persons of whom one should be wary. The climate of opinion is analagous to that of the passengers on a New York subway. To some extent the traditional provincialism is disappearing among the middle classes in towns and cities where outsiders are in continuous juxtaposition.

The system has protective functions, for it provides security against masses of people whose identities are unknown

¹ This material is drawn from a larger study sponsored by the Edward W. Hazen Foundation, cosponsored by the Area Research Center, Michigan State College, and to be published by the Dryden Press.

and whose motives for establishing a personal contact in a casual meeting may be suspect. Relatives are trustworthy or, if not trustworthy, they can, at least, be held accountable for their acts; others are neither predictable nor can they always be held responsible for what they do. It is best to be cautious.

The close and heavy personal involvement with kin restricts the depth of self-involvement not only with strangers, but also with others in work relationships. On the job it is somewhat foolhardy to put too much faith in others—superiors, peers, inferiors—with whom one has no kin or communal ties. There may be only a modicum of reward for craftsmanship and extra effort, for it is commonly believed that opportunities to advance go to favored relatives rather than to the most competent, or are dispensed on the basis of seniority rather than ability. Some think that superiors grab all the credit for whatever is done by an inferior, that fellow workers have to be watched lest they manipulate to their own advantage, and that subordinates will deceive or shrug off responsibilities.

In the wider society, middle-class life moves at a less intense, frenetic pace than in the West. There are ups and downs in the pace, but the average individual neither is pushed quite so hard to get things done nor is as overcommitted as the middle classes of the America we know.

Attractive aspects of public behavior

To the foreign returned, the dissimilarity between foreign public life and their own way of life is conspicuous. Certain aspects seem attractive; a majority from the United Kingdom look with favor on four attributes of British character. The Indian designations for these are "personal integrity," "self-discipline," "reserved but helpful," and "thorough in whatever they do." They

are applied to the manner in which the individual Englishman acts in nonfamily relationships—with strange Englishmen as well as with foreigners—on the job, in civic groups, and in public places where each man is anonymous and so thought to be free from "normal" social controls. Phrases used to portray integrity are: "solid," "reliable," "steadfast," "fair," and "people you can count on." Self-discipline appears impressive as "control over one's emotions," "strength of purpose," and "perseverance"; it is doubly so as to respect for the opinions and rights of others—including the right to privacy. On first contact, at the surface, the Britisher seems entirely formal, taciturn, if not cold, but when the ice is broken there emerges from beneath the surface layer a self that is called "goodhearted" and "hospitable." The foreign returned have much to say about the earnestness with which individuals go about their work and daily life (trying to get the most out of it), their methodical orderly nature, and the durability of the things they make.

The top four American qualities which are approved by the foreign trained overlap to a degree with the British characterization, yet they carry dissimilar referents in their concrete forms of behavior. Americans are known as individuals who are "friendly," "equalitarian," "generous," and "energetic." In any social situation, it is commonly said, the American is easy to meet, easy to mix with, and easy to get along with—the American is characterized as being pleasingly personable and informal, having a sense of humor, and enjoying life. "Everyone tried to make us feel at home." "They talk freely with anyone." "Americans at once see you as a person—I was received with open arms everywhere."

The equalitarian features of the individual that strike the eye of the for-

ign returned cover a wide spectrum of human relations. One man tried to put it all together in his mind's eye as "freedom—which is only in America, pure and straightforward freedom—a regard for the other fellow—that is the real American life."

Most are captivated by the opportunities for an open class system with its ample chances to climb on the basis of ability and work and with the widespread sharing of a high standard of living.

In contradistinction to the social distance in India that insulates the higher and lower classes and the economic chasm between class levels of living, they see Americans openly mixing in public places as equals and being consumers of the same products. The foreign returned remember that even working class families often had cars, that people dressed alike, and that "everyone had access to food." The American symbols of class differences are not seen or are overshadowed by the fact that all classes "have so much," just as Westerners may not see the configuration of status differences within a non-Western society, so overwhelming may be the mass poverty.

The energetic American comes into full view at work, in play, on the streets, and at home. "There is ceaseless activity. The people rush about from morning to night. They have boundless energy and work themselves to a premature death." "They go at a fast pace, everyone is busy, the tempo of life is fast—what they call progress."

SOCIAL WEAKNESSES

The one outstanding social weakness of the West, both the United Kingdom and the United States, that most of the foreign returned mentioned is that of racial discrimination. Race relations serves the foreign educated as an acid test of Western attitudes and values.

Racial prejudice is a hypersensitive spot whether the Indian is the object of discrimination or only a spectator of discrimination imposed on other colored peoples. Around this issue high interest can be alerted, lurking suspicions activated, and a whole train of antipathies concerning colonialization set under way.

Less than 5 per cent of the sample studied were apathetic about the entire subject before they went and afterwards. For the majority, the foreign experience did change the conceptions of racial relations which they held. One conception which many held before going abroad but which tends to become obsolescent among the foreign returned is the simple division of mankind into two opposing camps—white Westerners and the colored peoples of the rest of the world. They are as indignant as are others in India over any signs of Western imperialism and claims of white supremacy in Asia or Africa, but they do not state the issues exclusively along racial lines nor put all the whites into one class of men.

Before, I thought that all white people were alike. I had very deep prejudices before about white skins. Now I feel that everyone is the same, that human beings are all the same.

Again:

I used to think that all Westerners were pro-British and that all were different from us. I did not have any contacts with whites before. I learned about the differences between various Europeans, and that Americans are not the same as other whites. This left a very lasting impression on my mind.

The treatment accorded Indian students in the United Kingdom is used by them as one test of the Englishman's willingness to accept them as equals and not to relegate them to the status of inferiors. In the United States the treat-

ment of the Indian student and the treatment of the American Negro is used as a yardstick to gauge the sincerity of the American's belief in democracy. Persons who were subjected to discrimination in Britain say that they were disappointed but not surprised; persons with the same experience in America remark that they were not only disappointed but somewhat shocked.

The color bar in the United Kingdom before independence aroused resentment as being another proof of the ranking of Indians as a subject race; since independence, it is viewed as being an unfortunate flaw in British character that is offensive to a free people. The color line in the United States for the earlier generation of students was not an anxious one so far as they personally were concerned but in connection with the Negro was deemed analogous to British-Indian relations in India. The later students point to racial discrimination as an anachronism in a nation that is holding itself up to the world as the proponent of democracy.

Discrimination against Indian students

Less than one-fourth of the foreign educated in either the United Kingdom or the United States had actually been the personal object of discrimination in a specific instance which they could recall; more than three-fourths had heard of Indian students who had been discriminated against. Any incident which happens to one Indian becomes known to all; stories accumulate within Indian student groups abroad and are passed on to each incoming person. If the person was the only Indian in the American or British school he was less preoccupied with the likelihood of there being discrimination against Indians—he did not have a constant stream of stories coming his way and his excep-

tional status often meant he was lionized as an "interesting" person.

We asked the foreign returned who were the objects of or who had observed racial discrimination while they were overseas how they felt while it was happening. The answers given add up to this proposition: For most, if the discriminatory act was directed against the self, the occurrence was not interpreted as being a threat to their own ego but as insulting to their status rights and a violation of their beliefs as to what is right.

The United Kingdom cases who experienced race discrimination say that the color bar was no worse in England than what they were used to in India before independence—and in some respects, not so bad, or that the behavior of the Englishmen was pretty much what they expected from a people with the reputation for being prejudiced and thinking of themselves as the "master race." Many add that it was not easy to distinguish between British reserve with strangers and racial prejudice, but that in most instances, once they got to know an Englishman well, they were accepted as equals. Nearly all report no discrimination in the academic community, in their intellectual relations with professors and fellow students. A number remember that their teachers took an extra amount of interest in them because they were Indians. Although away from the college they might encounter children who would yell, "Look, Mom, there is a black man," or "Look at that nigger," adults did not talk that way. The chief area of discrimination occurred in trying to get housing accommodations in which the obvious reason for rejection was race.

The American cases had more varied responses. A few took a sympathetic or neutral point of view, for example,

"I knew the background of American actions and knew they were mixed up on this." "When I saw discrimination in the South, I knew these people did not know any better." "Every country has its own dirt. America has, just as we do, but we are interested in America not because of its dirt but for what it can teach us." The majority grumbled, gossiped within their own Indian group, and acted opportunistically. Inside their in-group they talked wryly about the contradictions between democracy and discrimination and how strange it was for an advanced country to have racial prejudices. A minority fully identified with the Negro as being another oppressed people, sought them out as friends, were keenly offended by discrimination against this ethnic group, and now say: "American democracy is for whites." As in the case of the British educated, the American sample report with but rare exceptions that they were not discriminated against on the campus and, far more than the British educated, speak warmly of professors who took an exceptional interest in them and who went out of their way to be helpful.

OTHER REACTIONS

About other social strengths and weaknesses of the West there is no consensus. There are, however, reactions common to the British returned and others held by the American returned.

Those trained in the United Kingdom feel fairly sure that they know what the British are like but those trained in the United States are not equally sure that they know what makes Americans tick. One plausible, though untested, hypothesis is that the British culture may be more homogeneous than its American counterpart. And as a result, perhaps the Indian has a more standardized set of expectations in the United Kingdom than in the United

States. It may also be that the British in their personal conduct in varying types of situations are more consistent and Americans more flexible.

Still another hypothesis can be inferred from the side comments of those who say, "The people are frank—but." The "but" refers to the observation that the English are hard to make out *before* a friendship is established; the Americans, *after* a contact is made. The Indian student is puzzled by the British because, "They want to take the initiative in deciding when to get acquainted and they resent inquisitiveness"; hence the Indian does not know where he stands until the Englishman tells him. Once the Britisher has opened up, the Indian adds, "He says what he means and means what he says."

Friendships with Americans are established more quickly, and either person is free to take the initiative. Although rarely rebuffed in starting a friendship, the Indian is not confident of the solidity of the bond: "You cannot assume that because Americans are friendly you are fully accepted. You still have to watch what you say." "Americans are free to talk but their freeness is a mannerism and we Indians often misunderstood." The American is described as smiling, polite, congenial, and careful not to offend. At first Indians impute from these cues more than they are intended to convey in American culture. Most of an Indian's friends take a span of time for each to test the other's involvement. The foreign returned are impressed by the rapidity with which strangers in America form friendships—and are upset when the attachments prove to be so temporary. It causes some to say, "Americans are friendly, but are they really sincere?" "Everyone is friendly—but it is hard to have a friend."

Eight out of ten of the foreign returned have a favorable image of the

British and Americans as people, as distinguished from their political and social patterns. Those back from the United Kingdom respect the British people (whether they like them or not) and those returned from the United States like the Americans (whether they respect them or not). Before going overseas, the students tended to be antagonistic toward the British and idealistic about the Americans; after being in the West, approximately 80 per cent revised their images—losing much of their antagonism toward the British and becoming more realistic about the Americans.

Three out of four now distinguish between the character of the foreigners in India, who are viewed most often adversely, and the character of the foreigners in their homeland, who are seen most often in a favorable light.

The Britisher at home appears to them to be a more decent person than the Britisher abroad.

There I became acquainted with Englishmen for the first time and I began to appreciate their character. I did not like them as rulers but there I found them most human.

Or:

Here in India, they are very obstinate, unbending, intolerable, aloof, arrogant, and pompous. There I met a different type—they were polite, they judged the individual as an individual and then formed an opinion, they were helpful. I am still no admirer of the British but my attitude has mellowed, and I respect them.

During the period of British rule there were few Americans in India. Beginning with the American soldiers who were stationed in India during World War II, large numbers of Americans have descended upon India. Consequently to many of the American trained, their first experiences with Americans in India came after their

favorable experiences with Americans in the United States. The United Kingdom trained are surprised to find that the British in Britain are "human," the United States trained are shocked to find that Americans in India are snobbish.

It is easier to get along with Americans in America than in India. In America there is little chance to show off, for everybody has so much; here the Americans show off. Here they tend to look down on Indians. Americans here lose much of their humility—they start feeling intellectually superior. Americans here are more authoritarian than in America.

Again:

Here the Americans are clannish, they restrict themselves to their own group. Americans at home are hospitable but here they do not ask you to their house; they remain more to themselves.

And:

The foreigners in India differ from those in their own country. At first when they come they are sympathetic to Indians but in time they become anti-Indian. They forget their modesty and their notions of equality when they come here.²

Enigmas of Western society

There are some aspects of Western society which remain enigmatic to the foreign returned.

Family life is one. It appears disorganized to some, democratic to others. The instabilities of the home, particularly in America, seem odd to most, in contrast to the stability of the Indian home. Whereas fellow feeling among coworkers is admired, the slim ties among relatives are frowned upon.

² We are concerned not with the validity of these judgments, but only with the objective presentation of a common point of view. Our own observations were that there are foreigners who do not fit the description but, as is the case of any stereotype, these are looked upon as being "different."

Some say, "The children are taught to be independent at a young age. This is a very good thing. But a person does not know the work his father is doing, where his sisters are, and whether or not his brothers will help him. It is a curse to be old, they get little respect and they cannot maintain themselves." "There is no love in family life. I found that affection is only skin deep there." "The attachment to the family is not real. Every man and woman is interested in himself, not in parents, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives. No one gets a happy home life." Some have the opposite reaction:

There is more democracy in family life. The individual is treated on his own merits with due respect for his needs. The elders consult with the junior members and their advice or suggestions are really considered; here the elders make the decisions.

Materialism is another enigma. The preoccupation with economic gain, the identification of an individual with the work he does, the premium placed on having an ever ascending level of living draws mixed responses—hostility and envy.

The average American lacks a sense of balance between materialism on the one hand and a faith or philosophy on the other. He feels an urgent need of faith, but scientific development is far outstripping the developments in the spiritual world. He has not been able to adjust his community living with the material progress of his country. There is a general nervous condition. The interesting thing is that the people there are the first to admit all this.

Again:

They are constantly in a hurry to get done whatever they are doing and give very little thought to the meaning of what they are doing. They see only the material values in life—get more money, get more luxuries; little else matters as ends. But it is an easy life—people are not worried about tomorrow.

Others are impressed by the spirit of "always trying to make improvements in efficiency and production" and say that "spiritualism is humbug—a fact which the foreigners already know and Indians should learn." The United States is more the object of criticism for "overdoing" materialism than the United Kingdom, and the main center of attack is not on the levels of living but on the discrepancy between the economy and other phases of culture.

Each culture contains its own premises by which a member's behavior is judged—the areas in which he is supposed to exercise authority and responsibility on his own and the areas in which he is supposed to submerge himself to the group; when he can compete or must co-operate; and so forth. The stranger in a society has difficulty perceiving the premises, the behavior, and the relationship between the two, as the next three quotations show:

America is based on egotism. For example, neighbors did not once pay any attention to the problems of others. In India we talk about our neighbor's troubles and are sincerely sorry. Everyone there is busy and minds his own business.

As a group they work better than as individuals—which is conducive to social welfare. They are willing to co-operate to bring credit to the group. This is the paradox of American individualism—they want to do things in a group way, one has a sense of achievement in a group and a sense of frustration as an individual. The American mind is confused.

In America, the individual thinks that by helping the individual he is helping the community.

THE ROLES OF A MIDDLEMAN IN A CROSS-CULTURAL RELATIONSHIP

The foreign educated comprise only one group of the many intermediaries between India and the West. Numerous Indians each year make trips to the

United Kingdom or the United States for business, on holidays, to attend conferences, and as official representatives of the country. Several thousand Englishmen and Americans work, visit on good-will tours, serve as teachers and technical advisers, and are posted on diplomatic assignments in India. There are expatriates from India in the West and from the West in India. A continuous flow of news and views is transmitted via the radio, press, and movies.

After their return, nonstudent visitors to the West usually move in social circles which include the social elite who can afford vacations abroad, the business tycoons, and the high-ranking officials who already are personally acquainted with Westerners. In contrast to these other intermediaries, a larger proportion of the foreign educated typically interact with people who know no foreigners personally.

Social influence

The foreign educated as a middleman in Indian social groups has an impact on the group members in proportion to the social capital he possesses that makes him influential and to the social response of the members who are open to being influenced.

The social capital of the foreign educated held in lowest esteem is the prestige of being foreign returned. The fact that they can say, "I was there," gives a certain margin of credence to what they say about the United Kingdom or the United States, but the extent to which their opinions are accepted depends upon their social position.

Certain forms of personal behavior are a social liability. Those few who patently play the foreigners' game or who, overly identified with the United Kingdom and the United States, zealously defend Western ways and are offensive in viewing local ways, are discounted. Individuals rated as influen-

tial in a social group do not act as blatant cultural hucksters. This personal element may seem amorphous; nevertheless, it is concretely evidenced in the social circles we studied.

When the sample cases are sorted out into uninfluential and influential, a large percentage of the persons with low influence show comparable social disabilities. In their own words:

People say I have become americanized. They criticize me at home for saying so much is good in America. They say that I say everything in America is good.

Again:

My ideas were too advanced for the people I had to live with here. I do not criticize the people, I merely make a statement, "This is the way it is done there." They usually are unconvinced.

The influential

The pile of influential cases contains these three representative comments:

Only if I find that they ask and really want to know do I talk about America. If I talk about good living there, they would be frustrated, so I talk tactfully. I do not say America is better but point out different things I saw there which I think could be used here.

There is no label of "foreign" on what I do and say. I wait for the people to turn to me for advice.

I talk about England to many, even to illiterate people, both in my family and outside. But I adjust what I say so that it can be understood. When a topic comes up, I do not make the point that I know about it directly. I never say outright, "This is how we do it in England." I correct local ideas informally, never in lectures or talks. This way, people ask you and you can fit the conversation to their interests and background. People do ask and so you can build up to the point.

Those who are influential, however, have more than communication skills.

They deftly, and often unself-consciously, earn a reputation of being just like everyone else in a group. A fine compliment bestowed on a foreign returned is, "He is just like he was before." The term most frequently used by their associates to describe them is sincere—a quality respected in Indian culture and unexpected in the foreign returned of whom the image is one of being high-hat and supercilious. Most of the highly rated influential individuals responded to our question "What kind of adjustment did you make when you got back?" by saying, in one way or another, "I tried to fit in."

The influential are located in all age grades; the mature, however, have a larger amount of social capital in a society that respects men and women in the advanced years of life. The young are influential with their immediate friends, whereas the older persons may wield influence throughout the community.

The audience

The people who are open to being influenced can be classified into members of primary groups and members of secondary groups. Primary types of groups are those in which the foreign returned have more or less continuous face-to-face contacts with relatives, persons belonging to the same subcommunity, a few friends, students, and in some cases an occasional subordinate or fellow worker. They are in a sense a captive audience who have at least to pretend to listen when the foreign returned talk. Word-of-mouth communication in India, as in most societies, often is believed more than word that is transmitted via the printed page—and of course, in those social groups with no literacy, it is the main source of all information about the outside world.

Provided the foreign returned is respected within his social circle, he has

free access to all of the informal discussions that take place and, as a participant, can introduce his ideas about the foreigners in a manner to fit the conversation. Probably the greatest impact of the foreign returned is not the initial period of storytelling in the first flush of being back home, but in the intermittent and unorganized sessions that take place subsequently. When we tried to pin down the persons being interviewed as to exactly how often and under what circumstances they brought up ideas learned abroad, hardly any could say; yet many said they were sure that their ideas slipped into the discussion. The relatives and friends of the foreign returned replied in the same fashion.

The social circles in which the foreign educated move vary in their receptivity to what the foreign educated have to say. Groups which have high access to information from the West and whose members are knowledgeable about the West are less likely to turn to the foreign educated as an "expert" than are others. Again, the foreign educated are more of a source for learning what Western people and their institutions are like than for finding out the international policies of the great powers. Finally, it needs to be pointed out that the prevailing sentiments toward the Western powers are governed more by the course of international events than by any interpretation of these events by the foreign returned.

Most of those who were highly critical of Americans and their ways while in the United States become defenders of America in India. With a change in the audience, from persons who know much about America (and so can see the disapproved patterns in a total social context) to persons who have little knowledge about America (and have peculiar notions without any context to explain them), a majority shift from

expressing doubts about American ways to giving the reasons why Americans act the way they do.

THE WISH TO BE UNDERSTOOD

The use of knowledge from one society by the members of another is animated by a demand that grows out of practical need. When India was under foreign rule, its people had to learn the ways of the British in order to deal with the governors. British authorities responsible for policy making and administration required knowledge of Indian conditions—even though most of the British people did not have to know much about Indian customs. It was not until the United States became a global power that the social facts about places like India seemed vital to the nation's leadership; at the same time, as India became a nation fashioning its own foreign policy, it has had to know more about the United States.

An American assumption is that understanding of America by Indians

would enable them to recognize that American values are not inimical to India's interests and that the nation's foreign policies are idealistic in conception. An Indian assumption is that if America understood Asia and the real issues, its policies would be better. Perhaps it would not be unreasonable to observe that both parties are anxious to be understood and that currently both may be more eager to be understood than to understand.

In an increasingly interdependent world in which India is a co-ordinate rather than a subordinate power, it seems highly probable that mutual understanding will increase in the long run. It will do so in the "one world" that is coming into being, not because that would be nice but because it will be necessary. It seems appropriate to suggest in this context that the foreign educated, along with certain other segments, have the potential of acting as interpreters of the West on a face-to-face basis with a wide range of Indian groups.

Ruth Useem, Ph.D., is assistant professor (research) in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State College. She has taught at the University of South Dakota, Queens College, and the University of Wisconsin. In addition to having spent several years in field research among the Sioux Indians, she served as codirector of this study.

*John Useem, Ph.D., is professor of sociology and anthropology, Michigan State College. He has served as visiting professor at the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, and has spent several years in field research among the South Pacific islanders. He is coauthor with Ruth Useem of a series of articles in scientific journals and recently contributed to *Planning Micronesia's Future* (D. Oliver, Ed.), *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change* (M. Mead, Ed.), and *Human Problems and Technological Change* (E. Spicer, Ed.).*

The America-educated Japanese,* I

The Student in America: Theory; Background; Images

By HERBERT PASSIN and JOHN W. BENNETT

THIS two-part paper endeavors to describe the most important images of American life and culture held by Japanese who have been educated in the United States, and to shed some light on how these images form and change in the course of their experience in America and in Japan. The analysis is based upon a study of Japanese students on American university campuses, and a companion study of returned students in Japan.¹

Within the total research program, images were only one of the problems studied. In its most general terms, the research was directed primarily toward the analysis of study abroad as an instance of intercultural experience. Apart from its theoretical importance for the study of culture contact and change, intercultural experience is of critical significance in international relations today, characterized as they are not only by the impact from afar of ideas and institutions but also by the direct personal contact of foreigners with every level of the home population.

* This project is part of a program sponsored by the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council and supported by grants to the Council from the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

¹ Bennett directed the research on Japanese in America, Passin on the returnees. The materials are being worked into book form at Ohio State University. The one hundred individuals studied intensively in both projects included pre-World War I students as well as younger people still in the student category. The field data were supplemented by extensive documentary materials.

THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS

It should be understood at the outset that the sample on which this analysis is based—namely, Japanese who study in the United States—is in no sense a cross section of the population of Japan. They are, in the first place, drawn from the best-educated sectors and generally from above-average socioeconomic levels. By contrast with the average Japanese, they may be characterized as politically aware and culturally sophisticated, usually in a somewhat Western direction; they usually have more familiarity with Western life, they are more attracted by the West, and they are more skilled in foreign languages. Within educated circles, they can be counted among those most favorably inclined toward the United States.

Thus, we will not expect to find among this group of Japanese extreme negative opinions of the United States (although these may develop in suitable circumstances), and by the same token we may expect to find them representing a generally "alienated" group in their own society. By "alienated" we mean having an attitude of critical detachment from one's own culture, tradition, and social order. This is, of course, a matter of degree, and we have in general reserved use of the term for only the more extreme cases.

IMAGES—DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION

The term "image" has come to be used in a number of different ways and to characterize a number of different

phenomena. As we shall use it here, it is a descriptive summation of *percepts*—what people see—and *attitudes*—how they feel about it. "Image" can be used to describe such diverse things as patterns of information and interpretation found in the mass media, the general tendency of "public opinion," or the views of particular individuals or groups.

It is important to remember that the educated foreigner who visits America is not a *tabula rasa*, but rather a complex human being, with the usual battery of feelings, goals, and frames of reference with which all people perceive and evaluate their environment. These frames of reference develop both from the individual's experience and from the historically conditioned atmosphere of his own culture. The historically conditioned images of his background society and culture determine or influence his view of America; and, in turn, his experience in and with America influences his image of America.

As we shall endeavor to suggest in the following section the special character of Japanese-American relations has created certain historical images of America which are widely prevalent in Japan. We have found, however, that the images with which the student starts his contact with America—whether they be favorable or unfavorable—are substantially influenced by the nature of his experience. The bulk of both parts of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the factors which seem to be most influential in affecting his image.

To describe images, we have distinguished between image *content*, image *judgment* (or type of critical perspective), and image *attitude*. When describing image content, we will often use the terms "stereotypic" and "realistic"; for image judgment, the terms "negative" and "positive"; and for attitude, "friendly" and "unfriendly." Al-

though these three aspects of the image often follow the same direction,² there are important cases in which they do not.³ In the following pages there will be found examples of the many possible permutations and combinations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS

In Japan's modern relations with the Western world, it is America—in the shape of Commodore Perry's ominous "black ships"—that has been identified as historically responsible for the "opening of the country." The decision to enter the world portended, on the one hand, danger to Japan's independence and traditional way of life, and, on the other, tempting advantages and exciting new prospects. The balance of these conflicting moods is evident in that approach to the West which the leaders of Meiji Japan were able to sustain with remarkable success: to change whatever interfered with the development of industrial nationhood, but to retain as much of the traditional social structure and culture as possible. Thus, the historical agent which forced Japan to her decision, America, is firmly embedded in the Japanese outlook as the source of danger and threat, as well as of the techniques to dispel them.

Japan learns from America

Throughout the years that followed the opening of Japan, America played a role of intermittent but substantial importance in the development of Japan's modern institutions. The more prominent examples include American

² When people are "positive" and "friendly," we speak of them as "favorable"; when "negative" and "hostile," as "unfavorable."

³ The conservative position in Japan today is often "negative" towards American civilization, but "friendly" to America for political reasons; the liberal, contrariwise, is often positively disposed towards the democracy of American life, but "hostile" to America because of her foreign policy in Asia.

technical assistance in the development of cold-climate agricultural methods; the influence of American educators and missionaries in the development of an educational system; and American influence in the development of modern industrial and commercial methods.⁴

The cumulative effect of this long history of contact and relationships was the emergence of an image of America which had decidedly favorable lineaments on the one hand, but on the other, elements of criticism, anxiety, and ambivalence. America was accepted as an ideal model of Western energy and achievement, and, as the youngest and most "promising" country of the Western world, she was considered in many respects the most suitable model for Japanese industrial reconstruction. But by the same token her suitability as an ideological, social, and cultural model was brought into question. In the moral sphere there has been from the very beginning of serious relations between Japan and America an ineradicable critical suspicion that America was shallow and immature. The anxiety and ambivalence, for their part, developed out of feelings of inferiority which inevitably accompany strong achievement-oriented activity on the part of people who have not yet accomplished their goals. Therefore, the revision of the "unequal" treaties, which had been based on the Western assumption that Japan was a "backward" country—like China or Siam—was peculiarly

⁴ Cf. Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950; especially Chap. II. It should be noted that America was not the only model for Japanese reconstruction. Other European nations were important in various ways, particularly in the early years of the opening, when American political and economic institutions were undeveloped. But, as Reischauer concludes, "in the long run the Japanese probably borrowed more from the United States than from any one European nation" (p. 11).

symbolic of the recognition that Japan demanded of the world.⁵

The role of American education

The popularity of American education has varied with the changing context of relations between Japan and America. In the first phase of Japan's entry into the modern world, students flocked to American universities, and persons with American training found all doors open to them to put their new knowledge to work in solving the urgent problems facing the country. When the mission of Prince Iwakura arrived in the United States in 1871, only three years after the Restoration of the Emperor, it counted over two hundred Japanese students in actual attendance in American institutions.⁶ These early students played a key role in Japan's modern institutional development, and the romantic flavor of greatness, pioneering, and adventure invoked by their names still attaches, however insecurely, to the latter day overseas students.

In later years a change in atmosphere could be detected. In their search for models, the Japanese came to feel that American conditions were so different from their own that perhaps more could be learned from European countries where the nature of the social and

⁵ Historical commentators have frequently observed that Meiji Japan wanted the techniques of the West, but not the consequences of these techniques, that is, it was willing to accept industrialization but not developments in the direction of a "mass society" which industrialization implies. (Cf. E. & F. Lederer, *Japan in Transition*, New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press, 1938; especially Chap. VIII.)

⁶ Cf. Charles Lanman, *Leaders of the Meiji Restoration in America* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1931), p. 52. Also G. H. Blakeslee (Ed.), *Japan and Japanese-American Relations*, New York: G. E. Stechert & Co., 1912. R. S. Schwantes, in a personal communication, has suggested that Lanman and other early observers, both Japanese and American, may have exaggerated somewhat.

economic structure more closely approached Japanese conditions. Moreover, the growth of a Japanese university system, modeled on German institutions, meant that Japan came to be able to train her own people. Therefore foreign education came to be viewed more as a chance to add polish than as a means for fundamental training. In many fields, the United States was regarded as inferior to certain European countries for providing this "polish."

After World War I American's stock as a place for training rose for a time, but then quickly declined with the rise of a militaristic regime which exploited anti-American sentiments for its own ends.⁷ With defeat and occupation after World War II, America once more became a popular place for all types of education and training, but of course doubts and suspicion of the value of such experience never disappeared completely. The great movement of overseas students to the United States in the postwar period must be attributed not only to America's popularity, but also to the superior availability of financial aid for going to America.

The postwar atmosphere

However, the immense interest and curiosity in things American, so apparent in occupied Japan, should not be underestimated. The defeat apparently persuaded the Japanese that they still had much to learn from the West—particularly from their conqueror, America—and they plunged themselves into an amazing emulation of American life and customs. Aside from the remarkably facile acceptance of reform measures introduced by the occupation, the Japanese copied American mass consumption standards, linguistic expressions, and in-

⁷ There is little doubt that the blow to national pride of America's Oriental Exclusion Act played a part in this change of attitude.

terpersonal behavior patterns—often in superficial and meaningless fashion.

Thus, for a brief period in the occupation, all the previous roles the United States had played in Japanese life and thought—instructor, tutor, paternal figure, most powerful nation—were brought to a new focus.⁸ At the same time, an expectable ambivalence over this dependence began to reassert itself. The experience of living under Americans as rulers, changes in occupation policy, and the problem of Japan's relation to the "cold war" have all contributed to a growing "anti-American" feeling. As will be shown later, this feeling has carried over to some extent in the attitudes toward American education and has had some effect on the position of the American-educated Japanese after his return home.⁹

THE CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE VIEW OF AMERICA

We can see from these brief historical considerations that there has always been a good deal of ambivalence in the Japanese approach to America. America's position as "teacher" and "superior" has often aroused a reactive hostility and resentment. In the present section, we shall examine the resultant contemporary outlook, which can be broken down into six major types of image content.

These types are not logical categories, but rather identifiable, salient groupings with psychological unity. They are the images one is likely to encounter if one talks with the "man on the street"; the images which appear in the mass media and even in the textbooks of history and geography;

⁸ See Kazuo Kawai, "American Influence on Japanese Thinking," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 278 (November 1951), pp. 23-31.

⁹ A special section on the influence of the occupation period on the Japanese outlook on America forms part of the conclusions of Part II.

the images which are part of the most generalized frame of reference of most Japanese, regardless of how sophisticated they may be with respect to the details of American life and behavior, and regardless of their attitudes toward America. These are also the images which have the greatest relevance for the understanding of Japanese political attitudes.¹⁰

It also will be observed that a description of the Japanese images of America will serve fairly well as a description of the images of America current in other countries. This would seem to be explicable on two grounds: First, in many nations outside of the Iron Curtain there is a common stock of information about the United States that has been made available—at least to the educated classes—through the diffusion of education and the impact of the mass media. Thus, many similar things about America are known in all countries—although there may be substantial individual, group, class, and national variation. Second, the position of many countries in relation to American power today is very similar: dependent, in need of American economic help, pressed for ideological commitment. It is therefore not surprising that the same reactions of irritation, resentment, and ambivalence develop.

Japanese images of America therefore share certain qualities with those found in Europe and in Asia. Indeed, the context of world politics and the effectiveness of mass communication are such that Americans frequently perceive their own country in similar terms.

¹⁰ Details on the methods used in constructing these image types cannot be given here. Briefly, they have been prepared on the basis of an intensive study of contemporary Japanese public opinion surveys, current published literature, personal discussions with Japanese of all social positions, and interviews with the one hundred or so students and former students studied in the research program.

What is distinctively "Japanese" about the images presented here is not the image content so much as the attitudes attending them: the selective emphasis of different elements, the extent of involvement, and the distribution of the images in the population resulting from unique factors in the historical development of Japanese-American relations. For example, Japanese, by comparison with most other peoples, seem to be more emotionally involved in their images of America, and their images seem to have a larger proportion of unrealistic, "exalted" elements.

Six images of America

We now consider the six major image-content types found widespread in contemporary Japan. The first four types are essentially groups of percepts to which entirely contrary attitudes may be assigned by different individuals. The last two images are inherently vectorial; the nature of the percept automatically implies a negative judgment and often unfriendly attitudes. These two negatively inclined images reflect important contemporary criticism of the United States, appearing in abundance in the Japanese mass media. They also can represent, for many Japanese, what might be called unfavorable "counterimages," available for use if attitudes shift in an unfavorable direction.

The neutral character of image types I, II, V, and VI, may be illustrated very simply. A Japanese who sees America as "democratic" (Image II) may not necessarily approve of this; he may dislike democracy. Or, while most Japanese would agree that America is a place where women are indulged (Image I), there would be much division of opinion, especially between men and women, on the virtues of sex equality. A recognition of America's superior standard of living (V) does

not necessarily imply a favorable attitude toward material wealth; it also can be seen as evidence of American "materialism."

Images emphasizing ideological aspects of America

I. *America as the home of women's rights.* Women have substantially equal rights and opportunities with men; marriage is based mainly on love and free choice of partner; wives have equal voice in family decisions; children are treated as individuals rather than as subordinate units for the convenience of the family; women can pursue any career they wish; they can even excel men in certain spheres.

(*Comment.* America has always been an important symbol in the struggle of the Japanese woman for equal rights. Educated Japanese women find that America exerts a powerful fascination for them; it is common for them to want to travel and live in the United States and to communicate their knowledge of American sex equality to their compatriots. Men, on the other hand, are less enthusiastic; although many "democratically" gulp down their disapproval and say "it might be a good thing," conservative men openly disapprove.)

II. *America as the land of freedom, democracy, humanism.* Human relationships in America are free, open, devoid of arbitrary status considerations; American life centers on the needs and interests of the individual rather than of the group; the values of humanism, tolerance, freedom of inquiry dominate.

(*Comment.* A broader and less specialized version of I (above). Often defined, as in the case of I, as the "opposite" of Japan: where Japan is feudal, hierarchical, ordered in its social relationships, group centered, inclined to stress obedience and conformity, America is democratic, free, open, individualistic, tolerant. Aspects of this image are often combined with V (below), to stress "freedom" plus "achievement." The image is based on a liberal criticism of Japan, and it can become the basis of conservative criticism of America.)

III. *America is an unreliable democracy.*

America has too much democracy; she cannot be relied upon because she is subject to changing whims, fashions, and pressures of public opinion; America is overly materialistic, uncultured, impulsive, disorderly, shallow, superficial, too individualistic; she looks down on Japan and "colored races."

IV. *America on the road to totalitarianism.* Whatever democracy America may have had in the past, she is fast becoming the land of race prejudice and discrimination, anti-intellectualism, and suppression of democratic rights; there are strong tendencies toward cultural authoritarianism and domination by big business and the military; she is shallow, superficial, soft, politically unreliable; she worships power and gadgetry.

(*Comment.* Image III is a negative view largely deriving from a conservative or authoritarian critique of American institutions; IV is based on a liberal critique. It will be noted that the two share some common elements.)

Images emphasizing material aspects of America

V. *America as technically the most advanced nation.* The material side of life is more highly developed in America than anywhere else: a high standard of living; high productivity; efficiency; ingenuity; high educational level; many scientists and skilled workers; opportunity for achievement and success (for Americans, not necessarily for foreigners).

(*Comment.* When approved, this image is probably typical of Japanese businessmen, engineers, and certain conservative leaders. When disapproved, it may become the focus of attack by liberal elements [see Image IV]. This image has played an important part in Japanese-American relations because of America's contributions to Japan's industrial, technical, and administrative development.)

VI. *America as a stable world power.* A powerful, well-organized, orderly, law-abiding, civilized nation; roles are clearly defined, and people know their place in society although there is relative freedom; very stable and predictable; the people

have good public manners [like traffic "courtesy"]; individuals know how to subordinate themselves willingly, not by force, to the public interest; the class system is ideal—it is hierarchical, but it still permits upward achievement.

(*Comment.* Really an extension of V into nontechnological spheres; the image is favorably held by people who are primarily concerned with Japan's power and stability and feel that America may be a guide and a model; but the same elements can be the focus of criticism by liberals, although some will accept a few of these elements as necessary for Japan.)

THE JAPANESE STUDENT IN AMERICA

We now turn from a generalized discussion of contemporary Japanese views of America to the particular images held by representative types of students who come to the United States for study. Our attention here will be centered upon the way these images form and change in the course of experience in the States and after return to Japan, and on the factors responsible for these changes.

Accordingly, our discussion of the America-trained Japanese will be divided into two sections: the American sojourn and the return to Japan.¹¹ This division follows a natural break in the research itself and permits the development of problems unique to the two phases of the experience. The American sojourn is generally an intense and strongly focused experience, since it is highly motivated, and it is also a relatively brief incident in the student's life. On the other hand, the "return" is a more diffuse experience, since it means no less than the totality of the adult life of the individual; it is an unlimited and continuing experience.

¹¹ The return to Japan is analyzed in Part II of this paper, which follows as the next article.

Thus, while the individual is in the United States, the problem of finding personal satisfaction may appear in fairly specific forms, accomplishing specific goals and having pleasant experiences. But back in Japan, satisfaction or gratification takes on new dimensions with every stage in the individual's life and with every change in the historical situations which affect his life. Consequently while his image of America may change once, or possibly twice, during his stay in America, it can change many times in the remainder of his lifetime.

The materials concerning image and image change will be presented in the form of a description of representative types of Japanese students of the postwar period. The reader should be cautioned that these postwar students do not correspond completely to the prewar variety and that the most important type of prewar America-educated Japanese is omitted. This type, who was thought of in prewar Japan as the "typical" America-educated person, was usually the young man who had his college education in America, returned to Japan, and thereafter based his entire career on his American training and connections—generally remaining friendly to the United States for the rest of his life. He was a staunch supporter of the occupation and, especially in its early years, was a familiar figure around General Headquarters. He is also commonly found around foreign-linked enterprises, such as missions, churches, embassies, import-export firms, English teaching, and youth groups.

Since he was not represented in the particular sample of Japanese students studied in the United States, in order to attain maximum congruity of the two sections of this paper it was decided to exclude him and to concen-

trate primarily on the postwar student types.¹²

A note on our method of explanation of image formation and change is necessary at this point. It has been found that an individual's image of America is best understood by determining the rather complex relationship between several factors, namely: (1) the individual's own goals in coming to the United States; (2) the extent to which he is able to satisfy these in his American sojourn and, in general, whether he has satisfying experiences while here; and (3) the kinds of ties he has back home which may predispose him toward one kind of image or another. In reading the descriptions of the representative types of students, the reader may note that the relationships among these three groups of factors take different forms for each type.

The Japan-alienated people

It is possible to divide the Japanese who come to the United States for study into two major groups: those who are alienated from their own society and those who are oriented towards it. This should be understood as referring to relative position on an extremely complex continuum, but the broad distinction has been found to be very meaningful. In their relationship to their own culture, educated Japanese tend toward a highly polarized view, in which the "outside," or the West (and especially America), is felt as an alternative. If one rejects Japan, one must accept the other. As one young Japanese doctor studying in the United States put it:

¹² Although he did not appear in our State-side sample, this does not mean that he cannot be found among the postwar students. The evidence, however, is that the type referred to in this paper as the "ideologist" has probably replaced him in frequency. See Part II, note 2, for further details.

We Japanese have no choice today but two: America or Japan. It is hard to find a compromise. You have to decide just how much of an American you want to be, or can afford to be, and the more American you become, the less Japanese you are.

This is putting it strongly, but typically.

Within this group of Japan-alienated people, it is possible to find different percepts of and attitudes toward America. However, these people can be divided broadly into two groups: those who have dominantly favorable views of America and those who are or can become dominantly unfavorable.

The woman rebel

Perhaps the most familiar case of the Japan-alienated, pro-American group is the Japanese woman who comes to the United States in search of the promised land of feminine role freedom and equality. This phenomenon, which has produced a notable literature,¹³ has been a standard facet of Japanese-American relations for the past three generations. To this "woman rebel," America is often the antithesis of everything Japanese she perceives as restrictive and unfair to her sex. Consequently her image of America (usually Type I mixed with II and aspects of III) is drawn in sharply positive and friendly, although often stereotypic, terms. It should also be noted that the chances of her actually gratifying her goals and desires in America are very good.

Since from her point of view, America is a land of opportunity for wish-gratification, the Japanese woman rebel has a

¹³ Cf. Sumie Mishima, *My Narrow Isle*, New York: The John Day Company, 1941; Shizue Ishimoto, *East Way—West Way*, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935; Michi Kawai, *Sliding Doors*, Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1950; Etsu Sugimoto, *Daughter of the Samurai*, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1934; Yoko Matsuoka, *Daughter of the Pacific*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952; and others.

tendency to interpret her experiences in this country as contributing to the liberation of her spirit and to the fulfillment of her desires. Although she may be interested in the political and economic aspects of American life, she is characteristically more sensitized to the roles of men and women in America, family life, feminine rights, competition with men, the rearing of children, and the arts. In all these areas she perceives, on the whole, what she was looking for, and to the extent that she is able to participate in the American scene, she can, in a very real sense, gratify her interests. Her putative identification with America, which is only the obverse of her alienation from Japan, is thus reinforced, and Japan may appear all the more alien and oppressive.¹⁴

In spite of this fact, it is interesting to note that the Japanese woman rebel often does not reject the role of "Japanese woman," assigned to her by Americans, because she may discover that the designation is a ticket to privileges and special consideration. A common case is that of the Japanese girl who has succeeded in securing financial support for her American study from Americans by appealing to them on the grounds of her sweet Japanese femininity, so "unfortunately" repressed by Japanese social conventions.

Since most women visitors from Japan are alienated from their own so-

¹⁴ Of course, not all Japanese women who come to America are rebels and not all are so completely gratified. Thus, a woman professor in a woman's college, who was a subject in the research program, came to America chiefly for specialized training in her field, organic chemistry, and she had little interest in American life and ideas. Her role in Japan was secure; she had succeeded in developing a comfortable niche in her own society which gave her considerable satisfaction, and therefore America did not have for her the special quality that it does for the majority of other women students from Japan.

ciety and are able to find what they want in America, their behavior often changes considerably, even after a short exposure to American life and ideas. While the Japanese woman at home is characteristically meek, shy, and reserved, when she comes to America she often blossoms out and becomes much more outgoing than her male countryman. She is generally more willing and able to enter into social relations with Americans and to live a well-rounded existence in the community at large. For many women, to have these very participative experiences was one of the principal goals in coming to America.

The methods a foreign visitor uses to "get along" in our society may be grouped together and termed his "adjustmental strategy." As in the case of military strategy, it is possible to be ingenious and efficient or clumsy and ineffective in the way one adjusts to given situations. On the whole, it is found that the "women rebels" have efficient strategies of adjustment in the United States, which means that they are able to accomplish their goals and "get along" in American life with relative ease. However, some of them are unable to overcome their inhibited social behavior, which may mean that they will have difficulties in adjusting to American life. But for virtually all of these women, whatever their success or failure in overcoming their inhibitions, the United States remains the land of opportunity and freedom.¹⁵

¹⁵ This is strikingly illustrated in the case of a schoolteacher who remained as inhibited in America as she had been at home, a source of great anxiety and feelings of failure. Her American associates regarded her as a shy, "typical" Japanese woman, although it was precisely from this role that she was trying—so unsuccessfully—to escape. And yet, in spite of her difficulties and inability to share in the give and take of American friendship circles, she did everything in her power to

While of all Japanese who visit the United States, the woman rebel is least likely to develop an unfavorable image, it should be noted that she is not entirely immune to negative judgments. When she sees aspects of American life which appear to her to obstruct feminist objectives, she will often add specifically disapproving judgments to her dominantly friendly attitudes toward America. Another of the mechanisms which can produce a drift toward unfavorable views is the tendency, observed in some women studied, to "blame" America for their sense of alienation; this may occur to them even before their return to Japan. However, this type of reaction should not be overstressed; the woman rebel is remarkably resistant to disillusionment over America.

The ideologist

Continuing our inquiry into the Japan-alienated person, we may now consider another type of person, who, in contrast to the woman rebel, does not always have satisfying experiences during his stay in America and who is prone to develop negative attitudes toward the United States (see image types II, IV, V). We refer here to the Japanese student—almost always a young man—with high intellectual ideals and strong liberal and equalitarian values, who is, in consequence, substantially alienated from many important areas of life in Japan. He may be found in almost all occupations and fields represented among Japanese exchange students. If he is strongly identified with any group, it is with one composed of people like

arrange to return to the United States after spending a year back in Japan. She was successful and did return to America—giving up her high post in the public school system of one of the largest Japanese cities. She commented that even though she had a very high position, she could "go no higher because I am a woman."

himself, that is, alienated individuals. Intellectually aware, and with a tendency to be articulate—and sometimes emotionally so—about his ideological goals and problems, he comes to America principally hoping to "find himself," to establish identifications and allegiances, through experiencing a free and stimulating environment which he anticipates will be both ideologically and emotionally gratifying to him. He wants to test or "measure" himself against America; he also wants to "measure" America, to see if she really is as people say.

Pressed by his internal needs and hoping to find much in America, the expectations of the "ideologist" are very high, perhaps too high for reality. He is often anxious to establish communication with Americans, but he may find that his adjustmental strategy is unequal to the task. Thus, he may discover that he cannot handle the language well enough for his purposes; or that he is unable to overcome his "Japanese" inhibitions. He may also discover that Americans habitually classify him, along with traditionalistic students whom he dislikes and rejects, in the category of "Japanese student." This assigned role and all it implies can offend him deeply, because he often may be anxious to avoid Japanese identity, preferring the role of "intellectual" or "man of the world," or even wishing some degree of "American" identity.

The environment to which the ideologist is exposed may also be an important factor in his changing view of America. If he is sent to an American environment which is unable to meet his needs—as, for example, a school lacking the intellectual atmosphere he desires—he may be severely frustrated. If, on the other hand, his strategy is flexible enough, he may abandon his intellectual goals and find other satisfying experiences in America. But in many cases—if not most—he is unable

to do this, and his image of America develops in decidedly ambivalent, if not negative, directions. He often comes to feel that the United States possesses the same features he dislikes about Japan; he begins to "accentuate the negative" in his perceptions of the American scene.

Since the ideologist is deeply interested in ideas, his perceptions of America are centered strongly on those aspects of the society and culture which have often been a challenge for Japanese. Political affairs are important here, and it goes without saying that the young ideologist will be sensitive to any American political developments which appear to him in violation of his expectations. Likewise, he will be sensitive to what he feels is excessive emphasis on advertising in the mass media and the general shallowness of radio, television, and popular magazines. The American educational system often appears to him in the guise of a "conveyor belt," as one student put it, particularly if he has come to a large state-supported institution, fresh from one of the elite Japanese secondary schools or universities. We have already mentioned his desire to mingle socially and intellectually with Americans. In these four areas—politics, popular culture, education, and social relations—the "ideologist" finds aspects of American life which are highly charged for the Japanese constantly being evaluated pro and con: he is searching for answers, and his opinions on these issues are like a teeter-totter, likely to swing to opposite extremes.

The end product may be a partial loss of his initial favorable predisposition towards America, and sometimes—since he has to that extent failed to establish a satisfactory identification with America—a compulsive effort to establish new identification with Japan. One of the students observed reached

this stage before his stipulated period of study was over and returned to Japan as quickly as possible. In other cases there is no attempt to rejoin Japanese society, and a state of "double alienation" develops. This is, however, a very fluid point in a continuing process; although the young ideologists reached a stage of double alienation in their ideological perspective¹⁶ soon after their arrival in the States, by the time of their departure they had all grown somewhat closer to Japan and definitely farther from America (although it would be incorrect to view them as completely hostile to the United States). The predeparture images of this type of student are likely to be negative in judgment, but with a mixture of friendliness and hostility. This mixed perspective may be illustrated by the remarks of a young socialist, made in his final interview:

I admit I am more of a reactionary over here—lately. I am undergoing a sort of reaction to the American environment, so it is a sort of Japanese patriotism while I am in the United States. . . . I have become more critical of American culture—and of Japanese culture to some extent. But, I mean that Japanese democracy or Japanese socialism should derive from the Japanese background. . . . The Japanese are too pro-America. . . . They should be more critical of America. . . . In terms of the American concept of democracy, the United States has generally succeeded, but in terms of an outsider's concept—such as a Japanese—she has failed in many areas. This idea of individualism has failed—it won't fit every society.

It should be noted that apart from the drift back toward a Japanese identification, the quotation also reveals the obtrusiveness of the polarity, Japan-

¹⁶ As measured by a special questionnaire on American and Japanese ideology and values, one of a number of instruments used in the study in addition to interviewing.

America. The two do not blend, they contrast.

The Japan-oriented people

In this section, we will examine some types of people who are predominantly oriented toward their own society. It will be found that these, like the alienated people, can have either favorable or unfavorable perspectives toward the United States.

The adjustors

The majority of young Japanese who come to the American campus do so in order to obtain specific training in business and technical fields, such as engineering, administration, or English teaching. In the case of the ideologists, this objective is secondary to other goals, but for the "adjustors," whom we now discuss, it is primary. For the adjustors, America is a source of useful knowledge which will enhance their own careers and, incidentally, serve Japan in good stead. (They usually will be found to emphasize image types V, VI, and parts of II.)

Such students are usually highly identified with Japan as a whole, but their identification is not of such character as to demand an unfavorable orientation towards the United States. Frequently they already have a job or the guarantee of one, and their study in the United States is accepted not as a break, but as an extension of their Japanese educational career. Their image of America—which usually centers around the material rather than the ideological aspects—tends to be moderately favorable, moderately friendly, and rather more realistic as contrasted with the stereotypic images held by many of the women rebels and ideologists. The adjustors characteristically exhibit a "double acceptance" profile in their ideology and values tests, sug-

gesting a high ratio of acceptance of both Japanese and American culture, at least of those aspects in both which they approve—and they tend to perceive in America, as in Japan, largely what they approve. Putting this another way, they habitually "accentuate the positive" in their perceptions of the American scene.

Their adjustmental strategies are, on the whole, efficient and capable. Gratification for them means, by and large, a successful learning experience in their professional fields, and frustration can easily result from attending an institution which does not give them what they want professionally. However, their adjustmental strategy and secondary goals are important here. Take, for example, the case of a young electrical engineer who acquired his Ph.D. in an American university in three years. He had come to the conclusion early in his stay that the electrical engineering curriculum there was actually somewhat inferior to that of his own university in Japan. However, he stayed on because he was able to satisfy secondary goals centering around the need for new and broadening social experiences, and he estimated that whatever his private judgment might be, the American academic degree would be highly valued in his particular field back home. His image of America, in spite of the frustration of his primary goals and objectives, remained positive and friendly.

As might be expected, the adjustor characteristically does not resent the identification of "Japanese" given him by his American hosts. Many of them feel that in some sense they are ambassadors of their country or of its more presentable aspects, and they are anxious to show themselves and Japan to Americans in the best possible light. They are relatively secure in their role

of "Japanese" and can derive considerable satisfaction from it, as may be seen in the following quotation:

At this large university, I feel very much a part of the total picture . . . there are many foreign students so that I am only one among many, and I do not attract much attention. When I spent some time in a small town in Indiana I was rather a center of interest and at the same time I felt my role to be somewhat that of ambassador or representative of Japan. Here, though, I simply feel like one of the students. I like both ways, of course.

The adjustor's perception of America can be either broad or narrow; he can be interested in "loaded" aspects of the American scene, as is the ideologist, and in many other things as well. It is not uncommon to find the young adjustor dwelling chiefly on sports, the characteristics of the American landscape, the beauty of American girls, and the marvels of American home comforts. The adjustor attempts to travel in the United States, as do all Japanese students, and when he does he is likely to be interested in the folkways and in the people as interesting human beings, more than in the social, economic, and political trends of the locality. He is, in short, typically less intent than the ideologist upon measuring America, testing hypotheses, or "finding himself"—although these motives are by no means entirely absent from his outlook. All Japanese students in America have them to some extent, because it is an inescapable part of the contemporary atmosphere of Japanese-American relations. But there are differences of degree, and the ideologist-adjustor distinction suggests such a difference.

The nationalist position

The class of Japan-oriented people who are for the most part negatively disposed toward America does, of course, exist,

and even within the adjustor group negative views are frequent enough. However, extreme anti-American attitudes or unfavorable images, combined with strong orientation toward Japan, are rare among the exchangeers for the reason that few persons with such views are interested in coming to the United States. This category would include, politically speaking, both extreme right-wing conservatives and pro-Communists. A distinction should be made between Japanese students in America who may possess partially negative views of America and these extreme anti-American, hostile images, which may be called "nationalist." This is particularly important because the negative views of the ideologists and adjustors are likely to be highly realistic (some disapproval may indicate an ability to make realistic discriminations, not stereotypy in these cases), while the genuinely anti-American and nationalist views are often stereotypic.

REALISM VERSUS STEREOTYPY

Therefore, in some sense, the net effect of a stay in the United States is to promote more realistic, if not more favorable, views of America among Japanese. Regardless of the type of student—woman rebel, ideologist, adjustor—there appear to be some grounds for accepting the truism that "travel is broadening," if by "broadening" is meant the formation of a wider reality basis for appraising situations. Unless a Japanese has extreme unfavorable biases (and, as indicated, few of these come to America), he is likely to go home with a firmer basis for judging the pros and cons of life in the United States than he had when he first came. Although he may respond to severe pressures back home to be anti-American, and may even show a disposition in this direction while he is still in America,

he has usually learned that the United States is more complex and less formidable than many of his initial stereotypes had suggested.

Thus, while the encounter with American life is a difficult experience for all Japanese, it is apparent that an unfavorable reaction is not inevitable. Adjustments can be made, and exposure to the richness and variety of American

life has, to some extent, the effect of promoting a realistic understanding entirely independent of likes and dislikes. This may be accounted a real gain in international understanding, but its durability depends upon the atmosphere encountered by the student after his return to Japan. This subject will be examined in detail in Part II of this paper.

Biographies of Herbert Passin and John W. Bennett appear at the end of the next article, The America-educated Japanese, II.

The America-educated Japanese, II

Images After Return to Japan; Conclusions

By HERBERT PASSIN and JOHN W. BENNETT

AS the student steps from ship or plane and sets foot on the soil of Japan once more, he carries in his miscellaneous assortment of baggage a picture of America which is different from the one he took away with him. For a majority it is a clearer, more realistic picture than the indistinct image with which they left; for some it is much the same old picture; for others it is completely new, even to the frame, the canvas, and the pigments. Just as their image of America had been painted by the totality of their experiences up to that point—before they went abroad as well as during their experience in an alien land—so the retouching and the revision, the setting right of a line, the addition or subtraction of a color, will go on for the rest of their lives. It is our purpose in Part II to inquire into the forces which continue to act upon that inner portrait of America—along with all the attitudes, ideas, hopes, aspirations, and conceptions of one's own country and its institutions that this implies.

THE PROBLEM OF REINTEGRATION

Whatever the views of the particular returnee concerning America may be, all will face one vital problem: how to achieve reintegration into Japanese life. This problem of reintegration has two aspects: acceptance in a career and social acceptance. The career problem is to make the American training a "plus," not a "minus"; social acceptance is a problem of reintegration into cliques and social circles, as well as of adjust-

ment to the contemporary stream of ideas, and is therefore more complex than the career problem.

The most important aspect of social acceptance is what to do about new habits of life, new ways of self-realization and self-expression acquired in America, which may be inappropriate to Japan and which will serve to distinguish the returnees from their fellows. For some, this will be a minor problem, easily resolved, but for students who have been in America a long time and have become thoroughly accustomed to American freedom of interpersonal relations and material comforts, the readjustments may be very painful. They will also have to contend with a general public disposition to be envious of them for having had the privilege of transcending the routine, humdrum existence of their fellows, and critical of them for what is suspected as cultural alienation. They are often felt to be "americanized" in manner and values, critical of Japan, and regarding themselves as superior.

In the career area, the main problem is to secure acceptance of the value of their American education. Persons who go from an established position to study in America will have little difficulty, but those who have had all of their higher education abroad may find that the market value of their training is substantially less than that of an elite Japanese education. They will also discover, possibly, that they are out of touch with the important cliques which serve as channels of advancement in their intended careers.

The strategy of return

Confronted by these problems, the student usually develops for himself what might be called a general "strategy of return"—analogous to the "strategy of adjustment" in America.¹ This may be a very conscious plan of attack or it may be a vaguely systematic way of responding to the pressures which are felt or anticipated. The strategies will differ with the returnee's estimate of the situation that confronts him, his characteristic psychological style, and the nature of his goals. His image of America affects this general strategy and is also affected by it.

Three general factors seem to influence the stability of the images of America which the returnees bring home with them: (1) the extent of identification and alienation in regard to their principal membership groups and to Japan as a whole; (2) the extent to which America and the American experience are a source of gratification and self-esteem in their lives in Japan; and (3) the extent to which, from the perspective of their life plans, America's behavior and relations with Japan allow them to identify with or accept the role of "America-educated returnee," assigned them by the public.

Conflicting identifications

Although for purposes of convenience we speak of the individual's identifications as if they were unidirectional, it should not be assumed that in fact the student is identified with only one group. More characteristically, he is identified with many groups—deriving from family, school, peer, business, and religious connections—whose several atmospheres with respect to the image of America may differ widely. Consequently he may experience conflict on

¹ See Part I, section on "The woman rebel."

several levels. First, there may be a conflict among his home membership groups. As a member of the class of "intellectuals," he is under the general pressures of the stratum as a whole, which today is somewhat hostile to America. But as a Christian, he may be impelled toward a more favorable interpretation. Second, his conflict of identifications may lie not among specific groups so much as between America "as a whole" and Japan "as a whole." "Japanese or American!" cried a brilliant newspaperman, "that's the question I have never been able to decide all my life." Among older returnees, this problem of conflicting identification, "Japanese or American," has plagued them with tragic tenacity. Some never fully resolve the question; all must deal with it in some manner.

Obviously the longer the student is in America, the more serious this problem is for him, because there is more time for his American identifications to be strengthened and his home identifications weakened. The problem of divided loyalty, of conflicting identification, is therefore often not as severe in the case of postwar students, especially those who have gone abroad under special governmental programs, because they usually stay for relatively short periods of one or two years. Beyond that point however, the problem of conflicting identification becomes increasingly serious.

The returnee and America's behavior

In the course of his experience, the student develops a set of expectations about what America is and how she will act in certain situations. If America's behavior is in conformity with his expectations, then he finds himself able to identify with her. However, when America's actions violate his expectations, then he is often resentful and disillusioned, and in some cases—as has

THE WOMAN REBEL

The "women rebels," like other extremely alienated students, are so deeply involved with America, and their images of America are so favorable, that in many cases they should properly be characterized as "americanized," that is, they tend to perceive Japan from a strongly American point of view. When the woman returns home, often with great reluctance, it is once again to the situation from which she had "escaped." This time, however, she hopes to make a new, emancipated life for herself and to put into practice her new skills, ideas, and habits of self-expression. By contrast with the Japan she encounters again, she recalls America as a land of freedom for her, where women are given every opportunity for full self-realization. They may have a career if they like, or marriage and family life, which she now feels need not mean the traditional Japanese subordination of the wife to the arbitrary will of the husband and of the needs of the individual to the demands of the traditional family unit, but rather mutual respect and consideration among the members of the family.

To the extent that her experiences in America were enhancing and liberating, she feels her experiences back in Japan as constricting and confining. She is unable to act the part of the traditional meek, submissive Japanese woman which may often be demanded of her, especially in relations with males. If she is not married, she will find that many men (and their families) do not want her for a wife because they think she is too americanized, too forward and aggressive for a woman, too intractable—in fact somewhat defeminized. If she is lucky, she may find a Westernized man whose own values are such that he prefers a wife who can be a companion rather than just a household drudge.

happened in the postwar period—he has felt betrayed and let down. If America does not act as he feels it should, whether it be in regard to liberalism, respect for individual rights, "fairness," or equality of treatment of Japanese, he finds it difficult to continue to accept the American label applied to him by the public. Many make efforts to disassociate themselves from America; or reflect sadly that "this" is no longer the "America that we knew"; or feel that the "true" Americanism—what they had learned and absorbed and accepted as American democracy—must be defended against the Americans themselves.

In order to illustrate these various forces affecting the returnee's image of America, we shall follow the return careers of the three types discussed in Part I under the section "The Japanese Student in America." It will be remembered that they represent selected *postwar* types, and are not completely illustrative of the *prewar* student types and their problems.²

² As noted in Part I, the most characteristic prewar type is not discussed except incidentally. This was the young man who came to the United States before completing his Japanese schooling and before establishing secure peer group identifications; or one who stayed in America a long time, usually with some strong revolt motive. Like the woman rebel, their American experience was usually extremely gratifying, and they underwent substantial personality and behavioral changes. Like the women, again, they found their return adjustment to Japan extremely difficult. Unlike the postwar ideologists, who rather quickly become negative towards America, the prewar group remains extremely friendly to America throughout most of their lives, often to their own great detriment. They seem to differ from the postwar ideologists in several key respects: (1) they were more alienated; (2) they came at an earlier age, so that they were more plastic and less attached to Japan; (3) they were more highly gratified while in the United States; (4) they became more americanized; and (5) they were more isolated from peer group attachments upon their return.

Otherwise she may be condemned to spend her days in lonely spinsterhood or seek some desperate solution to the problem of realizing her femininity.

Or she may, instead, elect to devote herself to a career. Here too she will run into many difficulties, although not as many as before the war. There are fewer opportunities for educated women than for men, her tenure will be somewhat insecure, and her pay will be lower than a man's. However, no matter what work she goes into, her American education will be a great asset to her, and today many new opportunities are opening up in such areas as elementary education, girls' colleges, English teaching, women's affairs, foreign trade (especially in foreign firms), and Japanese-foreign liaison. Since the occupation, there has been a vast increase in the number of jobs as well as in the range of roles permitted women.

Whatever course she takes—unusual circumstances aside—the woman rebel's image of America tends to be confirmed and reinforced by her experience. From the point of view of her American experience, she perceives the position of women in Japan as highly constraining; this in turn confirms her image of America as a place of freedom for women. Her relations with Japanese men persuade her all the more firmly that the American norms are superior. If she finds work for which she considers herself qualified, she tends to credit it to her American education. If she is unable to do so, then she blames Japan for not giving women a chance and sees this as further confirmation of her contrasting images of America and Japan.

Group pressures

Although the women rebels are alienated from the traditional norms of Japanese custom, they are not necessarily

isolated. At worst they may belong to groups of other women just like themselves. However, it should be noted that many of the groups with which the woman rebel would normally associate are today extremely critical of America, and she must come to terms with them. Some respond by a more tenacious reassertion of their favorable attitudes toward America and withdraw to circles where these are acceptable. Others, however, as part of the process of identifying themselves with the group's goals, may come to share its views of America, or at least to give more prominence to the negative components—always present, even if subordinated—of their own image. Although she is unlikely to have changed her conception of America as a land of freedom for women, she will then be more likely to associate with it her negative judgments of other aspects of American culture, such as race prejudice or restrictions on freedom of speech or the growing "militarization" of American life or the "shallowness" of American culture. This may be accompanied for her by regret that the America she has known is "changing" or is in danger of being displaced by the "new forces."

It is important in this connection to remember that the present atmosphere in Japan exerts very strong pressure on the woman returnee to become unfavorable towards America. If she is associated with groups where American connections are accepted, then she may have no difficulty. But many of the groups to which the woman rebel is drawn because of their general sympathy with the feminist movement are today hostile to the United States, so that the returnees are under pressure to accommodate themselves in order to retain the association. Furthermore, within these groups, increasingly, Russia and China are being offered as com-

peting models for the woman rebel,³ because they too are dedicated to the emancipation of women. Therefore the ideologically oriented woman rebel can turn somewhat away from America without giving up her devotion to the feminine cause; there are other directions in which she can express it.

THE IDEOLOGIST

It will be recalled that these young people are generally disillusioned with their own society and inclined to feel that America holds the answers to their questions. In Japan, they scornfully identify themselves with the so-called *après-guerre* generation and are often considered *Amerika-akogare* ("America struck"). Since their expectations are unrealistically exalted, as has been shown in Part I of this paper, they are rather easily frustrated by their experiences in America, and they often return substantially disenchanted with America.

If the ideologist is still in the state earlier referred to as "double rejection," he may withdraw from association with people and escape from both Japan and America, as for example to "French culture," "Asianism," or some other exotic field. He will remain dissatisfied and will continue his search for values and identifications that he can accept.

Very often, however, his partial dissatisfaction with America leads him to search for a basis for re-establishing identifications at home. In some cases it was found that the ideologist's disillusion with America led him to compulsive efforts to identify himself with something in Japan and to a retrospective approval of many things in Japan of which he had disapproved before.

³ A striking example is the recent publicity about the so-called "Russian" and "Chinese" methods of "painless childbirth." A few prominent institutions have begun to offer the treatment on a voluntary basis.

"All this bowing and scraping isn't so bad after all," said a young diplomat. "I used to hate it, but now I think there's something to it. It has an order, a graciousness, and a sense of measure which I had never realized before."

Group pressures

Because of the negative predispositions which may develop during his stay in America, the ideologist tends to be responsive to groups in Japan also having a negative orientation toward America. Since the Japanese intellectual world as a whole is today somewhat negatively disposed on political grounds toward the United States, in almost any identification the returnee establishes therein he will find his own unfavorable inclinations supported by the group atmosphere. In turn, his unfavorable attitude, based on "direct experience" in America, will tend to strengthen the negative direction of the group atmosphere. His own negative dispositions and those of the identification group will echo and amplify each other.

Even if he were not completely negative at the time of his return, the returnee often finds his lingering hesitations swept away by the pressures of the groups with which he desires to identify himself. Their negative orientation will swamp his remaining friendly images and inclinations and will confirm whatever negative ones he has. It must be understood that in many cases this is no simple abstract search for identification. Very often the returnee feels that he will have to make terms with the surrounding pressures if he wishes to continue his career. The atmosphere of the identification group will press the returnee to adapt his image of America by a very selective recall of his American experience. Since most intellectual groups hold the lib-

eral-critical image of America (Type IV) the ideologist will often find in his experience confirmation of "fascist" trends in America, "decline of civil rights," "shallowness" or "lack of culture," "absence of idealism." Some may respond to this pressure with reluctance, but others will not be unduly distressed to give whatever mark of good faith is required by the new identification groups.

In some cases, the disillusioned ideologist may find his identification with groups that are not necessarily negative towards America. In this case, his negative disposition may be somewhat tempered, or, where his hostility to America is only partial, it may be checked.

The extent to which the American experience is a source of professional and social gratification will also be important in the development of his attitudes. In many circles, having been to America will give him no prestige at all, but on the contrary will lay him open to suspicions of being too "pro-American" or "americanized" or "reactionary" or whatever other epithet reflects the bias of the group. Professionally as well, unless he has started from a firm position in Japanese society to which he returns after his American study, he often finds that American training—especially in nontechnical fields—may open no doors for him. In other fields, however, his American experience will be a definite "plus," whatever his own attitude may be. If the social capital brought him by his American study is substantial enough, socially and professionally, he may very well temper his hostility and in some cases even recover a more favorable view of America than he had when he arrived home. Some negatively inclined ideologists are surprised to discover that their status at home has improved because of their American experience, and that the lan-

guage ability and technical skills they acquired in America are highly esteemed in circles which they respect.

Japanese-American relations

The public identification of "American returnee" is peculiarly important for the ideologist. Since he is very sensitive to ideological issues, he is very attentive to the course of Japanese-American relations. If America pursues a course which is accepted in his groups or which he can defend as "democratic" or "favorable to Japan," then he is able to identify himself with it and to take some pride in his American connection. In this case, the favorable elements of his image of America are strengthened: America is a democratic country; it is helpful to Japan; it *does* support the position of his group. If America's course is defined in a contrary manner, then his negative views are strengthened. In the early period of the occupation, for example, many returnees along with other intellectuals enthusiastically espoused the American reforms. When occupation policy shifted to emphasis on economic rehabilitation and then later to the reconstitution of Japan as an ally, many of them felt not only in disagreement but also peculiarly outraged and betrayed.

Since one of the ideologist's main goals has been to associate with Americans on a level of equality, he will often be extremely sensitive to anything that suggests a slight or a failure to accord him the treatment to which he feels he is entitled. The occupation period has therefore been peculiarly trying, because Americans inevitably had a superior status to which it has been difficult for these returnees to adjust. For students who had learned in America how to interact with Americans on a plane of equality, to return to a situation of inferiority has been extremely galling.

One young man of upper-class origin sneered:

Look at these colonels lording it over everybody here. You'd think that they had always been used to this high living. But I have known them in America; I have seen them washing dishes and helping with the household chores. They're just ordinary people. I have utter contempt for the way they behave here.

Even the prewar group—who, by contrast with the postwar "ideologists" discussed here, have managed to retain their favorable attitudes towards America throughout their lives—are vulnerable to this experience.

THE ADJUSTOR

The adjustor usually returns from America feeling that he has had a satisfactory experience and that he has acquired skills and knowledge which he will be able to use. Although he thinks highly of America, and especially of her technology, power, and efficiency, he is glad to be back home in Japan. His life in America has been satisfying, he has had new experiences, and he has perhaps experienced a freedom in living styles and a vacation from home responsibilities that he has enjoyed. But he is glad to return to customs, habits, and behaviors that are more familiar and less of a strain.

Since he usually starts from a fairly secure position at home, very often it is expected that he will put the ideas, knowledge, and skill he has acquired in America to work. Therefore he has gratifying experiences immediately. He soon learns, however, that it is advisable for him to be cautious about flaunting his American experience, because some people will be jealous and resentful, and others will be hostile to America.

If, however, he is unable to make use of his American training, or if he re-

ceives no recognition for it—because, let us say, he did not have a really secure place, or his employers are not interested—then the adjustor may see this as further proof of Japan's backwardness and of America's advancement. His negative feelings about Japan—that it is backward, unprogressive, rigid—will be strengthened.

Group pressures

The highly alienated people⁴ are often outside and independent of home groups, or else they may keep themselves within milieux which are extremely indulgent towards their American experience, such as American returnee circles and mission institutions. But the adjustor types, with fairly strong original ties in Japan, are peculiarly affected by the atmosphere within which they must live. It is therefore very important to understand the images of America which characterize the specific groups in which they interact.

If his major home membership groups are somewhat hostile to America, the adjustor will incline to acquiesce in their views, because even if he has developed a somewhat friendly view of America during his stay, he is not strongly committed to it and not deeply involved in it. This can happen to many of the adjustors whose main sphere of activity is in intellectual areas as, for example, universities or certain newspapers or the higher levels of government service.

However, there are many groups in Japan which have a dominantly favorable image of America or an outlook not incompatible with a favorable image. When the returnee's identification

⁴ For example, women rebels or "ideologists." Among the prewar students, almost all of those who had gone at an early age or had stayed a long time would have been in this category.

is with such groups, his favorable images are subjected to much less pressure. For example, people associated with church activities, engineering, and business circles, or with the Boy Scouts, are able to maintain a favorable image more easily than are people associated with, say, the Teachers' Union. Again, upper-class identification seems to allow the individual considerable latitude; upper-class returnees often retain their favorable images of America fairly easily not only because the upper classes are somewhat favorable to America today, but also because they seem to be able to accommodate nonconformity more easily.

Advancement in a career

Generally, the adjustor has acquired some social capital as a result of his American study. Since he is able to attribute his gratifications and the enhancement of his position and his self-esteem to America, his favorable images are strengthened. An engineer, for example, who is able to put his newly acquired skills to work in his company, and perhaps receive a promotion, feels very warm towards the United States. In many cases, individuals are accepted *specifically* because of their American experiences as, for example, an English teacher who receives respect and advantages because he has studied English literature in America, or a person who becomes an accountant because he has learned American double-entry book-keeping. In these cases, the favorable images of America tend to remain steady, and they will even resist substantial attack.

Japanese-American relations

Although the adjustor has a relatively stable position at home and is not too deeply involved with America, he is, like all returnees, affected by changes in the atmosphere of Japanese-American

relations. Like the others, he has the problem of the extent to which he can accept the public identity of "America-connected" that may be thrust upon him. Since he is less ego-involved with America, he may be able to handle it somewhat more easily than other types, but he cannot escape the matter entirely. When America's course appears congenial to his reference groups—whether in business or the intellectual world—he can identify himself with America easily. But when America's action is contrary to his expectations and causes him difficulties, he is able to reject the identification fairly easily because of his relative noninvolvement. If his position is very secure, however, he may be able to exert a moderating and tempering influence around him by being "objective" about America. But if in his associations with Americans—individuals, companies, government agencies, embassies, institutions—he is not accorded the equality and respect he feels he deserves, then, like the other types, the adjustor may easily become very resentful and hostile.

In general, however, since the adjustor sees himself primarily as a Japanese, securely identified and located at home and relatively uninvolved emotionally with America, he can adjust his image of America rather easily to whatever the circumstances of his life—his identifications and associations, his career situation, the general political atmosphere—seem to require.

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

Having considered the general character of the Japanese student's image of America both during his American sojourn (Part I) and upon his return home (Part II), we wish now to turn our attention to two specific problems: (1) the effects of the American occupation on the Japanese student image of America and (2) the development of a

"realistic" view of American life and culture.

THE OCCUPATION

The occupation has dominated contemporary Japanese experience in a way that has yet to reveal its full significance. As noted in the section "Historical Backgrounds" in Part I, the occupation was in a sense the culmination of several generations of Japanese-American relations in which America played a kind of tutorial role, with Japan as disciple or pupil. The occupation reaffirmed that role, but because the context of relations it created was on the whole unpleasant for Japan—dependency, helplessness, subordination—the ambivalent attitudes were intensified.

The "power image"

Very briefly, the occupation brought with it an intensification of several elements of the traditional images of America, namely, those concerned with America's power and strength. On the unfavorable side, Americans are seen as arrogant, demanding, pushing, disrespectful, high living, luxury loving, and corruptible. The more favorable obverse of this is that Americans are skillful, accomplished, generous, bighearted, and tolerant. Obviously this occupation-period power image is related to the images described earlier, but since it has been reinforced by the direct personal experience of many people it has the possibility of becoming the dominant image of America in Japan.

For a good part of the younger generation in Japan, it is this image of Americans which has replaced, or fused with, the images which derive from the earlier historical relations between Japan and America. Many of the younger students who have come to the United States in the postwar period have had a substantial part of this view built into

their composite image of America. For many, the image has not been a settled thing so much as it has been a question, an issue to be resolved: Are Americans the powerful, arrogant people we see or are told about, or are they the accomplished, considerate, friendly people that they sometimes appear to be? Many Japanese endeavor to resolve this question in their own minds while they are in the United States. Therefore their judgment of the Americans they see in Japan forms an important part of the framework of perception with which the postwar students see America.

Throughout the occupation period, Japanese had to "look upward" to Americans because of their power and status—even if not because of their presumed personal qualities of intelligence and ability. Therefore there has been a strong appeal in the idea of sharing some of the "superior" qualities they perceived in Americans by going to the same fount of wisdom, America or, alternatively, American educational institutions. The occupation period has seen the revival of the "Western fever" which raged during the Meiji era when the West exerted an irresistible fascination.

A typical case is an upper-class college student who had gone to work for the occupation because he was attracted by the strength and energy of the Americans and also because he had to earn money to go through school. He was so much impressed by the Americans that he could not rest until he had left his university in mid-term and gone to America. "I wanted to see what it was they had, these bright young men who were running our country. I felt that whatever it was, we Japanese should have some of it too." The Americans with whom he associated in Japan became for him a standard against which to measure himself: was he as good as they or not? It was

under the impulsion of this combined image motivation that he spent three years in the United States, learning what he could for himself and for his country and measuring himself in the process. When he returned to Japan, he had finally come to feel that Japanese *could* stand up to Americans, that he had acquired what he needed from America (and, incidentally, that it was not so much), and that there was much he still needed from Japan rather than from America.

EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA

While they are in the United States, many young Japanese respond to this power image with an attitude of virtual self-abasement before the "superior" Americans—these poised, self-confident, breezy, *achieving* people. This high-status image of Americans—which existed in the past but has been intensified by the occupation—can constitute an insurmountable obstacle to social interaction with Americans, and many postwar Japanese students are unable to transcend it in the short year or two of their stay in the United States.⁶ Others find that they can interact with Americans on a basis of equality, and the discovery that a Japanese can attain a common level with Americans, *in America*, is a gratifying experience indeed—although, as has been made clear in other contexts, this gratification by itself will not necessarily ensure a friendly view of the United States. In some cases, it serves as a demonstration that Japanese can do as well as Americans if they choose.

These exalted images of America have been strengthened by the tensions of

⁶ This problem is the subject of special investigation in the research program and involves the concept of "cue confusion"; that is, a misunderstanding, by both the Japanese and the American, of the appropriate "cues" for behavior in social interaction.

the unique historical experience of defeat and occupation by a reforming conqueror. Consequently, an exposure to American life as it is actually lived tends to break up the "superman" stereotype. The longer the student is in the United States and the wider his circle of contacts and relationships, the more he comes to develop a realistic perspective toward the superman components of his image. Americans come to be seen in different contexts: they, too, are pitiable, weak, ordinary, prone to make mistakes, confused—like other people. Many are able to see American power as an incident of current world developments rather than as an inherent attribute of American national character. This exposure to American life unquestionably helps to reduce the excessive emphasis on power and wealth which is so characteristic of many contemporary images of the United States, and it makes Americans appear, not cold and remote, but human and fallible.

THE REALISTIC VIEW

It is therefore to be expected that many students return with more moderate views of America than those with which they went. Those who went with exalted images of America usually return seeing America as somewhat less than they had imagined. They feel that it is no longer unattainable and that, however advanced it may be in many respects, America differs from Japan only in degree. A newspaperman who went to the United States to study public opinion techniques had gone with the idea that American techniques were hopelessly beyond the attainment of Japanese. But, "I was able to put things in perspective," he said.

I had always felt, like all Japanese, that the United States is much more advanced than Japan. And this I found to be true. But I was also able to discover the limits of this advancement. I gained confidence

that American advancement is not completely out of sight, that it is attainable for us too. Japanese who have never been to the States think of the United States as a paradise, perfect in all respects. But I have seen it whittled down to size. I know what is strong about it, but I also know what is weak. The main thing I have learned is that it is normal and human. There are poor people as well as rich people. Not all houses are big and beautiful. On the other side of the fence, the race problem is not all as bad as it is supposed to be. . . . Americans are not all happy in their paradise. The great technical advances in the United States are not miraculous and mysterious; they are the result of favorable circumstances and hard work. Japanese can attain them to the extent that they are necessary.

It is not only the exalted views that change, of course. Students with extremely unfavorable components in their image of America also seem to undergo a tempering experience. A brilliant young diplomat of aristocratic, nationalistic lineage, who retained much of his hatred of Americans as the wartime enemy, found that two years in

America changed his conception of what Americans were like. They did not all look down on Japan, as he had suspected; they were not all arrogant and ruthless; and they were not all shallow. At the same time, however, he noted that life in America was not quite as unfettered and free as he had believed.

In the words of a crack newspaperman who has had the advantages and disadvantages of public association with America throughout his adult life:

That exchange program's a great thing, I'm telling you. Those kids come back convinced; they learn all kinds of things. They see America as it is, not as they thought it was. They see it's better than they thought and worse than they thought.

Precisely how many Japanese who visit the United States return with this realistic image is not known, but to the extent that they do the exchange program may be regarded as successful. For, in the last analysis, what more can we ask of foreign visitors than that, whether they like us or not, their attitude be based upon America as a reality, not as a stereotype?

Herbert Passin, Columbus, Ohio, research associate in anthropology, Ohio State University, has served on the faculties of Northwestern University and the University of California (Berkeley) in anthropology and was formerly deputy chief, Division of Public Opinion and Sociological Research, Civil Information and Education Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan. He is coauthor of *The Japanese Village in Transition* (1950) and of numerous articles on social change in rural southern Illinois, culture and food habits, culture change among the Tarahumara Indians of Mexico, and Japanese and other Far Eastern subjects. He was formerly contributing editor of *Acta Americana* (journal of the Inter-American Society for Anthropology and Geography).

John W. Bennett, Ph.D., Columbus, Ohio, is associate professor of anthropology at the Ohio State University. He has served as chief of the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division of the Occupation of Japan and has conducted research for the United States Department of Agriculture, the University of Chicago, the Social Science Research Council, and several wartime governmental agencies. He is presently supervisor of the Research Program in Japanese Social Relations, at Ohio State, and is author of a series of research monographs on Japanese society. He is a social anthropologist by training, but has done extensive work in the fields of sociology and social psychology, and is Vice-President of the Society for Applied Anthropology. In addition to numerous articles in professional journals, he is coauthor with Melvin Tumin of *Social Life: Structure and Function* (1949).

The Mexican Student Views the United States*

By RALPH L. BEALS

THE close proximity of Mexico and the United States means that the Mexican student usually arrives in this country with enough knowledge to make a rapid and satisfactory adjustment. Many students spend several years in this country, interspersed with visits home. They tend to scatter widely through the country, and it is difficult to find a reasonably large group for study at a single university.

This paper is based primarily upon intensive guided interviews with ten students at the University of California at Los Angeles; the total hours for each student ranged from five to more than twenty. Confirmatory evidence is provided by background information, a simple projective test, and an ideological test from over forty additional students from seven other universities and colleges. The majority of the students interviewed were graduate students. All were mature, serious, and intelligent. Opinions often were positive and the result of serious reflection. Overwhelmingly they come from middle- and upper-class urban backgrounds.

On arrival the Mexican student finds the material surroundings and living conditions much as he expected. He is prepared to adjust his way of living in situations where a student from a more similar Anglo-Saxon background may see only a senseless and irritating deviation from a familiar pattern. On the other hand, unlike the Japanese student, he is able to accept most Ameri-

can behavior at face value. But when less tangible aspects of culture are encountered the Mexican student has to modify many of his views. These modifications consist primarily in discovering the limited applicability of opinions and the development of complementary or extended images.

MACHINES AND WEALTH

The student changes little in his view of United States material culture. Although students know some Americans are poor, American living standards are believed to be high. Expectations of a mechanical civilization with many gadgets are fulfilled. American diet is good but the food is without inspiration. Large cities, big buildings, and heavy traffic the student expects, but he usually comes from or has lived in the fourth city of the hemisphere and reiteration of "the biggest and the best" irritates him mildly. The United States is

... a big country with civilized people, all of them, or at least most of them, having a high standard for living well. ... I knew that ... the worker of a factory has his own car and his refrigerator ... all the things that make for a comfortable living which in Mexico our laborers don't have.

SPIRITUAL VERSUS MATERIAL VALUES

On arrival most students accept and are little disturbed by the technical and mechanical superiority of the United States because they are convinced of the moral superiority of Mexican culture with its primary emphasis upon spiritual values. They are sure that, although relatively few are in want, Americans are selfish and irreligious. Family life is lacking, divorce is almost

universal, children are without discipline, "all American girls are easy," and there is no respect for art, literature, or music. These views are modified but not without struggle.

The impression we had was that the United States didn't care very much about art or people who really counted. I believed Americans did not teach anything about living; being phlegmatic, practical, not sentimental, not having poetry. ... Of course, afterwards, this changed when I began reading other things.

Not only are the moral aspects of social relations seen to be very different (these will be discussed more fully later), but some come to feel that Americans are more religious than Mexicans. At least, most are aware that church attendance, especially among men, is greater. The number of Catholics and Catholic churches and the number of Catholics in high position are a great surprise to many students. Others develop considerable interest in the role of Protestantism. One thoughtful Catholic student regularly attended services at a Protestant church. At the end of a year he concluded that he must respect sincere Protestants as he had come to respect any group with sound moral standards. (At the same time, he was convinced that Catholicism was best for Mexico and for himself.)

Some students continue to complain that they find less opportunity to attend cultural events, such as concerts, than they had in Mexico, although in fact they fail to attend convenient, high quality, and inexpensive concerts, theater, and lectures on campus. Other students recognize that desires for a good income, a good home, and a car are equally strong at home. The major difference is seen to be that these are realizable goals for many more people in the United States. Many say that American students are motivated

in their studies only by desires for personal advancement, while Mexican students wish to contribute to the development of their country. At the same time, paradoxically, they feel that Americans are less egocentric and more sociocentric, more willing to devote themselves to the welfare of society.

The discovery that the dichotomy between materialistic and spiritual goals is less sharp than expected seems to pose a severe threat to the self-esteem of the Mexican student. Only students with an objective sense of cultural relativism seem undisturbed. Others either seem ripe for alienation from their own culture or take refuge in an iteration of moral superiority.

Thus a student admires the high standard of living in the United States but finds social patterns "much looser than ours," and thinks that the achievement "led them [Americans] to lose all those moral values of our time." "I still think that we pay more attention to moral values." "I still think that almost all the people in the United States think that the only goal in life is to get money, to get work. ... Besides making money, we have another goal."

INDIVIDUALISM WITH ORDER

Initially the student often sees in the United States the apex of "mass culture" and the prototype of the "mass man." He is apt soon to recognize that there are other kinds of individualism than the Spanish derived "egoismo" of the Mexican. It is true that few make the connection between United States individualism and the relative independence of children and of women.

In Mexico ... a boy of eighteen years old is really a boy; he belongs completely to his parents. Here an eighteen-year-old boy, he knows how to do things, he knows how to choose between things, he knows

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how to answer for himself. That's what I mean by individualism.

Most students observe more respect for law and order in the United States and relate this to greater respect for others and their rights. One student early said, "There exists here a great liberty which is frequently converted into license, a license which is beyond that which is moral." Later he said:

... here in America they have really a wider freedom than we have back home, in everything. And they have a more wide concept of democracy, and their system of education creates more individualistic ways, and they are brought up in a more independent way of thinking. . . . The standard of living is more standardized than back home, and that happens with education, and so the social circle you can live in here is wider than back home.

The same student at first said Americans were superficial; later he remarked: "... now I've met more of them . . . now I can realize very clearly that they have another character and another way of thinking."

Previous attitudes toward economic life are affected by the new view of individualism. Thus, one student points out that the American economic system is more practical than the Mexican because all Americans work together for common goals. At the same time, as another comments, "In the United States great companies, great capital, exist, but still there is opportunity for competition."

More than on any other single aspect, Mexican students agree that what they like best in the United States is order. This emerges repeatedly in both interviews and projective materials. Expressions range from admiration for the greater respect for law and order to the way traffic is regulated, to the ease of getting a laboratory experimental animal. The order of American life appeals even to those who maintain

relatively hostile attitudes toward the United States. After an unpleasant experience on a visit home, one hostile subject exclaimed: "This could never have happened in the United States!"

SOCIAL RELATIONS

Although most students reject traditional Mexican society, they are surprised by the weakness of class distinctions in the United States. One student, here for several years, says his worst shock was to see the president of a bank wash the living-room windows in preparation for a party. Another remarks that here even a boy of the upper class does not mind working in a gas station or a grocery store, or selling papers. In Mexico this would be considered "... a terrible thing for those who do it. 'Can't his family support him?'" "Something that impressed me very much was the confidence of the people themselves."

The father of this girl was working until eleven or twelve o'clock at night, and he got his hands covered with oil. His behavior and way of treating us [were] exactly the same as the wealthy people, so that they don't feel bad if they are workers and if they have dirty hands, and they try to have the same things the wealthy people have—a refrigerator and a radio and a stove, and some things that can make life comfortable. That impressed me very much. In my own country the people that work with their hands are considered very low and, well, their behavior is in general really low.

Great differences are perceived between child-rearing practices and the social position of women in the two countries. Except for a few males, students shift images radically and favorably. Although students continue to feel that American family life is less close and rewarding, that our divorce rate is undesirably high, and that many children have insufficient discipline, they reject the authoritarian family

patterns of Mexico in favor of the better examples of American family life and child rearing. Shifts are most marked among women and among males resident some time in the United States, least marked or absent among a few males retaining a highly traditional outlook.

Mexican males revise their opinions that "all American girls are easy," but, regardless of time spent in the United States, they react strongly to the subject of American women with many contradictory comments. American girls are found easy to meet and to get on with. Often men admire the relaxed and sexually impersonal friendships that may exist between boys and girls. On the other hand, casual affections and intimacies which in Mexico are associated either with a serious courtship or with looseness here mean neither, to the confusion and perplexity of the Mexican male.

Mexican girls have less difficulty in understanding the United States male, although the greater informality is at first interpreted as lack of respect and is resented. Girls like the greater freedom they have in the United States, but American boys seem superficial. One girl at first thought American boys would make good husbands; later she hoped that she could find a Mexican "with something inside him," but who had been in the United States long enough to have acquired American attitudes toward women. Put crudely, some Mexican girls want continuation of the extreme formality and courtesy they might expect in upper-class circles in Mexico before marriage, but they also want a husband who will wash the dishes.

Mexicans feel that Americans are very friendly and courteous, but that they do not make friendships. The majority wish to be associated with American students and to know them better; inability to do so often is a major

source of disappointment. Mexicans recognize that the American student is busy and preoccupied with the established ties of his home environment, but they find social relationships to be highly superficial and somewhat disappointing. Many say that they associate with other foreign students only because of insufficient social contacts with United States students. On the other hand, some students find that to know foreign students from many countries is an important unexpected gain from their stay in the United States. Often they form quite new impressions: "I considered [some of] them backward countries, I didn't know of many of the latest advances—so I had to change my mind on many things."

THE UNIVERSITY

The Mexican student often is shocked at the competitiveness engendered by the university grading system in the United States. Others apparently expect it. Some think the professors present their material in less organized fashion than in Mexico, but most say that the informality of presentation makes teaching more effective. Greater opportunities for discussion, less authoritarian presentation, and more contacts with the professor are seen as advantages, although some had expected to find more than exists. Those few, however, in whom some professor has taken close personal interest obviously find this tremendously rewarding. Success in achieving academic goals and the establishment of reasonably satisfying social relationships increase favorableness toward the university.

DEMOCRACY AND IMPERIALISM

United States politics and foreign policy are of deep concern to a substantial number of Mexican students. This concern seems to be more objective and less emotional than is the case with students from some other coun-

tries. The importance of the United States on the world scene is no new thing to the Mexican, and he has learned to live with the facts even though he may not entirely like them.

The Mexican student tends to support current United States foreign policy, although he has misgivings about the future. He believes the United States is and should be economically and militarily strong and must maintain a firm policy toward Russia. Although he does not believe that the United States is always right and Russia is always wrong, few consider the United States today militarily aggressive or politically imperialistic. In part this is because the American people are seen as not imperialistic; indeed, some students, especially those who have been in the Middle West, feel Americans are too isolationist. Economic imperialism is thought to exist, but the Marshall Plan and Point Four are generally viewed as primarily altruistic, despite elements of self-interest.

Students who formerly regarded the United States as imperialistic tend to modify their views. One rather anti-American student admits that some kinds of "economic imperialism" can be beneficial for underdeveloped countries. Others recognize differences in corporations, and all tend to make sharper distinctions between corporations, government, and the American people. As one said:

Before the war I had a certain prejudice against the United States. . . . During the war they were constructing a big plantation. . . . I saw one camp, a working camp. It was one of the most pitiful things I have ever seen.

Yet he added:

Some of my best friends are Americans. . . . I'm not prejudiced against Americans. No, I really like people for what they're worth, and I do like Americans, and I do

like certain parts of the way of living, the American way of life. . . .

Most students may feel that the United States is not today imperialistic, except to some degree in the economic field, but they fear a revival. In evaluating these fears it should be remembered that memories of United States intervention are still vivid in Mexico. They anticipate that America will in the future re-embark upon an imperialistic course.

The United States is thought by most students to have an effective functioning political democracy. Some feel the effectiveness is lessened by the power of the mass media and perhaps underestimate the long range discrimination of the American voter. Few know much of the history of liberalism or the labor movement in the United States, and some are deeply concerned with what they perceive as trends toward fascism. Domestically they cite such names as McCarthy, Jenner, and McCarran in support of their view. Externally, they point out United States support of fascist governments in Latin America and elsewhere, governments they feel will turn against the United States whenever it is to their interest to do so. Fear of fascist trends is associated with fear of imperialism and a revival of past United States policies in Latin America. To these fascist trends they attribute the rising anti-American sentiment throughout Latin America.

Discrimination

Linked to belief in fascist trends in contemporary United States political life is the amount of intolerance and discrimination encountered. Even the best-prepared students are surprised and shocked by the discrepancy between professed democratic ideals and the discrimination against Negroes in the United States, especially in the South. On the other hand, little room

tion can be discovered toward discrimination against Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the United States.

Acceptance of discrimination against Mexican-Americans reveals the strength of class attitudes and class identifications among even the most liberal students. Few students have themselves experienced discrimination in the United States; individual maliciousness or bigotry is not so interpreted. Rather, discrimination against Mexican-Americans is interpreted in "home country" class terms. Thus a student who is deeply moved by the condition of the Negro in the South can say:

Of course, we know that Mexicans are discriminated against in a social way, because they are poor; but if they are rich they are not discriminated [against]. . . . I think people in Mexico believe that Mexican-Americans are discriminated [against] not exactly because they are Mexican, but because they are poor and ignorant, just like they would be discriminated [against] even in Mexico.

SOURCES OF PRECONCEPTIONS AND THEIR CHANGES

In few other countries are opportunities to learn about the United States as good as in Mexico. Mexican periodicals carry considerable United States news. Many United States radio stations may be heard in Mexico. Students often have read widely in American literature. Friends, relatives, and associates have been in the United States, and most students have had some contact with the many American visitors in Mexico. Finally, more than half of the students have traveled in the United States before coming to school here. More than a quarter have attended more than one United States school, and two-fifths have relatives in the United States.

Observation and personal contacts contribute more to preconceptions about the United States than do books or the

mass media. Motion pictures in particular are heavily discounted. Most students believe Mexican-made motion pictures give a totally false picture of Mexico and see no reason to place greater reliance on the Hollywood product. Some, however, think that while motion pictures give a distorted view of life in the United States they reveal much about the psychology of the North Americans. The unfavorable image of family life in the United States and belief in the near universality of divorce very likely come from the motion picture.

Another potent source of unfavorable impressions is the behavior of many tourists and students in Mexico. Although Mexicans meet some moral, well-behaved, and good-mannered tourists and students, the observable scandalous or ill-bred conduct of some is taken to be the norm for the majority and to be a reflection of the general moral level of the nation.

The Mexican social and political environment and intellectual traditions likewise contribute to student attitudes. Anti-Americanism is popular in Mexico. The student who elects to study in the United States knows that a political career will be impossible; nevertheless, he absorbs some of the atmosphere about him. Moreover, the tradition of the superiority of European, and particularly French, culture persists. Most students strongly oriented toward humanistic values—and this includes many students of the social sciences—would have gone to European universities had they been able to do so.

Books and periodicals play a larger part in forming favorable preconceptions. But personal contacts again seem the primary source, in this case either with returnees who give favorable reports or with respected United States citizens, usually through friendships, or with business or school associates.

CHANGING IMAGES AFTER ARRIVAL

Length of stay, closeness of contacts, and types of interest have much to do with the degree to which images change after arrival. Students here for a short time are not apt to become familiar with domestic politics; some have never heard of McCarthy and one thought Dean Acheson British. Students in some technical fields learn little outside their specialty; one of the students most favorable to the United States knew the least about it. Whether preconceptions are favorable or unfavorable, the most usual shift is not to discard them completely, but to discover that they are not representative. Students who admire United States democracy discover segregation. Critics of American family life discover examples they admire. In all but the most superficial matters, however, only time and favorable personal contacts can provide opportunities for better understanding.

Background, field of interest, and motivations likewise affect the student's perceptions in the United States. Those interested in technical training in the physical or biological sciences or engineering may have limited experience and interest, while those concerned with social and political problems often show considerable insight and are constructively critical.

Whatever their field of interest, students come overwhelmingly from middle- to upper-class families with fathers engaged in business or a profession. While about 20 per cent are born in small towns, the majority are educated in the city (including elementary education). Half received all or part of their secondary education in Mexico City and another quarter in one of the three next largest cities. More than a quarter have had some secondary education in the United States, and nearly a quarter have attended a "foreign"

school in Mexico (for example, the American School in Mexico City).

That nearly a third are wholly or partially self-supporting while about two-fifths are wholly supported by their families suggests strong motivations. Students on fellowships are the smallest category. Nearly half are graduate students. About a third are in professional schools and curricula; the next largest number are studying business subjects. Nearly one-third of the group have teaching, research, writing, or similar pursuits as goals. Ability and seriousness of purpose are suggested by University of California statistics for a six-year period showing that Mexican undergraduates make better grades than do United States students or foreign students from Canada, England, Scandinavia, and a number of other countries.

The Mexican student is not typical even of his middle- and upper-class urban background. The career goals of women students set them apart from most Mexican women. Men students present a more complex picture. Those oriented toward the industrialization of Mexico are apt to be economically and politically conservative, as these terms are understood in the United States; at the same time, they represent the sharpest break with Mexican tradition. A substantial number, imbued with ideas of social reform and progress, are more closely identified with the Nationalistic agrarian reform movements characteristic of all but recent post-Revolutionary governments. A lesser number, primarily oriented toward research or professional training, tend toward traditional values. To the confusion of the North American, such individuals may also be strongly anticlerical, for the distinction between the devout Catholic, the anticlerical, the nonreligious, and the Protestant cuts across many other categories.

Nevertheless, most Mexican students

see Mexico as a country undergoing major social, cultural, and economic changes, and on many subjects consider themselves more "liberal" or "advanced" than is the average Mexican. Virtually all students see themselves in advance of their fellow-countrymen in concern with functioning political democracy and in the rejection of authoritarian patterns both in public life and in the family (although here contradictory attitudes emerge). They favor greater liberality in child training, and much greater social equality for women. On the other hand practically all students give higher value to humanistic and cultural goals than to materialistic and economic goals. Finally, with few exceptions, the Mexican student believes himself to be motivated at least in part by patriotic, unselfish goals and wishes to contribute to the welfare of his country. Such goals need not conflict with desires for personal wealth, prestige, and achievement.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

A final word of caution seems necessary. Mexican students probably differ markedly from other Latin American students; certainly many Mexican students believe this to be the case. Consequently, without further study, application of the remarks in this paper to other Latin American students would be quite hazardous. Closer prior contacts and more serious motivation account in part for differences. Even

more important is the overwhelming influence of the Mexican Revolution and its violent disruption of the essentially feudalistic social patterns still characteristic of much of Latin America. Class and status considerations still are important, but most Mexican students are strongly oriented toward a dynamic society recognizing individual achievement and with an expanding economy. Interview materials reiterate the themes of progress, of social service and democracy, to a greater degree than is to be expected among most other Latin American students.

Numerous aspects of the Mexican image of the United States have not been touched upon. Neither has it been possible to give attention to the range of individual variation. Few students are either wholly favorable or wholly unfavorable. Students with predominantly antagonistic attitudes may state that their professors are magnificent. Students who are friendly and intelligent critics contrast with students who exhibit generalized hostility and rejection. Deserving of further investigation is the student who is equally hostile toward his home culture and toward the United States. In a word, students are people, and however valid generalizations can be concerning the group, variations in class, occupational, and regional origins, the idiosyncratic nature of personal experience, and the rich variety of human personality must be taken into account in understanding the individual student.

Ralph L. Beals, Ph.D., Los Angeles, California, is professor of anthropology and sociology in the University of California at Los Angeles. He has served as president of the American Anthropological Association and board member of the Social Science Research Council, and is present chairman of the Council's Committee on Cross-Cultural Education. He is author of numerous papers and monographs dealing for the most part with Latin America, including Cheran: A Sierra Tarascan Village (1944), Culture Patterns of Mexican-American Life (1951), Acculturation, Economics and Social Change in terms of Mexican-American Life (1951), Social Stratification in Latin America (1953), An Introduction to Ecuadorean Village (1951), Social Stratification in Latin America (1953), and The Village in an Industrial World (1953).

The Mexican Image of Americans*

By NORMAN D. HUMPHREY

THE images that Mexicans have of the United States result not only from a wide variety of experience with Americans and American culture, but also from the different social perspectives of Mexican viewers.

RURAL AND LOWER-CLASS MEXICANS

Rural and lower-class persons have few mass-media contacts with the United States. Few images reach them through the printed word, and, although half of the movies shown each week in the Mexican theaters are about the United States, almost all are "Westerns" which depict an outmoded if not fantastic version of American society and culture.

On the other hand, they have a good deal of experience with Americans directly. The majority of adult males in many small towns in such centrally located states as Michoacan or Jalisco have been in the United States, and in nearly every Mexican town and urban neighborhood will be found some residents who have visited the country. Millions of *contrabandos*, or "wet-backs," cross the border each year for varying lengths of time, and virtually every Mexican has some close friend or relative who is a permanent resident in the United States. The number of upper- and middle-class Mexicans who have been students in American universities and who thereby "know" Americans and United States civilization is small compared with that of lower-class migrants.

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Discrimination and friendliness

In view of the discrimination they experience in the United States, surprisingly few of this vast population of working-class and rural ex-migrants have come back with unfavorable reports. In fact, as a group they bear amazing good will to the country. One reason for this is that they are used to class discrimination at home. Moreover, Texas and Texans are regarded separately and known only incidentally as belonging to the United States. These semiliterate ex-migrants are regarded with favor by their working-class peers for their American knowledge and thus constitute a great reservoir of good will for the United States.

UPPER-CLASS ATTITUDES

In this attitude they contrast sharply with their literate, striving, strongly nationalistic "intellectual" superiors, who generally do not possess such favorable imagery, or do so only occasionally under circumstances evoking sentimental nostalgia. Educated persons who have not been in the United States, correspondingly, often view Americans as crass materialists—engineers or businessmen—wealthy yet eager for money and quite devoid of culture in its highest sense. The United States with its vast technology and power, as portrayed in periodicals, is to many of them a Roman Empire on the edge of catastrophe. It has the minor virtue, however, of opposing Russian Communism. Among such persons great value is placed on technology, on the one hand, but on the other there is a firm and unequivocal belief that technology

as an alleged basis for culture is inferior to poetry, philosophy, and a feeling for art and music, which Mexicans regard as peculiarly Latin concerns. Their conception of American power, especially the power to intervene actively in the civil affairs of Mexico, is much greater than any ever contemplated by Americans themselves.

AMERICANS VISITING MEXICO

The usual conception of the touring American, from whatever Mexican perspective, is that of a person who is rich and powerful, and who, despite the fact that he buys respect, is worthy of extreme courtesy. The American's forthrightness and bluntness indicate his lack of courtesy and insensitiveness to the feelings of others. Since the United States is a powerful and rich country, any representative of the American people (and each tourist is such) is in some degree powerful, and at the same time not completely trustworthy. He should be, however, dealt with in an extremely courteous way. With the American, as with any stranger, a Mexican must be on his guard and at the same time extend the generosity which should be given to anyone from another land. The Mexican's image of the American depicts a man of wealth and power, devoid of higher culture and lacking the elements of urbanity.

The forthrightness of Americans, their tendency to "rib" each other and to make bitter remarks to each other, offend the *dignidad* of the Mexican peasant or urban worker, as well as the intellectual. The American lacks the proper forms for manifesting *noblesse oblige*. In contrast to the German, he holds himself aloof and distant with the peasant. This, in turn, tends to impinge on the sense of self of the Mexican peasant or urban worker and may fortify the unpleasant aspects of the stereotype or image of the American.

Religiously, it is believed, the American is a Protestant who either has no serious religious convictions or, what is even worse, will try to evangelize Mexico to Protestantism. Protestantism is often regarded as a unified and un-Christian faith. The high divorce rates of the United States and other such phenomena indicate the basic irreligious orientations of Americans. A widely held notion is that Americans are devoid of honor in family matters and that the sexual morality of American women borders on that of the prostitute. The American phenomenon of the guilty conscience on "the morning after," however, is not readily comprehensible to the Mexican observer.

Perhaps the most significant in a land in which racial differences are culturally minimized, the image of the American is that of one who would impose racial discrimination on Mexico and who wrongfully practices it on Mexicans who are resident in the United States. The Mexican who has not traveled has very vague conceptions of the color line in the United States and knows the American Negro largely through his occasional portrayal of a movie role. His concern is not with the color line in its broader implication, but with the American's imputation of inferiority to persons of Indian ancestry and the unwarranted social discrimination practiced against them.

Since American tourists in Mexico tend to subordinate such racist feelings, the conception of the American as a race baiter is not strengthened by the observation of visiting Americans' behavior. Undoubtedly those peasant or urban-worker Mexicans who have suffered discrimination in the United States, on meeting Americans in Mexico, in part have tended to play the role they judge Americans expect them to play, but in general this is not the case.

American Babbitts

The most generalized image of the American, in whatever Mexican terminology it may be expressed, is that of an overactive, puritanic Babbitt, with more money than "culture," who buys respect but minimizes urbanity, yet who nonetheless should be dealt with properly because he represents wealth and power.

"RACE," CLASS, AND FELT NATIONAL STATUS

Several major facets of the Mexican's mentality are relevant to his conceptions of Americans and of American culture. Among them are the self-image of Mexican nationals and the intensity of their nationalism. Here strong class differentiations are evident. Although lower-class urban and virtually all rural Mexicans are strongly aware of *la raza Mexicana* and willing to defend it if necessary with their lives, it is largely the rising middle class (not so deeply entwined in American business enterprise as to be biased toward it but strongly identified with Mexican government bureaucracy) that is the most vehemently and sensitively nationalistic. Politicians are almost instinctively "anti-gringo." This vociferous nationalist element molds anti-American opinion by word of mouth, letters to the press, articles in periodicals, and the like. Yet, anomalously, it is also from this group that a vast number of fellowship students are drawn to American universities, especially on a graduate level.

From the fringe of this highly nationalist segment come those parents who early send their children to English language schools in the Mexican national and provincial capitals, believing it advantageous for the children. These schools, in turn, tend to direct their students toward American under-

graduate colleges. Students in such schools early are faced with problems of cultural duality and emotional allegiance. Where strong national identifications and strong school loyalties both provide basic reference groups for the student, a normal (in the sense of statistically predominant) consequence of such conflict is frustration. Such "marginality" in Robert E. Park's sense, with its attendant frustration, introduces severe emotional problems. In rare cases the individual will become alienated from Mexican cultural values. Ordinarily his personal unhappiness is resolved by hostility toward and generally unfavorable images of the United States.

Latin American variations

This is a singularly Mexican, and not necessarily a Latin American, phenomenon. In contrast to Colombia, for example, where students who have returned from American universities appear to have favorable images (with appropriate reservations) of the United States, their Mexican equivalents, despite ambivalence, tend to weigh their sentiments toward the negative pole. One factor centers in the class character of the American experience. Very few lower-class Colombians, of course, ever experience Americans or American culture directly, and if they do, Colombians tend to categorize Americans confusedly with northern Europeans.

AMBIVALENCES AND ANOMALIES

Americans are praised, of course, especially by intellectuals, for their efficiency (not only in mass industrial production but, for example, in library systems) or, somewhat sardonically, for their willingness to form lines at ticket windows. Americans are well regarded for their "organization" (including the relative lack of favoritism, clique groups, and "influence"), for minimization of

rivalry and hostility, for genuine cooperativeness and willingness to trust one's fellows in bureaucratic functioning, and, somewhat reluctantly, for a relatively strong sense of "fair play," democracy, and willingness to let the political victor receive the fruits of his legitimate conquest. While intellectuals do not question American technological superiority, they resent it, are jealous of it, and damn Americans for purporting to contend that it is the be-all and end-all of civilization.

Mexican intellectuals freely admit that advanced technology is an area in which they can learn. They feel that in time, if properly controlled by Mexicans, American technology can beneficially be introduced into Mexican civilization. But they dislike Americans for what *pochos* (American-born Mexicans), *agringado* individuals, and such Americans as missionaries and businessmen have introduced into Mexican civilization. They are disturbed by the penetration of elements of American mass culture. A Mexican intellectual can become as exercised, for example though with less economic rationality—about a stand bearing the sign "Hot Dogs" or "Hot Cakes" as a Frenchman can over one saying "Coca-Cola." The linked nature of cultural elements is not recognized.

Few Mexican intellectuals are aware of the significance of Tylor's concept of adhesions. Few have thought through the "undesirable" effects such things as the introduction of "desirable" trucks and automobiles will have on seemingly unrelated areas of strong emotional-cultural value which they want to retain, like the continued protection and seclusion of women. Pragmatism and materialism are inordinately condemned by an intellectual group which acts in terms of the most pragmatic precepts and adheres functionally to the most

materialistic values. While no figures can readily be shown to support it, the observation can be made, for example, that there are more Cadillacs in proportion to the population in Mexico City than there are in Detroit. To be sure relatively few "intellectuals" drive such cars, but they do not feel it beneath them to want them.

In other less obvious areas, however, pragmatic tests are employed. The basic and, for many, *only* value of American education is to extend and intensify specialization in some technical areas, and even this is regarded as largely fruitless if it does not have direct application to the Mexican scene. The concept of "halo" or auxiliary benefits, if considered at all, is likely to be explicitly denied. One highly trained technical specialist whose graduate work at Harvard involved a term project on problems in his field in literature concerning India inquired: "Of what value was that to me? India is totally unlike Mexico. Hence, that was useless endeavor."

Spiritual values

Furthermore, since virtually all Mexican intellectuals are convinced of their superiority through the maturity and "richness" of their civilization in the realm of "spiritual values," they can learn nothing from so philistine a nation as the United States. A prominent historian, when asked if any possible value (even in the relatively technical realm of historiography) might accrue to a Mexican historian's research technique were he to engage in the unlikely role of graduate student in the fact-oriented university world of American academic history, commented: "What could a Mexican, immersed in the processes of history, learn from a people virtually devoid of history?"

Protestant America

Interaction between the Mexican intellectual's self-image and his image of American culture focuses in this area of spiritual values. The spiritual values popularly centering in the "Protestant ethic," which have even permeated the conduct of a large segment of American Catholicism, are not generally considered by Mexican intellectuals in other than terms of their purported threat to Mexican spiritual civilization and hence, in large degree if naively, are regarded as negative forces in the American image. Certainly from one perspective the activities of Protestants themselves, quite apart from the ethic, are lumped together in an indivisible and largely barbaric phenomenon which stimulates in Mexico what, to an American, seems like a highly disproportionate unfavorable response. The activities of a few largely fundamentalist, dedicated, and certainly atypical Protestant missionaries, working especially in the Mexican hinterland, receive discussion in the Mexican press far out of proportion to their true merit, even as news value.

Threats to Mexican interests

Other American behavior which threatens Mexican interests is headlined in the press and creates much unfavorable imagery. What is often popularly regarded as truly—and typically aggressive—American behavior, the illegal fishing by American shrimp boats off the gulf coast within the Mexican defined eight-mile limit, focuses hostility. A recurring threat to Mexican social structure is coeducation. The desire on the part of one segment of the Mexican public for the extension of coeducation of the sexes is associated with American cultural imperialism. The character of sexual morality, the divorce rates, the disorganized family of the United States, are all spuriously regarded as

horrible consequences of the system of coeducation there, and firm and highly public resolves that coeducation should not happen in Mexico are vociferously aired.

ALTERED IMAGES OF EXCHANGE STUDENTS

The returned student has altered some facets of his image of America. He is convinced, partly as a consequence of his relative lack of success in areas of sexual conquest with American girls, that his prior conception of the accessibility of American women for those ends was slightly erroneous. His image of what are proper family status roles has altered. He begrudgingly admits some value in the more elevated position of American women and favorableness toward granting her opportunities for intellectual and other areas of self-expression and fulfillment. He comes to regard the American family as a much more stable, reasonable, and likable unit and possesses such an image of it after his American experience. As a male reflecting this image, he plans on being a less formidable tyrant in his role of father and husband than his cultural due at home would permit him.¹ His observation of the "freedom of cults," the religious tolerance observable on a surface level in the United States, has altered his image of the American in a favorable direction, and he regards American Catholics as more genuinely pious than he had anticipated.

The typical returned student hates the United States when he feels it openly ridicules Mexico. For example, he dislikes as denigrating Mexican civi-

¹ That some of these values are manifestations of the "Protestant ethic," with its emphasis on a controlled individuality which hesitates directly to exploit one's fellows rather than on weight placed on the values of submissiveness to human and ecclesiastical authority, is never brought clearly to view.

lization tourists who take pictures of beggars at the doors of cathedrals and basically, albeit secretly, subscribes to camera smashing as a just measure, but at the same time he smiles tolerantly at the prospect of the government campaign to eliminate begging.

Racial and political bigotry

He dislikes the United States for its racial discrimination, not so much as a consequence of having experienced it as on the nominal grounds that he opposes the underlying values of physiognomic or biologic caste discrimination. But he is not opposed to strong class discrimination and, even though he himself may be upwardly mobile in this regard, he does not juxtapose the two value systems of caste and class. Hence, although he is opposed to "racial" discrimination against Mexicans in the United States on the basis of notably identifiable Indian ancestry, he understands it and tolerates it if he regards it as stemming from class values. It is partly on this ground of opposition to caste discrimination that he finds discrimination against the Negro particularly abhorrent, but he tolerates it in class terms.

Virtually no Mexican student, in contrast to *braceros* or other migrants, was himself discriminated against on a university campus on any perceptible ethnic grounds. But his over-all image of the United States, and especially of Texas and *tejanos*, nonetheless is that of racial bigotry. He cannot bring this image into accord with the loud protestations by Americans about democracy and their image of themselves as democrats. He has almost equal difficulty understanding the American bigotry manifested toward minority political groups. A Mexican Communist prosecuted in New Mexico is first of all a Mexican, despite the ex-student's anti-Communist orientation. If Americans regard him

as overestimating the threat to Mexico of Protestantism as a clear and present danger, he feels that Americans are equally hysterical about unpopular political minorities and the nature of their threat. He has mixed elements in the montage of imagery regarding political order in the United States, although the relative absence of graft and the *mordida* creates a favorable imagery, when political facets are collated with those of his homeland. The image of the American and of American culture is obviously conditioned by the class position of the family of the ex-student, his politico-religious orientations, his predilections in terms of conservatism and radicalism, and the like.

Undergraduate and graduate students

Ex-students of American universities fall largely into two classes. One group consists of those who took the four years of undergraduate work in the States. On return to Mexico they are faced with problems of re-establishing themselves in the Mexican economy in terms of licensing for professions, of being regarded by parents as adults, and of finding clique and friendship relationships. The other group is composed of persons who received their basic professional training and education in Mexico. Thus having already met their problems of licensing for professional activity normally, and having established in regular fashion clique and "influence" relationships with superordinates and peers, they then come to the United States for a year or two as graduate students for the purpose of intensifying competencies in technical areas.

This latter group is perhaps more representative than the former in the sense that it has undertaken its residence in the United States under auspices of fellowships usually supplied by American foundations through joint ac-

tion and selection of the two governments. It is "representative" also since members of the group are in accord with Mexican conceptions of what is most desirable in the exchange relationship, namely, that Mexicans can gain most by undertaking specialized training in technical areas.

The class origins of these two groups overlap. Those who have attended American colleges and universities as undergraduates tend, however, to derive more than fellowship students from the extreme upper class in small cities, from the *nouveaux riches*, and from middle-class families with American business connections. A disproportionate number have attended the private "American" senior high schools in Mexico City. As these schools are not accredited by the Mexican Department of Education beyond *secundaria* (roughly equivalent of American junior high school), graduation from them does not prepare for entrance into Mexican universities or higher technical schools. Such American-Mexican high school graduates are therefore faced with the necessity of repeating several years of work in Mexican schools and, as often as not, are additionally tempted by some financial aid from American colleges and universities. Consequently they often go on to continental American schools, usually to technical training courses; the higher the status of the American college, the more favorably viewed it is in prospect.

Professional status on return

But when such an undergraduate returns to Mexico with an American degree in an engineering specialty, or in some other technical area which requires governmental licensing for practice or complete government bureaucratic functioning in Mexico, he is faced with problems of legal licensing or university "revalidation," or both.

Very frequently, especially in engineering fields, returned students discover that what is suggested by Mexican authorities is several more years of university training in subject matter they have already studied, when in their own minds they are already more adequately prepared than they would have been had they stayed in Mexico. The other alternative is an extremely long, arduous, costly, quasilegal procedure to have their training declared equivalent to that provided in Mexico at the national university.

An alternative is work as an employee of an American concern without full licensing at a salary perhaps a third less than that which an American citizen of equivalent training would receive. All of this adds up, in the returned student's mind, to a great deal of frustration, soul searching, and rationalization, and frequently to a feeling of having been robbed of opportunity and unjustly penalized by the American experience. The frustrated returnee often exhibits occasional strong hostility toward the United States, and, as circumstances demand it, a not too favorable image of the American.

A person with undergraduate American training who on return went into one of the numerous governmental bureaucracies would find himself devoid of the significant and extremely important clique support normally acquired through Mexican university or school associations, would be constantly subjected to the charge of being *agringado* by his jealous and distrustful associates, and would be subjected to various and repeated informal tests of purported ability and competency by his superiors, tests which would not be required of Mexican-trained associates. Woe unto him if he used American, in preference to Mexican, technical terminology. He would in all likelihood be stymied in licensing by the highly nationalistic,

legal requirements and university regulations, which he could not readily meet. Under the circumstances the normal consequence appears to be that his image of American training, while immediately on return quite favorable, deteriorates, and he comes to regard much of it as a handicap and a burden. He feels, without real justification, that even the English language benefit could as readily have been acquired in Mexico, along with the additional benefits that "pull" and clique alignments would have afforded had he been trained wholly in Mexico. He begins to hide his Americanization, publicly to ridicule those who identify with it, and to be basically more nationalistic than he would have been had he not possessed the American experience.

Those who go into private industry suffer least. The tendency toward augmented national loyalty and allegiance is less true of those genuinely upper-class persons, especially those of mixed ethnic grandparental origins, who have studied as undergraduates in the United States. These individuals already feel confident of the superior character of various areas of Mexican culture, such as its spirituality and philosophic depth, and are more internationally oriented than their "inferiors"; consequently they are less threatened by purported American superiority in realms of organization, system, and efficiency, especially in technology and economic apparatus. Moreover, since on return they invariably find niches in the economic structure of a private sort, in which profitable connections with American business firms are maintained, they have tended to remain more internationally minded, as is profitable to them, and to align their sentiments much less with national in-groups than with class benefits, regardless of nation. In this secure, cosmopolitan seg-

ment the reflected self in Cooley's sense does not involve a referent group of aspiring middle-class clique mates but a secure "old family" and friendship network, or at least an economically successful population segment, which operates on both sides of the border.

The successful scientist or technician who simply received advanced training in American universities develops a somewhat similar orientation. His reflected self was enhanced in large degree by American study. He tends to have an international view of the nature of his discipline and as a consequence is not threatened by American "cultural imperialism."

OVER-ALL REACTION TO THE U. S.

It is possible to distinguish "types" of Mexican intellectuals who have had American university experience and returned to find their niches in the Mexican social structure, and among them prior and subsequent images of Americans and of American civilization vary. The student who has attended American secondary schools in Mexico is likely early to develop conceptions of himself as a relatively inferior individual (in spite of a command of English greater than that of Mexican age mates in other schools) and ambivalent feelings toward Americans. His resident American high school classmates tend to discriminate against him socially, and because of the unaccredited character of his schooling for Mexican university entrance and the more advanced training of his age mates in such institutions as the national *preparatoria*, he comes to feel already deprived of opportunity in his home milieu. Once in an American continental college, however, he finds himself able to compete equally with American citizens, and, apart from his bilinguality and cultural value dualism, he finds American civilization and

American individuals largely to his liking. Only on return, when he discovers that his marginality has been accentuated and that his major status role in the eyes of his peers is that of an inferior (albeit highly educated) *pocho*, regarded in his native land by his colleagues and even to some degree by his family as an *agringado* foreigner, only then by a gradual process does he become more Mexican than the Mexicans and more nationalistic than his age mates who have not been to the United States.

The person who has received professional training at a Mexican institution of higher learning, and consequent legal sanction and licensing to engage in his profession, and who then, through foundation fellowship aid, has temporarily left his job in a governmental bureaucracy for further specialization in the United States, experiences a very different transformation of his "looking-glass self." Secure in his profession, properly lodged in a niche with already formed clique arrangements of colleagues, he finds his American university experience rewarding, if sometimes disappointingly irrelevant to his future role. On the American scene he was always sufficiently "foreign" so that he was never taken for an American in social interaction, and he assimilated so little of the nonacademic American culture as not to have it intrude upon his social personality on return to the homeland.

On return, he finds it much easier to slough off superficial signs of American residence which might annoy his untraveled colleagues, and he early learns that little can be transplanted without opposition even in technical areas, especially if it is labeled American in origin. A cultural nationalist, with fewer ambivalences at the outset than the undergraduate parallel, he can main-

tain a more mildly favorable attitude toward Americans without endangering or impinging upon his sense of self. Since his reflected self has experienced less alteration, the degree of his marginality on return is less, and he can consequently have a more favorable image of Americans than his more assimilated and alienated coworker.

Both types of personality discussed above derive characteristically from the rising middle class, the most nationalistic segment of the population. The general orientations of the upper-class persons who attended an American university either as graduate or undergraduate students are less nationalistic to begin with. On return their roles are more likely to be found in enterprises which tie in with American production and trade organizations. Thus no profound alteration of the sense of self is required, and the image of Americans and American cultural influence tends to be regarded with much less nationalistic hostility, and accordingly with greater equanimity.

FUTURE IMAGE CHANGES

The Mexican image of Americans, like the American image of other peoples, in all probability will be altered with the passage of time. As Mexico develops industrially and the standard of living is raised, there will undoubtedly be fewer attitudes on the part of self-conscious Mexican intellectuals in defense of deficiencies in their civilization and a more grounded pride in its areas of genuine achievement and superiority.

Alterations in licensing procedures on the Mexican scene, frank recognition of the inevitability of cultural penetration, anticipation of an altered social structure in which practices which are today precious for their antiquity will in-

evitably change, all will alter the Mexican image of Americans probably in a favorable direction.

The familiar deterrents to a favorable imagery, the basic and unassimilable conflict in value systems, the political and selfish machinations of nationalist

groups on both sides of the border, in short, any hostile effort, especially American instituted, which impinges on the Mexican's sense of self-worth and personal dignity, will function to perpetuate an unfavorable image of Americans and of American civilization.

Norman Daymond Humphrey, Ph.D., Detroit, Michigan, is associate professor at Wayne University, Detroit; he has taught anthropology and sociology there since 1939, with the exception of social anthropological field studies in Tecolotlán, Jalisco, Mexico (1944-45, 1947) and Sesquilé, Cundinamarca, Colombia (1950). He has also taught at the Universities of Texas and Southern California and at Michigan State College, Mexico City College, and the Escuela Normal Superior, Bogotá. In 1952-53 he was field representative for the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council in Mexico. With Alfred McClung Lee he is coauthor of Race Riot (1943) and articles in academic journals.

Scandinavian Students' Images of the United States: A Study in Cross-cultural Education*

By WILLIAM H. SEWELL, RICHARD T. MORRIS, and OLUF M. DAVIDSEN

DURING the past two years an investigation of visiting students from Scandinavia has been carried out at the University of Wisconsin. The central purpose of this study was to explore the processes involved in cross-cultural interchanges of students and to attempt to arrive at a more adequate understanding of the effects of foreign educational experiences. The following presentation of selected aspects of findings which have emerged from this investigation will center around the students' perceptions of various major areas of American society. Since many of these perceptions are expressed comparatively, a brief sketch of Scandinavian culture will precede the description of the students' impressions of the American personality and norms, the American educational system, family life, politics, and economics. Following this, certain characteristics of the Scandinavian students' reactions to the American experience will be discussed. Two major patterns of orientation will be described, and phases in the students' orientation toward America as well as attitude mechanisms employed in dealing with the new environment will be identified. Finally, one aspect of the anticipated effects of the foreign visit will be briefly discussed.

The study is based mainly on intensive interviews with 38 students from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. This

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group, which varies in age from eighteen to about forty, is made up of 34 male and 4 female students. Twenty-one of the visitors came from Norway, 8 from Sweden, and 9 from Denmark. Most of them are here on individually planned and privately financed study programs. Nine out of the 38 are engaged in the study of engineering, while of the rest 8 are studying one of the physical sciences and 21 are working within the fields of the liberal arts or social sciences. Of the total, 16 are doing graduate work and the others are undergraduates.

In spite of the fact that the Scandinavian countries under study are three politically independent constitutional monarchies with detectable cultural differences, the results of the present investigation indicate that, in regard to the students' images of America, they can properly be treated as a unit. Also by virtue of their linguistic similarities, their common traditions, and cultural homogeneity, they appear as an entity in the eyes of many Americans.

The desire on the part of each country to remain independent is strong, and attitudes of nationalism or patriotism are very common. Far from being militaristic or isolationist in nature, or taking the form of fear of disunity or subversion, these attitudes manifest themselves in great pride in accomplishments within cultural, social, and technical fields of human endeavor. They are continuously being passed on to the younger generation and reinforced through a variety of direct and symbolic means.

The preconceptions of America which the Scandinavian students bring with them form a picture which is by no means a clear one. It is however quite apparent that attention and interests have been guided to certain aspects of American culture more than to others. For this reason, the students are more aware of American technological developments and popular music, for example, than they are of religion, moral orientation, or patterns of social interaction.

Since in physical appearance the visiting Scandinavian student is not especially foreign-looking, and since his English-speaking facility is comparatively great, he is generally able to move around in the community without being detected as a native of a foreign country. At the same time, he makes no attempt to hide his identity as such, and he may even be observed to exhibit conspicuously his Scandinavian background by wearing certain kinds of clothing. This finding is compatible with our observation that the Scandinavian student comes to the United States with feelings of very high national status. In no way does he as a representative of Scandinavia feel inferior to his American fellow men. He is quite confident that the standing of Scandinavia in the United States is very good.

IMAGES OF AMERICAN PERSONALITY

One of the striking impressions resulting from interviewing Scandinavian students is that they all consider Americans rather immature in one respect or another, whether their general attitude toward America is favorable and tolerant or impatient and antagonistic.

The positive interpretation consists, first of all, in admiring the warm friendliness and spontaneity of Americans, the informality of dress and address, the quick acceptance of the

stranger into the group and the family. This admiration is tempered, sooner or later, by the feeling that much of this warmth and acceptance is merely skin-deep.

The superficial nature of American friendliness may be positively appreciated. Several of the Scandinavian students felt that the ease of social relationships here, the emphasis on social activity, joining, and party going had been beneficial for them personally—that it had made them able to get along better with others and to know others more quickly, had reduced their shyness and improved their social graces. One student remarked after a considerable stay in this country:

I now feel the urge to associate with people—to call up somebody to go out and have a beer or something. . . . I have never felt that way before. I spent a lot of time alone while at school in Scandinavia, just alone with a book. I don't think I can go back to that now; it would bother me quite a bit. . . .

A large number of the students have expressed a desire to see some of the American informality and spontaneity in social relationships transferred to their own culture.

On the other hand, the discovery of the seeming shallowness of friendships may come as an unpleasant shock and bring with it accusations of hypocrisy: the charge that informality is in itself merely a formality to cover up a lack of real concern for the other individual. Americans are said to have hundreds of acquaintances but no true friends:

They are not deeply interested in you as a person (which is reflected in their general lack of interest—and knowledge—about your country) and are apt to resent it if you are frank with them, or look too closely into their personal affairs.

There is another set of American personality characteristics which is com-

monly perceived as immature by the Scandinavian students, but which again may draw forth opposite reactions: Americans are happy-go-lucky, self-confident, exuberant, fresh, careless, reckless, uninhibited, flippant, wasteful, noisy, inconsiderate. These adjectives seem to have some sort of common descriptive base, but carry with them varying interpretations and evaluations of such behavior. On the positive side, the ebullience of the American spirit is seen as one of the strong motivating forces for the tremendous technical and commercial advances typical of America. The American emphasis upon constant activity and motion—the intense drive of the businessman, the bustling sales personality—fits in the same syndrome. It is admired by many of the students, who compare it with the relatively more stable, tradition-bound, and restricted distribution and consumption patterns found at home.

Negatively, this carefree, self-confident nature is detected by the visitors in the excessive spending and installment-plan buying in this country, which they feel give a false impression of the standard of living. The happy-go-lucky attitude toward life often turns into inconsiderate behavior, which the students see reflected in a lack of concern for community property. One of the first impressions of several of the students, which came as something of a shock to them, was the dirtiness and sloppiness found in the cities and on the campus itself:

It would be inconceivable at home for the students to throw papers around the way they do . . . and not to bother even to pick them up. . . . Do they like to live in a pigsty? Or do they think somebody else will pick up after them? It's disgraceful!

Intellectual and aesthetic immaturity

There is a rather different set of perceptions which touches upon another

facet of the over-all image of America, namely, the general intellectual and aesthetic immaturity of Americans. This perception is common to almost all the students in the study and, unlike the characteristics previously discussed, brings forth a common, unfavorable reaction. The chief focus here is upon the inability of Americans to carry on a serious conversation or discussion: they not only are ignorant of the serious affairs going on in the world, but they are not even interested in finding out. The reasons for this superficiality are assigned in several directions—the overemphasis on material, practical events, the lack of tradition in America, isolationism, rigidity of values, excessive emotionality, conformity—but the perceptions of the presence of this intellectual immaturity are constant:

Americans do not think deeply enough; they have no intellectual curiosity; they have no real opinions on serious topics; politics here is all emotion, not intellectual; there are no books on the bookshelves in the homes; they can't think logically.

The image of America as aesthetically immature or uncultured carries with it a general assumption that causes may be found in the very heavy stress placed on the technical, materialistic aspects of life:

Americans don't know what they want except money; there are hardly any pictures on the walls; American jazz is their only cultural export; students here learn art, music, and architecture without sentiment; emphasis on the technical makes them forget art and nature.

Some of the students also see the lack of artistic tradition as a cause of the immaturity. The negative reaction to America's cultural standards is reinforced in the criticism of mass media:

Advertisements spoil the radio; movies are inferior to European products; TV is low-grade vaudeville; burlesque shows and the worship of movie idols are symbols of American cultural attainment.

Reactions to the image

It should not be inferred from some of the rather scathing comments quoted that even the typical negative reaction to the perceived American personality is bitter, angry, or resentful. The general tone is quite different, and can be best summarized by another quotation from a Scandinavian student:

I realized that I would dislike many things here but I tried to tell myself that I must not judge Americans according to European standards of judgment but that I had to judge them by other measurements because America is a young country and Europe is old.

Conversely, a favorable attitude toward American character does not necessarily mean that the student wishes to be like the American or that he wishes to take back American ways to his own country. An illustrative comment here is:

I would not want a child of mine to go through an American public school—not because I worry that he would learn less but because I know it would make him an American and I want my children to be Danish. . . . We do things one way in Denmark—Americans do differently—I like Danish ways better because I am a Dane. An American would like the American ways better because he is an American. . . . Everyone likes his own country better than any other country.

All in all, there seems to be a common set of perceptions which are then interpreted and evaluated differentially in a rather detached fashion, with generally more light than heat. As one student put it: "I figure a country is a country; if other people can live there, I can live there."

IMAGES OF AMERICAN NORMS

The visiting Scandinavian students all claim that the numerous pioneer novels, Indian stories, and Wild West movies which they read or saw before coming to this country had little direct effect upon their preconceptions of America. They do, however, concede that these sources of information have undoubtedly aided in building up in their minds a picture of America as a country where individualism flourished, where strong opinions were strongly voiced, and where mobility and lawlessness were pronounced.

To their surprise, and sometimes to their dismay and disappointment, they find quite the opposite in many areas of American life. They perceive a mass culture which implacably forces every individual into a mold of conforming behavior. In art, in dating behavior, in sports, in clothes, in party behavior, and even in the use of swear words, there is a definite lack of variety, a hesitance to express originality. Generally this fear of appearing different is not seen as a result of any lack of intelligence or creativity, but as careful conformity to a set of externally imposed rules, for fear of being disliked. It is undesirable to behave differently as an individual. The American code seems to the Scandinavian student to be: Do not be different, but if you have to, be different together.

The consistent conforming of Americans to norms of the group or the organization is seen by many of the Scandinavian students as a form of superficiality in values. For example, one of the students observed:

At home an act is more apt to be moral or amoral depending upon its consequences in each situation for human happiness and well-being, not because it follows or violates some rule.

The perceived low incidence of individually reached moral judgments in America is evidenced in several ways:

There are too many laws here, and too little control. Police interfere in too many spheres of private life.

Political ideas all come from newspapers. Americans are like a flock of sheep. They don't think for themselves.

Religion is external. They go to church, but they aren't really religious in the way they choose to act.

Boy-girl relations are artificial and based on popularity. Too many moral restrictions have to be obeyed according to a rigid sex code, not the way they really feel about it. . . . It is all false modesty based on what the other person might think of you.

The students' negative reactions to conformity are most marked in the areas of sports and social recreation. There is an almost universal criticism of American commercialized, spectator sports, which provide so little in the way of physical exercise for the majority of those involved and which impose such a rigid seasonal restriction on sports conversation and participation. The contrast with the many individually oriented sports of Scandinavia, such as skiing, hiking, and the like, is continually, and unflatteringly, brought out. In response to the question "What about your own country have you missed the most while here?" practically all of the students mentioned fresh air and natural facilities for non-organized recreation as the deprivation felt most strongly. A main objection to social gatherings, and to the few individual sports in which Americans are engaged, is the overemphasis on planning and organizing the activities:

You can't just go on a walk or sit down and talk with people in your own way, you always have to *do* things, in just such an

order and in just such a way, one after another . . . always a program, always pre-arranged. . . .

The pressures for conformity are seen to be reinforced by the Americans' fear of being alone:

Americans like to have many friends, but with no reason for making them. . . . People want to be popular with everybody. . . . You have to be a social animal and belong to all sorts of social organizations to be respected here. . . . Americans value social contacts highly and get lonely without them.

It must be stated, however, that at least one of the students was able to interpret his own perception of American conformity as partially a function of his unfamiliarity with subtle differences in the new culture:

Americans and American ways all look alike, but maybe that's just because they are different from us. They are probably just as different to each other as they seem alike to us.

IMAGES OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS

In the case of practically all the students of our sample, attendance at an American university was the primary reason for their visit to this country. Also, the great majority of them had attended a university or other institution of higher learning at home prior to coming here. This means not only that their educational experiences in this country represent roughly comparable shared activities but also that these experiences contain a relatively high degree of psychological meaningfulness in the sense that the students have been exposed to two different university environments in the same sequence. Their contacts with other aspects of American culture are so varied that comparability is often very difficult.

Preparatory to entering a Scandinavian institution of higher learning the

students went through four years of secondary school or Gymnasium. During these years they were held to a very rigid schedule of classwork with almost no freedom of choice in selection of courses. Attendance was required, the competition was keen, and with three or four hours of homework daily, little time was left over for social or other extracurricular activities. The continuation of study at a university marked a definite break in the type of schooling. At this point they were considered intellectually and socially mature and sufficiently independent to pursue specialized study with little supervision. They were free to attend lectures or to stay away and took their exams when they felt ready to do so.

American universities

It is against this background of previous experience that the Scandinavian students' reaction to the American university system should be seen. Only by so doing may one understand the reasons why the topic of supervision of students elicits more unfavorable responses in an unstructured interview than any other aspect of American university education. They say that "required class attendance is childish" and that "frequent exams interfere with studying." While they find the physical facilities excellent and generally favor the student-teacher relationships, which are closer than at home, they are not impressed with the standards of education in America, particularly at the high school and undergraduate levels. They attribute this especially to the less rigid selection procedures and to the considerable amount of time spent by American students in social activities. In this connection the Scandinavian students are greatly surprised about the lack of distinction between work and recreation which their American fellow students exhibit. The sight

of a group of young scholars engaged in studying midst half-empty Coca-Cola bottles and blaring radios or phonographs never ceases to amaze them. It is perhaps significant that every Scandinavian student who initially lived in a dormitory soon moved out.

Family life

The opportunity for contacts with American family life varies widely among the group of visiting students. In spite of this, their evaluation of this phase of the American culture shows a certain consistency which no doubt derives from the fairly uniform background of family life and customs in Scandinavia with which the students compare it. They come to see the American home as one in which "the family bonds are not very strong," where "recreation is not family centered," and where "the wife dominates the family picture too much." They also find that "there is not enough control over smaller children." It is worth while noting that these observations are related to the interviewer with special emphasis and conviction by those students who come from rural areas in Scandinavia where family life is relatively more patriarchal and autocratic, and where, in the absence of many commercial recreational facilities and convenient means of transportation, family life is comparatively close.

Religion

Perhaps no other aspect of the American culture puzzles the Scandinavian students so much as does religion. Their first impression is one of great diversity and much competitive activity in interdenominational relations. In view of the religious homogeneity of Scandinavia this could perhaps be expected. The students are further amazed by the large number of people in America who go to church on

Sundays. Their surprise in this respect could also be anticipated, because the proportion of people in Scandinavia who go to church more than a few times every year is quite small. However, the visiting students also come to a conclusion which is less readily comprehended: they are quite in agreement that Americans are hypocritical. As one said: "They go to church but they aren't really religious; their religion is external and not so deep." Perhaps this impression should be seen against the background of a rather common belief in religious circles in Scandinavia to the effect that true religiosity is incompatible with any excessive or conspicuous concern for worldly goods or money. The students feel that "churches in America are too money oriented" and that "collection of money in churches is undesirable." While in this country, only one out of the 38 students attended church regularly. The majority never went, or on occasion attended mainly to "see what it was like." With one exception, the students all claimed to be fairly or very liberal in their orientation toward religion.

Political issues

The students as a group considered themselves somewhat to the right of center politically at the time when they arrived in the United States. At that time their knowledge of and interest in American political matters were very limited, and, in general, the group can be said to be a politically unalert and uninterested one. They rarely avail themselves of the opportunities offered by the various campus organizations to hear lectures or participate in the discussion of domestic or foreign political issues. Perhaps this is the reason why their impressions of politics in America show little pattern. On the other hand, the students often point out that they

find it difficult to get into a discussion of political or social issues with Americans in informal social settings, and if they succeed in initiating such discussions, the conversation very seldom goes much beyond casual observations of current happenings.

One may detect a considerable degree of concern in the students' evaluation of freedom in America. Responses such as "America is losing her freedom" or, more specifically, "Freedom of speech in America is curtailed" are not uncommon. Nor are the visitors impressed with the standards of political behavior in this country. Those who were here during the last presidential campaign and conventions are especially prone to make this known. On the further question of equality in human relations as it relates to the students' perception of American democracy, the visitors find more equality in professor-student and employer-employee relationships than they are used to. They completely approve of this and often express a desire for adoption of such practices in Scandinavian industries and institutions.

Prior to coming here the Scandinavian students had heard about discrimination against Negroes in America. However, they believed that it was largely a problem of the past and almost exclusively confined to the South. While they find little evidence of discrimination against Negroes after coming to this country, they are quite surprised by the tensions here between gentile and Jewish people.

In regard to the question of postwar American foreign policies in general and foreign aid programs specifically, it is surprising to these students to find in America a considerable degree of disregard for the United Nations and disapproval of the foreign aid programs. It obviously irritates them that "many Americans think Europe ought to be very grateful for this aid, when, in

effect, it is really good business for America."

The picture which the Scandinavian students develop of economic matters in the United States is a much more favorable one. They commend the American people for their industriousness and efficiency and attribute much of the credit for the high standard of living to these qualities. It also pleases them to see that private enterprises in this country have maintained a comparatively high degree of independence from governmental influence, but in the same vein they disapprove of having their own countries labeled with "the American interpretation of socialism." Those who have held jobs here, in particular, are favorably impressed by the efficient methods of production in America. They would like to see these methods transferred to their home countries.

IMPACT OF STAY

Reports from studies of students from other cultures reveal that, by comparison, the Scandinavian visitors approach America in an objective and practical manner. In their appraisal of this country they do not often feel compelled to judge in terms of ultimate pros and cons, but instead direct their evaluation to fairly specific areas or incidents. The preponderance of remarks during the interview which were critical of the United States should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction with the sojourn. Rather, such criticism should be seen in the light of the fact that the Scandinavian students generally do not consider the conditions under which they live and study in America superior to those available in their own countries. Consequently they do not deem it necessary to refrain from criticizing these conditions. It is quite obvious, also, that the Scandinavian visitors feel under no obligations to ex-

press feigned niceties about America in front of the interviewer, who is considered by them as a representative of their own culture.¹ Furthermore, they readily admit that a good share of their criticism is nothing but banter. While the national awareness of the Scandinavian students is naturally heightened by their presence in a foreign country, they do not seem to consider their experiences here as a threat to their national status, and emotional reactions are largely confined to situations where they feel curtailed in their effort to accomplish the specific purposes for which they come. In general, by comparison with other foreign students, the Scandinavian visitors seem to adjust to the American scene with remarkable ease.

Two patterns of orientation

Relying on those findings that emerge most clearly from our data, we can distinguish certain differences between Scandinavian students in their orientation and adjustment to the new environment. At the risk of making unfounded generalizations at a point when our material has not been exhaustively analyzed, we may differentiate between two major patterns of orientation.

We have been dealing with one group of students whose social and academic adjustment has been relatively easy, who have associated extensively with Americans, and whose attitudes toward the new culture are comparatively favorable. More often than not, the English facility of these students is high, they have previously had contacts with other cultures, and their prior knowledge of the United States is relatively broad. Transferring into the American university was a smooth process for this group, involving no academic prestige or credit loss. While here, these students have been

¹ All of the interviewing was done by Oluf M. Davidsen.

relatively free from financial worries, and their behavior has indicated a comparatively high degree of personal flexibility.

This orientation pattern contrasts with one which is manifested by a group of students whose attitudes toward America at the end of their stay are relatively unfavorable, who have experienced varying degrees of difficulty in academic adjustment, and whose social contacts in this country have not extended far outside of the Scandinavian student subculture on campus. Typically, this group uses the English language with relatively limited proficiency, and their rate of improvement in this respect is slow. They have had no or few previous contacts with other cultures, and their prior knowledge of America is slight. Personal rigidity, occasionally to the point of stubbornness, is likewise characteristic of these individuals. Upon entering the university here, these students have often encountered difficulties in the process of transfer of credits, or they have interpreted the transfer experience as constituting a loss in academic prestige. Financial worries and dissatisfaction with their educational experience here also typify this group. The group is, however, decidedly in the minority.

This attempt to distinguish in the sample of visiting Scandinavian students between the two sets of attitudinal and behavioral patterns contains striking omissions. It is anticipated that more sharply focused and further differentiated pictures will result when the analysis of data has been completed.

Time changes

Our interviews with each student have been spread out over a period of time ranging anywhere from a few months to almost two years. This has provided opportunity to observe the students' orientation to the United

States as a process in time. At the present stage of our analysis there is beginning to emerge a certain relationship between the students' reactions to their experiences here and the length of time they have spent in this country. With a considerable degree of clarity, our data point to three such orientation phases which seem to indicate a U-shaped curve of favorability toward America. The initial stage is characterized by fascination and by many superficial social contacts with Americans. During the intermediate phase, the number of social contacts with Americans appears to decrease, and the students seem to become increasingly critical in their evaluation of America. Finally, in the case of students whose sojourn extends beyond eighteen to twenty-four months, a much more relaxed attitude in matters pertaining to social relations is observed, and their judgments about the new culture become more favorable and differentiated. Among the numerous factors which influence the duration of each of these stages, language facility, social ease, and personal flexibility seem to be of special importance.

The relationship between the reactions to social and educational experiences in America with which foreign students leave this country and their orientation toward America after they have returned to their own countries is one about which very little is known and also one about which doubtful assumptions have been made. Careful follow-up studies would be required to bring this relationship completely to light. However, it seems appropriate to point out certain types of behavior on the part of our sample of visiting Scandinavian students which pertain to this issue. As has been stated previously, these students come to America with feelings of high national status. These feelings manifest themselves in surprise

about the ignorance of Americans about Scandinavia and in annoyance when attempts at overcoming this ignorance are limited to casual and superficial questions and inquiries. They also show up in the form of a high degree of identification with the home culture and in the students' anxiety to convey information about the Scandinavian countries. In the presentation of such information many of the students seem to be somewhat selective in favor of those aspects of their own culture which they deem desirable. While the operation of this attitude mechanism is perhaps a common phenomenon, it is felt that in the case of the Scandinavian students it is used more as an offensive than a defensive mechanism. Whatever its nature, it is significant that our data point to a reversal of this attitude mechanism after the students have returned. Those of our sample who are in this country for the second time are quite in agreement that such is the case. "Once you are home, everything over

here looks brighter" or, "When you get home, you forget the bad things and remember only the good things about America," are statements frequently made by such students. They also maintain that they are much more prone to defend America when home than while here. Even the students who are here for the first time expect to experience this same reversal.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INVESTIGATION

The principal aim of the present investigation was to develop leads and researchable hypotheses pertaining to the area of cross-cultural education. The exploratory nature of the methods and techniques used in pursuing this aim clearly requires that the generalizations about Scandinavian students' reactions to the American experience should be thought of as suggestive contributions to a widening field of scientific interest rather than final judgments or established facts.

William H. Sewell, Ph.D., Madison, Wisconsin, is chairman of the Department of Rural Sociology and of the Social Science Division at the University of Wisconsin. He has taught at the Universities of Minnesota, Texas, Puerto Rico, and Washington, and the Columbia University. His work abroad included a post as research leader with the Strategic Bombing Survey in 1945-46. He is president of the Midwest Sociological Society and president elect of the Rural Sociological Society. He is the author of numerous monographs and articles on social psychology, research methods, and rural sociology.

Richard T. Morris, Ph.D., Los Angeles, California, is assistant professor of sociology in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of California at Los Angeles. He has taught at Northwestern University, the University of Wisconsin, and the Ohio State University.

Oluf M. Davidsen, M.A., Madison, Wisconsin, is project assistant for the Social Science Research Committee at the University of Wisconsin.

The Swedish Students' Image of the United States*

By FRANKLIN D. SCOTT

SWEDES are intensely aware of the United States: "America is *the* great fact in the world today." They appreciate the vastness of America and the magnitude of her technological achievements and productive capacity. Yet this awareness of a distant land is due not only to the power and wealth of the United States, but fully as much to the more intimate fact that at least half the families of Sweden have relatives across the Atlantic. Swedes perhaps indulge a tendency to feel more closely acquainted with America than is actually the case. The old myths of gold in the streets, of opportunity and unlimited freedom, die hard. But they are being brought into question.

Sources of information about the United States for Swedes in general, as well as for Swedish students prior to a trip to America, are comparatively easy to identify. In the schools and in the universities specific instruction about lands beyond the ocean is meager indeed. Basic geography is taught, but American history comes into the curriculum merely as a part of world history. Students learn about the American Revolution; they gain some acquaintance with George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln; they know the part played by the United States in the world wars of the twentieth century. American literature is notably neglected in the secondary schools and is only beginning to find a

place in the universities; the English language is learned in the "English" manner and through the literature of England. But English is the first foreign language taught in the schools, it is taught exceptionally well, and it provides a tool for wider and deeper learning.

The newspapers of Sweden carry a large amount of news about the United States, and some of the great liberal newspapers are outspokenly friendly to America. Nevertheless the news they print, like the news printed in newspapers everywhere, is predominantly news of the unusual rather than the usual, the unique rather than the common events. Even in the friendly papers negative types of information overbalance the positive. Conservative papers until very recently were inclined to a supercilious attitude toward American culture. Left-wing papers have never missed the opportunity to report lynchings and graft in the great democracy of the West. From Russia, on the other hand, little news is available, and the inherent evil of the eastern neighbor is taken for granted—it simply is not news. Hence negative news and critical comment about the United States occupy far more space than any news about the U.S.S.R. Tarnish on the democratic idol is more newsworthy than the obvious viciousness of the Soviet ogre.

Sweden claims more movie houses per capita than the United States, and these theaters show many American films—more of them second-rate rather than first-rate. From these pictures Sweden gets an impression of American life and taste. And she builds impressions from

Swedish-Americans returning to the homeland bragging about their new country, and from tourists who carry evidence of wealth but not always of culture.

American democracy has long been idealized in Sweden, and the United States has been the promised land for hundreds of thousands of Swedish immigrants. Now in the mid-twentieth century the flow of immigration has ebbed, while the travel of students and trainees, hundreds each year, is at high tide. These intelligent and alert young people are learning their special fields, and they are also re-examining the myths held by their countrymen. America is up for inspection, and a clearer, more realistic appraisal is taking shape.

Hundreds of Swedes from all walks of life have contributed to the impressions here summarized. Newspapers, articles, books, letters, and reports have been examined. An evening with the "gossip mirror" reflected the ideas of ninety-two persons in Stockholm, and thirty-three others answered a questionnaire. Fundamentally, however, the conclusions rest on research in Sweden through one year, during which fifty selected "subjects" and acquaintances of these subjects were carefully interviewed. Each of these subjects had studied somewhere in the United States for one year or more in the period between 1920 and 1953.

STUDENT BACKGROUND

Who are the Swedes who come to the United States as students? The question is important, for these young men and women are not a cross-section of the Swedish public. In the first place they are, almost without exception, graduates of the "student examen" or a course in technology, commerce, or some other special branch of equivalent standing; they have attained an academic status comparable to the

sophomore year of college, roughly, in the United States. This means more than it does in the United States, both because of the disciplined factual education which it implies and because such graduates represent a smaller proportion of the total population than do high school graduates or college sophomores in the United States. In 1910, only 2.8 per cent of the men of twenty years of age had taken "student examen" or its equivalent, and only 0.4 per cent of the women had done so; the percentages have risen since then, but in 1950 stood at only 8.5 for men and 4.4 for women. The percentages tell only a small part of the story: most important is the fact that "students" come from certain rather clearly defined elements of the population. Farmers and workers comprise the overwhelming majority of the people, but as late as 1950, less than 4 per cent of the sons of farmers continued their education to the level of the "student examen," and only 4 per cent of the sons of laborers; on the other hand, 45 per cent of the sons of school teachers, 70 per cent of the sons of men who had themselves taken the "student examen," 60 per cent of the sons of officers, and 26 per cent of the sons of businessmen, took "student examen" or its equivalent.¹ Young men of the cities are about five times as likely to become students as are those of rural districts. Academic and professional training is obviously a matter of tradition and social class.

In their school training these young people have begun the study of English at the age of ten or eleven, and most of them have studied one or two other foreign languages; the majority of them have studied mathematics and history

¹ The statistics are from an elaborate statistical study by Sven Moberg, *Vem blev student och vad blev studenten?* (Lund, Sweden: Gleerup, 1951), pp. 53, 55.

* This project is part of a program sponsored by the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council and supported by grants to the Council from the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

but little social science in the secondary school. Despite the social revolution of the last half century and new democratizing tendencies in education, the general pattern remains the same. It is, therefore, a select group which pursues academic training in Sweden, and it is the elite of this group which has the best chance to get scholarships and fellowships for study abroad. Young men and women who travel to the United States for advanced study and research are thus screened from a small proportion of the total population; they are young people of high intellectual ability and they are from homes of "culture."

What then are the elements of the new appraisal of America by the youthful intelligentsia of Sweden?

FAVORABLE REACTIONS

The primary and the all but universal reaction of Swedish students to their American experience is amazement and gratitude for the outpouring of hospitality heaped upon them. One speaks of his reception as "not only friendly, unbelievably friendly." One is "overwhelmed," and another "cannot recall one person being unfriendly to me." Still another expresses his surprise that "Americans even succeeded in giving you the feeling that they were glad to help you." The wondrous awe with which they speak of the human warmth of Americans continues for years after their return. They marvel at the generosity of Americans, their openness and their cheerfulness. Some of them suspect, however, that much of the friendliness is superficial, and that Americans also in their relationships with one another lack the depth of true understanding and mutual regard that Swedes feel for one or two close friends.

Swedes sense the surging self-confidence of Americans, and the pervading optimism and hope of American society. This boldness was more marked in the

generation preceding the 1950's, but Swedes still feel in the United States the daring to try new things as a contrast to the caution and the personal security-mindedness of their home country.

One of the faults that Swedes most readily admit in themselves is the "royal Swedish jealousy" or envy. In Americans they see envy reduced to a minimum; they marvel at how Americans can rejoice in each other's successes, at how men sincerely congratulate their colleagues on promotions, and at how women will admire each other's hats. Above all, they admire the American capacity for teamwork in factory, office, and laboratory. One man who had studied also in Paris compared his experiences in the bickering, the short-sighted selfishness, and the frustrations of a French laboratory with his later experiences in an American laboratory where, despite personal dislikes, men co-operated wholeheartedly for the achievement of a common goal. This broad-mindedness may well be a function of the size of America and the manifold opportunities available, but the ability to work together is nevertheless regarded as one of the most noteworthy and praiseworthy characteristics of the American people. Many a Swedish student takes home with him a realization of the importance of teamwork, and a determination to practice it. In medical research, in technical laboratories, in business, returnees are stimulating co-operative work and a freer interplay between individuals.

The "poised skeptic onlookers" from small Sweden enjoy in America the "generosity of wide horizons and the vagabond temper," and they admire the creative energy of the people. One recent returnee remarked on the American will to make things better. . . . The great discovery for me was that there exist so many things in America that we have no idea about, and they are mostly the positive

things. . . . I find the American elite more to my taste than any other group of people I have ever met—the teachers, the serious students, the writers, the painters.

Positive appreciation is pleasant to hear, and it is the dominant note in the complex of reactions of students who have been to America from Sweden. Of those who had stayed in the United States at least nine months, not one was found who could be called unfriendly to the country or the people. They are, however, keen and judicious observers as well as appreciative visitors. The culture and the value systems of Sweden and the United States are sufficiently similar, yet sufficiently different in emphases, for visiting Swedish students to be forced to make comparisons on a highly refined level. They do not feel the strong contrasts sensed, for example, by Asian students. They move among their relatives and their fellow students, and in American society at large, inconspicuously. They participate easily in American life, and they experience minimal barriers to intellectual intercourse. They are accepted rather than challenged. Often they enjoy higher status in American academic life than in their home environment. Their evaluations and critical judgments deserve therefore special consideration. They speak as understanding friends who identify themselves as members of the same Great Society.

POLITICS

These friends are frankly puzzled by American politics. They are accustomed to a multiparty system in their own country and in the neighboring lands of Europe. They are accustomed to political parties which emphasize principle as well as the struggle for power, and of governments which more often than not must be formed by coalitions of parties. Political morality is high, and a known crook finds it prac-

tically impossible to maintain a position in government. These Swedish students are therefore puzzled by a system which requires the basic political compromises to be made within the parties instead of between the parties at the time of forming a ministry; and they are shocked by a system in which men who have been exposed as grafters and crooks can yet be elected to local and state offices and even to represent the American people in Congress. They find it impossible to reconcile their observations of American political life with their observations of American morality and idealism in other spheres, and shake their heads in bewilderment. Many of them are particularly interested in the public schools, and they are astonished at the evidences of politics connected with school administration. Their own schools are subject to a nationally centralized supervision and seldom become involved in politics except on a policy level.

The gulf between principle and practice in American politics is most sharply criticized in connection with broader issues. Though the Swedes live in the shadow of the Iron Curtain and have a long record of fearing and fighting the Russian bear, they condemn the McCarran Act as a petty thing for a great state and an unreasonable restriction on the liberty of the individual; they cannot reconcile such laws with their concept of American freedom. As to McCarthyism, they are amazed that the state will permit open violations of basic principles, astounded that a liberty-loving people will tolerate deceitful exaggeration and browbeating. While leftist papers ridicule the hysteria and crow over the resultant factionalism, the friends of America maintain a sad quiet—for they cannot themselves either explain or defend what they regard as tragic excrescences on the face of American society. These evidences

of fear and frustration indicate to the Swedes an immaturity and a peculiar lack of faith in proclaimed principles on the part of the American people, and a lack of self-confidence in dealing with greater issues which contradicts the customary self-assurance of the American as an individual. Because they like American people, these Swedes are saddened; because they hope for strong and idealistic leadership from America, they are concerned.

When these Swedish returnees view American foreign policy they are both sympathetic and suspicious. They are sympathetic with American goals, which they feel correspond closely with their own hopes for peace and for the betterment of conditions of life the world over. But they are distressed by the shifts and uncertainties of American diplomacy, and by the tendencies they observe for Americans to regard the issues of foreign policy as all black or all white. They but dimly appreciate the greatest difference between the United States and Sweden: that the United States is sufficiently powerful to feel a possibility and a responsibility to do something about world conditions, while Sweden is small and deliberately renounces responsibility for the major course of world events. Swedes are generous in attempts to alleviate human suffering and to help far countries in programs of technical assistance, but they carefully abstain from participation in the conflicts between states and ideologies. The Swedes who have spent time in the United States have a deeper understanding and sympathy than their fellow nationals for the basic American motivations in foreign policy. These visitors become convinced that the American people are guided by righteous desires and moral purpose. Yet they, like the rest of their countrymen, look East as well as West and prefer compromise to crusade.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF RETURNEES

It should be added that the Swedes who cross the Atlantic to study do not come with any deliberate purpose of finding or studying a new "way of life." Most of them have very little political consciousness on arrival. The all-pervasive social and political discussions in American colleges open up new vistas, and the visitors are challenged to explain and compare. The process makes them more aware of political problems both in America and in Sweden. This statement is confirmed by the frequent comments by recent returnees that they had no political interests before going to the United States, but that classes in the social sciences had awakened them to a new world of interests, that "bull sessions" had for the first time forced them to assess the value of Sweden's social-welfare system and to compare it with the American methods and ideals. Several of these young people on returning to Sweden began to enter political activity. Of the older, prewar generation of students back from America, it is significant that several whose fields of study were wholly academic are now among the top political leaders of the country. It is still more significant that their leadership shows its strength in the center, in the liberal party and the moderate wing of the social democratic party. The leader of the liberal party is a former fellow to the United States, the liberal editor of the most vigorous and most widely read daily newspaper in the country is another, a professor-parliament member is yet another, and now on the world stage, a director of research in UNESCO is another. These people are Swedes and independent thinkers, they are not in any sense American "agents," but there is no doubt that American experience stimulated their political thinking and that they understand and respect American

political ideals—especially the ideals dominant in American life in the prewar decade when they studied in the land of Jefferson and Lincoln.

THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SCENE

Toward the American social scene, basically similar to their own, the Swedes find themselves antagonistic at only a few points. Brought up in an atmosphere of sincere regard for the individual, and with virtually no minority problem, the Swedes at home have no occasion to question the basic doctrines of human equality. Those who come to America sometimes notice there for the first time the treatment of Jews "as a different kind of people." They condemn race prejudice in any form, although some interesting exceptions can be cited. One who observed the coming of the Negro into a northern college town developed a mild sympathy, or at least something of an understanding of the reason, for the existence of race feeling. Another who spent a year in a southern college went back to his Scandinavian home deeply imbued with the attitudes of the "southern gentleman." These cases at least highlight the fact that personal experience has a profound effect on attitudes, and prove the point that a year in America may significantly alter the outlook of a young man or woman.

The superficiality and materialism of America are clichés of Swedish thinking that are only slightly modified by closer acquaintance. The abundance of American wealth in "things," the habit of speaking in terms of dollar measurement, and the social prestige of the banker and the businessman tend to leave the average visitor with the same opinion he had before he left home. Many of them nevertheless modify this concept a little; some profess that their former attitudes were completely wrong. Some arrive at the eminently reasonable

conclusion that although Americans are materialistic, they are no more so than Swedes, that they have more money and more things only because of hard work and great resources, and that they look upon *things* as means to a better life, not as ends in themselves.

Swedes tend to retain an image of America as a land of limitless resources, vast distances, massive buildings, assembly-line production. It is the land where accomplishment is restricted only by will, it is where their cousins and their uncles made great wealth. It is new and strong and crude.

The belief that America has no "culture" is widespread among the European bourgeois and the untraveled portion of the intellectuals. The belief is actually reinforced in the minds of some of those who travel to the United States and fail to find oil paintings on middle-class living-room walls or to meet with businessmen who can talk about Faulkner or Hemingway. A Swedish fellowship student may very likely discover that his American cousins have automobiles and television sets, but meager "intellectual" interests. Both the young student and the mature researcher frequently complain that they cannot find among their opposite numbers in the States the breadth of cultural interest and knowledge which makes for stimulating conversation. Frequently the Swedish engineer or businessman has read more American literature than his host, and because he has read with the purpose of more clearly understanding American life and thought, he may have attained more penetrating insights than the more casual-reading American.

Music is the one field of the arts in which Swedes recognize superior American achievement and appreciation. It is odd, however, that many Swedes are themselves uninterested in music and unconscious of the part played by

music in American life. Those who are aware of it are invigorated and deeply impressed by the emphasis on music in schools, music festivals, and summer camps, by such modern composers as Copland, Piston, and Halsey Stevens, and by the great city orchestras. Most of all, they are impressed by the wide popular interest in music, the like of which, according to one expert, is not found elsewhere in the world.

RELIGION AND THE MORAL CODE

The reaction of Swedes to American religious thought and practices runs the gamut of all possible attitudes, and it is probably impossible to generalize about a Swedish image of America in this aspect. All are aware that religion is more vital in the United States than it is in Sweden and that it is expressed through a vast variety of denominations (which they call sects). Some are annoyed by the emphasis on religion in the denominational colleges, some are convinced that religion is mostly hypocrisy, some profess that they are more negative toward Christianity after seeing it in the States. Very few return to Sweden thinking of themselves as more deeply religious. The most common reaction, perhaps, is a somewhat puzzled recognition of the fact that a great people attends church in large numbers, treats religion as important, and supports by private contributions a multitude of different denominations. This is regarded as extraordinary, something little short of an aberration. The America-visiting academic Swede, who is of course not representative of the Swedish people as a whole, may even put it as one of them did:

Americans are so religious simply because they have not thought things through; they do not want to think things through, or think about serious things as we do—by serious things I mean art, music, literature.

The moral code which is associated with religious beliefs and emphases is still more baffling to the practical Swede. The Swede is likely to pride himself on the fact that he has accepted sex as one of the natural facts of life; he finds American attempts to deny freedom in sex an abomination. Ultimate results in the two cultures may be similar, but the conflicting enticements and restraints accompanying sex in America he finds frustrating, immoral, and physically deleterious. This is the aspect of American life in which he finds the greatest hypocrisy.

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

Education is the one subject on which one can expect from students universal, if not unanimous, reactions. In Swedish ideas about American education are many keen insights and appraisals. Generally accepted is the view that colleges and universities are so different in standards and quality of instruction that it is impossible to generalize about them—and with this point established, everyone begins to generalize! Also widely current is the idea that the elementary and high schools "comprise more social activities than studies," that school is play until the college and graduate years. Swedish students realize that the United States produces top-notch scholars, great scientists, effective businessmen, but they cannot understand how our easygoing schools have anything to do with the process. The educationally disciplined Swede thinks the American high school is a "great waste of time and energy"; "the Swedish student after twelve years knows much more than the American"; "the difference is amazing."

The college students from Sweden are, on the other hand, annoyed by the academic discipline of quizzes, examinations, term papers, and reports. Such

assignments were the stuff of their secondary education; they wonder how the supposedly mature student can tolerate this paternalism, this petty oversight. Basically the puzzle stays in their minds because they do not quite realize how fundamentally reversed are the two systems of education: American primary and secondary education allows freedom, while college and graduate school provide discipline; Swedish primary and secondary education provides discipline, while the university allows freedom. Results seem to indicate that either system may be good in itself, but an individual may find it difficult and disturbing to shift in mid-career from one to the other.

Despite irritations, the Swede finds much in the American collegiate system which he prizes: class discussion, the close contact between teachers and students, and the extracurricular activity which helps young people in "getting rid of shyness and teaches you to express yourself." One remarks that "perhaps the American educational system gives a better preparation for life." One wants utopia: an educational system for Sweden which would give "both the freedom of the high school and a knowledge similar to that given by the Swedish secondary schools."

Variations

Although Swedish students' views of America show fundamental similarities there are also significant variations, variations in degree if not in kind. Among the American factors causing these variations in attitude, the institutional environment probably deserves first place. Students who attend the small colleges feel more fully acquainted with the United States than do the Swedes who attend the universities, live in the cities, and perhaps associate largely with other foreign students in the "international houses" rather than

with Americans in private homes or in fraternities and sororities.

SECTIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL VARIATIONS

Section of the country makes a greater difference than would normally be supposed. The Swedish student is usually most cordially received by his hosts. If the hosts are the boys in a southern fraternity house the Swede is likely to return to Sweden with the racial prejudices of a southern colonel; if the hosts are the girls of a select eastern college the young Swedish visitor will in all probability view race and capitalism in their fashion. The persuasive power of sympathetic association acts strongly on impressionable youth in a foreign and complex culture. Reactions contrary to the climate of opinion in the most intimate host group occur, but they are rare. And second-hand American sectionalism encountered in Upsala is both amusing and frightening!

For the older group of students, especially, the significant variations come through professional contacts. Research scholars in medicine and technology and students of business in all stages seem to find their American counterparts thoroughly congenial; their impression of America is most vivid through these associations, and beyond them it is often vague. Students in the fields of the social sciences and humanities may have just as high personal regard for their professional friends in the United States, but they are likely to be more critical of American society as a whole than are the doctors, the engineers, and the businessmen. This is partly owing to the nature of their fields of study, which demands a critical approach to man and his works. It is also due to the fact that America's most obvious achievements are in the

realm of technology, science, industry, and commerce. In these fields, the foreigner can have only admiration for Americans and what they have done. Also, the visiting businessman feels less keenly than the humanist the differences in cultural emphasis between Europe and America. The artist, the literary man, and their ilk not only sense these differences but are likely also to have, consciously or unconsciously, the feeling that Europe's last claim to importance must rest upon her "culture," and they slightly resent America's claims in the realm of art and thought—while being quite willing to acknowledge American pre-eminence in the material realm.

POSITION OF THE RETURNEE

Except in a few self-conscious bastions which make it a duty of pride to defend and preserve Swedish culture, the returnee from America enjoys a certain glamor and prestige. Frequently he is asked to write articles for his home-town newspaper or a national magazine describing his experiences, American education, and student life; the specialist publishes detailed reports on his observations and research results; and the journalist or other general observer occasionally writes a book squeezing the whole of America between two covers. All encounter an eagerness at home to know more about the puzzling but powerful land of the West. They enjoy a preferred position in job getting: employers value the recognition of worth evidenced by scholarships, the adventuresome spirit which inspired travel, and the broadening effects of experience in a stimulating foreign society. In certain fields, such as economic research and medicine, study in the United States is so highly regarded and so generally practiced that those who have not had transatlantic experience feel apologetic. Swedes regard their

homeland's basic training in most fields as equal to or better than that obtainable elsewhere, but they admit the superior facilities for specialization in the United States, and study trips abroad are proudly listed in the Swedish Who's Who. Returnees do not stand apart as a special group, but their experience in America is known; and a few words from a respected returnee have more impact than hours of propaganda out of either Washington or Moscow.

U. S. INFLUENCE IN SWEDEN

The results of student travel to the United States, greatly increased since World War II, are evident in an increased understanding of America, the use of American machines and methods, the reading of American magazines and books, the visits to Sweden of friends and professional associates encountered in America—innumerable influences which add to and blend with other influences in ways both manifold and subtle. To weigh the effect of each such influence separately from the others is impossible; to disregard the total impact is unthinkable. From both friends and foes one hears that Sweden is becoming "the most Americanized country in Europe." Educational reactionaries may abhor the infiltration of the evil "American individualistic psychology," and other theories coming "along with the Gulf Stream"; but the fact is that Swedish education is being re-examined and reformed. The elementary school reform now under way would lead Sweden in the direction of the more democratic American system, and exhaustive governmental reports on higher education in the social sciences and in medicine advocate introduction of policies observed in the United States.

Sweden has not joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; she maintains a proud and rigid independence in the political sphere, and still more so in

the cultural realm. But politically she will co-operate with the West in every way except by signing on the dotted line. Similarly, in techniques and theories applicable to business, engineering, education, medicine, and other fields, Sweden recognizes no subservience to the United States, but she is ready and eager to watch, to learn, and to adapt to her own uses whatever is thought to be more efficient and more fruitful. Her students find much of

this adaptable material in the United States, and they are using it vigorously and effectively in their home country. They have not the Arabs' fear of American imperialism, no sense of cultural inferiority, no deep-seated historical resentments; they are free psychologically and actually to choose or to reject, to accept and modify what and when they will. They use their American experience, therefore, not as disciples of America, but as discoverers for Sweden.

Franklin D. Scott, Ph.D., Evanston, Illinois, is professor of history at Northwestern University. Since 1930 he has traveled and studied repeatedly in the Scandinavian countries, and in 1942 was a research specialist with the Office of Strategic Services in Washington. He has written a number of articles for the Encyclopaedia Britannica and the Britannica Book of the Year, articles in the field of modern European history in historical journals, and several books, including Bernadotte and the Fall of Napoleon (1935) and The United States and Scandinavia (1950).

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

WRIGHT, QUINCY. *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*. Pp. xii, 378. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954. \$5.00.

In May 1952 Professor Wright delivered two papers on the occasion of the retirement of Professor Hans Kelsen at Berkeley. These carried the titles "Should International Peace and Security Be Institutionalized?" and "How Can International Peace and Security Be Suitably Internationalized?" According to the author's own words in his preface, they contained "a summary of the ideas upon the general problem of stability and progress in international relations" which he had been expressing since 1945. Consequently, when the question of the publication of the two papers arose, it seemed to the author advisable to include other articles and essays which he had written, published and unpublished, which developed these ideas in more concrete form. This is the genesis of the book, and explains its general structure.

Professor Wright does not indiscriminately support the idea of institutionalizing international peace and security. To

him, institutions can have bad as well as good effects. What is important is that institutions be adapted to the changing conditions of an ever shrinking and changing world. He therefore concludes that "our problem is one of institutionalizing peace and security in the right direction, of the right type, and at the right speed."

How to do this, how to make progress in the suitable institutionalization of international peace and security, is the question with which most of Professor Wright's book is concerned. The author suggests four major approaches to the problem. First, there is need of a quantitative science of international relations to provide better guidance in determining the direction and amount of international regulation. Secondly, education must be more concerned with the world point of view, which can hardly emerge without a universal center of co-ordination and research. Thirdly, a constitution is needed which makes "the sentimentalized symbols and general purposes sufficiently ambiguous so that different views can be included and adaptation to new circumstances can be possible," while at the same time law and procedure are sufficiently precise to guide action. Finally, it is of the utmost importance that the powers and functions of the interna-

tional institutions be interpreted in such a way that their authority will keep pace with the opinion necessary to support it.

Without sharing to the full Professor Wright's contagious optimism regarding the application of reason to international relations, one may yet feel that he has by these essays made an important contribution to our understanding of the conditions of a better ordered world.

LELAND M. GOODRICH

Columbia University

JACOBINI, H. B. *A Study of the Philosophy of International Law as Seen in Works of Latin American Writers*. Pp. viii, 158. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. Guilders 11.50.

It is unfortunately true, as the author observes in the Introduction to his scholarly study, that Latin American contributions to international law are virtually unknown in the United States except in very restricted circles. Hence his examination of the attitude of Latin American writers towards the philosophy of international law will be welcomed by students, and they will be surprised to note the wealth of treatises and monographs that have come from countries which, in spite of their common traditions, have developed strong national points of view.

In separate chapters the author examines the work of nineteenth- and twentieth-century writers, distinguishing in the nineteenth century between positivists, eclectics, and naturalists, and in the twentieth century merely between positivists and eclectics. But the author is quite aware that the distinctions between the three groups are at times difficult to draw, and while it may be easy to set an extreme positivist against an extreme naturalist, there is a middle zone in which the distinctions are relative rather than absolute. The problem is one, he observes, not of separating "the sheep from the goats," but of determining the greater or less degree in which one or other attitude is to be found.

A closing chapter deals with "American International Law" and is marked by a careful analysis of the thesis of Alejandro Alvarez followed by the opposing points of view of a number of writers, including

Ruiz Moreno, Podestá Costa, and Ulloa. Perhaps the contrasting views are over-emphasized; and the question is best answered by the comment of the Dominican writer, Sánchez y Sánchez, that "the adjective [American] must not be taken as the expression of a distinct law, but as the expression of a particular application of general and universal public international law."

C. G. FENWICK

Pan American Union

DEUTSCH, KARL W. *Political Community at the International Level*. (Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science.) Pp. x, 70. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1954. 95 cents.

This monograph gives a historical survey of political communities in the contemporary terminology of social science, it elaborates a conceptual framework of international society, and it provides fourteen tests useful in measuring the degree of political integration. Deutsch's components for a stable international society follow Quincy Wright: political amalgamation supported by a psychological "we feeling," a degree of cultural standardization, and co-operation through trade, defense, and through the mutual recognition of vital interests. If the development of international society keeps pace with the increasing volume of political, cultural, and economic transactions; and if it not only solves the problems raised by these transactions, but creates the expectation that future problems will continue to be solved, then it can be said to be stable.

The fourteen tests designed to measure political integration cover three areas: the compatibility of autonomous groups, the extent to which international intercourse is mutually satisfying, and the volume of transactions. With real ingenuity the author indicates the importance of investigating mutually disruptive behavior; interchangeability of social roles; predictability of behavior; the number and relation of mutual economic, political, and cultural interests; the balance of transactions between areas; and the extent to which social communications integrate and penetrate social as well as geographical groupings.

Deutsch has made a significant contribution to the study of international relations. The elaboration of his fourteen tests for measuring political integration is both imaginative and suggestive. A useful appendix outlines ranges of transactions relevant for mapping a potential political community. However, one might criticize such conceptual tools as "integration load" or "integration capabilities" as being neither precise nor clear nor particularly helpful in analyzing peaceful change. Or it might be regretted that a greater attempt was not made to conform to standard terminology in the field (for example, use of "stable international society" would be quite as satisfactory as continuing the use of the unfortunate phrase "security community," which is dynamic only by definition). This reader, for one, is puzzled by the author's statement that communications must be considered a burden or problem in international relations, not a condition of stable international society (p. 34, note 17) after which he proceeds to outline six tests of political integration which are designed to measure the frequency, speed, fidelity, and effectiveness of communications (pp. 59-63). Could it be that communications create adjustment problems in the short run, but indicate the degree of integration in the long run? Finally, if these fourteen tests are going to be used effectively, it must be both by placing them in a historical perspective and projecting them into the future by assessing the rate of growth.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.

Stanford University

HOFFMANN, STANLEY. *Organisations internationales et pouvoirs politiques des états*. Pp. 428. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954. No price.

In No. 52 of the *Cahiers de la Fondation des Sciences Politiques*, Mr. Hoffmann seeks to measure the influence of states upon the organizations of which they are members and, conversely, the influence of the organizations upon states. The study is limited to the political field and traces the inquiry through three periods: the concert of Europe; the League of Nations; and

the United Nations. In the end he has not been able to find much advance.

The Great Powers constitute both the hope and the difficulty in three various eras. The United Nations, based on unanimity among these powers, was rendered impotent when they failed to agree. Members have sought to break this circle of impotence by evading the veto (for example, usage of abstention), by increasing the jurisdiction of the General Assembly, and by regional developments. The zone of national sovereignty is being reduced by political votes of a majority of small states, whose decisions interpret such things as human rights or self-determination as superior to Charter restrictions, since these are political votes; and, since they refuse to ask judicial decision, no state can feel any certainty as to its rights under the Charter. The votes, of course, are only recommendations, but few states are willing, thus far, to reject them.

On the other hand, states incline to settle their problems by negotiation, in which the United Nations plays a subsidiary role; it does not conduct, but only facilitates, the negotiations. The United States, he says, does not "go it alone"; even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is subject to the Charter, and in the Korean affair the United States submitted to the collective will. While the United Nations is extending its limited power of action to invade domestic jurisdiction, it remains true that states settle their own affairs, and the United Nations merely furnishes machinery for their negotiations. He concludes that where solidarity exists among the Great Powers, organization is not needed; where solidarity does not exist, organization is impotent. His hope for the future rests in the development of such a community of nations as is now being shaped up in Western Europe.

It is a penetrating and useful study.

CLYDE EAGLETON

New York University

TURNER, ARTHUR C. *Bulwark of the West: Implications and Problems of NATO*. Pp. iv, 106. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1953. \$2.00.

The author was the secretary of a study group under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs which, from March 1952 to January 1953, devoted itself to an examination of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The original draft of the book was made by Dr. Turner, and the present publication is based on that draft as it emerged after group discussions.

As regards the inspiration for the North Atlantic Treaty, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, in 1947 Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, is credited with possibly the earliest public expression of the need for such an organization, when he pointed out that the Security Council of the United Nations had become "frozen in futility and divided by dissension," and (in a speech in 1948) that in their search for peace "it is possible for the free nations of the world to form their own closer association for collective defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations . . ." (pp. 8-9). In the negotiations for the Treaty which followed the passage of the "Vandenberg Resolution" clearing the way for the participation of the United States, Canada played an important part, particularly in her successful effort to have it broadened from a strictly military alliance into an enterprise fostering fruitful collaboration among its members.

In discussing the problems encountered in the implementation and functioning of NATO, the part played by national pride and prejudice is pointed out. Likewise, the author observes that although the signatories of the Treaty agree in Article 5 that "armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all," each one retains the right to take "such action as it deems necessary." At this hour such hedging seems to this reviewer rather antediluvian, but apparently concessions had to be made to those whose nostalgic feelings blind them to the requirements of the present.

NATO's interest in and relation to the movement for European integration, evidenced on the one hand by the Council of Europe, and on the other by the Schuman and Pleven plans, are discussed at length. Succeeding chapters deal with NATO in

relation to the British Commonwealth and the United Nations, as well as "the general appropriateness of regional organization in the present world situation" (p. 88).

Space precludes the raising of but one query: Does it follow that as soon as it became evident that the Great Powers would not, as originally assumed, attain unanimity on major questions "the United Nations ceased to make sense, and it was impossible that it should work" (p. 77)? Were the Security Council the *United Nations* this sweeping conclusion might stand.

FRANK M. RUSSELL

University of California
Berkeley

THOMAS, NORMAN. *The Test of Freedom*. Pp. 211. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1954. \$3.00.

As a pacifist Mr. Norman Thomas did not blind himself to threats which force war even upon the most peace-loving nation, and as a Socialist he never ceased to be, first and foremost, a liberal. So he can give a candid account of his own political past which, without concealing errors of judgment, bears testimony to his unwavering and enlightened faith in Jeffersonian democracy. From this vantage point he reviews the present "state of liberty under the twin attacks called Communism and McCarthyism." The drama recorded in these pages is exciting enough, but it is related with an even and dispassionate voice, vibrant, however, with a deep devotion to America and American ideals. The desire to be just is dominant throughout, and equity is consistently placed above partisanship. Mr. Thomas analyzes with sympathetic understanding the conditions which rendered American liberals susceptible to the attraction of an illiberal doctrine: hatred of fascism, faith in social progress, and a critical attitude toward capitalism combined with loyalty toward a wartime ally and victim of Hitler's aggression. The author, who must have felt the strength of the temptation and who manfully resisted it, speaks here with singular authority. His arguments may exonerate erstwhile fellow travelers. But he is far from condoning the disreputable and traitorous acts which were

inspired by allegiance to Communist principles. His indictment of Bolshevik theory and practice is of uncompromising stringency. Again, looking at the other side of the picture, he does not mince words in pillorying those who defend liberty by methods utterly inconsistent with liberty. But his disgust with McCarthy's demagoguery does not tempt him into either belittling the Communist danger or adding to the Senator's stature by painting him as the arch-enemy of democracy.

Sane and sober are the words which well describe this book. But they fail to do full justice to it. The balanced record and analysis of facts are interspersed with passages worth remembering for the political wisdom which they convey. On page 61 we read: "At no point in the world—except in Tito's Yugoslavia—is there any evidence of any change in the essential nature of communism." And on the preceding page: "It is always necessary for the lover of civil liberty to reflect that men seek to escape as well as to win it; that they are interested not so much in the abstract freedom as in particular freedoms, of which the group freedom called national independence is at the moment the dearest in Asia."

HELMUT KUHN

Munich, Germany

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

HART, ALBERT G. *Defense and the Dollar: Federal Credit and Monetary Policies*. Pp. xiv, 203. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953. \$2.00.

At times in reading *Defense and the Dollar* I almost had the feeling of talking with a doctor eager for a patient on whom he could try a pet technique.

Dr. Hart says: "Despite inflation danger, we accept the judgment of our military leaders that we must spend faster for a time to build up an armament of planes, tanks, ships and guns." From that starting point, he examines mechanics for stabilization.

In the opinion of this reviewer (who

does not claim to be a monetary expert) budget-makers and appropriation committees should never overlook the fact that blind, unquestioning pouring out of dollars in response to requests by military leaders who think in terms of "missions" rather than of costs can defeat the procurement of wanted items by pricing them out of the market. During the first year of Korea, it might be remembered, our military effort lost more aircraft to rocketing prices than to enemy action.

The author, then, in this reviewer's opinion, is a bit too inclined to say in effect, "Let the military write the check—we can manage the flow of credit."

The evidence of good management assembled by Mr. Hart, however, is not reassuring.

He makes a detailed examination of the application of Federal Reserve policies from 1917 through 1952, and comes up with this record—

12½ years of "Clearly Appropriate Policies"

9¾ years of "Doubtful or Unobjectionable Policies"

13¾ years of "Clearly Inappropriate Policies"

Yet, his prescription seems to be "more of the same." He closes his book with the recommendation of the Clark committee that "The Congress should direct the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury to emphasize the requirements of economic stability in their open-market and debt-management operations."

Earlier in his book, however, Mr. Hart recognizes that "the Treasury leans toward easy money" by "a bias" which "arises naturally enough because each of the frequent flotations of government securities involves anxious moments; to make the flotation succeed, buyers must have plenty of funds" and that "the Federal Reserve 'as fiscal agent' sets up market contacts and handles bonds and checks as called for by the Treasury decision."

Mr. Hart neatly points out in an early chapter that funds are "created" by a normal bank lending operation and that "using these funds does not use them up."

When the borrower repays his loan, "the newly created funds will be retired."

During the period of the loan and the circulation of the created funds, an increase in buying power has taken place. The larger the period of circulation, the greater the turnover, the greater the volume of loans, the greater the increase of funds to compete for a dwindling production of consumer goods. In short, the greater the inflation.

Mr. Hart turns his back on gold or even a commodity-reserve as a limitation upon the volume of currency in these newly made funds. He thinks that the public "sees that we need an official defender of the integrity of the dollar." He concludes that "if the Federal Reserve (or any top monetary authority set up to co-ordinate the Federal Reserve and the Treasury) can fill this part worthily in the next few years, this country will have a good start toward a sound long-run monetary policy."

In view of Mr. Hart's own documentation of the 23½ years of doubtful or clearly inappropriate policies against 12½ years of appropriate ones, that seems to be a large and disappointing "IF."

If we need an official defender of the integrity of the dollar, it would seem more consideration might be given to permitting gold to resume more of its natural role of policeman through free convertibility. At least the policeman would be more than the opinion of some "expert" after a bad breakfast.

FRANCIS CASE

United States Senator
from South Dakota

PAUL, RANDOLPH E. *Taxation in the United States*. Pp. xii, 830. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954. \$15.00.

Taxation in the United States tells the story of how our Federal tax system came to be what it is, it offers a judicious appraisal of recent developments and trends in that system, and it suggests the directions toward which the author would like to see our tax structure evolve.

Perhaps no one in the United States is so eminently qualified as Mr. Paul to write this kind of book. He has devoted a life-

time to taxes: as a distinguished legal practitioner, as a Treasury official devoted to the public welfare, as a meticulous scholar, and as a humane individual who has never lost sight of the fact that the tax system exists only to serve mankind. The book is a direct product of this broad experience, careful scholarship, and humane outlook. Altogether, it is a major contribution to the literature of public finance. It will become a classic to be consulted not only by students of public finance but also by students of American history.

One of the most noteworthy features of the book is the exceptional quality of its literary style. It tells the story of American taxation clearly, logically, authoritatively, and with a fine sense of historical perspective. It conveys the drama of the struggles and ordeals out of which the American system of taxation has emerged. Yet it is consistently restrained and scholarly. It is historical writing of great eloquence and charm. From a literary point of view, this book stands alone in the entire field of public finance.

The central characters of the book are the individual income tax and its cousins the corporation income tax, and the estate and gift taxes. Mr. Paul traces the evolution of these taxes from earliest beginnings in the United States to the present. Two themes are stressed: first, the political struggles relating to the introduction of these taxes—struggles centered on the question of constitutionality; and second, the political, legal, and economic forces and necessities which have led to the numerous modifications of these taxes. While the book emphasizes the income and death taxes, it never loses sight of the total federal tax system—including the excises, import duties, and all the others.

The number of pages devoted to the various periods of American tax history is correlated with the amount of revenue collected during these periods: 104 pages on the period prior to World War I, 131 pages on the inter-war period, and 390 pages on World War II and after. The final section (141 pages) is devoted to commentary on the preceding history and to appraisal of the present tax system.

I hesitate to single out one part of the book for praise, because it is of uniform excellence. However, the final section seemed to me to be the most illuminating and helpful reading on general tax policy that I have encountered. The chapter on the judicial process is a remarkably lucid commentary on the role of the courts in the evolution of our tax system. The chapter, "The Unfinished Task," treats with uncommon sanity the effects of our tax system upon our economic and social life. The chapter, "The Story of Progressive Taxation," is an outstanding summary of the issues concerning graduated rates—issues which many had thought were settled but which are again coming to the forefront of political discussion. The final chapter is an eloquent plea for adequate tax and fiscal policy as a vital part of our effort to sustain our way of life against implacable totalitarian threats. As Mr. Paul puts it (p. 637), it is "the question whether Americans are willing to pay, in taxes, the price of the kind of civilization they have chosen for their own."

The final pages on the responsibility of tax "experts" should be read by every person who regards himself as a student or practitioner of taxation.

HOWARD R. BOWEN

Williams College

Temple University Survey of Federal Reorganization, The. 2 vols. Pp. 118; 117. Philadelphia: Temple University, 1953. \$5.00.

Dr. Robert L. Johnson, President of Temple University, whose services in marshaling citizen support for the objectives of the Hoover Commission have been a major civic contribution, has presided over another project of immense significance in federal administrative reorganization. Financed by private enterprise and undertaken by private citizens, this report contains one hundred twenty-six recommendations for improving governmental structure.

In October 1952, the Temple University program of research was begun in order to bring up to date researches for the Hoover Report completed in 1949 and to provide the new administration, whether Republican or Democratic, with guidelines for

continued reorganization. These recommendations were completed early in 1953 and transmitted to a special committee which had been appointed by President-elect Eisenhower. The Survey therefore represents proposals seriously considered by the new administration as it went into office.

Publication of the recommendations, not released during the initial stages of their consideration by the administration, is now a public service of practical reference value. An impressive group of public-spirited citizens served without compensation as advisers for the project. Twelve reports, plus a special statement on foreign affairs and mutual security, afford brief summaries of major administrative problems and specific suggestions for improved organization. The volumes do not include supporting studies representing the work of some 100 specialists in many fields. The materials are therefore of primary interest to specialists in public administration, but they are not the less valuable for their succinctness. This Survey, as it was designed, bridges the gap between the first and second Hoover Commissions. It is a monument to the tremendous civic support for better government and evidence of an abiding American determination to seek administrative progress through research and analysis.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

University of Maryland

RANNEY, AUSTIN. *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State.* Vol. XXXIV, No. 3 in "Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences." Pp. xi, 176. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954. \$4.00.

In his brief volume, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origin and Present State*, Austin Ranney has made an analysis of the theories concerning party government formulated at the turn of the century by a distinguished group of scholars and publicists, all Americans except one, and has made an attempt to describe the status of these ideas today. Ranney's careful and precise summary of the ideas of Wilson, Lowell, Ford, Goodnow, Ostrogorski, and Croly is the

first attempt to study the history of American theories about party politics. It ought to do something to arouse interest in a neglected field of political thought and may even persuade a few scholars to reread some of the classics of American political science. The intellectual materials examined are intrinsically so interesting and exciting that it is a sheer delight to rediscover them.

It seems to the reviewer that Professor Ranney is a little less successful when he attempts to formulate a party theory of his own. It is excessively academic to argue that the practical consequences of Wilsonian ideas of party government have been small because Wilson and his contemporaries did not develop fully the majoritarian implications of their theories, nor is it likely that the party system will remain static until the American public is converted to Willmoore Kendall's concept of unlimited majority rule. It is more probable that the idea of responsible party government had little immediate effect on American politics for the simple reason that from 1896 to 1932 there was no satisfactory way to implement the idea by holding the party in power responsible to the public. The election of 1896 produced a sectional alignment so overwhelming and so stable and developed one-party areas so extensively that the party system ceased very largely to be competitive. Talk of party responsibility made no sense under these circumstances.

On the other hand, the new national alignments resulting from the party revolution of 1932 have given a new meaning to Woodrow Wilson's concept of the role of the parties in American politics. The nationalization of party alignments since 1932 makes possible the kind of alternation in power which is the first prerequisite for party responsibility. The party system is now so widely competitive that responsibility is likely to be imposed on the parties whether they like it or not. It follows that it is now not very important that there are some people in the country who do not like the idea of majority rule.

In these times theorists may become influential by inventing those rationalizations needed by politicians who find themselves

in unfamiliar situations. If the test of an idea is going to be its capacity to get itself accepted, theorists ought to examine the market for their ideas. In one of the most dynamic periods in the history of the world it is a poor theorist indeed who cannot find people who see the relevance of his ideas to the things they want to accomplish.

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER

Wesleyan University

KRAUS, MICHAEL. *The Writing of American History.* Pp. x, 387. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953. \$5.50.

The present book is the second, enlarged edition of a work previously entitled *A History of American History* (New York, 1937). Though Professor Kraus has attempted to take account of significant books published in the interval, the fundamental character of his work remains unchanged. The new title is however somewhat more descriptive, since the emphasis continues to be placed upon the actual writing of history and not upon the institutional development of the historical profession, the character of historical instruction in the schools and colleges, or the impact of historical scholarship on the popular imagination. This limitation would seem to be perfectly justifiable.

In general, historians are grouped together in large categories, with major figures tending to receive some half-dozen pages each. Francis Parkman and Henry Adams, but not George Bancroft or Frederick Jackson Turner, attain the dignity of separate chapters. Non-American writers are not on principle excluded, but only Sir George Otto Trevelyan and John A. Doyle receive extended treatment. William Robertson and W. E. H. Lecky are mentioned only in passing, and the most influential living historian in the English-speaking world, Sir Lewis Namier, figures only in a footnote. This is all the more surprising in that Professor Kraus has a chapter on "The Imperial School" of historians of the American Revolution which might well culminate in an analysis of Namierism. For most of the historians

treated by Professor Kraus he supplies a brief but helpful selection from the biographical and critical literature about them, but he does not give a systematic catalogue of their own principal articles and books. The bibliographical value of the work is correspondingly limited.

It must be said that the criticisms made of the first edition of this book apply with equal force to the second. Perhaps inevitably, many of the chapters are disjointed. But Professor Kraus has made his task more difficult by the choice of meaningless and unhelpful categories for organizing his material. Why except for chronology should Jared Sparks, George Bancroft, and Richard Hildreth be lumped together as "Patriots, Romantics—and Hildreth"? What exactly is the science shared in common by Professor Kraus's "Scientific School"? In what useful sense do von Holst, Schouler, Fiske, McMaster, Winsor, and Channing deserve the collective title of "The Nationalist School"? And, finally, who would guess in 1954 that Charles A. Beard and Vernon L. Parrington are "Contemporary Trends"?

These rather mechanical juxtapositions are a function of the central weakness of the book, an almost total lack of feeling for historical writing as a part of the history of ideas. It is no accident that Professor Kraus's discussion of Puritan historians is substantially uninformed by a reading of Perry Miller's *New England Mind* and his discussion of Charles A. Beard not visibly influenced by Morton G. White's *Social Thought in America*—the two subtlest books of recent years which treat of historical writing in America as a mode of thought and a paradigm of intellectual history. One may here add that Professor Kraus's book is seriously impaired by his failure to recognize Perry Miller as the most vigorous creative intellect now at work among American historians. But intellectual history and intellectual historians are obviously not congenial to Professor Kraus. For his own part he gives what many people will be glad to have, an undemanding account, not from within but from without, of what his-

torians have said about America from colonial times to the present.

DONALD FLEMING

Brown University

COTTERILL, R. S. *The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes Before Removal*. "The Civilization of the American Indian Series," Vol. XXXVIII. Pp. xiii, 255. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. \$4.00.

From their discovery by De Soto in the Gulf and Southern Appalachian region in 1540 to their forced removal to Oklahoma three centuries later the Cherokees, Chocktaws, Chickasaws, and Creeks, with their Seminole offshoot, made a powerful impact upon the history of the white man in North America. This book is an account, based on much scholarly research, of these complex Indian-white interrelations.

In his preface the author disclaims this limitation; it was his aim "to write a history of the Indians, as distinguished from a history of their foreign relations." The purpose proved to be beyond the spiritual insight of this historian from an alien culture; but narrowing his study down to its proper field, he has done well.

He writes with a clear, vigorous style illuminated by flashes of wit. Thus he succinctly sums up the argument of English Superintendent Stuart to the Cherokees that if they would cede the land overrun by white trespassers "the trespassers would no longer be trespassing." When Spain entered the war against England in the American Revolution, the pro-British Chickasaws "remained unconscious of their conquest by a Spanish proclamation." The conscientious American agent Hawkins "returned to his task of promoting civilization and discord among the Creeks." When the Seminoles were induced to accept an uninhabitable reservation in Florida "where they would be free from white encroachment, the commissioners spoke with complete, if unintentional accuracy."

Such expressions are more than witty comments on specific happenings. Each of them could be the thesis of a book on the white man's Indian policy; they are

completely typical, true for any locality, any tribe, and any period of American history.

Unfortunately this cleverness is actually misleading in interpreting the obscure motives behind Indian actions, the emotional responses that constitute Indian reasoning. The author understands one fundamental native institution: the communal ownership of land as an economic system and a mystical concept. But aside from this he is lost.

He is equally obtuse in brushing aside the influence of white missionaries. Why, for example, does he not only ignore but deny their native language studies?

The real excellence of the book then is confined to the history and interpretation of the white man's official policy, more particularly the American policy, towards the Indians. The effect is not very gratifying to national pride, but this is a phase of American history that needs to be told.

ANGIE DEBO

Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College

JEFFERSON, THOMAS. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*. Vol. 8: 25 February to 31 October 1785. Edited by Julian P. Boyd, Mina R. Bryan, and Elizabeth L. Hutter. Pp. xxix, 687. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. \$10.00.

The eighth volume of this monumental series, for which the world of scholarship is so deeply in debt to the editor and his associates, brings sharply into focus two aspects of Jefferson's many-sided personality. One is the diplomat, engrossed in public negotiations. The other is the intelligent observer of his contemporaries with a philosopher's flair for reflective generalization.

As a diplomat this year, 1785, finds Jefferson busily occupied. The return of Franklin to the United States and the transfer of Adams to London leave Jefferson as the sole American Minister in Paris. The correspondence contains much information about the various drafts and discussions that culminated in the signing of a treaty of friendship and commerce with Prussia. Much time was also devoted

to the preliminaries of sending a representative to the Barbary Coast to come to terms with the pirate states located there. The picture that emerges is of a diplomat who is cool, realistic, shrewd, and well able to calculate matters of power and interest.

The private reflections that unfold in his letters to family and friends depict his character, tastes, and preferences. Writing to Abigail Adams, he remarks about himself: "I do not love difficulties. I am fond of quiet, willing to do my duty, but irritable by slander and apt to be forced by it to abandon my post" (p. 548). He has some judicious descriptions of American characteristics, contrasting North and South (p. 468), and of France and Frenchmen. By the latter he is alternately attracted and repelled. While full of admiration for French culture and polish, he is shocked at the unequal distribution of wealth, at the vicious form of government, and at the dissoluteness of many among the aristocracy. A simple pietist, a Puritan ascetic, rises in him to proclaim the simple virtues of rustic living and to warn against European "grand tours" for any American aged less than thirty. At the same time, his fundamental belief in people, and a readiness to distinguish between the individual human being and his social conditioning, evoke that noble humanism which befits the author of the words that "all men are created equal." He criticizes and condemns the institution of slavery and looks forward to its eventual abolition (pp. 184, 356). He begs that the American Indians be judged by their potential abilities rather than by their actual state, considering them in no wise an inferior stock (p. 185). For the horizons of his thought and sympathy are no less extensive than mankind itself.

LESLIE LIPSON

University of California
Berkeley

SCHACHNER, NATHAN. *The Founding Fathers*. Pp. x, 630. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954. \$6.00.

Beginning with the inauguration of Washington in April 1789 and ending with the inauguration of Jefferson in 1801, Mr.

Schachner's latest book offers the best modern survey of the politics and diplomacy of the Federalist era. It treats all the familiar subjects that figure in a college textbook. Interesting, fair, straightforward, and full of essential information, it is best suited to serious amateur students or beginning teachers. Especially good are its concluding chapters on the administration of John Adams. The writing is clear and generally forceful, though hardly distinguished. Mr. Schachner portrays the 1790's as a time much like our own and the Founding Fathers as men much like ourselves. The reader feels a sense of kinship with the past rather than that he is viewing from afar an age of supermen. The moral is that, despite earlier strains, the Republic endured.

The work falters when it touches the West. More serious is the lack of pointed background sketches that are needed to vitalize details. Incidents of minor importance are described, presumably for a human interest value. Actually, they obscure the essentials and give a disjointed effect. Mr. Schachner's two main themes, apart from party politics and personalities, are foreign affairs and the financial policies of the Federalists. In each case, decisions and events were influenced by economic conditions that should be analyzed. Mr. Schachner has not done this. He does not even show what economic goals the Federalist leaders sought to reach. His studies of Jefferson and Hamilton have led him to exaggerate the importance of those two colorful men, whose prolific writings give a distorted view of the period. Adhering to the common view, Mr. Schachner pictures Hamilton as the Federalist titan and Washington as little more than a figurehead. Actually, Washington was the guiding genius. All the major Federalist policies harmonized with ideas which he had repeatedly expressed. On January 29, 1789, he wrote: "... my endeavours shall be unremittingly exerted (even at the hazard of former fame or present popularity) to extricate my country from the embarrassments in which it is entangled, through want of credit; and to establish a general system of policy, which if pursued will ensure permanent felicity to the Common-

wealth. I think I see a *path*, as clear and as direct as a ray of light, which leads to the attainment of that object."

Hamilton went down rapidly after he ceased to be Washington's principal lieutenant.

Since a lack of understanding of Washington's ideas, purposes, methods, and influence is Mr. Schachner's chief weakness, his book gains considerably in interest, weight, and momentum after the General leaves the main scene of action.

CURTIS P. NETTELS

Cornell University

DAUER, MANNING J. *The Adams Federalists*. Pp. xxiii, 381. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953. \$6.00.

This book is a competent and well written analysis of the political crosscurrents within the Federalist party during the Adams administration. The author develops very nicely the split between the moderate Adams Federalists on the one hand and the Hamiltonian High Federalists on the other, a split which played a principal part in the destruction of the Federalist party. The High Federalists, Dauer emphasizes, had a positive program for converting the United States into a thoroughly aristocratic and hierarchical society and were intent upon using the new army, the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the quasi-War with France as instruments to this end. They were utterly disgusted with John Adams when he insisted on a program of internal moderation and a peace settlement with Bonaparte. The resultant party quarrel ruptured the cabinet, cost the Federalists the election of 1800, and set the Federalists far on the road to extinction. This interpretation of the High Federalists, incidentally, as extremists who deliberately sought to prepare for the destruction of the Jacobins through force and civil war follows the interpretation first set forth by Henry Adams in his *Gallatin*; it is at odds with what Morison, Bassett, Channing, and others have since had to say upon the same subject.

Not the least interesting part of the present work are the tables, which show in complete detail the voting records of all members of the several Congresses up

through 1800, and the congressional maps which show the distribution of High Federalist, moderate, and Republican districts throughout the United States in the same period. The author, it may be observed, is very plainly devoted to the Turner-Craven school of history, in that he believes that markets, land fertility, and soil exhaustion were the decisive factors in the distribution of Federalist and Republican political strength in the country. The result in this case is altogether convincing. However, one may express some cautious doubts about the proposition set forth in the preface that the quantitative inductive method applied to historical analysis will lead to general areas of historical agreement and lessen the controversies over rival interpretations of the social forces at work in an era. History, after all, is at once an art, a philosophy, and a mode of social analysis, and no amount of quantitative material can eliminate the decisive personal creative element in its production.

ALFRED H. KELLY

Wayne University

FREMANTLE, JAMES ARTHUR LYON. *The Fremantle Diary*. Edited by Walter Lord. Pp. xv, 304. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954. \$4.00.

This interesting work consists of the day to day observations of Lieutenant Colonel James A. L. Fremantle, of the Coldstream Guards, a fair-minded, intelligent Englishman, who in the fateful year of 1863 journeyed through the heart of the Southern Confederacy from the mouth of the Rio Grande to Gettysburg. Traveling, as he did, by train, steamer, stagecoach, and horseback, he had a fine opportunity to observe and evaluate all classes of people. His sympathy with the Southern cause, his adaptability, and his attractive personality won for him exceptional popularity wherever he went.

Coming with letters of introduction from influential men in England and receiving others from Southern generals, he was able to meet practically all the leading civilian and military leaders in the area through which he passed. Included in the list of the prominent men with whom he had

interviews were Generals Beauregard, Hood, Bragg, Joseph E. Johnston, Longstreet, and Lee. He was also cordially received by President Davis and Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of State.

He was greatly impressed with the spirit of self-sacrifice on the part of the Southern people and the equanimity with which they bore their sufferings and the loss of their property. The beauty of the women had a strong attraction for him. The ladies he met were often described as "pretty" and sometimes "extremely pretty." Nor was his admiration for the Southern people dampened by his opposition to slavery. On the contrary, he seemed to feel that they were doing their best with a bad situation which had been thrust upon them. Indeed, he went out of his way, more than once, to point out instances of good treatment of the blacks by the whites and of the loyalty of the slaves to their masters. He was not unmindful, however, of the shortcomings, and objectionable practices of the people, but even these he viewed with charity, in some instances mixed with a sense of humor. For example, he observed with amusement, rather than hostile criticism, the fine marksmanship displayed by his fellow travelers in disposing of tobacco juice through open coach windows.

The most interesting and valuable portions of this book are the descriptions of the countryside and cities through which he passed, his account of the military situation in Mississippi and the fighting at Gettysburg (some of which he saw from a treetop), and his appraisal of the prominent men with whom he came in contact. He spoke in the highest terms of President Davis and Generals Lee and Longstreet and expressed favorable opinions of nearly all of the other military leaders. He was the guest of Longstreet during the period of fighting in the campaign at and near Gettysburg.

A good map in the front and end linings makes it easy to follow the narrative.

This journal gives us a good view of life in the South at the halfway point in the Civil War, and one finishes reading it with a good taste in the mouth.

O. P. CHITWOOD

West Virginia University

LEFLER, HUGH TALMAGE, and ALBERT RAY NEWSOME. *North Carolina: The History of a Southern State*. Pp. xii, 676. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954. \$7.50.

A praiseworthy development of the last two decades has been the publication of readable single-volume state histories written at the adult level, characterized by professional standards, and far better suited for both classroom and popular usage than the formidable compendia of history and biography that have been traditional.

The University of North Carolina Press, which has been responsible for such volumes on Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, and South Carolina, has now turned its attention closer home with the publication of this excellent volume on the Tar Heel State. It is the distilled essence of many years of teaching and research in the history of their state by Hugh T. Lefler and the late Albert Ray Newsome, both professors at the state university, the latter at one time Secretary of the Historical Commission of North Carolina.

The treatment given in this book is extremely well balanced with respect to those matters which present particular problems to the authors of state history. It avoids the purely antiquarian interest to give proportionate attention to all periods of the state's history and brings the narrative down to 1953. Ample space is devoted to social, intellectual, and economic development as well as to the traditional political and military history. And the difficult problem of placing the state in perspective with relation to national history is conveniently solved by interspersing chapters on pertinent national developments which in classroom usage might be omitted or assigned as background reading.

In general the text has successfully avoided the filiopietistic for the more critical approach. In certain minor respects, however, the inevitable pressures of state patriotism have manifested themselves. This reviewer is compelled to point out that Andrew Jackson was a native son of South Carolina and not North Carolina as the text implies while attempting to

evade the issue. On the other hand, it would have been a valuable contribution to have included some explicit treatment and explanation of North Carolina's reputation as the South's most progressive state.

These are, however, but minor reservations. The book is, on the whole, a comprehensive and balanced treatment within the limits of available space. Its usefulness is enhanced by the device of topical headings and by the inclusion of appendixes giving the governors, information on the counties, population, and a chronology of significant events. The selected bibliography is arranged by chapter headings to provide a guide to further reading. This will be for some years to come the basic textbook for North Carolina history.

GEORGE B. TINDALL

Louisiana State University

FITE, GILBERT C. *George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity*. Pp. xiii, 314. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. \$4.00.

George Peek fathered the idea that came to be known as the McNary-Haugen plan. He led the fight for its adoption. In this struggle, the farm groups learned for the first time how to use effectively the political power which was inherent in their position in the economy and in the Congress. The campaign Peek initiated was the most sustained, highly organized, and ably led farmer movement in the nation's history. It became also the most controversial political issue of the 1920's.

Professor Fite's study will be welcomed as a significant contribution to our understanding of Peek and of the part he played in this struggle. The book is neither a biography, in the ordinary sense, nor a balanced and critical examination of the issues of the period, though it contains some elements of both. The picture of Peek that emerges is, we believe, a different one from what the author felt he was presenting. Peek does not appear as a great thinker or student of the problem. He is rather a genial, likable, and tireless salesman of an idea. His sincerity and selflessness can scarcely be challenged, but his lack of understanding of economic issues stands out with almost equal clarity.

It is in this realm that the author's treatment of the period is least satisfying. He writes as a historian but touches on many economic issues which unfortunately are not handled with sureness, objectivity, or understanding. There is a tendency to accept things as true because these leaders said they were true. It must be kept in mind that they were in the midst of a hot political campaign. Their statements and analyses, and those of their opponents, are obviously distorted and partisan as is to be expected in situations of that kind.

The good salesman convinces himself that the product he seeks to sell is the best in the market. George Peek was a good salesman. He was also an ardent protectionist. His understanding of the problem and his prescription for solving it changed very little even after the world market collapsed in 1930. Many of his later troubles stemmed from this over-rigidity of mind and his lack of understanding of the economic problems with which he was concerned.

Fite's account makes a worth-while contribution, but it should not be regarded as the whole story. As many biographers do, he has absorbed the thinking of the principal character to such an extent that he presents it uncritically. The treatment of the economic aspects of the problem is particularly unfortunate in places, but the space assigned to this review does not allow for discussion of them. Also the struggle of the 1920's seems to this reviewer to be pictured too much as a one-man affair. The opposition too seems to be given less than fair treatment. Calvin Coolidge was as stubborn and unyielding as Peek and probably as fully convinced that he was right.

Despite these defects, the student of farmer movements will find much to admire in the careful search of original records which the author has made and in the readable and interesting summary he has presented.

M. R. BENEDICT

University of California
Berkeley

VAN DEUSEN, GLYNDON G. *Horace Greeley: Nineteenth-Century Crusader*.

Pp. 445. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953. \$5.00.

Horace Greeley was one of the most contradictory personalities our history has turned up. I can think of no one more capricious and unpredictable. It was impossible to know in advance whether, in any particular situation, he would prove to be on the side of the angels or the devil's advocate.

Consequently, preparing an evaluation of his life, character, and contribution presents formidable difficulties. Some of these Dr. Van Deusen handsomely surmounts. For example, he shows a shrewd insight into Greeley's usefulness to liberal causes when he observes:

"This reputation was largely undeserved. For the Tribune editor was not half the reformer he was supposed to be. There was a Greeley who yearned to build the New Jerusalem and whose sword leaped lightly to his hand, but there was also another Greeley who was calculating, conservative and full of shifts and evasions, not to mention a third Greeley who sought refuge from reality in Utopia."

Yet I am afraid that the promise implicit in such a searching analysis has hardly been kept in this biography as a whole. It is not soundly proportioned. True, Greeley's greatest contribution has been as an editor, as the purveyor of news and the molder of opinion. But the areas in which Greeley failed are as important for a true portrait as those in which he succeeded, and it is not enough just to acknowledge them. They must also be described and analyzed.

It seems to me that here the author has not wholly met his responsibilities. When the Civil War came to an end, it is fair to say that Greeley's greatest days as a journalist were also over. After that he gave more and more of his time and attention to politics, and never effectively. I cannot but feel that the story of these irascible and barren years isn't very adequately presented. Neither in space nor in content has Greeley's impact—or lack of it—during the Johnson and first Grant administration, followed by the debacle which ended in Greeley's defeat, dethronement and death, been successfully described.

Typical is the handling of the weeks between the election of 1872 and the end. These were for Greeley a period of unbearable torture. Although it has been fifteen years since I read the letters he wrote then, I still recall with a shudder how they revealed a soul in torment, a mind falling apart under unendurable anguish. This is recorded here, of course, but certainly not in any way which makes the lay reader aware of its intolerable poignancy.

ALPHONSE B. MILLER
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

NOEL, MARY. *Villains Galore: The Heyday of the Popular Story Weekly*. Pp. xi, 320. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$5.00.

During the years between 1840 and 1890, thousands of middle-class Americans found escape in the emotion-charged fiction of the popular story weeklies.

Villains Galore is a skillful and fascinating recounting of the rise and fall of these low-priced weeklies. The first thirteen chapters are devoted pretty largely to historical aspects; the concluding section is concerned with content, authors, editorial and business policies, audience, and influence.

The author lists some forty publications, most of them published either in Philadelphia or Boston, which dominated American periodical reading during the half-century span of this era of American journalism.

The Flag of Our Union, established in 1846 by Frederick Gleason, a Boston job printer, was probably the first real family story paper. It was cheap and appeared weekly. Circulation income was its chief source of revenue. The content was "original" and paid for. It avoided politics and sectarianism while boasting of a high moral tone. It was sheer entertainment.

New York City, which became the home of a number of great daily newspapers when the *Penny Sun* was founded in 1833, was the site of the establishment in 1856 of what was probably the most successful popular story weekly of all—the *New York Ledger*, published by a wealthy and shrewd Scotch-Irishman named Robert Bonner. A

near rival appeared in the same city three years later in the form of the *New York Weekly*, published by Francis S. Street and Francis S. Smith.

Bonner knew all of the answers. He understood mass circulation practices, the value of advertising in other media, and reader interest. He hired the best authors, with Mrs. E. D. E. N. Southworth heading the list, and paid the best rates. His editorial rule was a model of simplicity: "Each installment must be packed full of incident and suspense, and each much be free from obvious improprieties."

The content of the popular story weeklies offers a rich field for investigation and analysis and Miss Noel makes the most of her opportunity.

Sweetness and violence are the unchanging elements. The Grand Reunion theme underlies all plots. Characters tend to be artificial because they are entirely controlled by the exigencies of the plot. The chief sins were tobacco, blasphemy, gambling, drinking, dueling, and suicide. The chief tabo was controversial politics.

A novel feature of the story weeklies was the correspondents' columns, composed usually of questions and answers but occasionally resembling the still popular letters-to-the-editor departments in newspapers and periodicals. A somewhat curious feature was the devotion of page 4 to material of a more high-brow nature.

Miss Noel freely admits the faults of the story weeklies but stanchly defends the role they played in the society which made them possible: "To millions of poor, hard-working, monotony-ridden lives, the story papers were a wide new world of high adventure and lovely sentiment, of mysterious danger, of wonderful escape. They were not only the popular magazines of the nineteenth century America, they were its Hollywood and radio."

FREDERIC E. MERWIN

Rutgers University

LINK, ARTHUR S. *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917*. Pp. xvii, 331. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$5.00.

With the publication of this book, "The New American Nation Series," edited by

Henry S. Commager and Richard B. Morris, makes an auspicious beginning. If the approximately 40 volumes that are to follow equal *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* in judicious selection of materials, in scope of treatment, in objectivity of interpretation, and in interesting style of narration, students of American history are in for a treat. Amply illustrated with cartoons, maps, and pictures, and with the text supplemented by numerous explanatory footnotes, the needs of all types of readers are met. One of the best features of this scholarly book is the critical essay of more than 30 pages on the sources. This section is not a repetition of the references found in the footnotes but is a general and comprehensive bibliography. An adequate and accurate index completes the book.

The author begins with a discussion of the contrast between the New Nationalism and the New Freedom as evidenced in the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. The former accepted the Hamiltonian philosophy of centralized government control whereas the latter was at heart a Jeffersonian liberal with laissez-faire leanings. Roosevelt failed to win the election of 1912 because he could not entice the progressive Democrats away from Wilson.

Anyone familiar with Wilson's writings would anticipate that he, upon becoming President, would "inaugurate a new system of presidential leadership." Moreover, he had fostered executive aggression as a policy when serving as Governor of New Jersey. By the fall of 1916 the New Freedom became a veritable economic reformation. The tariff was lowered, the currency was further controlled and given elasticity, the anti-trust laws were strengthened, the farmers were furnished financial credit, and labor was granted more recognition. But Wilson was no socialist nor even an ardent social reformer. The influence of Wilson's early Southern environment was revealed in the treatment which the Negro received at the hands of his administration. It was probably the greatest blot on his executive leadership.

It would be the irony of fate, said Wilson upon beginning his administration,

if he should be forced to deal chiefly with foreign affairs. Wilson was plagued with many diplomatic sore spots. The President and Bryan muddled through the increasingly trying situation of our relations with Mexico. The issue was compromised when we prepared to enter the European War almost two years after Bryan had given way to Lansing as Secretary of State. As strained as were our relations with Latin America from 1913 to 1917, recurring crises with the European belligerents were even more crucial.

With the campaign of 1916 impending, Wilson returned his attention to progressivism and peace. Congress, when pricked into action by the executive spur, enacted several liberal laws which helped Wilson to stay in power. By April 1917, we had drifted into war, and a new epoch in American history was begun.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

University of Florida

WHITE, WILLIAM S. *The Taft Story*. Pp. 288. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$3.50.

Students of history are aware of the fact that historians have an uncanny habit of correctly reassessing the success or failure of dead statesmen. As an illustration of this, the reputation for statesmanship of Franklin D. Roosevelt is decidedly on the down grade today. The reputation of John Quincy Adams has been rapidly rising for the past century, and now he is looked upon by many historians as one of our greatest statesmen. But it usually takes some time for authors or students of contemporary men to become nonpartisan and objective in their writings. All this makes the book by Mr. White the more remarkable. He has written a favorable assessment of Robert A. Taft with keen insight and also with great fairness. The book is of the highest journalistic quality, using the word "journalist" in the best sense.

The author divides his work into four parts, each one which is of absorbing interest and shows sound judgment. They are entitled: (1) The Fundamental Taft; (2) Taft in Responsibility and Irresponsi-

bility; (3) Taft in Foreign Policy; and (4) The Last, Best Taft.

The author is evidently well aware of the fact that, as stated to this reviewer by one of the leading men in Washington, "Taft was the most brilliant man in the Senate, but he did not have enough patience with the dumbbells." It was this lack of patience rather than the fact that Taft thought more quickly and also more deeply than the average politician of his time that caused him to lose the support of many of the common fry of politicians.

It is just an illustration of the old dictum of James Bryce who, sixty or more years ago, wrote the famous judgment in his American Commonwealth asking "Why the best men do not become President?" Recent history has thrown some doubt upon the final worth of this judgment since our Presidents have become national party leaders as well as executives. This goes far to explain not only the failure of Mr. Taft to become Republican candidate for President, but also in contrast the popular appeal of the vibrant and unreliable Franklin Roosevelt.

The Taft Story is a "must" reading for the intelligent citizen of today, irrespective of party, who desires to get at the inner meaning of American politics during the past few years. Its author has done a real public service in writing this book with such remarkable detachment so soon after the death of Mr. Taft.

WILLIAM STARR MYERS
Princeton, New Jersey

BURNHAM, JAMES. *The Web of Subversion*. Pp. 248. New York: John Day Company, 1954. \$3.75.

The subtitle of this book by a well-known expert on Communism is "underground networks in the U. S. Government." Using the published reports of congressional committees as his source material, Mr. Burnham attempts to chart the course of Soviet espionage and infiltration in Washington from the New Deal to the present. *The Web of Subversion* falls short of Burnham's generally high standard; it bears the scars of haste, and it is only moderately accurate as to facts.

On page 29, Burnham states that where men are named who denied charges of subversive activity under oath, "such denials will in each case be noted." An excellent procedure *provided it is consistently followed*. There are seven references to a certain Solomon Adler who appears as an accused Red espionage agent, but there is no allusion to Adler's categorical denial of these charges in published testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Naturally, there is no suggestion here that the omission of the denial was deliberate. It is suggested that when a man chooses to write about a subject which touches on the honor and reputation of his fellows, he has the duty to take the trouble to ascertain the truth.

Yet, on the whole, the story is factual and clearly told. It is a story that has been dinned into American ears for the past six years until the public has become thoroughly indoctrinated as to the power of the Communist underground. In fact, the current tendency is to project the dangers of the 1940's into the present and for the public to falsely assume that the Government is still caught in a vast web of treason. Burnham's view is that we have only cut a few filaments of the web, that we have merely eradicated "several advanced and exposed echelons." The evidence he offers for this conclusion is unconvincing. Thus he states that the McCarthy Committee discovered two Communist cells at Fort Monmouth and in the Government Printing Office, "both of which were still in existence when the hearings took place" in 1953. If this is true, it is strange that Senator McCarthy was too modest to make any such claim in the 1953 Report of his Committee. Moreover, the evidence which Burnham cites in his reference note does not substantiate his charge. It is high time to put the entire question of the extent and character of current Communist penetration of American security-sensitive areas in the hands of a study group of the stature and capacity of the Canadian Royal Commission.

NATHANIEL WEYL
Washington, D. C.

NICHOLS, LESTER M. *Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division*. Pp. 356. New York: Bradbury, Sayles, O'Neill, 1954. \$7.50.

This is by far one of the best unit histories to come out of World War II. The Tenth Armored Division was the first unit to defend Bastogne in the German winter campaign of 1944, "The Bulge," and it played a major role in saving Bastogne. Tankers of the division, who called themselves "The Tigers" and who were termed "The Ghosts" by the Germans, served in all four American armies and in seven corps overseas. They captured 56,000 prisoners, 650 towns and cities, and dashed some 600 miles across five European countries.

The dramatic story of this famous division is told by Lester M. Nichols, who was the team's historian throughout its operational days and who served in all ranks from private to major. The author recounts the history of the division from its baptism of fire in the Mars La Tour area to the epic of Bastogne and the pursuit of the Wehrmacht into the Austrian Alps. Throughout, the emphasis is upon eyewitness reports, anecdotes, and personal observations. The reader obtains a vivid first-hand account of what these 37,000 men accomplished and suffered.

This book is a magnificent tribute to the men who wore the triangular red, yellow, and blue shoulder patch. The author attributes their brilliant combat achievements to disciplined teamwork and first-rate leadership. The division sustained more than 4,000 casualties and received more than thirty battle honors, awards, and citations. Perhaps the most frustrated young Tiger was the one who was denied a Purple Heart, despite the fact that German shrapnel had knocked out one of his front teeth. He was declared ineligible for the award when it was discovered that the tooth was false.

The author is not a professional historian, but his research in compiling this volume is within the best tradition of historical writing. Aiming to present a completely accurate and carefully documented account, he used not only war communiques, orders, staff and unit commander re-

ports, and his own personal records as press officer, but he also submitted his manuscript to fourteen battle and staff commanders for review. The value of the book is considerably enhanced by battle maps, charts, and photographs.

In the recently published *Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944*, the Nazi leader is quoted as saying: "There's nobody stupider than the Americans. . . . I'll never believe the American soldier can fight like a hero" (p. 149). This battle story of the Tenth Armored Division, a superb contribution to the military history of the United States Army in World War II, should be assigned as required reading to the Führer in his personal Valhalla.

LOUIS L. SNYDER
The City College of New York

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

MYRDAL, GUNNAR. *The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory*. Translated from the German by Paul Streeten. Pp. xvii, 248. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. \$5.00.

This important book by a distinguished scholar is, like Schumpeter's *Theory of Economic Development*, an instance of delayed impact on the English-reading world, for the Swedish lectures on which it is based were given in 1928. Like Schumpeter, but far more explicitly, Myrdal reflects the dissatisfaction of a penetrating European intellect with the British economic tradition in which he himself participated. This book is almost wholly given to criticism and, as Myrdal states, merely foreshadows the methodological appendices to his work on the Negro problem, *An American Dilemma*.

Myrdal has made a major contribution to the continuing debate over the boundaries of the economist's discipline and its relation to ethics and politics. But, being a philosophical critique of economic thinking and an exercise in intellectual history, it may be resisted by the very economists to whom it is addressed. Myrdal attacks some of the basic attitudes and assump-

tions of the modern welfare economists and the devotees of model building. He describes utilitarianism as only a new guise for the Enlightenment's natural law reasoning, and by extension, much the same can be said of both marginal utility and contemporary welfare analysis. He argues that the main stream of economic thought employs concepts of general welfare which both logically and in historical origin inevitably involve interpersonal comparisons and—more importantly—into which the economist's value judgments must inevitably enter. Myrdal finds that the economists' practice of defining much of the social complex as external to their subject does not really free them to develop an independent science, but rather hampers them, as both scientists and citizens, in facing their most important problems. He holds that economic analysis should take into account not only differing institutions but the actual attitudes (value constellations or structures) of real people. He urges that a writer state his own pattern of values explicitly, and that economists devote themselves to "economic technology": the study of the likely effects of a particular policy in the light of a thorough exploration of the attitudes of relevant groups.

The core of Myrdal's position is what may be called a value-guidance theory of social causation (not unlike that of R. M. MacIver's *Social Causation*). He therefore wishes to consider the entire value complex of a group, rather than its economic standards of judgment alone. This outlook enormously complicates the task of the economist, and entails abandonment of his quest for laws of universal validity, but would it not make his work more realistic, and more useful?

EUGENE O. GOLOB

Wesleyan University

SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. *History of Economic Analysis*. Pp. xxv, 1,260. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. \$17.50.

History of Economic Analysis, published posthumously, will undoubtedly rank as the work which most fully reveals Joseph A. Schumpeter's scholarship and intellectual

powers. Professor Schumpeter's untimely death left the manuscript uncollated and certain portions of it incomplete as well. Fortunately, his wife, the late Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, herself a reputable economist, was able to collate and edit the manuscript for publication. She has also contributed a valuable foreword and appendix.

The book is unique with respect to both the range and sophistication of its analysis of the development of economics as a science. It covers a vast period from the first glimmerings of economic theory in the writings of the Greeks to many of the most recent contributions. Schumpeter's treatment of the medieval scholastic writings is particularly noteworthy, for it is probably the most comprehensive and sympathetic analysis of their economic content.

There are numerous histories of economic thought and histories of political economy, but, as Professor Schumpeter points out, these are concerned mainly with questions of economic ideology. Schumpeter's main concern, on the other hand, is with those technical and theoretical tools of economics which serve as an "engine" of analysis. The numerous economic works that are considered are judged primarily on the basis of their scientific merits, apart from the particular author's ideological preconceptions and attitudes. Professor Schumpeter prides himself on his consistency in this respect. He maintains this approach and method of analysis even when he deals with the works of Karl Marx. Thus although Marx's value structure and ideology are repugnant to him, Schumpeter concludes that because of his scientific contributions, Marx deserves to be recognized as one of the intellectual giants of the nineteenth century.

It should not be assumed, however, that Schumpeter ignores values and ideology. On the contrary, these matters are fully and interestingly discussed, but in such a manner as to bring out their influence on economics as a science. The book is further enriched by a number of valuable chapters on philosophy, mathematics, political science, sociology, and psychology, and their influence on the development of economics. In addition, there are descrip-

tions of the social and intellectual backgrounds of many of the economists whose work is discussed.

It is possible to disagree with Professor Schumpeter. Many persons, for example, may consider that he goes too far in his distinction between science and ideology. One might also disagree with the relative importance he assigns to the contributions of certain writers. Whatever the points of disagreement, however, no reader will fail to admire the sincerity, intelligence, and skill with which Schumpeter develops his subject; and few readers will fail to be enriched and stimulated by his analysis.

LEO FISHMAN

West Virginia University

PEACOCK, ALAN T. (Ed.). *Income Redistribution and Social Policy: A Set of Studies*. Pp. 296. London: Jonathan Cape, 1954. 25s. net.

The editor states the main purpose of this set of studies as follows: "to investigate the nature and magnitude of the redistribution of incomes brought about by social policies and to examine the likely consequences of the redistribution" (p. 7). Part I presents two theoretical studies: the first by Harry G. Johnson entitled "The Macro-Economics of Income Redistribution," and the second by Denstone Berry entitled "Modern Welfare Analysis and the Forms of Income Redistribution." The major part of the volume, Part II, is devoted to "regional" studies covering Denmark, France, Great Britain, the United States, and underdeveloped territories. The study of the United States was made by Alfred H. Conrad of Harvard Economic Research Project, Cambridge, Massachusetts. In these the emphasis is on measurement.

The authors have assembled and examined what they feel are the best data available to throw light on the extent of redistribution of income as a consequence of actions that provide revenue for the state and finance transfer payments and free goods, such as taxation schemes, social security, and government expenditures for schools, health, roads, and general protection. The studies for the most part relate to a single year; in several this year is

1950. A good deal of attention is given to whether redistribution is vertical, that is, taking money away from a given income group and returning it in the form of "free" goods and transfer income; or whether it is horizontal, that is, taking income from the rich and using it in such a way as to increase the equality of real income or consumption levels. Little attention is given to the relation of the redistribution programs to incentives to produce. Georges Rottier and Jean François Albert in concluding the analysis for France pointed out, "There has . . . been a marked decrease in the share of . . . income which a wage or salary earner can spend as he likes. . . . One may wonder whether this is not one cause of the social difficulties which France has known since the end of the war" (p. 136).

The book will be of interest chiefly to specialists in income measurement. Much space is devoted to description of data used and laments as to their inadequacies. The book will, however, give lay readers who may dip into it "here and there" a genuine appreciation of the difficulty of answering the seemingly simple question: "Do various programs designed to make income more equal actually accomplish that purpose?"

MARGARET G. REID

University of Chicago

LANE, ROBERT E. *The Regulation of Businessmen: Social Conditions of Government Economic Control*. Pp. xiii, 144. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. \$3.75.

Professor Lane utilizes the concepts and tools of social psychology to analyze the attitudes of businessmen toward public regulation. He explores the sources of their hostility, measures its changing intensity, observes the operation of the adaptive process, and suggests policies for the reduction of conflict between bureaucrats and businessmen.

The study covers the New and Fair Deal periods, excluding the war years. Selected types of control are examined, specifically: trade practices, antitrust, wages and hours, and labor relations. Documentary material is supplemented by interviews with twenty-five business men in

two New England states and seven ranking officials in Federal agencies. A content analysis of *Connecticut Industry*, the magazine of the Manufacturers Association of Connecticut, for 1934-40 and 1946-48, provides information on the ideological orientation of businessmen. Evidence on violations is derived from a special study of the New England shoe industry.

Economic factors are a minor cause of hostility to regulation; it is the "psychic costs" that are determinative. Regulation challenges the businessman's belief system, profanes his idols, and depreciates his myths; it denigrates the businessman himself, lowers his status, and subordinates his role; it frustrates him; it arouses in him new anxieties. When exposed to such deprivations and frustrations he reacts aggressively, particularly against the bureaucrats who administer the hated regulation. Gradually, however, the processes of adaptation and adjustment temper this original hostility and a partial reconciliation is effected. But this can never be complete because bureaucrats and businessmen remain divided by differences in occupational traits, language, value systems, and reference groups. More harmonious, efficient, and less wasteful regulation can be achieved if administrators, through opinion surveys and content analysis, understand the causes of conflict. They can then take positive steps to reduce conflicts, such as: minimizing damage to the business ego, reassuring businessmen of their status and role, relieving uncertainty, restructuring attitudes by improved communication. By the application of such techniques it now seems possible, the author says, to adjust these conflicts without weakening the force of regulation.

This is doubtful, for regulation dominated by the psychopathology of businessmen and the desire to avoid conflict will almost certainly sacrifice the public interest to appease this "powerful and reluctant minority." The author overlooks the fact that in a democracy, regulation is based on public interest and supremacy of law; that society regulates business organization and economic behavior, not businessmen as individuals; and that the psychological reactions of those regulated are

largely irrelevant. There is no need to appease their wrath for it is assumed they will conform to the public interest.

HORACE M. GRAY

University of Illinois

HAMILTON, DAVID. *Newtonian Classicism and Darwinian Institutionalism: A Study of Change in Economic Theory*. (University of New Mexico Publications in Economics, No. 1.) Pp. 138. Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1953. \$1.00.

The lengthy title of this volume suggests a degree of objectivity which the author has been unable to maintain. Still, his firm belief in institutionalism could have added to the charm of his performance if his arguments were as convincing to the readers as they were to himself. He tries to prove that the essential difference between classicism and institutionalism is to be found in the concept of change. The classicists—he summarizes—held that "the cause of change is independent of the economy and that change is caused by disturbing elements from without the system." On the contrary, the institutionalists consider change to be a part of the economic process and believe that, at all times, the economy undergoes a process of cumulative change (p. 27).

The first part of his argument hardly deserves detailed comment. Since, in the classical model, the economic process was essentially harmonious and automatically tended towards equilibrium, change could originate only from outside data. Yet this proposition is inaccurate if interpreted in the sense that the classicists ignored evolution. As the author remarks, they considered social structure "as something fixed in the natural universe." Owing to their failure, the economists had to wait for the advent of institutionalism, which taught them in accordance with the Darwinian revolution that "social structure was something arrived at through a process of cumulative change and as something undergoing further change" (p. 35).

Examples to the contrary are well known. On various occasions, the builder of the classical system accounted for the impact of social change on economic pro-

cesses, for instance by distinguishing stages of economic evolution and advancing different wage theories for the periods before and after the appropriation of land and the accumulation of capital. Even to the uncontested master of economic statics, Ricardo, social structure was subject to change rather than being "something fixed in the natural universe." Otherwise, he would have failed to demonstrate the historical trend of the land rent to increase with the progress of society. Too much has been said in recent years on Malthus' historical, comparative, and evolutionary approach to blame him for unawareness of the role of social change.

Also, the second part of the argument is deficient. The analysis of economic change as an endogenous factor goes back far beyond institutionalism. The frontal attack against the mechanistic view of the classicists started on the threshold of the nineteenth century with the romantic notion of organic growth. Economic development and growth remained the points at issue as long as there was a historical school. It would be difficult to prove that this turn in mind originated from the Darwinian revolution.

If, however, the main argument of the author breaks down, does he help us in other ways to better understand the reorientation due to institutionalism? Fortunately, he dismissed the elementary textbook proposition linking classicism with statics and institutionalism with dynamics. He should be commended for his discussion of other contributions of the institutionalists such as their concept of culture, their negation of individual behavior, their disregard for the price mechanism and pecuniary phenomena, and their identification of progress with technological development. Apparently, however, he has not told the whole story. In spite of his creditable effort, there is still room for a more thorough and less subjective comparison of the socio-philosophical roots of classicism and institutionalism.

FRITZ KARL MANN

The American University

BARLOW, E. R. *Management of Foreign Manufacturing Subsidiaries*. Pp. xii, 223.

Boston: Harvard Business School, 1953. \$3.50.

For those interested in foreign manufacturing operations, the author has presented the results of a study of some of the management problems involved. Basic information is taken from a study of the Mexican operations of seventeen companies.

Few of the companies studied found it possible to manufacture at lower costs in Mexico than in the United States, despite lower wage rates in the former. The small size of the Mexican market results in shorter production runs and greater use of general purpose machinery.

Organization. According to the author, it seemed immaterial from a performance viewpoint as to whether the foreign subsidiary was organized as a division, a department, or a separate corporation. The preferred organization method seemed to be dependent upon the legal or tax advantage for each particular company.

Supervision. Although there was considerable variation in the degree of control maintained by parent companies over subsidiaries, all companies studied exercised parent control over the following: (1) products to be manufactured or sold, (2) appointment and promotion of key personnel, (3) the type of accounting methods to be used and the financial information reported to the parent, and (4) expansion of local operations.

Ownership Policy. Attention is given to the advantages of a 100 per cent owned foreign subsidiary as compared with participating local capital in a jointly owned company. The chief reasons for joint ownership were found to be as follows: (1) desire to limit capital investment by the parent company, (2) fear of discrimination against U. S. concerns, and (3) belief that local owners could contribute special unique experience and skills in the management area. Jointly owned companies typically returned a smaller profit to the parents than did 100 per cent owned ones. However, there was less risk involved.

Executive Personnel. In selecting executives for new subsidiaries, most companies required men with the following: (1) experience in the company and knowledge of

its methods and practices, and (2) knowledge of the country in which operations were performed. There was found to be a difference of opinion as to which requirement was most important.

The material presented in this study is admitted to be exploratory by the author. There were not sufficient examples or a wide enough geographic area involved to warrant definite conclusions. Although the study is limited in scope, it is interesting, well organized, and a pioneering effort in the field.

JOHN F. MEE

Indiana University

BLOOMFIELD, ARTHUR I. *Speculative and Flight Movements of Capital in Postwar International Finance*. Pp. 88. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press (Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 3), 1954. \$1.00.

In this, the third of the Princeton series of less-than-book-length "studies," Dr. Bloomfield deals with postwar "hot money" movements. Noting the meagerness of the literature, he proposes to bring together and analyze the available information and to consider possible counter measures. An economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bloomfield is an experienced observer and writer in the field of international finance and has been closely associated with the United States government statistical program on international capital transactions.

"Hot money" movements are identified as international movements of private capital which involve exchange rate speculation or flight from feared losses through war or other contingencies and which accentuate disequilibrium in the balance of payments. The study deals topically with the motivations for and the mechanisms and effects of these movements, and with measures for controlling them or minimizing their effects. A section on "Illustrations" gives separate concise running accounts of the experiences of the sterling area, France, Canada, and several other countries or areas which have been importantly affected. Particularly helpful are the explanations, under "Mechanisms," of "leads and lags," underinvoicing and over-

invoicing, black market deals, and various other means of exporting capital from exchange control countries in the face of official disapproval.

The analysis, one which invites quantitative judgments, is admittedly hampered by the lack of statistical data on hot money. Although we may hope for future improvement in the statistics of private capital movements, there will remain the inherent difficulties, recognized by the author, of classifying transactions by motive and of measuring clandestine transactions.

Bloomfield finds these hot money movements to have had seriously disturbing effects, including balance of payments distortions, drains on reserves, prolonged or intensified trade and payments restrictions, and inflationary pressures. Such disturbances, he finds, have been unmatched by compensating benefits.

Various possible solutions are weighed, and the author concedes some value in exchange-control or other technical measures. But, disclaiming originality, he urges the importance of attacking the underlying problem of economic and political disorder. Offering no suggestions for dealing with the political and social causes of capital flight, but focusing on speculative movements, he recommends attacking international financial disequilibrium through monetary-fiscal policies, trade liberalization, and other familiar measures.

This well-ordered and thoughtful discussion contributes toward the understanding of an important and difficult problem. While not forbiddingly technical, it will appeal chiefly to readers with more than a casual familiarity with recent international financial developments.

EDWARD T. CROWDER

U. S. Bureau of the Budget

HARROD, ROY. *The Dollar: Sir George Watson Lectures, 1953*. Pp. vii, 156. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954. \$3.50.

The reader will not be astonished to learn that a book written by a Briton, under this title, is an argument for a correction of the currency imbalance between the United States and foreign countries,

for mutual benefit. Only politicians need be told this. But will they read it?

The first of the four chapters centers around the evils growing out of the "Crime of 1873," which really is a crime on page 17, but becomes just a series of accidents on page 154. It is refreshing to read that "... highbrows incline to bimetalism, while the naïve and simple-minded favour monometallism" (p. 8), but J. Laurence Laughlin would not have relished being called simple-minded. Furthermore, the argument for bimetalism works even better for greenbackism. The chapter would have been more accurate and effective if the author had studied a little more American history. Least important of all historical shortcomings is the triple reference (pp. 24-25) to a mythical [Daniel] Shay. Anyway the author did not spell it "Shea."

Mr. Harrod's grasp of American financial and monetary history is much better in the last three chapters (after 1900), but a wider use of other developments would have been useful. The Federal Reserve System, international co-operation, and the dollar gap occupy these chapters. The treatment is as good as can be expected in a brief space and from the Keynesian point of view. The author opposed the devaluation of the dollar in 1933 but believes it should be further devalued now for the good it would do Great Britain and other foreign countries (pp. 67-68). A dyed-in-the-wool Keynesian, following the party line and ignoring all arguments and facts unfriendly to the thesis, will agree with Harrod. Others will grant him a friendly smile, for after all he does write in a friendly style.

Nevertheless, the substance of the whole work comes on page 143: "Clearly an imbalance can only be rectified by an increase of world exports to the United States or a diminution of world exports from it." It did not require even a small book to lead up to this sensible conclusion, which is not at all essentially Keynesian. Why should not we of the United States take a long vacation while Europe supplies us with the good things of the world in exchange for the surplus of that huge pile of junk metal at Fort Knox which, as it is, is doing nobody any good? Why should not

America get some of the handouts while restoring a balance to the world's currency?

FRED A. SHANNON

University of Illinois

JAMES, MARQUIS, and BESSIE ROWLAND JAMES. *Biography of a Bank: The Story of Bank of America, N.T. & S.A.* Pp. vii, 566. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. \$5.00.

This rather massive volume portrays in considerable detail the founding and growth, and the vicissitudes and successes pertaining to its development, of what is today the world's largest bank with the largest—in fact the only significant—system of branches in the United States, Bank of America, National Trust and Savings Association, with head office in San Francisco, California. As indicated by the authors, at the beginning of 1953 the Bank of America had "538 branches in 317 California cities and towns, and 9 branches overseas [and had] resources of \$8,201,689,369.88" (p. 1).

Bank of America had its origin almost half a century ago with the founding of the Bank of Italy in San Francisco on October 17, 1904, by A. P. Giannini. The original Bank of Italy was a small, unit bank serving quite largely at first small Italian interests in the city and near vicinity. Mr. Giannini, however, had no intention of confining his operations to so circumscribed an area and shortly embarked on a program of expansion which eventually resulted in emergence of the financial titan described in the preceding paragraph.

Limitations of space preclude tracing the multifarious steps by which the Bank of America attained its present stature. Aided by the California banking law of 1909, which permitted the establishment of statewide branch banking systems by state banks, Mr. Giannini set out to attain his goal of a branch system that should serve every nook and cranny of California. In fact, at one time, he had visions of a nationwide branch system, and set out to attain that end through Transamerica Corporation, a holding company that might control banks in states other than California. Although frustrated in this effort, he did attain his desired end in California. The

Bank of Italy and the Bank of America in California, both large state branch-bank systems and both controlled by Giannini, were merged in 1927 as a national banking institution. Not until 1930 was the title changed from Bank of Italy, N.T. & S.A. to the present title.

One factor that keeps cropping up throughout the entire book is the ever present desire on the part of A. P. Giannini to help the small farmer and the small businessman. His ideal was always that of a bank for all the people, not just a privileged few, and he achieved a notable success in attaining that ideal.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the authors have performed a difficult task with better than average success. A book of half the length could have provided a more fascinating but less scholarly and complete biography. To do a satisfactory job, it was necessary to introduce a certain amount of statistical and factual data that makes for dull reading, but the authors have kept this to the least amount compatible with sound biographical standards.

FREDERICK A. BRADFORD

Lehigh University

NEVINS, ALLAN. *Ford: The Times, the Man, the Company*. Pp. xx, 688. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. \$6.75.

Every aspect of Henry Ford's early life is treated in this book—the infant, the lanky youth, the boy who everlastingly tinkered with machinery, the young man who lived on a "shoe string" while making determined efforts to get ahead. Not only did the author use the Ford Archives at Dearborn, rich as they are in documentary materials on Ford's early life, but he interviewed many people who knew Mr. Ford intimately.

Ford, the man and successful industrialist, is allotted only a part of the space in this very readable book. Here the reader also finds a biography of a company. Although Ford certainly was in control of the Ford Motor Company down to 1915, others had a voice in its affairs. Frequently involved in court actions over patent rights, the Ford Company has

awaited this book to clarify, for the lay reader, the details of these early legal battles. There are vivid descriptions of this corporation's early growth, its expansion in floor space, its increases in capital, its initiation of the assembly line, its contributions to mass production, the relations between the laborers and management, Ford's early opposition to unionism, the five-dollar-per-day wages episode, and numerous other phases of this remarkable company's history.

Mr. Ford's efforts to produce a cheap car that millions of Americans could be induced to own are treated in detail. This company grew on one innovation after another. As the price of the Ford car decreased, the company increased the efficiency of its sales and service organization. No other automobile producer equaled the Ford Motor Company in advertising, in number of sales, and in service rendered to car owners.

Dr. Nevins concludes this book in 1915. Certainly, a second volume on the last three decades of Henry Ford's life should be written. Although by 1915 many of Ford's useful years were spent, by no means was he through. In fact, some of his greatest achievements lay ahead. The company was to meet the crises of two world wars and an intervening major depression, and was to expand into an international industrial empire. It is to be hoped that Professor Nevins will write a second volume on the next thirty years of "Ford: The Times, the Man, the Company."

This book is well illustrated, has ample footnotes at the back, contains several enlightening appendixes, a well selected bibliography, and an accurate index.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

University of Florida

GILMORE, HARLAN W. *Transportation and the Growth of Cities*. Pp. vi, 170. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953. \$3.00.

This is a relatively brief, and clearly written, statement of the relation of transportation methods to economic systems and types of urban communities. The author summarizes the experience of ancient, medieval, and modern times. As so much

time is covered in so little space, it is probable that the main lines of thought are familiar to students of this field. Still, the presentation is clear and, perhaps, all the more forceful because of the lack of detail. The relation of the city to the country and the fiscal policies which exemplify this relationship are described. The volume should be particularly useful as collateral reading for young students of city government who are sometimes slow to grasp the basic relationships which are treated here. The study on which the publication is based was made possible by Tulane University.

LEE S. GREENE

University of Tennessee

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

ALLPORT, GORDON W. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Pp. xviii, 537. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954. \$5.50.

In the present-day world of intensified functional interdependence among groups, problems of intergroup relations have forced themselves to the foreground. As a consequence this problem area has increasingly become a focal preoccupation of social scientists. Professor Allport's book is representative of the growing concern with this vital area.

Part I of this eight-part volume is devoted to "Preferential Thinking." Following a brief account of the categorizing process, the analysis of group prejudice proceeds directly to the central importance of in-group membership and identification with in-group values. This is followed by a chapter on "rejection of out-groups." It is pointed out that while in-group formation need not necessarily result in antagonism toward out-groups, psychological reference to an in-group possessing a social distance scale in terms of which out-groups are categorized is a crucial factor in understanding prejudice. This take-off with in-group membership and out-group delineation and their consequences in determining the individual's intergroup attitudes and behavior definitely represents

the modern developing trend in the study of intergroup relations, as contrasted with approaches which tended to explain intergroup behavior taking the individual in isolation.

Part II summarizes methods and findings on group differences. Part III, which is logically related to Part I, includes general accounts of cognitive processes, the effects of categorization with separate chapters on linguistic factors and stereotypes in particular.

Part IV considers sociocultural factors (e.g., social structure, intergroup contacts). In Part V the acquisition of prejudice is treated, the point of departure being the general problem of conformity to in-group values.

Part VI, entitled "Dynamics of Prejudice," is concerned with the scapegoat theory, frustration, aggression, guilt, projection and other "mechanisms" derived largely from psychoanalysis. In Part VII on "character structure," the currently popular work on the "prejudiced personality" is presented, the "tolerant personality" sketched, and religion and prejudice considered.

Finally Part VIII deals with the reduction of group tensions, legislative and judicial decisions, evaluation of action programs, and some general guides for action.

This volume takes the view that a many-sided approach to prejudice is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the problem. This fact has important implications for practice. "Since the problem is many-sided, there can be no sovereign formula" (p. 507). The author points out that historical, sociocultural, situational, personality, phenomenological approaches and characteristics of the stimulus objects (groups) all have to be considered in accounting for prejudice. Rather than be one-sided, Professor Allport utilizes concepts and features of most of these various approaches: "Our own approach to the problem is eclectic. There seems to be value in all of the six main approaches, and some truth in virtually all of the resulting theories. It is not possible at the present time to reduce them to a single theory of human action" (p. 208).

Professor Allport's book may render

sovereign-principle theorists more sensitive to factors which they have overlooked. Social scientists and practitioners will welcome its humane concern with eliminating existing prejudices among human groups.

MUZAHER SHERIF

University of Oklahoma

PORTERFIELD, AUSTIN L., and ROBERT H. TALBERT. *Mid-Century Crime in Our Culture: Personality and Crime in the Cultural Pattern of American States and Cities*. Pp. ix, 113. Fort Worth, Texas: Leo Potishman Foundation, 1954. \$2.25.

The authors, Professors in the Department of Sociology, Texas Christian University, are already well-known as experts on the specific crime problems of the American South. The present book is a collection of revised articles published in various sociological journals by Porterfield alone or in co-operation with Talbert or others. While this makes the book as a whole slightly incoherent, its main theme, as expressed in the title, nevertheless remains throughout clearly discernible. As in their previous book *Crime, Suicide, and Social Well-being* (1948), it is again the authors' principal object to examine, by the application of statistical and sociological techniques, the relationship between crime and various other indices of social disorganization. They make it clear that the exclusion of psychological and psychiatric factors involves no adverse criticism of individualistic interpretations of crime as such, but only a rejection of the one-sided claims made on their behalf by some of the extremists. Their first two chapters are in fact essentially an attempt to arrive at a reasonable, though not altogether original, compromise, stressing the importance of "multiple interactive factors" in crime causation and leading to two of the principal topics of the book, that is, crime in the Southern States of the United States and the relation between crime, in particular homicide, and suicide. Again, as in their previous book, the authors find that homicides are far more frequent in the South and suicides in the North and that these differences are due not to genetic and racial, but to cultural

factors. For the twelve Southern States with the highest proportion of Negroes, the correlation between crime and heterogeneity of population is, according to them, strongly negative. In the third chapter, some results are given of a study of 222 cases of homicide in a southwestern city, showing that there is often not much to choose between murderer and victim, except that the former may be a conformist and the latter a non-conformist to local mores.

The most interesting aspect of the book is the attempt made in Part II to establish various new indices: first an "Index of Secularization" and another, more complicated and regarded as more useful, of "Depressed Folk Societies in Local Conflict." This Index, a composite of thirty-two sub-factors, gives a very high positive correlation with homicide and other serious crime, and a fairly high negative correlation with suicide. This is followed by a special study of crime and suicide in the different Census Tracts of Fort Worth, the results of which are interpreted as indicating that there is more homicide in districts with more interpersonal relations and more suicide in those with more impersonal ones—an interpretation which, though plausible, seems to be purely speculative on the strength of the material so far presented, as no explanation is given why, regardless of size, relations should be more impersonal in northern than in southern cities. In the comparison, made in Chapter VI, of the crime rates of forty-three southern and forty-three non-southern cities of equal size and showing a much higher rate for the first group the method of selecting the second group is not explained, which may leave the reader with the feeling that a different selection might have produced different results. In spite of such doubts, the book is, however, a valuable and stimulating contribution to the understanding of the pattern of crime in the American South.

HERMANN MANNHEIM

University of London

HENTIG, HANS VON. *Zur Psychologie der Einzeldelikte*, I: *Diebstahl, Einbruch, Raub*. Pp. viii, 195. Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),

1954. Paper DM 12.80; cloth DM 15.80.

This monograph on *The Psychology of Individual Offenses* is the first publication to come from the pen of Professor Hans von Hentig since his return to Germany where he is now professor of criminology at the University of Bonn. Professor von Hentig is known to a number of American criminologists from his teaching and research in several universities in the United States during the past decade.

In this short publication, which purports to be the first in a series sponsored by an association of German jurists, Professor Hentig analyzes some of the psychological, sociological, and statistical factors involved in three specific types of offenses: theft, burglary, and robbery. Somewhat after the method of the late Dr. E. Sutherland, the author explains the patterns of behavior of criminals (professional, white collar, and so forth) in terms of motives and certain pathological conditions. He explains how the "purse snatcher," the jewel thief, the fur-coat thief, and others operate in the larger cities.

In the material dealing with burglary the author describes the various *Modi Operandi* in breaking and entering homes, business houses, and public places. He gives an account of how burglars work in pairs or in gangs and their relationship to the "fence."

In the third part of the book Professor Hentig discusses the social factors relating to robbery as well as some of the techniques and procedures. He reviews the details in the well-known Brink's Company robbery in Boston and describes the psychological characteristics of the men who carry out such bold acts.

In the statistical data the author presents information dealing with prewar, war and postwar conditions in Germany. In addition, he shows how offenses vary by days of the week, by months, and by seasons. In general this monograph is an interesting document, but it does fall short of what is usually thought of as the psychology of theft, burglary, and robbery. It is descriptive rather than analytical. Also the question may be raised as to

whether there is a psychology of offenses, or is there only a psychology of offenders?

WALTER A. LUNDEN

Iowa State College

PECK, HARRIS B., and VIRGINIA BELLSMITH. *Treatment of the Delinquent Adolescent: Group and Individual Therapy with Parent and Child*. Pp. iv, 147. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1954. \$2.00.

The value of this well-written paper-covered book—and it has considerable value—is in its presentation of what is involved in the treatment of delinquents by a clinic that is officially connected with a children's court. Such an alliance obviously connotes certain conditionings of the treatment process, not the least of which is that assignment of a delinquent to the clinic must give some coloring of duress to his visits there. That various features of court clinics are widely considered inimical to favorable therapeutic results is shown by the fact that, though the earliest child guidance clinics were established, to be sure mainly for their diagnostic aid, as a branch service of the courts, later clinics concerned more with treatment fought shy of any court connections. This book offers an opportunity to form judgment on this important question of the value of a court clinic.

The authors, highly experienced in their respective fields of psychiatry and social work, describe some of the difficulties inherent in their working situation, but the reader discerns that there are some real advantages. Since, aside from the special exigences and opportunities of their particular setting, their methods of individual treatment naturally differ little from that of others of their craft, their emphasis is properly on group treatment, to which over half of their contribution is devoted.

Now it must be clear that with less, at least implied, authority back of the clinic it would hardly be possible to bring together groups of delinquents and, for that matter, of parents of delinquents in therapeutic sessions. The case studies of these groups are interesting and instructive; one wishes there were more of them with

further candid analyses of successes and failures.

Yes, and with the teaching values of their rich case material in mind one might willingly have dispensed with paragraphs and pages dealing with commonly known facts about delinquency and also with hortatory interjections. The argument for this is that, as the authors state, work like theirs is only for a well-trained professional staff; the book itself is hardly for beginners except as it may stimulate them to develop their own capacities.

Merited praise for this contribution taken as a whole outweighs various minor criticisms.

WILLIAM HEALY

Clearwater, Florida

VIRTUE, MAXINE BOORD. *Study of the Basic Structure of Children's Services in Michigan*. (Report of a legal study made for the James Foster Foundation.) Pp. xxviii, 391. Ann Arbor, Mich.: The American Judicature Society, 1953. \$5.00.

Juvenile courts are considered with reference to their various functions, which vary within the limits of a single state, some courts developing extensive administrative structures while others lean upon departments of public welfare and sometimes even upon voluntary agencies for services to court wards or persons appearing before the court. It is observed that "the practice with respect to 'unofficial cases' appears to have grown so far beyond the statutory language and intention as to jeopardize, in some instances, the identity of the court as a judicial agency." There is a nation-wide tendency to disregard rules of evidence and certain constitutional rights of the child or parent, as judges and probation officers study situations and dispose of cases according to their own understanding and sense of obligation. It is pointed out that children's cases do not receive the attention they deserve, and that consequently decisions of juvenile courts have not been tested by appeal as have the findings of other courts.

The discussions of guardianship and ward and adoption practices are among the book's most valuable contributions. The

reminder that "custody is a slippery word" is amply illustrated. Carelessness in termination of parental rights is too often a characteristic of divorce actions. Inadequately drawn court orders, lack of consent of parents, and failure to give adequate notice of adoption proceedings are among the factors which lead to the statement that in Michigan "the available material suggests that most adoptions now taking place may be deficient in legality."

The need for more and better threshold services is a recurrent theme. The visiting teacher, the county welfare worker, and the district child welfare consultant are among Michigan's resources for detecting a serious problem of a child and his family at a point when the child first exhibits need for help.

Lack of training in the law is a common deficiency among social workers. This is pointed out by the author and several of those she quotes, among them Dean Roscoe Pound, who also notes that lawyers need to get a more adequate picture of the needs of juvenile courts, and the relations of those needs to the whole system of judicial organization. We social workers may properly add that lawyers need to learn more about social work and that professional schools in all fields should pave the way, more than they have, for interdisciplinary study and practice.

HOWARD W. HOPKINS

Louisville & Jefferson County
Children's Home
Anchorage, Kentucky

ELLIS, ALBERT. *The American Sexual Tragedy*. Pp. 288. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1954. \$4.50.

Dr. Ellis has put together here out of researches into the attitudes expressed in the mass media of communication an unrelieved indictment of American sexual mores. He appears to be greatly surprised and horrified by the fact that he has found a number of truths which almost all informed people have known for a long time. He has one emphatic point to make, namely, that the American culture is one that is split between its convictions and its actions as to its sexual morality. This, while it is an important aspect of Ameri-

can sexual feeling and thinking, is neither new nor startling. His studied and over-emphasized research into the reports from the public sources of information seems overdone and without conspicuous value. Almost everyone who is able to read Dr. Ellis has been already able to draw the same deductions he has drawn from a careful and, presumably, searching examination of the mass public prints, the celluloids, the advertising material therein, and sundry other of the so-called media of communication.

His conclusions from these researches are heavily pessimistic and there is an unrelieved attitude of censure in them. He states that Americans are doomed to unrewarding and blunted sexual lives because of the demand for conformity to a set of outworn regulations. Dr. Ellis is particularly concerned with the demand for conformity to one simple ideal; namely, that adult and mature sexual individuals shall have their sexual lives inside of marriage and by a union of the male and female genital organs. This may seem neither startling nor disturbing to most people, but to Dr. Ellis it seems to be a gross form of pressure and even authoritarianism.

The plain facts of the case are that Dr. Ellis has tried to oversell his argument. His book lacks profundity or real scholarship. Unfortunately, he has the habit also of saying what he has to say in the most banal, elaborate, and labored fashion that it is possible to conceive. Altogether, the book has very little merit. Not to seem wholly nil admirare, it should be said again that he has one point to make, namely, that in our culture we say one thing and do another in our sexual attitudes. That definitely required saying and it is good that it has been said.

MARYNIA F. FARNHAM, M.D.

New York City

YOUNG, LEONTINE. *Out of Wedlock*. Pp. x, 261. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954. \$4.00.

Using her extensive social work experience, the author presents a study of the complex factors operating in the problem of birth out of wedlock. Considering the difficulties inherent in obtaining accurate

information about this cruelly stigmatized situation, the study is comprehensive in scope. Although addressed particularly to social workers, the book should serve to broaden the thinking of any professional person who may be confronted with some aspect of the problem by any of the principals entangled in it. As the book points out, the principals in this tragedy include not only the unmarried mother and child, but the father and the two families.

The introductory review of the historical attitudes toward unmarried parents and the "illegitimate" child indicates much less progress in the development of desirable attitudes on the part of the general public than is generally believed by professional people to exist. In presenting reasons for the persistence of negative attitudes in what one thinks of as an enlightened age, the author offers justified criticism of the legal handling of various aspects of these cases.

Contrary to the customary belief that pregnancies outside of marriage are largely accidental, the cases studied indicated that behavior leading up to the pregnancy is purposive, even though on an unconscious level. Even those women whose knowledge would normally be expected to include the use of contraceptives rarely use them. The possibility of abortion is considered by only a few. Also, once the pregnancy is established, loss of the baby before term and complications of pregnancy are unusual.

The seed of the relentless urge for baby sans husband, according to the author, is planted in the girl's own family background. The major family factor is domination of the home by one parent, most frequently the mother.

In addition to the intensive consideration given the problem and background of the unmarried mother, the unmarried father also is considered, as are the child, the case-work approach in attempts to help these people, and suggestions for handling of the out-of-wedlock problem as a whole. The value of the book is enhanced by the use of illustrative case material.

If it succeeds only in stimulating wise contemplation of this grave social problem, the book will serve a worthy purpose.

Conceivably it will do much more than this by providing information for those unfamiliar with this subject. Some readers will undoubtedly object to Miss Young's sweeping approach and tendency to generalize, but this need not interfere with the book's usefulness. At the end of the book is included a postscript for his "analytic colleagues" by Robert Fliess, M.D. (who wrote the foreword also) which interprets the author's premises in Freudian terms.

GENEVIEVE BURTON

University of Pennsylvania

RUOPP, PHILLIPS (Ed.). *Approaches to Community Development*. Pp. xvi, 352. The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1953. \$3.00.

Approaches to Community Development is an international symposium to which 22 writers, each "with authoritative and extensive experience relevant to the subject about which he writes," have contributed. It is claimed by its publishers to be the first of its kind. It is therefore most welcome, considering the urgent demands for such literature, so that informed guidance is available for those engaged in the development of the so-called under-developed and backward countries of the world.

The articles contributed are instructive and cover all aspects of community development. This can be seen from the groupings: The Sociology of Community Development; The Economics of Community Development; Education for Community Development; and Regional Considerations of Development Programs as found in Africa, the Middle East, India, Indonesia, and Latin America. The editor of the symposium, Phillips Ruopp, chairman of Community Development Projects, Ltd., contributes the first article. Here he defines the approach to community development very clearly in the following statement: "It is in the nature of community development that it must come from within through the greatest possible participation of the people in accordance with needs determined by their values, relying on persuasion rather than compulsion, and mediating with the needs of region, nation and world. In this mediation the Great So-

cietty and Small Community meet and sustain one another."

With this start he gives the lead to the other contributors who in turn examine community development from their different standpoints as sociologists, anthropologists, economists, educationists, and experts on agrarian law and "agricultural industries. Problems resulting from social changes are also discussed by them and an apt warning given that "Community Development is more often seen primarily as a problem of promoting material interests and goals than as a problem of values and human relations."

This caution brings out the absence of the significant contribution that a social worker might have made, had he also been invited to join the social scientists and educationists in presenting his point of view. The social worker is slowly being recognized as an important member of the team working in the field of community development, because he is the one most vitally concerned in the difficult but urgent task of stimulating people's participation. Once this is evoked his next responsibility is to help the same people make their adjustments to the social changes that inevitably follow such development programs. Aid of this kind is necessary if integrated and harmonious development of the community is to take place. Consequently, more than the other field workers he sees in true perspective the need for balancing the material blessings of community development with the spiritual and moral. His experiences might therefore have added to the value of an otherwise interesting and notable publication.

DOROTHY MOSES

UNESCO, Colombo, Ceylon

MAURER, DAVID W., and VICTOR H. VOGEL. *Narcotics and Narcotic Addiction*. Pp. xv, 303. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1954. \$7.50.

In this book a professor of English and a psychiatrically trained medical man present an over-all view of the narcotics problem. The first chapter of about 45 pages gives a brief historical and descriptive account of the habit and of the problem in the United States. The next hundred or

so pages deal mainly with technical medical matters. The last half of the volume includes chapters on the treatment of addicts, legal controls, addiction and crime, juvenile addiction, and addict argot. There is an index. The volume suffers from the authors' efforts to include too much in too little space.

To understand the views expressed and the limitations of this work it should be kept in mind that Dr. Vogel is a member of the Public Health Service and formerly was medical director of the Lexington Hospital for addicts. The manuscript was cleared for publication by the Headquarters of the P. H. S. in Washington. The authors may therefore have been under some constraint in the expression of opinions that might have been deemed critical of official ideology and of what may be called the "Washington line" determined mainly by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

It may be for the reason indicated above that Maurer and Vogel are rather cautious in suggesting that addiction per se should not be viewed as a crime, that the evil effects of marihuana have been grossly exaggerated, that the social evils connected with alcoholism far eclipse those connected with drugs, that opiates do not directly cause crime, and that the current trend toward harsher penalties indiscriminately applied to addict and peddler alike is neither just nor effective. At the same time that they venture these departures from orthodox opinion they also appear to support the status quo and to deny the implications of the above heresies. They favor compulsory treatment and do not clearly oppose present penal practices with respect to addicts. They flagrantly fail to discuss the apparent success of nonpenal control systems used in Europe, they do not adequately emphasize the dependence of the illicit traffic on drug prohibition, and their discussion of the clinic idea is grossly unfair, unrealistic, and incomplete.

The authors cite their own previous publications somewhat too liberally even when they are of only peripheral relevance and in one instance at least do not acknowledge a source of borrowed materials. There is also some overemphasis on publications and accomplishments of the Lex-

ington institution where Vogel was stationed for a time.

Apart from the limitations and biases indicated, this work is far superior to most current publications on this subject. Its authors have wide and direct acquaintance with the problem, and their discussion of its social aspects is usually moderate and sensible.

ALFRED R. LINDESMITH

Indiana University

LOOMIS, CHARLES P., JULIO O. MORALES, ROY A. CLIFFORD, and OLEN E. LEONARD (Eds.). *Turrialba: Social Systems and the Introduction of Change*. Pp. viii, 288. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953. \$3.50.

This book is described as a report on "the results of an interdisciplinary research program on the introduction of change and the nature of the social systems in the Central American community of Turrialba, Costa Rica" (Preface, p. v). The chapter headings, after an Introduction, are: The Setting of the Study, Social Status and Communication, Informal Social Systems, Economic Systems, The Ecological Basis of Social Systems in Turrialba, Demographic Characteristics of the Population, Health Systems, Religious Systems, Educational Systems, Agricultural Extension Systems, Political Systems, Levels of Living on Haciendas and Small Farms, Study of the Strategy of Changes on Large Estates and Small Farms in Latin America. This is an extensive program for a single monograph, even when done by several authors; but this work does manage to give at least a survey of the main aspects of each of its topics.

One reason for the comparative success of the book is that the frames of reference have been explicitly stated (p. 2-3). The research concentrated on "social relationships," organized into "social systems . . . which structure activities as individual and group needs are met," the structuring being "influenced in important ways by ecological and demographic factors." Change involves "changing the relative importance of the different social systems," "creating new social systems," and "changing rela-

tions of the individuals to their social systems."

Throughout the study much is made of the difference between the "formal" and "informal" systems. As "formal" is used here it refers to the structural arrangements of hierarchies on the haciendas, to the school-system, to the health services, to the church and its rituals. "Informal" refers to the communication systems between individuals, to "key" persons, and to "elites." The reviewer finds this dichotomy an advance over the more usual studies of this kind which treat everything at one level. He suggests, however, that the two terms are not enough, and that there are actually three levels of systems, for which he uses the terms *formal*, *informal*, *technical*. Most of the things here treated as "formal" are in what he would call the technical sphere (school system, health service, religious rituals). A few (church beliefs, attitudes toward hacienda owners) are in his formal category—traditional, unquestioned, hard to change. Much of what is called "informal" is actually his formal—for example, traditional relations between social levels, who speaks to whom, and so forth. The real informal behavior—largely out of awareness, and hardly subject to verbalization by its practitioners—is not made very explicit. In changes of culture, the informal systems, which are the individual's adaptations to his formal culture, become technicalized; then the technical systems—easiest to change and replace—become more and more out of keeping with the formal culture, and finally bring about the erection of new formal systems; then the process begins again. Formal systems change only from within; informal ones by being brought into awareness; technical ones easily, by explicit description. In the book under review, with its two-fold characterization of cultural systems, this process is blurred and the dynamics of change are not made clear.

The book is lithoprinted from typewritten material, with uneven right margins, and some of the figures are too small to be read easily, but the general appearance is pleasing.

GEORGE L. TRAGER
Georgetown University

MACKENZIE, GORDON N., and STEPHEN M. COREY, in association with JAMES HALL, VERONICA CASEY, MARY NEEL SMITH, and others. *Instructional Leadership*. Pp. xiii, 209. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1954. \$3.25.

This book is dreary reading. Vague and unexplained phrases, such as "benchmark," and fabricated postulates, like "action research," confuse the reader and impede communication. The slovenly practice of yoking nouns together, such as "behavior modification" and "problem definition," adds to the reader's burden. In the face of these and other difficulties the conscientious reader will wonder whether the heights of profundity that glimmer dimly just beyond his perception are real or whether he is bedazzled by semantic mirages. In places he will become quite certain that he is witnessing the garrulous unveiling of the obvious.

These deficiencies in communication are regrettable, because the book makes three significant contributions—contributions that are valuable in other areas as well as in education. First, the authors strip the concept of leadership of its false trappings and let the whole world see that the collection of tricks and techniques displayed on the dais of status are empty baubles. This exposure and analysis of what has hitherto masqueraded as leadership are pitiless, complete, and overwhelming. Leadership consists of action and not qualities.

The second contribution is interwoven with the first. The authors demonstrate that leaders are merely procurers of means for individuals and groups and not fore-runners or commanders. Politics as well as education should henceforth divest itself of the phony chatter about the need of strong leaders, towering personalities, and men of action.

The third contribution is the demonstration that group dynamics in all its ramifications can be used to develop leadership, and that status leaders need training in leadership almost as much as unlabeled privates.

These contributions grew out of a prolonged experiment among the principals, co-ordinators, and supervisors of the Den-

ver schools. The two consultants from Teachers College (the authors) planned, replanned, criticized, evaluated, and re-evaluated the experiment in the development of leadership. Their findings unquestionably have a high transfer value. Educational leaders have no excuse henceforth for confusing status with leadership.

EDGAR B. WESLEY

Stanford University

WASHBURN, CARLETON. *The World's Good*. Pp. xiii, 301. New York: John Day Company, 1954. \$4.00.

The subtitle, "Education for World Mindedness," gives the key to the contents of this interesting and realistic analysis of the role of education in "influencing the oncoming generation toward an enlightened world-wide cooperation for man's well-being."

Part I emphasizes the changes necessary in our schools if they are: to provide the basis for a truly democratic experience; to appreciate and value cultural differences of groups; to understand the way prejudices are formed and perpetuated; to establish the dual concepts that wars bring more problems than they solve and every possible means should be taken to prevent them; yet, if war comes, each individual must give everything he has to bring about military victory; and to cultivate the attitude that "in the world's good is your own, and in yours the world's."

Part II is a clear exposition of the agencies and activities of governments aimed to establish world co-operation. These include: the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and Technical Assistance. The concluding chapter, "Patriotism and World Mindedness," describes attacks on these organizations and expresses the conviction that only through the education of children and adults throughout the world can "ignorance and confusion regarding the United Nations and its agencies be overcome."

This book is written primarily for teachers at all levels from the grade school to

the university. But it would be of interest also to parents and to all who are seeking to create attitudes essential to world-mindedness.

FRANCIS J. BROWN

American Council on Education
Washington, D. C.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

PERRY, RALPH BARTON. *Realms of Value: A Critique of Human Civilization*. Pp. xii, 497. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954. \$7.50.

This is a splendid work. It has been awaited for many years as the promised sequel to the now classic *General Theory of Value*, published in 1926. Such a book can issue only from a lifetime of dedicated exploration in the vast domain of man and his works. It is a comprehensive survey of many-faceted human civilization, grounded throughout upon a general theory of value. The book thus restates the thesis of Perry's earlier volume and extends it to a comparison and critique of the special realms of value represented by man's moral, political, economic, legal, scientific, esthetic, educational, and religious activities. As the culmination of the most sustained, penetrating, and comprehensive inquiry into human values that has yet been made, *Realms of Value* is a monumental philosophic achievement.

Perry regards value in general as a function of interest: "A thing—any thing—has value, or is valuable, in the original and generic sense when it is the object of an interest—any interest," and "a thing is an object of interest when its being expected induces actions looking to its realization or non-realization" (pp. 2, 3). Value is thus conceived relationally in terms of interests and their fulfilling (or non-fulfilling) objects. Values are properties of things not in isolation, but of things considered "interestwise," considered in their capacities to fulfill, sustain, and engender interests.

From this point of view the delineation of the various special realms of value is made in terms of the isolation of basic

types of interest. Esthetic values answer to the esthetic interest in "joy of apprehending"; scientific values to the interest in "highly qualified cognition"; religious values to man's interest in "the fate of that which he accounts most valuable"; moral values to "the interest in interests," the interest in "the organization of interests for their greatest possible benefit, and embracing as many interests as possible." Correspondingly, the interrelation of the realms of value follows the interrelation of interests. And the criticism of various values is to be made in terms of how adequately they fulfill the interests to which they minister, and how they affect other interests in the total domain of human activity.

Realms of Value is not merely close analysis; it is also a "critique of human civilization." It not merely defends democratic liberalism, but it celebrates it, advocates it, and challenges it to assume moral responsibility for the human future. *Realms of Value* is a credo, a manual, and a testament of the democratic vision.

CHARLES MORRIS

University of Chicago

LEVINSON, RONALD B. *In Defense of Plato*. Pp. 674. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. \$10.00.

There is probably no single philosopher in the history of western thought whose influence even approaches that of Plato. One reason of this predominance has been the matchless beauty and persuasiveness of Plato's style; another, the fact that Plato's principal ideas—both in general philosophy and in political thought—have been very close to the predominant traditions of the West, idealism in philosophy and authoritarianism in politics. As empiricism developed in modern philosophy, and as democracy acquired respectability and prestige in modern politics, Plato has been subjected to more and more critical examination. From Jefferson to Bertrand Russell there is a consistent line of opposition to Platonism; it is not surprising that anti-Platonism has been so slow in developing in England, whose aristocratic traditions, deliberately fostered until recently by her ancient universities, have pro-

vided the natural setting for the acceptance of Platonic ideas in education and politics. In the United States, the long cultural dependence upon England has delayed a fresh approach to Plato, viewed in the light of American thought and American political experience. During the last twenty years, there has been a considerable amount of new work on Plato, both in Europe and the United States, and much of it has been highly critical of Plato. Warner Fite's *The Platonic Legend* (New York, 1934) and Hans Kelsen's essays on Plato's concepts of love and justice (published around the same time in European and American journals, but unfortunately not brought out as yet in book form), started a new era; other significant critiques of Platonic thought were published by R. H. S. Crossman, A. D. Winspear, and Karl Popper.

Professor Levinson's *In Defense of Plato* will be strongly welcomed by all students of Plato, whatever their own interpretation of Plato. It is perhaps a sign of the times that a massive volume needs to be written, entitled *In Defense of Plato*. This would have been hardly possible only a generation ago, and it shows that Fite, Kelsen, and Popper have not done their pioneering work for nothing. Levinson's volume is above all useful as a source of reference with regard to recent research and writings on Plato. He recapitulates in detail the arguments put forward by the anti-Plato critics, and his summaries of those writings are usually fair and exact. There is no other book which provides the reader with a similar guide through the recent critical literature in this vast field. Secondly, the author takes great pains in not defeating his own purpose by drawing a caricature of the anti-Platonic argument: he makes concessions to Plato's recent critics where such concessions seem indicated. To this reviewer it seems that the author does not go far enough in conceding validity to some of the principal arguments of Crossman, Fite, Kelsen, and Popper; and on the whole, Professor Levinson adheres to the orthodox interpretation of Plato. He dismisses too lightly, for example, the extent to which Plato has been idolized by the

Nazi and fascist regimes; and while Plato cannot obviously be made responsible for all crimes and misdeeds of those two regimes, one is impressed by the fact that Nazi and fascist ideologies perceived a deep spiritual and intellectual kinship in Plato rather than in, say, John Locke or Thomas Jefferson. The author concludes as follows: "The essentials of Plato's vision still stand: the prophetic image of a social brotherhood, growing up in grace and harmony and understanding, under justice, toward an ideal perfection never quite to be reached." Even those who find this position unacceptable will gain immensely from *In Defense of Plato*.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN

Princeton University

NEILL, THOMAS P. *The Rise and Decline of Liberalism*. Pp. xi, 321. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1953. \$5.50.

A book should be dealt with in the light of its defined limits. Here, these limits are set forth in the text, but are not indicated by the title. The volume under review is concerned with the rise and decline of classical liberalism. This it does and in good measure. The author proposes a second volume on *Liberalism in Prospect* which will deal with the contemporary scene, as the present study deals with the nineteenth century.

The introductory chapter, "Liberalism: Toward a Definition," does survey representative views on liberalism down to the present. The author well says that "it is obvious that there is no formula of faith which can be labeled Liberalism at all times and all places. It is, indeed, of the very nature of Liberalism to have no set creed, no formula of faith to which all true Liberals must adhere." He shows also how the theory of liberty was changed from a negative to a positive concept in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Due tribute is paid T. H. Green's services in transferring the positive concept of liberty to the Anglo-American tradition. Nevertheless, it is the negative concept of classical liberalism which draws most of the author's attention and suffers most of his strictures.

After dealing with the many—and often

contradictory—attitudes which stem from loose definition, the author follows Carlton J. H. Hayes in distinguishing "ecumenical" liberalism from "sectarian" liberalism. The former refers to that liberalism which is identified with generosity of spirit or liberality of mind, while the latter refers to a precisely defined and rigidly held body of doctrine, a secular religion. The author concentrates on secular liberalism in Britain, France, and on the Continent in general. The last half of the book is an appraisal of various aspects of classical liberalism.

The well-scotched faith in the inevitability of progress is dispatched again. The author is concerned, and he is not alone in this, because society has become rootless and is living on its spiritual momentum. Is this, however, a liberal failing or the dilemma of modern man in general? Speaking of the origins of liberalism, the author concludes that "from the very beginning, therefore, Liberalism develops as a body of thought and as a system which cannot work, for . . . it is based on a false concept of man and of society which leads logically—almost necessarily—to anarchy and from there to some form of totalitarian tyranny."

The twentieth century is no stranger to totalitarian tyranny. One wonders just when tyranny arose in any country that respects the dignity of the individual in the liberal sense, led by a man or a movement holding that the individual, applying his reason as developed by education, is not less capable of making a good decision than is external authority.

RALPH G. JONES

University of Arkansas

UNESCO. *Interrelations of Cultures: Their Contribution to International Understanding*. Collection of Intercultural Studies. Pp. 387. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1953. \$2.00.

The activities and publications of UNESCO have been viewed by its enemies as those of the propaganda ministry of an ominous "internationalist" conspiracy and by its friends as a marshaling of the spiritual and intellectual resources of the

world in the cause of mutual understanding and world peace. If we are to judge by the present volume of essays, both these views are somewhat exaggerated. The only propaganda they seem to contain is the bias each author exhibits in favor of the country whose culture he is describing. Since this is in most cases his native country, or one to which he has devoted close study, these sympathies are understandable. Since, too, at least eight different cultures are so discussed (Japan, China, India, Negro Africa, Spain, Mexico, Spanish America, and the United States), the total effect of the volume is rather that of a quick visit to a museum than that of a monolithic propaganda "line."

This variety of impression is re-enforced by the variety of interpretation and method which the authors have brought to the common subject of "the present stage of the indigenous cultures of the various peoples of the world and . . . the relations existing between these cultures." Some have written historical surveys of major cultural epochs, others have sought to analyze a culture into constituent cultures, still others have tried to trace a culture's essence in its literature, arts, and sculpture, and one essay sets out the explicit theological, philosophical, and ethical principles of Indian culture. Professor McKeon, moreover, in a subtle essay on "Philosophy and the Diversity of Cultures" develops additional possibilities of interpretation which are not exemplified in this volume. The essays by Shih-Hsiang Chen on Chinese literature, by Alain Danielou on traditional arts in India, and by Michel Leiris on African Negro carving and sculpture, are interesting and distinctive. However, readers may also find in some of the others conveniently brief summaries of material that is usually widely scattered.

There are two essays, both rather slight and casual, on American culture, which fall in with the old stereotype that while other cultures have historic traditions, "philosophies," literatures, arts, problems, and so forth, in American culture there is only diversity, dominated perhaps by science and efficiency. It is also curious that except for Spain, no essays were included in this volume on European culture.

Clearly the organization and methodology of intercultural studies need much improving before they will serve to advance the international understanding sought by UNESCO.

MILTON SINGER

University of Chicago

NEUTRA, RICHARD. *Survival Through Design*. Pp. xi, 384. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. \$5.50.

This *feu d'artifice* is the reflection of a pyrotechnic personality. This distinguished modern architect-planner can sweep into his orbit observations and experiences in Ceylon, China, and Japan as well as in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and can bring to bear the thinking of Sigmund Freud (in whose home he played as a boy), his friend Charles A. Beard, Zola, Serge Eisenstein, Erwin Schroedinger, Norbert Wiener and his Cybernetics, Roman lawyers, Adolf Loos (the pioneer German modern architect), Pavlov and a host of physiologists, Adelbert Ames and a host of experimental psychologists.

Neutra characterizes these 47 chapters (some only four or five pages long) as a "loose and yet linked cycle of writings collected over almost a lifetime." There is no table of contents to guide the reader to the author's scheme of organization. There are no chapter titles; each section has as motto a gnomic utterance. In short, this volume is a *Commonplace Book* or *Table Talk*. If the reader will accept it as such, he will find it studded with exciting ideas and striking phrases ("obsolescence precoc"). He will also find it studded with italics and capitals that show Neutra's impatience with the printed page as a means of expression; and he will find it strewn with the obfuscation apparently inevitable when a modern architect turns philosopher. ("Gradual increase of functional perfection in design seems to be accompanied by a proportionate decrease of extra-functional supplementation. Here emerges a psychological law of human production," p. 101.)

The central theme of this collection of reflections is not the challenge of the H-bomb: it is the vital importance of molding man's environment to meet his neurological

and physiological requirements: "physiological space must prevail . . . over any other arbitrary notion on space." Closely linked to this theme is the concept of the design of environment as a four-dimensional space-time continuum. It is fascinating to read how an architect like Neutra sees responses to the senses of smell and sound as part of his problem.

Neutra preaches the replacement of the "GRAND, GODLIKE ORIGINATOR" by "a cooperative team which then reveals its own peculiar physiology of production"; "COMMUNITY PLANNING is an art, but one in need of a large scientific advisory board, CHAIRED BY AN EXPERT IN BIOLOGY." With this as a main thesis, it is odd that I find only one passing reference to Patrick Geddes, the great preacher of "biotechnics" (whose centenary is celebrated this year), and apparently none to Lewis Mumford. (The lack of an index makes it impossible to be certain that there may not be one.)

CHARLES S. ASCHER

Brooklyn College

MAYER, CHARLES. *In Quest of a New Ethics*. Translated and with a Preface by Harold A. Larrabee. Pp. 321. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. \$4.00.

A little more than one-third of this book is devoted to what the author calls "principles"; the remainder consists in "applications." As regards principles, we find that the mind is material; that there is no soul; that there are no final causes; that the assumption of God's existence "leads to inescapable inconsistencies" (p. 32); that "duty," "rights," and "virtue" are useful illusions (pp. 86, 92); that all truth is relative (p. 136). Unhappily the author deals dogmatically—perhaps "cavalierly" is a better description—with the many thorny questions that these views raise. His arguments are not likely to convince his opponents (Thomism, idealism, intuitionism, pragmatism, phenomenalism, existentialism, and several other rival schools are, for instance, considered and disposed of in some ten pages). And even those who accept M. Mayer's naturalistic principles are likely to feel that the argu-

ments by which he supports them are inadequate.

Turning now to "applications," we find a great variety of topics discussed in more or less random fashion. The author holds that "we cannot have both economic liberty and [social] security at the same time"—security means "social leveling"; leveling results in equality; "equality is opposed to liberty." The conclusion of this syllogism seems to be that equalitarianism is more harmful than totalitarianism (pp. 144-47). Further, M. Mayer argues that "economic crises are necessary" (p. 192) and that "the state of affairs which is most likely to conserve and promote the progress of all humanity is that of free competition" (p. 154). He rejects wage and price controls, even when the state is "under the pressure of special circumstances" (p. 157). He defends the gold standard (p. 181) and puts Keynes right on the subject of the role of savings in bringing on economic crisis (p. 196). In the area of political institutions M. Mayer thinks that "democratic regimes are badly equipped to do great things," and that "unity of direction in the hands of a very capable man invested with dictatorial powers would seem to assure the maximum of efficiency at all levels of human activity." Unfortunately, because they abuse their powers, "most dictators come to a bad end." Under these circumstances, it would seem that the best regime would "consist of a dictatorship in which the holder of the supreme power could be replaced at any moment by a senate elected by the people" (p. 296).

The author is bitter about American opposition to colonialism. For the colonial powers there is, he says, a simple alternative: "subdue and dominate, or give up and leave" (p. 231). M. Mayer seems to choose the first alternative, for, "far from appeasing the ambitions of the backward peoples, the Occidentals, in raising them to their own standard of living, have only sharpened these ambitions" (p. 213).

M. Mayer prefaces his whole discussion by declaring, "We shall try to give straightforward answers to the principal questions of metaphysics, ethics, and social relations." This was an ambitious undertaking.

ing; unfortunately it does not seem to this reviewer that M. Mayer has been successful. He has indeed given us "straightforward answers" in the sense of leaving us in no doubt as to where he stands on a number of contemporary issues. But answers in the more fundamental sense of reasoned and connected arguments are singularly lacking.

W. T. JONES

Pomona College

GOLOB, EUGENE O. *The "Isms": A History and Evaluation*. Pp. xii, 681. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$6.00.

This is history with an element of direction—the sort of thing criticized by Buckley in *God and Man at Yale*. Its reception will depend on the sympathies of its readers, but probably most of those who read it will find it enlightening.

Classical capitalism is dismissed briefly as a system which evolved into monopolistic capitalism. Due attention is given to the neo-Mercantilist interventionism which characterizes the modern mixed economy. Well over half the book is devoted to socialism.

The author disparages classical economics. Among economists, he would be labeled an Institutionalizer. He deals with the Russian variety of Marxism at length and in a sharply critical manner. He applies the name corporatism to a system of political pluralism in which various organizations act as checks and balances. He comments pertinently that "The defeat of fascism . . . , far from removing corporatism as an ideological issue and social option, has made it possible . . . to consider its essential character and strength, unconfused by the fantasies of manic nationalism." His solution is found in neo-Mercantilist corporatism, with the government acting to promote the general welfare, but with the society which it governs composed of groups powerful enough to influence policies, and with the "Judaic-Christian tradition" supporting democratic discussion. There is much of this in our present society.

Modern nationalism might be assessed more incisively than is done here. No doubt Golob's Institutional predilections

explain his neglect of welfare theory, but, when social solutions are suggested, it is reasonable to expect more examination of ethical theories than he attempts. Lack of objectivity is displayed when he states that proportional representation "can, and has, so well reflected the disagreements of the people as to render effective government impossible, discredit democracy, and justify dictatorship," without saying anything on the other side. Very likely, Golob had Germany in mind here; but is proportional representation to be blamed for the rise of Hitler? It should be pointed out that the dire consequences to which Golob refers have not occurred in the Scandinavian countries.

The book is well-documented, largely from secondary sources. Disadvantages in textbook use may be the ornate literary style and the great length of the chapters, insufficiently subdivided for easy student assignment. But, within its limitations, it is very well worth-while, and it should be read by a wider circle than those who teach and study "isms" courses.

EDMUND WHITTAKER

Colorado Agricultural and Mechanical College

CHATTERJEE, MANMATHA NATH. *Out of Confusion*. Pp. xvii, 165. Yellow Springs, O.: Antioch Press, 1954. \$3.00.

The difficulty of distilling the essence of an inspiring teacher into a series of chapters is illustrated by this work from the pen of the Brahmin-born, European-trained American citizen Dr. Chatterjee, for three decades professor of the social sciences at Antioch College. A foreword by Arthur E. Morgan, former president of Antioch, and an introduction by Harry Elmer Barnes, leave no doubt about the Socratic evocativeness of his teaching. The book, however, is "a mixture of autobiography, personal philosophy, and social theory," the value of which lies in "flashes of intuition" rather than in logical argument.

Dr. Chatterjee finds Western society "delinquent" and "confused" because it lacks a "well-defined objective." The result is no unity of purpose in our institutions. As Barnes puts it: "Governments are nation-minded; religions are church-

minded; labor unions are union-minded; business men are business-minded. But, although all of these exist for the benefit of humanity, none seems to be truly people-minded." As a cure for this chaos, the author has a formula: Man-Society-Discrimination-Responsibility, or M-S-D-R. His third word, discrimination, is poorly chosen, since what he means is simply the necessity of choice. "From time immemorial up to the present, mankind, though still groping in the dark, has had occasional glimpses" of this formula, the application of which would exalt spirit over matter, make men more consciously social, and abolish war. Indeed, five words sum up the gist of the matter: "Let There Be More Love."

Unfortunately the book's concrete proposals do not take us very far out of confusion into a sun-lit world. Some of them, indeed, such as "Live above the law," are themselves anything but clarifying. Mankind has been told again and again to "make friends even of his enemies," to stop exploiting the Asian peoples, and to "arrest the ever-increasing demand for national defense to avert the constant threat of war." Many will second the author's plea to "push the Point Four program in the spirit of *Servus servorum*"; but his advocacy of a research Institute of Peace to study such questions as "Is it possible to have a highly industrialized society without a philosophy of war?" seems to ignore a host of existing agencies which do not happen to start from ultra-pacifist premises.

HAROLD A. LARRABEE

Columbia University

JOHNSTON, RUBY F. *The Development of Negro Religion*. Pp. xxi, 202. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. \$3.00.

This book deals with an important subject which is worthy of the attention of any social scientist interested not only in the social development of the Negro in the United States but also in the evolution of religion generally as a social and psychological phenomenon. Unfortunately, it is evident that the person who undertook the study of this important subject did not

possess the necessary training and knowledge to treat the subject adequately.

In the Preface, which is partly hortatory, and in the Introduction, which is a mixture of common sense and confused notions, the author proposes to study the relation of the Negro's religion to his social experience. Part I is supposed to be a condensed history of Negro religion. But it turns out to be a poorly integrated and uncritical use of various sources of information on the religion of the Negro before the Civil War. Part II, which is supposed to deal with "Religion in Transition," opens with a chapter entitled "Religion in a Sensate Culture." The title of this chapter is typical of the sociological and psychological jargon that is interspersed in the text throughout this part of the book and adds to its confusion. The materials on Negro religion, which were gathered in the South, could have counterbalanced to some extent the bad features of this study. They were used, however, without any understanding of their relevance to the general subject.

Although it was once thought, and may still be believed by some people, that anyone can study the Negro, it is difficult to understand why the publisher would permit such a work to appear among its titles.

E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

Howard University

ANDREWS, THEODORE. *The Polish National Catholic Church in America and Poland*. Pp. ix, 117. New York: The Macmillan Company (originally published by SPCK, London), 1954. \$2.50.

Today there are between four and five million people of total Polish stock in the United States. Though there were Poles in the United States in considerable numbers previous to the Civil War, the great influx of Polish people did not begin until after 1870, reaching its apex in 1912-1913 when nearly two hundred thousand entered in that one year. This vast immigration was motivated largely by economic conditions in Poland, due mainly to overpopulation and backward agricultural methods. Thrifty and capable of hard work, many found employment on farms, and soon farming communities of Poles were to be found in sections of New England—

especially in the Connecticut river valley—as well as in the middle states and Texas, but the great majority became city dwellers. Three-fourths of the Polish immigrants were devout Roman Catholics and were fanatically loyal to Polish cultural patterns; largely they lived apart from other groups, developed a vigorous American-Polish language press, and formed unions and alliances in large numbers, which kept alive the Polish language bond and a Polish national spirit.

The rise of the Polish National Catholic Church in America can be understood only in the light of the above facts. On their coming to America the Poles soon discovered two distressing facts. The first was that their churches in America were controlled by the Irish and to a lesser extent by the Germans. Today of the more than 165 Catholic bishops in the United States only seven are Polish, and only one of the seven is a diocesan. The second discovery was that even in a 100 per cent Polish parish the church property was held in the name of the bishop of the diocese, who was most frequently an Irishman who could neither speak nor understand Polish. In 1896 a delegation of laymen from a Polish congregation in Scranton came to their bishop requesting that the congregation be represented in the management of parish affairs. Both the parish priest and the bishop of the diocese peremptorily rejected their request, while the bishop threatened them with a civil penalty if they did not submit. The congregation now turned to the Reverend Francis Hodur, a former priest of the parish, and under his leadership a new Polish parish was formed and a church erected. When the bishop of the diocese refused to consecrate the church unless the title be placed in his name, the congregation turned to Father Hodur who consented to be their pastor, the final result being the establishment of an independent parish. Soon there were other independent parishes in other Polish communities. In 1904 these congregations were consolidated at a Synod attended by 147 clerical and lay delegates, where the Polish National Catholic Church in America was formed. Similar movements had already begun in other

Polish communities, and in 1914 a Lithuanian National Catholic Church was formed along similar lines. These groups in revolt have retained the Catholic ceremonial as well as Catholic doctrine in the main, though rejecting papal claims and hierarchical control.

The Polish National Catholic Church has a membership and constituency in the United States of more than 200,000 and maintains a mission in Poland—begun in 1923. Its clergy are permitted to marry, and intercommunion with the Protestant Episcopal Church was established in 1946.

This informative study was prepared as a Th.D. thesis at the General Theological Seminary (Episcopal) in New York, and it makes a welcome contribution to our understanding of a little-known phase of American church life among a sturdy body of "New Americans." Unfortunately there is no index.

WILLIAM W. SWEET

Southern Methodist University

BARTH, KARL. *Against the Stream: Shorter Post-War Writings, 1946-52*. Pp. 253. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. \$3.75.

These postwar writings have decided advantages for revealing Barth to us. Despite all talk about an independent Christian message, he seems much immersed in the currents of affairs. One result is a theological existentialism. Revelation and faith are geared to bring a "direct, unshakable and absolute certainty." Revelation means "the action of a Subject" whereof faith speaks "with absolute assurance." All down the line, psychological conviction takes over the work of logical evidence. Barth opposed Hitlerism. He advised Hungarian churchmen to be neutral about Communist totalitarianism. Bruner's open letter of protest fell on stony ground. Even his charge that Christians are thereby urged to give ethical sanction to what they were powerless to prevent made little impression. The one basic difference in these forms of tyranny Barth finds in Hitler's "basic crime" of distorting the church's message.

Why the policy of neutrality? A major part of the answer is that historical events

are couched between two theological stations within the drama of human salvation. Political policies are not to be taken too seriously; they are incidental. Authoritative action taken by God with respect to lost mankind is the decisive thing. That action centers in His appointments for Jesus the Messiah.

From this divine-action-core theory of history Barth deduces his doctrine of God. He arrives via our need for certainty and authority. "The very instability of political history should serve to confirm the Christian assurance that only the love of God is eternal." Of course, that is not the only alternative. It is Barth who takes social instability as an occasion for appealing to a God who compensates for human deficiencies. Logic is bent to religious zeal and takes an all-or-nothing form.

Barth's agile mind has an urgent case to make. We do need assurance and a decisive word for human affairs—at least an individual in a turbulent world does. The Word of God comes therefore in Jesus Christ as the authoritative revelation, as indeed the essence of biblical faith. Bible content to one side, the individual needs status which gives him independence from his surroundings. In this either-or situation, religion becomes a divine transaction with respect to the soul. God acts once and for all, and for every individual. His part is to give assent, intellectual and emotional.

This transactional religion continually asserts its mastery. It is everywhere assumed and goes without questioning. To a legalistic authoritarian it undoubtedly sounds convincing. Otherwise it could not continue to dominate thinking among Christians as it does. It has one sound idea, that God is the source of our life. Beyond that, it is most objectionable. It sets out by misrepresenting God as a regal authority whose action precludes significant human response. Jesus the revealer is transposed into a figurine in a manger, on a Golgotha, and at the right hand of God. He is the "propitiation for our sins and accepted by God." Man is a lost unit, the victim of mass guilt and of collective responsibility. The church is an official organ for the propagation of the Word of

God thus interpreted. No wonder human problems lie beyond "reason and ethics." Reason is chained to apologetic. Ethics is an aching void.

IRL G. WHITCHURCH

Kingfield, Maine

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

BRUNTON, D., and D. H. PENNINGTON. *Members of the Long Parliament*. Pp. xxi, 256. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. \$4.25.

To know our own world better we must understand as far as possible the secret springs of ancient struggles, not least of which have been those classic upheavals, the Puritan, American, French, and Russian Revolutions. In the first of these the work of the Long Parliament was central. Traditionally the history of Parliament has been told in terms of neatly categorized groups of merchants, lawyers, and country gentlemen; a method yielding more to the dictates of simplicity than to the dictates of truth. Sir Lewis Namier broke new paths in the 1930's by attacking the problem of Parliamentary history at a more basic level. He investigated the individual human elements of which parliaments were composed. After gleaning new facts from local sources, he found that the strings that moved the puppets on the national stage more often led back to family and county connections than to king and country. The old generalizations crumbled. The historian was hesitant in presenting new ones. Mr. Brunton and Mr. Pennington, both formerly close associates of Sir Lewis at Manchester University, have now brought the history of the Long Parliament under the scrutiny of this new approach.

The "original members" of the Long Parliament were divided into Royalists and Parliamentarians but Mr. Brunton and Mr. Pennington did not find that these divisions corresponded to separate social classes, nor to occupational interests, nor to educational opportunities, nor to political experience. Age alone seemed to set apart the younger Royalists. In social and

economic status the Recruiters differed as little from the "original members" as did the Rumpers from those secluded.

Two long chapters deal with the membership from the Eastern Association and the six counties of the South-West. The history of families on both sides has been traced through several generations to ascertain whether old families disappeared and new ones arose. Invariably old families held on and new ones failed. "Enterprise in exploiting the political situation" was not "as important in determining the station in life of the successors of our Members of Parliament as the usual accidents of family history"—births, marriages, deaths.

This is not a book for laymen. It is a tool for scholars. Appendix I contains valuable information on the regional number, age, length of service, and family parliamentary record of the M.P.'s. This volume has an admittedly negative value. It is to humble the student before all generalizations, especially any which speak of this revolution as a class struggle. New interpretations are withheld, but they are foreshadowed in this preliminary study which, even thus far, has well deserved a laudatory introduction from Tawney.

GEORGE C. ROGERS, JR.

University of Pennsylvania

PELLING, HENRY. *The Origins of the Labour Party, 1880-1900*. Pp. ix, 258. London: MacMillan & Co. (distributed in the U. S. by St. Martin's Press), 1954. \$4.00.

The title of the book here reviewed is exact. The author has given us an analysis of the Labour party, not of the labor movement; he has given the story of the birth of a political party that is socialistic and yet he has not recounted the rise of British Socialism. He has limited himself to origins, starting with the first trade union committee that began applying parliamentary pressure and closing with the election of 1906 in which the Labour party was put on a firm footing in Parliament by winning seats for thirty members.

The problem in Britain was to find a political line that could be followed by all of the trade unionists, by most of the

Socialists, and by some of the Radicals and Liberals to the end that a permanent parliamentary group could be maintained and that it could win elections on the basis of its own program, and be financed by its own membership.

Records of organizational meetings, publications of societies, correspondence of labor leaders, press notices, and other primary or contemporary accounts form the backbone of the study. Many principals have left their statements in print, as, for example, the Webbs, Shaw, Cole, Hyndman, Mann, Morris, and Pease. There are a number of good biographies and special studies upon which the author has drawn. These materials have been well handled.

There had been liberal and radical thought in England for many years, and there had been Marxist and other types of Socialism for a long time. But when, in 1880, the Lambeth Democratic Association decided that it was time to take political action because laborers were losing their franchise in London and because the caucus system worked to the disadvantage of labor candidates, a committee was appointed. A labor party was decided upon; it was called the Democratic Federation. Hyndman, its leader, made it an openly Socialist body in 1883; and in the following year it became the Social Democratic Federation, somewhat encouraged by its Marxist counterpart in Germany. William Morris, a man of wealth, was its treasurer. But in this year, 1884, Morris left the Federation and formed with Engels the Socialist League which opposed the political approach. On the other hand, in 1884 there was formed the Fabian Society as an outgrowth of the Fellowship of the New Life. It stood for parliamentary action as a means of reform. It helped to color the movement with evolutionary rather than revolutionary spirit. But it was too lofty to get the popular strength necessary for political action.

It is Keir Hardie and his Independent Labour Party, Socialist and favoring political action, that the author credits with the greatest support for the growing party movement. He gives us a fine, critical picture of Hardie, "the only reliable Parliamentary asset of independent labour." It

is the reformed Liberal, Ramsay MacDonald, that made Labour politics national in scope. When, partially as a result of the "union smashing" in America and of the Boer War, trade unionism grew and in its strength because political-minded—in about 1899—the backbone of a political labor force had been created.

Hardie, MacDonald, and many Labourites favored "labor" rather than "Socialism" as the basis of the movement for parliamentary power. The testing of the formula that would make a winning party is the story told by Henry Pelling. One does not know at the end from which one of the ingredients of the Labour party the author drew his own inspiration.

The book is especially well edited and manufactured.

W. HENRY COOKE

Claremont Graduate School

ATTLEE, C. R. *As It Happened*. Pp. viii, 312. New York: The Viking Press, 1954. \$5.00.

To the general reader this autobiography will reveal much about its author and the nature of British socialism. The straightforward and unadorned narrative suggests an unassuming man, but one with a great deal of wisdom and practical common sense. Mr. Attlee has always done his own thinking; unlike his early associates he became a socialist; unlike some of his later colleagues he did not take the pacifist line either in the war of 1914 or in the crises of the 1930's. Like most British Labourites the inspiration for his socialism was mainly humanitarianism; fourteen years of settlement work in London's East End convinced him that collectivism was the only solution, but it was a socialism empirical, experimental, and flexible. Disapproval of Marxism is always evident; he never liked the doctrinaire Social Democratic Federation, and the distrust of Communism is apparent throughout, which helps one to understand why the Communist party has failed to infiltrate and destroy the Labour party, and why the latter has remained so democratic, so parliamentary, and so British.

To anyone familiar with recent British history or with Roy Jenkins' biography of

Attlee, however, this book will be disappointing. Much space is allotted to conventional matters such as early life and school, while important events get very casual treatment. Two sentences relate the defeat of the first Labour government and two short barren paragraphs the following general election. Mr. Attlee could tell much more about such events as the Labour debacle of 1931, Labour's adherence to the Churchill coalition, and his choice of Ernest Bevin rather than Hugh Dalton as foreign secretary; but he makes few revelations and his account falls short of what can be found elsewhere. The chapter on Commonwealth relations is more satisfying, but with respect to India it would have been more illuminating if he had developed somewhat his theme that his difficulties in arranging for the transfer of power were created by the Indian communities themselves rather than by British unwillingness to withdraw. American readers will note with interest his admiration for President Roosevelt's knowledge of world strategy and prevision of the course of the war. During Attlee's visit of October, 1941, when the British African forces were confined to Egypt and Tobruk and the United States had not yet entered the war, the president discoursed upon the importance of North Africa and, putting his finger on Algiers, said: "That is where I want to have American troops" (p. 173).

CARL F. BRAND

Stanford University

COLE, G. D. H. *An Introduction to Trade Unionism*. Pp. 324. London: George Allen & Unwin (distributed in U. S. by The Macmillan Company, New York), 1953. \$4.25.

Although it bears the title of one of Professor Cole's previous books, this is in fact an entirely new work. Designed as a textbook, this relatively brief volume is exactly what its title indicates—an introduction to the character and the problems of modern trade unionism in Great Britain. With his usual clarity, Professor Cole takes the reader step by step through the complexities of trade union government, finance, and organization. He devotes separate chapters to the changing nature of

collective bargaining in Great Britain, to the trade unions and the law, politics, and education, and to a general survey of "trade union policy." This latter chapter deals with questions relating to strikes, wages, and productivity, but it is likely that the discussion of new problems—e.g., the nature and the desirability of "workers' control"—raised by postwar nationalization will be of most interest to American students.

Throughout the book, Professor Cole's comments provide sensible and well-balanced insights. His discussion of trade union "democracy" is a useful antidote, for example, to the conclusions drawn a bit too readily by many readers of Mr. Joseph Goldstein's *The Government of British Trade Unions*. In trade unions, as in other types of association, he points out, democracy has to do with giving every member a chance to participate actively if he wishes. That most members do not is less the result of calculated planning by trade union leaders than of the apathy characteristic of most forms of voluntary association, whether political or social or economic. Similarly, for American students accustomed to regard the Trades Union Congress as a colossus dominating the organized labor movement in Britain, his analysis of the narrow limits within which the T. U. C. conceived of its functions in the past—and, to a lesser extent, conceives of them in the present—will be of considerable value.

The one real weakness of the book, surprisingly enough, is in the chapter devoted to "strength and weakness" of the trade union movement. Here we have a summary of the state of organization in the various major trades and industries, but very little in the way of an analytical assessment either of particular unions or the trade union movement as a whole. This is especially disappointing since Professor Cole is perhaps uniquely qualified for the task. But there is enough material here, at any rate, to enable the student to begin to make his own generalizations. Finally, since the book is likely to be reprinted in the future, several mechanical faults may be noted. On page 31 an entire line of print which belongs in the second para-

graph appears also in the first. And, in the review copy at least, pages 113–128 are bound out of sequence before pages 105–112. These minor annoyances, however, do not seriously mar this clear, straightforward, and very readable survey of contemporary trade unionism in Britain.

HENRY R. WINKLER

Rutgers University

MACPHERSON, C. B. *Democracy in Alberta: The Theory and Practice of a Quasi-Party System*. Pp. x, 258. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953. \$5.50.

This, the fourth of a series sponsored by the Canadian Social Science Research Council dealing with the background and development of the Social Credit movement in Canada, is an extremely significant volume. The author, an associate professor of political economy at the University of Toronto, has indeed, in the words of Clark, the editor of the series, "struck on a new, bold approach to the study of Canadian politics." His analysis not only "constitutes an important contribution to an understanding of western Canadian political development" but also offers a tentatively rewarding approach for the study of political and social movements in this and other countries.

What Professor Macpherson, in effect, does is to offer an explanation of the appearance in Alberta, within a relatively brief period, of two new movements, each demanding the abandonment of the party system and the traditional cabinet system and the adoption of a new and more democratic type of government—a government capable of implementing popular demands and of protecting the people from economic exploitation. These movements were (1) the United Farmers, which dominated the provincial scene from 1921 to 1935; and (2) the Social Credit, which has controlled the Alberta government since 1935. His thesis, briefly stated, is that both movements can be traced to "the needs of a society that is politically and economically a subordinate part of a mature capitalist economy, and whose people, at the same time, have preponderantly the outlook and assumptions of small-proper-

tied independent commodity producers." Such a society, in certain circumstances, is led to reject the orthodox party system. But the party system performs one function indispensable for democracy in a mature capitalist economy: it moderates and contains the opposition of class interests. Thus the Alberta reformers were forced to find a substitute for the party system. This they found in what Professor Macpherson calls the "quasi-party system."

Whether this new system can properly be called democratic is open to question, for the influence of the voters over their government, admittedly, has been quite limited. There can, however, be no doubt that a new, and probably permanent, political system has emerged. Whether such a system will eventually find acceptance in other provinces and on the federal level only time can tell. But it unquestionably is true that the conditions that gave rise to Alberta "radicalism" are "not entirely lacking in Canada as a whole."

WILLIAM R. WILLOUGHBY

St. Lawrence University

DAY, BRIGHAM. *Le Canada et les droits de l'homme: Le Concept des droits de l'homme dans la politique étrangère et la Constitution du Canada*. Pp. ix, 154. Paris: Librairie du recueil Sirey, 1953. 900 fr.

This little volume, a doctoral thesis from Paris, should prove of interest not only to those who follow Canadian affairs but also to those concerned with the interrelations of national and international policies. Indeed it may unintentionally provide some comfort for the proponents of the recently defeated Bricker amendment, for the author concludes that the legislative and normative action of the United Nations is incapable of overcoming the resistance of even a law-abiding country such as Canada.

Mr. Day is concerned with bridging the gap between the anarchy of state sovereignties and the implementation of acknowledged human rights. His analysis of the Canadian course leads him to the conclusion that even a well-intentioned democracy may escape the internal consequences

of international declarations and legislation. As an avowed and ardent internationalist he is finally led to turn from reliance on the United Nations and to seek a more effective organization in some other quarter. After a brief examination of the British Commonwealth and the Pan-American Union, the last hope for realization of his ideals is found in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is perhaps a curious conclusion (and contrary to his thesis), for there is no reason to expect NATO to be more effective respecting the rights of man than the United Nations. If the expanding membership of NATO has not already weakened the sense of community standards, there is no ground for thinking other members attach the same importance to Article II as Canadians do. In any case, as a voluntary organization, NATO will be exposed to the same defects that are found in the United Nations.

This is not the first French thesis on "rights" in Canada and their relation to international law, but it is distinguished by a thorough basis of Canadian constitutional law and history. The concepts of the constitution, the federal background, and the disputed "treaty" jurisdiction are carefully and selectively examined, as are the chief examples of provincial legislation, judicial decisions, and the recent parliamentary inquiries respecting a proposed bill of rights. The merit of the volume, however, lies not in any new information but in the utilization of what is known to argue the deficiencies of existing policy.

H. MCD. CLOKIE

University of California
Berkeley

DEANE, PHYLLIS. *Colonial Social Accounting*. Pp. xv, 360. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. \$9.50.

Miss Deane has done excellent pioneering work in the very difficult field of national income and product in the African colonial territories. The work under review, the second and final report on the economies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, is based on a compilation of official and other documents and firsthand field experience acquired in 1946 and 1947. The interim report, *The Measurement of*

Colonial National Incomes, based on materials available in London, was published in 1948 and included estimates for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 1938 and Jamaica for 1929 to 1938. The result is a cogent, lucid, and searching exposition of the economic structure and growth factors and problems in primitive economics on which has been superimposed an advanced Western technology. In spite of Miss Deane's modest contention (p. 229) "that this particular experiment has [not] done more than collect, sift and discuss the readily accessible evidence for two Central African economies," it is evident that she has applied with perspicacity and clarity the conceptual apparatus of the national income approach to underdeveloped territories and has helped lay the foundation for further study in other areas leading to the eventual measurement and international comparison of real income and welfare. The author has also succeeded in providing a set of accounts and much analysis which will be of value to those responsible for formulating and administering economic policy for the new Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This is no mean achievement considering the formidable problems of measuring subsistence production, the inaccuracy of census statistics, the unreliability of data on the labor force, and the lack of a satisfactory census of agriculture and a systematic survey of internal trade.

It is unfortunate that there was a time lag of almost four years between the dates of writing and publication; much has occurred in that interval affecting income and product in the area. Obviously, the most important event was the federation of the two northern territories with Southern Rhodesia. Miss Deane does discuss some of the area's problems in a chapter entitled "The Central African Economy" comparing the income components and status of development in each territory and analyzing the common problems arising from the relatively low level of African productivity. Of significance also was the transfer of domicile of the major mining companies from London to Northern Rhodesia; thus they can no longer be considered foreign companies although they

will still remit dividends to stockholders abroad. Still another development was the sharp spurt in copper prices which led to increased investment by the mining companies in Northern Rhodesia, expanded European and African incomes, and enlarged governmental surpluses for development programs. Finally, considerable financial assistance was extended for the development of transportation, power, and metal output by the United States government and the International Bank.

FRANK R. LAMACCHIA

Department of State

LEAKEY, L. S. B. *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu*. Pp. xi, 115. New York: John Day Company, 1954. \$2.50.

Dr. Leakey's book is unique in two important respects. It is written by an authority on the Kikuyu and it is the first one to provide a proper background for an understanding of Mau Mau. The author possesses the unimpeachable credentials of an observer who grew up among the Kikuyu, learning their language and achieving tribal membership and status. His appraisal in late 1952 of Mau Mau as an anti-European and anti-Christian terrorist society bent on driving all foreigners from Kenya has indeed been substantiated, although subsequent developments indicate that the movement is all this and more too.

The first part of the book describes native law, custom, and belief as they once operated and as they now appear after prolonged contact with European institutions and influences. Dr. Leakey believes the Kikuyu have had substantial benefits from European civilization but is nonetheless convinced that all too often the stabilizing factors in Kikuyu society have been impaired or destroyed without adequate substitutes to replace them. The conviction that these conditions have made Mau Mau possible he sets forth in discussing land ownership, marriage customs, initiation ceremonies and education, religion, and other elements.

The second part of the book shows how astute Mau Mau leadership has capitalized on Kikuyu concern with land and population problems, on the social and economic consequences of living in a "money

economy, and on the existence of separatist churches and schools established by some Kikuyu after quarrels with missionaries over scriptural interpretation and over female circumcision. Dr. Leakey also provides a sketch of the organizational antecedents of Mau Mau and gives special attention to the now notorious oath which plays so important a role in its strategy.

The last chapter offers proposals to prevent a recurrence of the present troubles. These proposals call for changes in policy with respect to land, water supply, urban housing, birth control, education, the color bar, and Christian missions. The fact that the resolution of the present crisis in Kenya may render some of the suggestions unusable cannot detract from the worth of the book as a clear and valuable exposition of basic problems and their current political expression through the Mau Mau movement. Like the 1952 English edition, this American edition contains useful maps as endpapers.

WILLIAM E. DIEZ

University of Rochester

CALPIN, G. H. (Ed.). *The South African Way of Life*. Pp. ix, 200. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. \$3.50.

Prepared under the auspices of the South African Institute on International Affairs by the International Studies Conference, at the instance of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the terms of reference of this collection of essays are indicated in its subtitle, "Values and Ideals of a Multi-Racial Society." Its theme, quoted in the Foreword by A. L. Irvine from the final paragraph of the "Introductory" by David Marquand, who repeats the passage in the concluding discussion, sets the tone of the intervening chapters: "For the past 150 years the history of South Africa has been a history of struggle and conflict. Conflict between black man and black man, between white man and black man, between white man and white man; struggle of white and black against a not over-generous nature—this is the background of its present problems."

Its authors include members of all the racial groups of the country except the

Indians, who are discussed in a chapter written by the editor. The roster includes five Afrikaners, two Englishmen, one African, two Colored, one Jewish, and one born in Holland. Political affiliations vary; not all the Afrikaners are Nationalists, though the two Colored authors are or were members of the Coloured Advisory Council, a government-sponsored organization opposed by a considerable number of the Colored community.

The various contributions, as might be expected, do not have equal value, but their quality is on the whole high, and their respect for the facts admirable. We got from them a profound sense of the historical depth to which the roots of present tensions strike, the reasoning by means of which historically derived present positions are rationalized, and the basic dilemma of a multiracial society where a determined minority maintains a preferred position. The Afrikaans-English conflict is well described, the tone of the chapter on the English-speaking community showing by clear implication how much on the defensive this group, earlier dominant in South African society, has come to be.

The one defect of the book arises from the fact that most of its chapters seem to have been written in 1950, so that a number of critical developments, introduced to implement militant *apartheid*-ism, such as the transfer of the education of Africans from the Department of Education to the Department of Native Affairs, are not mentioned. It is a pity that an appendix of such recent events could not have been provided. The criticism, however, is minor in view of the fact that, on the whole, the book is probably the best all-round exposition of the South African scene that has appeared in recent years.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

Northwestern University

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

DEGRAS, JANE (Ed.). *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-1941*. Vol. III: 1933-1941. Pp. xxii, 500. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$8.50.

Superlatives have already been exhausted in reviews of the two preceding volumes in this admirable series on Soviet foreign policy, compiled and edited by Mrs. Jane Degras. The third and final volume, covering 1933 to 1941, maintains the high standards of accurate translation, judicious selection, and careful editing which characterized its predecessors. Mrs. Degras and the Royal Institute of International Affairs have rendered an invaluable service for which students of international relations must remain deeply indebted.

No period of Soviet foreign policy presents such dramatic events as the years preceding World War II. The general pattern is well-known—the shift from militant anti-fascism to Nazi-Soviet pact, the assiduous efforts for collective security within the League of Nations followed by Soviet partition of Poland, attack upon Finland, and expulsion from the League. Less familiar, however, are the many clues in Soviet foreign policy documents which show these changes to be carefully considered tactics within a coherent and comprehensible framework of policy. Here lies the chief contribution of Mrs. Degras's work.

Orthodox diplomatic historians insist on archival research as a basis for analyzing foreign policy. As these volumes indicate, however, Soviet policy reveals its basic motivations in official speeches, editorials, and newspaper reports. One need not trace the detailed secret negotiations between the Wilhelmstrasse and the Narkomindel to understand Soviet objectives in Finland, the Baltic states, and Eastern Europe. In the formal statements of Stalin and Molotov and in the many revealing Tass reports these objectives emerge in a coherent pattern. Similarly Soviet-Japanese relations, moving from a cautious *pas de deux* in Manchuria to indirect warfare in China and open clashes along the Mongolian border, can be traced with surprising completeness in the published record. In short, a thorough study of this book provides a fairly comprehensive picture of Soviet strategy and tactics in international relations.

Only the subversive aspects of Soviet foreign policy as expressed through the

Communist International remain outside the scope of Mrs. Degras' work. Her preface indicates that companion volumes are already in preparation to remedy this defect. This is not a crippling limitation, however. Contrary to Sir Winston Churchill's famous epigram, Soviet foreign policy is susceptible to the same method of analysis as that of other countries. Within the limitations imposed by Soviet secrecy, Mrs. Degras provides a broad yet reliable record of that policy as it evolved during the first 25 years of Soviet rule.

ALLEN S. WHITING

Taipei, Taiwan

MOORE, BARRINGTON, JR. *Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship*. Pp. xvii, 261. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. \$4.50.

In his own words, Barrington Moore attempts 'to weigh, with an eye to the future, the sources of stability and the potentiality for changes in the Bolshevik regime.' He also writes in his preface: "... the test I have tried to apply in including or omitting any particular piece of information was the clue that it might give to the future, rather than its desirability in rounding out our image of the present." Correspondingly the last chapter of the book has the title: *Images of the Future*.

To write about the future is always a risky undertaking. However, the reader need not be frightened by the dangers of "an exploratory foray" as the author himself characterizes his book. Barrington Moore does not indulge in prophecies. He uses abundant and well arranged evidence in order to determine the more probable alternatives of future development in the Soviet Union. The book, while less adventurous than the author himself seems to believe, certainly is very informative and stimulating.

Dr. Barrington Moore undertakes to explore the interplay of the three, in his opinion, most important elements influencing the development of the Soviet regime: power, rationality (technical and economic), and tradition. He recognizes

that "these three elements do not necessarily exhaust the criteria according to which decisions can be made in the Soviet system." He assumes, however, that most probably the future shape of the Soviet regime will be determined by an increase and corresponding decrease in the emphasis of each of these three elements. And his final conclusion is: "If peace should continue for a decade or more, the rationalist or the traditionalist forces in Soviet society, or some unstable combination of the two, may do their work of erosion upon the Soviet totalitarian edifice."

The method itself has its advantages, but also limitations and shortcomings which cannot be discussed in this review. At any rate, one wonders whether while concentrating only on those three elements the author has not omitted too many factors of possible import. In the scope of the study as chosen by the author, his analysis is very enlightening and convincing as far as "power" and "rationality" are concerned. The same hardly can be said about his observations concerning "tradition." In this reviewer's opinion, the author's concept of tradition is too vague, embracing very disparate elements as, for instance, the attachment of peasants to their personal plots and the inertia of the bureaucratic routine.

GEORGE DENICKE

Washington, D. C.

BLACK, C. E. (Ed.). *Challenge in Eastern Europe*. Pp. xviii, 276. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954. \$4.00.

These twelve essays, dealing primarily with the region embracing Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, were originally presented in somewhat different form as lectures at the Institute of Public Affairs and Regional Studies of the Graduate Schools at New York University in the summer of 1953. They were prepared and are now published in co-operation with the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. In a brief foreword Joseph C. Grew states: "To sustain the hope of free-

dom in half a continent; to learn and to contribute to truth and knowledge; in enlightened self-interest to dedicate ourselves and our country to freedom's cause and restitution—this is the *Challenge in Eastern Europe*."

The essays bear the mark of their origin and are able general surveys, omitting footnotes, bibliographies and other monographic apparatus. The editor contributes an introduction on "Eastern Europe in Historical Perspective" which is limited largely to a survey of nineteenth-century developments and a conclusion, on "Eastern Europe and the Postwar Balance of Power," which is the highlight of the volume. He has grouped the essays into three parts. The first of these deals with "The Politics of Eastern Europe." In a discussion of "The Liberal Tradition" Hubert Ripka stresses the influence of western liberal ideals, but points out that the liberals in the east were not convinced of the virtues of competition in a free market and were always willing to take a degree of state control. Arnold J. Zurcher presents a well organized and temperate account of the "Authoritarian Forms of Government Between the Wars," while Stanislaw Mikolajczyk gives a more impassioned denunciation of "People's Democracy in Theory and Practice."

The second group of essays considers "The Development of an Agrarian Society." Here Ladislav Feierabend writes on "Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement"; Branko M. Pešelj on "Peasantism: Its Ideology and Achievements," Geza Teleki on "Industrial and Social Policies Between the Wars," and Jan H. Wszelaki on "Industrial and Social Policies of the Communist Regimes." Although this region has been a predominantly agricultural area in the past, industrialization is now being pushed with marked success but also at tremendous cost to the general well being of the peoples. There has been rapid urbanization but the overpopulation of agricultural areas still remains a fundamental problem. Illiteracy has steadily decreased since World War I, and the present regimes have done much in this field. They have also paid much attention to advanced specialized technical training from which

they will recruit their future administrative personnel.

In the final section, entitled "The Search for Regional Security," Henry J. Roberts writes on "International Relations Between the Wars"; Jacob B. Hoptner on "The Structure of the Soviet Orbit" in which he discusses the various political agreements among the satellite states and the U.S.S.R.; and Karl W. Deutsch on "Problems and Prospects of Federation." The latter is a penetrating analysis in which the author, however, develops more problems than solutions.

There are other topics which might well have been considered in this *Challenge of Eastern Europe*. There is, for example, practically no mention of the role of the church in this area, nor is there an adequate treatment of the minority problem during the interwar years, with an evaluation of how the system of minority treaties under supervision of the League actually functioned. The book, however, is not meant to be a history of Eastern Europe, and it fulfills admirably its purpose of providing interesting and informative essays on many social, political, and economic problems of this area.

E. C. HELMREICH

Bowdoin College

GADOUREK, I. *The Political Control of Czechoslovakia: A Study in Social Control of a Soviet Satellite State*. (Library of the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in exile, No. 1.) Pp. xvii, 285. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese N.V., 1953. \$3.25.

The importance of any scholarly book on today's Czechoslovakia is given by two facts: (1) the country is part of the Communist empire in Central Europe, and (2) because of the depth of its democratic tradition, it is probably Communism's weakest link.

It is gratifying to note that several young Czech scholars in exile, grouped around the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute established in Holland, are undertaking a systematic study of the Czechoslovak problem. Mr. Gadourek's work is the first of a series which the institute intends to publish in English.

The book under review is a scholarly sociological study which has earned its author a Ph.D. degree at Leiden University. Its first part is a detailed and well-organized description of the Communist tyranny in Czechoslovakia. In the second part the situation created by the oppressive regime and the reaction against it, present and potential, is analyzed. Both the description and the analysis are clad in technical sociological terms, a fact which will be appreciated by the experts in that field but which will somewhat puzzle the average reader. As a sociologist, Mr. Gadourek has focused his attention on the oppressors rather than on the oppressed so that the tremendous drama of the people as a whole remains on the margin. Moreover, his approach, being too theoretical and abstract, proves a handicap in his evaluation of Czech resistance. For that purpose a broader knowledge of the history and psychology of the Czech people should have been brought forth. As their history shows, the Czechs are one of the most resistant and vital people in Europe, stubbornly and intelligently opposed to any foreign ideology and domination.

The real political situation in the Communist Czechoslovakia is illustrated by the following quotation from an underground report of May 1952: "Then a question may be raised: on whom, on which social strata, on which people is this regime actually based? Any dictatorship is necessarily bound up with a group of people who profit from it and who support and defend it. Fascism is said to have been supported by capitalists; who are the supporters of communism? The working-class perhaps? Definitely not. Neither the farmers or the intellectuals. Communists form a certain privileged class but the position of the individual members is unstable and uncertain. This is the case even with the high officials of the Party, the secretaries of the County Committees, or the members of the Central Committee, as is generally known" (p. 211).

Much credit must be given to the author for the clear and systematic picture of the Communist Party and Government in Czechoslovakia, based on what must have been a great amount of painstaking re-

search. The Party-State combination is described in particularly interesting manner in the three spheres of the legislative, judicial, and executive power, the distinction among which is necessarily fictitious in a totalitarian system. Perhaps the Ministry of States Security with its multiple police organizations, including the 150,000-man-strong National Security Guard (SNS), equipped with tanks and artillery, which is in direct contact with the Politburo in Moscow through a special secret code, represents with the army the two main elements in the true balance of power of a Soviet Communist State. The facts which have been collected and analyzed by the author make this book a most valuable addition for those who seek a broader knowledge of the Communist satellite world.

VLASTIMIL KYBAL

New York City

WANKLYN, HARRIET. *Czechoslovakia*. Pp. xviii, 446. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. \$6.25.

After a detailed survey of the regional geography of Czechoslovakia, the author devotes 28 pages to the climate of Western Czechoslovakia, and 43 pages to vegetation, soils, forests, and forest industries of the same regions; then, for some unaccountable reason, outlines of the histories of Western Czechoslovakia and Slovakia follow (pp. 136-214); next come the chapters on farming, industry, trade, and communication (pp. 215-377); the chapters on population and settlement (pp. 378-406) and Sub-Carpathian Russia (pp. 407-430) conclude this strange study.

Although the all-embracing title would seem to indicate that this might be an all-embracing survey of Czechoslovakia, actually the coverage is limited mostly to a detailed survey of the physical geography of the pre-Communist Czechoslovakia and Carpathian Russia. In this respect Wanklyn has produced an excellent reference book, compiled "from other people's written work" (p. v), mainly from the writings of de Martonne, Ancel, Defontaine, Tibal, Martel, Mousset, Kral, Pohl, Moschales, Maschatschek, and Blau, and from the Czechoslovak studies in the *National*

Atlas and the *Czechoslovak Encyclopaedia*. But hardly any attempt has been made to relate the facts of physical geography to social and anthropological geography. Only here and there does the author touch on the geopolitical aspects of that phase of Czechoslovakia. The chapters on history are weakest. Wanklyn spends a lot of time reciting the names of kings and dynasties, and the overwhelming impression is that there is hardly any meaning to the history of Western Czechoslovakia and Slovakia.

Probably the basic trouble with the author, an Englishwoman, is that she rehashed "other people's written work," without gaining anything at all from taking "cross-country journeys for two months in 1947 by train and bus." Furthermore, in the true typical English fashion, she stresses overwhelmingly only the English references, together with the authors noted above, without being aware that in recent years excellent studies have also appeared in the United States—specifically R. J. Kerner's *Czechoslovakia* (University of California Press, 1940) and S. H. Thomson's *Czechoslovakia in European History* (Princeton University Press, 1943, recently revised). The maps and drawings are mostly excellent and obviously reprinted from expert sources. But many of the photographs are really poor, and the author should have asked the Czechoslovak information services for help. This should also have been done in regard to the extensive use (and sometimes misuse) of the diacritical signs so freely used in the numberless Czech names here.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

University of Bridgeport

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

WILEY, W. L. *The Gentleman of Renaissance France*. Pp. xii, 303. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. \$5.00.

No one with a shred of imagination who has wandered through the châteaux along the Loire or elsewhere in provincial France remains unshaken in his devotion to the

idea of progress. Never before or since have men fashioned for themselves residences of such charm and grace. As the cathedrals of earlier centuries bear witness to an age of religious aspiration, as the crushing mass of Versailles bears witness to the veneration which a later age was to accord to political power, so the châteaux of sixteenth century France stand as reminders of an age in which men attached supreme importance to the pleasures of living in spacious elegance.

It is to the men and women who made their homes in these châteaux that Professor Wiley direct his good-humored and perceptive attention in this admirable study of the gentleman of Renaissance France, taking the Renaissance as meaning simply the sixteenth century. After a glance at the legal and social position of the gentleman and the sources of the conception of gentlemanliness, he proceeds to describe the manners, dress, conversation, and diversions of the gentleman, his education, his sense of honor, and his attitude towards women.

The France here described is a land which knows peace at home and growing opulence, a land in which the king is master but not a despot, a land in which men of noble birth hold a secure pre-eminence. Not yet has Versailles become the shrine of a political absolutism which will reduce the gentleman to the role of a mere domestic servant of the king. Not yet have the provinces been reduced to a hinterland of Paris, nor has the bourgeoisie begun to contest the privileges of aristocratic birth. For a moment, France seems to be attaining an equilibrium between monarchical and aristocratic interests, between the landed estate and the bourgeoisie, between the metropolis and the provinces, such as was to develop in England during the next two centuries.

The reader cannot close this admirable study without feeling a twinge of regret that France did not continue in the evolution which the sixteenth century seemed to presage, without wondering what France might have become had the provinces held their own against Paris and Versailles, had the gentleman withstood the king and the bourgeois. And the reader cannot help but

wish the author would provide a sequel to this study dealing with the Bourbon age, to help explain how the aristocracy passed so soon from its golden age, here described, into the decadence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

PAUL FARMER

University of Wisconsin

CASE, LYNN M. *French Opinion on War and Diplomacy During the Second Empire*. Pp. xxii, 339. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954. \$6.00.

A generation ago, public opinion studies enjoyed a brief spell of popularity among historians and then went into almost total eclipse. Professor Case has now returned to this somewhat neglected field. Unlike most of the earlier studies, his work is not based on newspaper sources, but rests for the most part on official reports furnished to Napoleon's government by bureaucrats scattered throughout the country. This vast bulk of archival material offers the historian a reasonably accurate insight into the public temper; for it was part of the job of these officials to keep a finger on the public pulse. Of course the materials are not foolproof. Then as now, there were officials who were stupid or bigoted, or who reported what they thought Paris would like to hear. On the whole, however, Napoleon wanted facts rather than flattery, and most of the *procureurs* were astute enough to recognize this preference.

Professor Case has sought to analyze the shifting currents of French opinion during the major foreign policy crises of Napoleon's reign. He has done the job in the same competent manner and judicious spirit which gave weight and authority to his earlier books on the Second Empire. The volume is the product of many years of research and reflection; its conclusions are buttressed by a thorough study of all the relevant sources. The nature of the subject matter pretty well precludes any startling new interpretations. Perhaps the most intriguing bit of revisionism is Dr. Case's contention that French opinion in July 1870 was at least potentially pro-war, and that the government's decision to fight was taken in part because it expected an

explosion of pro-war sentiment. The author argues his case well, though he shows also that Napoleon had consciously flouted public sentiment when he entered earlier wars.

The exact impact of public opinion on Napoleon's foreign policy decisions is difficult to judge. Professor Case suggests that this influence was too great for the good of the nation or the regime. He feels that in matters of foreign policy both then and now, the men at the top are usually more competent and far-sighted than the masses; that in such matters, "Jacques and his fellow compatriots . . . can only help in making blunders." Whether or not this rather pessimistic view is justified, Mr. Case's book deserves to be praised—and, better still, to be read. It is a valuable addition to the scholarly literature on the Second Empire.

GORDON WRIGHT

University of Oregon

MUNDY, JOHN HINE. *Liberty and Political Power in Toulouse, 1050-1230*. Pp. xiii, 402. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. \$6.50.

This is the story of a mediaeval town in the period of its youth and vigor. While Mr. Mundy's interest centers in the political institutions of Toulouse, he devotes sufficient attention to its economic and social structure to make the political history intelligible. He also sets Toulouse in its wider background in relation to the county of Toulouse and the country-side about the town. In short the reader feels that he understands the place of Toulouse in mediaeval society as well as the society of Toulouse itself.

Mr. Mundy has achieved the unusual feat of making a contribution to historical literature at two different levels. The text is well-written in a lively style and contains the minimum of unexplained technical terms. A general reader who wants to know what a French mediaeval town which developed in the Mediterranean tradition was like can read this book with both pleasure and profit. It will be a boon to the teacher of courses in mediaeval history. We have good works in English on northern towns, but nothing on

southern towns outside Italy. At the same time the notes and appendices make this a valuable study for the specialist. In addition to extensive and detailed notes showing the sources for the statements made in the text Mr. Mundy supplies lists of officials and the full text of many important documents. He has produced a book that will stand for a long time as the standard monograph on Toulouse.

It is impossible in the space at my disposal to give more than a very meagre outline of the development of Toulouse as told by Mr. Mundy. First came the growth of the town with the aid of the count and the lay and ecclesiastical lords who lived in it. The Gregorian reforms brought a decrease in the secular authority of the ecclesiastical lords. Then bit by bit the lay aristocracy reduced the power of the count. By the end of the twelfth century the patrician consuls were masters of Toulouse. Early in the thirteenth century for reasons not clear to me and I suspect not clear to Mr. Mundy the consular government became more democratic or at least less patrician. During this same period it tightened its hold on the town government at the expense of the remnants of the count's authority and the privileges of the private jurisdictions within the walls. Mr. Mundy ends his account before the town felt the heavy hand of Alphonse of Poitou who brought a restoration of the count's authority.

This is a book that everyone interested in the Middle Ages should read. The more time and care he or she can give to its perusal, the greater will be the reward, but a rapid reading of the text alone is eminently worth while.

SIDNEY PAINTER

Johns Hopkins University

LOWIE, ROBERT H. *Toward Understanding Germany*. Pp. ix, 396. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. \$6.00.

The Germans are neither a racial nor a political but a linguistic unit which, consequently, includes the Austrians and the Swiss. To show the heterogeneous nature of this unit established in the Introduction, Professor Lowie discusses German

particularism and social stratification. A major objective of his chapters on German family types is the refutation of the stereotyped tyrannical German father. In the last part of his book, central problems of contemporary Germany are tackled: anti-Semitism, Nazism, and democracy.

The great merit of this work lies in its exhibition of numerous facts which often are illuminating and corrective. Its crucial weakness is its failure to connect these facts in a way which would contribute much more significantly toward understanding Germany. In the author's passionate effort to be fair, his subject matter tends to disappear: the Swiss family is as patriarchal as the German, or more so (p. 252); "anti-Semitism cannot be regarded as a specifically German phenomenon" (p. 324). When he discusses German behavior toward Jews during the Nazi period, episodes involving help and risk strike one less as instances of human greatness and dignity than as entries in a ledger. The effect is "on the one hand, on the other," which may convey "objectivity" but keeps the subject matter at best in the museum. As elsewhere, the tabu on value judgments excludes from analysis what can only be perceived by means of them—notably political and moral phenomena. Judgment intrudes anyway either directly or in the form of questionable parallels (pp. 67, 353), or in the obscure assertion that in World War II "naturally towns without military interest escaped" destruction (p. 166), or, in its particular context, in a reference to the "countrymen of Kant and Goethe . . . a highly cultured nation" (p. 347).

At the end of the book, the author expresses the expectation that comparative studies of other Western European cultures will provide us with "a sounder factual basis for dividing . . . [their common] area into cultural subdivisions than the inexpensive one of national or even linguistic boundaries." His book would have contributed much more toward this aim and gone far beyond being a mine of information if he had transcended classificatory ethnology toward analysis in terms of social relations, culture patterns, and

configurations, even national character, but above all, politics and morals.

KURT H. WOLFF

Ohio State University

HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. *Experiment in Education: What We Can Learn from Teaching Germany*. Pp. xvi, 303. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954. \$5.00.

Developments of such magnitude have taken place in the world during recent years that it is difficult to pause to examine experiences, even when they are as significant as that of the United States and its Allies in the occupation of Germany. Professor Hocking performs a useful service when he reminds us that there is much to be gained from a consideration of what has gone on in Germany since 1945, though he seems, to this reviewer, to assume too much when he maintains that the time has arrived when a definitive evaluation of American occupation policies and programs can be made—at least another decade will be required before it will be possible to determine with any degree of certainty the full impact.

While the announced purpose of Professor Hocking's book is impressive, serious students are likely to be disappointed with his finished product. The inclusion of a considerable amount of reminiscing drawn from many years of teaching and travel in the United States, the Far East, and Europe makes for a certain interest, but it also confuses the picture. The early section of the book, which deals with the American record in Germany, is based on a brief visit to Germany in 1948 and on a formal directives, and reports. A casual reader would perhaps find such a treatment useful, but a serious student discerns many gaps, inaccuracies, and unsupported generalizations. It is difficult to conclude that the analysis which Professor Hocking offers constitutes an adequate base for evaluating the justification of American efforts to assist the Germans in reconstructing their system of education. One rather gains the impression that the author has not even attempted to examine the involved record carefully, diffi-

cult as that might be on the basis of a brief visit and consultation of the directives, but has started out with the thesis that military defeat imposed upon the Germans was all that could be justified in the way of an Allied program in the education field.

The second section of the book purports to evaluate American education in terms of the occupation experience in Germany. Actually, it is difficult to discover much evidence of a serious and dispassionate effort to perform such a task. The author uses what he maintains to be the American record in Germany to support his long-held ideas that the main basis of university education should be historical surveys, philosophy, mathematical physics, economics, and law. The social sciences are discarded because of their "ambiguity." He concludes, on the curious evidence of experiences of a friend and presumably his own as a student in Germany in 1902, that German universities actually did a better job of giving an insight into social, political, and economic forces in human society through outstanding professors in philosophy, history, and other fields than American universities can claim to do.

HAROLD ZINK

Ohio State University

LANGE, M. G. *Totalitäre Erziehung: Das Erziehungssystem der Sowjetzone Deutschlands*. Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft, Vol. 3. Pp. xxviii, 432. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1954. DM 21.80.

This is a scholarly study of totalitarian education in the Soviet Zone of Germany, written by a schoolman who taught under the East German Republic and edited the official educational periodical before emigrating to West Germany. The author is an authority in the social philosophies of contemporary education, a master of the German and Russian pedagogical literature, and a writer able to present an esoteric subject to the Western world. A cynic might, however, add that the first draft of this book was actually written behind the Iron Curtain and therefore makes out the best possible case for education under an aggressive and terroristic dictatorship. The

Institute for Political Science, Berlin, is to be commended for publishing this volume as the third of its series of studies.

The development of the rule of the Communist dictatorship over the East German school system identified education as the expression of the will and goal of the state and the fountainhead of patriotism for youth. From the Soviet Union were imported the thought shibboleths, the dialectic of authority and freedom, Marxist semantics, in fact, the great directives for "a pseudo-rational educational system" and "an anti-fascist democratic order." The majority of the school bureaucracy had to be oriented toward Communism. Only a few teachers among those considered Marxists had really studied Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and Soviet pedagogy as a party science. An elaborate system had to be worked out in order to catch teachers who were concealed enemies of Stalinism. Finally, an effective public school organization was taken over by a handful of Moscow-trained educators with the support of the dictatorship.

In his survey of the Russian science of education, the author points out that the Anglo-American Dalton plan was adopted with modifications in 1924, the project method in 1930, and other important contributions of "reform pedagogy" before the great renunciation of 1936. The survey of "totalitarian psychology" is especially timely now that the dictatorship suddenly demands increased emphasis on research into creativity. History has, however, consistently covered the important developments in the Western world since the seventeenth century with emphasis on the English revolutions, the American War of Independence, the French Revolution, and the European revolutions of 1848.

Since the Communist state does not tolerate any independent influence of science, religion, art, or pressure groups, there emerged a new type of a pseudo-rational educational system. To be sure, it was tinged with medievalism and Russian imperialism, especially in "the rules for students," "the seven principles" of pedagogy, and the encyclopedic "student note book" which every scholar at regular intervals must show to his parents. Professor Lange

states that the acute danger to the free world is the determination of the totalitarian state to go beyond the complete submission of youth to a rigorous training of the younger generation as devoted fighters for the dictatorship.

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ
Stanford University

SWEET-ESCOTT, BICKHAM. *Greece: A Political and Economic Survey, 1939-1953*. Pp. viii, 207. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954. \$4.00.

This book is an authoritative description of economic and political affairs in Greece from the beginnings of World War II in 1939, through the years of Communist-inspired guerrilla warfare after the war, and into the period of recovery to 1953. It is studded with facts gleaned from most of the none-too-plentiful and secondary materials available in English. The author himself spent a period of time in Greece and was in close contact with the resistance movement during German occupation as a member of the British Force 133 Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

The intricate complexities of the resistance movement are traced as they are reflected in postwar politics and international affairs. The division of the resistance forces into the Nationalist and Communist elements after the Germans had gone, and their war with one another, is the modern Greek tragedy in which many patriotic citizens were unwittingly trapped and which even now divides the nation underneath. But Greece is still a free and sovereign country thanks to British and American economic and military aid without which it would have surely been joined to her Russian satellite neighbors to the north. The West, because it has Greece and Turkey on its side, still can contain the Cominform in the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East.

Twenty-five hundred years ago, Herodotus said: "Poverty is the inheritance of Hellas from of old." How much more true this is in modern times after four years of German occupation and four more of revolution the author sets down in bristling detail but with clarity. How

utter the devastation was cannot be learned in a book, one must see in the flesh the ruins of countless villages, the absolute poverty of the masses in Greece, and the total absence of facilities for living that Western people regard as basic. But things are improving in Greece, if but slowly and haltingly, impeded as improvement is by the whirling gyrations of Greek politics.

If there is any weakness in this fine account of the problems of modern Greece it is in the absence of an evaluation of the structure and operation of the Greek government distinct from its politics. It is very important to know that the Greek state is highly centralized, so much so that it is top-heavy, and that local government has been strangled almost to death since the days of the first Venizelos. They say in Greece: Athens is Athens, and Greece is Athens, and today this is almost entirely true, and thereby hangs a tale. The nation would be much stronger if the national government would decentralize some of its powers to its local units. But this, too, may come in time, and here, too, there has been improvement.

Altogether, Mr. Sweet-Escott has written a very good book and has made a substantial contribution to the knowledge of Greece today that is available to us in the West.

HAROLD F. ALDERFER
The Pennsylvania State University

LUKACS, JOHN A. *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe*. Pp. xii, 878. New York: American Book Company [c. 1953]. \$7.50.

After World War I the area extending from Finland to Greece and comprising the Baltic region, eastern Central Europe, and the Balkans, was divided into thirteen small nation states, enjoying for a brief time the illusion of independence. Too weak and distracted to shape their own destinies they became pawns and prizes in the power politics of their larger and more powerful neighbors. The political relations between the states of this area and the Great Powers of Europe is the theme of this book. From 1917 to 1934 they enjoyed the illusion of independence; a diplomatic revolution occurred between

1934 and 1938 with the revival of German power and the withdrawal of France and Britain from the area; from 1938 to 1941, a contest ensued between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia for mastery of the region, ending in the "War of Wars"; the wartime domination of this region by Hitler ended in 1944 as the "Russian Era" began; the imposition by Russia of satellite status upon the area, excluding Finland and Greece, is the theme of the "Epilogue" covering the years 1946-1952.

Post-mortems are painful and the one presented in this study is especially so because of its twin themes—the abandonment of Eastern Europe to Hitler by France and Britain between 1934 and 1938, and the abandonment of the same region and peoples to the Soviets by Britain and the United States between 1943 and 1946. The seeds of catastrophe were sown in the first period, and the harvest reaped in the second.

A commendable book in many respects, Lukacs' work possesses, in the reviewer's opinion, certain weaknesses: the approach is almost completely that of diplomatic narrative; the presentation of American policy makers as naïve and purblind, or worse, is overdone; by excluding all war issues and aims excepting those concerned with Eastern Europe, a highly distorted view of British and American policies is produced; and exceedingly complicated narrative materials are presented in an overly complicated pattern of organization. In the strength column one should note: the exploitation of a great quantity of relevant documentary and memoir material; the presentation of little-known domestic political developments in these thirteen states during their bondage to the Axis and their "liberation" by the Soviets; the author's familiarity with the politics and personalities of Eastern Europe; and the generous bibliographical notes and the enlightening commentary upon the sources. Finally, the author has produced an interesting and valuable work. If somewhat one-sided, it assuredly presents a challenging thesis.

ORON J. HALE

University of Virginia

NELSON, GEORGE R. (Ed.), assisted by AUNE MÄKINEN-OLLINEN, SVERRIR THORB-JÖRNSSON, KAARE SALVESEN, and GÖRAN TEGNER. *Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe*. Pp. xiii, 540. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ejnar Munksgaard. (Sponsored by the Ministries of Social Affairs of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden), 1953. \$6.50.

Sponsorship of this volume by the Scandinavian Ministries of Social Affairs effects a circumspection not entirely conducive to impartial examination of the problems of welfare or freedom. Within this limitation, however, the volume's authors and editors have accomplished a remarkable weaving of infinite detail into a comprehensible whole. Readers familiar with *Social Sweden* will recognize the model and appreciate added data on the other countries.

Criticism of the volume is difficult both because of its limitation and the extensive, almost encyclopediac, information it contains. Any government agency would be incapable of impartiality in the long debate over establishment of the Scandinavian welfare system, but on "social patterns" no one could expect a fuller descriptive treatment, especially from the legislative and political side. The book's language is often technical and shows marks of translation in its idiom and phrasing. But why carp at these details when the book fills a gap made obvious by the recent new edition of *Social Sweden*?

The contents of this handsome volume are of interest to a variety of persons, whether inspired or not by Marquis Childs. For the labor economist there are sections on labor relations, collective bargaining, the labor courts, and problems of full employment; for the sociologist chapters or parts on the family, treatment and care of children, health and rehabilitation, and housing. The economist will be rewarded by some quite new details of recent legislation on social security, and the political scientist and historian will appreciate the entire volume for its depiction of phases of contemporary Scandinavian life.

Emphasis on welfare and freedom focuses attention on the tradition of "welfarism" in Scandinavia which began at the century's turn and which has continuously been extended. Recent legislation concerning welfare, especially in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, has been based on foundation established long ago by Conservative and Liberal parties. "Creeping socialism" began with them and Socialists twenty or thirty years later broadened and improved on these basic principles. The missing debate on these principles dismays the political scientist and the historian who desire closer examination of fertile periods of inception of programs, such as the extensive system of Scandinavia, which has been noticed and praised the world over.

An excellent index and brief bibliography for non-Scandinavians accompany the volume; the format is luxurious, the pictures beautifully illustrate the text, and the printing is superb. The five Scandinavian countries are justifiably proud of their co-operative effort, and the editors deserve credit for their difficult but rewarding task.

RAYMOND E. LINDGREN
Occidental College

STURMTHAL, ADOLF. *Unity and Diversity in European Labor: An Introduction to Contemporary Labor Movements*. Pp. 237. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953. \$3.75.

As the title indicates, the author, who has been associated for many years with European movements, sees in the European trade unions a rich diversity of organization, ideology, and problems. Yet, if compared with trade unionism in the United States, European labor shows a different spirit which may make it appear to the American observer as more unified than it is. These common features are partly due, as Sturmthal demonstrates, to the feudalism of the past which fixed the status of everybody within a hierarchy as a member of a well defined class, in contrast to the American spirit of getting ahead. Opposition to the social degradation of the worker in feudalism, and the wish to reverse the social order were

strong motivating forces at the origin of the European labor movement. Thus feudalism determined the class consciousness of the European worker and enlightened absolutism convinced him that political power was the key instrument of social transformation. Therefore, the close alliance of all European trade union movements, with the exception of the French, with political parties developed. Political unionism, says the author, is the fate of European labor. Another uniform feature, the influence of the intellectual on the European trade unions, is likewise ascribed to the legacy of feudalism and may be expected to diminish with the progress of democracy.

In opposition to Selig Perlman, who contributes the ideological and political elements in the European labor movement to the influence of intellectuals—an opinion likewise held by Lenin—the author describes how German workers regarded the revisionist movement as a revolt of moderate intellectuals against radical workers, an attempt to lead the Socialists into "weak compromises" with capitalism.

However, far more striking than such uniform features is the diversity of the European trade union movements. A short sketch of the historical background, the multifariousness of traditions, of economic, political and social conditions, shows the roots of this variety and explains the affiliation of trade unions to political movements. Relationship to socialism, syndicalism, and Communism is discussed. Working class internationalism, both political and within trade unionism, is dealt with from its beginning to the present, and the role of American labor in the postwar international movements explained. This is followed by a presentation of present day unionism and a discussion of two of its burning problems, collective bargaining in a full employment society and the union function in nationalized industries.

In a simple, lucid way some developments are brilliantly presented, especially the Neo-Marxism of German labor and the rejection of Communism by Continental Social Democracy whose adherents claim true descent from Marx.

This book, which is the outcome of

classes the authors gave for members of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, is an excellent contribution to workers' education. It is written for a reader who wants to familiarize himself with the essentials of a situation rather than with its details. It gives a vivid account of the atmosphere in which European labor functions.

FRIEDA WUNDERLICH
New School for Social Research

OTHER COUNTRIES

SHAH, K. T. *The Promise That Is New China*. Pp. viii, 342. Bombay: Vora & Co., 1953. \$2.00.

Since the publication of this book, the author, Professor K. T. Shah, well known in India for his comprehensive if controversial scholarship, has died. The painstaking thoroughness which distinguished his earlier writings is evident in this book which is the outcome of a tour in China undertaken on the occasion of the May Day celebrations of 1952 at Peking. The writer was one of a group of Indian Trade Union delegates invited to participate in these celebrations by the All-China Federation of Labor. As such, he was an official guest, subject to the limitations of an official and guided tour.

Nevertheless, Professor Shah, with the eye of a trained observer and with his considerable economic background, saw perhaps more deeply into the Chinese scene than most of his colleagues. The book is in the form of a diary and would have been the better for more careful editing. It is diffuse and in parts unduly discursive. It also suffers from being overloaded with a minutiae of trivial detail. Inevitably also it suffers from the defects of a day to day account which in the best of circumstances must seem superficial.

There is little attempt made to assess and analyze the achievements, such as they are, or the totalitarian pattern of the Communist dictatorship. Professor Shah is content to recite the facts as he saw them and as he was told them by his Chinese guides through the familiar red litany

of "facts and figures." To these Professor Shah adds his own not inconsiderable academic knowledge. The picture which emerges appears factual but in the Communist context need not necessarily be so.

Had Professor Shah lived longer, it is possible that he might have found time to collate his facts and figures and present the Chinese scene not through the shifting kaleidoscope of a daily diary but from the objective standpoint of a spectator and analyst.

FRANK MORAES

Bombay, India

BEN GURION, DAVID. *The Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*. Edited and translated from the Hebrew under the supervision of Mordekhai Nurock. Pp. xv, 539. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. \$10.00.

This is a remarkable volume, but a strange volume. The language is deeply moving and replete with the noblest quotations from the Hebrew prophets, and from Ben Gurion himself! But to the reviewer, filled with admiration for the spiritual claims of Judaism, but lacking in appreciation for the inaccuracies and embroiling attitudes of current Zionism, this is a strange volume.

Perhaps it is inevitable that Ben Gurion, who for almost half a century has lived and worked for the consummation of the political state of Israel, should see only moral purpose and peace through the establishment of this sovereign state. But these purposes appear to be monopolized by Israel and Jewry. "We fall short of other nations, being few, and less imperial, but in intellectual gifts we admit none our better." "Moral strength has made us what we are to-day." "Love thy neighbor as thyself" this is the one and only key to the legislation and laws of Israel."

Given such superiority for Israel, it follows that others must be quite different. As for the British, although there are passages that admit that "British officials are not all our enemies," nevertheless the undercurrent of hatred against them constantly appears. As for the Arabs, Ben Gurion's scorn is great. "The sloth of our

Arab periphery will be a drag upon our forward-looking system." The destiny of Israel is rebirth, but apparently there is no such chance for the renaissance that has already appeared among the Arabs!

We are told of Israel's desire for peace with her Arab neighbors, but the acts of recent years have been odd if that is the goal. "Have we not," declares Ben Gurion, "held out our hands in peace to all who dwell with us and on our borders, since our third homecoming? We will give all possible help to the peace envoy of the United Nations, but not for peace at any price." And as for Count Bernadotte, that great peace envoy, there is only a single mention of him in all the 539 pages. Indeed, there is no mention in the entire book of the murder of the impartial United Nations envoy, Count Bernadotte, by Jewish terrorists in Jerusalem.

For the non-Jewish layman one of the most interesting chapters is "Mission and Dedication," an historical outline of the cultural and religious contacts of the Jewish people. "We are now at odds not only with our Arab neighbors," said Ben Gurion, "but to a certain extent with the greater part of the world organized in the United Nations. The issue is Jerusalem." That "we must be prepared for a protracted spell of peacelessness" has a ring of reality.

To Ben Gurion and his fellow Zionists, this volume sets the charge to struggle and ultimate victory, regardless of what happens to the rest of the world. To the non-Zionist, whether Christian, Jew, or Moslem, it raises doubts because of its many inconsistencies and contradictions. This is an impressive but strange volume!

EDGAR J. FISHER

Amherst, Virginia

GAMBLE, SIDNEY D. *Ting Hsien: A North China Rural Community*. Pp. xxv, 472. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. \$6.50.

Mr. Gamble, whose pioneering research in Peking is well known to students of Chinese sociology and economics, directed the studies of rural life carried out in Ting Hsien between 1926 and 1933. The surveys and projects completed there in co-operation with the Mass Education

Movement make of that "model" county in Hôpei probably the most thoroughly studied area of its size in China. The major results were published in Chinese in the mid-thirties, when they had a salutary effect on the development of the social sciences and of rural reconstruction in China. Mr. Gamble has now performed a valuable service by making available in one English volume the full results of the research program he so ably conceived, including data heretofore unpublished in any language.

The findings concern varied facets of demography, agricultural economics, domestic budgets, public finance, village industry, governmental structure, family, religion, and education. Among the more significant data presented are those relating to family and marriage and their economic correlates. It should be noted that good use is made of historical material. The placement of Ting Hsien, 1926-33, in the stream of Chinese history and the attention paid to aspects of culture change lend a welcome dynamic quality to the volume. The most obvious deficiencies of the research program and of the book lie in the unconcern with cultural depth and integration. The reader is presented with intriguing statistics, intelligently discussed, but they do not add up to the way of life of the Ting Hsien inhabitants. The series of projects unfortunately did not include any intensive anthropological community studies to bring the functioning culture into focus. As it is, many questions of interest were apparently not asked of the data. The fascinating texts and summaries of folk songs, plays and proverbs, for instance, have not been analyzed for the light they can obviously throw on cultural norms.

It is ungracious, however, to raise objections which are largely irrelevant to the original objectives of the research. The field workers wanted a statistically valid picture of the major social and economic characteristics of the families in the hsien, in order more effectively to develop and carry out a program of rural reconstruction. This practical aim was largely achieved by the survey techniques employed, and in the process, extensive data

were gathered that are of great value to Western students of China today. The wealth of material in this book, presented precisely and dispassionately, is somewhat overpowering for the general reader; it is made more accessible to the specialist by an introductory summary pointing up the more significant findings in various fields, by well presented tables, and by an adequate index.

G. WILLIAM SKINNER

Cornell University

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

The objectionable features of the review, by Samuel Koenig, of Alfred M. Lilienthal's book, *What Price Israel*, in your March issue, should perhaps most properly be pointed out to you by the author. This organization, however, has an interest in what Dr. Koenig calls "an objective evaluation" of the issues raised by the establishment of the State of Israel. It seems to us that in his review Dr. Koenig himself displays an attitude which is anything but objective.

Dr. Koenig compares the relationship of American Jews to Israel with that of American Czechs, Poles, and Lithuanians "toward their countries of origin" after World War I. In thus comparing Jews, many of whom regard themselves solely as a religious community, with Czechs, Poles, and Lithuanians, who are nationality groups, he reveals his acceptance of a basic Zionist thesis. Objectivity would at least have required noting that not all Jews consider themselves members of a "Jewish" nation, that probably the majority of them consider themselves nationals exclusively of the countries where they live.

As for Israel being the "country of origin" of American Jews, Dr. Koenig would have a difficult time proving this. Six years ago the State did not exist. If he means the ancient state of Biblical times, Christians and Moslems are equally entitled to think of it as their "country of origin."

Later, Dr. Koenig speaks of "the Jews, like other ethnic groups in America." Here again, Dr. Koenig accepts the Zionist view of Jews and ignores the large number of American Jews who regard themselves as Jews only by religion.

Dr. Koenig professes skepticism concerning the charge that American Zionists may be more concerned with Israeli than with American national interests. Yet it has been made clear that American national interests now call for "impartiality" in relation to the Middle East. Two recent speeches by Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade, chief of the section on Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, have spelled out in detail the vital need for such a policy. The second of these speeches has been described as reflecting Administration views—an Administration elected to office by an overwhelming majority of the American people. Yet for Zionists to support such a policy would force them to stop being Zionists who are, by definition, committed to the upbuilding of but one of the states of the Middle East.

Mr. Lilienthal's book may not be the "objective evaluation of an historical event and its implications for America and American Jews" which Dr. Koenig would have preferred. But Dr. Koenig's review can itself certainly not be characterized as an objective evaluation of that book.

VICTOR RAPHAELS

Assistant Executive Director

The American Council for Judaism

Dear Sir:

Since the remarks regarding my review of Lilienthal's book, for reasons not quite clear, do not come from the author but from an officer of the American Council for Judaism, I shall address my reply to the latter and the organization he represents.

In comparing American Jews with American Czechs, Poles, and Lithuanians, I am not subscribing to "a basic Zionist thesis" but am stating a view widely accepted by sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists, namely: that the Jews are best classified as an *ethnic, cultural, or nationality* group. As such they are quite comparable to those groups. Mr. Raphaels

and members of the Council could easily ascertain this by referring to almost any modern work on ethnic or minority groups, particularly one published in the United States. Mr. Raphals and other members of the Council have, of course, a right to hold the view that Jews are merely a religious group, but they should be aware of the fact that this is a *basic Council thesis* and not a scientifically arrived at or objective view.

Nowhere in my review are the Jews referred to as a *nation*. Neither is it anywhere stated that Israel is their *country of origin*. What is implied is an interest on the part of Jews in this country and elsewhere in Palestine, now Israel, which is comparable to that shared by the above-mentioned and other American ethnic groups regarding the countries of their origin.

As to what serves the best interests of America in the Middle East (or elsewhere) there is a division of opinion, which, in a democracy, is not only permissible but desirable. In taking the view that America's interests are best served by a policy favorable to Israel which, demonstrably, is the only democratic state in the Middle East, an American does not necessarily put the interests of another country above those of his own. On the other hand, in taking the opposite view, or in advocating a pro-Arab policy, one does not automatically become a loyal or patriotic American as is implied throughout Lilienthal's book.

SAMUEL KOENIG

Brooklyn College

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Edited by

PHILIP E. JACOB, Ph.D.

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

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FOREWORD

This volume of THE ANNALS is concerned with the future direction of United Nations development and in particular with the basic issues which must be confronted as the time approaches for a comprehensive reappraisal of the Charter.

Although the question of subjecting the Charter of the United Nations to formal review will not be decided until the General Assembly holds its tenth session in the autumn of 1955, intensive study and discussion are already under way by the major governments concerned, by the Secretariat, and by private organizations and scholars. Vigorous debate in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during the fall of 1953 preceded adoption of a resolution instructing the Secretary-General to compile the full documentation of the San Francisco Conference and to prepare a "repertory" of the practices of United Nations organs. A special subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has been examining the problems connected with a review of the Charter and assessing the attitudes of the American public toward possible revisions. In France, a special commission has been appointed to conduct a similar study. Active policy preparation is also under way, of course, in the executive departments of most of the Member States. Among private efforts, the Brookings Institution is undertaking a most thorough study of the Charter's evolution and implementation. The boldest proposal for actual revision of the Charter is a detailed redraft advanced by Mr. Grenville Clark and Professor Louis Sohn which would transform the United Nations into a supranational authority.

As compared with these essentially technical studies, the present volume focuses attention on some of the broad problems of policy which lie behind the review of specific Charter provisions and shows the principal lines of approach being taken towards them by responsible statesmen and scholars. What is the proper scope of United Nations functions? By what yardsticks does—or should—the United Nations determine its actions? How inclusive should the United Nations community become and what are the most appropriate procedures for reaching decisions within such an organization? How can it be adapted to implement the control of arms under conditions of atomic technology? What are the necessary conditions of an effective Secretariat? The articles and comments which follow, as they come to grips with these questions, evaluate the probable effects of Charter revision upon the future potentialities of the United Nations in its manifold tasks.

In the first part, "Re-evaluating the Scope of United Nations Functions," the question is directly faced as to the Organization's intrinsic capacity to fulfill the tasks to which it has been committed. Two of the authors urge that the present provisions of the Charter can be so sharpened as to strengthen substantially the authority of the Organization, especially as an instrument for the maintenance of security and as a guarantor of the rights of non-self-governing peoples. Two others conclude, however, that the effectiveness of the U.N. in the settlement of disputes and in the promotion of respect for human rights does not demand changes in the Charter, but depends rather on improving the climate of international relations and fully utilizing the possibilities for action within the present framework of the Organization. A third approach is skeptical as to the potential value of the

United Nations—with or without Charter revision—and suggests that there are strict practical limits to its initiative both in security and in economic matters. This third point of view was to have been challenged by one of the principal leaders in the development and expansion of the economic and social welfare functions of the United Nations. At the last minute, unforeseen circumstances prevented the preparation of the article; the omission of an adequate presentation of recommendations to extend this phase of United Nations activities is much regretted.

In the second part, "Yardsticks for United Nations Action," three contrasting views are expressed concerning the adequacy of the Charter in defining the proper criteria by which U.N. actions should be governed. The failure of the Charter to lay down clear legal standards has left most United Nations decisions to be determined by political considerations, based on national interest. But it is pointed out that in the give and take of policy formulation purely self-centered national interest has tended to yield to a broader concept of collective interest, or at least to an acceptance of compromise in the interest of longer-run national objectives. The issue then joined is whether the formal confirmation of frankly political—but international—yardsticks through Charter revision would strengthen the over-all impact of the United Nations or would instead nip a budding sense of community interest among the members of the Organization.

In the third part, "Problems of United Nations Organization," specific proposals for the solution of four key problems are evaluated by panels of commentators who have closely observed, or themselves participated in, the day-to-day operations of the Organization. An initial position paper was prepared on each problem and circulated to the panels as a springboard for their critiques. The members of the panels were deliberately chosen to bring out essential differences of view or emphasis, and the editor has been gratified by the willingness of all the participants to respond so carefully under the pressures of time and limitations of space placed upon them.

The current preparations for Charter review in the United Nations and the United States and the present policy orientations of the Soviet and American governments on this issue are set forth in the last part, "Prospects of Revision." The risks—and some of the positive potentialities—in attempting to remodel the United Nations are thereby sharpened, and the prospects for revision weighed against the anxiety to leave well enough alone.

A wide range of personal views and a broad representation of the countries belonging to the United Nations, as well as of some of the nonmembers, characterize the contributors. Authors and commentators of fifteen nationalities are included. Most of them have had direct personal experience in or with the United Nations—as representatives of their governments to U.N. organs, members of the Secretariat, consultants, or observers. Two of the authors have been President of the General Assembly. Six have headed their country's delegation to the United Nations. Three are currently their nation's Ambassador to the United States. The chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada have, despite heavy official commitments, made a most significant contribution to the volume.

PHILIP E. JACOB

How the United Nations Charter Has Developed*

By FRANCIS O. WILCOX

IN some respects the Charter of the United Nations is much like the Constitution of the United States. Both are written in form and both would be classified by political scientists as fairly "rigid" in character because they contain rather difficult amendment procedures. The Charter, like the Constitution, was designed to lay a broad base for an institution which might develop to meet changing needs. And the Charter, like the Constitution, has proven flexible enough to be adapted to many new situations without the need for formal amendment.

It is important to keep this fact in mind when the problem of Charter revision is under consideration. In the eight years of U.N. existence not a single formal amendment has even so much as reached the final voting stage in the General Assembly. Even so, many far-reaching changes have taken place within the U.N. system. Some important articles of the Charter have already fallen into disuse. Others have been applied in a way that the San Francisco drafters did not contemplate.

We are by no means examining the Charter that was drafted in San Francisco in 1945. We are examining the Charter of 1954 as it has been amplified by custom and usage, resolutions of the various U.N. organs, and treaties, like the Atlantic Pact, which are consistent with the Charter and have a heavy impact on the U.N. system. If we should proceed now to consider

amendments to the old Charter rather than the new, it would be much like a surgeon planning a major operation on the basis of a diagnosis made nine years ago.

The purpose of this paper is to examine briefly the growth of the United Nations Charter. First it reviews the provisions of the Charter relating to the formal amending process. Then it surveys the informal means by which the Charter has developed since 1945.¹

¹ On this question of Charter amendment and Charter growth see the following: L. M. Goodrich and E. Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents* (second and revised ed.; Boston, 1949), Chap. XVIII; Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations* (New York, 1950), pp. 816-24; A. Vandenbosch and W. N. Hogan, *The United Nations: Background, Organization, Functions, Activities* (New York, 1952), Chap. XX; S. Engel, "The Changing Charter of the United Nations," in *The Year Book of World Affairs* (New York, 1953), pp. 71-101; E. P. Chase, *The United Nations in Action* (New York, 1950), Chap. XVIII; E. Gross, "Revising the Charter: Is It Possible? Is It Wise?" *Foreign Affairs*, January 1954. See also U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Review of the United Nations Charter: A Collection of Documents* (Senate Document No. 87, 1954); *Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference* (Department of State Publication 2349, June 26, 1945), Chap. XVIII; N. L. Hill, *International Organization* (New York, 1952), Chap. XVII; S. Engel, "De facto Revision of the Charter of the United Nations," *Journal of Politics*, February 1952; H. Shaw, "The Constitutional Structure of the cross," *Nebraska Law Review*, November 1950; N. de M. Bentwich and A. Martin, *A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations, . . . With an Appendix on the Developments of the Charter Between May 1949 and March 1951* (London, 1951); *Yearbook of the United Nations*, New York, 1946-47, 1947-48, 1948-49, 1950, and 1951;

* This article is based on a staff study prepared by the author for the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, created pursuant to Senate Resolutions 126 and 193, Eighty-third Congress.

FORMAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CHARTER

At the San Francisco Conference two different methods of amending the Charter were finally agreed upon. The ordinary procedure is set forth in Article 108.

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 108 thus outlines two distinct steps that are to be followed in the normal amending process: (1) adoption of the proposal by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly; and (2) ratification by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including the permanent members of the Security Council. Four important points should be noted in connection with these steps.

1. Proposed amendments may be adopted by the General Assembly without any action on the part of the Security Council. In the initial stages, at least, the will of a majority of two-thirds of the members prevails. No single state or small group of states can prevent an amendment from being approved and sent on to the member nations for further consideration and possible ratification.

2. Article 108 reiterates the predominant position of the great powers in the

U.N. The requirement that amendments must be ratified by two-thirds of the U.N. members, including the five permanent members, simply means that no amendment can become effective if it meets with the disapproval of any of the permanent members. By failing to take positive action on an amendment adopted by the General Assembly any one of the five great powers can prevent its entry into force even though it may be ratified by all the other members of the United Nations.

3. Once an amendment receives the required number of ratifications, including those of the five permanent members, it becomes effective with respect to all members, even those who voted against it or failed to ratify it. This is an interesting example of the impact of the Charter upon the traditional concept of state sovereignty. For, apart from the permanent members, the entire membership of the U.N. has committed itself in advance to accept any new obligations that Charter changes might bring in their wake.

4. It should also be noted that amendments must be ratified by Member States "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." While this proviso is a bow in the direction of popular government, it is not altogether clear what practical effect it has. In a few countries the chief executive, acting on his own authority under the constitution, would have power to approve amendments. In most states, however, positive action by the legislative branch would be called for.

In one sense, even with the great power veto, the amending process set forth in the charter is a comparatively liberal one. Many multilateral treaties cannot be amended without the consent of all the signatories. The North Atlantic Treaty is a good case in point. No change, however slight, in the text of that agreement could be accom-

plished without the specific approval of each one of the fourteen treaty members.

Theoretically, at least, the Charter is much more flexible. If forty U.N. members agree, it would be possible to bring about far-reaching changes in the Charter even against the opposition of as many as twenty nations, excluding the Big Five.

Article 109

The normal amending procedure outlined in Article 108 was not enough to satisfy the demands of many delegations who were displeased with the Charter as it emerged at San Francisco. Some delegates argued that they would be unable to secure ratification of the instrument in their states unless assurance could be given that, within a reasonable period of time, there would be an opportunity to review the Charter and strengthen its provisions in the light of experience. For this reason Article 109 was developed. Basically it is the residue of an attempt to set up a second method of Charter amendment different from and easier than that found in Article 108. The attempt fell short of its mark. A reading of the text shows that while Article 109 establishes a somewhat different procedure, it is certainly no easier than that envisaged in Article 108.

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including

all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

It will be observed that Article 109 does not guarantee that a review conference will be convened on any fixed date. The only guaranty involved is that the question of calling the conference will be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly after ten years have elapsed. This in itself is not a concession of any great moment, since any member has the right to request that an item be placed on the agenda and the General Assembly approves its agenda by a simple majority vote.

One significant concession however, should be noted. If ten years elapse and the question of calling a review conference is automatically placed on the General Assembly's agenda, the decision to call the conference may be taken by a majority vote of its members instead of the two-thirds vote required under paragraph 1. This decision must be concurred in by an affirmative vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Thus no great power, by its negative vote, can prevent the convening of a review conference.

Differences between Articles 108 and 109

Basically there is little difference between Article 108 and Article 109. Actually, the General Conference contemplated in Article 109 has the same composition as the General Assembly

C. Eagleton and R. N. Swift (Eds.), *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs*, New York, 1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952; A. H. Feller, *United Nations and World Community*, Boston, 1952; H. Morgenthau, "The United Nations and the Revision of the Charter," *The Review of Politics*, January 1954; J. F. Dulles, *War or Peace*, New York, 1950.

referred to in Article 108. In both cases, each member of the U.N. would be represented and would have one vote. Likewise any amendment approved by either the General Assembly or the General Conference would require a two-thirds vote of the entire U.N. membership. Moreover, whether one thinks in terms of "alterations" or "amendments" to the Charter, they would come into force under exactly the same circumstances—namely, through ratification, in accordance with their constitutional processes, by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations including the permanent members of the Security Council.²

Thus Article 109 is no easier from a legal point of view than is Article 108. The gamut an amendment has to run is just as long and just as difficult under one article as the other. There is no reason to suppose that a fundamental change in the Charter that has been rejected by the General Assembly would muster any more support in a General Conference called under Article 109.

In some respects it might prove simpler to secure action through the General Assembly since that is an established organ of the U.N. and meets at least once every year. It is regularly available. No special effort, no positive vote, is required to bring it into being as is the case with the General Conference.

On the other hand, there are practical difficulties involved in attempting to divert the attention of the General Assembly to such a controversial matter as the amending process. Confronted each fall with an overflowing agenda, most delegates have been inclined to postpone any serious discussion of Charter amendments pending the convening of the first General Conference under Article 109.

² See Kelsen, *op. cit. supra* (note 1), pp. 817-18.

The atmosphere in a General Conference should be much more conducive to a balanced appraisal of the various arguments relating to Charter revision and review. That will be the task of the conference. It will be convened for that specific purpose. Delegations will be briefed on the issues involved and will have instructions from their governments.

The question of whether to hold a General Conference for Charter review will, therefore, be on the agenda of the tenth annual session of the General Assembly in 1955 and it is likely that the conference, if agreed to by a majority vote, will be held the following year. Secretary of State Dulles, as early as August 1953, announced that the United States would vote in favor of convening such a General Conference.

INFORMAL CHARTER CHANGES

The Charter has been subjected to what one might call informal amendments in a variety of ways: (1) through the nonimplementation or nonapplication of certain provisions of the Charter; (2) through the interpretation of the Charter by various organs and members of the U.N.; (3) through the conclusion of supplementary treaties or agreements, such as the Headquarters Agreement of 1947 and the North Atlantic Pact; and (4) through the creation of special organs and agencies.

These informal amendments substantially affect the provisions of the Charter although they leave its text intact. In some cases they create gaping holes in the document as it was drafted at San Francisco. In other cases they merely fill in the interstices. In still other cases they chart fundamentally new paths of progress for the U.N.

It is outside the scope of this study to examine in detail the growth of the Charter since 1945. But it does seem desirable to take a quick look at the

process in general terms, for without a knowledge of what has been happening during the past eight years one cannot tackle intelligently the broader problem of Charter revision.³

Nonimplementation or nonapplication of Charter provisions

In a number of instances organs or members of the U.N. have disregarded or have failed to implement certain Charter provisions. As a result several articles which the framers believed were highly important in making the U.N. an effective instrumentality for world peace have already fallen into disuse.

Perhaps the best example is Article 43. That article was designed to put teeth into the United Nations system. Under its terms the members of the U.N. agreed to make available to the Security Council the armed forces, assistance, and the facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. But after eight years of fruitless negotiations the great powers remain deadlocked over such questions as the numbers and types of forces each country shall make available, their locations, their degree of readiness, and so forth. Consequently, the agreements referred to in Article 43 have never come into existence and that provision of the Charter remains a dead letter.

Much the same situation exists with respect to Articles 44, 45, 46, 48, and most of Article 47, which relate to the use of armed forces by the Security Council. These provisions of the Charter are largely contingent upon the entry into force of Article 43. Taken together they constitute the heart of the U.N. collective security system as it was envisaged at San Francisco.

³ On this problem of informal Charter change see the articles by S. Engel cited above (note 1). Portions of this section are based on these articles.

Article 106 offers still another striking example. Briefly put, this article provides that prior to the time the Security Council is ready to begin its peace-keeping functions under Articles 42 and 43, the five permanent members should consult with one another with a view to such joint action as may be necessary to maintain world peace. The great powers, in other words, were given the joint responsibility for maintaining peace, on a transitional basis, until the new organization was properly equipped to perform its functions in an effective manner.

But the split between the East and the West has not only hamstrung the Security Council; it has also prevented giving effect to the transitional arrangement which was supposed to hold the line until the full organization could swing into action.

Mention might also be made of Article 23, paragraph 1. This article provides that the General Assembly in electing the six nonpermanent members of the Security Council shall pay special regard, in the first instance, to the contribution of U.N. members to the maintenance of peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization and also to equitable geographical distribution. In actual practice the General Assembly has pretty largely disregarded the first two criteria, placing most of its emphasis on equitable geographical distribution. Normally two members have been elected from Latin America, one from Western Europe, one from the British Commonwealth, one from the Middle East, and, during the first few years at least, one from the Soviet satellite bloc.

Of course it can be argued that these criteria are in no way legally binding upon the General Assembly. Certainly if they are disregarded there is no method provided for appealing the action of the General Assembly. Yet

when the guideposts are ignored it simply means that, in effect, Article 23, paragraph 1, has been dropped, at least temporarily, from the Charter.

Interpretation of the Charter

It is a confusing fact that the Charter makes no provision for its interpretation. In practice the organs and members of the U.N. are left free to interpret the various articles according to their own discretion. Consequently, any meaning which a provision of the Charter might reasonably have can prevail in any particular instance. This flexibility has led to a number of interesting developments.

Voting in the Security Council. One of the most significant of these developments relates to the all-important question of voting in the Security Council. The language of Article 27, paragraph 3, seems quite clear. It provides specifically that for other than procedural matters decisions of the Security Council are to be made "by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."

Does this mean that action cannot be taken by the Security Council unless it is concurred in by all five of the great powers? Does it mean when a permanent member abstains or is absent at the time the vote is taken that no decision can be reached? Certainly any strict construction of the Charter might lead to that conclusion.

Early in its history the Security Council took the position that an abstention or an absence of a permanent member did not constitute a negative vote. It was this liberal interpretation of the Charter, coupled with the absence of the Soviet representative from the meetings at the time, which paved the way for swift Security Council decisions when the Republic of South Korea was attacked in June 1950. With

only four permanent members present, the Security Council brushed aside a number of neat legal problems and approved three resolutions which made possible U.N. decisions against the aggressor in a way not contemplated by the Charter.⁴

Before leaving Article 27 it might be well to point out that that article, perhaps more than any other, illustrates how differently the Charter may be interpreted by certain members on the one hand and by an organ of the U.N. on the other. At San Francisco the great powers agreed upon a very narrow interpretation of "procedural" questions. For the most part these were the organizational matters referred to in Articles 28-32 of the Charter; the adoption of the rules of procedure of the Council, the selection of the President, the time and place of meetings, the establishment of subsidiary organs, etc. Beyond this point, argued the sponsoring governments in their statement of June 7, 1945, decisions of the Security Council might have "major political consequences," and accordingly would require the unanimous vote of the permanent members.⁵

Since that time the General Assembly—in an attempt to narrow the area within which the veto applies—has been inclined to define procedural questions very broadly. On April 14, 1949, the General Assembly recommended to the Security Council that a long list of some thirty-one decisions be considered

⁴ For a fuller discussion of the practice of abstention, see United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter Staff Study No. 1, *The Problem of the Veto in the United Nations Security Council*.

⁵ United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the United Nations S. Doc. 87, *Review of the United Nations Charter: A Collection of Documents* (hereinafter referred to as *Collection of Documents*), p. 362.

procedural and that the Council conduct its business accordingly. Included in the list were a number of decisions—such as the admission of states to U.N. membership—which had heretofore been considered substantive in character.⁶

The distance between the narrow interpretation of the sponsoring governments at San Francisco and the liberal interpretation of the General Assembly is considerable. Since the Charter itself does not spell out the distinction between procedural and substantive questions, either of these two interpretations could apply. Clearly there is great elasticity in this part of the Charter if the members wish to use it.

The Secretary-General. There has also proved to be considerable elasticity in the Charter provisions relating to the role of the Secretary-General in the United Nations. Articles 97-100 might leave the impression that his political functions were to be quite limited in scope. Only in Article 99, under which he may bring to the attention of the Security Council matters which in his opinion may threaten world peace, is there any real grant of political initiative.

Yet, in fact, influence exercised by the Secretary-General has been one of the significant developments within the United Nations. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council—and still more important the Secretary-General himself—have taken a broad view of his functions. He has made statements before both bodies on a variety of questions, and he has undisputed authority to place any item he considers necessary on the General Assembly's provisional agenda. One has only to recall his vigorous role in the Korean crisis, his proposal for a U.N. guard force, and his attempts to bring about a rapprochement between the Soviet bloc and the free world, to understand

the expanding nature of his political activities.

Non-self-governing territories. Still another demonstration of what custom and usage can do is reflected in the General Assembly's interpretation of Article 73 (e) regarding non-self-governing territories. According to that article the Member States are obligated to submit to the Secretary-General, "for information purposes," data of a technical nature relating to the economic, social, and educational conditions in the non-self-governing territories for which they are responsible. Presumably this language does not grant to any U.N. organ the authority to deal with the information furnished or to make recommendations about it. The General Assembly, however, has gone considerably beyond the letter of Article 73. In 1949 it created a special committee to examine the information transmitted and to submit reports thereon to the General Assembly:

containing such procedural recommendations as it may deem fit and such substantive recommendations as it may deem desirable relating to functional fields generally but not with respect to individual territories.⁷

With this as a starting point, the General Assembly has gradually expanded its influence. It has approved a standardized form for governments to use in submitting information. It has requested additional information from Member States. It has debated at length the reports submitted to it on the information received. If the present trend continues, the time may come when world opinion would expect the colonial powers to account to the U.N. for the efficient administration of their non-self-governing territories.⁸

The General Assembly. Finally, per-

⁷ *Collection of Documents*, p. 728.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Part C (X), pp. 749-79.

⁶ *Collection of Documents*, p. 572.

haps the most significant change in the Charter has taken place as a result of the sharp shift in the balance of power between the Security Council and the General Assembly. During the past five years the Security Council, meeting less and less frequently, has faded into the background. The General Assembly, on the other hand, has played a more important role than the framers of the Charter anticipated.

At San Francisco much emphasis was placed upon the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. It was to meet in continuous session. Armed forces were to be placed at its disposal. It could make decisions binding on all U.N. members. It was to be a small body capable of acting with vigor and dispatch in order to keep the peace.

The General Assembly was designed to be a much less powerful organ. It was scheduled to meet in regular annual sessions. It was to have no armed forces at its disposal. It could not make decisions—only recommendations. Its main weapon was discussion and debate.

As the Security Council has fallen into disuse, largely because of dissension among the great powers, the General Assembly has become a stronger and more vigorous organ. By various devices, including the creation in 1947 of the Interim Committee, or the so-called "Little Assembly," ways and means have been found to keep the General Assembly in virtually continuous session. Moreover, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which was approved in 1950 after the attack on Korea, geared the General Assembly to take quick action against an aggressor in the event the Security Council failed to exercise its responsibility for the maintenance of peace.⁹

⁹ *Ibid.*, Part C (V), pp. 494-556.

Today, the General Assembly may be convened in emergency session in twenty-four hours. It may make appropriate recommendations to the members for collective measures, including the use of armed forces. It has created two important subsidiary organs: (1) a Collective Measures Committee to report on the methods which might be used to strengthen international peace and security; and (2) a Peace Observation Commission to observe and report on any situation which might endanger international peace and security. Finally, Member States have been asked to earmark certain of their armed forces so organized, trained, and equipped that they could be made available promptly for service as United Nations units.¹⁰

In filling this new role the General Assembly has already demonstrated that it can make far-reaching recommendations. Thus, on February 1, 1951, it approved a resolution finding that Communist China had engaged in aggression in Korea.¹¹ This was followed on May 18, 1951, by a second resolution calling for an embargo on the shipment of war materials to Communist China and North Korea.¹²

It can be argued, of course, that resolutions of this kind are only recommendations to the Member States and have no binding effect. But in fact, the strategic materials embargo has been put into operation by some forty-five countries and has considerably limited strategic trade with aggressor nations.

The conclusion of agreements which supplement the Charter

The character of the Charter has also been changed as a result of numerous treaties and agreements which have

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 557.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 596.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 597.

been entered into by various Member States. These agreements define in greater detail the general provisions of the Charter. They usually spell out in more specific form the rights and duties of Member States and the powers and functions of U.N. organs. In some instances they lay down obligations and commitments which go beyond those contained in the Charter. A few examples may be helpful to show the nature of this development.

The Charter itself, for example, sets forth in broad terms the basic principles relating to the legal capacity of the U.N. and the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by representatives of the Member States and by U.N. officials. (See Arts. 104 and 105.) At San Francisco it was assumed that these were matters which could be worked out more properly at a later date. Indeed, Article 105 specifically calls upon the General Assembly to make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of the principles regarding privileges and immunities or to propose conventions to the members for this purpose.

Under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of February 13, 1946, what was once two short articles of the Charter—some nine lines—has grown into a document of thirty-six sections, setting forth in some detail the juridical personality of the U.N., the immunity of U.N. property, funds, and assets, the right of the U.N. to use communication facilities, the privileges and immunities of officials accredited to the U.N., and so on. As of October 1953, forty-two nations—the United States not among them—had ratified the convention.¹³

In the same category is the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations signed

on June 26, 1947. This agreement defines the headquarters district in New York and clarifies the rights of the U.N. with respect to postal and radio facilities, the use of an airport, the inviolability of the headquarters, police protection, and related matters. Like the Convention on Privileges and Immunities it gives substance to the general provisions of the Charter.¹⁴

Of a somewhat different character are the declarations which some forty-four nations have made, voluntarily accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It is true, of course, that all members of the U.N. are obligated to settle their differences by peaceful means.¹⁵ But the Charter does not impose any particular method of solution upon the parties to a dispute. Consequently, when U.N. members accede to the so-called optional clause of the Court Statute (Art. 36) and agree in advance to submit their legal disputes to the Court for settlement, they not only enlarge the competence of that body but also accept obligations over and above those already embodied in the Charter.

Most important, from the point of view of the future development of the U.N., are the changes which have taken place as a result of the conclusion of such agreements as the Brussels Treaty, the Rio Treaty, and the North Atlantic Pact.¹⁶ The United Nations Charter was designed to tackle the problem of collective security on a world-wide basis. That grand design soon proved inadequate. As a consequence, U.N. members who feared the threat of Soviet aggression were compelled to continue their quest for security in other directions. In such agreements as the Rio Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty they shifted their emphasis from uni-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2, Art. 2 (3) of the Charter.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Part C (VIII).

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

versal collective security to security based on regional pacts and the idea of collective self-defense as expressed in Article 51.

Thus the United Nations is a very different organization from what it was eight years ago. Then it stressed the essential unity of all members against aggression anywhere. Now it is an organization within which groups of states are seeking to preserve the peace by uniting their strength in order to deter aggression from Communist sources.

There are, to be sure, some critics who still argue that the Atlantic Pact is not a regional arrangement and that it violates the spirit if not the letter of the United Nations Charter. Whether the Atlantic Pact is based upon the regional chapter (Arts. 52-54) of the Charter, or whether it derives its existence from Article 51, is beside the point. The real point is that these agreements have added new wings to the U.N. structure. In developing, as they do, new techniques for joint action against armed attack they give new meaning and new vitality to Articles 51-54.

In this connection mention should also be made of the bilateral mutual defense treaties which the United States has concluded with the Philippines, Japan, and Korea, and the tripartite pact with Australia and New Zealand. These treaties, which also spring from Article 51, outline a somewhat different approach to the security problem in an area of the world which is not quite ready for the kind of commitments contained in the Atlantic Pact. The words in Article VIII of the treaty with Australia and New Zealand, "Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area," carry the implication, however, that the treaties are only the first step in the building of a more effective security system for the Pacific.

The creation of subsidiary organs

Somewhat akin to the conclusion of supplementary agreements, although of less constitutional significance, has been the creation of special organs within the U.N. system. While both these devices were anticipated by the Charter, they have helped to round out that document in a way that probably was not foreseen a decade ago.

The Charter provides that both the General Assembly and the Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as are deemed necessary for the performance of their respective functions. (See Arts. 22, 29.) A good many standing committees have been set up under the Rules of Procedure of the two bodies. In addition, a large number of committees and commissions have been established by resolution of the two parent organs to perform certain specific functions. Some of these are of a semipermanent nature, like the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, the International Law Commission, and the Disarmament Commission. Still others are *ad hoc* bodies, like the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan, the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. As of March 1953 there were at least thirty-two subsidiary organs of the General Assembly and three of the Security Council.¹⁷

The Interim Committee, or the "Little Assembly," is perhaps the best example of this type of constitutional de-

¹⁷ United Nations, Department of Public Information, *Structure of the United Nations* (Sixth Revision; May 1953), U.N. Document ST/DPI/7*.

velopment.¹⁸ Since it was created to strengthen the General Assembly and thus to offset the veto-ridden Security Council, it was given broad competence to deal with questions within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly when the latter was not in session. For the proper exercise of these functions the Interim Committee was given the power to conduct investigations, to appoint commissions of inquiry, to adopt additional rules of procedure not inconsistent with those of the General Assembly, and to advise on the calling of special sessions of the General Assembly.

The resolution creating the Interim Committee underlined its character as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly in accordance with the terms of Article 22. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union and its satellites challenged the constitutionality of the Committee. They charged that it was designed to circumvent and weaken the Security Council. They insisted, too, that the Committee possessed such broad powers that it was equal in rank with the General Assembly and consequently did not constitute a "subsidiary organ" within the meaning of Article 22.

These arguments were not accepted by the General Assembly. At the same time the terms of reference of the Interim Committee were narrowed somewhat so as to meet the criticisms launched against it. Its authority to conduct investigations was circumscribed and its power to advise on the calling of special sessions of the General Assembly was limited to questions actually under discussion by the Committee. In addition, it was made clear that the Committee was not to trespass on the sphere of activity of any other organ of the United Nations.

Despite these assurances the Soviet Union and its satellite states continued

to regard the Interim Committee as unconstitutional and refused to participate in its work. The Committee has not met since 1952.

The Soviet bloc has vigorously opposed the creation of other subsidiary organs on constitutional grounds. They attacked the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, insisting that it constituted illegal intervention in a civil war and interference in the internal affairs of another state. Similarly they held that the terms of reference of the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans were incompatible with the Charter and the principle of the sovereign equality of states. But these organs were established and discharged their responsibilities.

Out of U.N. experience with subsidiary organs to date the following principles emerge:

1. The power of the General Assembly and the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs to perform a wide variety of functions has been established. The authority which these agencies exercise, however, cannot go beyond the authority possessed by the parent organ under the Charter.

2. Most of the subsidiary organs exercise their mandates within a definite time period, the length of which depends upon the nature of the task to be performed.

3. The subsidiary organs are strictly accountable to the General Assembly or the Security Council and must submit reports on their activities at regular intervals.

The subsidiary organs by no means have a free rein; rather they are carefully hedged about by restrictions and limitations. They do not amend the Charter in any substantive way. Yet they do constitute a significant part of the Charter structure.

¹⁸ *Collection of Documents*, pp. 499-505.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

As the time for the review of the United Nations Charter approaches, those who are interested in determining whether the United Nations can become a more effective instrumentality for world peace will want to examine carefully the alternatives open to them. Should an effort be made to bring the Charter up to date through the formal amending process? Or would it be more prudent to wait upon the normal development of the Charter through informal adaptation and change? This is a fundamental question that must be faced before the Charter review conference is convened.

In his book, *War or Peace*, published in 1950, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles commented as follows:

I have never seen any proposal made for collective security with "teeth" in it, or for "world government" or for "world federation," which could not be carried out either by the United Nations or under the United Nations Charter.¹⁹

Many of the imperfections in the U.N. system could be remedied without the change of a word in the Charter. Certainly the impact of the veto could be softened quietly and quickly if the permanent members would informally agree to refrain from using it. Likewise, many nations now awaiting admission to the U.N. could be admitted without any formal Charter change.

While the Charter is gradually being developed by these informal methods, certain disadvantages stem from relying on them instead of amendments of a more formal nature. For one thing, they are much less permanent in character. A formal amendment is firmly imbedded in the Charter for all to see for years to come. But an informal

¹⁹ P. 204.

Charter change can be modified or abrogated with relative ease; it may be here today and gone tomorrow, depending upon the will of certain states or the action taken by a particular organ of the U.N.

More important still, informal changes may be much more limited in scope because they apply only to those states responsible for them.

The Atlantic Pact, for example, binds only the fourteen nations members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And a particular interpretation of the Charter agreed upon by the five great powers has no legal validity beyond this limited group. On the other hand, a formal amendment, once in effect, is binding upon all the members of the U.N. whether they vote for it or not.

Some people, also, are inclined to question the constitutionality of informal amendments. In practice, however, there is no satisfactory way in which the constitutionality of an informal amendment can be effectively challenged. To be sure, the International Court of Justice may hand down advisory opinions, but such opinions are purely advisory in nature and have no binding effect either upon the members or upon the organs of the U.N. There is no power of judicial review within the U.N. system.

The members and the various organs of the United Nations are alone competent to pass upon the constitutionality of their actions. This being the case, changes brought about through the informal amendment processes must be considered constitutional so long as the states involved remain within their obligations under the Charter.

On the other hand, Charter growth through interpretation can only proceed within well-defined constitutional limits. The United Nations is not a superstate. It is based squarely upon the principle

of the sovereign equality of all its members, as Article 2 constantly reminds us, and it must function within the specific limitations laid down in the Charter. However broad an interpretation one might place upon the Charter, the United Nations—under the limiting language found in Article 2, paragraph 7—is not authorized to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Likewise the authority of the General Assembly cannot be increased beyond a certain point for, under the express provisions of the Charter, it can only recommend; it cannot make decisions binding on U.N. members.

The foregoing paragraphs indicate that many changes in the United Nations have been brought about by informal methods and by agreements made outside, but at the same time collateral to, the Charter. Some changes which have been proposed, however, could only come about by formal amendment. Thus, a change in the permanent membership of the Security Council, a change in the formal amending process, or a grant of authority to enable the General Assembly to make decisions instead of recommendations would undoubtedly require formal amendment before they could be made effective. In fact, it has been argued (by the Soviet Union) that some of the informal changes mentioned in preceding paragraphs, many of which were developed

as the result of American leadership, are of the type which should have been submitted for approval by the formal amendment procedures provided in the Charter.

Our government has indicated that when the question arises in 1955, the United States will favor calling a review conference. The existence of the veto does not mean that such a conference would be a waste of time. The only logical course of action now is to proceed with a careful study of the entire problem and the formulation of proposals which we may find in our national interest, on the assumption that no single nation will willfully block approval of any desirable amendments.

This assumption may prove wrong. If it does, supporters of the U.N. may well conclude that their objective of developing an organization that can better serve the cause of world peace can still be attained without invoking the formal amendment process. Since its inception the Charter has demonstrated a remarkable facility for adapting itself to changing needs and circumstances. This flexibility may provide the way in which the United Nations can be made more effective in protecting the interests of the United States and preserving peace.²⁰

²⁰ On the desirability of calling a review conference, see article by Ernest A. Gross cited above (note 1).

Francis O. Wilcox, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Chief of Staff of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He was chairman of the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Louisville and has held several posts in both the executive and legislative branches of the government. He served as an adviser to the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations Charter. Since that time, he has participated in most sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.

Strengthening the United Nations

By CARLOS P. ROMULO

"... we must boldly explore ways of so strengthening the United Nations that it may have ... the power to prevent universal catastrophe."

IN his now historic address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower prefaced his proposal for an international pool of atomic energy for peaceful purposes with a heart-warming tribute to the United Nations. He said:

At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly.

Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those hopes.

But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the wisdom, the courage, and the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well-being for all men.

To make this speech, President Eisenhower flew into New York directly from Bermuda, where he had been in conference with Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain and Premier Laniel of France about the grave issues of war and peace. The event thus possessed all the elements of high drama. First, the Bermuda Conference was held in the framework of the old classical di-

plomacy, wherein the heads of the three great powers of the Western world met together in secret in an attempt to maintain peace by strengthening the free-world coalition against a potential enemy. Second, President Eisenhower, as head of the most powerful nation in the world, spoke on a matter truly of life and death for all humanity. And third, the General Assembly of the United Nations was deliberately chosen as the platform from which the historic message would be given to the world.

What President Eisenhower told the General Assembly has been heard around the world. His bold proposal on atomic energy has become the number one item of world statesmanship and will so remain in the anxious months to come. But this event is significant for another reason. It dramatically points up the degree in which the United Nations has been sadly left behind in the furious pace of scientific progress in the modern world. It was appropriate that President Eisenhower should have chosen to submit his fateful proposal on atomic energy to the United Nations. But the United Nations lacks the authority to act promptly and effectively on the Eisenhower proposal.

A VESSEL TOO FRAIL

Suddenly we realize that no political instrument exists today which could cope with so great a need. Somewhat sadly we realize that the United Nations has become a vessel too frail to

be the repository of humanity's hopes and fears in the atomic age.

Nine years ago, I represented the Philippines during the San Francisco Conference which gave birth to the United Nations. As the representative of a country that had suffered grievous loss of life and destruction of property during the war, I gave earnest support to every proposal which was intended to enable the United Nations to cope with the menace of future war. After two months of strenuous effort, the Conference completed the Charter of the United Nations, the first words of which proclaim the determination of the peoples of the United Nations "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."

The Charter of the United Nations was completed on June 26, 1945. Twenty days later, on July 16, the United States set off the world's first atomic explosion. In another twenty days, on August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

In retrospect, these dates are significant. The final blueprint of the United Nations was completed shortly before the world was aware that atomic power had become a reality. The eloquent words with which the Charter opens, affirming mankind's determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," referred therefore to the only kind of warfare which men had known until then. It was murderous and destructive warfare which made no distinction between combatants and noncombatants, but it was nevertheless one which was waged with conventional weapons of finite potency. It was total war, and it was right that those who founded the United Nations in San Francisco should have established as the primordial aim of the

Organization the prevention of similar wars in the future.

Meanwhile, the world has moved from the menace of total war with conventional weapons towards the menace of absolute war with bacterial, atomic, and hydrogen weapons. The United Nations probably has the means to intervene effectively and in time to prevent or halt a war fought with conventional weapons. But it does not have the means to do so in the case of a war fought with absolute weapons.

The reason is simple: the United Nations was not built to the scale of the atomic age in which we live. Another way of putting this idea is to say that, in the short space of nine years, the Charter of the United Nations has become dangerously obsolete to the degree that under its existing provisions the Organization is powerless to act effectively to forestall universal catastrophe.

IMPOTENCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL

The most convincing proof of this statement is the confirmed impotence of the Security Council. This is the organ which has primary responsibility for maintaining or restoring international peace and security. I shall not take away from this organ the credit which rightly belongs to it for settling or helping to settle disputes between nations and for preventing or stopping a number of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. But in the only instance among these which involved large-scale fighting and which had the actual potentiality of leading to a third world war—namely, the Communist aggression in Korea—the Security Council was saved from total impotence only by the narrowest of accidents, that is, by the providential absence of the Soviet Union from the meeting which ordained military sanctions against the

Communist aggressors. Moreover, Korea happened to be a theater of war which the Soviet Union did not consider to be important enough to require its actual participation and all-out effort.

Under the Charter, the Security Council is responsible for organizing readily available armed forces from Member States for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. In the past eight years nothing concrete has come out of its efforts in this field. It was left to the General Assembly, under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, to formulate plans in advance for the organization of collective measures against future acts of aggression.

Furthermore, the Security Council is primarily responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. The records dealing with this matter form the most dreary chapters in the history of the United Nations. In eight years of study and discussion nothing has been accomplished. The armaments race has proceeded without interruption and at a faster pace than during any other peacetime period in the history of the world. Today, having wasted eight years in a fruitless search for an acceptable formula for the regulation of armaments, including atomic weapons, we have the sinister spectacle, to use the words of President Eisenhower, of two atomic colossi, the United States and the Soviet Union, malevolently eyeing each other across a trembling world.

The great weakness of the Security Council, of course, is that while it has all the attributes of authority, it lacks the actual instruments of power necessary to make that authority real.

MORAL POWER OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

It is significant that President Eisenhower chose to speak before the Gen-

eral Assembly. This body, in which all the sixty Member States are represented, has been variously called an international debating society, the forum of humanity, and the town meeting of the world. It is weak where the Security Council is strong, at least on paper. It has none of the outward attributes of authority, but it has power over the hearts and minds of men out of all proportion to the actual authority it wields. Far from being a Parliament of Man, it has authority only to make recommendations to Member States, and a state may fail to comply with these recommendations without running the risk of coercive sanctions.

I have said of the United Nations in general that it has become a vessel too frail to serve as the repository of the hopes and fears of humanity in the atomic age. Lacking something better, we have at least in the General Assembly a repository of the good sense and good conscience of humanity.

It used to be said that while the United Nations has not achieved much success in the political and security field (disarmament is one of its more awesome failures), it has done much useful work in the economic, social, cultural, humanitarian, trusteeship, and legal fields. During the past seven years, this has been largely true. Despite the cold war, the United Nations has accomplished tasks of international cooperation which, against the background of previous history, are nothing short of prodigious. The problems of world economic and social development, particularly the effort to raise standards of living, the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the march of the trust and non-self-governing territories towards eventual freedom, the continued development of international law—all these have been faced and measurable progress has been made in

their solution, in the very shadow of the cold war.

We have the Technical Assistance Program and we have the useful work continually being done by the specialized agencies in the fields of agriculture, industry, science, education, health, finance, trade, transportation, and so forth.

CONCERTED CAMPAIGN TO ARREST PROGRESS

All this is true. But today there seems to be a general feeling that the possibilities of United Nations action even in these nonpolitical questions have become nearly exhausted. We have come to a point of diminishing returns. There is growing reluctance on the part of the developed countries to assist the underdeveloped countries in their programs of economic development. One example is what has happened to Point Four in the United States; another, the freezing of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance; yet another, the virtual pigeonholing of the project for the establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.

In another field, there is the growing resistance of the more advanced countries to any action designed to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world. The reasons they give are strange indeed: either they say that they do not wish to risk lowering their own standards by signing conventions or covenants concerning these matters with the less developed countries, or they say (as they do on questions like those of Tunisia, Morocco, and race conflict in South Africa) that the United Nations is forbidden by the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter from interfering in these matters.

In the matter of trusteeship and non-

self-governing territories, we have come to a point not only where activity has ceased but where the trusteeship system and the principles underlying Chapter XI of the Charter are "withering on the vine."

It is difficult to escape the feeling that, on all sides, there is a concerted and deliberate campaign to arrest progress in these nonpolitical fields under the auspices of the United Nations.

One generous way of explaining this is to say that since so much progress has been achieved in these fields during the past seven years, we ought prudently to settle down and consolidate the gains that have been made. I am afraid, however, that the real reason is twofold: first, that further progress in these fields must now await the conclusion of the cold war and the establishment of genuine international cooperation among the great powers; and, second, that the United Nations has exhausted the limits of its possibilities of action under the Charter as it exists.

We are back where we started. We realize that there is something naïve and unreal in trying to promote higher standards of living, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law in a world where men are condemned to live in constant fear of universal death. We are compelled to admit that under the present Charter, the United Nations is incapable of performing the service that it should for the peoples of the world in the atomic age; and the most important and urgent single element of that service is to save humanity from the menace of atomic destruction.

President Eisenhower, in the speech already referred to, justly credited the United Nations with realizing "part of the hopes" which had been pinned on it by the peoples of the world. But, in his own words, "the wisdom, the courage, and the faith which can bring to

this world lasting peace for all nations" are yet to be provided.

NARROW MARGIN OF SAFETY

In other words, the question remains whether the good sense and good conscience of humanity will be asserted effectively and in time to forestall a war of annihilation with atomic and hydrogen weapons. Since our margin of safety is so narrow, we must ask ourselves whether we should be content with the United Nations as it is, knowing that it was tailored to the needs and uses of a preatomic age; and whether we should accept the terrible risk which attends the widening gap between our onrushing atomic science and the inertia of our political know-how.

The answer is not easy. For, throughout history, men have sought to retain the forms and institutions of their daily life long after these have been outmoded by the ideas and precepts of advancing science. In the past, however, there was always a margin of safety sufficient to afford men time to adjust themselves to the new conditions. Except for sudden revolutionary short cuts often necessitated by a massive accumulation of intolerable evils, it has nearly always been possible to remodel the old forms and institutions for the more spacious requirements of the new ideas and principles.

The question, I repeat, is whether in this atomic age, we are permitted the time to do this. It is a serious question, but one which should not lead to panicky solutions.

We must reject, to start with, the notion that the United Nations should be scrapped. I think that, faced with the possibility of universal disaster, sensible people everywhere are inclined to feel somewhat more comfortable and secure with the United Nations than without it. If it gave us nothing more

than this sense of added comfort and security, the United Nations would be worth having.

However, a sense of security is not enough. The danger which mankind faces is both real and immediate, and it must be met simultaneously on two levels. First, we must endeavor to make the United Nations function to the utmost of its possibilities under the Charter, using its undoubted moral influence to help prevent impending disaster. Secondly, we must boldly explore ways of so strengthening the United Nations that it may have, before it is too late, the power to prevent universal catastrophe.

In other words, it is not enough to say that the United Nations is better than nothing. We shall find before long that the United Nations is not good enough unless it is the best that human ingenuity can fashion, unless it is able to provide "the wisdom, the courage, and the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations."

REVOLUTION FOR SURVIVAL

To cope with the atomic revolution, we need a political revolution of at least equal imagination and magnitude.

In accordance with Article 109 of the United Nations Charter, the tenth regular session of the General Assembly, which will be held in 1955, will discuss a proposal to call a conference to review the Charter. While such a conference will almost certainly be held, it is generally doubted whether any major amendments to the Charter will be approved. Since amendments are subject to the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council, it is naturally assumed that amendments purporting to strengthen the United Nations at the expense of the big-power veto and of the principle of state sovereignty will have little if any chance of adoption.

Nevertheless, necessity is still the mother of invention. Our need is for peace, no longer as a mere convenience but as the indispensable condition of human survival. This thought will not sink in easily, for men's minds have been inured to situations of measurable and surmountable danger. But the irrevocable finality of the danger we face will inevitably moderate the prevailing pessimism and compel all Member States, especially the great powers, to be more receptive to proposals for revision of the United Nations Charter, no matter how radical they may seem.

SCOPE OF ESSENTIAL CHARTER REVISION

In considering amendments, the yardstick should not be what seems possible in the context of the present international situation, but rather what is necessary to enable mankind to avoid atomic destruction. Accordingly, any and all proposals which would make it possible for the United Nations to cope with this danger should merit careful consideration. Such proposals would certainly include: the restriction of the scope of domestic jurisdiction and of the concept of state sovereignty, the limitation or abolition of the veto, the establishment of a system of weighted representation of Member States, and the placing in the hands of the United Nations of the means to enforce decisions involving international peace and security, particularly as regards the regulation of armaments, control of atomic energy, and prohibition of atomic weapons.

There are those who will say, "This

is 'world government'"—and dismiss such proposals as utopian and impractical. But in the present context of human affairs, any revision of the United Nations Charter would be less than practical that did not attempt wisely and courageously to bridge the gap between what is possible and what is necessary. This can be done only by a bold new approach, a desperate frontal assault if you will, upon the problem of international organization, undeterred by the limitations of past or present experience. Do we discount the inertia which induces the human mind to seek the line of least resistance and to devise partial or makeshift remedies for recognized evils? By no means. However, while the force of custom is indeed powerful, it is not more so than the instinct of survival. Therefore, in this matter, we must not only think in terms of the improbable but also attempt the seemingly impossible.

The alternative is to let the world drift willy-nilly towards disaster, borne on the ancient tides of power politics and war.

I am aware that there are those who would choose this dread alternative. Their attitude has taken the form of an aggressive attack against the United Nations, not because it needs to be improved and strengthened, but because they would destroy it utterly and let every nation withdraw into the hard shell of its sovereignty like a turtle.

The reference to the turtle is a deliberate one. It emphasizes the fact that it is impossible, in this age of the jet plane, to return to the age of turtles. It is much later than we think.

General Carlos P. Romulo, Ph.D., Lit.D., D.H.S., LL.D., Makati, Rizal, the Philippines, was President of the fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly (1949-50) and Chief of the Philippine Delegation of the United Nations (1945-53). He headed the Philippine delegation at the San Francisco Conference. From 1950 to 1952 he was Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippine Republic and from 1952 to 1953 Ambassador to the United States. He is now Chairman of the Philippine Delegation to the ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Limits to the Powers of the United Nations

By RAYMOND ARON *

"The United Nations does not have the capacity to ensure collective security. . . . It would be a . . . mistake, through false idealism, to seek in the Charter the secret of salvation and a substitute for force."

IS the United Nations—and can it be—an essential instrument of security in the world of today? Can a revision of the Charter add decisively to the effectiveness of the international organization? It seems to me that the answer to these two questions must be negative. To attribute the impotence of the U.N. to the right of veto or to the division of powers between the Security Council and the General Assembly is to take the effect for the cause, to confuse the symptom with the disease, or to imagine that legal texts can change the ways of those strange monsters, the national states.

UNATTAINABLE PREREQUISITES OF UNITED NATIONS EFFECTIVENESS

Under what conditions would an organization of the United Nations type be able to guarantee security and peace? (By "organization of the United Nations type" we understand an organization created by states that subscribe to certain obligations; agree to abstain from certain acts, but do not renounce the defense of their interests, of which they remain the sole judges; do not alienate any part of their sovereignty; and do not stipulate in advance what military contribution they will provide to execute the organization's decisions.)

The first condition is that in case of unqualified aggression by a state the Security Council be unanimous in recognizing the aggression and in designating it as such, and unanimous in calling upon the Member States to come to the

the same civilization, later like the non-Member States have both the determination and the military capacity to coerce the aggressor and punish him.

The second condition is that the conflict submitted to the U.N. be juridically defined, that it lend itself to the legal formalism of the Charter so that the wrongs of the parties may be determined, not according to political expediency, but by reference to the letter of fundamental texts and concepts.

Never in history have these two conditions been fulfilled; never have they been so far from fulfillment as in the present-day world.

THE IMPOTENCE OF THE PEACEFUL

It was imagined originally that the immense majority of peaceful states would alone always be able to control the aggressor state in a military way. Even if the states we are assuming to be peaceful were ready to go to war out of respect for a universal principle—which is not the case—the concentration of military might makes it impossible, at present, to coerce one of the two great powers by the threat of war alone. Against the Soviet Union or the United States, this threat would be totally ineffective since each of the two is alone capable of resisting the combined forces of the small and medium-sized nations and would not yield except at the end of a devastating war exhausting for all participants. We may add that the present grouping of states is such that neither of the great powers will ever be isolated. Each will

always have with it those states which, because of geographic proximity, economic or military subordination, or ideological solidarity, will have no other recourse than to share their leader's fate to the end.

Moreover, let us not imagine that the uncommitted states, those that refuse to enter either of the two camps, would act more disinterestedly, with a more acute sense of equity. When his interests are involved, for example in Kashmir, Mr. Nehru does not differ from the foreign minister of any other country. When an international question not directly concerning India is at issue, he by no means says only what is true and just. His positions on Tibet (which, however, concerned India), on Korea, and on Indochina are compromises among truth, personal passions (anticolonialism, antioccidentalism), and realistic calculations (fear of China and desire to appease her).

In the last century, certain political writers placed their hopes in a world conscience: the judgment of public opinion would suffice to prevent crime or to check the criminal. Let us recognize the facts: in international relations, there is no world conscience—first, because the world is divided into two camps, each adhering to its own system of values; second, because even in those countries that subscribe to our system of values statesmen speak and act according to expediency. So much is this the case that if one of them, against his interest, were to proclaim a policy based upon pure morality, all observers would look for cynical motives behind such a noble and surprising conduct.

NATIONAL SELF-PRESERVATION: UNJUSTIFIABLE ISSUE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

As for the second condition, reality is more remote from it today than in

any other period of history. The principal reasons for this seem to me to be the following: the juridical formalism of international organization supposes that states exist, and that the conflict submitted to the organization concerns essentially, if not exclusively, relations among states. However, in our era, every conflict involves the existence of one or several states, not the relations between them.

For the U.N., the crossing of the 38th parallel was a case of aggression in both the juridical and military senses of the term, since only the state of South Korea was recognized by the U.N., the government of North Korea having refused to apply the decisions made at Lake Success concerning elections and the establishment of a state for the entire country. But, within the ideological system of the Communist camp, only the North Korean government was legitimate, and the crossing of the parallel was not an act of aggression but an episode in a civil war for the liberation and unification of the entire country. Such at least was the esoteric version intended for the initiated; for the general public, it was proclaimed that South Korea began the war.

When the conflict is not between two governments of the same country, each justifying itself according to the principle of legitimacy of one of the two camps, it is likely to oppose a government which, formally, is in rebellion and a legitimate sovereign which, however, represents a distant imperial power. Such was the case of Indochina. Holland's sovereignty over the islands of Indonesia having been accepted and recognized by all states, there is no doubt that in positive international law the men who today form the Indonesian government were rebels in 1945, and that the problem was an internal one. Juridically, France

* Translated by J. W. Smith.

can plead the same thesis with regard to Tunisia and Morocco. If one day a "revolutionary" Tunisian or Moroccan party were recognized as a government by the states of the Soviet bloc (as was Vietnam in Indochina), we would shift from case number two to case number one, that of two legitimate governments. The wording of the Charter empowering the U.N. to act in matters affecting world peace is so vague and open to such broad interpretation that the U.N. took jurisdiction in the case of Indonesia. In reality, the majority of the great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, also sided with the rebels, and the Dutch government gracefully yielded to pressure. Thus the U.N. favored Indonesian independence, a fact which certainly may be considered a success, but which has little or nothing in common with "collective security."

A third possible case is that of the conflict among the Jewish Agency, the mandatory power (Great Britain), and the Arab countries. The U.N. was not called upon to prevent or sanction aggression, but had rather to arbitrate among incompatible claims. Following the departure of the mandatory power, the arbitrational decisions were not accepted, either by the Jewish Agency, transformed into the State of Israel, or by the governments of the Arab states. This double rejection meant war in Palestine. It has not been forgotten how the two series of events, deliberations and decisions in the U.N. on the one hand, military operations and the supplying of Israel with arms by the Communist bloc on the other, finally led to the creation of the State of Israel and a precarious armistice in Palestine. The intervention of the U.N. was neither decisive nor sterile. It was an element in an evolutionary process, as was also the local war. The U.N., in this case, was an organ of mediation

and arbitration. It attempted not so much to state the law as to express what was expedient. Comparable to the concert of the great powers, it tried to shorten the war and give its sanction to a compromise among the conflicting interests, a compromise acceptable to the great powers. Would the intervention of the latter have been more or less easy in the absence of the U.N.? It is difficult to judge. Probably the state of public opinion makes it preferable to camouflage the intervention of the great powers under the U.N. formulas.

We see that in these typical cases what is involved is not collective security against an aggressor, but the very existence of the state, disputed between two governments that claim justification according to rival concepts of legitimacy, between a rebel government and a colonial power, between a governmental authority seeking to transform itself into a state and neighboring states that deny its right to a territory. In none of these can it be clearly perceived in what way a modified Charter would have facilitated the U.N.'s action or made it more effective.

THE ILLUSION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The examples that we have just analyzed permit us to define the United Nations' function¹ in the world of today. The United Nations does not have the capacity to ensure collective security, a concept for which we vainly seek a meaning in the present world situation. Neither is it able to put an end to the cold war or diffuse a general feeling of security. The concentration of power in two continent-states, the ideological incompatibility between the

¹ It is obvious that we are considering solely the problem of war and peace, and that we are excluding social and economic functions, etc.

Soviet and the Western regimes, the reciprocal fear aroused by the accumulation of atomic bomb stock piles, and the growth in the destructive force of weapons of war are facts that it is not in anyone's power to eliminate.

The idea of world unity is the expression of a desire or of an illusion. It is of course true that the diffusion of Western civilization has spread a thin layer of uniform technology over the surface of all continents. From New York to San Francisco, passing through London, Paris, Rome, Beirut, Karachi, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Hawaii, the air-line passenger will find the same airports, but he need only leave the fields to find the most varied means of transportation, from the donkey and the pushcart to the American car, the most varied clothing, ways of eating, and family institutions. In the sphere of international relations, it seems to me that the truth lies between the superficial uniformity of certain techniques and the infinite diversity of customs. The concentration of power and the progress of the means of transportation and destruction have placed the Soviet Union, Europe, the United States, China, and Southeast Asia in the same international political system. A sort of world concert has replaced what, fifty years ago, was called the concert of Europe. The diplomatic practices of Europe have become general, and the representatives of all continents and cultures converge upon New York.

But the unity of diplomatic forms, the unity of the world field of forces, does not constitute the equivalent of what was dreamed of in the ideology of "one world." Whatever may be the similarities of industrial structure in the United States and the Soviet Union, rivalry between the two countries has sprung up at first like conflicts of the past between the two leading states of

the same civilization, later like the conflict between a state bearing a new universal religion and other states.

The conflict between the two leading states is made all the more serious, in Europe, by the unnatural division of Germany and Berlin; in Asia, by the internal weakness of the states that have succeeded the colonial empires of Europe, by the confusing of nationalism and Communism, by the revolt of the peasant masses, and the frustration of the intellectuals. None of these real causes of insecurity could be obviated by a system of collective security.

RELEVANCE OF THE U.N. IN THE BIPOLAR CONFLICT

Such a system, in theory, should prevent military aggression, the crossing of the border between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, or between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic. With or without the U.N., these kinds of aggression are improbable for they would entail a serious risk of generalized hostilities. (They are improbable, that is, as long as the Soviet leaders wish to avoid a general war.) The U.N., in this situation, is not powerless, but neither is it indispensable. It reinforces the unwritten guarantee given to most countries by American determination to resist Soviet expansion. But if the U.N. did not exist, it is to be doubted whether the Soviet Union would invade Iran or Yugoslavia militarily. The existence of the U.N. makes such an eventuality even more unlikely.

The usefulness of the U.N. is more marked in the case of conflict in which Soviet ideology justifies military action, but in which Western ideology forbids it. We are thinking of the case of Korea. The esoteric doctrine of the Communists did not exclude recourse to arms to extend the reign of popular democracy to a portion of a country

still subjected to imperialism. If, in the absence of the U.N., the two governments had been on the same plane, neither one having a better title than the other, American leaders would perhaps have been more reluctant to intervene.

It must be admitted, however, that this advantage was compensated for by the difficulties resulting from the contradictions between the U.N. as an organism stating the law, and the U.N. as an organism attempting to limit hostilities. If North Korea was an aggressor, if the motion recommending that the United Nations Command unify the country was valid, China was guilty of aggression in sending its volunteers into combat. The U.N. did indeed proclaim it to be an aggressor, but shortly thereafter decided to open negotiations with the aggressor states. North Korea, which the U.N. did not recognize before June 1950, was recognized in effect at the end of its unjust war. Standing by a formalistic position, refusing negotiations with the aggressor, would have meant the risk of prolonging and expanding the war. It was judged preferable to accept the contradiction between legal and expedient action. But in the end the victim suffered as much as the guilty party, and the experience might well be as frightening to protected states as to aggressors. Even so, we may say that the U.N. tends to prevent the possible repetition of attempts to unify by force of arms countries divided between rival governments, that it aids, to a limited degree, in rallying a coalition against the aggressor without hindering realistic compromises between the two camps.

THE U.N.'s FICTITIOUS ROLE IN SMALL-STATE CONFLICT

What is the U.N.'s function in the case of conflict between two small states, both independent, neither of

which is attached to the Soviet camp? We are thinking, for example, of the conflict of India and Pakistan over Kashmir, or of the absence of a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab countries. One is hesitant to answer because it is by no means certain that events would take an essentially different course if the U.N. did not exist. Perhaps the intervention of the great powers to stop hostilities between India and Pakistan was facilitated through the use of the international organization as an intermediary. But the recommendations concerning a plebiscite, made by a U.N. mediator, have not been accepted by the state that fears the results of consulting the people's wishes. I believe, after my experience in New Delhi, that basically the leaders of India do not consider themselves morally bound to subscribe to the results of a plebiscite. Strategic or geographic arguments seem to them to win out over the desires of the populations concerned. Quite obviously, no great power is interested in using coercion to make India and Pakistan comply with U.N. law. The matter will be decided locally in a manner determined by the facts and the relation of forces. Perhaps this is a deplorable conclusion, but it would be still more deplorable for us to give way to illusions dangerous for the values we profess to defend.

As for Israel and the Arab countries, peace between them will be established not by the U.N. but, sooner or later, by the pressure of Western countries, which are as anxious to pacify local disputes outside the Soviet zone as the U.S.S.R. is to inflame them.

U.N.'s IRRESPONSIBLE SPONSORSHIP OF COLONIAL "LIBERATION"

Finally, there remains the possible U.N. action in case of conflict between "rebels" and a "colonial power." It would seem that there are as many

problems as there are concrete situations. According to the circumstances, one is tempted either to blame or to praise the U.N., never to count on a revision of the Charter to increase its merits or diminish its shortcomings.

This is not the place to evaluate French policy in North Africa. Appeal to the U.N. has resulted in many speeches condemning France, and in others, made by the representatives of the colonial powers, denying the right of the international organization to intervene in internal questions. Have these speeches influenced French leaders? I fear not; I fear they have awakened hopes in the minds of nationalist leaders, and have contributed to "hardening" the attitude of the French administration. Abstractly, one may say that the U.N., by the tribute it offers, by the ideology on which it is based, and by the inquiries it conducts, supports "liberation" movements in the nonautonomous territories of the non-Soviet world (obviously the very existence of nonautonomous territories in the Soviet Union is ignored by the U.N.). There are some who will take satisfaction in this fact. We could be surer that satisfaction is appropriate if the U.N. were able to create states and establish an order in place of those whose authority it undermines. Such is not always the case, unless a great power continues to support the structure upon which the U.N. places its seal, for example, Great Britain in the independent kingdom of Libya.

Perhaps in Southeast Asia appeal to the U.N. will favor the Western effort to prevent the sovietization of this economically and strategically important zone. The difficulty will be the same as in Korea: in Vietnam, in Laos, in Cambodia, tomorrow perhaps in Thailand, there will be two governments. There will probably be a majority in

the General Assembly ready to proclaim that in Laos and Cambodia only the non-Communist governments are legitimate, which is likely to be true there, though not in Vietnam. Even if the Communist states oppose this majority decision, it will facilitate the formation of a regional alliance and perhaps American military intervention.

It is obvious that this hypothesis will be confirmed only if the United States decides to act, and carries with it the interested parties—the threatened Asian countries and the countries of the Atlantic alliance. The U.N. cannot stop the Sino-Communist expansion which advances by infiltration, guerrilla warfare, the formation of rival governments, and the regrouping of populations scattered among several countries (the Thai). The U.N. can only facilitate the rallying of public opinion in the United States, and the creation of a common front. In other words, if governments were free to make decisions through an untrammelled exercise of authority, the U.N. would scarcely be useful. Recourse to the U.N. is less the homage paid to virtue, less the evocation of an unreal dreamworld than an acknowledgment of democratic ideologies that constitute a determining factor by the influence they exercise over the minds of men.

Perhaps it would in fact be difficult, men and circumstances being what they are, to defend Southeast Asia against Sino-Communist expansion without creating a regional alliance, itself placed under the sponsorship of the U.N., to calm the scruples of the independent states of Asia. It is obvious that this formal framework will never be more than a condition of the essential factor, namely the great powers' will to act. It would be a mistake through false realism not to recognize the necessity of this framework. It would be an equal

mistake, through false idealism, to seek in the Charter the secret of salvation and a substitute for force.

THE REALISTIC REVOLUTION AGAINST WAR

Perhaps the preceding discussion will be judged cynical. Personally, I do not so regard it. To say that the establishment of the U.N. has not essentially changed international relations is a judgment of fact, not a value judgment. The critic of these views should prove that the judgment is false before accusing us of cynicism. If he admits that the judgment is true for the past, but holds that it must cease to be so in the future, it is incumbent upon him to show in what way we may modify the fundamental conditions of the present historical situation which limit the effectiveness of the U.N.

Raymond Aron, Doctor of Letters, Paris, is professor at the Institut d'Études politiques and the École Nationale d'Administration. He is contributing editor of Le Figaro and author of Le Grand Schisme (1948), Les Guerres en Chaîne (1951; published in the United States as The Century of Total War), and other works.

Real discussion, beyond these observations which are difficult to refute, should deal with the significance of this analysis. Can we conceive of an international system in which the U.N. would genuinely guarantee the security of all and every one? Would it be enough to change certain elements in the situation, or would it be necessary to change the essential characteristics of relations between states as we have known them for the past six thousand years?

Such a discussion would go beyond the scope of this short study. Permit us to advance, without demonstration, the following hypothesis: the progress in arms of mass destruction or the spread of a world-wide empire will perhaps eliminate wars between states from history. I doubt whether an international organization will ever be capable of such a revolution.

Developing the Peaceful Settlement Functions of the United Nations

By ELMORE JACKSON

"... we are not making effective use of the legal instrument we now have. . . . the essential problem . . . is that of creating out of the United Nations an instrument of trust. . . ."

IS there enough power undergirding the efforts of the United Nations to settle political disputes? If not, what types of additional power, or authority, would contribute to the effectiveness of the U.N.'s peaceful settlement work?

These questions are basic to the considerations surrounding any Charter review conference. There is no reason, however, for these questions to be any easier to answer in the field of international disputes than would similar questions which might be asked in the field of labor-management disputes—or indeed in any form of conflict settlement. Every dispute has its own characteristics and its own human equation. The general field of dispute settlement has always been one in which generalization is hazardous. But with a Charter review conference in prospect, some analysis should now be attempted. Before venturing on this uneasy ground let us look briefly at the general setting in which the U.N.'s more specific mediation and conciliation work takes place.

Undergirding the special efforts of the United Nations to settle particular conflicts such as those in Palestine, Indonesia, Kashmir, and South Africa has been the general work of the organization in the economic, social, and trusteeship fields. By the constant adjustment of conflicting economic interests, by stimulating economic-development programs through the provision of technical assistance, by helping to establish com-

mon objectives in the social field, and by providing a framework through which dependent peoples can progress toward self-government, the United Nations is helping to channel into patterns of orderly evolution a multiplicity of problems—many of which would otherwise develop into threats to peace. This is peaceful settlement at its best—in the early stages and on a preventive basis.

No less important is the general political work of the General Assembly. Here, at the beginning of each Assembly, each national delegation has the opportunity to air its grievances, to state its concerns, and to make its contribution to the climate of opinion in which the succeeding political business will be conducted. While more and more specific disputes are being brought to the attention of the General Assembly, the Assembly is especially well adapted to the transaction of what might be called "general political business of international interest."

The Assembly is the town meeting of the world. Thus to refer to it is not to deprecate its power—as anyone familiar with a New England town meeting should know. Trial balloons are sent up—and brought down! Log-rolling and block voting take place. But beneath it all essential fact finding and fact assessing take place. Influences of conciliation and mediation are brought to bear. Important principles are delineated and agreed upon. Ad-

justments and compromises take place. This is essential international political business in the modern world—conducted as it must be in a common setting.

If the Assembly is to play an increasingly effective role in the peaceful settlement of disputes, either directly or through subsidiary bodies, must it be given more legal power through a Charter review (or revision) conference?

SCOPE AND POWERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

While the United Nations Charter conferred upon the Security Council special responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security, substantial responsibilities were also given to the General Assembly. Under the Charter the General Assembly may (1) "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter . . .";¹ (2) "consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security . . .";² (3) "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations . . .";³ (4) "initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of . . . promoting international co-operation in the political field. . . ."⁴ "Subject to the provisions of Article 12 [consideration by the Security Council], the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the

¹ Art. 10.

² Art. 11, par. 1.

³ Art. 11, par. 2.

⁴ Art. 13, par. 1.

provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."⁵

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish any problem of peaceful settlement which would be excluded from General Assembly consideration under these broad provisions. Excepted only are questions under consideration by the Security Council. A means for the orderly and vetoless transfer of any of these problems to the General Assembly "if the Security Council is failing to exercise its function of maintaining international peace and security" is provided by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War.

If the General Assembly has sufficient scope to consider any problem which might arise, what of its power to deal with this wide range of issues?

There are two principal aspects to this felt need for more power in the United Nations. The first concern is for an organization with sufficient moral, economic, political, and police strength for would-be adventurers to be deterred by this combined strength (and by predictable consequences) from embarking upon, or continuing, a course of action leading to the disruption of the international public order. A second concern is for the authority and prestige to deal with political disputes—if possible before they become threats to the peace.

The United Nations Charter distinguishes, in general, between the functions of the Organization in handling threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression (Chapter VII) and the settlement of the background political disputes which may have caused the disruption of public order (Chapter VI). In the former

⁵ Art. 14.

case the Organization may make recommendations for (or, in the case of the Security Council, decide upon) measures, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security. In its efforts, however, to get a settlement of the political issues which may have caused the dispute, the primary reliance is upon the methods of investigation, conciliation, and mediation. In dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression under Chapter VII it is even suggested that, in calling upon the parties to a dispute to comply with provisional measures, these measures might well be "without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned."⁶ In its work under Chapter VI the Security Council may go so far as to recommend terms of settlement if it "deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."⁷ Otherwise, while the Council may recommend or initiate appropriate methods or procedures of adjustment, it may make recommendations with regard to terms of settlement only on the request of the parties.⁸

It is evident that those who framed the Charter believed that the full power of the United Nations should be used to restrain threats to the peace and, if a breach of the peace or an act of aggression had already occurred, to restore international peace and security. While they were not prepared to have this same power used to enforce a particular form of political settlement, the Security Council was empowered to recommend terms of settlement if the Council concluded that international peace and security were "likely to be endangered." A similar power appears now to reside

⁶ Art. 40.

⁷ Art. 37.

⁸ Art. 38.

in the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.

In other types of conflict settlement a public recommendation by the mediating body has often proved an effective means of securing agreement. The fact that even this limited power of recommendation has been used so infrequently by the U.N. suggests that Charter limitations may not at the present time be a major handicap to the development of the U.N.'s peaceful settlement activities. If the members of the United Nations have been reluctant to encourage the use of that power which the Organization now possesses, it is even more unlikely that they would, barring a drastic alteration in international legal relationships, take the further step of bringing some form of compulsory arbitration more into the forefront of the U.N.'s peaceful settlement work.

NEED FOR MORE POLITICAL POWER?

Not all the advocates of more power for the General Assembly are seeking an increase in its legal power. Mr. John Foster Dulles in his speech of January 18, 1954, before the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, said:

In the General Assembly, each nation has one vote—is this the best arrangement? If the General Assembly is to assume greater responsibilities, then should there not be some form of weighted voting, so that nations which are themselves unable to assume serious military or financial responsibilities cannot put those responsibilities on other nations? Should there be, in some matters, a combination vote whereby affirmative action requires both a majority of all the members, on the basis of sovereign equality, and also a majority vote, on a weighted basis, which takes into account population, resources, etc.?

The Secretary obviously had in mind the exploration of possible Charter

changes which might give more practical *political* power to the General Assembly. It is difficult in theory to argue against Charter modifications which it might at some future time be possible to achieve along these lines. The present voting system does exert certain restraints on the large powers. This makes for a system in which at times the full scope of the diplomatic resources of these powers has been used in the search for support on certain issues. While there are some countries that would look with favor on voting changes in the Assembly, it seems likely that if the United States were to emphasize such revision as one of its principal objectives in a Charter review conference, many of the small countries would lose some of their interest in such a conference. They are not likely to look with favor on revisions which would reduce their power. Even a simple majority vote on the holding of such a conference might under these circumstances be very difficult to obtain.

CREATING AN INSTRUMENT OF TRUST

In questions of the settlement of international disputes, the essential problem is not that of the legal power of the United Nations. The problem is that of creating out of the United Nations an instrument of trust which can be relied upon to render effective service in the peaceful settlement field. While certain minor adjustments in the Charter might facilitate the creation of such an instrument, the basic problem is not the formal enabling powers of the Charter. It is a question of assembling within this area of U.N. activity persons who because of their political wisdom and experience, their insight into contemporary issues, and their personal integrity inspire confidence that the vital national interests with which they deal will be handled with resourcefulness, patience, and care. It is also a question of estab-

lishing a more effective means through which certain lessons can be drawn from past experience—experience both inside and outside the United Nations.

Let us look first at this question of past experience. The United Nations staff is now engaged in the assembling of a general repertory of Security Council experience and of general experience under the Charter. But not since the Interim Committee was, for all practical purposes, laid to rest in 1950 have the members of the United Nations made any sustained effort to draw lessons from the U.N.'s past work in dispute settlement. Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico in September 1952, on the occasion of his turning over the presidency of the General Assembly to Lester B. Pearson of Canada, suggested that the General Assembly establish a committee to concern itself with the development of the U.N.'s peaceful settlement work and that this committee operate parallel to the Collective Measures Committee. This apparently useful suggestion was not taken up by the General Assembly.

What new approaches might a review of past experience suggest?

While different disputes call for different handling there has been a general trend in recent years away from extensive debate and "instructed" commissions toward a more flexible and informal use of the United Nations' peaceful settlement facilities. It is easy to understand the reluctance of states to turn to the United Nations for help in a dispute in which they are a party if the U.N.'s first move is to be a public debate in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. The debate is certain to bring new political influences into the situation, some of them extraneous and many of them unpredictable. The general debate has the possibility of aggravating the dispute and sometimes of making its ultimate solution more difficult. Thus a state's de-

cision to submit a dispute to the United Nations is usually based on its estimate of the possibilities of picking up support for its case.

But suppose it were possible for the United Nations to provide, initially, a more informal (and less legislative) type of aid to the disputants. Might there not under these circumstances be a freer turning to the United Nations and a freer use of its facilities?

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S KEY ROLE

The initial point of regular informal political contact in the United Nations is the office of the Secretary-General. It would appear to have been the intention of the framers of the present Charter that the office of the Secretary-General should, in its political functions, be developed over and above that of the comparable office in the League of Nations. Under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, "the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

It is apparent that both the first Secretary-General and the present one have conceived of their role as being a broad one. Probably no single individual connected with the U.N.'s peaceful settlement work can have as much influence as the Secretary-General in building confidence in the United Nations political work and in making the Organization a "trusted instrument." In order to fulfill effectively, however, his oft-times quiet and backstage role, the Secretary-General must have a group of senior officers in the political field who can keep him constantly apprised of important developments in all major geographical regions with which he must deal. The method through which this skilled political advice is made available is less important than that it should be available within the Organization as a

whole. The dictates of good administration would appear to suggest that such a staff should either be located in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs or attached to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.

Supplemental to those on his own staff on whom he can call, the Secretary-General has two other principal sources of political and diplomatic experience to which he can turn—for either informal or formal assistance.

The heads of the sixty permanent delegations to the U.N. are continuously available. Some of them have had extensive diplomatic experience and many of them can be focal points of conciliation as issues are weighed and negotiated both before and during consideration by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The representatives of certain countries are often able, for reasons both of geography and interest, to be of special assistance to the Secretary-General on an informal basis. In making the United Nations a trusted instrument of political negotiation there can be no substitute for the closest diplomatic relationship between the Secretary-General and the heads of the delegations representing the Member States.

PANEL FOR INQUIRY AND CONCILIATION

The Secretary-General and the principal officers of the General Assembly and the Security Council have another diplomatic resource which could be much more fully used. On April 28, 1949, the General Assembly established a Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation. The international panel was to be composed of persons who "by reason of their training, experience, character and standing, are deemed to be well fitted to serve as members of commissions of inquiry or of conciliation and who would be disposed to serve in that capacity." Each Member State was permitted to designate

five persons. The Panel was to be available to the Security Council and the General Assembly, to their subsidiary organs, or to Member States involved in controversies. The method of selection was to be determined in each case by the appointing organ. Upon the joint request of the parties to a controversy, appointment could be by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly, or the chairman of the Interim Committee. The administration of the Panel was lodged with the Secretary-General.

The theory behind the Panel was an eminently good one. It was believed that it would facilitate the U.N.'s dispute settlement work to have in being a roster of persons well qualified for service as members of mediation or conciliation commissions—persons who in accepting designation had entered into certain informal undertakings as to availability and interest and who were of sufficient eminence to have been designated by their own governments. Initial designations were for five years. These five years have elapsed, and the time has now come for the Panel to be reconstituted.

The United Nations Charter encourages parties to a dispute to attempt to settle the conflict themselves before bringing it to the United Nations. Should disputing parties not at times be encouraged to turn to the international Panel and by agreement to secure the services of one of its members as a mediator and conciliator? Following the lead given by other types of contracts or commercial agreements, treaties between states might provide for certain types of disputes under the treaty to be subjected to mediation or to arbitration by a qualified person selected from the Panel by the two parties or by the Secretary-General. The Panel has to date been used only once—in the selection by the Security Council of Dr.

Frank P. Graham as mediator in the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. The Panel constitutes a resource for peaceful settlement which could be more fully used by the United Nations.

President of General Assembly in conciliatory work

The trend toward a more informal type of political negotiation is further indicated in the increasing use which has been made of the office of the President of the General Assembly. At the first part of the third session of the General Assembly, held in Paris in 1948, Mr. Evatt of Australia was associated with an effort, authorized by the Assembly, to conciliate the dispute over the Greek children. In 1950, as President of the Assembly, Mr. Entezam of Iran served as chairman of two different good offices commissions set up by the General Assembly in an effort to seek a solution of the Korean conflict. During the fall of 1951 Mr. Padilla Nervo of Mexico, as President of the Assembly, served as the chairman of a closed conference of the principal powers concerned which made an effort, during the Assembly, to break the disarmament deadlock. Mr. Pearson of Canada during his presidency of the General Assembly in the fall of 1952 was deeply involved in efforts to achieve an armistice in Korea.

Possibilities of the Panel

The articles relating to the composition and use of the Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation permit the President of the Assembly and the Secretary-General to appoint persons from the Panel to undertake tasks of inquiry or conciliation when requested to do so by a treaty or by the parties to a dispute. There would appear to be no reason, however, why the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General could not, if they so desired, as-

sociate some member of the Panel with them in any informal conciliatory work in which they were engaged. Both men are free to appoint such assistants as they require. Through such informal association, experience could be gained against the time when formal appointment might be made by conflicting parties or some special responsibility assigned by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Persons from the reconstituted Panel could be asked occasionally to serve as rapporteur of the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendation of the Interim Committee in April 1949.

The history of international mediation has been a history of the search for the impartial and effective third party. We have commented on the importance of having readily available, competent, and impartial individuals who are in a position to use their good offices in disputes previous to or during the more formal consideration of these questions by one of the established organs of the United Nations. Let us now turn to alternative methods that might be employed by the Security Council, the General Assembly, or a subsidiary organ in the consideration of disputes.

PRIVACY IN NEGOTIATION

It has been suggested that a rapporteur might be appointed to negotiate with the parties following the opening statements by the parties in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. The President of the Security Council has at times performed this function. There are times when it is desirable for the opening statements of the parties to be followed by statements on the part of other members which reveal the degree to which sentiment exists for peaceful settlement—or for a particular type of settlement. To allow the debate to go on to the passage of a resolution frequently results, however, in a hard-

ening of positions and an exacerbation of the conflict.

It has been suggested, therefore, that the Security Council and possibly even the General Assembly should experiment with a plan under which, in certain cases, it would terminate debate following the principal statements on the part of all interested parties and at that point turn the negotiation over to a more private treatment. This suggestion is well worth exploring. It is not unlike the use of working parties which has been developed by the Assembly during two of its recent regular sessions. We have mentioned the working party approach as used on the disarmament question at the 1951 session of the General Assembly in Paris, when the debate in the Political Committee was adjourned to permit a ten-day closed conference of the countries principally concerned to meet under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, the President of the Assembly. A similar approach was used by the Second Committee during the 1953 session, when a subcommittee met in closed session under the chairmanship of Mr. Mates of Yugoslavia in an effort to reach agreement on the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that the United Nations has by no means exhausted the possibilities of further shaping its procedures and its personnel in ways which could aid it in gaining the confidence and trust of its members in its work in peaceful settlement. It is not so much by reaching after the spectacular as by "month to month" gains in these areas that the U.N.'s reputation will eventually be built.

POWER TO RECOMMEND TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

Let us return now to the question of the power of the Security Council or of

the General Assembly, or of one of their subsidiary organs, to recommend terms of settlement to parties in dispute. We have indicated that this was a power which the United Nations has thus far been reluctant to use. Mediators or conciliation commissions have frequently urged the parties in private to accept particular terms of settlement, but the Council and the General Assembly have been chary of attempting to go on record on behalf of such detailed terms. The veto is a constant hazard in the Security Council, and the General Assembly because of its size is hardly adapted to the detailed consideration required in these matters. Furthermore, such resolutions tend to freeze the situation and reduce possibilities of later compromise. There are, therefore, substantial arguments against more frequent attempts by the Security Council or the General Assembly to recommend specific terms of settlement.

Could not a case be made, however, for subsidiary negotiating organs, appointed either by the Security Council or the General Assembly, to have more freedom to make recommendations for settlement, and to release these recommendations if they felt that public consideration of them might promote a settlement? It seems likely that if the negotiating organs had the power to publicize recommendations, the disputing parties might take these recommendations more seriously in the preceding private negotiations. We have suggested that this has been the experience in other types of conflict settlement. It is the usual practice for the parent body to retain its freedom of action, but public discussion of recommendations made by a subsidiary body enables both parties to assess more accurately their respective positions—and the needs and possibilities of compromise.

It would undoubtedly be very much

easier for U.N. commissions and mediators to develop and use recommendations if, as proposed by the Vandenberg resolution adopted by the Senate in June 1948, the veto could be removed by voluntary agreement from "all questions involving peaceful settlement of international disputes and situations." The Security Council would then be able by simple majority vote to fix flexible terms of reference for its subsidiary negotiating bodies. It would also be freed to give more active support to such bodies, including, if it appeared in order, support to either general or specific recommendations for settlement.

To what extent is Article 37 of the Charter a handicap to the development of this procedure? This article permits the Security Council to make recommendations on terms of settlement in cases in which the Council decides "that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." The General Assembly has not been given such powers explicitly, but it would be difficult, following the series of Assembly resolutions on Palestine and the subsequent passage of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, to maintain that such powers were lacking.

There is an understandable reluctance among states to have disputes to which they are a party deemed a danger to the peace. The words of Article 37, however, are mild ones—"likely to endanger." It would be difficult in this anxious and frequently trembling world to conclude that any dispute between two countries of sufficient importance to be put on the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly did not in fact fall into this category. There may be times, however, in which it is not politic or conducive to a prompt settlement to say so. It might thus be wise, at some time when other Charter revisions are being made, for Article 37

to be redrafted. In the meantime, in an international situation in which we are in much need of plain speaking about the importance of avoiding disturbances to the peace, this Article should not be a serious handicap to the development and use of the power to recommend terms of settlement.

In a world so unsteadied by the ever present possibility of the misuse of unprecedented power, who is there among us to say that our intergovernmental institutions would not serve us better if they could, with common consent, be substantially altered? But any such common consent will only flow from a much clearer conviction than appears now to be evident that our principal dif-

ficulty lies in Charter limitations. Any general sampling among those reasonably well versed in United Nations affairs would, I believe, show an overwhelming conviction that we are not making effective use of the legal instrument we now have. Greater use can be made of the offices of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. The Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation can be reconstituted. Further use can be made of the power to make public recommendations. While we seek opportunities and agreements to perfect the Charter, let us realize that in creating an institution of trust, it is the human equation that makes the greatest difference.

Elmore Jackson, New York City, is director of the Program at the United Nations of the American Friends Service Committee. He has served as personal assistant and political officer to the United Nations mediator in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. He was for a time personnel director and later assistant executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee. He is the author of Meeting of Minds (1952), a comparative study of conflict settlement in the labor and international fields.

Barriers to the Expansion of United Nations Economic Functions

By RAYMOND F. MIKESELL

"... while there is plenty of room for improvement in the organizational structure of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the basic problems with respect to the role of the U.N. in economic and social affairs cannot be resolved by changes in its constitution. . . . International economic co-operation . . . must be based on a foundation of political security and trust."

THE United Nations Charter rightly recognizes the intimate relationship between international peace and security and the solution of economic problems. Paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Charter states as one of the purposes of the U.N. "To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character. . . ." In addition members pledged themselves "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" and "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." But the U.N. has no power to compel action in the economic and social sphere on the part of its members, nor was it given a clear authority to initiate action beyond the making of studies and recommendations, preparing international conventions for the signature of governments, and convening international conferences. The Organization could, however, perform services upon the request of member governments, and there is no limit to the number and functions of specialized agencies which might be created for operating assignments.

The question of how far the U.N. should extend itself into the field of operations for implementing the purposes of the Charter in the economic

and social field has rarely been debated as a constitutional issue, and a change in the language of the Charter could scarcely be expected to resolve the fundamental differences among the members in this field. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a formula could be devised, and still less agreed upon, which would provide the answer for all situations which may arise in the future. Take for example the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). Korean relief was a responsibility of the United Nations arising out of the Organization's "police" action in Korea. Similarly relief and resettlement of the Palestine refugees is intimately related to the political activities of the U.N. in connection with the Arab-Israeli war.¹ Even if it were considered desirable for the U.N. to refrain from administering action programs in the economic field, it cannot escape responsibility for economic problems growing out of its political or military activities.

So long as the principle of noninterference with the internal affairs of the members is maintained and so long as members cannot be required to con-

¹ The General Assembly established in 1950 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to administer a program of relief and rehabilitation among the Arab refugees.

tribute specific sums of money for special economic and social activities, the problems of implementing the economic and social objectives of the U.N. will continue to be dealt with on an evolutionary basis and will be governed in large measure by the political relationships between and the political attitudes within the Member States. It is the position of this paper, therefore, that while there is plenty of room for improvement in the organizational structure of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the basic problems with respect to the role of the U.N. in economic and social affairs cannot be resolved by changes in its constitution. The nature of these problems will be discussed in the remainder of this paper.

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Chapter X of the United Nations Charter established the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as the principal U.N. organ, under the General Assembly, for discharging the functions of the U.N. in the field of international economic and social co-operation outlined in Chapter IX of the Charter. The Council is a political body of eighteen members, with a number of functions requiring a variety of competence and organizational structure for effective fulfillment. The Council undertakes studies, issues reports, and makes recommendations on a wide variety of economic and social matters. To assist in this work it has established commissions such as the Economic and Employment Commission and the Fiscal Commission, which are composed of government nominees who debate issues in public session for the benefit of their constituents, just as do the members of the Council when the resolutions are referred to that body. Since the functional Commissions have tended to be little more than subarenas for the cold-war debate, most of them have been in-

active in recent years. The Council's other duties include the co-ordination of the activities of the specialized agencies, calling conventions for the establishment of new specialized agencies, advising the General Assembly, and performing services at the requests of members of the U.N.² Thus ECOSOC combines in one agency the functions of one or more specialized agencies, that of a co-ordinator of other specialized agencies, an economic and social adviser, a research institute, a high level forum for debating divergent social and economic philosophies, and a propaganda medium for the opponents in the cold war. While it is not the primary purpose of this paper to discuss organization, it would appear that the ineffectiveness of the U.N. may be due in part to the multiplicity of its functions. In addition, there should be a clear distinction between bodies which are supposed to do a technical job and those whose members represent governments and which are supposed to negotiate and debate. Finally it should be recognized that serious negotiations cannot be conducted in public forums.

A more fundamental barrier to effective action by ECOSOC in implementing the purposes of the Charter is to be found in the cold war itself and in the lack of any political basis for co-operative action between the East and the West on economic and social matters. While this barrier has been dealt with in certain of the specialized agencies through the virtual exclusion of Soviet bloc members, the most important operative organs, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Pay-

² For a critical discussion of ECOSOC see A. Loveday's "Suggestions for the Reform of the United Nations Economic and Social Machinery," *International Organization* (World Peace Foundation), August 1953, pp. 325-41.

ments Union (EPU), have been entirely outside of the U.N.

It has been suggested that the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly could carry out their functions more readily if they had greater powers over the operations of the specialized agencies, particularly those with substantial resources at their disposal. There is no doubt that better co-ordination is needed between the specialized agencies, particularly in the field of technical assistance, and perhaps between technical assistance and the leading activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). There are also problems of co-ordination between the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which have not been satisfactorily dealt with. However, if the U.N. were given powers over the IBRD or the IMF it would strike at the principle of weighted voting in these institutions. Moreover, not all U.N. members belong to each of the specialized agencies, and these agencies would not welcome dictation by nonmembers.

THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

Many of the international agencies responsible for implementing the broad economic and social objectives of the U.N. either had been established or had had their charters negotiated before the U.N. came into existence. These organizations include the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Universal Postal Union, and the International Telecommunication Union, to name a few. These organizations tend to have highly specialized functions and operate on the basis of international agreements

with respect to the rules of conduct in their respective fields. Except for the Fund and the Bank the operations of these agencies do not involve large amounts of money. The Fund and the Bank make loans in accordance with well-defined criteria. Moreover, the interests of the countries supplying the bulk of loan funds are well protected by a system of weighted voting and in the case of the Bank, by the necessity of maintaining the confidence of the American money market in the soundness of the Bank's obligations.

Several specialized organizations carry on technical assistance activities related to their special fields. These include the World Health Organization (WHO), FAO, ILO, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), whose technical assistance activities are co-ordinated to a degree at least by the Technical Assistance Board of the U.N. The technical assistance functions of the U.N. will be taken up in a later section.

Finally, certain specialized agencies have been created by the U.N. for dealing with emergency relief and rehabilitation problems. These include the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the International Refugee Organization (IRO),³ the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and UNKRA in Korea. While these organizations have distributed substantial sums of money for economic assistance, they have special characteristics which distinguish them from certain other types of economic aid programs which have been suggested as appropriate for the U.N. With one exception, they are emergency programs for particular areas or groups of peoples and deal with problems arising out of political or

³ Now terminated.

military developments in which the U.N. has been closely associated. Moreover, in the case of Arab refugee relief, the complex political nature of the problem would have made it difficult for individual countries like the United States to deal with it on a unilateral basis.

In the light of the controversy over the continuation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization in 1946—an organization which antedated the U.N.—we might raise the question as to whether or not all relief problems should be handled by a U.N. organization. Aside from the political split between the East and the West, in which UNRRA ultimately foundered, there are other difficulties inherent in multilateralized charity. There are first of all no adequate criteria for relief needs on a national basis, although starvation and the absence of clothing and shelter represent fairly definitive criteria for individual needs. But the question of whether or not a nation can or should meet the relief needs of its own people without outside help is a politico-economic one of the greatest complexity. There are countries where millions of people live their lives at what the Western world would regard as a subrelief standard. A relief standard to some peoples would seem like luxury to others. If Greece has civil disorder and widespread crop failures combined with an earthquake or two, should she receive relief or be asked to draw down her exchange reserves or borrow from the IBRD, the IMF, or the Export-Import Bank?

International relief in general is too broad and too vague a function to be administered by an international political body. It is extremely difficult to establish definite criteria for the carrying out of such a function by an international secretariat, and its administration by a large committee of

members might mean little more than a political grab bag.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The principal regional organizations within the U.N. framework are the Economic Commissions for Europe (ECE), for Latin America (ECLA), and for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). Their activities, like those of the Economic and Social Council itself, are largely in the realm of study and debate, directed toward the economic problems of their respective regions. But the great diversity of economic structure and interests and the wide differences in political orientation which exist among the nations and territories of these huge geographical areas make these groupings somewhat artificial. An organization designed to deal with economic problems must have something more in common than geography. There must be at least a minimum of political cohesion and agreement on common goals, and there must be economic problems which are not only common to the geographical area but are capable of solution on a group basis.

Trade and foreign exchange relationships provide the most promising field for group action on a geographical basis, especially if the economies are sufficiently complementary to make possible and advantageous a larger amount of intra-area trade. This is true to a high degree in Europe, except that the split between the East and the West greatly limits the effectiveness of the ECE in the field. There are some possibilities for improving trade relations among the countries of the Far East by reducing trade barriers or the formation of customs unions. However, the fact that trade within the area is largely financed with Western European currencies which are already more or less interconvertible greatly limits the need for action in the

field of foreign exchange. In Latin America the opportunities for an expansion of intraregional trade are far less promising, and the countries are divided between those which trade on a dollar basis and those which trade on an inconvertible basis. Solution to this problem must be found outside of the area.

Contiguous countries may find a basis for co-operation in the field of economic development, particularly in the development of rivers flowing through the territories of both, but it is difficult to see how effective co-operation in the development field can take place between Indonesia and Pakistan or between Ecuador and Argentina. Under certain conditions transportation and communications provide a basis for regional co-operation. Regional development funds would seem to make sense only if capital exporting countries are included in the region, and even here the economic advantages of regional over free-world funds or loan institutions are sometimes difficult to see. On the other hand, there may be a political basis for regional activity. For example, the United States might want to establish an intra-American bank, such as was planned before the war, as a part of a program of hemisphere solidarity.

It is worth noting that the most important regional economic organization from the standpoint of its concrete accomplishments is the OEEC, which is not associated with the U.N. This is an organization originally established in response to a request by the United States for joint planning of European recovery and composed of states with certain common political and economic aims. However, its greatest achievements lie in the field of trade and foreign exchange.

The purpose of the above remarks is not to deny the desirability of regional commissions as forums for the discus-

sion and study of regional problems, but to raise certain questions as to their feasibility in the field of operations. Special regional organizations can only be effective in the fields of trade, finance, communications, and joint development if there exists a concrete basis for joint action in these fields. Geographical orientation alone is not a basis for action on a regional basis.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The demand for expanded economic functions of the U.N. stems largely from those who believe that economic development should be promoted by large grants and so-called soft or non-bankable loans, on a multilateral basis. This view is by no means confined to the representatives of the underdeveloped areas, although official support for U.N. development programs involving substantial sums of money is largely confined to the spokesmen for the underdeveloped countries.⁴ A contingent endorsement of the principle of a substantial U.N. development fund was given by the United States when it initiated a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly favoring the establishment of such a fund when sufficient progress had been made in internationally supervised disarmament.⁵ However, the United States has recently opposed the establishment of the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) which provides for initial contributions total-

⁴ The International Development Advisory Board in its Report to the President of the United States recommended the establishment of an International Development Authority to operate under a management contract with the IBRD. The Authority would have an initial capital not to exceed 500 million dollars of which the U. S. subscription would be 200 million dollars. *Partners in Progress*, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, March 1951.

⁵ This resolution was adopted on December 7, 1953.

ing 250 million dollars. SUNFED was not officially opposed in principle but on the grounds that continued world tensions and the large United States defense and foreign aid budgets make a substantial contribution from the United States unwise at this time. However, many United States officials and Congressmen are privately opposed to the proposal in principle. Somewhat less controversial is the position that the activities of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board, which now operates on a budget of about 20 million dollars, should be substantially expanded.

Few would deny that there is a close relationship between world peace and security on the one hand and the realization of the aspirations of the peoples of the low-income areas of the world for a better life on the other. The fact that these areas are the most important battle ground in the cold war makes the promotion of economic development a vital aspect of the free world's struggle against Communist aggression. However, the fact that the U.N. includes the Soviet bloc has led many people to doubt the appropriateness of U.N. action in this field.

The basic argument for international programs for economic development as against unilateral ones administered by the capital-supplying countries is that only in this way can foreign aid be divorced from the sordidness of international politics and the fear of political dictation by the Western powers. It is also argued that an international institution can have a greater influence over the internal economic policies of the recipients of loans and grants, since recommendations from international civil servants are less likely to be considered as being motivated by special political or economic interests of foreign powers. Thus the countries from whom the bulk of the money for economic development must come are asked to

employ a nonpolitical instrument for achieving what they regard to be long-term political or security objectives.

Difficulties of international economic programs

This thesis must, I believe, stand or fall on whether or not the internationalized activity is capable of being administered by technicians and administrators in accordance with objective criteria upon which the Member States are in reasonable agreement. If decisions as to the allocation of funds must be made in part at least on the basis of political interests of the members, the members contributing the bulk of the resources will insist either upon a veto or upon dominating the management of the organization. But an institution whose policies are dominated by the United States and a few Western powers may fail to satisfy the desire of the underdeveloped countries for an international institution whose policies are determined on a one country-one vote basis.

The experience of the IBRD provides a case in point. For various reasons the Bank is largely dominated by the United States, a fact which is frequently referred to by other countries. The Bank's charter lays down some rather specific rules for the guidance of its management, rules based on what have been regarded as conservative financial principles. And while one may argue that the Bank has been over-conservative in the implementation of those rules, they provide at least an approach to objective criteria for the administration of a loan fund by international civil servants. Yet if the Bank's policies were controlled on the basis of one country-one vote, its operations would undoubtedly be fraught with political difficulties and disagreements. Some countries have taken the position that the Bank's lending and loan-super-

vising policies represent an undue interference with their sovereignty. In fact some have expressed a preference for Export-Import Bank loans over those made by the IBRD on the alleged grounds that the standards of the United States government institution are somewhat more liberal.

While the criteria for the administration of an international grant fund would be somewhat less objective, it is quite possible to develop criteria for making capital grants in terms of the soundness and priority of the projects. In fact the standards for making sound capital grants which are capable of expanding the social product by something more than the rate of depreciation are similar to those for making bankable loans. It is quite likely therefore that the problem of allocating grants among the various claimants on an international fund would be solved for a time at least by a dearth of sound projects. But would such policies be satisfactory to a democratically chosen board of directors of an international grant fund? Or would the countries which made available the bulk of the resources be satisfied with what they might regard as unsound and wasteful policies?

There is perhaps an even more serious barrier to internationalized economic assistance today. Foreign aid, particularly in the United States, has come to be regarded as a political weapon for achieving specific objectives in the cold war. While it is true that we share the more fundamental objectives with the other countries of the free world, there are special political and economic objectives of the United States which could not always be realized through a multilateral development fund. For example, the international agency might not adopt the same regulations with respect to the trade relations between the aid recipient and the Soviet bloc which the United States

requires of bilateral aid recipients. Or this country might want to deny aid entirely to countries with neutralist or Communist leanings, or to give the bulk of the aid to certain countries in strategic positions. On the economic side the United States has sought to make foreign aid available in certain forms such as surplus agricultural commodities, and has required that a portion of its aid funds be spent exclusively for United States commodities and that 50 per cent of the aid exports be carried in United States ships. Without passing judgment on these objectives, it is safe to say that these specific political and economic objectives could not well be realized in an international organization.

Technical assistance

Technical assistance, provided it does not involve a large element of commodity aid, is free of many of the difficulties referred to in connection with internationalized development grants. Technical assistance is necessarily limited by the availability of well-defined projects and of specially trained personnel. Within the free world at least the sharing of technical knowledge and experience has not given rise to political controversy and the criteria of administration can be made reasonably objective. In spite of problems of coordination and duplication, the technical assistance activities of the U.N. have been fairly successful, and there has been little political bickering over the allocation of the funds made available by the Technical Assistance Board. U.N. technical assistance has some real advantages over bilateral programs, principally because the former is non-political and also because the U.N. can draw its experts from all over the world. Its principal disadvantage as compared with the United States program is the lack of integration with loan and grant

programs including the administration of counterpart funds. As long as the United States has large bilateral foreign aid programs it is unlikely that it will disband its own Point Four activities in favor of wholly international technical assistance.⁶

ECONOMIC STABILITY

Second only to economic development is the demand that the U.N. take action in promoting international economic stability and preventing sharp fluctuations in the prices of primary commodities. This has been the subject of three reports to the Secretary-General of the U.N. by committees of experts,⁷ has been discussed in a number of publications of the U.N. Secretariat, the Commissions, and the specialized agencies, and has been widely debated within the U.N. Three types of programs to be administered by the U.N. or its specialized agencies have been proposed for dealing with international economic instability: (1) stabilization of the flow of international capital through an expansion of the lending activities of the IBRD; (2) stabilization of the flow of international trade by requiring countries whose imports have declined by reason of a fall in internal business activity to make available additional amounts of their currency to the International Monetary Fund for meeting deficits of countries whose exports have declined; and (3) international commodity stabilization schemes.

A discussion of the technical details

⁶ For an excellent discussion of this problem see W. R. Sharp, "The Institutional Framework for Technical Assistance," *International Organization*, August 1953, pp. 342-79.

⁷ See *National and International Measures for Full Employment*, December 1949; *Measures for International Economic Stability*, 1951; and *Commodity Trade and Economic Development*, 1953, all prepared by committees of experts for the U.N. and published as U.N. documents.

of these proposals, which have been developed in U.N. reports and debated in the Economic and Social Council, cannot be undertaken within the space of this article. Each of them would require substantial sums of money to be subscribed largely by a few countries to international agencies for use in implementing rather broad economic objectives. While it may be possible to devise automatic rules for the guidance of administrators in these fields, the technical details of each of these proposals have been severely criticized by leading economists who are both competent and internationally minded.⁸ In fact the major proposal for stabilizing trade contained in the U.N. report entitled *National and International Measures for Full Employment* was criticized in a subsequent U.N. report of experts under the chairmanship of Professor James W. Angell entitled *Measures for International Economic Stability*. Satisfactory means of determining the causes of a decline in a country's imports do not exist. Nor is it always possible to stabilize the total flow of investment capital through public lending agencies while at the same time following investment standards which could be agreed upon by both the capital lending and the borrowing countries alike. Equally difficult would be the determination of criteria for commodity price stabilization which would be acceptable to both consuming and producing countries. However, there is good reason to believe that an international buffer stock scheme could be administered successfully on the basis of objective criteria, provided these criteria could be agreed upon by all countries concerned, and

⁸ See for example Jacob Viner's "Full Employment at Whatever Cost," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August 1950, pp. 385-407; and H. C. Wallich, "United Nations Report on Full Employment," *American Economic Review*, December 1950, pp. 879-83.

provided the secretariat were left free from political interference.

But the problem goes deeper than that of devising administrative criteria and technical standards. Each of these action programs involves conflicting national interests which cannot be resolved by international secretariats operating institutions in accordance with broad objectives. The operating decisions of these proposed institutions are in large measure political, and an international political climate which would make it possible to leave the proposed functions to an international secretariat simply does not exist.

TRADE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Postwar experience has indicated that the field of trade and foreign exchange is one of the most fruitful areas for multilateral action programs. The most successful organization in this field has been the OEEC, which organized the European Payments Union and administers the Code of European Trade Liberalization.⁹ World disequilibrium and the dollar shortage have limited the effectiveness of the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but once convertibility of the major trading currencies is restored, these institutions should have greater success in obtaining compliance to a code of fair trade and exchange practices. Their strength must lie in persuasion through consultation rather than any attempt to enforce a rigid set of rules through sanctions.¹⁰

The Fund, like the IBRD, administers substantial resources for specific purposes laid down by its charter, and their employment is controlled in large

⁹ The International Materials Conference had a considerable degree of success in the allocation of scarce sources within the free world.

¹⁰ See R. F. Mikesell, *Foreign Exchange in the Postwar World* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1954), Chap. XXII.

measure by the United States government. From its inauguration it has been criticized on the grounds that (1) it does not permit automatic access to its resources by members in accordance with a fixed formula to be administered by the secretariat and (2) that it has been too niggardly in its lending policies. The fact is, however, that the United States would very likely withdraw from the Fund if the dollars which it has contributed, were not used in accordance with what it regarded as reasonably sound financial policies. This country has insisted that the Fund's resources be carefully managed by its politically appointed executive board and not left to the decisions of international civil servants.¹¹ Schemes advanced both in this country and abroad for an automatic international clearing union not only have little chance of acceptance in this country but overlook the basic political element in all international economic assistance.

CONCLUSION

International economic co-operation, except possibly in a few innocuous areas such as the exchange of freight cars, must be based on a foundation of political security and trust. Moreover multilateral action programs in the economic field require common political objectives, since action at a governmental level cannot be divorced from political aims. This would seem to rule out most forms of economic co-operation between the free world and the Soviet bloc, and certainly will make impossible multilateral action programs involving objects of national interest such as trade and money. Thus joint membership in international economic organizations other than debating so-

¹¹ See R. F. Mikesell, *United States Economic Policy and International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952), pp. 157-62.

cieties can only be successful if the free world can control the organizations so as to prevent their being sabotaged by the Soviets. This represents perhaps the major barrier to any expansion of U.N. economic activities in which the Soviet bloc participates to any significant degree. There is simply no common ground for joint economic activity between nations where one is seeking to destroy the others.¹²

Apart from the basic contradictions inherent in action programs in U.N. organizations involving both the free world and the Soviet orbit, there are severe limitations on U.N. activities which involve substantial expenditures of funds even when the activities are confined to non-Soviet countries. Economic assistance programs in specific areas or situations in which the U.N. has assumed military or political responsibility represent an appropriate and perhaps necessary field of U.N. activity. On the other hand economic assistance programs for budgetary support or economic development for large areas inevitably involve conflicting national interests which cannot be dealt with by a nonpolitical secretariat. Where such institutions exist, as in the case of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, their policies necessarily tend to be dominated by

¹² Until recently the Soviet bloc had not contributed to the economic and social programs of the U.N. The recent action of the Soviets in contributing to the Technical Assistance Board may envisage a change in this policy.

the major creditor country. Criteria for the dispensing of grants are less definite and objective than those provided by the charters of the Bank and the Fund. The possibility of international action programs in this field will depend largely upon (1) the willingness of the underdeveloped countries to accept the more conservative standards of the countries supplying the bulk of the funds, plus a considerable degree of domination of the management by these same countries; and (2) the willingness of the United States to give up certain national political and economic objectives in the administration of that portion of her total aid program which is taken over by an international body.

Economic action programs have been most successful in the fields of trade and foreign exchange relations, but the most important work has been done by regional organizations outside the U.N. Overshadowing all U.N. activities are the political relations between the Soviet and the free world and, to an increasing degree, divergent political attitudes among the free-world states toward the Soviet orbit and the cold war. While this problem has been solved by some specialized agencies by the virtual exclusion of Soviet members or by de facto domination on the part of the major Western powers, an extension of U.N. activities into other fields of economic activity may be inhibited either by the necessity of including Soviet members or by divergent cold-war philosophies among the free-world members themselves.

Raymond F. Mikesell, Ph.D., Charlottesville, Virginia, is professor of economics at the University of Virginia. For a number of years he served as consultant on foreign exchange to the Department of State. He took part in the monetary and financial conferences at Bretton Woods (1944) and Savannah (1946), and has been a staff member of several government missions abroad. He is the author of *United States Economic Policy and International Relations* (1952), *Foreign Exchange in the Postwar World* (1954), and numerous articles on international economic organization.

Human Rights and Charter Revision

By QUINCY WRIGHT

"... retrogression in the effort to protect human rights will be temporary. . . . But without an adequate world opinion and suitable national policies real progress cannot be made. *With* them, the already existing procedures of the Charter permit of continuous progress."

THE effort to protect human rights by international law was not initiated by the United Nations Charter. The conception of a natural law of universal obligation defining certain rights of man was elaborated by Greek philosophers and Roman jurists. This conception figured in the writings of patristic and medieval theologians and in the theory of the Renaissance jurists, who utilized it as the basis for an international law binding sovereign states. Francisco de Vitoria, in his *Relectiones de Indis et de jure belli* of 1532 which initiated that discipline, asserted that denial of the natural rights of trade and missionary activity to the Spaniards by the Aztecs was sufficient grounds for the conquest of Mexico by Cortés. The subsequent classical treatises on international law generally conceived that law as protecting the fundamental rights of individuals as well as of nations. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, international law emphasized the rights of nations. Preoccupation with the sovereignty and independence of states induced a neglect of the rights of individuals. States were said to be the only subjects of international law and were free to deal with their nationals in their territory as they saw fit.¹

Nevertheless interventions to stop

¹ George Manner, "The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 46 (July 1952), pp. 428 ff.

pogroms, persecutions, and inhumanities which "shocked the conscience of mankind" occasionally took place and were considered justifiable, though on moral rather than strictly legal grounds.²

More concrete definitions of human rights developed during the latter part of the nineteenth century in diplomatic pronouncements and arbitral awards establishing the "international standard" to be applied in the treatment of aliens within a state's territory,³ several general treaties came into force concerning the rights of soldiers, sailors, prisoners of war, aborigines, minorities, workers, and women.⁴

The League of Nations system, though designed primarily to protect the rights of nations, especially small nations, affirmed the duty of states to maintain

² Ellery Stowell, *Intervention in International Law* (Washington, D. C.: John Byrne & Company, 1921).

³ Edwin M. Borchard, *The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad*, New York, 1919.

⁴ Geneva Red Cross Conventions, 1864, 1906, 1929, 1949; Hague Conventions on the Rules of Land Warfare and on adaptation of the Geneva Convention to maritime warfare, 1899, 1907; Berlin treaties regarding the Near East, and Central Africa, 1878, 1885; Brussels slave trade convention, 1890; white slavery conventions, 1904, 1910; conventions prohibiting white phosphorus in the match industry and night work for women in industry, 1906. All general international conventions from 1864 to 1914 are listed, and those of later date are printed in full in Manley O. Hudson, *International Legislation*, 9 vols. (Washington, D. C. [Vols. I-VII] and New York [Vol. IX]: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931-1950).

"fair and humane treatment" to labor and to secure "just treatment" to the native inhabitants of their territories.⁵ The mandates system and the International Labor Organization were established to develop standards of such treatment and to provide procedures for maintaining those standards. Treaties and procedures for the protection of minorities in a number of countries were also developed within the League system.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's assertion of the "Four Freedoms" in January 1941, the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, and the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1942, which established the protection of human rights as an objective of the war, were a response to the "shock to the conscience of mankind" by the Nazi barbarities to Jews and liberals. These pronouncements were implemented by prosecutions of "crimes against humanity" in the Nuremberg and other war crimes trials; in the reaffirmation of "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women" by the Preamble to the United Nations Charter; and in the many clauses of the Charter pledging the United Nations and its members to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Realization of these commitments has been imperfect.

In the perspective of history, efforts to implement the concept of a universal protection of human rights have been energetic in proportion as nations have been in close contact and have had common cultural and religious standards. Such an effort was manifested in the Roman *jus gentium* and *jus naturale*, in the medieval divine law and natural

law, in the Renaissance law of nature and nations, and in the recent movement to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the periods between these efforts—the periods of the *lex barbarorum*, of the Machiavellian princes, and of the modern sovereign states—national cultures have been so different that universal standards for the protection of individual rights seemed unobtainable and have been so isolated that such protection seemed unimportant.⁶

DIMINISHED EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

It is not, therefore, surprising that the development of "cold war," isolating Western and Soviet cultures from one another and creating belief in the radical difference of these cultures, has led to a renewed emphasis upon national sovereignty and a decline in the effort to protect human rights.

The refusal of Soviet states to accept the Universal Declaration of Human Rights promulgated by the General Assembly in 1948 and to permit investigations or report on the protection of human rights in their territories and the refusal of the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention (which the Soviet government has ratified) or to consider the ratification of human rights covenants are evidences of the waning since 1947 of enthusiasm for the universal protection of human rights. The Bricker amendment movement in the United States and the nonratification of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights negotiated in the Council of Europe constitute further evidence of the reversion to state sovereignty and the decline of faith in a universal culture from which standards of human rights could emerge.

⁶ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 909 ff.

⁵ Art. 23.

Apart from this official lethargy, popular discussion of human rights and support for their international protection has greatly diminished, especially in the United States. In 1943 the American Bar Association authorized study of a bill of human rights by its Committee on International and Comparative Law,⁷ but in 1953 it supported an amendment to the federal Constitution to prevent acceptance of such a bill by the United States.⁸ In the hearings before the Thomas subcommittee of the Senate on Charter revision in 1950 discussion concerned proposals for strengthening the United Nations by perfecting collective security arrangements or establishing general or regional federations. Little was said about human rights. The committee report made no recommendations but commented on "the stultifying effect of East-West conflict on the United Nations" and noted that because of American interest in peace with freedom in spite of this conflict "nearly one-half the members of the Senate and more than one hundred members of the House have joined in resolutions calling for the strengthening of international organization."⁹ In the hearings before the Wiley Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter in 1954 emphasis has been upon either strengthening collective security or protecting United States sovereignty. In these

⁷ American Bar Association, Resolution of House of Delegates, March 1943, on an "International Constitution and Bill of Rights," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 37 (October 1943), p. 661. See also draft by a committee of the American Law Institute, "Statement of Essential Human Rights," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 243 (January 1946), pp. 18 ff.

⁸ American Bar Association, Report of Committee on Peace and Law through the United Nations, February 1, 1952, approved by House of Delegates, February 26, 1952.

⁹ Eighty-first Congress, second session, Rep. No. 2501, *Revision of the United Nations Charter*, Report of Committee on Foreign Relations, September 1, 1950, p. 55.

hearings neither the Secretary of State (Dulles) nor the United States Ambassador to the United Nations (Lodge) suggested any strengthening of the human rights provisions of the Charter.¹⁰ Of over seventy statements made to the committee in Akron, Ohio¹¹ and Milwaukee, Wisconsin,¹² only one urged such action. This one made a strong plea for attaching a bill of rights to the Charter itself "to retrieve the loss since 1945 in the matter of protecting human rights."¹³

The conference of ninety-five national organizations held in Washington in March 1954 under the auspices of the American Association for the United Nations vigorously opposed the Bricker amendment; supported covenants of human rights, the Genocide Convention, and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women; and regretted the negative attitude of the United States government toward these treaties. The resolutions of the conference, however, gave primary attention to the strengthening of collective security, the control of atomic energy, and disarmament.¹⁴

NEED OF UNIVERSAL STANDARDS

That retrogression in the effort to protect human rights will be temporary is suggested not only by the continuance of considerable popular demand for such protection and by the repeated reassertion of such a demand in the history of civilization, but also by considera-

¹⁰ Eighty-third Congress, second session, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, Part I, January-March, 1954.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Part II, February 12, 1954.

¹² *Ibid.*, Part III, April 10, 1954.

¹³ Statement by Bruno V. Bitker, *ibid.*, Part III, p. 201.

¹⁴ *Conference on United States Responsibility for World Leadership in 1954*, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., February 28, March 1, 2, 1954, Resolutions, American Association for the United Nations (New York, 1954).

tion of the conditions of the present world.

The world continues to shrink. Telecommunication, aviation, and atomic energy will increasingly assure that every people will be informed of conditions everywhere and will be vulnerable to attack from anywhere. The material interdependence of the world, in spite of efforts to erect artificial barriers to communication, trade, and invasion, will continually press for moral unity. The conscience of mankind will continue to be shocked by conditions such as exist in Soviet labor camps, in South Africa, in parts of the United States, and in many underdeveloped countries. Such concern is indeed manifested by numerous resolutions of the General Assembly on notorious instances of racial discrimination, oppression, and persecution; on technical assistance; and on care of children.¹⁵ Such sentiments will continually urge more precise standards and more effective implementations of human rights.

The fear of war and the demands for more effective collective security will inevitably lead to a realization that peace is a function of society and that society implies some common standards of value. The world community cannot unite against aggression unless it is united in favor of some human values. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an effort to define values which can unite mankind. Universal standards of human rights are a condition of a community of nations in which peace can be preserved.

Furthermore, respect for such standards, assuring a modicum of peace and justice within each nation, is a condition of mutual confidence among nations, in turn permitting co-operation. General

Marshall while Secretary of State observed in this connection:

Governments which systematically disregard the rights of their own people are not likely to respect the rights of other governments and other people and are likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force in the international field.¹⁶

THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN

The "self-determination" of nations, demanded by colonial and subject peoples and supported by the United Nations Charter, can be achieved peacefully only through free elections or other manifestation of consent of the governed, and such consent cannot be manifested in the absence of at least moderate respect, within the territory to determine itself, for the human rights of freedom of opinion, communication, and association, and of due process of law in trials and investigations.

Democracy, which means the opportunity for continuous self-determination within an established jural community, implies that the state is for man, not man for the state. An international law that protects the sovereignty of the state to persecute, massacre, discriminate among, and deny justice to its citizens is an international law of autocracy, not of democracy. Except as international law demonstrates its interest in *people* as well as in *peoples* it cannot attract the support of educated public opinion, without which it cannot live. While a world "safe for democracy" is not the same thing as a world all of whose states are democratic according to the Western model, yet the world cannot be safe for democracy unless all states, whatever their procedures for ascertaining the values, opinions, and consent of the people, and whether or

¹⁶ Quoted in Senate Subcommittee Hearings, *op. cit. supra* (note 10), Part III, p. 203.

¹⁵ Aleksander W. Rudzinski, "Domestic Jurisdiction in United Nations Practice," *Indian Quarterly*, Vol. 9 (October-December 1953), pp. 313 ff.

not they function through voting by the people, respect that essential aspect of democracy, assurance of human rights for the people.

International protection of human rights is an ingredient in the demands for collective security, for international justice, for self-determination, and for democracy. Under modern conditions of communication and vulnerability, the rights of nations can be assured only in a world which respects the rights of man.

This assertion does not overlook the relativity of many individual rights to local conditions. Home rule, national autonomy, adaptation of law to particular religious, cultural, historic, institutional, economic, and social conditions is no less important than universal respect for the rights inherent in the nature of man and society. The extreme relativity of rights, asserted by Carneades and some modern anthropologists, which considers all rights products of particular cultures, customs, and conventions, overlooks the aspect of all men as members of an organic species with common biological needs, as moral animals with common psychological wants, and as social animals with common requirements inherent in the nature of any society.

A code of human rights which sought to be too explicit, comprehensive, and centrally enforced would, in the varied conditions of the world, establish a tyranny as dangerous to peace, justice, self-determination, and democracy as would no code at all. The problem of reconciling human rights and national rights, implicit in the United Nations Charter, cannot be evaded. The problem must be worked at continually because the line between universal and locally conditioned rights changes with the evolution of international communication, culture, society, and organization. Whether viewed biologically, psy-

chologically, or socially mankind is not static.¹⁷

Domestic jurisdiction of states

Universal respect for the "domestic jurisdiction" of nations is, therefore, the obverse of universal respect for human rights. Under international law a state's domestic jurisdiction is determined by the absence of international obligations, leaving it free to settle a dispute, controversy, or situation at discretion. A state cannot finally determine the international obligations either of itself or of other states; consequently a controversy, dispute, or situation which involves the interpretation or application of an international obligation is not within any state's domestic jurisdiction "solely," "exclusively," or "essentially."¹⁸ The state may make a preliminary decision upon the scope of its obligations, but international law requires it ultimately to settle the issue by agreement or submission to an appropriate international authority. Apart from its international obligations, a state can regard every question whatever as within its domestic jurisdiction. That is the legal meaning of sovereignty—the quality of being legally bound by no rules, principles, or standards except those of international law. Since, however, determination of the existence and meaning of international obligations is a question of international law, determination of the extent to which in a given situation the international obligations of a state qualify its domestic jurisdiction and legal sovereignty is itself a question of international law.¹⁹

¹⁷ Hersch Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights* (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1950).

¹⁸ See League of Nations Covenant, Art. 15 (8); United Nations Charter, Art. 2, par. 7.

¹⁹ Rudzinski, *op. cit. supra* (note 15); Q. Wright, "Recognition and Self Determination," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1954.

To what extent does respect for human rights qualify the domestic jurisdiction of states? The answer is clear in the abstract: only in so far as a state is under obligations, established by general international law or by treaties to which it is a party requiring such respect, is its capacity to deal with individuals limited. While general international law doubtless imposes obligations in respect to persons in foreign territory and in respect to aliens within a state's territory or on the high seas, in the interest of the state of which they are nationals, such obligations do not seem to be imposed in respect to its own nationals or stateless persons within its territory, unless indeed an argument can be drawn from principles of natural law. Those principles are given some support by practices, of "humanitarian intervention"²⁰ and declarations affirming the dignity of human personality. In the main, international obligations in this field arise from treaty. It belongs to the sovereignty of states to make treaties, but in so far as a state has assumed obligations by treaties to respect or protect human rights it has qualified its domestic jurisdiction.

U.N. Charter

The United Nations Charter is a treaty and undoubtedly the members have assumed certain obligations in respect to human rights by that instrument itself. The "pledge" in Article 56 to take "separate" as well as "joint" action "in co-operation with the organization," to prevent discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language, or religion in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and the "obligation" "accepted as a sacred trust" in Article 73 and in trusteeship agreements in pursuance of Article 76 "to promote" the "well-being," "advance-

ment," and "just treatment" of the inhabitants of non-self-governing and trusteeship territories clearly constitute international obligations. Whether or not these obligations are "self-executing" in the domestic law of the United States, a question raised in the Fujii case in California,²¹ they are certainly international obligations to be interpreted ultimately by appropriate international procedures, not by the domestic procedures of any state.

Apart from obligations concerning human rights undertaken by the Charter, the purposes stated in the Preamble and Article 1 undoubtedly contemplate that the members will undertake further obligations by entering into general treaties, such as the Genocide Convention and the proposed covenant of human rights. While their commitment to these "purposes" may imply an international obligation to negotiate in good faith, such an obligation is moral and political rather than legal. It raises the issue of the most practical and effective way of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights" in existing circumstances. On this issue opinions may legitimately differ.

METHODS OF SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS

The United Nations has proceeded on the plan of first drafting and promulgating by General Assembly resolution a Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a guide to policy but without direct

²¹ *Fujii v. California* (1950) 217 Pac. 2d 481; 218 Pac. 2d 595; (1952) 242 Pac. 2d 617. See also Manley O. Hudson, "Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 44 (July 1950), pp. 543 ff.; Q. Wright, "National Courts and Human Rights—The Fujii Case," *ibid.*, Vol. 45 (January 1951), pp. 62 ff.; Lawrence Preuss, "Some Aspects of the Human Rights Provisions of the Charter and Their Execution in the United States," *ibid.*, Vol. 46 (April 1952), pp. 289 ff.; Charles Fairman, "Finis to Fujii," *ibid.*, Vol. 46 (October 1952), pp. 682 ff.

²⁰ Stowell, *op. cit. supra* (note 2).

legal force, and then of drafting and submitting to states for formal ratification and acceptance as legal obligations "covenants" defining certain human rights in legal form and providing for their implementation by international procedures. In the actual drafts submitted to the General Assembly in 1954 these procedures were confined to investigations and reports on the initiative of states. Individual petitions initiating such procedures, though discussed, have not been included.

The Council of Europe has gone further in providing, in its draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights for a European Court of Justice to enforce these rights against adverse state action, as the Supreme Court of the United States enforces the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against states of the Union. This convention, however, has not gone into force.

It has been suggested that the United Nations General Assembly might authorize the Commission on Human Rights to receive petitions and report on them, applying the obligations of the Charter itself and official interpretations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and thus gradually build a code of human rights from precedent to precedent. In this way the Supreme Court of the United States has built a code of federal rights from the brief "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A vesting in the world court of authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to states confining persons in alleged violation of human rights might contribute to such a development.²²

The United Nations and UNESCO

²² Luis Kutner, "A Proposal for a United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus and an International Court of Human Rights," *Tulane Law Review*, Vol. 28 (June 1954), pp. 417 ff.

have also engaged in an educational campaign to instruct peoples as to the history, philosophy, law, and practical necessity under modern conditions of respect for human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been an important contribution to this effort, especially as it was accepted unanimously by the General Assembly with the exception of the Soviet bloc, which, though abstaining, did not vote in the negative.

The United States government, having for the time rejected the treaty method in an effort to appease the Bricker amendment group in the Senate, has proposed a program of education, investigation, and report through the Commission on Human Rights. These proposals had not yet been acted upon by the General Assembly in September 1954.

The United Nations General Assembly by its debate on outstanding issues of human rights—the Mindszenty case in Hungary; the nullification of the human rights clauses in their peace treaties by Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; the labor camps and war prisoners in the Soviet Union; the treatment of Indians and natives in South Africa; and the situation of the inhabitants of some trusteeship and non-self-governing territories—has contributed to public interest, education, and the development of standards in the field.²³

DIFFERENT TYPES OF RIGHTS

Recent discussion has utilized the term "human rights" to cover radically different types of rights deemed to be universal. Of President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, the first two, freedom of speech and freedom of religion, call upon governments merely to refrain from interference with the individual,

²³ *Yearbook of the United Nations; Yearbook on Human Rights* (United Nations); Rudzinski, *op. cit. supra* (note 15).

while the last two, freedom from fear and freedom from want, call upon governments to protect and assist the individual. In debates in the United Nations the United States has manifested most interest in the first type of rights consonant with the political and economic philosophy of laissez faire, while the Soviet states have emphasized the second, especially the social and economic rights which may be promoted by state socialism, often at the expense of civil liberties.

A more complete classification of the types of human rights would include: (a) *civil liberties*, implying freedom from unnecessary governmental restraints and enjoyment of due process of law and equal protection of the laws; (b) *individual security*, implying protection from violence or restraint, not only from government agencies but also from other persons; (c) *social and economic opportunity* through provision of education, public health, social security, work and fair conditions of work; and (d) *cultural autonomy*, implying self-determination of non-self-governing peoples, minorities, and nationalities.

Civil liberties

Civil liberties have constituted the principal content of constitutional bills of rights in the West. As they involve only abstention from action by governments they can be enforced by legal processes nullifying conflicting laws and administrative decisions.

Individual security

Individual security is a consequence of adequate police and criminal laws to maintain law and order in each state. States must act positively to give such protection. International action may contribute to the general enjoyment of this right by providing for co-operation among states in the detection and pun-

ishment of crime and by requiring states to enforce laws forbidding genocide and other crimes against humanity which they might not spontaneously include in their criminal codes. The situation where government itself encourages or participates in such crimes presents peculiar difficulties such as were faced in the war crimes trials. These difficulties may be met by establishing an international criminal court of adequate jurisdiction and supported by sufficient force to bring the accused, who may be a high government official, to justice. A convention for such a court has been drafted under United Nations auspices, but the provisions concerning its jurisdiction were inadequate.²⁴ The problem obviously cannot be solved in the absence of effective collective security against aggression by states. Implementation of the right to security—freedom from fear—requires positive action by both states and the international community, not merely the abstention from official action which is adequate to implement civil liberties.

Social and economic opportunity

The necessity of positive action is even more true of the right to social and economic opportunity. Programs of education, public health, social security, full employment, and suitable industrial and agricultural conditions require not only positive government action but also appropriate political organization and large public appropriations. The realization of such programs is, therefore, dependent on the wealth, political organization, and even the social ideology of the state. Exclusive attention to the realization of these rights tends toward an increase in the

²⁴ Q. Wright, "Proposal for an International Criminal Court," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 46 (January 1952), pp. 60 ff.

functions and the power of government. Furthermore, the capacity of a state to progress in these fields often involves its international economic and political relations. Consequently efforts to assure equality in the enjoyment of social and economic opportunity may tend toward excessive governmentalization and centralization dangerous to civil liberties and the self-determination of local or national groups. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and the specialized agencies have been established to promote gradual progress in these fields. The problems are so complex, however, that a statement of social and economic rights in a code of human rights can hardly constitute more than a declaration of goals or objectives of national and international administrations, permitting wide variation in the adaptation of means.

Cultural autonomy

Respect for the cultural autonomy of non-self-governing peoples, minorities, and nationalities involves particular areas and situations. Some cultures may be incapable of survival in the modern world, some may be as yet incapable of self-determination, and some may exhibit aggressive characteristics dangerous to international peace and security. Statements of such rights can only be in the most general terms susceptible to adaptation to varied situations. It is the function of the United Nations and the nations to deal with such situations as they arise, in the light of the broad principles of the Charter and balancing noninterference with positive efforts to contribute to the advancement of underdeveloped peoples.

All of these types of human rights are matters of international concern under modern conditions, but the obligations of *abstention, protection, administration, and political adjustment* which they respectively impose upon states are

so different that a single legal code and uniform methods of implementation are not possible.

CONCLUSIONS

From this analysis of human rights and the foregoing brief history of past and present efforts to promote respect for and observance of such rights the following conclusions seem justified:

1. A program of education developing a strong and general public opinion favorable to human rights is essential before states will be willing to undertake further legal obligations.

2. Human rights of different kinds should be dealt with separately, implemented by different methods, and kept in balance. Government action to maintain law and order and to assure social and economic opportunity to all may conflict with the claim of individuals and groups to enjoy freedom and self-determination in opinion, association, and many types of action. Respect for human rights implies the maintenance of balance among the different types of rights.

3. Formal definition of human rights and implementing procedures can probably develop best through agreement by the states to be bound. This is because of the variety of rights involved, the different situation of states in respect to them, and the principle of international law—reflecting the dominance of nationalism in the contemporary world—that states become legally bound by new rules, principles, or standards only through consent. It is to be expected that states will be less reluctant to accept procedures of investigation and report than procedures of judicial decision and condemnation.

4. The Charter provides suitable goals and opportunities for reaching agreement to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. But without an adequate

world public opinion and suitable national policies real progress cannot be made. *With* them, the already existing procedures of the Charter permit of continuous progress. Revision of the Charter in this field is not likely to prove possible at the present time and does not seem necessary.

Quincy Wright, Ph.D., LL.D., has been professor of international law at the University of Chicago since 1931, having previously (1923-31) been professor of political science there. He served as special assistant in international law to the United States Department of State (1918, 1921), consultant to the Foreign Economic Administration and Department of State (1943-44), technical adviser to the American member of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (1945), and consultant to UNESCO (1949) and to the United States High Commissioner, Germany (1949-50). He is the author of A Study of War (1942), Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations (1954), and various other works on international law and United States foreign relations, and editor of A Foreign Policy for the United States (1947) and The World Community (1948). He was president of the American Political Science Association in 1949 and of the International Political Science Association from 1950 to 1952.

International Responsibility for Non-self-governing Peoples

By SERGIO ARMANDO FRAZÃO

"... at San Francisco the *national* concept of colonization began definitively to surrender to the idea of ... 'colonization as an international public service.' ... the colonial powers should try to consolidate the ideological front of the free world by formulating a new political appraisal of the 'colonial question' and by conceding ... what, according to the majority of the opinions expressed in the forum of the United Nations, is considered to be within the compass of the times."

CHAPTER XI of the United Nations Charter is the first international normative instrument aiming at a comprehensive regulation of the social phenomenon of colonization. From the point of view of originality and innovation, it is indisputable that the Declaration Regarding Non-self-governing Territories stands out as one of the boldest and most positive contributions of the San Francisco Conference to the legal order of international relations. Nor can it be easily denied that Articles 73 and 74 are, amongst all the provisions of the Charter; those which most markedly bear the imprint of the political and juridical philosophy inherent in the system of the United Nations, as they assert the competence of that Organization to deal systematically with a whole set of social problems which hitherto had escaped comprehensive international control. Both these Articles reflect the elemental design of the founders to integrate into a juridical system of ecumenical perspective a gamut of obligations whose implementation was formerly the sole responsibility of the national state. The juridical expression of the ideal of universality, that is, the principle of the extension of the institutional order to all peoples, would have been grossly distorted if the interests and aspirations of hundreds of mil-

lions in non-self-governing territories were to be left outside the law of the United Nations and under the exclusive competence of the internal public law of the states holding jurisdiction over them.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF COLONIZATION

Most certainly, the old colonial law was influenced by considerations of a humanitarian nature which, varying according to the moral standards of the times, progressively qualified the content and the objectives of colonial policies.¹ International conventions also intervened to ensure collaboration against the practice of acts offensive to deep-rooted social values of contemporary civilization and, further, to guarantee the observance of these values among certain dependent peoples.² Although these international conventions dispensed some protection to indigenous populations, none of them, not even the

¹ These influences were responsible for the continuous evolution of the so-called "colonial pact," whose original terms entrusted the metropolitan countries with a monopoly over the economy of, and commercial intercourse with, their colonial possessions.

² See the Final and General Act of the Berlin Conference, February 26, 1885, especially Chap. I, Art. 6; see also the General Act of the Brussels Conference, July 2, 1890.

rules of internal public law governing the type of relations between metropolitan countries and their colonies, departed from the classic national concept of colonization.³ The idea of having the colonizing power responsible for the well-being and material development of the peoples under their jurisdiction—the "white man's burden"—had indeed become firmly established since the latter half of the nineteenth century and served as an ethical justification for colonial expansion. But until the San Francisco Conference, or, to be more exact, until the Twenty-sixth International Labor Conference (Philadelphia, 1944), effective international control over colonial policies was held to be inadmissible intervention in the internal policy of the metropolitan countries involved.

Timidly, Article 23 *b* of the Covenant of the League of Nations endeavored, in the wake of the international mandate system, to elevate the "just treatment" of indigenous populations to the category of a legal international commitment. The vagueness of the terms, however, and the lack of precision as to the scope of the obligation to respect the basic rights of the "colonials" resulted in no more than a commitment not to discriminate in favor of the "colonist." Unquestionably, this commitment was already in the nature of a legal obligation. Its content, nevertheless, was still merely a statement of humanitarian principles.

The grammatical and historical interpretation of Chapter XI and its ideological axis of reference make it clear that at San Francisco the *national* concept of colonization began definitively to surrender to the idea of colonization

as an "international function," that is, to the concept of "colonization as an international public service."⁴ The formulation of this concept, however inaccurate, in a special chapter of the Charter, removed the "Off Limits" sign which had been blocking the colonial avenue to the competence of international law. Although the framers at San Francisco were not yet able to internationalize the administration of all non-self-governing territories and were obliged to compromise with the jurisdictional power exercised by the metropolitan countries over the territories not falling under the trusteeship system, it is nonetheless true that Chapter XI introduced a new element qualifying the *raison d'être* and the purposes of that jurisdiction.

POLITICAL QUALIFICATION OF "WELL-BEING"

The compromise with the classical violation of the right of self-determination still appears in the implicit admission of the "colonial possession." In fact, the legality of colonial conquests, and, by implication, the legitimacy of the political and juridical situations deriving therefrom, were not openly contested at San Francisco and are not evaluated in Chapter XI. It is, however, difficult to dispute that those situations have since been defined as a function of the interests of the international community and of the peoples directly concerned. The ancient maxim, *Jus et obligatio sunt correlata*, found expression in the specification of the goals to be served by colonization, that

⁴ For a doctrinal explanation of these concepts, see Georges Scelle, *Cours de droit international public* (new ed., revised and enlarged; Paris, 1948), pp. 212 ff.; and A. Mathiot, *Les Territoires non autonomes et la Charte des Nations Unies* (Paris, 1949), pp. 6 ff.

³ According to this conception, the colonial power could freely and righteously aim at the political and administrative integration and at the cultural and economic assimilation of their colonies.

is, in the definition of the objectives which render the very idea of colonization acceptable to the conscience of the contemporary world. By comparison with the treatment that the colonial question, as a whole, received in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the progress achieved at San Francisco was immense. The measure of this progress can even be physically ascertained by considering the area and the number of persons coming under the scope of international law. Furthermore, it cannot easily be denied that the Declaration is based on the fundamental political assumption that the situations of colonial subordination as they presented themselves to the United Nations founders should be, by definition, transitory. The sociopolitical dynamics which in colonial areas derive their driving force from the ideal of emancipation and have this emancipation as an ultimate goal were to be, according to Articles 73 and 74, duly encouraged and directed to the attainment of that prime goal. Consequently, Chapter XI should not be considered to encompass solely the already accepted moral responsibility for the well-being of dependent peoples; nor can the importance of Articles 73 and 74 be sufficiently brought out merely by admitting that they were formulated as legal obligations whose violation could eventually set in motion the system of sanctions embodied in the Charter. Over and above those considerations it appears that the true significance of the Declaration resides in the fact that through it a new notion was introduced into the legal system of the international community. This notion, being a consequence of an equally new philosophical approach to the major problem of relations amongst human groups, completely changed the import and the meaning of the colonial problem. The outstanding feature of the Declaration is, indeed, the implicit

recognition that the well-being of non-self-governing peoples is inseparable from an ultimate political qualification, for it is in the spirit of Chapter XI that that well-being is strictly dependent upon the development of conditions conducive to the correction of the status of subordination to alien jurisdiction.

The second aspect of the international function of colonization may be found in the nexus established between the adequate implementation of the "sacred trust" (involving, among other obligations, that of admitting and aiding aspirations to political autonomy of which social and economic progress are the logical foundations) and the interests of international peace and security.

The full weight which the colonial question acquires when it is referred to as one of the elements of the system of international peace and security does not permit the allusion to the general objectives of the Organization contained in the preamble to Article 73 and in clause 73 *c* to be considered redundant or merely expletive. On the contrary, it seems apparent that through the references appearing in the preamble to Article 73 and in clause 73 *c*, Chapter XI stipulates that the promotion of the well-being of non-self-governing populations is one of the means of attaining the over-all goal of international peace and security. By inference, the realization of this fundamental objective of the Organization is made dependent upon the fulfillment of the obligations set forth in that chapter, in the same manner as it is dependent upon the implementation of all the other obligations assumed under the Charter.

CONSERVATIVE REACTION

The experience of the last eight years bears witness to the fact that the United Nations, or rather the majority of the General Assembly, have consistently abided by the interpretation of the

Declaration outlined above. The action undertaken by the majority to fill up, by means of resolutions, the lacunae that weaken the efficacy of Chapter XI has been rebuffed by the colonial powers, who, opposed to such a broad understanding of their commitments, have sought to give a much more restrictive definition of their actual obligations towards the United Nations. Some of them have categorically denied that the Organization is authorized to interfere in any way with the administration of territories to which only Chapter XI applies.

Conservative reaction tried its best to entrench itself behind the inaccurate phraseology of Chapter XI; at times it played with grammatical interpretations and very often had recourse to flagrant sophisms to reject any idea of an international accountability for all dependent territories. It so happened that many a progressive stand assumed at San Francisco has come of late to be contradicted by attitudes displayed by the same delegation regarding Chapter XI in action.

Extremist positions even reached the point of contesting the constitutional right of the Organization to pass *recommendations* on matters dealing with territories covered only by Article 73; by the same token the reach, nature, and juridical content of the Declaration were frontally challenged. Fighting against what they deemed unjustified inroads upon their rights under the Charter, the colonial powers committed the major error of trying to disparage, if not the basic purposes of Chapter XI, at least the reason for its incorporation into the Charter and its normative value. The lax terminology of the commitments they had undertaken provided slippery ground for an elusive interpretation of their obligations to the United Nations.

INSTITUTIONAL NORM AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION

First of all, the objections raised against any action of the General Assembly on matters regulated by Chapter XI were advanced under a misleading understanding of Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The privilege of exclusive jurisdiction over dependent territories not coming under the trusteeship system—in spite of the qualifications made as to the objectives that jurisdiction should serve—was considered to be safeguarded by the unilateral character of the Declaration and by the freedom reserved to the colonial powers to specify, in all sovereignty, the territories to which "the general declaration of policy of Chapter XI" should apply.

None of these contentions find support in the legal system of the United Nations. The Charter is more than a mere contractual act of a multilateral character. It is an institutional instrument through which, by original agreement of the parties thereto, an Organization has been created for specific purposes, with interests and rights of its own and of a hierarchy superior to the rights and interests of the Member States. The very idea of unilateral Declaration and, by way of consequence, of the establishment of obligations by unilateral consent is alien to the philosophy of the system whose normative value is rather to be found in the conceptual significance of the institutional norm and not, solely, on the narrower idea of multilateral contract. In the light of the growth and rights of societal institutions, the rule of Article 10 assumes a meaning and scope which would be handicapped and curtailed if it were to be interpreted according to the classical theory of contract.⁵ The

⁵ The theoretical basis for this reasoning is provided by the juridical conception of the

statutory authorization received by the General Assembly to discuss "any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter" and "to make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations, or to the Security Council, or to both, on any such questions or matters," invalidates an easy recourse to the exception of domestic jurisdiction. As has been pointed out, the Declaration in itself, and even more so when considered within the logic of the system, excluded the social relations to which it applies from the sanctuary of domestic jurisdiction by specifying the goals the Organization aims at achieving in the colonial sector. In good faith, what may be questioned is the measure or the extent of the obligation assumed by the administering countries toward the institution, the content of this obligation and its definiteness, but not its existence and its juridical nature.

The arguments to the contrary may be easily traced to the age-old obsession with state sovereignty. The safeguards provided in the system of the Charter for this principle of state sovereignty would be tantamount to an inherent contradiction if they were to be utilized generally and as a means of evading the fulfillment of obligations of a statutory character. *A contrariu sensu*, could it not be sustained that clause 7 of Article 2 stipulates that all the obligations assumed under the Charter and the actions performed accordingly are not in themselves encroachments upon domestic jurisdiction? Indeed, the whole system would be undermined by the idea of permanent conflicting competences and by the possibility of these supposed conflicts being resolved through the imposition of

superior normative force of the institutional norm.

the competence of the national law over the competence of the statutory norm (or of the pertinent and unequivocal rule of international law).

JURIDICAL MEANING OF "DECLARATION"

Carried out to its final consequence, the interpretation which invokes the exception of domestic jurisdiction with a view to depriving the Organization of its institutional authority to deal with matters falling under the provisions of Chapter XI, but not under Chapters XII and XIII, would result in a logical and juridical absurdity. This interpretation would indeed imply that the Declaration Regarding Non-self-governing Territories is an anomaly within the Charter, since Chapter XI would not share in the juridical nature, that is, in the normative character of the constitutional instrument. For the same reasons, it is hard to accept the argument that the binding force of Articles 73 and 74, and, therefore, the jurisdictional powers of the Organization to supervise the colonial policy of its members, is weakened by the significance of the word "Declaration." For those who espouse this misleading interpretation, "Declaration" would be equal to a "statement of principles" grouped in an enunciative text but excluding by its letter and spirit a formal accountability as to the application of such principles. Following through this sequence of ideas, Chapter XI, deprived of its binding force, would add up to an exposition of good intentions as to matters concerning colonial administration. In short, it would have no efficacy but that emanating from its moral reach. Therefore, the progress reflected in the text of the Declaration, by comparison with the philosophy of the Covenant of the League of Nations, would be limited to a more detailed

enumeration of the principles of colonial policy.

The weakness of these allegations is plain. To refute them, it need only be borne in mind that even the literal interpretation of a legal text requires the interpreter to have recourse to criteria of legal semantics. In the semantics of international law, Declaration means convention, that is, lawmaking treaty. Even grammatically interpreted, Article 73 sets forth a general obligation—"the obligation to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories." It goes on to indicate in four clauses the manner in which this obligation must be fulfilled. This reasoning seems to disprove the objections to the vagueness of the content of the obligation accepted under Chapter XI.

OVER-STRONG COUNTERREACTION OF THE MAJORITY

It is only fair to say that, in many instances, the majority in the General Assembly embarked upon deliberations that could not be considered properly upheld even by the most liberal interpretation of the letter and the spirit of Article 73. Arithmetical victories have imposed the viewpoint of the majority. It is possible, however, that the approval of some resolutions which are not in full conformity with the intentions of Chapter XI has come as a counter-reaction against the conservative trend displayed by the colonial powers. Many of these texts which seem to ignore the differences in statutory discipline established by Chapter XI on the one hand and Chapters XII and XIII on the other are open to a pertinent legal criticism. Not a few resolutions were inspired by political prejudices and substituted political definitions of questionable value for less controversial juridical criteria.⁶

⁶ The decision taken by the General Assembly not to consider the matters relating to

This original bias appears even in the actual wording of the texts, which seemed bound to stimulate divergencies rather than to achieve even partial victories.⁷ It would have been easier to

Chapter XI as "important matters" for the application of the voting procedure referred to in clause 3 of Article 18 is legally unsound and a grave political mistake. The records of the discussions in the Fourth Committee of the eighth session of the General Assembly seem to indicate that this decision was worked out for the sole purpose of assuring the approval of the resolution concerning the "factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government"—Resolution 742 (VIII)—whose legal substantive value and whose constitutionality are most dubious.

⁷ The express reference to the "competence of the General Assembly" in operative paragraph 3 of Resolution 742 (VIII) was entirely unnecessary and tactically erroneous. The draft proposed by the Brazilian Delegation tried to surmount this difficulty, although implicitly reaffirming the competence of the General Assembly to decide on the cessation of the transmission of information. Indeed, the whole draft was directed to expressing this competence and its approval by a large majority would have sanctioned the principle (see doc. no. A/C.4/L. 272). Furthermore, this resolution goes beyond the provisions of Chapter XI by introducing some assumptions which cannot claim legal support, be it in the letter or in the spirit of Article 73. Paragraph 6 states, for instance, that the manner in which the territories referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter can become fully self-governing is *primarily through the attainment of independence*. This contention is politically disputable; juridically, it is an inaccurate statement. All forms of associations are, within the same paragraph 6, considered mere concessions. Moreover, the proviso of association on the basis of absolute equality presupposes independence. Therefore, the interpreter, in a *reductio ad absurdum*, would be allowed to imply that due to the inaccurate wording of paragraph 6, self-government could be attained through independence. Last but not least, paragraph 6 does not take into account the possibilities for integration in federal or unitary states. This is presently the way in which Greenland is achieving self-government. As to the "list of factors" in itself, in spite of many defects, it is a worthwhile assembling of elements which may help

capitalize little by little upon concessions diplomatically gained. Very often, the resolutions approved lost their tactical possibilities by unnecessarily reaffirming principles when in themselves they were already the practical effects of those principles.⁸ This bad diplomacy and these bad tactics prejudiced the flexibility of Chapter XI for growth and further development, not only because the recommendations passed by the Assembly lack binding force but also because they stirred up violent opposition on the part of the Member States which were supposed to implement them. Further, to the attempt by General Assembly to act *de jure ferenda* to supplement the provisions of the Charter, the administering countries reacted by denying what was *jure facta*. Therefore, the arithmetical victories became empty triumphs.

THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL INFORMATION

Colonial resistance initially appeared in the refusal to submit information of

the Assembly in judging concrete cases, provided the peculiarities of each case are duly considered and the fundamental role given to the right of self-determination.

⁸ The last paragraph of the preamble of Resolution 748 (VIII) concerning the cessation of the transmission of information in respect to Puerto Rico is expletive. It was introduced by way of amendments to the first draft sponsored by seven Member States who, also defending the principle of the competence of the General Assembly, tried a formula to state it without unnecessarily stirring up opposition. This formula appears in paragraph 8 of the operative part of Resolution 748 (VIII): "the General Assembly considers it appropriate that the transmission of information should cease." The competence is implicit in this wording. There are grounds to suppose, however, that the introduction of the amendment was bound to prejudice the compromise appearing in paragraph 8 so as to divert votes on the principal conclusion of the Resolution, that is, the approval of the conclusion according to which Puerto Rico had become self-governing.

a political character. The basis for this refusal may be found in the wording of Article 73 *e*. However, even conceding that the omission of information of a political character was intentional, through this argument the Organization has been deprived of capital elements of knowledge as to the manner in which the specific obligation assumed under Article 73 *b* is being performed. The logical contradiction is shocking: the Assembly is informed of the economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories, but not of their political evolution, that is, the development of their capacity for self-government, which is, in the spirit of the Declaration, the very goal of their economic, social, and educational progress. The final destination of the information exacted or, in other words, its ultimate utilization, has also been a matter of controversy, the colonial powers maintaining, even less logically, that the final recipient of information was the Secretary-General.⁹

ESTABLISHMENT OF MACHINERY OF IMPLEMENTATION

The sustained effort with which the majority in the General Assembly en-

⁹ Clause *e* of Article 73 was not discussed at length at San Francisco, and the reasons for not including information on political conditions were not made sufficiently explicit. (See United Nations Conference on International Organization documents, Vol. II, pp. 421 ff.) The reservations determined by security and constitutional reasons were also not sufficiently clarified. The idea was not to ask for more detailed reports than those submitted to the national Parliaments. This, at least, was the explanation furnished by the delegate from the United States. Implicitly, it was therefore admitted that the United Nations should receive at least as much information as the national Parliaments. In the second session of the General Assembly (New York, 1947), the question of the transmission of information of a political nature was raised. The compromise text finally approved by the Assembly considered the transmission of such

deavored to correct the main lacuna of Chapter XI—the absence of machinery for the implementation of its provisions—has since 1946 been blocked by the intransigence of the administering members. Their participation in a body which, even though transitory, could systematically help the General Assembly in the performance of its functions has been secured by means of successive transactions which limited the competence of the First *Ad Hoc* Committee, subsequently christened the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, to questions of an exclusively technical nature. Ostensibly, the doubts as to the constitutionality of this committee are supported by the same kind of reasoning, by the same interpretation, or misinterpretation, which, in the last analysis, would lessen the significance of Chapter XI to that of generous-hearted impulses inspired by an outmoded colonial paternalism.¹⁰

Article 22 destroys any objection to the legality of deliberations of the General Assembly which aim at creating subsidiary bodies with a view to facilitating the exercise of the functions which are incumbent upon that principal organ of the Organization.

information in conformity with the spirit of Article 73 but admitted that its transmission should be voluntarily effected. See Resolution 144 (II).

¹⁰ The maximum that could be obtained was to give to the Committee a duration of three years. When, in 1952, in the course of the seventh session of the General Assembly, it was again proposed that the Committee should be established on a permanent basis, the colonial powers implied that they would not participate in it. It is to be noted that during the first part of the first session of the General Assembly (London, 1946), the Australian delegate had emphasized the necessity of establishing a machinery which would guarantee the execution of the obligations assumed under Chapter XI. See *Non-self-governing Territories: Analysis of Information* (United Nations ed., 1948), p. 13.

Historical precedents lead us to believe that all the reservations and mistrust which vainly seek legal supports are born of the fear that there may be created a machinery of control potentially capable of holding, with regard to the non-self-governing territories, in the strict sense, functions similar to those which are exercised by the Trusteeship Council. The hypothesis was, in fact, considered in San Francisco, when the well-known Australian Memorandum came up for discussion.¹¹ The fundamental purpose of the Australian delegation, at that time, was to attribute the same status to and consequently submit to the same international control all dependent territories. The abandonment of that proposition appears in the comprehensive "working document" prepared by the American delegation, finally crystallizing in Chapters XI, XII, and XIII, in the distinction between the two types of dependent territories.

It is necessary not to lose sight of that distinction whenever a definition is sought of what may be called the "effective measure of jurisdiction of the Organization" or the degree of control of the United Nations over the territories to which only Chapter XI applies. There is a great step, however, between that distinction and flat rejection of the admission that Chapter XI also establishes a certain degree of competence of the Organization and, consequently, that it is perfectly legal to provide this Chapter with means of implementation. Once this step is taken, we cross the limits of the reasonable and of what may be termed juridically correct.

It is also to be noted that the Aus-

¹¹ See Document UNCIO 575, II/4/12 (UNIO ed.), Vol. X, p. 697; and for a brief appraisal of the discussion at San Francisco: see *Non-self-governing Territories: Analysis of Information*, pp. 3 ff.

alian thesis favoring the establishment of a Committee of Experts for the examination of the reports that should come from all the non-self-governing territories was never definitively set aside at San Francisco. The opposition met by the Australian proposition focused chiefly upon the extension of the juridical discipline of the trusteeship system to all dependent territories.¹²

THE ROOTS OF DISAGREEMENT

The analyses which have been made as to the content and nature of the Declaration lead to the conclusion that Chapter XI is an integral part of the normative system of the Charter, to the same extent that the objectives set forth therein are part of the general objectives of the Organization.

From the practical point of view, however, any critical evaluation of the eventual possibility of redrafting Chapter XI should primarily take into account the difficulties encountered by the United Nations in implementing its present provisions. As we have tried to indicate, the root of such difficulties lies in the conceptual divergencies as to what the Declaration really intends to declare. These conceptual divergencies were responsible for many an embittered discussion on "principles"; starting from conflicting assumptions, colonial and noncolonial powers have not only been unable to agree on the nature and purposes of Chapter XI but also on the very significance—the political, the juridical, even the current significance—of the phraseology of Chapter XI. Such a basic disagreement is the constant and immediate cause of

the mistrust with which administering and nonadministering members envisage their mutual intentions, the former protesting against the usurpation of, or encroachment upon, the rights they did not relinquish by signing the Charter, the latter alleging the failure of the colonial powers to comply with their specific obligations towards the United Nations.

Certainly, the complex of elements determining the political approach of administering and nonadministering members to the colonial question sharpens the antagonism which stems from the two unbridgeable interpretations. For that same reason, the discussions of colonial subjects in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly have very often been influenced by considerations of national policy or by international political issues which had no direct bearing upon the merits of the actual problems under consideration. Nevertheless, the good faith with which the colonial powers are endeavoring to accomplish the sacred trust of civilization has not, as a rule, been denied. The systematic criticism launched against them, individually or as a group, may be traced to: (1) a demagogic anticolonialism either ignoring political, economic, and social realities or nourished by restive memories of a recent colonial status or (2) a tangible wish to utilize anticolonialism not to favor the aspirations of colonial peoples in general, but to play it as a card in the game of international politics or to serve some clear, specific interest, however just.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR REVISION

Hence, the eventual revision of Chapter XI should seek primarily to eliminate the causes of conflict regarding its interpretation. The redrafting of Article 73 should necessarily be based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) a

political premise to the effect that the concessions already made by the administering authorities and generally expressed in the idea of international accountability are irreversible and (2) a juridical *propositio* pursuant to which this international accountability should have a clear-cut legal definition and be formulated with the exactness and precision in which legal commitments are stated so as to avoid all possible misunderstandings concerning the nature and object of the obligation assumed and, especially, to dispel any doubts regarding the statutory powers of the Organization.

This latter aspect of the problem is by far the most important. It has already been said that Chapter XI was born out of misunderstanding. This derisory remark is not entirely justified by the historical antecedents of the Declaration, but it is unfortunately true that the political compromise arrived at in San Francisco was not couched in the best terms. It cannot be questioned that the colonial powers were obliged to yield to the idealistic and liberal forces which stamped the historical postwar moment and called for a new pattern of international relations. The victory over the undemocratic conceptions of life and the state lent momentum to the "colonial rebellion" and enriched it with an ideological content.

It is, therefore, hard to agree with those representatives of administering authorities who recently declared that their respective governments would never have signed the Charter if the provisions of Chapter XI were to be interpreted in the manner imposed by the majority in the General Assembly. This is tantamount to saying, "if they had thought that Chapter XI would ever be implemented." On the contrary, it is to be noted that the colonial powers were perfectly aware of the importance of the commitments they were

assuming towards the Organization to be. They labored and maneuvered to preserve the original title of their jurisdiction over their colonial possessions; and they obtained a remarkable victory when, in its final form, Chapter XI ended by compromising with the principle of national sovereignty by implicitly acknowledging that the power of jurisdiction over the dependent territories to which Chapters XII and XIII were not to apply *had as its source* the internal public law of the respective metropolitan countries.

As of 1947, however, one would be inclined to believe that the colonial powers par excellence had entered into the colonial agreement in San Francisco with mental reservations, with an interpretation of their own as to the extent of their obligations to the international community organized in the United Nations. It would also seem that the vague formulation of their commitments, the ambiguity and the lack of basic definitions in Chapter XI had not been entirely unintentional.

CENTRAL POINTS TO BE REVISED

The uncertainty of the phrasing which later hindered the acceptance of commonly agreed criteria for interpretation of the Declaration begins with the definition of the territories involved. To the misleading heading of Chapter XI, Article 73 adds a new element of confusion by broadening that heading with a new qualification: "a full measure of self-government." What does this mean? From the juridical point of view—and that is the criteria of interpretation to be applied to legal documents—self-government means autonomy, a constitutional status of internal political autonomy inside a larger political system, by contrast with the international status of independence. The reference in the Covenant

¹² This point was made by the Brazilian delegate, Professor Vicente Rao, in the Fourth Committee of the fifth session of the General Assembly. See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Fourth Committee*, p. 5, *in fine*.

of the League of Nations to "fully self-governing dominions and colonies," as well as the absence in the text of Chapter XI of the word "independence," and still further the concessions made in the Declaration to the principle of state sovereignty—all these considerations seem to justify the legitimacy of the conceptual distinction between the two expressions. But it is also true that this restrictive interpretation would gravely imperil the exercise of the right of self-determination, which is one of the fundamental principles of the Charter and is implicitly reaffirmed in Article 73 *b*. Some delegations aimed at identifying a full measure of self-government "with independence"¹³ with a view to recognizing in the latter the sole objective of Chapter XI and to denying that a full status of self-government could exist within a form of association or a compact with the old metropolitan country. There is reason to suppose that such a stand was, for the most part, inspired by political prejudices which, by implication, went so far as to trample upon the right of self-determination of the peoples concerned.

All this points to the necessity of finding in the revision of Chapter XI a formula to combine the objectives of self-government and eventual progressive independence. By contrast, and with the help of juridical criteria, it would not be impossible to define both concepts.

On the other hand, the institutional nature of the interests of the Organization and the principle of collective responsibility as to their realization logically determine that the Organization should decide in the final instance exactly when its *droit de regard* over colonial administrations should cease, that is, when the obligation to supply infor-

mation disappears because it has lost its purpose.

The competence of the General Assembly to decide on this cessation of transmission of information is, indeed, the most logical consequence of the whole system. As previously pointed out, the endeavors to work out formulae which, without compromising with the principle, intended to soothe wounded sensibilities, were hindered by the intransigence of the most radical currents of opinion. Consequently, many opportunities were lost for the United Nations to establish a kind of case law which would benefit from the support of a large majority. Assuming that colonial resistance will continue to oppose the rule of competence from being explicitly formulated—and in all probability this assumption is accurate—the most satisfactory political solution, and legally the most advisable, would be listing in the text of the Charter the territories to which a revised Chapter XI would apply. At the very least, the contractual agreement implied in this enumeration would disavow any further argument that a Member State could decide on its own when and why a territory would fall outside the scope of Chapter XI.

Another capital point that should be cleared in the revision is the one concerning the machinery of implementation. The establishment of such machinery, which is already outlined in the resolutions concerning the Committee on Information, would practically solve many questions as to the actual efficacy of the obligations assumed by the Member States with colonial responsibilities and as to the rights of supervision by the United Nations. Such a step, also by implication, would eliminate one of the reasons for the highly critical attitude of the majority of the United Nations members as to the real intentions of colonial policies.

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE BEFORE WESTERN POWERS

From a political perspective, that is, bringing into the picture the fundamental issues of the policies of the Western powers, it is perfectly obvious that a just treatment of colonial aspirations is closely tied up with the aims that the free world claims to be fighting for. The ill-inspired tendencies to play down such an intimate connection have proved disastrous to the cause of Western civilization. Every move which is suspected of complying with colonial interests has failed to win support even amongst those Member States who have sided with the colonial powers in fundamental political issues; such moves have also provided grounds for the not entirely unjustified mistrust which equates "Occident" with "imperialism."

It seems, therefore, that even for selfish purposes, or as political tactics, the colonial powers should try to consolidate the ideological front of the free world by formulating a new po-

litical appraisal of the "colonial question" and by conceding, without engaging in hopeless struggles, what, according to the majority of the opinions expressed in the forum of the United Nations, is considered to be within the compass of the times.

The ideal solution would certainly be to resume discussions by taking again as a working document the Australian Memorandum which, at San Francisco, was by far the most progressive and realistic approach to the colonial problem. Admitting, however, that the administering powers will firmly oppose a radical transformation of the legal status quo, it will be extremely dangerous for them not to accept an unequivocal definition of their obligations toward the United Nations and a larger and more clearly determined measure of control by the United Nations over the fulfillment of the "sacred trust" of civilization. For what has to be borne in mind is that the idea of international accountability will never more be wiped from the political and juridical conscience of the world.

Sergio Armando Frazão, New York City, is Brazilian adviser on political affairs to the Permanent Delegation of Brazil to the United Nations. He has been vice-president of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories (1953), adviser to the Brazilian delegation to the Fourth Committee of the eighth session of the General Assembly, alternate representative on the Committee on South West Africa, and in 1952 assistant professor and examiner of international law at the Brazilian Diplomatic Academy (Instituto Rio Branco). He is the author of The Autonomy of the Will, a thesis on the theory of contract, awarded a prize by the Brazilian Bar Association and published in the Biblioteca Jurídica Brasileira (1937).

¹³ See Note 7 above.

The Yardstick of International Law

By CLYDE EAGLETON

"The United Nations is undoubtedly a political order, but it was intended to be a legal order also. . . . The peoples of the world . . . will not accept a system in which their disputes are settled by majority vote without regard to justice; and they will not give the United Nations authority to do more than recommend unless that authority is carefully restricted by law."

IT is a question of deep-lying importance in the future of the United Nations, and of mankind, whether that institution should be a legal or a political order; it would be better, doubtless, to ask whether it is to be more of a political or more of a legal order. Actually, it was conceived as both, and it is so described by those who know it. Thus, Mr. Feller, who was Legal Counsel for the United Nations, said of it:

The Charter is a legal text, but it is also a political document in which the representatives of many nations decided to set forth statements of aspiration, of ideals and of moral sentiments. . . . The United Nations was born into an atmosphere shot with the clashes of ideology and political strife. It was only by going forward that it could survive. The road of broad construction was the one along which it could progress. . . .

At the same time, the process of adaptation through interpretation and usage has its defined limits. The United Nations is a legal order and it cannot tear itself loose from the specific restrictions of the Charter, irksome though they may be from time to time to one interest or another.¹

The representatives of states often insist upon respect for law and Charter, even though on other occasions, or on the same occasion, they say "don't be legalistic." Mr. Byrnes, at the end of his

educational experience as Secretary of State, asserted that

The struggle for peace is the struggle for law and justice. It is a never-ending struggle. Law and justice can be developed and applied only through living institutions capable of life and growth. And the institutions must be backed by sufficient force to protect nations which abide by the law against nations which violate the law.

And Secretary of State Acheson said that the United Nations is a means to the end which is "progressive development of a peaceful and stable world order where law rather than force and anarchy will govern the nations in their foreign relations." Democratic and Republican presidents alike have asserted this objective; so has the Secretary-General.

This is natural enough, for people through centuries have come to believe that law is the best device so far discovered for handling disputes between human beings in order to avoid or prevent the use of force; and it was easy to transfer this concept to disputes between nations which are, after all, composed of human beings. This is not to say that law is the only method, or that it is an adequate one, or that all thinkers agree that it is the proper answer in international affairs. Most disputes between individuals are settled between the parties without recourse to the courts, though even in these cases, law

is in the background, which greatly influences the agreement reached between the parties. In the same sense, Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations makes it the first duty of the parties to a dispute to try to settle it by "means of their own choice."

THE RECOURSE TO LAW AMONG NATIONS

International law, of course, is weak and inadequate; there are some, indeed, who say that it is not law. Lawyers, I regret to say, frequently say this; they, like others, seem to think that international law should grow all by itself. Lawyers believe in law; they know what a struggle it is to get a new rule of domestic law into being, and they may be willing to work hard to help; but it does not seem to occur to them that international law must have similar support. People say that they want law between nations, but do nothing to build it up; when it is unable to meet needs, they jeer at it. Nevertheless, and doubtless because it is indispensable, there is an international law; at any rate, there is a set of rules governing the conduct of nations. Governments base their claims against other governments upon the basis of this law, use legal procedures in the argument, refer cases to tribunals, accept and obey the decisions given and pay indemnity where ordered. No state ever denies the existence or the binding force of these rules. It is difficult to deny the name law to such rules.

The trouble is that this law does not reach out to cover those matters which peoples would most like to see covered—vital questions such as economic relationships, the prevention of the use of force, the rights of individual human beings, et cetera. Furthermore, this law does not have behind it the procedures found in domestic law, by which a nation can be brought to court even when

it does not want to go, nor does it have means of enforcing the law when it is clearly applicable. The reason for this is that those very persons who criticize it for these defects are unwilling to have such requirements applied to their own nation, or, at the least, make no effort to have their own nation develop the law and submit to it. This is not surprising; nations have for centuries been accustomed to being sovereign, to defend their rights by themselves, to depend upon themselves. Along with this, they claim the right of free decisions upon all matters with no limitation from any outside authority.

With such habits of thought reaching back for centuries, it is not easy for people to think of submitting their nation's disputes to, and relying for protection upon, the community of nations. The state was created for the purpose of protecting and advancing the interests of its individual members, and it is difficult for these members to accept the idea that their interests can no longer be adequately protected by the state, and can be better protected in some respects by the organized community of nations. In the interdependent state of the world today, and with the weapons and methods of modern war, no state can even fight a war with its own unaided efforts; it must have help from the outside.

There is a school of thought which argues that the state should pursue its national interests in whatever way would achieve them, regardless of law or morals. Those who think in this way either live in the past, unable to give up the idea that the state is the supreme human institution; or they may prefer politics to law, particularly since international law is so weak an institution; or they may simply be recognizing a factual situation, and be unable to think beyond this situation. These "realists" prefer to depend upon national power,

¹ A. H. Feller, *United Nations and World Community* (Boston, 1952), pp. 42-43.

though not more than two states in the world today are really able to think in terms of national power—which, ultimately, means war. They talk of “wise statesmanship” as a better solution, but the road of history is strewn with the wrecks of states which sought to depend upon shrewdness and national power. Wise statesmanship is desirable and has at times been most helpful; it is not always present on both sides at the same time, or in sufficient quantity and virtue.

“Power politics” is frequently set up against law, but there is no necessary conflict between them; they are not necessarily alternatives; both have their part to play in human affairs. Within any human society, the game of power politics is constantly being played, from the women’s society in a church to municipal government to Congress (where we have lately had a horrible demonstration of the way in which the game can be played). There are pressures other than physical force which may be employed, and we shall have to learn the methods of “cold war.” But it is just this struggle which has produced law. Intelligent human beings have become convinced, through painful experience, that there must be rules within which this struggle for power is to be carried on; they have concluded that mere power, brute force, should not be allowed to override the opportunity of the individual to develop his life and talents in his own way, insofar as they do not damage the same right on the part of other individuals.

On the record, it would appear that in the past power politics has been dominant; this is not certainly true, for many episodes of history have been adjusted by law and morals, rather than by superior force. But if it is true, the conclusion does not follow that we will continue the record of the past; indeed, it may be impossible to follow it under

present conditions. Each state, like each individual, must be prepared to stand up for his own rights, to fight for them if necessary, but alone he cannot succeed. This is why he has built up and believes in law. Whatever arguments may be put forward for “power politics,” it is no complete answer; it provides no ultimate and satisfactory answer. When “wise statesmanship” has failed, as it must on many occasions, a nation must fall back upon law or upon war, and today, men do not want war. There must be law within which the game of power politics is played; this law is the yardstick of advancing civilization as between nations.

With this by way of background, perhaps unnecessary, let us ask whether the United Nations was set up as a legal order and how far in practice it is moving in that direction. For this purpose, we may consider its habits as to the settlement of disputes, the respect which it has shown to the Charter and its provisions for the development of international law.

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

The makers of the Charter did not evidence much interest in international law. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals contained only one reference to it, and this was taken out at San Francisco. Originally, as in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the provision was that the decision whether or not a matter was a domestic question was to be made in accordance with international law. At San Francisco, when the clause was moved back under “Principles,” the reference to international law disappeared. Many states, however, noted this complete exclusion of law, and their efforts resulted in two inclusions: one in Article 1, paragraph 1, where it was said that a dispute would be settled “in conformity with principles of justice and international law”; and the other in

Article 13 where, in weak words, the General Assembly was instructed to make recommendations for the purpose of promoting political co-operation and encouraging the development of international law. Compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over members for legal disputes was of course rejected; and the only vestige of law as regards the functions of the Security Council was that it should take into consideration (Art. 36, par. 3) that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred to the International Court of Justice.

It cannot be said that any greater interest in law has been shown in the practice of members in United Nations organs. There may be occasional references to law in the debates in the Security Council, but it is never a determining factor in a decision. Article 36, paragraph 3, has been used on only one occasion, and that was when a veto had frustrated the Council so that it could do nothing itself with regard to the dispute. The parties were encouraged to take this case (Corfu Channel) to the Court, and did so; but Albania paid no attention to the decision of the Court when it was given. Nor has the Council ever asked the Court for an advisory opinion. It is authorized to do so, and it could ask for advice on points of law, as the Council of the League of Nations did, the decision of the dispute remaining in its own hands; but it has shown no interest in the Court. The suggestion has often been made in the Council that a matter be referred to the Court for an advisory opinion and occasionally a motion to that effect, but none has been passed; and even those who in discussion seem to favor such reference rarely vote for it, and usually abstain.

The Charter, of course, provides no legal principles to guide the Security Council in settling disputes, and no criteria of any kind; it is absolutely

free to do what it can get votes to do. There is not even a definition of aggression—which, as the experience of the League of Nations showed, is extremely difficult to work out—though it was fought for at San Francisco and is again being fought for in the United Nations. The recommendation made by the Council is, then, a purely political one; whether it is a legal matter or not, it will be decided on a political basis. The prevailing belief seems to be that disputes are better handled through conciliation—if the Council action can be called conciliation—than through judicial settlement. The latter, it is said, is a harsh and final decision, and in these days it is better to bargain and reach a compromise which will not leave either party in a bitter frame of mind. The Council itself can do no more than recommend; a judicial decision is binding. One may reserve his bit of doubt as to this reasoning. A political vote leaves one free to work for his friends or to veto action against them. If the majority is on your side you are lucky; if not, you veto. There should be better ways of handling disputes than this. The Netherlands is probably no more happy over the political votes which resulted in her losing Indonesia than she would have been if a court had issued a decree to this effect; Pakistan would doubtless be as happy over a judicial decision concerning Kashmir as she is in facing the political power of India. And always in the Security Council is the frustrating effect of the cold war, by which a court would be little affected.

RESPECT AND DISRESPECT FOR THE CHARTER

The Charter is both a constitution and a treaty, and in either case is entitled to great respect as a legal instrument. As a treaty it is under international law entitled to legal interpretation,

and this was affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the case concerning conditions of admission to membership, in answer to the claim that it was a political question: "The Court can not attribute a political character to a request which, framed in abstract terms, invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty provision." As a constitution, it should provide its own means of interpretation, but this was not done at San Francisco. Here, as elsewhere, the Court was rejected, and there can be no such directing and controlling guidance as the Supreme Court of the United States has been able to give concerning its Constitution. A committee at the conference reported that no means of interpreting the Charter had been agreed upon but that it was probable that each organ, or each member, would interpret it for itself.

So far as one can speak of interpretation, this is what has happened. Each organ decides its own powers for itself, for the most part simply by going ahead to adopt whatever a majority wishes to adopt, and without bothering to consider the challenge someone may have raised concerning competence to do what was proposed. Out of some seventy-two (which does not cover all such cases) instances in which a proposed action was challenged (not necessarily by motion) as contrary to the Charter, on fourteen of these a vote was taken—a vote, that is, on the question of competence, as differentiated from the vote on the proposal itself. Of these, only three were in plenary Assembly; they were on domestic questions, the right to define "self-governing," and membership with regard to Italy in the Trusteeship Council. Eight of the fourteen votes were on the domestic questions clause, all but one being taken in committee. In nine of the fourteen instances, the organ concerned declared itself competent; in

five, it held itself incompetent. It is to be noted as to these votes that in every case in which the organ said that it was incompetent to act, it was with regard to a motion which had been introduced by a representative of the Soviet bloc, and in two of the cases in which the competence of the organ was sustained, it was done through defeat of a Polish or Yugoslav motion which would have denied competence. On the other hand, and except for the two just mentioned, every case in which competence to act was upheld was on a proposal in which the anticolonial majority were intensely interested.

It is a strange fact with regard to the above that, though someone raises a question as to constitutionality on a very large number of proposals, very rarely does one make a motion calling for a decision. Such a motion is provided for under Rule 80 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, which gives priority to it, but the rule is practically never used. It is strange that delegates who say in the debates that the proposed action is illegal and/or should be referred to the Court, will in either case usually abstain rather than vote against the proposal which they have asserted to be illegal. This is strange only if one is thinking in terms of law; the delegates for the most part are making their decisions on a political basis. They have done their duty, apparently, when they have pointed out the unconstitutionality.

An explanation of this attitude is to be found, on the part of many delegates, by their expressed view that it is not necessary to take a vote on competence, since the vote on the proposal itself implies belief that it is a constitutional action. The President of the Security Council on one occasion said: "Those who believe that the matter is within the competence of the Council may vote affirmatively or negatively on

the Australian resolution; however, those who believe that the matter is outside the competence of the Council will certainly vote against the resolution."² It is probable that the President was not so naïve as to believe this; certainly, the records do not support this optimistic view. It is very convenient for a Member State which eagerly wishes some proposal to be adopted to be told that if a majority votes for it, that proves it is constitutional. It saves him the trouble of recording his state on the question of legality, and saves him the risk that the action he desires might be blocked by a vote that the organ was incompetent to adopt it. We have noted above the practice of abstaining, rather than voting against, on the part of some who have expressed the view that the proposal was unconstitutional. The representative of the United States declared on one occasion that he would abstain because he thought the Council did not have jurisdiction, and at the same time asked: "How are we to support the rule of law in the world if we treat lightly the basic law in the Security Council itself?" How, indeed?

To add to the difficulty of obtaining a proper interpretation of the Charter, states take positions which are inconsistent. In practice, practically every state can be shown to have voted for competence when it wanted something and against competence when it was opposed. The Soviet Union has often and emphatically asserted that when a proposal has been voted, that proves that the organ believed it to be constitutional; when, however, the proposal was one that it did not like, it asserted (and quite correctly) that repeated violations of the Charter do not make an illegality any more legitimate. There have been occasions on which decision

as to the right to adopt a proposal was postponed until after the proposal had been adopted.

The most fundamental issue, and the one over which most disputes as to interpretation have occurred, is derived from Article 2, paragraph 7, which forbids the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. This clause is for the United Nations what is the most fundamental question within any government: where is the line to be drawn between the power of government and the freedom of the subjects thereof? The clause applies to everything in the Charter except enforcement action under Chapter VII. It is a drastic statement, which would appear to leave each member free to exclude the United Nations on the mere assertion of the member that it was a domestic question. A liberal interpretation of the clause might be expected and be justifiable; what has happened is that from the beginning and more extensively, the clause has been disregarded and thrust aside. In the cases of Franco Spain, and of the Indians in South Africa, where the matter was first debated, reference to the Court for interpretation was rejected, and efforts to have the organ concerned vote first as to whether it was competent in these cases was also refused. It was several years before a committee voted on the question of competence and not until the seventh Assembly that the plenary body for the first time voted on competence. The argument was made that other clauses, such as those dealing with human rights, which were regarded as in conflict with Article 2, paragraph 7, prevailed over the latter article, which begins with the words "Nothing in this Charter shall. . . ." The situation is made more confused by the inconsistency of the members. Thus Australia at San Francisco sought to tighten Article 2,

² Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, No. 68, p. 1687; *ibid.*, Sixth Year, 562nd Meeting, p. 2.

paragraph 7; later, as against Spain and the Netherlands she maintained that any matter covered by the Charter could not be a domestic question (which leaves little reason for putting the clause into the Charter) but with regard to South Africa, she thought that the clause should apply. Similar inconsistencies could be shown with regard to most members.

It seems highly improbable that a court, through judicial process, would have arrived at such a conclusion. Members have been unwilling to commit themselves through formal vote and, when they have done so, it was clearly a political vote, and possible because of the prevailing majority of small states which are anticolonial and anti-great power and who assert the superiority of the vague provisions concerning human rights and self-determination *et cetera* over the restrictive clause. It is a strange paradox; Article 2, paragraph 7, is intended to protect national sovereignty, and these smaller states assert their sovereign independence most strongly; yet they attack the clause which protects them. That the decision is a political one is indeed affirmed in the only study of the clause from a constitutional viewpoint made by an organ of the United Nations:

... the organs of the United Nations take the final decision on competence, on whether, from a political standpoint, the question before them is or is not within the domestic jurisdiction of the State and whether it is sufficiently serious and important to arouse international concern. ...²

DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

With regard to the development of international law, there is as little interest

² General Assembly, Eighth Session, Official Records, Supplement No. 16, Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa, 1953, A/2505, p. 22.

and quite inadequate methods. An International Law Commission was set up, it is true; and it is a fairly competent body, doing its work sincerely and seriously. But it is limited in its choice of topics for study, particularly as to the new law so badly needed; and above all, its work requires the ratification of states individually to become effective as law. Thus far, interrupted as it has been by uncongenial tasks unloaded upon it by the General Assembly, it has succeeded in preparing only one draft convention, which is now being considered by states. It remains to be seen whether they will approve.

If one may judge by the past, the chances are that half of the states will take no action at all, a number will sign, and a smaller number will finally ratify and be bound by the rule. While it will be helpful to this extent, it can hardly be called a rule of law binding upon all members of the community of nations. This is the weakest aspect of international relations and little improvement is to be found in the practice of the United Nations. No systematic provisions have been made for international legislation. There is no agency to study and report upon what legislative treaties are needed or which ones could be undertaken with some prospect of acceptance. There is no expert body provided for drafting a treaty intended to lay down a new rule. Such a draft convention may originate in any part of the U.N.—for example the Transport and Communications Commission or the Commission on the Status of Women—which may or may not have available persons competent in drafting. The United Kingdom, disturbed by this situation, sought to have drafting of legal documents put into more competent hands, but made little headway. There is no method for ascertaining the view of governments in order to decide whether the instrument is ripe for rati-

fication. And, above all, there seems to be no advance whatever in getting around the principle that no state can be bound except by its own consent.

The General Assembly can only make recommendations; it cannot pass laws binding upon members. These recommendations may have great weight, and they may lead to sufficient acceptance in practice by states to result ultimately in the establishment of a rule of customary international law. It does not seem probable that the Assembly could be given any legislative power so long as it operates on the principle of equal voting, which enables the majority of small states to have their will. From the viewpoint of making or developing international law, then, the United Nations has made little progress—though legislative treaties do occasionally have some success; and in practice, it has paid little attention to this problem.

CONCLUSIONS

The record shows easily that the members of the United Nations have little interest in law as a means of adjusting differences between themselves, and as little in the constitutional system which the Charter was intended to provide. This is not surprising. The majority of members are small and many of them new states, which wish to develop; the Soviet bloc in a parallel sense wishes to develop its ideology and controls. International law is for either of them a set of rules of the past, which stand in their way; they are looking to the future and wish no restraints. A constitution has as one of its primary purposes to restrain the government and protect its subjects and one might expect the weaker states to rely upon the Charter; in fact, it works the other way, for they constitute a majority and do not want the Charter restrictions to prevent them from moving as they want

to move. It is the older and stronger states, having vested interests, who support international law and wish to rely on the constitutional protections given by the Charter. Of course, a smaller state may itself occasionally be the object of attack, in which case it hastily scampers back under the shelter of the Charter; and a large state has more than once been willing to stretch its interpretation of some Charter restriction to gain votes in the cold war or for other purpose.

This is doubtless normal development in the chronology of history; it takes any new government a long time to shake down into smooth running; Americans especially can reflect upon the difficulties of bringing together thirteen sovereign pygmies into the mighty nation of today.

But one should not mistake a factual situation for political or moral principles. It does not follow from a circumstantial situation in which political methods are preferred to law that it is logical and desirable that the United Nations should be a political order. The struggle for political power goes on always and everywhere, but unless it is brought under control in the sense of rules within which it is to be carried on, the inevitable end, the final solution, is physical conflict. States joined the United Nations on the understanding that their freedom of action would be limited only in a few and slight ways, and they were more interested in the restrictions set in the Charter to protect them against the United Nations than they were in the authority of the United Nations to do things. These protections are now being removed through an interpretation of the Charter by a majority acting upon a political motivation. The situation would doubtless have come to a head long before now had the United Nations the right to do more than make recommendations. Even

so, South Africa rejects its resolutions and reacts bitterly against the United Nations; more than one member has walked out of meetings, refusing to participate in what it regarded with good justification as illegal action; now the more powerful states—upon whom the United Nations depends—are being forced to oppose the unrestrained desires of an impatient majority. How long those whose constitutional rights are thus disregarded will continue to have patience with it is uncertain; it is an evidence of the need and the value of the United Nations that no state has even threatened to withdraw.

The United Nations is undoubtedly a political order, but it was intended to be a legal order also, based upon a treaty and a constitution. If the present trend continues, it will be no more than machinery for conferences, at which states can vote anything they wish. But in such a system, only those states participate which wish to; the system offers no security, no sufficient assurance of help, to justify membership. There is no need for a charter if it is not heeded, and there is no need for an organization in which all states work together if all that it can do is what conferences of the old order could do. Unless the United Nations can offer more, in the way of legal rules which

provide some security for members and some authority through which progress can be made, it is apt to disintegrate.

This does not mean that the United Nations is falling apart; on the contrary, it hangs together and accomplishes things in a degree which shows how members realize that they must hang together. But the centrifugal forces are present and should be recognized. If one thinks in terms of improvement of the United Nations, the fundamental decision is whether the proper course is toward a political order, with little attempt to restrain sovereign states. The latter is the way of the past; its ultimate solution is war. The hopes of the peoples of the world are for a United Nations which can solve community problems without war. But they will not accept a system in which their disputes are settled by majority vote without regard to justice; and they will not give the United Nations authority to do more than recommend unless that authority is carefully restricted by law. Review of the Charter will not answer this question. The Charter is there now and, weak as it is, members pay little attention to it, except in oratory. Amendment of the Charter is not enough; the answer must be provided by a changed attitude of members, individually supporting law and the Charter.

Clyde Eagleton is professor of international law at New York University. He worked in the Department of State on the making of the Charter of the United Nations, was an assistant secretary at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, attended the San Francisco Conference with the delegation of the United States, and has twice served as consultant to the United Nations. He is president of the American branch of the International Law Association and a member of the Executive Council and Board of Editors of the American Society of International Law.

The Yardstick of National Interest

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU

"... the United Nations emerges as a new and important instrument for the pursuit of national interests. . . . it performs that service by the very restraint it imposes upon its most powerful members in the pursuit of their respective national interests."

THE United Nations is today an instrument through which its members try to protect and promote their respective national interests. Whether it be disarmament or collective security or Korea or Palestine or trusteeships or East-West trade, these issues do not change their nature because they are raised within the United Nations rather than without. They owe their existence as controversial issues to conflicting national interests. Their being raised in one of the forums which the United Nations provides may mitigate or aggravate their controversial nature, facilitate or hamper their peaceful settlement; it cannot sever their organic connection with the interests of the nations concerned. This being so, the issue of whether or not to submit a certain problem to the United Nations or even whether or not to remain a member of the organization must be determined exclusively by the usefulness of the United Nations for the protection and promotion of the interests of the nations concerned. A nation must ask itself whether or not it serves its interests better to submit a certain issue to the United Nations rather than to settle that issue otherwise, and to retain its membership in the organization, using or not using it as it sees fit, rather than as a matter of principle to pursue its interests outside it.

This pragmatic and instrumental approach to the United Nations must con-

tend with two strong popular tendencies, one internationalist, the other isolationist in character, and both taking a utopian view of the United Nations. Their view is utopian because both of them misunderstand in different ways the distinction between organization and substantive policy. An organization is a mere instrument which lends itself to all kinds of uses, a mere framework within which all kinds of structures can be erected, an empty shell, as it were, which can be filled with all kinds of content. An organization, through its procedural requirements, may force a policy into a certain mold, altering its methods and dynamics; it cannot alter the core of the policy itself. Thus the United Nations is nothing more than a club in which all kinds of members can pursue all kinds of policies, a stage on which the drama of international politics is played again in a new setting. The setting is new, but the plot is as old as history. In one word, the United Nations presents a new production of the same old play.

Both internationalists and isolationists have shared in the utopian expectation that the United Nations would change not only the setting but the plot as well. Since that expectation was disappointed, as it was bound to be, both now share a disillusionment which tends to transform itself into hostility to the United Nations itself.

The isolationist thinks of the United

Nations as an instrument of American policy pure and simple, knowing only of one national interest worth pursuing, that of the United States. He cannot accept a situation, let alone an organization, which compels the United States to come to terms with other interests equally legitimate. For him, it is either all or nothing. Either the United States deals with the world on its own terms, or it refuses to deal with it at all. Either the United Nations can be used as an instrument of American foreign policy, like the Department of State or the Army, or it is of no use to the United States at all. More than that, membership in the United Nations is even harmful to the interests of the United States in that it prevents the United States from having its own way all the time and compels it to adapt its own policies to those of other nations.

The internationalist, on the other hand, has looked at the United Nations as an alternative to power politics, that is, the kind of politics which nations have pursued traditionally and which they still pursue today within the United Nations. He expected the United Nations to initiate a kind of international politics in which nations would pool their power for common purposes rather than pit them against each other in competition. This expectation was supported both by the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the United Nations and by the climate of opinion prevailing at the end of the Second World War.

PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING CHARTER

The Charter predicates the successful operations of the United Nations upon the continuing unity of the great powers, working in harmony within the framework of the Charter. The Charter assumes that harmony, it cannot itself create it. The functions and structure of the Security Council, espe-

cially the provisions for the veto, are derived from that assumption. This assumption reflects in good measure a climate of opinion which expected the wartime unity of the allies to continue after the war. The rifts between the Soviet Union and the Western allies which became wider and more numerous as the war drew to a close were regarded as the usual difficulties, to be expected among friends, which would be ironed out by good will, understanding, and mutual concessions.

Thus the utopian hope which made the internationalist look at the United Nations as a new and radical departure in international relations was in a measure shared by the philosophy underlying the Charter itself and was deeply imbedded in the spirit of the times. When that initial hope of a dawning millennium had been disappointed, it was replaced by another hope, equally utopian, that the United Nations could establish peace between East and West if only the conflicts which could not be settled by diplomatic negotiations were submitted to the United Nations. It was widely believed that a dispute, by being put on the agenda of an agency of the United Nations, would somehow lose its sting and become susceptible to a peaceful settlement which could not be otherwise obtained. To "by-pass the United Nations" was in this view the cardinal sin of American statecraft, as though there were in the United Nations a healing power which need only be invoked to make itself prevail.

BY-PASSING U.N.

The fact of the matter is that nations which cannot help pursuing policies designed to serve their national interests are compelled by the very character of the United Nations as a potentially supranational organization to by-pass it under certain conditions. Insofar as substantive matters are concerned, the

Security Council of the United Nations operates through seven of its members, of which the permanent ones must form a part; the General Assembly, through a two-thirds majority. It follows that it makes sense for a nation to submit an issue to the United Nations only if it has a chance to obtain the support of the Security Council or the General Assembly. In other words, only those issues lend themselves to disposition by the United Nations with regard to which the interests of one nation or a small group of nations happen to coincide with the interests either of seven members of the Security Council, the permanent ones included, or of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly. Where such a coincidence between an individual national interest and the collective interests of a qualified majority of the United Nations does not exist from the outset, the individual nation cannot help but by-pass the United Nations in order to pursue its own interest, or else it must create a collective interest within the United Nations which coincides with its own. At this point the United Nations emerges as a new and important instrument for the pursuit of national interests. It owes this importance both to the character of contemporary world politics and to the procedural requirements of the Charter.

ALLIANCES VS. U.N. ACTION

It is one of the distinctive characteristics of contemporary world politics that most of the objectives which nations pursue on the international scene are not peculiar to themselves, but are shared by other—generally many other—nations. It is safe to say that the traditional pattern of national objectives which could be defined as the possession of a particular piece of territory has virtually disappeared from contemporary world politics. The dispute

between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is the only important example of this obsolescent pattern that comes to mind. On the other hand, the dispute between France and Germany over the Saar, and that between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste, which on the face of them seem to revert to the traditional pattern, are in actuality inseparably fused with the issue of Western defense and of the Western alliance in general.

In consequence, all great powers have a direct—positive or negative—interest in the settlement of these issues. A civil war between North and South Korea or a colonial war between Indochina and France involves directly the national interests not only of the immediate parties, but of all great powers. The interests of the great powers in such local issues are so direct and paramount that they tend to overshadow the interests of the original parties to the dispute. The interests of the latter become mere pawns in a world-wide power struggle, and the locale of a particular dispute becomes a mere accidental theater where the world-wide struggle happens to be fought out.¹

A great nation, such as the United States, can pursue its interests, which it has in common with other nations, either through the traditional instrumentality of alliances or through the United Nations. Either instrument offers advantages and presents liabilities for the United States. But the very fact that the United Nations is available as an instrument of national policies, that, in other words, the United States has a choice between the United Nations and the traditional instruments of foreign policy, gives to the policies

¹ It has been shown elsewhere how that internationalization of local issues results inevitably from the bipolarity of power and the tendency toward a two-bloc system, characteristic of contemporary world politics; see my *Politics Among Nations* (2nd ed.; New York, 1954), pp. 322-40.

of the United States an opportunity for flexibility which would be valuable under all circumstances and which is particularly so under the conditions of the cold war, characterized by the unprecedented rigidity of foreign policies.

If the United States chooses to pursue its interests through the traditional instrumentality of an alliance, as it is doing for instance in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in its relations with Japan, it has the advantage of being able to bring the paramountcy of its power directly to bear upon the policies to be pursued in common by a limited number of nations. Such an alliance lends itself easily to the translation of a common interest into a common policy, devised and decisively supported by the preponderant member of the alliance.

Yet such an alliance is in the contemporary world exposed to a liability which cannot help but seriously impair its chances for success in pursuing common policies and may even jeopardize its cohesion as an effective instrument for common policies. It is not by accident that the West intervened in the Korean War not as an alliance of nations who were willing and able to make effective military contributions to the common cause, but in the form of a police action of the United Nations, supported by many more nations than participated actively in the military operations. We are here in the presence of a revolutionary and little-understood change in the character of world politics. National policies, pursued as such, have become discredited for two reasons, growing from the objective character of contemporary world politics.

National policies pursued by one of the superpowers through traditional methods carry within themselves the possibility of a third world war which would inevitably destroy the respective allies of the superpowers, if not the su-

perpowers themselves. The more self-centered and traditionally oriented the national policies of the superpower are, the more likely are they to be self-defeating in terms of the voluntary support they can expect from their respective allies. The policies pursued by the Soviet Union under Stalin since the end of the Second World War which, with the exception of China, found support only among nations which had first been conquered by the Red Army are a case in point. The crisis in the Western alliance which has been smoldering for a long time and has become acute at the moment of this writing illustrates in a different setting the same self-defeating consequences of national policies oriented toward a national interest defined in particularistic terms. Thus we are here in the presence of the paradox that a national policy, in order to have a chance to prevail, must define itself in terms transcending the national interest of a particular nation and comprising the national interests of those nations whose support it seeks.

THE UNDERLYING PARADOX

This is so even with respect to policies, such as economic and technical aid, which by their very nature seem to transcend the national interest of any particular nation. The immediate effects of such a policy can only be disadvantageous to the giving nation since they entail for it an economic sacrifice; and they can, in view of the intent of the giver, only be beneficial to the receiving nation. Yet there are nations which have refused economic and technical aid proffered by the United States, and there are many more who have accepted it but grudgingly. It can safely be said that the small amount of good will which the United States has earned by assisting needy nations is out of all proportion to the amount of money spent for that purpose. One might well

summarize the paradox of this situation by saying that the United States has never done more for other nations than it did in the last seven years, and that its prestige among these nations was never lower than it is today.

One of the main reasons for this paradox—there are others which do not concern us here—must be sought in the fact that the United States appears to other nations not primarily as the unselfish dispenser of aid, but as one of the superpowers pursuing its own national interest in the world. Thus the recipient nation cannot help suspecting a sinister connection between the unselfish appearances of the proffered aid and the traditional selfish objectives of a great power.

It so happens that there is a point in such suspicion, even though it is not quite the point which has given rise to that suspicion in the mind of the recipient nation. The United States has indeed embarked upon a global policy of economic and technical assistance not for humanitarian, but for selfish reasons. It has done so in pursuit of its national interest. Yet that national interest is not the traditional one, peculiar to one and perhaps a few other nations. Rather it is an interest which the United States shares with the other nations on this side of the Iron Curtain: the containment of Communism within the limits reached at the end of the Second World War. For such a policy, which serves the interests not only of the nation undertaking it but of most nations of the world, to be effective, it must both in its formulation and execution bring out those of its elements which transcend the exclusive national interest of a particular nation.

INSTRUMENT FOR COMMON POLICIES

The United Nations has become an instrument for the pursuit of national interests which a nation has in com-

mon with many others. Two organs of the United Nations have lent themselves particularly for that purpose: the General Assembly and the specialized agencies.

Little needs to be said about the qualifications of the specialized agencies for this purpose. For it is the constitutional function of these agencies to serve objectives which by definition transcend the interests of any particular nation. The very fact that on these agencies the recipient nations are represented cannot but have a salutary effect upon the political relations between giver and recipient, to which we have referred above.

The General Assembly, conceived by the Charter as a deliberative agency subordinated to the Security Council and limited to making recommendations without binding force, has become the politically dominant organ of the United Nations. It has been shown elsewhere how the General Assembly reached this position of political eminence;² it must suffice here to consider the results of this development. Within the United Nations as conceived by the Charter, a new United Nations has arisen, operating within the framework of the Charter but not by its assumptions and objectives. The Charter assumes the continuing unity of policy and purpose of the permanent members of the Security Council, and it seeks the preservation of peace and order in the world through the harmonious co-operation of these permanent members. The new United Nations assumes the continuing cleavage of the world into two warring camps and seeks the protection of one group of nations against infringements by the other. The nations which feel

² Hans J. Morgenthau, "The United Nations and the Revision of the Charter," *The Review of Politics* (Notre Dame, Indiana), Vol. 16 (January 1954), pp. 3-21. See also Morgenthau, *op. cit. supra* (note 1), pp. 453-65.

themselves so threatened are able to use the General Assembly of the United Nations for their purposes because they comprise at least two-thirds of its members, which is the majority required by the Charter for substantive decisions of the General Assembly. The core of that majority is composed of the United States, the nations of Western Europe, and most members of the British Commonwealth, amounting to nineteen votes. This core has attracted a group of other nations, changing in its composition from issue to issue and ranging in numbers from all members of the General Assembly with the exception of the five members of the Soviet bloc to a bare two-thirds majority.

This new United Nations pursues the traditional objective of a grand alliance: common protection from the imperialism of a great power. Yet in its operations it differs in significant respects from the traditional pattern of an alliance. These differences are due to the distribution of power within the group and the limitations which the procedures of the United Nations impose upon the exercise of that power.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN ALLIANCES AND U.N.

While in a traditional alliance at least some members were of approximately equal strength, the new United Nations is grouped around a nation whose strength is much superior to that of any single member of the group and even greater than that of all of them combined. The success of the common enterprise depends primarily upon the leadership and power of the United States. For better or for worse, at least the members of the core are tied to that leadership and power, and they can escape it only at the price of the common purpose, that is, protection from Soviet domination. The inescapable weight with which the leadership and

power of the United States presses upon this core forces its members to adapt their peculiar national interests to the common purpose and to redefine them in its terms.

The relationship is different between the predominant power and those nations which cluster around this core in ever-changing combinations to make up the two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. For these nations are less exposed to pressure from the predominant power and, hence, have a freedom of movement which is gainsaid to the members of the core. They can abstain from voting or even vote with the Soviet bloc without jeopardizing their national interests as they understand them. Since without their votes there can be no two-thirds majority, it is for the predominant power to redefine its interests in order to make them acceptable to these nations, and to adapt its policies to their preferences.

The Charter requirement of a two-thirds majority, then, diminishes the power even of so powerful a nation as the United States. Dissent on the part of the weaker members, which such a nation might disregard or dissipate in a traditional alliance, must be taken into consideration when it comes to fashioning a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. A traditional alliance reposes upon power relations pure and simple which, through their very operations, establish a community of interests. For getting a resolution adopted by the General Assembly, it is not necessarily sufficient to have unchallengeable power; what is needed here is suppleness and accommodation in the formulation of interests and policies in order to gain the support of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly. The actual weakness of a nation whose vote is needed counts for little if the nation who needs that vote has no lever through which to make its su-

perior power prevail. Thus the very necessity for a powerful nation to pursue some of its interests through the instrumentality of the United Nations may require a modification, however superficial, of those interests and of the policies designed to secure them.

Viewed from the traditional perspective, this necessity, dictated by the preferences of other nations, for a nation to redefine its interests and change its policies however slightly may be considered a liability. Circumstances may indeed arise when a nation may be reluctant, for the sake of co-operating with other nations, to modify policies which it deems right. Yet membership in the United Nations does not preclude a nation's pursuing its interests with its own policies in isolation or in co-operation outside the United Nations. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the Charter of the United Nations itself provides for the traditional methods of diplomacy as an alternative to its own.³ The United Nations does not impose upon its members a single pattern of action. Quite to the contrary, it adds to the traditional methods of pursuing the national interest a new one which, as we have seen, reflects certain fundamental changes in the structure of contemporary world politics.

U.N. SERVES CAUSE OF PEACE

The new procedures of the United Nations have still another virtue which, paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, results from the very fact that they limit the freedom of action of even the most powerful of its members. Peace and freedom—domestic as well as international—depend upon the power of the powerful being kept within tolerable bounds. No society can rely per-

manently upon nothing but the self-restraint of the powerful for the preservation of its peace and of the freedom of its members. The mechanics of the traditional balance of power imposed such checks upon even the most powerful nations. With the state system having been transformed into a bipolar one, those traditional checks have largely disappeared, and the two superpowers oppose each other restrained by virtually nothing but the common fear of universal destruction. It is here that the United Nations performs yet another service for the national interests of its members, not of one or a group of members but of all of them, and it performs that service by the very restraints it imposes upon its most powerful members in the pursuit of their respective national interests.

Today all nations have one interest in common which transcends almost all others: the avoidance of a general war. The chance is slim that one or the other of the superpowers would deliberately start such a war. The chances are much greater for such a war to break out by the superpowers being sucked slowly into a local conflict which they feel compelled to expand step by step until they are face to face with the alternative between ignominious retreat and a third world war. The chances are perhaps even greater for a third world war to develop from the improvidence and blunders of one or the other or both superpowers. Thus it is the pattern of the outbreak of the First rather than of the Second World War which one must keep in mind when one thinks about how to prevent a third one.

To the prevention of a third world war the United Nations can make two contributions. The restraint which its procedures impose upon the policies of its members might well be able to mitigate the improvidence, the blunders, and the complete identification, heed-

³ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Diplomacy," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 55 (August 1946), pp. 1067-80.

less of its world-wide effects, with a local interest, to which the policies of the superpowers, freed of most of the traditional restraints, cannot help being prone. Thus the United Nations may well contribute to the cause of peace by preventing the superpowers from going to the extremes which virtually nothing else prevents them from going to except their self-restraint born of mutual fear.

The United Nations can serve the cause of peace in yet another, more intangible, way. It can render that service by its very existence. In a period of history when the exchange between East and West of information, views, and propositions through the traditional diplomatic channels has been reduced to a minimum, the very possibility of carrying on such exchanges unobtrusively through the intermediary of the United Nations offers opportunities for the promotion of peaceful settlements,

of which the great powers have made too little use. The success which they achieved when they chose to avail themselves of the United Nations as a discreet instrument for negotiations, as they did in the case of the Berlin blockade, ought to have encouraged them to make further use of this instrument.

Instead, they have yielded to the temptation to misuse the United Nations as a platform from which to make propaganda speeches, as a stage on which to strike poses for the home audience, as a kind of theater prop with which to strike ineffectually at the enemy. This misuse has not served the interests, however conceived, of the nations concerned. And it has spread and deepened that disenchantment with the United Nations which has obscured in the public mind the contributions which the United Nations could make to the national interests of its members.

Hans J. Morgenthau, Chicago, Illinois, is director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy and professor of political science at the University of Chicago. He has taught at Brooklyn College and the University of Kansas City since coming to the United States in 1937. Prior to that time he practiced law in Munich and Frankfurt. His most recent books are Atomic Era (with others); Germany and the Future of Europe (with others); In Defense of the National Interest; The H-Bomb (with others); and Aspects of American Government (with others).

The Yardstick of Collective Interest

By ALEŠ BEBLER

"... the United Nations *as-a whole* was created primarily for the protection of peace. . . . The outcome of the Korean War has . . . proved that in the final analysis solutions governed by the yardstick of *collective* interest are best even for the parties directly involved in the conflict."

THE basic question which, in my opinion, should be answered before we undertake a further analysis of viewpoints and proposals concerning the strengthening and improvement of the system of collective security is the following: What is the "collective" interest or, more exactly, what yardstick should be used in determining this interest?

Obviously, it is not sufficient to seek this yardstick in the special interests of particular states and nations. Although lasting peace and security can be ensured only through a harmonization of national interests, it is also clear that threats to peace and security result from the clash of differing national interests which—from purely national points of view—appear of equal legitimacy. Therefore, it seems necessary to recognize above the purely national interests a higher general interest—the common interest in the progress of all mankind.

The history of the establishment and work, and even of the failure, of international organizations in this century indicates awareness of such an interest. Today, the maintenance of peace and avoidance of a general conflict is the foremost object of common interest. The ever enlarging and destructive power of war, as demonstrated by the two world wars fought in the twentieth century and by recent experiences with nuclear armament, has given substance

and impetus to this concept of a supreme collective interest.

PEACE—BASIC CRITERION FOR U.N. ACTION

The United Nations Charter is the most explicit and recent document expressing this concept. It limits narrowly conceived national and regional interests, establishing certain common basic principles and aims which are indispensable if we wish to avoid a renewal of the devastations of war and to lead humanity along the road of progress. It sets forth as the foremost aims of the United Nations:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. . . .

Thus the Charter recognizes that the maintenance of peace stands above everything as the yardstick by which the Organization's actions should be governed.

The struggle for peace is important not only to avoid the suffering and devastation that wars bring to people. Peace is indispensable to social progress, to the development of non-self-governing peoples towards independence, to the development of economically underdeveloped areas towards a more modern way of production—in

short, to all the revolutionary changes in social relations which characterize our era and which have so transformed my own country. Viewed in this light *any* aggressive war is reactionary and cannot be justified by anything, even by seemingly progressive aims. Experience has shown that even wars which have some of the characteristics of a struggle for national liberation may, by endangering peace and injecting elements of aggression, defeat their own purpose and jeopardize the very aims which perhaps subjectively inspired some of their protagonists.

Therefore, the criteria of the collective interests must specifically include protection of peoples and states from pressure, be this pressure of a political, military, or economic character. A broad definition of aggression is then required, extending not only to acts of overt hostility against a national territory. As a matter of fact, the internal organization of the United Nations, whose various organs are empowered to deal with all the sources and forms of aggression, political, economic, and military, confirms this concept of the broad scope of the collective interest in resisting aggression.

DETERMINING COLLECTIVE INTEREST

The United Nations also represents a new phenomenon in international law which makes it unnecessary to limit the criteria of the collective interest to those legal principles which have already been crystallized. The international community as personified in the United Nations has become an *active* factor in the development and broadening of the domain of international law in relations among states. It can itself take a hand in the determination and implementation of the collective interest.

The universality of the United Nations, furthermore, as conceived by its founders with equality of rights among

all states, presumes no priority of the great powers in determining the collective interest. The point is that peace must be peace for all, both for the great and the small! The tendency to reduce the problem of security in the world to arrangements between the great powers is still strong. Without denying the primary responsibility of the great powers for the maintenance of world peace, an unbiased yardstick for the collective interest is necessary, outside of, and even contrary to, the narrowly conceived interests of one great power or another, or even a group of such powers. The yardstick lies in the interest of the *community*. Viewed from this angle, not even the right of veto, although constituting one of the cornerstones of the special responsibility of the great powers for the maintenance of international security and peace, can be the decisive criterion for determining what represents the collective interest. It is conceivable, though—at least under present conditions—that the veto could thwart certain misuses of the claims of collective interest, arising from the relations of political and economic inequality which today exist between the great powers and individual small or medium-sized countries.

In determining the yardstick of collective interest one must exclude ideological considerations and controversies. The simultaneous existence of countries with different social systems and different ideologies is a rule in our era. Nonrecognition of the necessity of the parallel existence of such different systems and ideologies paves the way for fatalistic views regarding the unavailability of armed conflict, views which characteristically help to instigate war. It is precisely the existence and realization of differences in the degree of development and progress of individual countries that represents the basis for

the continuous broadening of the activities and tasks of the United Nations in economic, cultural, social, and humanitarian fields, activities which do not merely supplement the activities of the Organization in preventing war, fighting aggression, and promoting peaceful settlement of disputes, but are an actual prerequisite for the achievement of collective security. It is not accidental that ideological motives usually lie at the root of attempts to bypass the United Nations in international questions and that they often, although perhaps not always, conceal other negative tendencies, such as intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, the policy of spheres of interest, and ideological intolerance and discrimination.

DEMOCRATIC DECISION AND COLLECTIVE INTEREST

The practice of the United Nations has at the same time pointed the way toward a unique *method* for determining the collective interest, namely, the application of democratic principles to the organization of work within the international community. This democracy within the United Nations is, unfortunately, not yet sufficiently expressed. And it must not be forgotten that even when decisions are reached under conditions of formal democracy the positions of individual delegations or groups of countries can be influenced by outside pressures and considerations which limit the independence of their participation in the discussions and recommendations of the Organization or reduce it to a mere formality. In the broad perspective, however, the struggle for the democratization of the work of the United Nations is not only leading to an enhancement of the role, authority, and relative importance of the Organization in international relations, but will also lead to greater independ-

ence and a freer stand of individual small and medium-sized countries. This in turn will assure their becoming more active in the promotion of peace and security and hence in determining the true nature of the collective interest.

CLARIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE INTEREST THROUGH CHARTER REVISION

What practical conclusions follow from this general analysis of the concept of the United Nations during the nine years since its birth? First, a condemnation of aggressive war as a crime against humanity should be inserted in the Charter. The Charter could at the same time contain more precise obligations on the part of the Member States concerning the prevention, in their territories, of activities or propaganda directed against the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of other countries, and the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, including not only the threat and use of force in the narrow, purely military, sense of the word but also economic and political pressure exerted with the view to curtailing and abolishing the sovereign will of a given country in the field of international relations.

The experience of the Security Council in dealing with instances of a threat to peace or of open aggression indicates, in my opinion, that the only acceptable criterion for determining the collective interest is the practical political effect of the action taken as against even the most perfectly designed legalistic constructions or a one-sided confidence in *ad hoc* settlements based on a unilateral presentation of national or regional interests in a given case. This experience simultaneously points out the danger of partiality in decisions reached by the Council, owing to the indisputable influence exerted by the great powers over the

smaller ones, be it for internal political reasons or because of certain likes or dislikes due to ideological or other reasons.

DEFINING AGGRESSION FOR CHARTER

Therefore, one of the basic practical problems in the work of the United Nations, and especially of the Security Council, in preserving collective security and resisting aggression, is the effective and speedy identification of aggression and of the aggressor. My country has taken steps designed to achieve this aim as simply as possible. The Yugoslav position has neither limited the definition of aggression to certain specific qualifications nor left the characteristics largely undetermined, but has provided—in addition to enumerating the types of aggression that have appeared so far—room for a subsequent inclusion of new and unexpected forms of aggression. It is also important to mention the Yugoslav proposal concerning the duties of states in the case of an outbreak of hostilities, which was prompted by the situation in 1950 and the experience gained from the aggression in Korea. This imposes on states that have been drawn into an armed conflict the obligation to declare, within twenty-four hours of the beginning of hostilities, their readiness to retreat to their national territories and to cease all hostilities, while the conflict is referred to the competent international bodies. Adoption of this proposal by the General Assembly has considerably extended the scope of international law and at the same time has limited, for the purpose of protecting the higher interest of collective security, one of the "classical rights" of a sovereign state—the right to legitimate defense. Thus, a new opportunity has been created to expose the aggressor before the international community and to facilitate the establishment of a yard-

stick of collective interest, which can serve as a basis for the undertaking of collective action in case the conflict is not halted.

Full implementation of these concepts regarding the determination of responsibility for the beginning of hostilities calls for the insertion of increased international legal power in the United Nations Charter. (This is particularly necessary since it is hardly possible to expect a change in the application of the right of veto under present conditions of international relations, at least in so far as the application of collective measures is concerned.)

With this we have come to the central problem of the yardstick of collective interest at present, namely, the not yet completely regulated relation between the role of the Security Council as conceived by the Charter and the role of the General Assembly as confirmed by practice during the Korean War, especially by the introduction of the resolution "Uniting for Peace."

INEFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY COUNCIL

Theoretically, with the world divided into "camps," a threat to collective security through an act of aggression (or of a threat to the peace or a violation of peace) may find both countries in question belonging to the same camp or to opposite camps. It is obvious that in the first instance grave consequences could not result in the Security Council, and furthermore outside the Security Council many means exist within regional and other organizations to avert conflict. However, in the case of a conflict of the second type, the situation would be reversed. The permanent members of the Security Council would be divided, and the veto of one or several great powers could, as has been seen, become an obstacle to the reaching of decisions indispensable for collective

interest. Thus the position of the aggressor and his initial advantage would be protected, whereas the position of the victim of aggression would be made more difficult. It is precisely this situation—in connection with the struggle for a new division of the world, necessarily involving a clash of opposite "camps"—that is fraught with the danger of the outbreak of a new world conflict.

The conclusion to be drawn is that if the present system of voting in the Security Council remains in full force (and the consent of its permanent members is also necessary to amend it), then the danger arises that this body, whose primary duty is to be the guardian of peace and the representative of the endangered collective interest of the world community, will be paralyzed at the moment when the danger to the cause of peace is the greatest.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS AGENT FOR U.N. COMMUNITY

Consideration of this situation caused Yugoslavia to support the "Uniting for Peace" resolution and to vote for its partly amended version. Adoption of this resolution represents an important phase in the development of the yardstick of collective interest, adapting the yardstick less to the letter than to the spirit of the United Nations Charter. The governing principle is that the United Nations as a whole was created primarily for the protection of peace and that, therefore, the Organization as a whole is responsible before mankind for the maintenance of peace. It is logical, therefore, that it should have the last word in applying the yardstick of collective interest, that is, the possibility of stepping in and undertaking the indispensable actions in the event the Security Council is paralyzed. The wording of the present Charter, however, still limits the General Assembly

to recommendations of appropriate measures. Therefore, the forthcoming revision of the Charter will inevitably raise the further question: In the event of a division in the Security Council, how can the international community, represented in the United Nations, make not only recommendations, but decisions regarding the application of coercive measures?

SHOULD GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAKE DECISIONS?

Is such a change useful and necessary? The reasons which led to the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution apply also today. The possibility of reaching actual decisions to invoke coercive measures would increase the moral pressure on the potential aggressor. The cause of peace and collective security could only gain thereby.

However, in such an application of the yardstick of collective interest a decision, once reached, would not be a light one, as its consequences would be very grave. Such a decision could result in heavy material pressure on the part of the majority of the members of the United Nations and possibly even in a war launched by this majority on behalf of and taking advantage of the authority of the United Nations, against one or several protégés of one or several great powers, and possibly even against one or several of these great powers! One could expect to hear the partly plausible observation that the United Nations would thereby only start what was its main task to prevent, that is, a world war. On the other hand a threat to a possible aggressor, pronounced in advance, could discourage him from an adventure or force him to localize the adventure, which was actually what happened in Korea. A final argument would be that if there had to be a war and if the

United Nations were on the right side, then the authority of the United Nations in such a just war would help to assure the defeat of the aggressor and shorten duration of the conflict.

All this, taken abstractly, sounds convincing and seems to guarantee a more or less safe scheme for the application of the yardstick of collective interest in any situation. However, in a concrete case, a systematic application of even the best and most well-meaning principle could be fraught with grave dangers. How certain can we be that, in the event agreement is reached on the abolition of the veto in the Security Council, the majority in the Security Council would be on the right side? Can it even be taken for granted that the majority in the General Assembly would necessarily and automatically be on the right side?

DANGERS OF MAJORITY DECISION— KOREAN EXPERIENCE

In the case of Korea, where on the whole the United Nations unquestionably played a progressive role in localizing the conflict and in resisting aggression, some events occurred which showed that the right of the United Nations to reach binding decisions on the application of coercive measures could endanger the collective interest. The Yugoslav Delegation warned against these dangers as early as the discussions on the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, as well as during the discussions on Korea in the General Assembly in 1950. The danger lies in the fact that even a majority may reach biased decisions, may erroneously determine the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities, may declare a civil or national-liberation war as aggression, may go too far in sanctions against the aggressor and thereby increase the danger of extending the war to new areas, and so forth.

Although the *main* feature of the Ko-

rean War was aggression on the part of North Korea, a state within one world camp, against South Korea, a state within another such camp, this war also contained, beyond any doubt, certain elements of a civil war and, in the view of a large number of Koreans, even elements of a national-liberation war. This came as the result of the fact that this unfortunate country had been thrown into a state of internal tension as a result of the artificial division of the country into two parts (through no fault of its own) by the great powers, so that the desire to attain unity—a desire generally accepted by world public opinion as justified—played an important role in the war. The failure on the part of the majority in the United Nations to take into account these elements manifested itself in the treatment accorded to the government of North Korea in the Security Council and the General Assembly, that is, failure to invite this government to appear before these bodies, and also its exclusion from the work of the United Nations because the majority of the United Nations members did not recognize it. Recognition of the South Korean government and nonrecognition of the North Korean government was influenced in fact by the atmosphere of the cold war going on between the East and the West. By permitting these occurrences, full advantage was not taken of opportunities to advance the settlement of the conflict as effectively and with as little sacrifice as possible.

KOREAN TRUCE—DETERMINING COL- LECTIVE INTEREST THE HARD WAY

The second, even more characteristic, example is the carrying over of the Korean War beyond the 38th parallel. If the aggression on the part of North Korea against South Korea was a disguised attempt on the part of the Soviet bloc to broaden its own "sphere

of influence" by force, the decision of the General Assembly of October 1950, whereby the armed forces of the Unified Command were permitted to cross the 38th parallel to the north and to occupy North Korea, could only serve the purpose of reducing this sphere by force. The Chief of the Yugoslav Delegation to the 1950 session of the General Assembly, Mr. Edvard Kardelj, pointed out that:

... [such] a settlement ... could serve as a very dangerous precedent for the future, a precedent which would, theoretically, justify in certain circumstances the intervention on the part of the United Nations in the internal political struggle of any country. Such a settlement would not be in the concrete interest of our efforts exerted for peace either, as it would complicate and create even more tension in international relations. Moreover, such a settlement could only undermine the strength and authority of the United Nations, as it would be freely exploited as a means to ruin the reputation of this Organization. And it would not be in the interest of the Korean people either ... as it would automatically lead to the expansion of the power of the South Korean Government over all of Korea. ... The United Nations cannot and must not take upon itself the responsibility for the expansion of the power of one or the other government. It is the Korean people themselves who will have to decide on a unified government. ...

Later developments justified Mr. Kardelj's prediction that "any attempt at changing unilaterally the situation in Korea by war ... *in itself carries the seeds of an expansion of the war.*" The war expanded with China's entry and ended only after huge sacrifices had been sustained. The basis of truce was precisely what the Yugoslav representatives had been proposing from the very beginning, that is, agreement not to attempt to bring about a change in the Korean situation by armed force.

It is significant that such a settlement was rejected in the course of 1950, once by the representatives of the camp which was responsible for the aggression in Korea and the second time by the majority in the United Nations through the adoption of the resolution on the expansion of the war beyond the 38th parallel. Yet, after great devastation and destruction, affecting all the Korean people and all armies engaged in the conflict, this basis of settlement was adopted. Hence it is obvious that under the given circumstances such a settlement represented the right gauge of collective interest in the Korean War.

We have dwelt on the well-known facts of the Korean conflict at length, in order to illustrate our concept of the real character of collective interest, as well as of the difficulties in determining this interest. This situation also demonstrates the inadequacy of the narrowly legalistic or the nationally limited approaches to determining such interest and the paramountcy of a broader, primarily political evaluation of the interest of the community. The outcome of the Korean War has further proved that in the final analysis solutions governed by the yardstick of *collective* interest are best even for the parties directly involved in the conflict. Otherwise—by the expansion of the conflict, the broadening of the scope of operations, and delay in the solving of controversial questions—they stand to suffer great sacrifices in men and material, as well as in possible political advantages which they enjoy in a given area.

CONCLUSIONS

What concrete conclusions connected with the envisaged revision of the United Nations Charter are implied by the criteria of the collective interest of the international community? In what way can real democracy in the work of

the United Nations as a whole be ensured? How can the *whole* United Nations be made the most responsible guardian of world peace and security—the highest collective interest of all mankind—in view of the fact that the great powers have such a special position of responsibility in the world today and that even a majority in the United Nations can accept solutions that are not conducive to this highest interest?

Certain changes in the text of the United Nations Charter appear advisable in the light of the Korean War, as well as experience to date in overcoming the most difficult periods of international tension arising from the division of the world into opposite blocs.

1. It seems necessary to insert in the Charter definite criteria regarding responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities, criteria which would in advance comprise the possibilities available to the potential aggressor, and thus reduce the possibility of aggression.

2. The collective interest of the international community requires insertion in the Charter of the clearest possible provisions to prevent the application of coercive measures when they contravene the real purposes of the Charter. For instance, such measures should not be applied for the purpose of interfering with domestic affairs, intervening in civil or national-liberation wars, and so forth. Such a modification of the provisions concerning collective measures for the maintenance of international peace and security would ensure against their possible misuse for the purpose of retarding and diverting the normal social and political development of a country.

3. In view of the great importance of the Security Council in protecting the collective interest, perhaps the broadening of the Council by inclusion of at least one permanent and one alternate member could be discussed, whereby the Council would acquire a more universal character, and a wider scope and variety of views would be obtained in appraising questions of collective security and determining the collective interest, giving to this appraisal a broader and more impartial character and reflecting more closely the attitude of the entire Organization.

4. In the event that a certain limitation of the right of veto should be possible, the decisions on coercive measures in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter should by all means require a large, almost unanimous, majority in the Council.

5. The broad criterion of collective interest seems to require that the General Assembly should also be given jurisdiction in the confirmation of such measures by a definite large majority of votes (possibly a larger majority than the two-thirds required for the adoption of recommendations), which would not only broaden the democratic and universal character of the decisions concerning collective interest but would also remove the possibilities of taking rash and too severe measures.

Such changes would better enable the international community to apply to the question of the maintenance of collective security in the face of aggression, violation of the peace, or threat to the peace, a genuine yardstick of collective interest, which is represented—in the final analysis—by the United Nations itself.

Alaš Bebler, Doctor of Laws (Paris), Belgrade, was Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations (1950 to 1952) and in this capacity was a member of the Security Council at the outbreak of the Korean War, as well as delegate at all regular sessions of the General Assembly. He is now Deputy Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia.

Expanding the United Nations Community

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITION BY R. W. VAN WAGENEN

COMMENTS BY HEINRICH VON BRENTANO, CLEMENT DAVIES, RAJESHWAR DAYAL, R. W. G. MACKAY, LESTER B. PEARSON, AND YOU CHAN YANG

WE have been asked to discuss the broad problem of expanding the United Nations community, with special reference to the narrower and more concrete questions of membership and regionalism.

Expansion of community is considered here as having two dimensions—breadth and depth. In terms of breadth, the United Nations “community” certainly includes all its members, whether or not they always support the organization; it may also include those nation-states which normally support its aims and activities, but which are not card-carrying members. In terms of depth, the problem of expanding the community is that of strengthening its cohesive forces. The strength of those forces, in turn, seems to rest upon a “sense of community” which can usually be observed in stable national governments and in smaller human groups, but which is to be found also between some nation-states.

Briefly, the hypothesis runs along these lines: (a) Nation-states generally control themselves no better than smaller groups when it comes to intergroup fighting. (b) Smaller groups have solved this problem permanently either by having no relations with each other or by achieving a very strong sense of community which is able, if necessary, to support some kind of restraining institution. (c) The burden of proof is somewhat heavier upon those who believe that nation-states can handle the problem by some really different method than it is upon those who believe that

the tried-and-true method used by smaller groups might eventually be made to work for these large but unique groups called nation-states. Such a sense of community might eventually become strong enough to support a real system of collective security or even a nuclear government, or it might not. But in any case the development of a sense of community seems likely to be the crucial element in the problem of long-run war prevention.¹

On these assumptions, one way to frame the greatest question of our time is this: Can a sense of community be developed in *depth* over a *wide* enough area to support institutions for the long-run prevention of war?

BROADENING U.N. MEMBERSHIP

Broadening the membership of the United Nations would not necessarily broaden the sense of community, but limiting the membership would seem even less likely to do so. One may be well aware of the dangers of personal contact between people of incompatible cultures and still estimate that the net result of such contact among large numbers is on the plus rather than the minus side—at least under conditions where the United Nations is likely to

¹ This brief statement leaves large gaps in definition and connective reasoning. Some of these gaps may be reduced by reference to an earlier discussion of “expanding community” in *Research in the International Organization Field: Some Notes on a Possible Focus* (Princeton University, Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Publication No. 1 [Princeton, N. J., 1952]).

be involved. One need not travel all the way with the functionalist doctrine in order to believe that sense of commitment is one important element in sense of community. Also, broader membership need not mean universality.

Provided that the states sponsored by the West are also admitted and provided that this is not accomplished by means of the "package" trade which has been frequently proposed and rejected, there should be some gain from the admission of the European non-member Soviet satellites. The United Nations as a whole, and the Western states in particular, have an interest in reducing the opaqueness of such "windows on the world" as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania already have. There is even less doubt about the value of admitting such states as Germany and (to mention some of the fourteen already vetoed by the Soviet Union) Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Italy, Japan, Libya, and Portugal. If it be argued that new states which have emerged from non-self-governing or trusteeship status are likely to cause trouble for their former masters, one answer is that on balance the cases like India and the Philippines may be more typical than exceptional. The indications are that the balance of political forces would not substantially change, but only the size of the forces—much like what resulted when eighteen-year-olds became voters in Georgia. If the new states should turn out to be recruits for neutralism, it would be well to have this fact register inside as well as outside the United Nations.

Is there any way in which membership could be increased without Charter amendment? Obeying in a rough way the architectural principle that form follows function, the draftsmen who framed the Charter designed two types of regular membership: one with veto power and one without. They also

permitted nonmembers of the United Nations to hold membership in the specialized agencies and the regional economic commissions. A fourth type has been added which is legally not membership at all, but which might be called "functional participation": Italy, by virtue of being the administering authority of Somaliland, sits with the Trusteeship Council in all its meetings but does not vote. A fifth type, associate membership, would be very similar and might be useful. This is already a practice of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Secretary Dulles has suggested publicly that the same sort of device might be used for the U.N. itself. He pointed out that if the unanimity requirement on recommendations for membership cannot be amended out of the Charter, some type of associate membership could be established. Such members would be permitted "to come in and take part in the proceedings, to express their views, and to record their votes."² This might be done without Charter amendment, presumably by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. It should have the effect of pulling into somewhat deeper commitment at least those nonmembers who are free of Soviet domination.

THE PROBLEM OF REGIONALISM

If the first dimension of sense of community—breadth—applies mainly to the membership problem, the second dimension—depth—applies mainly to the problem of regionalism. Both problems embody the great dilemma of tightness as against comprehensiveness. Is it most effective that an international organization for the prevention of war consist entirely of a small but hard core, with

² U. S. Congress, Senate, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, Hearing before Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, Part I, January 18, 1954, p. 20.

the punch and maneuverability which comes from unanimity? Or is it more effective for it to be large and comprehensive, so that even though its movements are lumbering it will not overlook any important segment of political power? This is the dilemma of a deep but narrow commitment as against a broad but shallow one. Of course there is no general solution which can be substituted for sound political judgment in each case. But the Charter device of tying both regional and collective self-defense arrangements into the universal organization has been as good a reconciliation as could be expected, even though it has been only lightly tested. When Costa Rica was invaded by armed forces coming from Nicaragua in 1948, would it have increased that member's sense of commitment to the United Nations if the Security Council had acted on the case instead of the Organization of American States? Or was Costa Rica's sense of commitment to the United Nations increased indirectly, through a tightening of the sense of commitment to the Organization of American States? The Guatemalan case of 1954 does not furnish a good test because of the particular domestic relations between the defender and the invader.

Divided commitments can hardly be avoided when neighbors already enjoying a strong bond for historic or geographic reasons are asked to forge a bond with a wider group. Yet divided commitments need not always be conflicting commitments, so that to strengthen the region is not necessarily to weaken the universal organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, is frequently referred to as a pillar of support for the United Nations.³ This, it is usually said, is be-

³ The legal question as to whether or not NATO is a regional organization in the eyes of the Charter is not at issue here.

cause the members of NATO are themselves the firmest advocates of the principles of the Charter, and therefore whatever strengthens them also strengthens the Charter. There is another and different kind of reason, however, why NATO may be contributing in the long run to a sense of commitment to the United Nations. One of the great obstacles to the evolution of community is sometimes an exaggerated "none of your business" tradition, the psychological equivalent of the domestic-jurisdiction tradition. The habit-forming effect of international relations has been neither proved nor disproved, and common sense is by no means firmly attached to one side of the argument or the other.⁴ It may well be, however, that we can overcome in one region of the world the psychological obstacle to sharing certain types of national decision with certain friendly states. If we then find that we recover from the anguish of this experience, it may be less of a shock later to find ourselves minding other people's business, a bit more, as well as the converse. Again, this could hardly help contributing toward commitment, involvement, and sense of community over whatever area the habit grew to cover.

Over against the advantages of strong regionalism are the dangers of a new localism leading to a new neutralism. If a sense of commitment by a nation-state to its region becomes so strong that it cannot bring itself to be concerned about events outside the area, localism may set in at the regional level. If a state has geared its military forces into a regional defense system, it might feel less willing, and indeed less able, to answer a general call which would take its troops away from the region. There

⁴ See the brief treatment of this question by Howard C. Johnson and Gerhart Niemeyer, "Collective Security: The Validity of an Ideal," in *International Organization*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (February 1954), p. 35.

is also the problem of multiple commitments faced by a state like Australia, which finds itself tied into a Southeast Asian regional organization in addition to ANZUS (Pacific Security Treaty, Australia, New Zealand, United States) and NATO (the latter psychologically, through the Commonwealth).

CHARTER REVISION

This brief discussion of membership and regionalism in the light of the "expanding community" concept does not lead us to Charter revision. Judged by the effect which they would probably have upon a sense of community, any Charter amendments which have been proposed so far in these two fields seem either to be of doubtful relevance or of doubtful possibility by themselves. One exception might be the elimination of the veto on membership, and even this could be achieved in part without Charter amendment. With regard to regionalism, the progressive and realistic plans being prepared by the Collective Measures Committee would not require more than a series of General Assembly resolutions to put them into effect if they could be thoroughly agreed upon beforehand. Perhaps it is unnecessary to add that if events should unexpectedly permit a sweeping revision of the Charter in the direction, for example, of a true international police force or an effective agency for the control of atomic energy, the present discussion would have to be completely re-examined.

POLITICAL REALISM

Those of us who take the hardheaded, practical idealist position usually have to explain that our views are based upon the national interest. The approach called "expanding community" belongs here. "Sense of community" and "sense of commitment" can both be

read as "sense of common interest" if it remains clear that the long run, and not simply the short run, is understood. It is taken for granted by the practical idealist that national interest should lie at the root of national action; but he refers to a very deep root.

Although this is not the place to reopen fully the great debate about "realism" in international politics,⁵ a few words should be said at this point about the "practical idealist" position because of the clear and full statement of the "realist" position published so recently by Professor Morgenthau.⁶ Although some room for exception still remains, Morgenthau has unfortunately described political realism so very broadly that most serious scholars will find the issue defined almost out of existence. He has included so many positions in the realist camp that former opponents now find themselves tagged with the same label. For example, both the school of thought which regards law and morals as being largely irrelevant to national power and the school of thought which feels that this view largely misses the point⁷ now qualify as political realists.

⁵ Among the many pieces contributing to this debate, see the issue of THE ANNALS edited by Norman D. Palmer and devoted to *The National Interest—Alone or With Others?* (Vol. 282, July 1952), especially the articles therein by A. H. Feller and Hans J. Morgenthau. The latest statement by George F. Kennan has been published as *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954).

⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (Revised ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), pp. 3-13.

⁷ Quincy Wright, for example, has long and ably emphasized the importance of the second view. Most recently: "Clearly what is needed is a balance between politics and law in the world. Law must be corrected and kept up to date by politics and politics must be regulated by law."—In George A. Lipsky (Ed.), *Law and Politics in the World Community* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1953), p. 13.

The only recourse for those who do indeed regard themselves as realists in the Morgenthau sense and as practical idealists in another sense is to maintain their factional differences within the realist camp. (Their view remains, of course, distinct from that of altruists and of impractical idealists.) The effort to develop broader and deeper sense of community is focused upon the possibility of change rather than upon its difficulty; yet both aspects are included under realism.⁸ Thus we can have our realism and eat it too—provided we do

⁸ Morgenthau goes so far as to say this: "Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical circumstances and the moral requirements of the contemporary world." But he immediately points out that "The realist parts company with other schools of thought before the all-important question of how the contemporary world is to be transformed."—*Op. cit. supra* (note 6), p. 9.

not have an appetite for sudden, sweeping change.

It is within this sort of framework that the criterion of "expanding community" can be applied to the question of Charter revision. Applying it to the limited problems of membership and regionalism, it seems to say this: The United Nations has real potential for increasing the sense of community among certain nations, and the Charter itself puts no major obstacles in the way. Only one provision places a large but passable stone in the rocky road of progress—the veto on admission of new members. If real progress can be made at all, however, it can be made within the present terms of the Charter unless a massive change in political climate should suddenly occur.

EDITOR'S NOTE. Professor Morgenthau has related his concept of realism in national policy to the specific issues of Charter revision in an article in this volume of THE ANNALS. See above.

Richard W. Van Wagenen, Ph.D., is associate professor of politics and director of the Center for Research on World Political Institutions at Princeton University. His field is international organization and he has taught political science at Stanford, Yale, Duke, Columbia, and Princeton universities. Earlier, he was on the staff of various organizations in the field of public affairs. During the period 1942-47 he served as an Army officer, mainly in military government, and was for two years Deputy United States Secretary of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. He is author of *The Iranian Case: 1946 (in consultation with T. Cuyler Young, 1952)* and *Research in the International Organization Field: Some Notes on a Possible Focus* (1952).

COMMENTS

HEINRICH VON BRENTANO

There are two problems which appear to me to be of special significance. The first relates to the function of regional organizations within the framework of a universal organization, the second to the significance of the veto.

1. A universal organization, that is to

say, an organization with world-wide intercontinental membership as the United Nations in fact is, depends for its operation upon the homogeneity of outlook in the realm of international law and collective security of its most important members, as long as these mem-

bers retain as individual states sufficient strength to cause them to believe that they are not yet irrevocably dependent upon international solidarity. Now the Soviet Union aims at a system profoundly different from that aimed at by the free nations. At the same time the Soviet Union in its concentrated effort proves so strong that individual nations of the free world standing alone and by themselves cannot hope to resist successfully. Under such circumstances the creation of a community like that of NATO is the very condition of creating a balance of power, the balance of power being in turn the prerequisite of the preservation of peace. Thus it may be said that NATO forms a necessary means to fulfill the aims of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The veto power is essentially the reflex of the belief of the states which insisted on it that they are strong enough, if need be, "to go it alone." The veto is essentially the reflex of sociological realities, if not objectively then at least as viewed by the individual states in question. As long as the recognition does not prevail that an attempt "to go it alone" is bound to fail, willingness to surrender this reserve

CLEMENT DAVIES

Dr. Van Wagenen's article setting out the immediate considerations involved in expanding the United Nations community, with particular reference to the problems of membership and regionalism, is an analysis which, to me at any rate, reveals almost total gloom as to the possibilities for betterment. It reminds me somewhat of the relevance of the directive given to those who had to plan the construction of the Mulberry harbors for the D day invasion of Normandy: Sir Winston warned his team not to waste time on the reasons why it

power will normally be very limited indeed. On the other hand if this recognition of the futility of isolated action really prevails, the use made of the veto power, even if technically given, will certainly diminish rapidly. One might, therefore, be inclined to use the paradoxical formula that the abolition of the veto will be possible the moment it is no longer particularly necessary to proceed to such abolition.

Taking a general view, I should like to insist on the importance of a worldwide forum, on the futility of attempts at formal change when not implemented by sociological reality, on the necessity for the free world to build up strength to create a balance of power, and on the urgent need to promote co-operative efforts designed to foster the appreciation of values dear to our society (such as the underdeveloped countries program). Finally, I would emphasize, wherever possible, the necessity of co-operative efforts designed to bring nations together in fields of common interest, where the power aspect is not exclusively dominant.

Heinrich von Brentano is chairman of the parliamentary group of the Christian-Democratic Union in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn.

could not be done "as the difficulties argue for themselves." While Dr. Van Wagenen sees clearly enough the advantage of universalizing the U.N., he obviously does not think it will happen. In general, I suppose, Dr. Van Wagenen represents the so-called "realist" approach to the problem—although he hints at the insufficiency of that approach when he writes, . . . "if events should unexpectedly permit a sweeping revision of the Charter . . ." and again at the end of his article when he says, ". . . unless a massive change in

political climate should suddenly occur." But if the U.N. does not go forward in 1955-56 it will go backwards; it is certain that it will not stay still. The lesson of Dr. Van Wagenen's article for me is that nothing much is to be hoped for from the present setup unless new forces are brought to bear.

I am dismayed that there seems to be so little awareness of the critical point which the U.N. has now reached. Is it seriously thought that the nations at present outside the U.N.—comprising half Europe and half Asia, a third of the world's population—will be content to remain outside or even to accept a second-class associate membership? or, if they do, that the U.N. can continue the pretense that it is really a world organization? Have we not seen already at Geneva, in the discussions on Korea and Indochina, that if the U.N. does not put its house in order, then another organism or, at least, mechanism will take its place? It may well be, as Dr. Van Wagenen suggests, that regionalism can in certain measure be a substitute; but even then, there will be a need for some permanent forum where the different regions can meet on equal ground. If the U.N. cannot develop in such a way as to provide this, then it is doomed.

WORLD FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

According to the excerpt from Mr. Morgenthau's book on the realist point of view, quoted in note 8, larger groupings of nations are not ruled out, but there is no agreement on the means whereby they may be achieved. In these few brief comments I should like to propose that far greater emphasis should be given to the constructive movements outside the U.N. which, with totally inadequate funds in comparison with those on the other side of the Iron Curtain, are trying to break

the present deadlock. The prime need, as I see it, is for leadership to be given to the untold millions throughout the world who loathe war and will certainly support any real solution that abolishes it. These millions see clearly enough that nation-state politics have brought us to the present impasse and that nothing much further is to be hoped for from them. The only hope really is to go back to the ordinary folk in the world who are the *deus ex machina* able, if they once perceive the answer, to insist upon its implementation. That answer is of course World Federal Government, which Mr. Van Wagenen seems afraid to mention, even though countless leading statesmen throughout the world have supported the idea and a recent poll in the United States has shown that 46 per cent of the American public is in favor of a United Nations strengthened into an organization that would have sufficient power legitimately to be called a world government. It may interest your readers to know that operating on a shoestring, a few of us in the British Parliament have been able to build up a group of over seventy members of Parliament here, and in the space of three years the movement has spread to Parliamentarians all round the world. These new forces will, we believe, soon receive backing from many of the non-governmental organizations attached to the U.N., since they can thrive only if business between countries becomes less subject to obstacles than it is at present. Furthermore the U.N. Charter revision conference itself in its composition and form could reflect a far more democratic basis of representation than is the case at present in the General Assembly. That might be a beginning towards a U.N. more firmly based in the peoples and not only the governments of the world.

It may be argued by the realists that

leadership in governments is unlikely to heed these forces and frame the necessary policies at U.N. to reflect them. But is there not already the dreadful logic of the hydrogen bomb to constrain them? We must hope, pray, and assume that faced with his logic, with "equality of fear," governments will have the courage to make a reality of the hopes and longings of ordinary folk

RAJESHWAR DAYAL

In certain circumstances it may be misleading to regard "expansion of community" as having the two dimensions of "breadth" and "depth." By separating these dimensions we tend to regard them as contrasting, and perhaps eventually as conflicting. It might be simpler and more accurate to say that the United Nations community should include and should fully represent all the varied political and ideological elements existing in the world today, and that any increase in the cohesiveness of this community must be built upon the foundation of this inclusiveness. Indeed, if cohesiveness is purchased at the price of exclusion, it is likely to prove a wholly fictitious gain.

A further disadvantage of this terminology is that no term seems to have been devised to express proper representation in the United Nations of its membership. Breadth is defined as including both the membership of the United Nations and those who support its ideals and activities. Depth is equated with cohesiveness, but representation of Member States by governments which are in effective control of them and which can undertake international responsibilities for them has obvious consequences both in terms of breadth and depth and can have an extremely powerful impact upon the degree of international community and the preservation of international peace.

the world over who all wish for the abolition of war.

Clement Davies, Q.C., M.P., London, has been leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party in Great Britain since 1945. He is president of the Parliamentary Association for World Government. He has had a leading place at the commercial bar and has been chairman of numerous committees of the House of Commons.

Proper representation of China in the United Nations is, of course, the most important example, and no discussion of "community," even in the abstract, can be entirely relevant unless it provides terminology for recognizing and discussing this problem. It is extraordinary that there is no reference to the question of Chinese representation either in the abstract or specifically in this paper.

U.N. MEMBERSHIP

In discussing the advantages of the large-scale admission of new members, it is pointed out that new states which have emerged from non-self-governing or trusteeship status are more likely to follow the example of India and the Philippines than to "cause trouble for their former masters," that the balance of political forces would not change but only the size of the forces, and that if the new states should turn out to be recruits for neutralism, it would be just as well to register this fact within the United Nations. It does seem to us that the aim of the United Nations is not to create a membership which would not cause trouble for colonial powers, nor to preserve the present balance of forces in the United Nations if that balance is not representative of actual trends in the world. The United Nations must be conceived of as a dynamic and growing organization in which bal-

ances must change precisely because the world is always changing.

Professor Van Wagenen observes that the veto on membership could be eliminated in part without Charter amendment. If this means that it can be done by voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Council not to use the veto on membership questions, it is merely stating the obvious without adding that it is improbable. If, on the other hand, it is suggested that the veto can be limited without the Charter being amended, and without the five permanent members agreeing on its limitation, we are at a loss to see how this can be done.

REGIONALISM

The article observes that while "breadth" applies mainly to the membership problem, "depth" applies mainly to the problem of regionalism. Both problems, it states, "embody the great dilemma of tightness as against comprehensiveness. Is it most effective that an international organization for the prevention of war consist entirely of a small but hard core, with the punch and maneuverability which comes from unanimity?" We doubt if unanimity is a proper ideal for the United Nations, and punch and maneuverability become very much less important if problems can be settled by conciliation and mediation within the United Nations.

Reference is made in the paper to the Costa Rican question being dealt with in 1948 by the Organization of Ameri-

can States. But no previous reference of the matter to the Security Council had been made. In the recent case of Guatemala, the matter was passed on to that Organization after the Council had already been seized of it. Can it be argued that the application of this reverse process has increased the sense of commitment to the United Nations?

It can hardly be argued that regionalism enhances the sense of world community. It is precisely certain states who are members of regional organizations who have most often invoked Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, and opposed the inscription on the agenda of items unpalatable to them.

There are deep dangers in regarding regionalism as an alternative to the United Nations or as a means of divesting the latter of its primary responsibilities. If there is a sense of separate or divergent interests between certain countries or groups of countries, such organizations tend to increase that sense. If there are latent antagonisms between such groups, they may very well be intensified. The result may be to undermine and make considerably more difficult the achievement of the larger unity of the United Nations. It is only when the principle of universality is fully recognized and applied that the United Nations can adequately fulfill its great role for the preservation of peace.

Rajeshwar Dayal, New York City, has been representing India to the United Nations since 1952.

R. W. G. MACKAY

A sense of community has been developed in depth over a wide area to support institutions of government in India, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, but the last country is by far the best example. Without the institution of the federal government,

the United States would not have developed as it has.

Cannot similar federal institutions be created in Eastern and Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia? A Federation of Western Europe, of which Great Brit-

ain was a part, would create one government over a wide area of 280 million people, among whom a sense of community already exists. Such a federation could lead to the Union of Africa, as most of Africa forms part of the colonial territories of one or other of the states of Western Europe. Furthermore, it should not be beyond the capacity of American diplomacy to create a similar federal institution for Latin America as a whole.

The Security Council of the United Nations is not really representative of the peoples or governments of the world. Red China is not a member, and France and Britain, who are members with a veto, certainly do not speak for Europe. If the Security Council were to consist of representatives from North America, India, China, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, it could provide an institution capable of arriving at decisions binding on, and supported by, the peoples of the world. Moreover, with the creation of these regional institutions, war would be banished in the individual regions, and there would be a possibility that the world-wide institution created on the basis of the regional organizations could in the long run prevent war.

If we wish to expand the United Nations community, there are at least two problems to face: first, it should embrace all the peoples of the world regardless of color, race, religion, or ideology;

LESTER B. PEARSON

The further development of our sense of community is unquestionably, as Dr. Van Wageningen emphasizes, the crucial need of our time. In a sense, this has always been man's crucial need—the history of political actions and social relations in any period may legitimately

be regarded as that age's attempt to work out answers to the basic question "Who is my neighbor?" But though the essential problem is as old as history, the technical advances which we have made during recent decades in communications and in the power of

Thus, an effective world organization being premature, we can work towards it by creating regional organizations which have a sense of community and which function over a wide enough area to make them both effective and stable.

R. W. G. Mackay, M.A., LL.B., London, a lawyer, was a Labour Member of Parliament in Great Britain from 1945 to 1951. He is the author of Federal Union and You Can't Turn the Clock Back. A leader in the organization of the European movement.

be regarded as that age's attempt to work out answers to the basic question "Who is my neighbor?" But though the essential problem is as old as history, the technical advances which we have made during recent decades in communications and in the power of

weapons have faced our generation with the need for a decisive and fairly rapid advance in the scale and level of community organization and attitudes—as the only alternative to serious risk of unparalleled destruction.

I like Dr. Van Wageningen's point that the expansion of community should be considered in terms of two dimensions—breadth and depth. There will also, I think, be agreement that progress is desirable in a third and qualitative dimension—for the community which we seek must be something more than the ant colony or the regimented monolithic society of the totalitarians. Cohesion is necessary but not enough.

EXPANSION IN BREADTH

As to expansion in breadth, I agree that the United Nations would benefit if it included more of the sovereign states which exercise influence in their parts of the world. I do not agree with the view of the United Nations as a form of anti-Communist alliance, which would be much improved if the few Communist members were ejected. The United Nations was not designed to be such an alliance, nor is it needed for that purpose. It is the invaluable role of the United Nations to serve as the constitutional framework for international co-operation: a unique forum and focus for negotiations, which, as I see it, requires as wide a membership as possible of states which qualify under the Charter.

The United Nations as a focus for negotiations is, I think, most useful if, like an honest mirror, it reflects the political face of the world as it is.

To those who complain that the United Nations provides Communist nations with an opportunity for propaganda, I would point out, as Mr. Lodge did at a recent hearing of a United States Senate subcommittee, that the U.N. arena provides us with an in-

valuable chance to refute false Communist propaganda before an audience which includes those nations whose sympathies are uncertain.

If vetoes, or the threats of vetoes, continue to prevent the entry into the United Nations of new members, we might in time have to explore ways in which qualifying nonmember nations might be associated with United Nations work. But I do not think we should abandon the far preferable possibility of reaching some agreement on the entry of applicants. I would not be opposed to a "package deal" as such. Where moral principles are not betrayed, compromise is the civilized and traditional method of making progress with competing interests. This is as legitimate in politics as in business. Where "package" deals are objectionable, it is the contents, and not the wrapping together, to which exception is sensibly taken.

I certainly agree with Professor Van Wageningen's point that deeper or more far-reaching and precise commitments to narrower groupings such as NATO or regional organizations need not in any way conflict with loyalty to the United Nations, and can indeed strengthen it.

As I have already suggested, the primary value of the United Nations flows precisely from the fact that it is so nearly universal, that it does embrace within one constitutional system, however embryonic, both sides in the cold war, and many nations whose attitude to that prevailing tension is "neutralist." It is precisely this near universality that can make the United Nations valuable if we are ever to move toward the gradual relaxation of tension and lowering of temperatures essential to any secure peace.

Meanwhile, the United Nations can also serve effectively for international police actions, as the Korean example illustrates. The "Uniting for Peace"

resolution gives added flexibility for this function, should it be needed. Where more fully articulated and more highly organized collective security arrangements are necessary, these can be and are achieved through such arrangements as NATO or ANZUS.

Conflict is no more inevitable in the multiple loyalties which simultaneous membership in the United Nations and in other organizations entails than it is in an individual's loyalty to family, school, town, and nation.

EXPANSION IN DEPTH

I agree wholeheartedly that we must extend our community in depth, and agree too that this is above all a problem of psychology—of political habits, intellectual outlook, and moral attitudes. As Professor Van Wageningen says, the sense of commitment is an important element in the sense of community. This is why threats by one party to withdraw from the community if outvoted on some question tend to jolt and weaken the community as a whole: for threatened withdrawal implies so limited a commitment, so feeble a loyalty, to the international system itself.

Probably the most important contribution which political leaders can make to any "expansion in depth" of international community lies in the field of more adequate consultation between friends. For it is consultation alone that can produce democratic unity, and that distinguishes free allies from reluctant camp-followers. In this con-

YOU CHAN YANG

I recognize that Dr. Van Wageningen's thesis is an effort to be fair and to balance carefully what I term the pros and cons of the United Nations, but it is difficult for a Korean to be philosophical and restrained when his country has

nection I was somewhat puzzled by Dr. Van Wageningen's statement that "the habit-forming effect of international relations has been neither proved nor disproved." Surely the attitudes of awareness, consideration, and understanding generosity which prompt consultation with others can become habitual in international society as elsewhere. These qualities never come easily, but on them the unity and therefore the fate of the free world may well depend.

There is another way in which the United Nations community can be increased in "depth." Although its members are national states, its success depends in the last analysis on the support of the peoples who are in the widest and truest sense the U.N. community. That is why the work done by private organizations within Member States to educate the public about the United Nations, and to enlist their thinking support, is a significant but often overlooked pillar of that community. The present studies connected with a review of the Charter may themselves, by stimulating and increasing public interest in the United Nations, aid in this vital work.

Lester B. Pearson, M.A. (Oxon.), LL.D., D.C.L., Ottawa, Canada, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, was senior adviser of the Canadian delegation to the San Francisco Conference and has represented Canada at subsequent meetings of the United Nations General Assembly. He was chairman of the Canadian Delegation from 1948 to 1951 and President of the seventh General Assembly (1952-53).

been ravaged by a cruel and remorseless enemy, and he pictures homeless women and children fleeing before the roaring guns and the heavy tanks of aggressive Communism.

The pros of the United Nations were,

so far as its inception was concerned, deeply rooted in the hearts of all who believe in freedom and the preservation of the dignity of man. When the United Nations was brought into being, it seemed to be a further affirmation of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, and it gave hope to all whose dream was peace.

But the cons were not long in developing. The magnificent effort of the United Nations in Korea, wherein collective security was invoked for the first time, has since been dissipated because the Communist aggressor remains in control of half of Korea and is even being considered for membership in the United Nations as I pen these words.

I hope and pray that the United Nations will not die, but revision of its Charter, "enlargement of the community interest," and other devices to restore its onetime vigor and to prolong its life will all fail, in my opinion, unless it returns to the basic principles adopted when it was founded.

The past months have seen further and further disregard of its utility and possibilities. It has been bypassed in numerous conferences by powers large and small. As a consequence, many nations—and particularly the smaller nations—have had their initial faith in it weakened to such an extent that even now they are doubtful of an effective

future for it, while it has yet to attain its tenth birthday.

Why cannot the United Nations operate like the forty-eight states of the American Union? Some observers in this country have pointed out, for example, that apparently the state of Texas has little in common with, say, the state of Vermont. Texas is vast and expansive, full of oil and millionaires, we are told, whereas Vermont is small and compact with little farms and slow population growth. Yet when the security of the United States is at stake and the state of the Union is endangered, Texas responds to the alarm and so does Vermont—and so do the other states.

I am proud of the Korean people for their response in the face of the Communist danger, and all Koreans will forever be grateful to the American people for coming to our rescue; we are grateful also to those other United Nations Member States who likewise responded.

But until and unless the United Nations—at least the free members of it—answer instinctively and instantly when freedom is at stake anywhere in the world, its future cannot but be enshrouded in doubt.

You Chan Yang, M.D., Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States.

Improving the Policy-making Processes

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITION BY H. FIELD HAVILAND, JR.

COMMENTS BY LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN, G. A. LINCOLN, LOUIS B. SOHN,
AND KENNETH YOUNGER *

"... the Knight said, ... 'The great art of riding ... is to keep your balance properly. ...' He let go the bridle, and stretched out both his arms to show Alice what he meant and this time he fell flat on his back. ..."

DESPITE loud and frequent declarations of what ought to be done, the United Nations has found it just as difficult as Alice's friend, the White Knight, to stay astride its own lively aspirations. Moreover, the swelling legions of enthusiastic advisers who are preparing their champion for the review joust of 1956 run a similar risk of letting hopes outrun reality. It is important, therefore, as we reflect for a moment on the policy-making processes of the major U.N. organs, particularly the General Assembly and Security Council, to see those processes as part of the total world environment within which they have developed and must continue to develop in the future.

To try to squeeze the essence of that environment into a brief paragraph, one is bound to begin by pointing out that the dominant forces that have shaped the U.N. have been the interests of the most powerful nations, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. Another major factor has been the rising level of expectations of the underdeveloped and non-self-governing peoples, who have found it advantageous, as well as painful, to be fought over by the

behemoths. Finally, our ever accelerating-technological development has made all nations more intimately dependent on each other than most of them—small as well as large—have been ready to acknowledge through a pooling of powers and resources.

Besides reminding ourselves of the impact of these forces, we must avoid the easy luxury of unco-ordinated hit-and-run recommendations, aimed primarily at our pet hobbies among the U.N.'s many functions. Rather we must relate our advice to the whole pattern of U.N. responsibilities and, furthermore, measure all suggestions in terms of carefully thought out basic assumptions underlying the entire structure. The first assumption, I suggest, should be that the United States and the Soviet Union are likely to remain the two most crucial powers in determining the success or failure of the U.N. and that it would be foolhardy to attempt any revision of the U.N. that would force either one outside the pale. Second, I assume that, since the "veto" governs all amendments to the Charter, it is improbable that any basic revision of the U.N. can run the gauntlet successfully. Third, I assume, nevertheless, that, within these limits, there is considerable leeway for improvement through making more effective use of what now exists. Fourth, I assume, concomitantly, that our gravest world

problems today—economic and social as well as political and military—require increasing integration of our separate national communities, that such integration can prosper only if organized along democratic lines, that we should take bold and immediate steps towards that goal with all countries that believe in and practice at least the minimal concepts of democracy, and that the necessarily limited membership of such arrangements need not hinder but can help the cause of peace.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

With these basic assumptions in mind, let us look at the policy-making processes of certain major U.N. organs, noting past trends and weighing possible alternatives for the future. In the case of the General Assembly, the most striking and generally recognized trend has been its rapid blossoming into prominence in the political field in contrast to the progressive wilting of the Security Council. Yet the public at large is not generally aware of all the factors which have encouraged this development or of all its negative as well as positive aspects. While it is true that the major anti-Soviet powers, and chiefly the United States, have led the way, it is also true that the Soviet bloc itself has advocated a stronger role for the Assembly when such a tactic has seemed to favor Soviet interests, as in connection with the situations involving Spain, the Soviet complaint of United States aggression against China, the status of the former Italian colonies, and Palestine. The smaller countries, of course, have also favored vigorous development of the Assembly's role, as they did at the San Francisco Conference, although some of them have occasionally been alarmed at the weight of the political burdens which the United States and others have wanted to shift to the Assembly, notably various aspects of the

Korean conflict. At the same time, many of the underdeveloped and non-self-governing nations have increasingly appealed to the Assembly to counteract what they take to be excessive inertia on the part of the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Assembly's Special Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, in which the great powers are heavily represented.

Against this background we must consider the question: What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of this development in the light of the basic assumptions set forth above? On the positive side, one can say that resorting to the Assembly has avoided complete paralysis on some issues, particularly those due to stalemates among the great powers in the Security Council. Moreover, though the Assembly is limited to a recommendatory role, it has been able to generate a significant degree of compliance in some instances, as in the enforcement of an embargo on the shipment of war materials to Communist China and North Korea. Its deliberations also involve the broadest range of nations represented in any U.N. organ and hence the broadest range of potential collaboration. Finally, although some observers deplore the absence of weighted voting in the Assembly, one should recognize that there is informal weighting due to the obvious influence of leading powers—India, for example, as well as the United States—and the deference shown them in appointments to all U.N. subbodies and in other organizational arrangements.

On the negative side, however, there is still the disadvantage that the voting strength of a country in the Assembly bears no necessary or direct relation to its actual significance in terms of human or material resources. Recommendations can be, and have been, passed

* *Editor's Note:* Additional consideration of the issues discussed by Professor Haviland appears in the articles by Carlos Romulo, Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau, Aleks Bebel, and David Key, and in the comments by Heinrich von Brentano and R. W. G. Mackay.

without the endorsement of the only nations capable of supplying the support necessary for their success. To take an extreme example, the Assembly, during its 1948 session, approved a resolution on the financing of economic development without the backing of a single permanent member of the Security Council. Some of the less powerful nations are also capable of exercising a kind of "veto" to the extent that they can control, particularly through the Latin American and Asian-Arab blocs, approximately one-third of the votes on any question.

A second disadvantage is that, if the Assembly is pushed too far, some of the most influential members, such as the Soviet Union or India, may be seriously alienated, even to the extent of being forced out of the U.N. altogether. A third objection is that this trend has sometimes resulted in a maddening duplication of debate on such issues as human rights, which have dragged from subcommittee to committee to Economic and Social Council to Assembly main committee to plenary meetings of the Assembly, and then around the barn again. A fourth criticism is that appeals to the Assembly promote excessive laundering of dirty linen before the world public, although this argument is apt to underestimate the ample opportunities that exist for off-the-record negotiations in the corridors and lounges at U.N. headquarters. Others have said that easy access to the Assembly relieves the great powers, in too high a degree, of the responsibility for working out compromises among themselves on situations in which they are the principal determinants of an effective solution.

What, then, are likely alternatives for the future? To what extent should the Assembly be utilized in preference to other channels? One extreme alternative would be to expand the Assembly's appetite to devour most of the

functions of the other U.N. organs. But this would probably lead to severe indignation and certainly deprive the Assembly of the invaluable assistance of smaller, more flexible, and specialized bodies. In the other direction, one might try to bar the Assembly from even discussing certain matters (perhaps questions requiring "action") or certain subjects at certain times (possibly political issues on the agenda of the Security Council). Yet we have learned that there are decided advantages, within limits, to be derived from using the Assembly as a relatively free, though weak, general forum of last resort.

A third alternative is to use the Assembly only to the extent of, and not beyond, its capacity for effective performance. For example, until the Assembly can be endowed with the prerequisites necessary for an adequate collective security system, it can be said that it should rely primarily on either the Security Council or complementary external arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nor does the Assembly seem equipped to engage in exhaustive analytical studies or drafting efforts required for U.N. economic and social activities, such as the human rights program. For these functions it can be argued that the Assembly should depend principally on its related councils, commissions, and committees, which, in turn, may need reorganization (discussed in separate articles above).

Another question is: What powers should be granted the Assembly? At the outset it should be recognized that there is little evidence that the major powers would approve any real legislative authority for the Assembly. Yet we have seen that there are considerable opportunities for developing widespread compliance within essentially the present framework. Moreover, the Assembly can improve its peaceful settlement pro-

cedures, including the skills, timing, level, and other aspects of such negotiations, in order to take fuller advantage of those situations that are ripe for such efforts.

Another question is: Can Assembly voting be improved? Here again, the principal powers do not seem inclined to alter the Charter. One possibility, however, would be to place certain operational programs under somewhat autonomous subbodies, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), with provision for weighted voting in their governing councils. Further efforts might also be made to clarify the application of the two-thirds rule.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Now turning to the Security Council, one can say that, in spite of that organ's relative decline in comparison with the Assembly, it is still a useful instrument, given the proper climate. It was designed to facilitate collaboration among the great, and near-great, powers, and it can continue to function in this role whenever feasible, as it has in connection with situations such as those involving Palestine, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. As for the Council's basic authority, any change requiring Charter amendment seems out of the question. One alternative, however, would appear to be to continue the present pattern of depending primarily on the Council's recommendatory rather than its binding authority, as in the situations just cited. More might also be done to improve the

Council's peaceful settlement functions as already suggested with reference to the Assembly.

Should the Council's voting procedures be altered? Once more, it is improbable that the United States and the Soviet Union can agree on any formal change in the Charter, but it may prove feasible to ease the situation in practice. It has already been possible to achieve at least tacit agreement that an abstention is not a veto, and it might be possible to expand the category of "procedural" questions to be decided by simple majority, as suggested in the studies of the Assembly's Interim Committee.

Again emphasizing one of the basic assumptions set forth above, it would seem shortsighted, to say the least, to destroy the bridge in the process of repairing it. Improvement should not be sought at the risk of jeopardizing the participation of the United Nations' most influential members. At the same time, we should do more to increase public understanding of another assumption referred to above; namely, that current world problems call for increasing international integration. True, integration will not guarantee peace, but it can remove many of the most divisive barriers that are constant invitations to conflict. Yet we must also recognize that integration comes most easily at the less universal level, where there is the greatest consensus, and most painfully at the most universal level, since it is there we find the greatest heterogeneity of cultures and interests.

H. Field Haviland, Jr., Ph.D., is associate professor of political science at Haverford College. He has also served recently as chairman of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation's Seminar on the United Nations and as consultant to the Brookings Institution. He is coauthor, with Daniel S. Cheever, of American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers (1952) and Organizing for Peace: International Organization in World Affairs (1954). His own work, on The Political Role of the General Assembly (1951), appeared as the seventh volume in the United Nations Studies series published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

COMMENTS

LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN

Implicit in many of Professor Haviland's conclusions is a verity about the United Nations which comes near to being an eternal one—at least as far into the future as it is possible to project—namely, that the United Nations for most important purposes is little, if anything, more than the sum of its national components. The interplay of national policies through the United Nations and the balances struck among those policies largely determine how the United Nations operates, what it achieves, and what its potential may be. Professor Philip Jessup used to pose the question for his graduate classes by asking: "Is the United Nations an 'it' or a 'they'?" The answer is clear: The United Nations is a "they."

This assumption, it seems to me, is crucial for any examination of how the United Nations policy processes can be improved. For it suggests, as Mr. Haviland has implied, that the place to turn for the most important answers is to the policies of the national members of the United Nations. In this conception, the United Nations is an instrumentality through which nation-states can strive to accomplish their national objectives, especially the ones which they have set forth in Article 1 of the Charter as the "Purposes of the United Nations." This does not deny that there are useful questions to be asked about the procedures of the Organization itself, about the practices of the organs, or the wording of its rules of procedure. But it does assert that those questions are secondary to the more basic ones about the conceptions which nation-states have and which they follow concerning the place of the United Nations and the role they will play in it.

In these terms, the key question for Americans is not "In what ways can we improve the operation of the United Nations by changing the provisions of the Charter or by modifying the procedures under which it operates?" but "How far has the United States made the most effective use of the United Nations as it is and how can better use be made of the United Nations in the future?"

This brief "comment" does not permit examination of the many directions in which the question may lead. There is space for only one sally—and a brief one at that.

Since 1950, the most dangerous threats to peace and security in the world—and to the peace and security of the United States—have arisen in the Far East, in the Korean and Indochinese conflicts. A comparison of these two cases, especially in terms of how United States interests were served, is revealing.

KOREA

In the case of Korea, the United States moved immediately to stem aggression through the United Nations. The United Nations served as a vehicle for mobilizing diplomatic, political, and material support for the defense against aggression which was mounted on United States initiative under United Nations auspices. The result was a final triumph for freedom in the world and for American interests, not only because the aggression was thwarted and the cost of overt aggression amply demonstrated, but also because these results were accomplished in a local war which was prevented from becoming a general conflagration. The importance of the United Nations in focusing and per-

magnifying the pressures against total war cannot be definitely calculated, but it was certainly great.

The North Korean advance across the 38th parallel which initiated the hostilities was unmistakably identified as an act of aggression, even by neutral-minded India, because (1) the Korean case had been on the General Assembly agenda since 1947, as a result of United States initiative; (2) the legitimacy of the government of the Republic of Korea had been recognized by the General Assembly; and (3) a United Nations team in the field was able to certify that it was the North Korean forces which began the fighting by moving across the parallel. Had it not been for these three facts many governments would have been strongly impelled to regard the fighting as a civil war between rival claimants to control of Korea. Once the act of aggression was identified, the United Nations helped to solidify and expand the working alliance of free nations against the aggression.

Finally, the United Nations served as a means of permitting the mediatory influence of the uncommitted countries to be effectively exerted. The fighting was ended and the Armistice Agreement signed partly because of the role which countries such as India were able to play in the United Nations in drawing the opposing sides toward a common denominator.

INDOCHINA

Contrast this history with the case of Indochina, which never came before the United Nations. The recent settlement in Geneva, enforced no doubt by circumstances, was a grave blow to freedom in the world. The losses which Geneva ratified are the most severe suffered by the democratic world since Czechoslovakia fell in 1948 and China shortly thereafter. Beyond these, there was the unhappy spectacle of American

diplomacy isolated as it has never been since we turned our backs on "isolationism" at the outset of World War II. In Indochina, there was never an identified "act of aggression" which could serve as the rallying point for free-world resistance. On the contrary, many nations continued until the very end to regard the fighting in Indochina as a colonial war, in which their sympathies were with the forces opposing the French.

WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE?

It is no doubt a great oversimplification to suggest that the difference between the two cases lies in the fact that one was handled by the United Nations and the other was not. And it would be grossly unfair to the United States government to imply that there was not awareness of the value of employing the United Nations and even an effort to persuade the French to submit the Indochina case for United Nations action. But it may well be that in this difference may lie an important part of the difference in the results. Who can say that three or four years of United Nations discussion would not have convinced even the "neutral" nations that the Vietminh stood for the subjugation rather than the liberation of Indochina? The opportunity for exposure was not exploited. Who can say that a United Nations guarantee of Indochinese independence in the future would not have gone far to eliminate the confusion over "colonialism" which permeated all consideration of the issue? The guarantee was never sought. Who can say that the United States might not have won in the United Nations diplomatic and political support for a solution in Indochina which would have safeguarded Indochinese independence and guaranteed free elections? We could certainly not have been more isolated than we were at Geneva. Who can say that the

United Nations arena and the intervention of United Nations agencies might not have facilitated an earlier cessation of fighting and better terms? In any event, the costs of continued fighting could hardly have been much greater than they were or the terms of settlement much worse.

FULL USE OF U.N.

This analysis at least suggests that before permitting full rein to our zeal for reforming the United Nations we ought first to attempt to use it as well as it can be used. The Korean case amply demonstrated the rewards of doing so, although not, of course, without travail and difficulty.

In using the United Nations to the full, there is always the risk, to which Professor Haviland referred, that the Soviet Union will feel itself forced to withdraw from the organization. With him, I agree that it would be "foolhardy" to force the Russians out by attempted revision of the Charter; and to that I would add "or by any other means," except in the direst circumstances. But this is a risk which has

already been taken many times. The "Uniting for Peace" resolution ran that risk. So did the United Nations firmness in Korea. The Korean experience suggests that the Soviet interest in staying in the United Nations is fairly strong. Despite the fact that the United Nations was used in Korea to thwart Soviet objectives, over Soviet opposition, the Russians did not withdraw. This is not to deny that the risk exists. But at what point the risk becomes operative it is hard to predict. And against the risk there is balanced the certainty that, if the United Nations is not employed to help deal with the major problems of our times, it will atrophy and die. No better instrument exists to help strive for the purposes set forth in the Charter.

Lawrence S. Pinkelstein, New York City, on the staff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace since 1952, was formerly with the Division of Dependent Area Affairs of the Department of State, the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations Secretariat, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

G. A. LINCOLN *

Dr. Haviland has taken a reasonable and realistic approach to the question of Charter revision, and his point that we might "destroy the bridge in the process of repairing it" should be given the most serious consideration by both those who are enthusiasts and those who are skeptics concerning the U.N. Although this point is clearly made, I wish he had stressed it more and had taken the opportunity to stress also that capabilities for Charter revision are, in fact, inherent to the day-to-day operation of that Charter. The "living Char-

* With the assistance of Captains Griffith, Klemmer, and Traber, U. S. Military Academy.

ter" has been evolving, like the British Constitution, very rapidly through usage. It would seem that this method and direction hold more hopes and less hazards, for the present, than any attempt at formal review and revision. Dr. Haviland has done a service in shooting some well-aimed shots into the rather usual United States faith that improvement can certainly be attained by institutional and procedural changes.

The article does not appear to define precisely what we expect the U.N. to contribute to the operation of affairs among nations. Although the point is not stressed, perhaps because it is so

obvious, the operating aspects of the U.N. in the security field were conceived on the assumption of substantial unanimity among the great powers. This situation has not come about. Furthermore, the concept of the U.N. as being a policy-making (rather than a policy-recommending) body may tend to be dangerous because, to some minds, there may be a strong implication of too close a similarity to national democratic legislatures. The U.N. makes vital contributions as a clearinghouse for diplomacy, as a forum, and as an essential institution for achieving maximum understanding and identifying maximum areas of agreement on difficult problems—these are vital contributions. But the U.N. does not make the policy; rather, the states which are members make U.N. policy, and it is effective policy only in so far as Member States accept and support U.N. conclusions.

SOME SUGGESTIONS

Following the line of these summary and admittedly incomplete thoughts, it seems that even more stress might be placed on (1) the importance of the recommendatory role and (2) on the need for restraint in proposing and pressing matters which some states consider contrary to their vital interest. As to the first point, the recommendatory role could be well and effectively argued for as achieving the maximum effectiveness that the U.N. can be expected to attain in the near future. If a state cannot be brought to react favorably to a recommendation, it is difficult to see how any working of the U.N., as conceived at San Francisco, could force it to react. As to the second point, the need for restraint is, of course, inconsistent with the almost uncontrollable urge of small or new states toward using this unprecedented opportunity to throw their weight about in world affairs.

Rather than a policy-making process, there is a tendency toward use of the U.N. to further changes. Sometimes these changes are opposed by affected nations on the grounds that they are not the concern of the U.N.

Dr. Haviland's article might have brought out somewhat more clearly that the various committees and commissions of the Assembly have some similarity to the committees of a national legislature. With more maturity, proposals impossible of acceptance might be kept in committee until an area of agreement is reached which would seem to permit some useful exercise of the recommendatory role of the Assembly. Such a perfected method of operation should eliminate some of the concern over an expanded "appetite for problems." These thoughts, however, presume much more restraint in using the U.N. as a propaganda sounding board than currently exists.

SOME QUESTIONS

There are at least two matters touched on in the article on which I should like to hear more of Dr. Haviland's views. First, what are the appropriate areas for U.N. policy making in a divided world—if analysis, determination of areas of agreement and disagreement, and exercise of the recommendatory role are called "policy making"? Second, by what policy and administrative expedients do we bridge the gap between the universal U.N. and the regional organizations and nation-state executive agents (the United States in the case of the Korean War) which logically have to carry out a collective security action of any magnitude? When successful policy necessitates a program of execution, what are the guidelines for that execution? This is a most important aspect of the policy-making process. If we define such practical guide-

lines, perhaps we shall know more about practical policy making.

Colonel G. A. Lincoln, West Point, New York, professor and head of the Depart-

LOUIS B. SOHN

While I agree to a large extent with Dr. Haviland's analysis of the present situation, I believe that his "alternatives for the future" do not properly present the choices with which we are now confronted. Though he himself advises against "hit-and-run recommendations," his suggestions cannot be easily fitted into any clear pattern.

The basic points in Dr. Haviland's analysis are that the Security Council has not been able to discharge the principal responsibilities imposed upon it by the Charter and that the General Assembly has unexpectedly taken over many of the functions of the Security Council. But he admits that the Assembly does not exercise its newly acquired functions in a responsible manner, and seems to recommend that maintenance of peace should be put again in the hands of the Security Council and that the Council should use for that purpose only its recommendatory powers, abandoning its power of making binding decisions. Dr. Haviland does not believe in the possibility of changing the voting rules in the Assembly or the Council; he suggests only such minor changes as can be made without a Charter amendment.

We should not try to turn the clock of progress back. The great powers were given a chance to direct the affairs of the world by means of the Security Council, and they failed ignominiously. The power has shifted to the General Assembly and it should stay there. The only question before us is: How can we make sure that the General Assembly will properly exercise its new responsibilities?

ment of Social Science of the United States Military Academy, is coauthor of Background for Our War (1942) and International Politics (1954) and author of Economics of International Security (1954).

The first step would be to make the General Assembly more representative of the peoples of the world. This can be best accomplished by replacing the present "one state—one vote" system by a weighted voting system which would ensure that a decision of the majority of the General Assembly would represent actually the will of the majority of the world's population. Dr. Haviland asserts that the principal powers do not seem inclined to alter the Charter provisions on voting, but it is quite clear that they would be the chief beneficiaries of any such change and there is no reason to assume that any one of the great powers would veto an amendment granting to them larger representation than they now possess. The Secretary of State of the United States has recently suggested that weighted voting be introduced in the United Nations, and it may be expected that the United States will press for an appropriate amendment and that other great powers will rally behind it.

Once that problem is solved, it will be much easier to grant to the General Assembly officially the powers which it is now exercising in a manner not always consistent with the Charter. It might even be possible to endow the Assembly with new powers which would enable it more effectively to perform its role as the chief guardian of world peace.

Louis B. Sohn, M.Dipl.Sc., LL.M., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is professor of law and John Harvey Gregory lecturer on world organization at Harvard University.

KENNETH YOUNGER

Dr. Haviland's reflections lead him to the conclusion which most serious students of United Nations Charter reform have found inevitable—that major changes in the Charter cannot be forced through without driving some major members out of the organization, and that this is far too high a price to pay. The only changes which can be seriously contemplated are therefore either quite minor in character or involve modifications of practice and procedure rather than Charter revision.

MEMBERSHIP QUESTIONS

Dr. Haviland rightly stresses the decisive influence of the United States and the Soviet Union, and sees clearly that any action which would drive either out of the United Nations would be not so much a reform of the United Nations as its abolition and a replacement by something quite different. I should like to see him carry the argument further, and point out that the absence of other major powers from the organization is also a serious obstacle to the effective handling of world affairs through the United Nations.

The case which leaps first to mind is China, for no one, whatever his views on the government which sits in Peiping, can seriously maintain that the Chinese state is now effectively represented in the United Nations. But there are other instances almost as damaging. In the Far East, it is not only China but also Japan which is without a voice in the world organization. What serious discussion on Far Eastern problems can, in such conditions, take place in the United Nations?

Europe is no better. How can the United Nations play a significant role in Europe when Germany, Italy, and numerous smaller European states are

not there? The answer is that it cannot and does not play a significant role in Europe. This situation was accepted in the immediate postwar period, when the settlement with enemy states was deliberately left to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Ten years later, however, this "transitional" arrangement must somehow be superseded. Otherwise the United Nations will inevitably be relegated to a subordinate status and become quite unimportant.

For this reason the decision which is most urgently needed in the United Nations is about its own membership. This is not a question of abolishing or circumventing the veto. The only way to secure effective membership for the United Nations is by a horse trade, whereby all the controversial applicants are balanced against each other and admitted together—China with Japan, Spain with Hungary, perhaps even East with West Germany, and so on.

This idea will shock many, but it is not really shocking, for there are certainly states already in the organization whose claims to "peace-loving" status or even to effective independence are as dubious as those of any new applicant. The problem is not a moral one at all. It is simply the question whether disputes between the real antagonists in world affairs are to be handled in the United Nations or elsewhere. If the present membership remains unchanged they will be handled elsewhere.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL

Beside this, the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council—on which I broadly share Dr. Haviland's approach—is of secondary importance.

There is still a role for the Security Council, especially in the field of disarmament where great-power agreement is indispensable. The increased influence of the General Assembly is, however, to be welcomed. It does not give the United Nations the authority for which the makers of the Charter hoped, but in the absence of great-power unity and a mandatory enforcement system it provides a certain check to open aggression and, if the worst occurs, sub-

stantial moral backing for collective resistance to aggression.

Kenneth Younger, M.P., London, was a member of the United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations (1946-50), Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1947-50), and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (1950-51). He is vice chairman of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

International Control of Armaments

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITION BY DAVID F. CAVERS *

COMMENTS BY GRENVILLE CLARK, BENJAMIN V. COHEN, W. STERLING COLE,
AND PERCY C. SPENDER

POLITICAL tensions induce increased armaments; increased armaments heighten political tensions; heightened political tensions . . . and so on. At what point should we try to cut into this circle? And could this action be taken within the framework of the present Charter or would revision be necessary?

In seeking a point of beginning, I turn to arms control in part because I am pessimistic about political settlements. We may succeed in negotiating this treaty or that truce, but I suspect we shall find that ending the particular disputes has not ended either the prevailing rivalry or the tension that accompanies it. But, after all, do we really shrink from rivalry or even tension? Is not what we fear the very real risk that, under present conditions, they may lead to atomic war?

Arms control could cut down that risk materially, even though the free nations remained pitted against the Communist states. The fears that have always resulted from a race to achieve security by arms are being magnified many dimensions today by the combination of military secrecy on an un-

precedented scale with the widespread realization that, behind whatever curtains the other side has drawn, it is building up a terrible potential for atomic destruction. When fears of this sort become acute enough, people seek release, and talk of preventive war can command a hearing—on both sides.

A control plan worthy of the name would end the dangerous secrecy and the arms race as well. The very act of entering it would gainsay warlike intentions, at least for the short run, since the disclosures required by the plan would go sharply counter to the war-maker's interest. Moreover, the adoption of the plan itself would have disposed of a number of issues (for example, various rearmament problems) which are commonly regarded as political but which the plan's designers would have had to resolve in setting up a workable control mechanism.

Happily, every day a control plan lasted, the harder it would become to discard. A people can regret a political settlement bitterly; the sacrifices entailed by its inevitable compromises are called appeasement. But how many people would lament a cut in the arms bill? And if the first cut had been small, would not political pressures grow for more? Arms limitation could become a vested interest, since at least some of the funds it freed would find their way into budgets for peaceful development in which millions would have a stake.

The difficult part of the business is getting started. I see no evidence that

* The writer is indebted to his colleague, Professor Louis B. Sohn, for helpful criticism and references to United Nations experience.

The record of the London meeting in May and June of the five-power subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission was disclosed after this article was written. Held at a time of great political uncertainty, the meeting was an exercise in reconnaissance, neither side being ready to make major concessions. Our own were concealed in ambiguity.

drastic proposals can command acceptance now or that complex plans can be negotiated. However, the start must be genuine. A false beginning would make it harder to muster support for a second try. Therefore, the most hopeful move toward peace may be the least ambitious control plan that is consistent with national protection.

BLUEPRINT FOR CONTROL

A blueprint for control may be magnificently simple and demonstrably effective, and yet be ignored. To secure the support of the rival blocs calls for motives on their part other than admiration for the control plan. Such motives may exist today, but, before noting them, I shall outline a minimal control plan and consider its relation to Charter revision.

First, a point of clarification. Standing alone, the reiterated Soviet proposal, a pledge against the use of atomic weapons, is *not* a control plan, however sweeping its terms. It typifies the dangers of a false start. Ought the men responsible for the size of America's atomic arsenal to reduce it by one kilogram because the Soviets gave such a pledge? Ought the Soviet promise to induce us to be any more lax as to defense measures than we already are? And would the Soviets be any less vigilant because the United States had taken oath? Of course not. And would not the reports of a continuing atomic arms build-up after the pledges had been solemnly signed and the souvenir pens distributed induce in newspaper-reading citizens everywhere either cynicism or hopelessness? If this is to be avoided, the pledge must be accompanied by a control plan.

A second point: an atomic weapons control plan is not a sufficient control plan. Today such a plan could give no assurance that at least some, and

possibly a good many, atomic bombs were not hidden away, and thermonuclear fusion has multiplied the destructiveness of even a small supply. Control of the air would, therefore, remain a rational military objective, and a good excuse for a race in conventional armaments. And the hard task of policing atomic operations without uncovering the secrets of the uncontrolled armaments would sharpen, not quiet, suspicions.

DISARMAMENT AND ARMS-REDUCTION PLANS

What we need, then, is a control plan that actually controls and that extends to all weapons. Must it *forbid* all weapons, compel true disarmament? No. That is a long, hard step, a step we ourselves are far from ready to take. At this stage, it remains a goal, not a means. But should a control plan not require at least the reduction of present armaments? That, in some respects, is a move even harder to negotiate than abolition. If reduction does not operate equally, one side has had its position worsened and may be endangered. But how is equality to be measured, given the prevailing diversity of defense needs, weapons, and auxiliary devices? How are we even to begin to balance reductions until both sides have disclosed their present arms? Yet, having thus surrendered the shield of secrecy, suppose they failed to agree on controls? It is easy to see why proposals for arms reduction which begin with an arms census get nowhere.

STANDSTILL PLAN

A minimum arms control plan is one that would do no more than stop the present arms race and keep it stopped. After such a standstill agreement had been put into effect—and it need have

no limit as to time—the control agency would then have to take an arms census both to police the arms standstill and to work out the details of permitted replacements. But by that stage the agreement would have been reached and both sides would have bound themselves not to increase armaments, whatever imbalances the census revealed.

Suppose a standstill plan were in operation. The still suspicious nations would have such protection as existing armaments give; they need have no fear that their rivals were outstripping them in an arms race; they would be assured that no decisive new weapon of offense or defense was being produced in quantity; and they would know that preparations for war by their rivals would almost certainly be detected by the inspectorate well before an attack could be launched. As this degree of assurance was achieved, the dread of sudden catastrophe that now overhangs the world would gradually fade away.

The initial arms census might, of course, reveal that one side had more of this or that weapon than the other side had suspected. Whatever these disparities, neither side could hope for an easy victory. The status quo would be preferable to reciprocal atomic attacks. Disclosure would document what daily is becoming clearer: we have achieved with the Soviets what amounts to an effective, working balance in armaments: the mutual power to devastate.

TOTAL WAR—MUTUAL SUICIDE

This is a broad statement. In support, I offer Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor, one of the West's leading strategists of the postwar period. Air Marshal Slessor recently wrote:

The Second Air War—if it should come—would not remotely resemble the first

one. . . . The picture we have to envisage is a rapid succession in the first few weeks of cataclysmic disasters, compared to which the Hamburg "catastrophe" (as the Germans called it) would be child's play. . . . To admit that this terrible fate would not fall upon one side alone is merely to acknowledge that we have at last reached that stage, which men have thought before now that they were reaching, when total war would amount virtually to mutual suicide.¹

THE CONTROL AUTHORITY

If the powers wish to substitute an effective standstill control plan for the costly pursuit of arms supremacy, this would, of course, require the creation of an authority to administer the controls. This could be done either by an annex to the Charter, adopted as an amendment, or by a multilateral treaty. In neither case would change in the Charter's present terms be required. This annex or treaty could include a prohibition against the use of atomic and other specified weapons. The relationship between the control authority and the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat could be carefully worked out, and the rules of those bodies could be adjusted to accommodate the new agency.

Neither the annex nor the treaty method is novel. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an annex to the Charter, and the specialized agencies in the economic field exemplify the use of the treaty device.²

¹ Slessor, "Has the H-Bomb Abolished Total War?" *Air Force*, Vol. 37, No. 5 (May 1954), pp. 23, 25; also published in *Boston Sunday Herald*, May 2, 1954, p. 1.

² The United States delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission submitted on July 12, 1946, a detailed memorandum outlining treaty provisions to implement the Baruch plan, then before the U.N. Commission. See U.N. Atomic Energy Commission,

Space is lacking to project a structure for a control authority thus created, but one central point should be made concerning it. Arms control is a matter of utmost gravity. The power of decision on big issues should be closely linked with responsibility. Basic policy problems of military significance should be resolved by the states having militarily significant forces, however helpful the views of other states may be and however indispensable their contribution to administration. An allocation of power that departs from customary U.N. patterns may be required.³ If this were hard to work out in an annex, resort to the treaty method would be indicated.

Pursuing the implications of this idea further, the authority's designers should recognize that arms control can exist only by virtue of the acquiescence of the great military powers, so long at least as the controllers are not as strong as the controlled, a proviso likely to persist for some time to come. Therefore, with acquiescence setting the actual limits of authority, issues of the veto and of sanctions should not be exaggerated. They should be resolved in such a way as to facilitate initial agreement.

Official Records, Spec. Suppl. (1946) Memo. No. 3, p. 106, reproduced in U. S. Department of State, *International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy* (1947), Appl. 16, p. 160. This treaty was to embody the charter for the projected Atomic Development Authority and define its relationship to the U.N. Neither the United States Delegation nor the Commission itself seems to have resolved the question whether the relinquishment of the veto, proposed by Mr. Baruch in atomic sanctions cases, should be by treaty or Charter amendment.

³ Compare the provisions for weighted voting in the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

Either the annex or the treaty method would allow the adherence of nonmember states, hopefully a vanishing category.

I hope this does not seem cavalier. It is the gravity of the problem that dictates this view. Let us look at a hypothetical case—and without recourse to Ruritania. Suppose an inspection team from the U.N. authority uncovered an undeclared atomic bomb cache in, say, Czechoslovakia. Suppose that the Czechs refused to give up the bombs, and, in the Security Council, Russia vetoed an order directing their surrender to the U.N. Immediately the question would arise whether, as a practical matter, the treaty still survived or whether, instead, we should have to resume building up our own atomic armaments and defenses.

If the veto had been renounced, the situation would be much the same. When the U.N. made its demand on the Czechs, they could thwart the control plan by refusing to comply. Suppose that in this they had the Soviet's express approval. It would be necessary to decide, just as in the veto case, whether the treaty's usefulness was ended.

FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

The fact that such a crisis might arise does not mean that legal procedures could not be set up to deal with it. Thus, either the annex or the treaty could include a provision that would apply if a party to the agreement failed to live up to its terms and, in so doing, created a substantial risk to the peace and security of other signatories. The latter should then be authorized to withdraw from the agreement. The power to determine whether such a breach had occurred, however, could be vested in the International Court. In case of need, the Court would have power to "indicate interim measures of protection" against the breach.⁴ It could

⁴ International Court of Justice, Statute of the Court, Chap. III, Art. 41, par. 1, Rules of

act on an emergency basis,⁵ and then proceed to a full judicial inquiry. The agreement could properly provide that resort to the Court would not preclude the complaining powers from proceeding at once to take such precautionary measures, short of war, as they thought wise. An orderly procedure need not limit their right to self-defense.

In the operation of a control plan, most of the serious issues jeopardizing effective control would doubtless be disposed of in the Security Council rather than in the Court. But there would be a host of lesser questions arising in the interpretation and application of the treaty, despite the fact that it should be as precise and specific a document as human skill and foresight would permit. Most of these questions would arise out of day-to-day operations and could be worked out between the authority's executive (which might well be staffed chiefly from the less military nations) and the state or states involved. But a board might be provided to hear appeals from the executive, and the authority could, of course, resort to the Court for advisory opinions.

INSPECTION FUNCTION OF CONTROL AUTHORITY

The inspection function of the control authority would impose a large but not overwhelming burden upon it. The same reasoning that makes it possible to say that our armaments are in effec-

Court, Art. 61. The President may act alone if necessary; Art. 61, par. 3.

⁵ The Permanent Court of International Justice, pursuant to rules similar to those of the International Court, took interim action on one occasion two days after such action had been requested. *Pless Case*, P.C.I.J. Series C, No. 70, p. 429. In the recent *Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case*, the International Court took interim action in two weeks. Order of July 5, 1951, I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 89.

tive balance even though no arms census has been taken would make small-scale breaches of the standstill relatively inconsequential. Major departures could be detected by a knowledgeable inspectorate with freedom to check military forces and supplies, key industrial installations, reactors, and power sites, and to conduct aerial surveys with reasonable frequency. Quantitative determinations could be made without entailing disclosure of secret devices and processes. Laboratory weapons research might be allowed—it could scarcely be prevented—but developmental work calling for pilot plants and test models could and should be controlled. The time span between drawing board and production line for the complex mechanisms of modern warfare should enable a technologically competent inspectorate to detect and abort new monsters in embryo.

The control authority might well have a division with a secretariat and technical staff directed to the study of problems in the reduction of existing armaments and charged with the formulation from time to time of reduction proposals.

ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR PEACE

So far I have barely mentioned atomic development for peace. The Authority we proposed in 1946 was to have developmental responsibilities, a corollary of the monopoly of fissionables it was to have. Under a control plan that left nuclear weapons and stockpiles lawfully in the hands of their possessors, obviously these nations could undertake their own atomic development programs. However, the agreement creating the control authority could also provide for a development authority with functions similar to those outlined by President Eisenhower in his speech to the General Assembly on December 8, 1953.

body could work closely with control authority in dealing with the problem of the production of fissionables. Suppose a control plan were to go into effect tomorrow. Would our reactors be permitted to operate? I should think only those engaged in research and development ought to be free to do so. The needs of peacetime reactors in the near term could readily be supplied from military stockpiles. But in time this situation would end. Reactors producing fissionables should then be permitted to operate at a rate and frequency that would serve only to satisfy the needs of domestic power reactors and for such exports as the President's (or the Politburo's) plan may contemplate. No large new stockpile should be allowed anywhere under the guise of meeting civilian needs. Nuclear fuel in use in the power reactors would be less dangerous than stockpiles. Not only would its withdrawal disrupt those dependent on this source of power, but the fuel itself might require fairly protracted reprocessing to be ready for use in bombs. Therefore, whenever the development authority found that a nation's atomically powered electric industry required more fuel, it should have to certify that fact to the control authority, and the latter should authorize the operation of fuel-producing reactors long enough to meet the industry's needs. On motion of a state aggrieved by either ruling, the authority complained of should be required to submit the issue to the International Court for an advisory opinion and to be bound by the Court's ruling.⁶

CIVIL WARS

This sketch must pass over technical difficulties such as the determination of

⁶ Compare the analogous provision (Art. VIII, Sec. 30) in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

arms replacement rates and the handling of unfinished ships and installations. But the really tough problem for this and any other arms control plan is what to do about civil war. Suppose that Iran blows up in a rebellion against the Shah's government, strife that the West believes is being fomented by the Soviets. The Loyalists claim the rebels are being armed by Russia and ask for Western planes, tanks, and artillery. At this point the inspectorate attains critical importance. It would have the responsibility of determining the facts as to the alleged flow of munitions across the Russo-Iranian frontier. If this was occurring, a protest would follow, and, if that were not heeded, the case would go to the Security Council or to the Court, or both. Even though Council action were vetoed, still, if the Court found a major violation, the complaining powers could hold the annex or treaty to be at an end and decide whether to back the Shah or let Iran be swallowed up in the now familiar fashion. The same problem and the same choice could be posed by the falling out of two neighbor states, if either or both had powerful backers.

Is there any reason to hope that, given an arms control plan, such incidents would stop? I think so, and for a simple reason, a reason that also leads me to believe that a standstill plan, if adopted, would not be sabotaged by the obstructionist tactics that for the Communists seem standard operating procedure. The reason is this: The great military powers would not adopt an arms control plan unless they wanted arms controlled. Entry into the plan would exact a heavy price: the disclosure of military secrets and the cessation of developing defense programs. If the powers thought that price worth paying, they would not throw away the benefits of control just to back a local struggle. (This does not mean, inci-

dentally, that the plan would assure tranquillity for Iran and like countries. There are subtler ways of upsetting a regime than by shipping arms—and, note too, there are subtler ways to defend one.)

U.S.S.R. AND COMMUNIST CHINA

But is there any real chance that the Soviet government and its Chinese ally would regard the cessation of the arms race as a benefit worth buying? So far their interest in disarmament has seemed centered on exacting a pledge against atomic weapons with the evident purpose of embarrassing the United States. They may believe that they can carry the armaments load better than we and our allies. They may look to the arms burden as a growing source of friction in the Western camp and as a block to economic and social progress among all nations not under their domination. But against this view are other considerations, among them those "political" settlements that are necessary incidents of arms control.

Despite the defeat of the European Defense Community, Russia must reckon with German rearmament as a probable next step. A powerful Germany separated from Russia only by a cordon of untrustworthy satellites is a prospect that Russia seems to fear. China may also view a rearming Japan with disquiet. A standstill would block the

rearming of both Germany and Japan. Moreover, both Russia and China have economies that have been retarded by the drying up of East-West and the China trade, not to mention the exactions of military expansion. The barriers to trade would fall as the barrier to arms increases was erected. And since no arms control plan operating through U.N. machinery would be effective if China did not take part, the curbing of Chinese military expansion would entail acceptance of Red China's U.N. claims (though not to Formosa).

These are potent affirmative attractions. Moreover, acceptance of the plan would call for no major internal reorganization in Russia; no loss of the power to say *Nyet* in the U.N.; no subservience to a Western majority in the development of Russia's atomic resources. Can we really be sure the Soviets would reject such an opportunity? Or that the Chinese would refuse to go along?

THE UNITED STATES

The foregoing says nothing of the reasons why the United States might wish to enter such a plan. These can be entrusted to the thoughtful reader. Among them he may stress the hope that, if the world can control the instruments of its own destruction, perhaps in time it will have the good sense to abolish them.

David F. Cavers, LL.B., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Fessenden professor of law and associate dean of the Harvard Law School. During World War II he served as associate general counsel for price in the Office of Price Administration. He is an associate of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. He was formerly editor of Law and Contemporary Problems (1933-45) and is author of a number of articles on the international control of atomic energy, chiefly in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

COMMENTS

GRENVILLE CLARK

With the "improvement" of the A- and H-bombs, our civilization faces so unprecedented a problem that one must welcome any serious suggestion toward a solution, especially a proposal from so careful a thinker as Professor Cavers. And yet I am obliged to consider his proposal unsatisfactory because, on analysis, it is inadequate to meet the situation.

Be it noted that in so far as any binding obligation is concerned, Professor Cavers' proposal is confined solely to a "standstill" in the arms race. For, although he hopes that a standstill will lead to something more, he proposes no binding obligation whatever for any reduction in national armaments, not to speak of their abolition.

It seems clear that the proposal does not sufficiently take into account the immense destructive power of the new bombs which already exists or soon will. Professor Cavers recognizes the necessity of establishing an effective inspection system as an essential part of the standstill agreement. No one would predict that the very complicated agreement that would have to be negotiated for the setting up of such an inspection system could be achieved within less than two or three years. During that period it seems inevitable that the nations, and especially the two superpowers, would accelerate their production of bombs, so as to start the standstill at the highest possible levels.

These increases, when added to the present stocks, would produce an accumulated power of destruction almost beyond belief.

It has been reliably calculated that by the end of 1957 the United States will possess fissionable material suitable

for A-bombs equivalent in explosive power to 430 million tons of T.N.T. Since the Hiroshima bomb had an explosive power of about 20 thousand tons of T.N.T., this prospective stockpile would be the equivalent of 21,000 Hiroshima bombs; and it would be about 320 times the explosive power dropped on Germany in World War II, officially reported as the equivalent of 1,340,000 tons of T.N.T. In addition there would be H-bombs of a number and power that is anybody's guess, but which by 1957 might well double our total bombing potential. It is staggering to note that a potential equal to 800 million tons of T.N.T. would be nearly 600 times the explosive power dropped on Germany in World War II.

Obviously, if even a small fraction of such an arsenal could be dropped, the United States would be able to devastate not only Russia and China but all the larger cities of the entire world. By the same token, if Russia possessed bombs with only one-tenth of this power, she could at the least devastate Britain and Western Europe to an unimaginable extent.

In the light of this situation, it is hard to see how a mere standstill agreement, whereby the nations while not increasing might nevertheless keep intact their vast destructive power, could appreciably lessen the mutual tensions and fears that now bedevil the world.

What is required is something far more radical and far more adequate, namely, complete disarmament. By this I mean the total *abolition* of all national military forces and armaments of any description right down to the level of lightly armed and strictly limited forces for internal order only. I say

complete disarmament because in the H-bomb era nothing less will suffice, and because both common sense and the record of history show that all efforts at mere reduction will bog down in disputes over "quotas" and "needs" of the various powers.

It may be argued that a standstill, even though no solution, would represent some progress and would at least be easier of achievement than complete national disarmament. But this I venture to doubt. If a man finally comes to realize that he is very ill, it is often no more difficult to persuade him to accept a major operation that can cure him than to obtain his acceptance for a severe but inadequate treatment that can probably do no more than keep him from getting worse. I suggest that this

BENJAMIN V. COHEN

Time and space limits do not permit a balanced appraisal of Professor Cavers' article; I can make only a few observations which I hope will be helpful.

1. In connection with the general problem of Charter revision, Professor Cavers' conclusion, with which I wholly agree, that no change in the present terms of the Charter of the United Nations is required to permit the adoption of an effective plan for the international control of armaments, is most significant.

It is one of the basic principles laid down in the existing Charter that neither force nor the threat of force shall be used by Member States in their international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter. The Charter has not been rendered obsolete by the discovery of atomic weapons. Effective disarmament arrangements are not excluded by the Charter, but are necessary to carry out its stated objectives.

We have failed to implement the

analogy may apply to the present world situation. For I do not really believe that the peoples are so lacking in intelligence and will as to tolerate the present arms race without a vigorous effort to rid themselves, through complete disarmament, of the intolerable threat of modern war.

Grenville Clark, LL.B., Dublin, New Hampshire, lawyer, has been a vice-president of the United World Federalists since its founding in 1947. He was chairman of the National Emergency Committee for Selective Service (1940-41) and of the Citizens Committee for National War Service (1944-45). He is the author of A Plan for Peace (1950) and coauthor with Louis B. Sohn of Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision: Detailed Proposals for Revision of the United Nations Charter (1953).

Charter with respect to the control of arms, but that is not the fault of the Charter. No mere formula of words which could possibly be added to the Charter by way of amendment would ensure the development and observance of an effective plan for the international control of armaments. If there should be a general conference for Charter revision, the Soviet Union would probably call for an amendment embodying its brief and magic formula forbidding the use of all atomic weapons. But neither that or any other paper formula would be of any practical value or effect until the principal military powers agreed upon a concrete and workable plan for the international control of armaments.

As Professor Cavers has pointed out, within the framework of the present Charter, treaty arrangements may be made for the effective international control of armaments if the principal states concerned can agree on the terms of

such arrangements. Such arrangements could impose additional powers on existing organs of the United Nations or on newly created organs, and could provide special voting procedures for determining violations or settling disputes arising thereunder.

Much should and must be done to stop the nations racing with more and deadlier arms to their common destruction. But we should not let ourselves be diverted from the difficult task of working out and securing acceptance of concrete plans for the effective international control of armaments by indulging in false hopes and expectations as to what may be accomplished by Charter revision.

STANDSTILL ARRANGEMENT

2. Professor Cavers performs a distinct service in calling for consideration of the possibility and feasibility of a standstill arrangement, a minimum control plan which would stop the present arms race and keep it stopped. Since some sort of a standstill is likely to be the first stage or a part of the first stage of any armaments control plan, political leaders should be in a position to appraise the possible effects of such an arrangement. Indeed the British and French representatives at the recent meetings of the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission suggested that a standstill or freeze should be a part of the first stage of the disarmament program.

Professor Cavers believes that there is good chance of agreement on a standstill because it would preserve rather than disturb the existing working balance in armaments between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly in the reciprocal power to devastate. There may be some merit in Professor Cavers' desire to achieve in the first instance a simple standstill,

without trying to secure anything in the way of a balanced readjustment or reduction in armaments, but I should think it would be wise to guard against any rigid or inflexible position in this regard. Professor Cavers may have more faith in the nature of the unverified working balance in armaments which has come about through the armaments race than those who would have to accept responsibility for the standstill. Some over-all ceilings or limitations on the numbers of persons to be permitted in the armed forces and on the kinds of armaments to be allowed might help to increase the confidence of all concerned in the nature and workability of the balance in armaments to be obtained by the standstill.

A standstill arrangement has considerable attractiveness as an entering wedge to balanced disarmament, but I cannot share Professor Cavers' apparent hope that a general standstill by itself, without reasonable expectation or assurance of further advances in the way of more definite agreement on the quantity and kind of permitted armaments, could last very long. The problems of inspection, verification, and enforcement under a general standstill would in time become, I fear, even more difficult than under a more definite arms control agreement. After a while the difficulties of distinguishing between replacements and betterments or additions might become virtually insoluble.

FLEXIBILITY NEEDED

Certainly Professor Cavers' plan is excessively rigid if he contemplates, as he apparently does, that the standstill should be inflexibly applied to all nations. He states without qualification, for example, that it would block the rearming of Germany and Japan. Of course the object of a standstill would

be defeated if the Soviet Union and the United States were free without restraint to add to the arms of their allies. But a workable standstill arrangement must be flexible enough to avoid creating or maintaining a really dangerous disequilibrium of power in any important strategic area. Professor Cavers' standstill if inflexibly applied across the earth would neither afford nor permit any adequate defensive counterpoise to the power of Red China in Asia. The present power situation in Asia is not particularly conducive to peace and stability. Perhaps that situation cannot be remedied over a short period. But a standstill agreement which would render such a situation irremediable for the indefinite future might be a doubtful

contribution to the peace of the area or of the world.

A standstill arrangement as an approach to balanced disarmament is a constructive suggestion which merits thoughtful exploration. But in our quest for a simple start to stop the armaments race we must be careful to guard against any serious imbalance of power which may endanger the peace.

Benjamin V. Cohen, LL.D., J.D., S.J.D., was counselor of the Department of State from 1945 to 1947 and a member of the United States delegation to various international conferences during this period, member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (1948-52), and U. S. representative on the U.N. Disarmament Commission (1952).

W. STERLING COLE

Dr. Cavers frankly states that he "turns to arms control" in part as a means of reducing international tensions and cutting down risks of atomic war, because he is "pessimistic about political settlements." As a member of the school of practical politics, and a more than casual observer of foreign affairs, I am more inclined to look to the political arrangements which Dr. Cavers rejects to obtain the desired ends. Although I confess I partially share Dr. Cavers' pessimism about political settlements, I am far more doubtful of the effectiveness of any arms control that we might negotiate in the foreseeable future.

In theory, the plan Dr. Cavers proposes seems desirable—but so did the Baruch plan for international control of atomic energy. It looked mighty good on paper. Yet, despite the fact that more than fifty members of the United Nations endorsed it, and leading statesmen described it as the most magnificent and generous offer in history, it foundered on the rocks of Soviet op-

position. The various proposals of the defunct League of Nations for limitation and reduction of armaments and for collective security, and the Locarno and Kellogg-Briand peace pacts were hailed as panaceas for international ills, yet Mussolini in Ethiopia, Tojo in Manchuria, Hitler in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and Stalin in Finland proved how little weight such treaties really carried when the chips were down.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

I am ready to concede that the "political settlements" which I would advocate in preference to "arms control," and by which our present foreign policy is regulated, can be transitory and an illusion. They are of value only so long as they are mutually or multilaterally acceptable. Admittedly, they are negotiated with escape clauses and loopholes and even with crossed fingers. When ratified they are devoid of teeth. But a "political arrangement" (for ex-

ample, a pledge to renounce war as an instrument of national policy) does not leave us with our defenses impaired, as would a sanctionless armaments control; nor are we left in an inferior position militarily unless, as we have all too often done in the past, we stupidly disarm ourselves. Treaties, like any unsecured contract, are scraps of paper to those who wish to break them, and there are rarely any peaceful means of specific enforcement.

Democracies such as Britain, France, and the United States, and small neutrals like Belgium, Norway, Holland, and Denmark, who in the past counted on treaties alone for protection, were caught short when the dictators acted. But it must be considered that they were not bound by treaties to let their defenses crumble or their offensive strength grow blunt.

It would be far more indefensible in today's world voluntarily to lay oneself open to aggression, or even to invite it by espousing an armaments control which at best would be unilateral. The day of dictators is not past—we have powerful ones with us still. Is it permissible to assume that history will not repeat itself if given a chance?

ARMS CONTROL AND COMMUNISM

If Dr. Cavers could guarantee that all governments concerned with armaments—the U.S.S.R., the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Japan, and China—would see eye to eye, be practicing democracies, and have the same concepts of political morality, then a plan for control or even limitation and reduction of existing armaments would conceivably be possible. But the irreducible objectives of Communism (and the openly avowed means of securing them) and the objectives of democratic states are as far removed as the poles. We have police states against free peo-

ples; Iron Curtains against Open Doors; the concept of government as the master rather than servant and of citizens as slaves rather than sovereign; and we have the Kremlin, despite Moscow's mouthings on "peace," "democracy," and coexistence, sworn to destroy capitalism by any means whatsoever, preferably foul rather than fair. It is not coexistence that is all-important; it is co-survival.

Dr. Cavers' plan envisages, first, a simple standstill agreement; then a control agency which would (1) police the standstill, (2) take an arms census, (3) conduct effective inspection on the spot by checking military forces and matériel de guerre, key industrial and atomic installations, and laboratory weapons research, (4) make aerial surveys, and so forth. In short, it is a reworking of the stillborn Baruch plan to which the Soviets gave a thundering *Nyet*.

To assume that the Soviets would accept any such plan, or surrender one iota of their national sovereignty, or agree to revision of the United Nations Charter, is naïveté. To expect the Kremlin to consider as sacred any treaty whatsoever, if it were to their advantage to break it, is to be deliberately blind to precedents; *vide* the Russo-Finnish War, Russia's expulsion from the League of Nations, the fate of the Baltic republics and the Balkan states, Korea, and postwar Germany.

Arms control with the U.S.S.R. is an illusion; with other countries it is unnecessary. Since it is impossible for the Soviets to meet even our minimal security demands for limiting our own defenses and at the same time maintain their police state—the sine qua non of Communist dictatorship—to pursue the matter further would be to lull our people inexcusably into a false sense of security. That we must not do.

In my view, we will be wise to resign ourselves to political realities and to

become accustomed to the world's perils, rather than to invite the aggression and possible national destruction which would come with unilateral armaments control.

PERCY C. SPENDER

Little discernible progress has been made this year towards achieving any degree of disarmament in a world equipped with weapons of unprecedented destructive power. But unlike 1953, when the United Nations Disarmament Commission met only once just before the eighth session of the General Assembly so that it could report it had nothing to report, there have been attempts this year to come to grips with the disarmament problem which lies uneasily on the conscience of mankind.

There have been public and private exchanges in New York, London, Washington, Berlin, and Geneva. We all know they ended seemingly in deadlock, and Secretary of State Dulles has commented wryly to the press that because of a fundamental difference in approach, private talks with the Russians seem to produce no more agreement than do public exchanges.

How next, then, to tackle this problem of disarmament? There is, I am afraid, no ingenious elusive key which once found will unlock the door. Viewed from Olympian heights, it would seem that only time will provide an answer, that armaments will be reduced or abandoned only when rendered redundant through long years of peace which terror, perhaps, rather than statesmen, may ensure. When I speak of terror I mean, of course, fear of the terrible consequences of global war—a fear which may give us a protracted global peace, albeit an uneasy one.

The key to this disarmament problem does not lie in protocols, pacts, or inter-

W. Sterling Cole, LL.B., LL.D., Washington, D. C., is Representative from New York in the United States Congress, has been a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy since 1947, and was elected its chairman in April 1953.

national conventions, important though these may in themselves be. It passes beyond such machineries to the meta-physical—to the minds of men. There can be no disarmament while sullen distrusts smolder and anxious tensions remain.

Let us examine the stalemated position on the control of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The non-Communist world adheres to its position that such weapons should be outlawed, but only after arrangements for international inspection and policing have been made. The Russian position demands an immediate and unconditional ban of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, with a system of international control thereafter to be worked out by the Security Council—where of course the Soviet has a veto.

Naturally, the West cannot agree to such a proposition. But what is the working of the Russian mind? Is it possible that it too suspects a trick; that it fears that any international disarmament body—on which the Communists would be outnumbered just as they are in the U.N.—would be used against them? What is the real reason why the Soviet will not agree to an effective banning of atomic weapons? Reduced to conventional weapons for defense, one might argue, the Soviet Union would be far less vulnerable than it is today. But as it is, our positions remain poles apart.

Everyone who prays for peace is praying that somehow means will be found to enable the Communist and

democratic systems to exist peacefully together. History has shown how societies or creeds hostile to each other have nonetheless learned to live side by side. Under the overhanging threat of atomic war and in the face of stiffened Western resistance, Communist pressure—in a global sense—has eased a little, I think it fair to say.

Along the periphery where Communist and anti-Communist forces come into contact with each other are situations sure to generate tensions. If we can keep these dangerous tensions under control without sacrificing any of our principles, we may develop a long uneasy peace with lessening strain, less reliance on costly arms, and increasing amenability towards international co-operation.

EXPLORING EVERY POSSIBILITY

This will be a long process, and meanwhile we must keep striving for disarmament, whatever the disappointments or frustrations. By all means let us press forward with President Eisenhower's suggestion for an international agency to further the peaceful application of atomic power, with or without Soviet Russia; by all means let us examine amendments to the Charter of the United Nations and consider whether the control of the use of weapons of mass destruction requires more specific treatment in the Charter itself; by all means let us amend the U.N. Charter to set up a control authority, if it is feasible and would help. And let us have continuing talks on the problem in public and in private, particularly among the big powers. Some day, something will have to give somewhere; a suspicion may abate; a tension be re-

moved. If we remain in touch with the Communists, exploring every possible formula and establishing our good intent by the manner in which we conduct ourselves, some day we may find a shifting of their position which will enable us safely to modify our own and to achieve real progress towards disarmament.

The Disarmament Commission has met in New York on at least two occasions this year and its special subcommittee conferred in London between May 19 and June 22; although no progress was discernible, it could not have been less than in 1953 when there were no meetings at all.

Following President Eisenhower's atomic proposals to the United Nations Assembly last December, Secretary of State Dulles this year conferred with Soviet Ambassador Zarubin in Washington and with the Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. Molotov in Berlin and Geneva. Again no visible progress was made, but who knows? These cumulative endeavors may have allayed suspicion enough to make possible at least one step along the road we must travel.

The achievement of disarmament, as I said before, is a matter of men's minds and political philosophies rather than of formula or procedure. But to bring about the fusing of the former we must persevere with the latter, in the full knowledge that until we succeed, mankind can never rest secure.

Sir Percy C. Spender, K.B.E., Q.C., LL.B., Washington, D. C., Ambassador of Australia to the United States since 1951, was Vice-President of the United Nations General Assembly (1950-51) and chairman of the Australian Delegation (1950, 1952-54).

Strengthening the Secretariat

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITION BY WALDO CHAMBERLIN

COMMENTS BY W. FRIEDMANN, AWNI KHALIDY, JACOB ROBINSON, AND WALLACE S. SAYRE

THE Secretariat of the United Nations is large, and its approximately seven thousand employees are scattered all over the world, about half of them working elsewhere than at the headquarters in New York. It should be noted that there is no fundamental difference between the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, because the final and complete responsibility for the latter rests with the former. "His choice of staff, more particularly of the higher staff—and his leadership, will largely determine the character and the efficiency of the Secretariat as a whole."¹ The Charter gives this group of people two broad functions: those that are political and are implied under Article 99 of the Charter, and those that are more specifically stipulated as administrative in Article 97. The gap between political and administrative is partially bridged by the Secretary-General's role in the General Assembly and the Councils, specified in general terms in Article 98. The rules of procedure of the organs have reinforced this interrelationship by extending to political fields the Secretary-General's right of participation in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and their subsidiaries. If the Secretariat is to be strengthened, the problem arises as to which of the two roles, or what combination of them, is to be emphasized.

The first Secretary-General had be-

¹ *Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations* (London, Doc. PC/20, 23 December 1945), p. 86.

fore him the precedents of two very different but successful international officials, Albert Thomas of the International Labor Organization and Sir Eric Drummond of the League of Nations. Thomas' concept of the role of the head of an international secretariat was one of dynamic leadership, extending to presentation of proposals and vigorous argument and negotiation in support of them in constituent bodies. He also took an active part in directing the administration of his secretariat. Drummond, on the other hand, exerted a great influence on the substantive work of the League of Nations by working in the background and eschewing public participation in the policy-making process. He, too, saw his administrative role as an important part of his over-all task. Mr. Trygve Lie apparently believed that his time and energy should be devoted to political negotiations in the interests of world peace, and that the administrative aspects of his role should be delegated to assistants. He did give strong support to the substantive work of his senior officers, particularly in the economic, social, and dependent-area fields; it would be unfortunate if that feature of his leadership were not retained. In each of the three examples, the question was one of emphasis. Where Drummond and Thomas believed that the success of their tasks required a balance between the political role, which each carried out in a different manner, and the administrative function, in which both took an active part, Mr. Lie emphasized the political role

and delegated his administrative functions.

The second Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjöld, appears to be moving toward Drummond's concept of the post. He has taken a much greater part in the administration of the Secretariat than did Mr. Lie and seems aware that in the present political situation in the world an individual, even the Secretary-General of the United Nations, can exert little influence on the international tensions that exist.

A major reorganization is now in progress in the Secretariat, little of which has been formalized but parts of which have been put into practice. This makes it difficult to state what the situation is at the moment, or what the future Secretariat will be.

BALANCE OF CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

An important change which would strengthen the Secretariat would be to secure a better balance between the desirable aspects of both centralization and decentralization. The problem is not unlike that of a large university which tries to retain the benefits of having strong departments without losing the advantages of a co-ordinated university educational program. Within the Secretariat a number of methods might assist in achieving such a balance, one of which could be to have more units responsible directly to the Secretary-General. This would make it possible to break up some of the catch-all Departments such as Security Council Affairs, Public Information, Conferences and General Services, and Administrative and Financial Services. In turn, this would permit bringing together units with more nearly identical interests and duties, with possible (or probable) elimination of some duplication of efforts and services. Units devoted primarily to field activities, re-

search, writing, area study, relations with specialized agencies and nongovernmental organizations, distribution and sale of documents, and legal work appear to be particularly appropriate for combination and reallocation. There are many indications that the reorganization is moving along these lines.

More units reporting directly to the Secretary-General will require the elimination of a considerable number of high posts, as has been suggested by members of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. This may also tend to reduce the undesirable gap between the Secretary-General and a considerable number of his senior officers. This policy has clearly been that of the second Secretary-General, even before the reorganization started.

Effective centralization will require an expansion of the immediate office of the Secretary-General, which many observers have considered too small for the nature of the tasks that center therein. The probable creation of two deputies to assist in developing the political role of the Secretary-General appears to be a salutary step. However, if overcentralization is to be avoided there will also have to be a clearer delegation of authority than existed in the past. In considering the size of the Secretary-General's immediate staff and the functions which should be delegated elsewhere, consideration might well be given to the creation of an intelligence service which could provide him with the type of information needed to exercise the immense responsibility conferred by Article 99. Such a service, to be effective, would have to be very close to the Secretary-General on a personal basis. Mr. Lie was fortunate in having a United Nations commission on the ground in Korea on June 25, 1950, but it is conceivable that had he been permitted to have an adequate intelligence service of his own, it might

have been able to warn him of the impending aggression in time for him to have prevented the attack by calling to the attention of the Security Council the preparations that were being made for the attack.

The very extensive operations of the Secretariat away from headquarters suggest the possibility of adapting to all field operations the system of Regional Technical Assistance Representatives (RTAR's) used by the Technical Assistance Board. Perhaps the concept of regional offices could eventually be expanded to include field personnel of the specialized agencies—a step that might lead to the realization of an international civil service such as was proposed by the Preparatory Commission in 1945. Adaptation of the RTAR concept might provide part of the better balance between centralization and decentralization of field activities which are presently decentralized.

STAFF MORALE

No other steps, perhaps, would do more to improve the quality and effectiveness of the Secretariat than to improve the morale of the staff. It would be difficult to improve upon the devotion of most of the personnel to the cause of the United Nations, but there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the lack of diversification of work. The rather rigid compartmentalization that has existed has made it difficult for members of the staff to know about or understand what transpires elsewhere, even in their own units or department. "Jobs" have been broken down into

their component parts, as in large factories, and the various parts assigned to personnel of increasingly lower grades. This has led to boredom and dissatisfaction, running from low to high. It should be possible to redefine many posts so as to make them more interesting and stimulating for capable people, while at the same time providing greater opportunity for rotation between units and between headquarters and field services.

Much has been done to clarify and settle the tenure problem since the advent of the Walters Committee in 1952 and the Kerno and Mudaliar Committees in 1953 and 1954, but the very breadth and scope of the reorganization now under way has caused considerable uncertainty in the minds of many members of the Secretariat. Some of this insecurity is unavoidable in a Secretariat that lacked effective leadership for seven years. A closely related but different problem, to which there is no clear answer, is that of geographical distribution, a problem which is very often present in any personnel issue. In an international organization, perhaps even more than in a national government, there will probably always be a certain number of employees appointed for political reasons, some of whom will be highly competent and some of whom will not. If the latter were taken out of the administrative or operational stream and used as advisers or consultants, or simply not used at all, the permanent career service would be freed for greater development and effectiveness.

Waldo Chamberlin, Ph.D., New York City, has been professor of government at New York University since 1949, and is now director with the university's Program of Studies in United Nations. He was chief documents officer of the San Francisco Conference and in United Nations. He was chief documents officer of the San Francisco Conference and in United Nations Preparatory Commission (1945-46), deputy director of the Documents and Sales Division of the United Nations (1947), and director of Documents Control Staff (1948).

COMMENTS

W. FRIEDMANN

I am not qualified to comment on Dr. Chamberlin's technical suggestions regarding the reorganization of the Secretariat of the United Nations. With regard to the improvement of the morale of the Secretariat, however, to which Dr. Chamberlin refers, there is much evidence that the greatest threat has resulted from recent loyalty investigations and the very serious doubts as to the extent to which the Member States of the United Nations will be permitted to superimpose their "loyalty" standards on those of the United Nations. The legal position should be clear enough. Article 100 of the United Nations Charter provides that "in the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any authority external to the Organization," and that "each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities." That the United States now requires clearance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of all United States citizens before they apply for a United Nations post may still be regarded, although with some difficulty, as a legitimate application of internal policies. Far more serious is the acceptance by the previous Secretary-General of the so-called "jurist's report," a hastily compiled and poorly reasoned document, which came to the conclusion that not only United Nations employees (of United States nationality) convicted of a criminal offense involving national disloyalty but also those who in the course of *any authorized national investigation* exer-

cise their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination should be absolutely barred from further employment by the United Nations. In the pursuit of this policy Mr. Trygve Lie dismissed a number of United Nations employees of American nationality, many of whom were later reinstated by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. The United States delegate to the United Nations then declared that his country would seek to have this award nullified by a United Nations resolution. It is arguable (although very doubtful) that a United Nations resolution could effectively annul such awards, on the theory that a United Nations resolution established the Tribunal. But there can be no doubt that if it became a practice for lawmaking bodies to annul the judgments of courts which they dislike on the ground of legislative sovereignty, judicial independence would become a farce. Certainly such a precedent would gravely jeopardize the value of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal.

AMENDMENT OF STAFF RULES

The present Secretary-General has sought and obtained an amendment of the staff rules which enables him to terminate the appointments of permanent staff members who *inter alia* do not meet the highest standards of integrity required by Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter:

(i) If the conduct of the staff member indicates that the staff member does not meet the high standards of integrity required by Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter;

(ii) If he learns of facts, anterior to the appointment of the staff member and relevant to his administrative suitability,

which, if they had been known when the staff member was appointed, should, under the standards established in the Charter, have precluded his appointment; or

(iii) If such action would be in the interest of the good administration of the Organization and in accordance with the standards of the Charter.

Although in the first two cases termination will not take place until after consideration by a special advisory board and is subject to appeal to a staff board and ultimately to the Administrative Tribunal, the Secretary-General in his report of November 1953 has expressed his view that the Tribunal should not review the exercise of his discretion but broadly speaking only the abuse of powers or illegal procedure. In other words, in the hands of a strong Secretary-General the present staff regulations will be good protection; in the hands of a weak one they will not. The situation still remains uncertain as to the extent to which the Secretary-General should be compelled to accept the standards of "loyalty" or "subversion" used by any one Member State. While this has

AWNI KHALIDY

The first duty of a good Secretary-General of the United Nations is to put his house in order. Unless that machinery is organized on efficient lines its chief will be unable to make use of it to discharge his duties under the Charter. To ignore this premise would defeat the very purpose of the machinery and would result in unfortunate circumstances such as the sensation about the existence of subversive elements in the Secretariat in 1952.

The Secretary-General has two capacities under the Charter, political and administrative. Dr. Chamberlin puts the problem clearly when he says, "If the Secretariat is to be strengthened, the problem arises as to which of the

recently been primarily an American problem, it can, of course, arise in regard to any other member. The spirit as well as the letter of Article 100 should be clearly confirmed, perhaps by express reference to the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" (Art. 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice) as the standard applicable to United Nations employees accused of conduct incompatible with their duties. It would be equally beneficial for the morale of the staff if Member States undertook to stand by the awards of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal and channeled their dissatisfaction into attempts to revise the law for the future.

W. Friedmann, LL.D., Dr. Jur., LL.M., professor of law at the University of Toronto, was visiting professor at the New York University School of Law (summer 1954) and expert consultant to the United Nations Seminar on Public Industrial Enterprise in Rangoon (1954). He is the author of Legal Theory (3d ed., 1953) and Law and Social Changes in Contemporary Britain (1951).

two roles, or what combination of them, is to be emphasized." If a choice between the two roles *has* to be made it is healthier to opt for the administrative role. But a balance could be struck between the two roles, delicate though it may be. It is right that the Secretary-General should have a political responsibility to suggest and guide. But care should be taken lest this develop into interference or intrigue; nor should it take the color of mobilizing forces against one or more members of the United Nations. Dr. Chamberlin correctly estimates that Sir Eric Drummond's method was both administrative and political, the latter taking the form of exerting influence in the background.

This seems to me to be the ideal balance between the two roles and the best in ensuring efficiency and dignity, without dragging the Secretary-General into open controversy.

What kind of Secretariat should the United Nations have, and how big? The present Secretariat is too big, and it is an open secret that many of its posts are duplicatory. In a number of other positions there is very little to do. An unduly large organization becomes unwieldy and inefficient.

If the present Secretariat is to be curtailed of what type should it be? It can be either a vast pool satisfying geographical distribution or an expert international civil service. The first type is, for many reasons, undesirable; it is the one which mainly prevailed in the first seven years of the United Nations. Perhaps the best method of curtailing the Secretariat is to organize it as a compact international civil service aimed primarily at efficiency and impartiality. If this method is to be adopted the Secretariat should have two types of posts, one the expert type comprising the heads of departments and sections, the other the clerical type providing the necessary help. Accordingly, a number of posts, such as heads of departments, should be connected directly with the Secretary-General. This would enable him to be in constant touch with his main advisers, and therefore aware of the currents in the Secretariat. It would also contribute to smoother and speedier work, to say nothing of the elimination of duplication in posts. This appears to be the policy of the present Secretary-General.

U.N. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

On one issue I would disagree with Dr. Chamberlin. To organize an intelligence service of the Secretariat is indeed undesirable. Morally it is against the spirit of the Charter, which advo-

cates open diplomacy. If that diplomacy has failed it should be reviewed. Then, it is doubtful whether the Secretary-General, to fulfill his responsibility under the Charter, really needs an intelligence service of his own. A United Nations Intelligence Service would never be as strong as the services of individual countries; it would certainly cost a tremendous amount of money, for which it would be difficult to account to the Fifth Committee with the gallery listening in. Moreover, such a service would inevitably clash with the services of Member States in the field, with the probable result that they would end up by spying on each other. But perhaps the most potent argument against this idea is that a U.N. Intelligence Service would become in the hands of an unscrupulous Secretary-General a destructive weapon used for dangerous purposes, in which the losers would be the vast majority of the small countries in the United Nations.

ABILITY AND IMPARTIALITY

If the Secretariat is to be a compact and efficient organism it must be selected primarily on two bases, ability and impartiality, with reasonable regard to geographical distribution. In the first seven years of the United Nations impartiality was a mere expression, with the result that some Secretariat members meddled in private politics and some even abused their responsibilities. Under the new Secretary-General the United Nations has the right to expect strict impartiality as well as real ability among his staff. If those two attributes are aimed at, in a Secretariat organized on an expert-clerical basis, the problem of geographical distribution as it now exists will have lost its force. More stability in the Organization would contribute to its efficiency.

A word about United Nations person-

nel abroad. The specialized agencies are very large in themselves. More emphasis should be put on field work, reporting to a small but efficient headquarters, in line with the type of Secretariat outlined above.

Awni Khalidy, New York City, is the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the

JACOB ROBINSON

Professor Chamberlin, writing of methods for strengthening the Secretariat, mentions also *en passant* its research activities. This aspect of the work of the Secretariat calls for some comments.

It is not generally realized that the Secretariat of the United Nations is the greatest institute of social research in the world. A glance at the six catalogues of economic and social projects containing lists of 1,663 projects of the United Nations Secretariat (together with 1,910 additional projects of the specialized agencies) reveals a scope and extent of research work unparalleled in this field.¹ The subject matters range over a wide area of economic and social problems, including economic stability and development, statistical questions, transport and communications, fiscal questions, regional economic activities (Europe, Asia, and the Far East, Latin America), human rights, narcotics, population, social welfare, cartographic questions, technical assistance, economic and social conditions in trust and non-self-governing territories, and codification of international law.

The characteristic features of United Nations research projects are supposed to be their anonymity, collective re-

United Nations. He has been associated with the Organization since its beginning in various capacities, and has been in the Iraqi diplomatic service since 1934, mainly in Europe, having served with the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in 1936-37. In 1953 he was chairman of the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly.

sponsibility (co-operation of various experts), their practical (not academic) orientation, their spirit (the paramountcy of the interest of the international community), and their objectivity.

DEFECTS IN U.N. RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

What are the defects of the present organization of research in the United Nations? In the first place, not all the projects are within legitimate limits of the activities of the Secretariat. The Secretariat should limit itself to research projects of comprehensive, not to say universal nature, where access to information from a great number of states is required and where the mentality of the international civil servant is the one best suited for such a research project.

Secondly, not all the projects undertaken on orders by the United Nations or engaged in *motu proprio* by the Secretariat are absolutely necessary. In numerous cases reference to existing literature would suffice.

Thirdly, the methods used in the various publications of the United Nations are far from being uniform and of the same scientific standard.

Fourthly, students of social problems (in the widest sense of the word) cannot but be distressed by the lack of common knowledge about this field of activities of the Secretariat and in par-

¹ It is regrettable that the Secretary-General intends to discontinue this important reference publication; see United Nations Document E/2398 of 13 May 1954, par. 27. The same document indicates a tendency to reduce the research activities of the Secretariat.

ticular by the lack of appreciation of it in the special literature on the subject matter concerned. Even printed publications of the United Nations are given much less attention in the reviews of scientific journals than is given to individual publications with or without the imprint of a university press.

Finally, the organs of the United Nations rely mostly, if not exclusively, on projects prepared by the Secretariat, discounting research done elsewhere. A welcome addition to such Secretariat projects could be abstracts of the existing literature on any particular problem for the benefit of the interested United Nations group.

In order to put an end to these defects in an otherwise highly valuable field of activities, the suggestion is hereby made for the Secretary-General to have in his inner cabinet a director of research who would concentrate in his hands the responsibility for all research work and make the appropriate selection of research projects to be un-

WALLACE S. SAYRE

Professor Chamberlin's prescription for strengthening the United Nations Secretariat amounts, in essence, to a proposal that the Secretary-General should undertake a more modest political leadership, that he should refine his administrative organization, and that he should lean more heavily upon the senior career officers in the Secretariat. It is true that some of Professor Chamberlin's suggestions do not have these declared purposes, and indeed one or two of his recommendations would seem to have an opposite intention; but, on net and in result, the program suggested would move the Secretary-General toward the pattern of Eric Drummond's muted political role and away from the stronger political leadership demon-

dertaken. Thanks to his erudition, he would also be able to discard those projects which are repetitious. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication, he would arrange for co-operation with the specialized agencies, with private scientific institutions, and with individual scholars. He would see to it that the research projects receive the necessary attention of the scientific world, and in particular of the scientific periodicals. Finally, he would introduce strict and uniform rules for methodological problems, as well as for the use of source material and bibliography.

Jacob Robinson, LL.D., New York City, legal adviser to Israel's Permanent Delegation to the United Nations since May 1948, was previously in charge of the Institute of Jewish Affairs (1941-47). In Lithuania, he was a member of the bar (1922-40), member of Parliament (1922-27), and legal adviser to the Foreign Office. He is the author of numerous works on legal and sociological problems.

strated by Albert Thomas and Trygve Lie.

The strength of the Secretariat, as Professor Chamberlin correctly notes, depends upon the nature of the leadership exercised by the Secretary-General. A strong Secretariat is the product of a Secretary-General who understands the primacy of his political role and sees his administrative role as instrumental to his political leadership. Such a Secretary-General is not cut to the pattern of a high career official, exercising his political influence anonymously and demonstrating his skill in the arts of administration as the larger half of his responsibility. There is no chief political official in the United Nations comparable to a Prime Minister (or to

the President of the United States) whom such a career-type Secretary-General can serve. The Secretary-General himself has an inescapable political leadership role; he is accordingly, as are all political leaders, a risk taker and an expendable, not a career official.

The Secretariat will be strengthened, then, by a Secretary-General who consciously seeks, not to "balance" his political and administrative roles in ways which de-emphasize his political leadership, but rather to fashion his administrative organization to strengthen his political performance. It is doubtful whether this purpose is served by increasing the number of administrative units reporting to the Secretary-General or by immersing him in more numerous contacts with the senior career staff. The Secretary-General's greater need is for broadly conceived and creative political advice.

The Secretary-General is not strengthened by trends toward a self-directing, autonomous bureaucracy within the Secretariat. All bureaucracies have strong

aspirations toward such status; in the United Nations staff such tendencies reduce the political role of the Secretary-General and pull him toward preoccupation with technical problems of management and of specialized programs.

The main road toward strengthening the Secretariat would seem to be to remove the ambiguities, in the Charter and in the precedents, concerning the political leadership responsibilities of the Secretary-General, and to make such responsibilities unequivocal and of first priority. If this were done, problems of administrative structure and procedure would come into meaningful perspective as methods for strengthening the political leadership of the Secretary-General.

Wallace S. Sayre, Ph.D., is professor of public administration at Columbia University. Besides service on university political science faculties, he has been consultant to various federal, state, and local agencies. He is the author, among other books, of The United Nations Secretariat.

Risks of Revision: Appraisal of United Nations Preparations for Charter Review

By SALAH EL DINE TARAZI *

THE Charter of the United Nations has been the object of much criticism ever since it came into force. On several occasions liberal thinkers, little concerned with political, social, and economic situations, have brought to light the shortcomings of this document of world-wide import. Certain critics, imbued with legalistic formalism and idealistic precepts, have attacked, in the pertinent Articles, what may be termed "inadequate and ineffective." On the other hand, diplomats and thinkers from countries with colonies and overseas possessions have deemed exaggerated the dose of anticolonialism contained in the Charter.

Owing to the fact that revisionist ideas had become current, some countries wished to give them more concrete form. Article 109 of the Charter provides in paragraph 1 that convocation of a conference for the revision of the Charter may be decided at any time "by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council." Paragraph 3 of the same Article hastens to add that "if such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council."

* Translated by Eric Sellin.

As a result of reading these two paragraphs, we note that the General Assembly, in the course of its tenth session, will be forced to solve the problem of convoking a conference for the revision of the Charter. Subsequently, the Security Council will find it equally necessary to face its responsibilities squarely. On the other hand, this conference could not, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 109, adopt any decision without a two-thirds majority. Furthermore, modifications of the present text of the Charter will not take effect until they have been "ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council" (Art. 109, par. 2).

Under these conditions, it appears quite difficult to arrive at any modification of the present text of the Charter, inasmuch as, after the terms have been adopted by the conference—assuming that two-thirds of the members ratify them—a single one of the five permanent members of the Security Council can prevent their coming into force by refusing ratification. Fully to understand this state of things it is necessary to look back and consider the "climate" in which the San Francisco Conference of 1945 took place. This conference did not deliberately undertake the task of conferring dictatorial attributes on the Big Five when it permitted each of them to exercise a right of "veto" in the Security Council and in connection with the ratification of amendments to the Charter. The political conditions that

governed the world in 1945 imposed that formula; they continue to impose it on us today, as we shall see further on.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY, EIGHTH SESSION

With these essential facts in mind, three countries approached the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the request that he place on the agenda of the eighth session of the General Assembly three items different in nature but possessing a common denominator—the future revision of the Charter. The three countries in question were Argentina, the Netherlands, and Egypt.

The point proposed by Argentina appeared rather modest. Its object was to entrust the Secretary-General with the preparation of a study of the interpretation of the Charter by the various members of the United Nations.

The Delegation of the Netherlands asked that the General Assembly call on the governments of the Member States to present their suggestions on the amendments they planned to formulate.

Egypt, much like the Netherlands, requested that a special committee of fifteen members be created with the duty of undertaking the preparatory study necessary for eventual revision of the Charter. The report of this committee could, according to the Egyptian Delegation's way of thinking, be placed before the revision conference and would thus facilitate its task.

The General Assembly decided to include in its final agenda the three points mentioned above and referred them for study to the Sixth Committee, entrusted with the examination of legal questions.

DEBATE IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE

The Sixth Committee decided, first of all, to proceed with a general debate on the three points concerning the revision of the Charter. This debate proved instructive from all points of view. It

furnished, in any case, substantial proof that the idea of a revision was not yet ripe and that one should not venture to put the cart before the horse. Furthermore, after several meetings, Egypt hurriedly withdrew a draft resolution it had presented in order to give effect to the item on the agenda that had been placed there at its request. Egypt thus abandoned the idea of the establishment of a special committee to study eventual amendments to the Charter. From then on, the debate in the Sixth Committee was confined to the preparation of an official document containing various interpretations of pertinent provisions in the Charter and to the possibility of ascertaining to that end the opinion of the governments of Member States.

Although the question under discussion lost much of its scope after the withdrawal of the item proposed by Egypt, debate was lively and animated. Certain delegates concentrated their efforts on condemnation of the rule of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, which is found in Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter and which has come to be known, since San Francisco, as the "right of veto." Actually, it is clear that, in criticizing the "veto," one criticizes the Soviet Union. This attitude would appear normal if it were exhibited in a revision conference, but from the way the matter progressed it became quite apparent that the criticisms were strictly polemical rather than animated by a wish to remedy real defects, which, if allowed to remain, could even constitute a risk to the future of the Organization.

In spite of these polemics, a great many of the countries who had often declared themselves against the veto did not approve of the idea of asking the governments for their opinions on the terms of an eventual revision. They

had their own reasons—which, as a matter of fact, they did not all share. For the colonial powers, it was a question of avoiding any reformulation of the provisions dealing with trusteeship or non-self-governing territories, as a new draft might carry a somewhat more precise definition of the concept of autonomy or independence and might shorten the period during which the administering powers would continue their management of the territories in question.

The Soviet Union fought against asking the governments for advice, claiming this procedure to be illegal, premature, and of a nature to embitter international relations rather than to ease them. This was also the view of Poland and of Czechoslovakia. It rose from the basic idea that one could not express opinions on the subject of the revision of the Charter except at a specific revision conference, in the event of its being called in accordance with Article 109. Any contrary procedure should be condemned, for it would not be likely to foster peace and direct it into a safe and certain path.

Certain countries of the African-Asiatic bloc, in agreement with some countries of Latin America, felt that one should not insist on having the opinion of the governments, but should be content with requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a study of the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. Although these countries had amendments to formulate, notably in the economic and social fields and in that of non-self-governing territories, they nevertheless thought that it was by no means necessary to risk undermining an edifice whose construction had been paid for by the sufferings and misery endured by mankind in the course of World War II. One could wait, after all, till 1955 to adopt (in the course of the tenth session of the General Assem-

bly) a decision with respect to the convocation of a revision conference. In the last analysis, there was no sense in hurrying if people were not ready to adopt any concrete solution right away.

At the conclusion of a prolonged debate, rich in nuances, the Sixth Committee adopted a resolution whereby it entrusted to the Secretary-General the preparation of a series of documents, among which a "repertory of the practices of United Nations organs" figures conspicuously. These documents were to be completed and communicated to the Member States in 1954 or a little later. At a meeting on November 27, 1953, the General Assembly approved this resolution, which received the number 796 (VIII).

INDICATED COURSE OF CHARTER REVISION

Thus it was quite clear that the idea of requesting the opinion of the Member States had been definitely set aside. The procedure of revision of the Charter would have to take the most usual course. The question would be included on the agenda of the tenth session, and the responsibility for calling the conference would devolve on the General Assembly by virtue of the clear and exact provisions of Article 109, paragraph 3. The delegations, however, would have the opportunity of drawing their arguments from the documents which would be put at their disposal by the Secretary-General.

This historical and legal survey permits us to estimate even now the intrinsic value of the modifications which might be made in the present text of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter constitutes, without a doubt, a document unique in the history of international relations and in the progress of mankind. If certain groups of powers had in mind to retouch this document without the nearly unanimous consent

of all the partners, sad and even disastrous consequences might result from such an action, which, far from serving the cause of peace, would instead endanger it.

SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

We have already mentioned the political climate that prevailed at the San Francisco Conference. It is impossible to overemphasize the fact that this climate was the result of the coalition that events had forced on all the democracies independent of the color of their social convictions. The capitalistic powers, namely, England, the United States, France, and China, were forced to fight side by side with the Soviet Union to destroy the forces of evil incarnated in German Nazism, Italian Fascism, and Japanese imperialism, forces that tried to halt the progress of man and turn back the clock of history. Thanks to this obstinate battle, the coalition of the democracies dedicated its victory with the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations. This marked the beginning of a new era.

Thus the United Nations Organization is the fruit of a long and careful collaboration of countries of various kinds. For the first time in history, the idea had arisen of a universal merger of forces in order to maintain peace and security and to promote higher economic and social standards in all countries. It is indeed too early to pronounce any judgment on the concrete value of these efforts, but it would be equally inappropriate to apply a brake to such a momentum.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE U.N.

Before the creation of the United Nations, international relations had always served policies tending to assure the supremacy of one state or group of states to the detriment of others. Every-

thing done in this field bears witness to the truth of this claim. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the political defeat of the German Holy Roman Empire, to the profit of England, whose economic aspirations spanned the horizon. The relations between France, England, Spain, and Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were marked by a reciprocal wish for mutual destruction. Alliances were made only with a view to counteracting or nullifying other alliances. There were successive wars; some rulers profited from them, others were forced to pay the price with the blood and wealth of their subjects. Territorial changes depended on the outcome of battles and were without previous consultation of the populations involved. In spite of this uncertain, arbitrary, and chaotic state of affairs, the rules of international public law only held for countries belonging to what was then called "Christendom"; the countries "outside Christendom" or of the "Barbary Coast" were considered outside the law. The relations that European powers maintained with the Ottoman Empire were stamped with the seal of discrimination and legal inequality. The Sublime Porte was obliged to bow to the injunctions in the treaties of surrender, and the citizens of the victorious states enjoyed, even inside the Ottoman Empire, a more favorable treatment than that accorded to the subjects of the Sultan.

Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

Two events marked the end of the eighteenth century: on the one hand, the revolt launched by the colonies in the New World against England, which terminated in 1788 with the Constitution of the United States of America, and, on the other hand, the French Revolution of 1789. These events had their repercussions on the course of international public law. For the first

time in history, colonies had succeeded in shaking off the yoke of the parent country and proclaiming their right to live in sovereign independence. Likewise for the first time, in one of the greatest powers of the world feudalism received a mortal blow from which it never recovered. The bourgeoisie, having gained the power in France and subsequently been ensconced in Europe by the Napoleonic conquests, frightened England and the reactionaries in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The fall of Napoleon I provided all these forces with an opportunity to injure the prestige of France. The Congress of Vienna of 1815 revealed their plans. It was followed by the Holy Alliance initiated by Czar Alexander I, the object of which was to protect the monarchs and those who supported them from popular upheavals. It was unable, however, to weather the blows of the Revolution of 1848 in France and those that followed in Europe. From that time on, the will of the people became an element which had to be taken into account in the conduct of diplomacy. Unfortunately, balance-of-power politics continued to prevail. During the second half of the nineteenth century the German Empire was reborn, thanks to a subtle game which Bismarck played both with Austria-Hungary in 1866 (the Seven Weeks' War) and with France (the war of 1870). It became necessary once more to establish a power balance; it was set up to the detriment of Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, and, especially, of "the Sick Man of Europe," an epithet applied to the Ottoman Empire. For the first time, Turkey, a non-Christian power, was allowed to participate in the "concert of Europe." Discontented with the Treaty of San Stefano which had put an end to the Russo-Turkish war, Bismarck, with the aim of robbing Russia of the fruits of victory, invited the

Sublime Porte to participate in the Berlin Congress of 1878.

The Berlin Congress inaugurated a new stage with reference to the political equilibrium of Europe. It stimulated France and England to follow a path of colonial expansion in Africa as well as in Asia. The goal of the campaigns of "conquest" and "pacification" was to create markets and outlets and, as a means to this end, to reinforce political influence by military occupation of the overseas territories now transformed into protectorates or into colonies pure and simple. The allocation was often unsatisfactory in the eyes of the partners and created dissensions among them which succeeded in threatening the security of Europe. In this manner rivalry set France against England in connection with Egypt and North Africa; it was resolved by the compromise hidden in the Entente Cordiale of 1904. Similarly, the Franco-German quarrel on the subject of Morocco was terminated as a result of the Conference of Algeiras.

All these quarrels revealed a lust for power and a struggle for markets characterized by a refusal to grant to weak powers the attributes of state sovereignty and by a complete scorn for the aspirations of colonial peoples.

The United States

In the nineteenth century, the United States of America took no active part in European affairs. Guided by the Monroe Doctrine, it engaged in building up its economy and consolidating its power by limiting its political activity to the sphere of the New World. It was the first to proclaim the necessity of applying the principle of nonintervention. Moved by this ideal, Wilson proclaimed, after America's entry into the war in 1917 on the side of the Allies, his Fourteen Points that stressed the

free exercise by a people of the right of self-determination. Unfortunately, Wilson's ideas, which appeared to be a harbinger of the League of Nations, were not put into practice.

The League of Nations

The League of Nations, created in 1919, was the forerunner of the United Nations Organization. It was, however, full of the defects which had stymied the concert of Europe. In fact, power politics continued to reign within the new organization. One large allied power, the United States of America, refused to participate in it. Another large European power, the Soviet Union, born out of the October Revolution of 1917—which also constitutes an important date in history—was not admitted until 1934.

The League of Nations was not in a position to prevent the avalanche of World War II. There is no need to dwell here on the causes that made it totter to its final ruin. It is enough to point out the advantages of the United Nations Organization compared to the League of Nations.

VIRTUES OF THE U.N. CHARTER

Three basic concepts mark, in our opinion, the superiority of the United Nations. These are its appeal for universality, the respect for the sovereignty of its members, and the outlawing of war.

The universality of the United Nations is first of all a result of the fact that two power blocs drew up its Charter: there were both capitalist and socialist countries at the San Francisco Conference. Agreement prevailed among them, a fact which proves that the coexistence of the two types of regime was possible.

Today one may divide the members of the United Nations into three distinct categories: countries with a capitalistic

regime, countries that base their economy on socialism, and underdeveloped countries. The present Organization aims to embrace as many states as possible.

The concept of universality is also apparent in the number of matters submitted to the various organs of the United Nations for examination. Today no aspect of human activity escapes the notice of the Economic and Social Council. Specialized agencies are attached to this Council, and through them the Organization rallies the world in an attempt to make it an indivisible entity.

However, the intimate collaboration of the states cannot take place without a respect for their independence. That is why the Charter of the United Nations rests on the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States, large or small. Power politics have disappeared, at least in the spirit of the Charter. The respect of sovereign equality means that there is no difference among the states; it means that nonintervention in their domestic affairs is the dominant rule. This rule is but a necessary corollary to the principle of coexistence. Each country has the right to have a political and social regime of its own choice; other countries do not have the right to attempt, by any subversive activity inside or outside another country, to overthrow the government of that country, regardless of how this government came into power.

In order to put these principles into practice, the Charter denounced war as a method of solving international conflicts and replaced it with collective security on a world-wide scale. The armed forces of the Member States may intervene only in case of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" in accordance with Article 39. Consequently, it is impossible, according to the spirit of the Charter, to create alliances or power coalitions di-

rected against other states under the pretext of a future or imminent danger.

These are the virtues found in the Charter of the United Nations. Of course, it has its defects as well. One of its most conspicuous faults is the insufficiency of the provisions concerning trusteeship and non-self-governing territories; the former are subject to control through the medium of the Trusteeship Council, but, as far as the latter are concerned, the Organization is satisfied with receiving information about them. The colonial powers seem to be jealous of their prerogatives and will not submit to taking orders. Moreover no time limit has been fixed as to when these countries may gain their autonomy or independence.

Salah el dine Tarazi, alternate representative of Syria to the United Nations and a member of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, has been a member of the Syrian Delegation since 1950. He is a professor on the Faculty of Law of the Syrian University and was in law practice in Damascus from 1940 to 1945. In 1948 he was first secretary of the Syrian Legation in Paris.

WARNING ON REVISION

However, in spite of the shortcomings that the Charter may contain, it is necessary, in the best interests of mankind and its needs, to undertake a revision only with the utmost prudence and skill. We must not risk ruination of what we have gained. The hour of world government has not yet struck. As long as inequality in fact exists among the states, it is imperative that they conserve their sovereignty intact and not lose it within the world Organization. To revise the Charter in the direction of suppressing sovereignty and creating organs exerting direct action on the states is simply to return to a policy of force and the balance of power.

Soviet Policy Toward Revision *

DURING the discussion on the inclusion in the agenda of the proposals on "preparatory work with regard to the possible holding of a general conference" to review the Charter, the delegation of the Soviet Union pointed out that those proposals were in no way technical or procedural, nor entirely unrelated to the revision of the Charter, as their advocates asserted.

In the course of the debate in the Sixth Committee, it was repeatedly demonstrated that the fact that this question had been raised at the present session of the General Assembly could not be dissociated from the campaign which is being waged against the fundamental principles of the Charter, and in particular against the principle of the unanimity of the great Powers, the corner-stone of the United Nations. The debate bore out the case put forward by the Soviet delegation during the discussion on the inclusion of these proposals in the agenda of the present session.

It was proved beyond all dispute that another purpose of this campaign was to exacerbate the cold war. The reactionary circles in the United States are trying, by means of this campaign, to divert the attention of public opinion in the United States and a number of other countries from the incontestable fact that the current serious crisis of the United Nations—now degraded to the role of an appendage of the North Atlantic bloc—is due not to the shortcom-

ings of any of the provisions of the Charter, but to the fact that the fundamental provisions of the Charter have been disregarded and violated by a number of countries and particularly by the United States. It has thus become quite clear that the reason why the General Assembly is being asked to adopt a decision relating to "preparatory work with regard to the possible holding of a general conference" for the review of the Charter is that it desired to use the name of the United Nations to cover up and justify the great campaign against the fundamental principles of the Charter which is being conducted by the United States and certain other countries.

The preamble of the draft resolution adopted by the Sixth Committee, in particular, has that end in view. In this connexion, we believe it should be remembered that in the Sixth Committee sixteen delegations voted for the replacement of the preamble by another form of words containing no reference to "preparatory work with regard to the possible holding of a general conference" for the review of the Charter. As you know, the majority of the Sixth Committee rightly deleted from the operative part of the draft resolution an appeal to Member States of the United Nations to submit their views with regard to the possible review of the Charter; the operative part, in the form in which it was adopted by the Committee, now calls merely for the publication of certain documents connected with the San Francisco Conference and of a repertory of the practice of United Nations organs. We consider that the request to the Secretary-General, contained in sub-paragraph

* Text of statement by Mr. P. D. Morozov, delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, before the United Nations General Assembly, eighth session, November 27, 1953. United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session*, 458th Plenary Meeting (A/PV. 458).

(c) of the operative part, to prepare a repertory of the practice of United Nations organs, imposes on him an obligation which it is not within his competence to fulfil; it entails the type of research which, by definition, cannot be effected without commenting in one way or another on decisions taken by the various organs of the United Nations.

For these reasons, the USSR delegation will vote against the preamble and against sub-paragraph (c) of the operative part of the draft resolution submitted by the Sixth Committee. If the preamble is adopted, my delegation will vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

The Soviet delegation wishes to emphasize that the tremendous value of the United Nations as an instrument of peace depends first and foremost on unswerving fidelity to the provisions of the Charter and, above all, on adherence to the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council. What is needed to extricate the United Nations from the serious crisis in which it finds itself is not a revision of the Charter, but the return of the Organization to the road which was marked out for it by the Charter. The entire work of the United Nations should be concentrated on the fulfilment of its essential task, which is to promote the solution of international problems and to prevent, with the co-operation of all its Members, any possibility of aggression by one State against another and, in particular, to prevent the outbreak of a new world war. In the present international situation, any proposals for the review of the Charter can result only in weakening and undermining the Organization and increasing international tension. For that reason we consider that delegations which are sincerely interested in

the maintenance of international peace and security should unite their efforts to prevent the adoption of decisions capable of being exploited to the detriment of the United Nations.

* * *

A summary of the statement made by Mr. Morozov before the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, November 2, 1953, follows: †

8. . . . The debates [in the Sixth Committee] had confirmed a primary truth: the international atmosphere was such that to raise the question of review was to risk providing the forces of aggression with weapons. The representatives of Poland, the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Czechoslovakia had demonstrated very clearly that the question before the Committee was linked to the campaign launched by the United States against the principles of the Charter, against the maintenance of peace. He fully shared that view.

9. In a statement made at a previous meeting, Mr. Byrnes had maintained that it was not the United States which was instigating the campaign for a review of the Charter. He had said nothing about the campaign being conducted in the United States under the influence of reactionary elements against the principles of the Charter, but he had wished to make the Committee believe that other countries had in fact started the campaign for revision. Moreover, Mr. Byrnes had contradicted himself repeatedly. He had said that the United States would vote for the calling of a General Conference for a review but later had said that the United States delegation did not yet know whether a

† United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Sixth Committee, Summary Records of Meetings*, 16 September to 28 November, 1953, pp. 93-94.

review was possible or desirable. Those two statements were surely irreconcilable.

10. There was no doubt that the United States was anxious for a review of the Charter, for as early as 1948 the United States Senate had adopted a resolution calling for the abolition of the unanimity rule in the Security Council. Since then, on 28 July 1953, the Senate had authorized the establishment of a special sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, with large resources, to study proposals for amending the Charter. In a plenary meeting of the General Assembly early in the current session,¹ Mr. Dulles had stated that good use should be made of the opportunity to review the Charter.

11. He wondered what direction that review was to take. In a speech made at Boston on 26 August 1953, Mr. Dulles had stated that the unanimity rule in the Security Council no longer met the requirements of the present situation. That was the view generally held in reactionary circles, which wished the rule—the keystone of the United Nations—to be eliminated. The world was told that the inadequacies in the United Nations action were attributable to defects in the provisions of the Charter. However, the world was not told that the severe crisis through which the Organization was passing was to be explained only by the fact that the Charter had not been respected, particularly by the United States. The great people of China were deprived of their legitimate right to participate in the Organization's work. In many other respects the provisions of the Charter had been flouted.

12. Many delegations had said that the preparatory work should not serve

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 434th meeting.

as a pretext for encouraging hatred of certain States. Yet that was a real danger. Even though some delegations had endeavoured to confine the debate to procedure and to inject a moderate note, violent and vicious attacks had been made upon the principle of unanimity and, through that principle, upon certain States. He wondered what would happen if that discussion were to continue unabated for two years.

13. The speech of the representative of Panama (372nd meeting) was one example of that aggressive attitude. He had said that at San Francisco the principle of the equality of States had been disregarded for political reasons. According to him, as a result of the domination of the great Powers, the United Nations was inferior to the League of Nations. That was false and misleading. The League of Nations had demonstrated its impotence. The lessons of experience had been heeded. The Organization had been made more effective by the establishment of the fundamental principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council. The representative of Panama had also claimed that the unanimity rule was contrary to the interests of the smaller Powers. Mr. Molotov had said, however, that the right of veto prevented the formation of aggressive blocs, was an obstacle to intrigue and, although not a panacea, was an effective tool for better co-operation in the interest of all the Powers, large and small.

14. The proceedings in the Committee illustrated the struggle between two schools of thought, one which desired international co-operation through the United Nations, the other which reflected a desire for world domination. The value of the United Nations depended on its effectiveness in maintaining peace. As the Committee had probably noted, the effectiveness of the

Organization could be ensured through respect for the Charter and a sincere desire for co-operation; it was not necessary for that purpose to amend the fundamental provisions of the Charter. The Syrian and other representatives had rightly said that any attempt to alter the Charter might have disastrous ef-

fects on the very existence of the Organization.

15. For the reasons he had just explained he was opposed to any proposal for preparatory work in any form whatsoever which would be connected with the idea of a review of the Charter. . . .

United States Planning for Charter Review

By DAVID MCKENDREE KEY

PREPARATIONS by the United States for a possible conference to review the United Nations Charter are currently proceeding through three channels: the country's private organizations, the Senate subcommittee on this subject, and the Department of State. Secretary of State Dulles has urged citizens' groups throughout the nation to give serious study to the question so that the government may have the benefit of their thinking and a measure of public opinion. The Senate, in 1953, established a special Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter which, during 1954, under the chairmanship of Senator Wiley, has been holding public hearings in different parts of the country. This subcommittee is directed:

to make a full and complete study of proposals to amend, revise, or otherwise modify or change existing international peace and security organizations, for the purpose of guiding the Senate in the fulfillment of its responsibility . . . to advise the President with respect to the foreign policy of the United States, and particularly with reference to the policy of the United States at the General Conference of the United Nations for review of the Charter. . . .¹

In the Department of State, an increasing amount of time and attention is being devoted to the technical analyses and appraisals that must underlie eventual policy decisions concerning Charter review. The results of these separate efforts, taken in conjunction with the views of other friendly nations and with the world situation at the time the conference is held, will determine

the United States position at such a conference.

PROCESS OF POLICY DETERMINATION

This government has made no commitments with respect to Charter review beyond indicating that it expects to favor the holding of a review conference when, under the Charter, this question comes before the tenth session of the General Assembly in the autumn of 1955. In their statements before the Senate subcommittee, Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Lodge have said that final policies in relation to Charter review will not be decided until the views of the American people and of the Congress have been ascertained.² These views are not likely to become crystallized before some time in 1955. The problems involved are complex and the range of reactions to them wide. Much study will be required if the conclusions ultimately reached are to be soundly based, and much discussion will be needed before the general consensus of the country can be discerned. The Senate subcommittee is not expected to report until February 1955.³

When these views have become crystallized, it will be the task of the administration to merge them with its own thinking on Charter review for the purpose of determining a United States position on the specific problems in-

² Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, second session, on Proposals to Amend or Otherwise Modify Existing International Peace and Security Organizations, including the United Nations, Part I, January 18 and March 3, 1954.

³ Senate Resolution 193, Eighty-third Congress, second session.

¹ Senate Resolution 126, Eighty-third Congress, first session.

volved that will most accurately reflect our national objectives and most effectively further our national interests as they relate to the United Nations.

At this stage, consultations with other friendly nations will be necessary before final decisions can be made. Charter review is essentially a political problem and must be considered in the context of existing relations among states and the demands of the world situation, from the standpoint not only of United States interests but also of the parallel interests of the rest of the free world. The United Nations is a voluntary association of sovereign states, which depends for implementation of its decisions on the free co-operation of its members. Care must therefore be taken at a review conference to avoid action that would jeopardize this co-operation, and to assure that the decisions reached will contribute to, rather than detract from, the free world's sense of common interest.

SUPPORT FOR A REVIEW CONFERENCE

In deciding to favor the holding of a review conference, the administration was responsive to public sentiment as reflected in the Senate resolution establishing the special subcommittee. It also took into account the fact that at San Francisco in 1945 many states had accepted Charter provisions to which they had strong objections on the understanding that there would be an opportunity to review these provisions at the end of ten years. The United States had indicated at San Francisco that it would support the holding of a review conference after ten years, and, as Secretary Dulles has pointed out, it would appear to be a matter of simple good faith on the part of this government not to reverse its position now. That a majority of United Nations members will still wish to hold a review conference when this question arises in

1955 appears likely from the discussion at the eighth General Assembly of certain procedural proposals looking toward Charter review.

Further, the administration thinks that a review conference can serve a useful purpose, despite the fact that under the Charter, the U.S.S.R., along with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China, has a veto over any proposed amendments. A careful reappraisal of the Charter against the background of ten years' experience should, at the least, serve to clarify that the failure of the United Nations entirely to fulfill the high hopes held for it in 1945 is primarily a matter of the performance of Member States, and particularly of the Soviet Union, in observing their Charter obligations. It should serve to bring about a greater understanding of the potentialities of the Charter and a greater realization of the development within its framework that has already taken place in order to meet a world situation that was not foreseen in 1945. Such a reappraisal could also serve to develop agreement on improved practices under the Charter as it now stands, which would strengthen the Organization immeasurably. Where amendment may seem desirable, the conference will make clear whether nations generally are prepared to go any further in their commitments than they were in 1945. In this connection, the possibility should not be entirely precluded that, should there be general agreement on the desirability of some change in the Charter, the U.S.S.R. might prove susceptible to the pressure of world opinion and refrain from exercising its veto, particularly if alternative methods of achieving the same end, but without amendment, have been developed.

The potential value of a review conference, therefore, appears to the administration to outweigh the two prin-

cipal dangers in such a conference; namely, that its calling will arouse false hopes, which can only lead to later disillusionment, and that it will stimulate efforts to rewrite the Charter, which could destroy the United Nations in the present circumstances of international tension.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

President Eisenhower has said of the United Nations that "it still represents man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield" and has characterized it as a "sheer necessity."⁴ In his testimony before the Senate subcommittee, Secretary Dulles emphasized that "the Charter as it is can be made to serve well the cause of international peace and justice" and warned against pressing differences of opinion on how to strengthen the United Nations to a point where they undermined or disrupted the Organization.

There is in this country strong support for the United Nations. There is also some disillusionment. There are those who feel that the failure of the United Nations to fulfill all their hopes arises from the fact that it does not go far enough, and they advocate its transformation from a voluntary organization of sovereign states into some sort of superstate. At the other extreme are those who are basically skeptical of all world-wide efforts toward international co-operation, and they would like to see the United States withdraw from the organization. Still others would like to see the U.S.S.R. and its satellites expelled, and the United Nations turned into a closely knit military alliance. Some Americans have in mind specific amendments of a less far-reaching nature

⁴ Statement by the President on September 23, 1953, to the members of the U. S. Committee for United Nations Day, Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 29, no. 745 (October 5, 1953), p. 457.

which they believe would enable the Organization to function more effectively, while others are averse even to considering changes in the Charter for fear that in the present world situation the end result will be a loss of ground.

In the view of the Department of State, proposals along the lines of the first three do not fall within the proper scope of Charter review, since the purpose of such review is to strengthen the existing Organization—not to destroy it or to change completely its character. To try to write a completely new Charter would, in the words of Secretary Dulles, be to "open a Pandora's box," and the chances of bringing together in a new organization anything approaching the present membership of the United Nations would not be good.

It is therefore with the thinking of the fourth group mentioned above that the Department of State is primarily concerned in its studies preparatory to Charter review, since it does not support the view that it is too dangerous even to consider amending the Charter.

PRINCIPAL ISSUES

No decision has yet been taken on what, if any, amendments to the Charter the United States should advocate. The past nine years' experience in the United Nations, however, points to certain major questions as likely to arise at any review conference.

Membership

One of these questions is the scope of United Nations membership. Should we move toward making that membership as nearly universal as possible, always remembering, of course, that there are some regimes whose complete disregard of accepted standards of international conduct is such that they cannot properly be brought into organized international life? The United Nations nine years ago was much more nearly

universal than it is now. Since 1945, many new nations have come into being, and the ex-enemy states, excluded from original membership in the United Nations, are again becoming important members of the world community. There are now nineteen applicants for United Nations membership, fourteen of which would have been approved except for the Soviet veto. The other five—sponsored by the Soviet Union—have never received a majority vote, since it has not been thought that they meet the Charter qualifications for membership. This impasse with respect to new members has caused growing concern, and at a review conference two questions in this connection may be raised: (1) Does Article 4 of the Charter set forth the proper criteria for membership? (2) Should the veto on the admission of new members be eliminated? The Vandenberg resolution adopted by the United States Senate on June 11, 1948, recommended a voluntary agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council to remove the veto in this regard.

The Security Council

The obvious inability of the Security Council in this sharply divided world fully to exercise its "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" raises the basic question whether there are any feasible Charter changes that would enable the Council more effectively to discharge this responsibility or whether we should rely, rather, on alternative arrangements. For example, could the Charter provisions for membership and voting in the Council be improved? Should the veto be removed from the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter? This also was recommended by the Vandenberg resolution. Carrying forward the line of development begun in 1950 with the

"Uniting for Peace" resolution, should greater responsibility in the security field be assigned to the General Assembly, where there is no veto? Or in the present world situation should we leave primary responsibility for security to collective self-defense and regional organizations authorized by Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter?

Economic and social issues

The growing importance of the General Assembly in the security field, together with the increasing attention being given by the Assembly to economic and social problems and to "colonial" issues, suggests the question whether some type of weighted voting is needed in that organ, reflecting the capacity of members to assume economic and military responsibilities. Further, there is the question whether under these circumstances some reallocation of functions as between the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council is needed to enable the United Nations to function more effectively. The magnitude of the program in the economic and social field, as well as its importance in strengthening the free world, points also to a re-examination of the relationships between the United Nations itself and the specialized agencies to see whether any greater integration of the latter with the former would contribute to the efficient operation of this program.

There has been a growing tendency in the United Nations for states whose sympathies are aroused by conditions outside their own boundaries to bring these conditions to the attention of the Organization. This development has given rise to questions concerning the interpretation of Article 2 (7) of the Charter, which stipulates that the United Nations shall not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdic-

tion of a state, and to grave apprehensions on the part of some members. It may be asked, therefore, whether Article 2, paragraph 7, adequately delimits the competence of the United Nations or whether a more precise line should be drawn between the common interests within the scope of the association and the individual interests that remain the exclusive concern of a Member State.

Regulation of armaments

While the question of regulation of armaments did not receive particular emphasis in the writing of the Charter, the awful destructiveness of atomic and nuclear weapons has since heavily underscored this problem. Much effort therefore has been and is being spent by the United Nations in seeking a solution to it. The lack of progress is directly attributable to Soviet policy, but the question still remains whether anything was omitted from the basic structure of the United Nations that if added now might assist our continuing effort to reach general agreement on a com-

prehensive program of safeguarded disarmament.

International law

There has also been little progress made toward the development of a real international law, generally accepted by the community of nations, to replace political considerations as the basis for decision by the United Nations. This raises the question whether the Charter provisions designed to encourage such a development are inadequate or whether the lack of progress is a matter of the disposition of Member States.

In the view of the Department of State, these are the major questions—as they have arisen out of our experience over the past nine years in the United Nations—that should be considered in connection with Charter review. It is therefore toward determining where the answers to them lie that the Department is currently directing its preparatory studies. Further consideration, and experience between now and any review conference, may either broaden or contract the list.

David McKendree Key, Washington, D. C., is Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. He entered the Foreign Service in 1925 and thereafter held many posts of increasing responsibility in different parts of the world. He was United States Ambassador to Burma from 1950 to 1952, when he retired from the Foreign Service. He served as adviser on Far Eastern affairs to the United States Delegations to the sixth, seventh, and eighth sessions of the General Assembly (1951-54).

The Senate and the Review of the United Nations Charter

By ALEXANDER WILEY

TO illustrate the problems involved in the review of the United Nations Charter I have frequently used this example: "You can have a mechanically perfect automobile, the finest automobile in the world. Put it in the hands of bad drivers and it won't be a fine automobile for very long. You might not even have a car at all!"

This analogy seems to me to indicate the basic limitations of any review of the Charter. We can work to perfect the machinery of the United Nations and other international organizations to which we belong. We can even try to improve our own driving. We cannot, however, control the quality of all the driving; the steering wheel, for better or for worse, is shared by many nations.

It does not follow from the analogy, however, that a review of the Charter at this time is without value. To carry the example a little further, suppose the engine of the automobile is missing or is not delivering the amount of power the salesman said it would. Just because the driving has been bad is no reason why we should not raise the hood and try to find out whether or not we can tune up the engine. If this is done, a number of interested observers will soon gather around; some of these may be experts on engines and some will be wise, helpful laymen. They will analyze the difficulties and offer advice. People will almost certainly ask first whether there is any gas in the tank. There will be, in all probability, some extreme suggestions on what ought to be done, like junking the automobile or replacing the engine completely with a new one.

There will also be some moderate ideas on what is wrong with the carburetor or the valves, the spark plug and the radiator. Out of the wisdom of the observers, in short, may come some of the answers as to how the drivers, inadequate as they are, may still proceed on the road to decent, peaceful relations among the nations of the world.

SENATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHARTER REVIEW

Among the interested observers in any examination of the Charter of the United Nations is the Senate of the United States. The Senate has a dual constitutional responsibility in any conference that may be called to review the Charter.

In the first place, under our Constitution no amendments that may be proposed can become effective without the consent of the Senate. Under Article 109, paragraph 2, of the Charter:

Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect *when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes* by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all permanent members of the Security Council.

The Senate of the United States has the additional function of "advice" in foreign relations, and this function may be brought into play in connection with the review of the Charter. That is, the Senate need not stand apart from the review conference and wait to see what may be produced in the way of amendments to the Charter. It may instead

come in on the ground floor and suggest to the President what changes, if any, are believed desirable or acceptable.

THE SENATE AND U.N.

Full participation in this fashion would be in accord with the long-standing interest which the Senate has had in the United Nations. It is an interest which was first manifest in the Fulbright and Connally resolutions in 1943 and has persisted ever since that time.

In those resolutions, the President was advised, in effect, to co-operate with other countries in the creation of an international organization to keep world peace. Various senatorial groups subsequently assisted the executive branch in planning our national policy during the drafting of the Charter. At San Francisco, members of the Senate and the House made outstanding contributions as members of the American delegation. On July 28, 1945, the Senate consented to ratification of the Charter by a vote of 89 to 2.

Nor did the interest of the Senate wane after ratification. In the ensuing months, a considerable body of legislation was approved which made possible our effective participation in the United Nations and its various specialized agencies, and in each year since, the Senate has considered appropriations growing out of our membership in the organization.

The Senate has not always waited for the initiative in United Nations affairs to come from the executive branch. From time to time it has given specific guidance to the President on American policy in the United Nations as, for example, in the resolution adopted January 23, 1951, expressing the sentiment of the Senate that Communist China should not be represented in the organization.

The Senate has even taken the lead in seeking fundamental adjustments in

the United Nations system. In the Vandenberg resolution, adopted June 11, 1948, the President was called upon to seek voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlement of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members. In the same resolution, the Senate also encouraged the President to seek regional security arrangements for the defense of the United States and to press for the international control of armaments, within the framework of the Charter.

The Vandenberg resolution was adopted at a time when one of the fundamental premises of the United Nations Charter, unity of the permanent powers, had collapsed under the pressure of Communist aggression. It was an attempt by the Senate to bring about an adjustment in both United States policies and the United Nations system, in the light of the changes which had taken place in world politics.

Part of the Vandenberg resolution, those portions dealing with regional security, have already borne fruit in such arrangements as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and our security pacts in the Pacific area. These arrangements were designed to buttress the security of the United States and world peace at a time when it had become evident that the collective security provisions of the Charter would not prove as effective as originally expected. Other parts of the resolution have not been carried out, but they have become integral parts of our foreign policy. They represent objectives still being pursued by our government. In short, then, the effect of the Vandenberg resolution, even though only partially implemented, has been to strengthen the hand of the executive branch in matters involving the United Nations system. As a result of this resolution, two Presidents have been able to negotiate and

to act with confidence, because they had before them certain visible boundaries of senatorial consent.

The Vandenberg resolution suggests the role which the Senate can play in a review of the Charter. It can advise the President as to whether it believes the United States should support the holding of a review conference and, if so, what changes if any he should seek to bring about in the Charter at such a conference. It can also use the occasion of a general review to examine the policies which are being pursued by this country in the United Nations and other international organizations and make recommendations thereon if such are deemed desirable.

PROBLEMS AND NEEDED FACTS

An old professor of mine many years ago taught me a very fundamental principle in the practice of law. He said: "Whenever you have a case first make sure you get the facts, all the facts; *then* look up the law." The same principle, it seems to me, applies in a review of the Charter. Members of the Senate must familiarize themselves fully with the facts involved in Charter review before they can hope to deal effectively with this difficult question.

The facts today are more extensive and more complicated than those which were involved in drawing up the Charter a decade ago. Major questions which were debated and discussed then are likely to arise again. In the first flush of peace at the end of World War II, it was easy to regard as settled matters which in reality were unsettled. Eight years of operating experience with the Charter has shown this to be the case. It has shown, too, that while parts of the Charter have worked effectively, other parts have worked badly, in ways not anticipated, or not at all.

It is likely that member countries, in-

cluding the United States, will want to take a fresh look at many of the questions that were considered at San Francisco in 1945. Among these questions are those involving the impact of the United Nations on domestic jurisdiction, the problem of membership, the voting procedures in various organs, the respective functions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, trusteeship and non-self-governing territories, control of armaments, regional security arrangements within the United Nations system, and the status of the specialized agencies.

Such questions, complicated in themselves, will moreover have to be reviewed in the light of the collapse of a fundamental premise of the Charter—harmony among the five permanent powers. In 1945, a continuance of this harmony was assumed and written into the Charter. In 1954, however, there is a situation of world-wide tension produced primarily by forces of aggression emanating from the Communist states.

To this complication of the problem of review must be added one other. During eight years of operation the United Nations has evolved into an organization quite different from what was originally anticipated. This development has come about largely, though not exclusively, as a reaction to the intransigence of the Soviet Union. Whatever its causes, the development has produced changes and adjustments in the United Nations system which were not foreseen. It would be highly unrealistic, then, to review the Charter except in this larger setting.¹

¹ The Chief of Staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Francis O. Wilcox, has shown in a staff study prepared for the subcommittee the ways in which the U.N. has grown within the framework of the present Charter.

EDITOR'S NOTE. This study served as the basis for the opening article in this issue of THE ANNALS.

SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ESTABLISHED

In these complex circumstances how is the Senate to obtain the facts necessary for effective participation in the impending review? On July 28, 1953, it passed Senate Resolution 126, introduced by Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa, establishing a special Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter under the Foreign Relations Committee. The subcommittee consists of six members chosen from the Committee and two additional members selected from the Senate at large by the Vice-President.²

In setting up this subcommittee, the Senate provided itself with a special channel of information on the subject of Charter review. There are, of course, many other sources of information available to members of the Senate, such as the daily press and constituent correspondence, to note only two. The subcommittee, however, is an arm of the entire Senate and it acts as a kind of clearinghouse for relevant information on Charter review.

Under the terms of Senate Resolution 126, the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter "is empowered and directed to make a full and complete study of proposals to amend, revise or otherwise modify or change existing international peace and security organizations."

The purpose of the study is clearly set forth in the resolution, namely, to assist the Senate in discharging its function of advising

the President with respect to the foreign policy of the United States and particularly with reference to the policy of the United States at the General Conference of the United Nations for the review of the Char-

² The subcommittee is bipartisan, with a present membership that includes Senators Ferguson, Knowland, Cooper, Holland, Sparkman, Gillette, and Mansfield, in addition to myself as chairman.

ter to be held in accordance with article 109 of Chapter XVIII of the Charter.

SUBCOMMITTEE FUNCTIONS

The subcommittee, as an agency of the Senate, is only one of many groups, official and unofficial, in this country and abroad that are participating in the general preparations for a review of the Charter. There is, so to speak, quite a crowd of interested observers gathered round examining the engine under the raised hood.

The Department of State, for example, is making a thorough study of the technical questions involved in review. Other foreign offices are undoubtedly doing the same. The United Nations General Assembly at its last session voted 52 to 5 to direct the Secretariat to undertake certain preliminary study in anticipation of a conference. Individual students, private organizations, and research foundations in considerable number are examining the question.

The very extensiveness of the preparations for the review suggests the limitations as well as the potentialities of the subcommittee. We have neither the intention nor the capacity to duplicate the efforts of all the other examiners of the Charter. On the contrary, we have drawn upon their work and will continue to draw upon it to the fullest possible extent. The job of the subcommittee is one of fact gathering from many sources, and it is also a job of fact digesting. What we are trying to do is to bring to the attention of the Senate the fullest possible amount of usable information on the subject of Charter review.

To do the job effectively requires that members of the subcommittee inform themselves fully on the general issues of Charter review. We must examine and weigh numerous analyses of the prob-

lems and proposals for dealing with them. We must seek information emanating from many sources and representing many points of view. We must study the issues and the possible alternatives for their solution in a framework of how best to protect the interests of the United States in a world at peace. We are expected, finally, to report to the Senate with respect to the Charter and the United Nations system so that the Senate will be better equipped to discharge its functions of "advice" in connection with the impending review conference.

SUBCOMMITTEE METHODS

The subcommittee has interpreted its directive under Senate Resolution 126 to include two principal fields of study. We are concerned, first, with issues arising out of the operation of the United Nations system under the Charter. We are also concerned with United States policies in the United Nations and related international agencies of which this country is a member. Criticisms, analyses, proposals, and suggestions which fall within these two categories are regarded as germane to the work of the subcommittee.

In carrying out its responsibilities under Senate Resolution 126, the subcommittee has used two methods that are commonly employed by congressional bodies of this kind. We have drawn upon the research facilities available to the legislative branch of the government, particularly the subcommittee staff and the Library of Congress. We have also used the device of the public hearing.

One of the first actions of the subcommittee was to collect basic documentation relative to Charter review. As published in Senate Document 87, the collection contains the international instruments related to the adoption of

the Charter, a documentary history of United States legislation since 1943 which has helped to shape the course of our participation in the United Nations system, and an illustrative selection of official studies, acts, and statements dealing with some of the principal issues of Charter review.

As additional background for its study, the subcommittee has in process a series of staff studies, each analyzing a principal problem of review. At present, five of these analyses have been completed; they deal with the veto, the development of the Charter and the amending process, membership in the United Nations, representation and voting in the General Assembly, and peaceful settlement of disputes.³

The other principal device of the subcommittee, the public hearing, has already been employed eight times, and further use of it is contemplated. Early in 1954, the subcommittee received the testimony of the Secretary of State and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations.⁴ Both Mr. Dulles and Ambassador Lodge dealt with the problems of Charter review as seen from the perspective of the executive branch and helped the subcommittee thereby to delineate the scope of its own study.

³ The five studies referred to are Staff Study No. 1, The Problem of the Veto in the United Nations Security Council; Staff Study No. 2, How the United Nations Charter Has Developed; Staff Study No. 3, The Problems of Membership in the United Nations; Staff Study No. 4, Representation and Voting in the United Nations General Assembly; and Staff Study No. 5, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the United Nations. U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Committee Prints*, 1954. Others dealing with collective security, the specialized agencies, trusteeship, human rights, and similar issues are in various stages of preparation.

⁴ U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the United Nations, *Hearings*, Part 1, January 18 and March 3, 1954.

Grass-roots hearings

One of the most important actions of the subcommittee has been to invoke in a new setting the old device of the public hearing of interested citizens. Beginning in Akron, Ohio, on February 12, 1954, the subcommittee has met at intervals of several weeks in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Greensboro, North Carolina, Louisville, Kentucky, Des Moines, Iowa, and Minneapolis, Minnesota.

These "out of Washington" or "grass-roots" hearings, as they have sometimes been called, represent something of an innovation in the field of American foreign relations. Committees of Congress have frequently met in cities outside Washington to consider domestic issues. The present series, however, represents the first attempt to take a major question of foreign policy directly to the people of the United States for testimony and discussion.

The subcommittees has gone out into the country to obtain analyses, criticisms, and ideas with respect to United States policies on the Charter and the United Nations system. We have not been disappointed. Wherever the subcommittee has convened, the response of the local citizenry has been substantial, stimulating, and creative.

These hearings have not been lacking in qualities of humor which represent the essence of the wisdom of the American people. One witness in Akron, for example, commented: "As for the United States, our people as yet are not ready to substitute 'My world 'tis of thee' for 'My country 'tis of thee.' I couldn't sing that." And when questioned about the advisability of keeping the Soviet Union in the United Nations, he added: "I want her in. We can watch her better. If she gets out, you can't tell where she will ramble."

As many as fifty witnesses have sometimes been heard in a single day of

testimony in these grass-roots hearings. The witnesses have been drawn from all walks of life, and their observations have served to enrich our understanding of the problems before us. The conduct of these hearings is not without difficulties. The United Nations is a subject which arouses strong and sometimes conflicting passions in the communities of the United States. However, by making every effort to keep the proceedings impartial and objective and to hear all points of view (so far the subcommittee has heard or received written statements from every person requesting an audience), it has been possible to reduce the heat to a minimum and increase the light to a maximum.

These hearings are not, of course, a public opinion poll on the popularity of the United Nations and are not intended to serve that purpose. They do, however, tap sources of wisdom throughout the country on the problems of Charter review, sources which otherwise might lie dormant. The data collected from these hearings will be weighed, together with other information obtained from research, official sources, and national organizations. This vast accumulation of raw materials should provide the basis for judgments by the subcommittee which will be rooted in the intelligence and understanding of the American people.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The work of the subcommittee on the United Nations Charter shows clearly that there is a widespread and informed interest in the United States in the question of Charter review. Few, if any, of the individuals and groups with whom we have come into contact in this work are seeking miracle solutions to the complex problems that arise from the fact that nations live together to-

day in a shrunken world in which the threat of Communist aggression is ever present. For the most part they are deeply concerned with these problems and are looking for sensible, practical ways of meeting them.

The subcommittee shares this con-

cern. We are examining along with others the mechanism under the hood of the United Nations system. It is highly important, in my opinion, that we do so. The security of the nation and the peace of the world are closely connected with this mechanism.

Alexander Wiley, LL.B., Washington, D. C., United States Senator from Wisconsin since 1938, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, was a delegate to the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly (1952). He has also served as American delegate at numerous international conferences. He is a member of the bar in Wisconsin and practiced law there for many years before his election to the Senate.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

CLARK, GRENVILLE, and LOUIS B. SOHN.
Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision: Detailed Proposals for Revision of The United Nations Charter. viii, 149. Preliminary Print by the authors, Dublin, N.H., 1953. No Price.

Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision is the most judicious and explicit of the proposals to establish some form of world government as a guarantor of international peace and security. Advanced by two eminent lawyers in preliminary form as a basis for discussion and criticism prior to final publication in 1955, the work embodies a comprehensive textual revision of the United Nations Charter and a point-by-point commentary giving the rationale for the amendments proposed. It is therefore germane to the current public and governmental consideration of Charter review, in anticipation of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly when a decision must be reached whether or not to initiate the procedures of Charter amendment.

The authors have no doubt that the maintenance of genuine peace demands a "disarmed world governed by law," and

that this in turn will require the acceptance of world political institutions endowed with supra-national authority. In contrast to some other proponents of world government, however, they believe that this transformation should and can be achieved through the established procedures for the revision of the United Nations Charter, and they assume the retention of the United Nations as the basic framework for world government. They anticipate furthermore the continuance of national states as important political units, but with representation in the United Nations weighted according to population and delegates free to vote as individuals unstructured by their governments.

The most significant distinction between the Clark-Sohn approach and previous plans for world government is the clear priority given to disarmament as an essential condition of world order. National disarmament—universal, enforceable by United Nations inspection and military forces, and complete in all arms down to the limited requirements of internal police—is held to be the prerequisite for world government, not its incidental by-product. In linking disarmament with the strengthening of United Nations authority, the one inescapably dependent on the other, the authors have struck a note of realism

which has not been characteristic either of "revisionists" or of those who have extolled United Nations action in Korea and elsewhere as an effective practice of collective security. They cogently urge that the main features of a disarmament plan must be included in the Charter itself as "constitutional legislation" because, unless there is agreement *in advance* on this matter, there is no likelihood that any other Charter revisions will be accepted or indeed that any alternative arrangement could effectively provide for security. The futility of the eight years of disarmament negotiations which followed upon the failure at San Francisco to face the crucial necessity of taking decisive action *then* on the principles and machinery of disarmament bears out the position taken in the Proposals on this point.

How far this positive "realism" will convince those who make official policy decisions in the militarily potent states is questionable. The delusion that the key to security lies in massive national armament holds a strangely persistent power over the minds of men on both sides of the cold war, in spite of day-to-day demonstrations that weapons no longer serve as persuasive instruments either of physical defense or diplomatic strategy. Clark-Sohn nevertheless urge that theirs is a practical approach. They admit that adoption of Charter revision along the lines they suggest presupposes a general East-West political settlement. But they urge that their proposals for disarmament and for a monopoly of armed force in the United Nations, by providing assurance that the agreed terms will be enforced, will meet a basic condition for the negotiation of a general East-West settlement.

All else hinges on the validity of this expectation because the authors concede that the drastic reorganization of the United Nations they propose could hardly prove acceptable unless states—in the face of the danger of mutual annihilation if they pursued present security policies to their conclusion—were ready to think in realistic terms of how to get along together. Membership in the revised United Nations is to be universal and automatic for all states—and indissoluble. The General Assembly

becomes the unicameral legislative body of the United Nations, with broad powers to enact binding laws relating to questions of armament and security, to settle disputes, to tax and borrow, and to define and provide for the punishment of offenses by individuals against the Charter. The Security Council is abolished and an executive council is made the executive arm of the General Assembly and responsible to it. The "veto" is abolished and decisions in the General Assembly are reached by a majority of the representatives, voting as individuals. A bill of rights would safeguard the individuals against the violation of basic rights by the United Nations or anyone acting under its own authority, but would *not* attempt to safeguard him against acts by his own national or local government.

PHILIP E. JACOB

University of Pennsylvania

WARNE, J. D. *N.A.T.O. and Its Prospects*. (The Army Quarterly Series.) Pp. vii, 110. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1954. \$3.00.

As a member of General Gruenther's staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Wing-Commander J. D. Warne of the Royal Airforce is highly competent to speak on the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its prospects for the future. Like most British authors, he writes succinctly, confidently, and comprehensively, mellowed with intelligent qualifications to illustrate his mature reflections on the many imponderables involved. Whether he deals with the political structure and command organization of NATO, or with Soviet military power, with special reference to the Soviet build-up of strategic air power, Commander Warne speaks with authority and realism.

While advocating the development of NATO into a real political community, the author takes a dim view as to its possibility. He is convinced, however, that "habits of co-operative action" in various fields, taking place gradually under the pressure of day-to-day problems, may bring progress in this direction. He observes that one of the gravest problems has been the difficulty of ascertaining an equitable

"burden-sharing" of military costs, which mounts in intensity because of the disparities in the national wealth of the NATO membership.

Paradoxically, this provocative little volume tells us more about Commander Warne as a political analyst than as a military strategist. One of its strangest omissions is its failure to expound upon the strategic military concept that undergirds this unique military alliance—whether NATO is designed to fight a "total war" or a possible "brush-fire war"; what type of defense, mobile or static, is to be employed; what kind of offensive or defensive weapons will be utilized.

As a politico-statesman, the author declares his central thesis as follows: "N.A.T.O. could perform a useful role in the development of Western policy. . . . It is perhaps time that the generals should remind the politicians that diplomacy is too important a matter to be left to chance." Lest perchance the politicians have neglected their responsibility for postulating a positive political objective and commensurate policies, Commander Warne unhesitatingly offers his conceptual framework: "Containment as a policy is, moreover, clearly not enough. A basis would, on the other hand, already seem to exist for superimposing a long-term policy upon short-term requirements for military security. A basic task for the West, however, is to think out what the long-term objective really should be *vis-à-vis* the East-West cleavage itself, rather than any single aspect of it. The greatest need, and perhaps the most likely to go by default, is for open minds."

Commander Warne's open-mindedness is revealed when he attempts to hypothesize on the crucial issue as to whether Soviet hostility to the West is based upon Russian traditional national interest or upon Communist ideology that views capitalism and Communism as incompatible. His personal ambivalence on this point does not, however, detract from the fact that it is heartening to find a military man deeply concerned about political objectives and political methods. Our own Chiefs of Staff could well emulate this author's example.

ALFRED J. HOTZ

Western Reserve University

WORMSER, RENÉ. *The Myth of The Good and Bad Nations*. Pp. ix, 180. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954. \$3.00.

Mr. Wormser would have done better to have stuck more closely to his title. It is true that others before him have criticized the popular idea that the world is divided into inherently good and inherently bad nations. Still, it is worth while to expose once more the fallacies of this mode of political thinking, and the grievous consequences which it has spawned.

Mr. Wormser, rushing headlong in his journalistic chariot, is not content with so restricted a course. He swerves back and forth over the whole field of "revisionist" doctrine with a momentary pause for a flashback survey of post-Renaissance European imperialism. The revisionist critique of twentieth-century United States history and historians can be sufficiently serious, but it is unconvincing when packed untidily into a short, derivative book that argues by simple declarative sentences rather than by evidence.

Mr. Wormser, like some other revisionists, is simplistic. He finds unjustified our interventions in World Wars I and II. He explains the first as the result of the machinations of bankers and President Wilson. The second he pretty well reduces to the scheming of President Roosevelt. Things just aren't that simple, especially if we keep in mind the problem of possible alternatives.

Rightly rejecting the starry-eyed view of Britain and France as permanently "good" nations that are always trustworthy friends and allies, it is hard for Mr. Wormser, in spite of his disclaimers, to resist the temptation merely to substitute Germany, Italy, and Japan on his moral pedestals. He would solve our present tribulations through an alliance resting primarily on these three. He does not explain to us on what grounds he thinks Italy, with its massive Communist controlled parties, would be a firmer ally against Moscow than Britain or even France. He does not observe that today it is Japan, not Washington, that is coy about Japanese rearmament. Nor does he seem to realize how a "pro-German" European policy, with the perspective of the return of the "lost

colonies," might become the one factor that would consolidate Eastern Europe and Moscow.

JAMES BURNHAM

Kent, Connecticut

THORP, WILLARD L. *Trade, Aid, or What? A Report Based Upon a Conference on International Economic Policy at the Merrill Center for Economics, Summer 1953.* Pp. xv, 224. Homewood, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. \$4.50.

The title and subtitle accurately describe the genesis and nature of this book; it is a report based on eight weeks of discussions by experts of the topic "trade, aid, or what?" Nearly sixty men, recruited mainly from academic and government circles with a sprinkling of business men, contributed their ideas on commercial policy (that is, trade controls and tariffs), exchange rate policy (for example, fixed versus fluctuating exchange rates, problems of convertibility), or foreign investment policy (for example, role of foreign capital in the economic development, problems of increasing private and public foreign investment). The author, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and now an economics professor at Amherst College, has not tried to present a consensus of opinion or even to summarize the areas of agreement or disagreement. He has instead attempted to outline the problems that were discussed and indicated the various considerations affecting each.

The result is a lucid and straightforward statement of a complex and difficult range of problems. Occasionally, the author expresses his own view of the directions in which a solution must be sought, but for the most part he confines himself to a thoughtful discussion of the ins and outs of the problems that come within his purview. Furthermore, this is done with only an infrequent reliance upon the special jargon of the professional economist. The result is a book that is recommended reading for every citizen who is interested in obtaining a better understanding of the international economic problems that give

rise to the headlines in our daily newspapers.

IRVING B. KRAVIS

University of Pennsylvania

MIKESELL, RAYMOND F. *Foreign Exchange in the Postwar World.* Pp. xv, 658. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1954. \$5.00.

Ever since the war of 1914-18 destroyed "a world payments system based upon sterling as the principal international medium and gold as the common regulator of national monetary systems," the "complexities and difficulties" of exchanging currencies across national boundaries have constituted a "most perplexing" economic problem, particularly so since the close of World War II. The subject has indeed been discussed in innumerable articles and official documents, but there has been no comprehensive investigation of it. Now Professor Raymond F. Mikesell fills the gap with the substantial volume under review. His study is the first detailed examination of trade and financial policies and practices, and currency and exchange controls as they have developed throughout the world in the postwar years. The author's remarkable enterprise merits the warmest praise, and the sustained lucidity of his writing will appeal to a wide audience of students and specialists.

Mikesell's work seeks 1) "to provide a better understanding of foreign exchange practices and policies since World War II" by bringing together information on the exchange control systems and international payments arrangements of more than seventy-five countries and evaluating the policies underlying the exchange practices as to their economic effect; 2) to formulate suggestions for dealing with disequilibrium and dollar shortage, the development of a code of fair exchange practices, and sterling convertibility, with the ultimate aim of attaining as high a degree of convertibility as possible among the currencies of the nations of the free world; and 3) to propose policies for the United States in dealing with this problem.

Because of limitation of space it is not

possible to summarize or comment adequately on the many aspects of the book. The following will therefore be limited to some brief remarks on Mikesell's opinion on the urgent problem of convertibility. The central conclusion of Mikesell's study is "that trade discrimination and exchange restrictions on current transactions are not only economically harmful, but they are responsible for a misallocation of resources which the free world can ill afford if it is to defend itself against internal and external aggression." Therefore, the one way in which western nations can preserve their strength in the cold war is to reduce trade barriers and restore freely convertible currencies among themselves. In this program, the author maintains that "the assistance of the United States would be crucial to the success of any convertibility plan which is likely to succeed. Such assistance would include a liberalization of U. S. trade policies, a substantial stabilization loan to the United Kingdom, and eventually, an additional subscription to the Monetary Fund."

However, as Mikesell correctly emphasizes, for convertibility to succeed it must be "undertaken gradually and through the cooperative action of Britain and the leading Western European countries." "It must be achieved by concerted action of the leading countries of the free world to create a system of universal multilateral settlements." In this respect, the author is at variance with the International Monetary Fund's individual country approach to convertibility, but his views are supported by all public authorities in western Europe. Thus, to cite only two cases, the recently reported agreement of the West German and British governments on a European convertibility plan pointed out "that the problem would have to be approached collectively and not by individual governments" while the *Nederlandsche Bank* declares in its annual report for 1953 that "from the technical monetary point of view, our country can thus be regarded as standing on the threshold of convertibility. But this certainly does not mean that it could cross that threshold alone."

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER

Washington, D. C.

JENKINS, SHIRLEY. *American Economic Policy Toward the Philippines.* Stanford University Press. Published Under the Auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. Pp. viii, 181. \$4.00.

The recent experience of the Philippines indicates clearly many of the difficulties faced by the newly independent states of the southeastern Asia region. The structure of every sovereign state must be underpinned by as stable an economy as possible, but, in this part of the world, the forces of history, geography and circumstance have generally fostered an economy which is relatively undiversified, relying for exports on handicrafts, foodstuffs and industrial raw materials of a narrowly limited variety. On the other hand, the thirst for the myriad products of modern industry has grown apace in every land. The consequence tends to be economic instability, exchange difficulty, and a publicly supported program of industrialization. Under such circumstances, political and economic tensions multiply alarmingly and demand for their solution a level of statesmanship which is not invariably to be found.

In this respect, the economic history and problems of the Philippines deserve more attention than they have received. Here is the one area in this part of the world which is blessed with the combination of good agricultural land, many natural resources, and extremely low population pressure. Nonetheless, the record of the last three decades illustrates the great difficulty of expediting industrial development in a land long given over to another way of life.

In a sense, the carefully documented analysis of Mrs. Jenkins points quite properly to the responsibility of the United States in failing to help the Filipinos plan more effectively for economic independence. It is true that American guidance was impaired by a lack of clear-cut understanding as to the political future of the archipelago, and, as well, by conflicting economic pressures at home. It is also true that no other colonial power has undertaken this kind of planning. Even so, the fact remains that the United States, throughout most of its half century of political relationship with the Philippines, gave more

lip service than hard thinking to the implications of trusteeship.

Mrs. Jenkins has examined the economic record with great care and her account is lucid and well-balanced. Since economic policy issues in these days are seldom motivated solely by nonpolitical considerations, the political setting outlined in a lengthy introduction by Dr. Claude A. Buss is particularly helpful.

GRAYSON KIRK

Columbia University

MCNEILL, WILLIAM HARDY. *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946*. (Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946.) Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Pp. xviii, 819. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. \$15.00.

This significant piece of contemporary history dealing with the most critical period of the twentieth century was written at Chatham House by a young history professor at the University of Chicago. It is the most weighty contribution yet made by an overseas author to the *Survey* series.

In conformity with the established arrangement scheme of the *Survey* volumes the author divides his work into parts, chapters, sections, subsections and subheads. The first and longest part of the book (pp. 1-375) is the history of the two-year period (December, 1941-December, 1943) of "co-operation to fight the war." Therein the author has carefully compressed nearly all the history of those two war years. Nothing of importance is omitted; nothing extraneous is included. It is a sweeping survey of facts and figures, of military, political and economic planning on global scale. This period might be called the romantic period of the grand alliance. Each partner took some pains, at least in appearance, not to offend the others, though this conventional etiquette was often discarded by the late American President in some of his dealings with the British Prime Minister, especially at the Teheran Conference. Part II (pp. 376-565) deals with the period between Teheran and Yalta (December, 1943-February, 1945). Here again Mr. McNeill is eminently suc-

cessful in presenting a coherent and comprehensive narrative of the decisive fifteen-month period of the war during which most far-reaching and disastrous decisions were made. The division of Germany into occupation zones and the West's tacit acquiescence to the eventual loss of Eastern Europe and of the Balkans (except Greece) have their origin in this period. Part III (pp. 567-746) covers the period of "break-down of Allied co-operation" from February, 1945, to the end of 1946. Even though this period includes the birth of the United Nations, it is the period of disappointment and disenchantment, of frustration and failure. Part IV concludes with the author's "reflections and general observations" (pp. 747-68). There is also Appendix I listing major conferences and meetings, and Appendix II (pp. 772-89) on Lend Lease by Sir David Waley.

In this *magnum opus* Mr. McNeill has produced a thorough compendium of World War II, and therein lies its real value. As a contemporary history, however, the work is not without serious blemishes: it is seriously marred by the author's personal views. Towards the end he is clearly conscious of the fact that the high hopes of the West were shattered, but throughout his viewpoint is that no serious diplomatic mistakes were made by the leaders of the West, that most of the agreements arrived at on controversial issues were the result of mutual concessions, and if at times West's spokesmen conceded more to Stalin than what they hoped to receive, this was done partly for the sake of expediency and partly because they had no choice. Besides, "top-level negotiations were handled with extraordinary dispatch, even though it often happened that the concessions Stalin made were subsequently nullified by the failure of his subordinates to translate agreements into deeds" (p. 80). This seems to imply that Stalin worked under certain constitutional checks and balances. His acceptance of our proposed "compromise" on the veto question is considered, in all seriousness, a concession. His acquiescence to allow French representation on the Allied Control Commission in Germany is mentioned as another concession (p. 549).

In 1947 in his *The Greek Dilemma* Mr. McNeill did a good day's work and thereby earned deserved recognition. In the opinion of one reader this more important work does not measure up to the fine standard set in his earlier work. For a more balanced and realistic appraisal of events and forces during this period one must turn to Wilmot's *The Struggle for Europe* and General Deane's *The Strange Alliance*.

A. O. SARKISSIAN

Library of Congress

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

BUCKLEY, WILLIAM F., JR., and L. BRENT BOZELL. *McCarthy and His Enemies: The Record and Its Meaning*. Pp. xviii, 413. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954. \$5.00.

With admirable forthrightness William Schlamm opens the Prologue by stating that Buckley and Bozell "have chosen to study and take sides in the most scandalous fracas of the century," so from the beginning the reader is warned that this report of the record is not without prejudice.

The book is remarkable for many reasons. Here is a presentation of an individual who, to quote Charles Murphy, "more than any other contemporary United States politician has made himself the excavator of political corpses, the rattler of skeletons, the resurrector of the past. Inevitably a man who works with such varied materials means many different things to the company that is for him."

Just what he means to these two young Yale graduates is never quite clear, because they never discuss McCarthy the man. Nowhere in this account do they give him any personality and background, any record of his own such as was published in the *Milwaukee Journal* some years ago. With the studied precision of tightrope walkers they restrict themselves to McCarthy's public utterances in connection with Communist infiltration of the Federal government.

In doing so they use a great many of the

Wisconsin Senator's well-known techniques. The volume is a hodgepodge of footnotes and citations, liberally sprinkled with italics, and backed up with six lengthy appendices covering almost fifty pages—a fitting counterpart of the fistful of confidential papers, the photostats, and the bulging briefcase that have such an important place in McCarthy's panoply.

These young men have a great deal of ability, and they have done a prodigious amount of work. That they are bewitched by McCarthy is evident. That they have no great admiration for him seems also true. Time and again they concede he has played loosely with the truth, that he "hadn't a leg to stand on," or even that "some of his specific charges were exaggerated, a few had no apparent foundation whatever." Yet this was unimportant in their argument. The Committee, the Department, the opposition were wrong.

Like the Senator, they appear to ignore the fact that changing circumstances alter men's decisions, that hindsight is vastly more prevalent than foresight, and that attitudes once right and just may seem ludicrous or even horrible ten years hence.

Why was this book written? Is it a spontaneous eulogy of the ism not the man? Though its 400 pages seem tedious beyond all hope of being widely read, only the naive would be impressed by such academic pyrotechnics. Surely politically informed readers will sense beyond this verbose collection of irrelevancies the pertinent facts that are a rightful part of the record.

JOHN SPARKMAN

United States Senator from Alabama

HANDLIN, OSCAR, ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, FREDERICK MERK, ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, JR., and PAUL HERMAN BUCK. *Harvard Guide to American History*. Pp. xxiv, 689. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1954. \$10.00.

Let it be said at the outset that here is a worthy successor to Channing, Hart, and Turner's *Guide to the Study and Reading of American History*, first published in 1896 and revised in 1912. Like the older

work, it is designed to serve as a teaching instrument and a bibliography, and, as such, it deals critically and analytically with the methods and materials of historical research, and provides, as well, valuable and detailed topical references within a chronological framework. Much that is covered treats of American cultural and intellectual developments, so that this is very definitely a work broad in conception, and, as it turns out, remarkably complete in execution. Like the old *Guide* it now supplants, and a brief *Harvard Reading List in American History* that appeared in 1949, it is destined to have a decided influence in its field and should prove a major stimulus to scholarly endeavor.

The greater part of the volume consists of reading lists, beginning with the prehistory of the continent and going down to 1952. Each topic is informatively outlined, and recommended general and special references, sources, and bibliographical aids are noted. In many instances, specific chapter citations are listed, and scholarly journals and state publications have been intelligently culled for pertinent articles and documents. There is an exceedingly useful 142-page author, title, and subject index.

In comparing the contents of the *Guide* of 1912 with the present work, it is clear how considerable is the newer emphasis in the study of American history and civilization. In the *Harvard Guide*, for instance, we find sections devoted to graphic materials, sound recordings, mechanical devices for copying manuscripts, and even suggestions for financing research. The numerous special bibliographies and manuscripts surveys made available since the 1930's, and duly recorded here, have opened up a wealth of primary sources to the ambitious researcher. As for the products of scholarship, the publications of the university presses alone over the past few decades have enriched the literature of the subject tremendously and blazed new paths for fruitful investigation. From art and architecture to transportation and travel, examples may be cited of how full and reliable the reading lists are. Some eighty-four pages of bibliography are devoted to twentieth-century America, and the book

and article references for the period 1941-1952 are commendably up-to-date. Not only has significant note been taken of all the new trends, but, in addition, much that was important in the old *Guide* has been retained.

As is inevitable in a work of this magnitude, there are some typographical slips and other errors (the full title, for example, of Channing, Hart, and Turner's *Guide* is incorrectly given in the very first paragraph of the preface). On the whole, however, this is a sound and painstaking job, a tribute to the enormous industry and erudition of the men who compiled it and an example of the high standards of the university which published it.

SIDNEY I. POMERANTZ

The City College, New York

DAVID, PAUL T., MALCOLM MOOS, and RALPH M. GOLDMAN (Eds.). *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952*. Vol. I: The National Study; II: The Northeast; III: The South; IV: The Middle West; V: The West. Pp. xxii, 256; xi, 369; xi, 363; xi, 334; and xi, 298. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, May 10, 1954. \$3.50 per vol. or \$17.50 per set.

These five volumes contain the net product of the most notable research project ever undertaken by the American Political Science Association. As early as November, 1951 the Executive Director of the Association got a plan adopted to make a comprehensive study of the election of the delegations to the Republican and Democratic National nominating conventions and of their activities before and during the conventions as well as the proceedings of the conventions as they occurred.

In due time several hundred members of the Political Science Association got busy on the field work of gathering pertinent matter about the delegations in each state. Grants of funds enabled Paul T. David, director of the project, to assemble a staff of specialists who, in collaboration with other political scientists, observed first hand the work of the delegations at Chicago and the proceedings of the conventions. Then the staff, in close cooperation with the Brookings Institution, assembled the rather inchoate mass of data expressed

in millions of words and began the arduous task of its organization, analysis, and interpretation and finally the writing of these volumes.

Only Volume I deals with the project as a whole. The others give the results of the field work by regions: The Northeast, The Middle West, The South, and The West. Here the case history of each delegation representing a state or territory can be found. Each of these regional volumes opens with a brief prefatory note giving key facts and a commentary followed by essays on the case findings of each state in the region, and each essay is concluded with a "review and appraisal."

Volume I, entitled "The National Story," is the most fascinating of the five. The foreword was written by Ralph Bunche, President of the American Political Science Association, who pronounced this "by far the most ambitious attempt undertaken to apply the case method to research in the field of politics." Paul T. David wrote the chapters entitled "The Presidential Nominating Process," "Procedures and Experience in the 48 States," "Basic Issues of Nominating Procedure" and "The Record and the Future" which closes the volume. Malcolm Moos wrote "The Pre-convention Campaigns of 1952" and "The Republican National Convention," while Ralph Goldman collaborated with the other two scholars in writing the chapter, "The Democratic National Convention."

One of the most astonishing revelations of this study is the wide range of variations in the political process from state to state. Here is something that should reduce the propensity of politicians and commentators to make easy generalizations. At long last speculation can be tempered at least by a body of factual data, scientifically analyzed and evaluated.

Most important of all, we suspect, is the pause this study should give to the tendency of those unfamiliar with the social process to brush aside the national convention as an outmoded and unworthy institution. The scholars who produced these volumes made no categorical judgments, but between the lines this reviewer thinks he can read the conclusion that no foreseeable substitute for the convention can

provide the absolutely indispensable means of arriving at the party consensuses that the convention affords.

Here we can read: "A national primary would disregard the necessity for sectional, factional and group compromises that are the price of [party] union" while "the convention environment puts emphasis upon the process of compromise and adjustment through face to face negotiation. It brings representatives of every section and group together in one place, where they are required to think about the problems of the party from the national point of view."

These scholars have not said it, but out of the results of their labors there emerges this reader's convictions that the national nominating convention, growing naturally out of the folkways and mores of a politically gifted people, justifies its existence as an institution.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY

Ohio Northern University

CAMPBELL, ANGUS, GERALD GURIN, and WARREN E. MILLER. *The Voter Decides*. Pp. xiii, 242. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954. \$4.25.

This unique study of a presidential election was made in 1952 by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. We have here, as V. O. Key, Jr., says in his foreword to the volume, "the most impressive analysis yet made of a national election." In the past, the armchair generalizations of journalists about the meaning of an election have been just as valid as the off-the-cuff assertions of politicians. When, for instance, Ambassador Clare Booth Luce said, "The American people voted [in 1952] for a more dynamic and a more radical foreign policy," her declaration, though implausible, was on the evidence as good as the next one.

It is impossible in a brief review to mention all of the important findings of this study or to comment upon the scores of tables. It is notable, however, that the voters preferred the Democratic to the Republican party: "The Democratic party elicited more feeling, both of approval and

of disapproval, than the Republican party, with a net of greater apparent popularity." Communism in government was an issue of such slight interest to voters as to be barely statistically reliable in the responses. "More people made unfavorable comments about Eisenhower than about Stevenson" (45% to 35%). Why, then, did Eisenhower win? He aroused more enthusiasm among Republican voters than Stevenson did among Democratic voters; he was far better known, and enough Democrats voted for Eisenhower to turn the tide: "Had these 1948 Democrats stayed with Stevenson in 1952, General Eisenhower would not have gone to the White House."

In spite of all the campaigning, "About one in every three adults felt that it would make no difference [to the country] which party won."

If studies such as this could be made of future congressional and presidential elections, preferably in such form that the statistics are comparable, we would be on our way to a better understanding of American political behavior; we could take more and more of the guesswork out of political analysis. At any rate, nobody who writes or speaks about the 1952 election should be taken seriously if he has not studied this book.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN
University of Colorado

ZELLER, BELLE (Ed.). *American State Legislatures: Report of the Committee on American Legislatures*. Pp. ix, 294. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. \$3.50.

Probably the best way to introduce comment on this report is to quote from the Preface. At the beginning of its study, the Committee established as objectives: (1) The collection of a body of factual data, to serve as a basis for recommendations; (2) the encouragement of the study of state legislative processes; (3) the stimulation of grants of funds by the legislatures to their own research agencies; (4) the enlisting of the help of various organizations in promoting state legislative reforms; (5) the encouragement of the establishment of a "citizen's clearing-

house"; and (6) the stimulation of "broader research in the legislative process with the assistance of foundation and government funds."

The first objective has been met—here is the report with the recommendations. One might say that the second objective bids fair to be realized. As for the rest of them, only time will tell if any one is "encouraged" or "stimulated." Actually there is a "citizenship clearing house" already in existence: it has different aims. However, if the 1313 group is regarded as a center for administrative research and integration, the Citizenship Clearing House, now located in New York City, could become a center for political (policy) study and encouragement. It is my own view that there should be close cooperation between those studying the political party system in the United States and those who have taken policy formation in legislatures as their province. We know that there are serious deficiencies in the party system which are closely involved in the entire legislative process. Dr. Zeller says, "The conclusion is clear that the state legislatures are poorly equipped to serve as policy-making agencies in mid-twentieth-century America."

Most of the data constituting the factual basis of the report is taken from the writings of political scientists and official documents emanating from state legislative councils and similar agencies. These sources have been supplemented by confidential questionnaires and the personal experiences of such Committee members as the late Professor Chamberlain and Dr. George B. Galloway, both of whom enjoyed many opportunities to study the legislative process at first hand.

All of those who have a genuine interest in state legislation (the politician, the enterprising citizen, the editor, the teacher, the student) will find much value in these rather economically summarized facts and opinions about legislatures. Obviously, in a book of less than 300 pages, none of these matters is exhaustively discussed. It is equally clear that a short review cannot find flaws in the presentation without doing injustice to the scholars who worked for four years gathering the information, con-

sulting about it and reducing it to statements which they felt were valid.

Briefly, this book urges more "delegation" of legislation and devolution of authority. Sympathetic consideration is given to proportional representation, unicameralism, objective and automatic redistricting and reapportionment, annual sessions, and various procedural and organizational reforms. The most important recommendation is the general one that legislatures be made more powerful, be given more work to do, and adequate facilities and prestige. It is to be hoped that this report will be carefully studied. Dr. Zeller is to be congratulated for her part in this work. She will probably be happy if only some of the recommendations are adopted. Not all of them can be, but it is urgent that something be done soon about state legislatures.

ROY V. PEEL

University of Utah

BEALE, HOWARD K. (Ed.). *Charles A. Beard: An Appraisal by Eric F. Goldman, and Others*. Pp. xiii, 312. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1954. \$4.50.

In an era when the philosophy and the methodology of historical writing were being thoroughly revised, Charles A. Beard was a leader of change. *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* was a turning point in historical thinking when it appeared in 1913, and *The Rise of American Civilization*, written with his wife Mary Ritter Beard in 1927, applied the same principle of economic interpretation to the entire American story. If Beard had written only these two books, his place would be secure as the master who had succeeded in adapting the principles of modern economics to political problems and, with this instrument, had rewritten American history. His method uses the techniques of Marx and Hegel without becoming involved in the doctrinaire programs of Communism, fascism, or other "foreign" ideology. His patriotism remains unchallenged while he destroys the false idealization of the American "fathers." Then in 1934, he wrote *The Open Door at Home*, a "trial philosophy of national interest," and the implications of his ideas

as applied to foreign policy began to be felt. In 1939, two volumes of testimonial essays were projected in his honor. They were never published. Beard died in 1948.

This book, which is an appraisal (in the main, sympathetic) rather than a *Festschrift* in the ordinary sense, comes belatedly six years later. Instead of former students, its contributors are chiefly younger historians who have been influenced by the master, but reserve the right to be critical. Most are unhappy about Beard's isolationism of the later years, many take pains to emphasize the difference between his economic determinism and that of Marx. There is some inevitable overlapping in the discussions of various aspects of his thought and achievement. George R. Leighton finds himself in sympathy with perhaps the most generally controversial phase of the problem, Beard's foreign policy and the attack on Roosevelt; Merle Curti offers a gracious analysis of his historical criticism as revealed by his many reviews, and the editor of the volume, Howard K. Beale, gives a careful appraisal of his achievement as a historian.

But for the reader who wishes a fair and summary estimate of Beard's final place in history, Richard Hofstadter's "Charles Beard and the Constitution" is best. As the book on the Constitution is the key to Beard's thinking, this "placing of the ideas of the volume in their historical context" unlocks the larger problem.

Among other contributors are Harold J. Laski, Max Lerner, George Soule, and George S. Counts. A bibliography is supplied, but the book lacks an index.

ROBERT E. SPILLER

University of Pennsylvania

BUDENZ, LOUIS F. *The Techniques of Communism*. Pp. ix, 342. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954. \$5.00.

At long last we have a basic textbook on the theory and practice of Soviet Communism by one who knows what he is talking about. Louis Budenz's new book is must reading for all those who profess to know anything about Communism. It should prove invaluable in courses on Communism not only in schools and colleges, but also in community study groups.

There has never appeared such a superb analysis of Communist techniques, from both the theoretical and practical point of view, particularly as they apply to the United States. It is incumbent on political scientists who have been critical of congressional investigations of subversion to read this book with an open mind.

A few of Budenz's more striking observations deserve quotation: "It is precisely the ability of a small group, the vanguard, moving in a strictly disciplined manner and under concealment, into non-Communist organizations, that makes Communist activity so effective." "Every move by the United States in the international scene which is based on appeasement containment, or accommodation... is therefore futile." "It has been the disbelief that anyone rich or educated could be Communist-minded, which has caused such havoc in American thinking." "The constant reiteration of 'civil liberties' is a ready made device to gather the largest support against any effort to curb the conspiracy." "The Red functionary or member never reads a Communist article merely to get information. He always looks for the order that is given by it." "The strength of the Red press... lies in... prevail(ing) upon non-Communist organizations to speak out for the Kremlin's position at any given time." This latter statement is documented in the cases of the Korean truce, attacks on Rhee and Chiang, and attacks on committees investigating subversion.

Of especial concern to thinking Americans is Budenz's statement that "the Soviet fifth column in this country has not made as much headway among the working people as among industrialists, educators, and other professional groups." The author's presentation of quite a few case histories documents the charge. He indicates that a little house cleaning is in order for the double standard academicians who stoutly opposed fascism but today insist on accommodating Communism.

The most important single quotation in the book is especially good food for thought as of the moment: "It is the records of pro-Communists in education, government, or other agencies which should be pri-

marily considered, and not whether technically they can be proved to be Communists. If those records reveal a consistent aid to Soviet Russia, its fifth column here, and its fronts, then these individuals are enemies of the United States and should be recognized as such."

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

Marquette University

BLUM, JOHN MORTON. *The Republican Roosevelt*. Pp. viii, 170. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. \$3.50.

Having completed his monumental work as one of the editors of the eight-volume *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Mr. Blum has endeavored to distill his findings and thought concerning the role of Theodore Roosevelt in the American political tradition. The result, *The Republican Roosevelt*, is neither a biography nor a complete account of Roosevelt's public career; it is instead, as the author explains, "an interpretation of the purposes and methods of that career."

Such a study has long been badly needed. Under the impact of *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, historians have begun to examine their old glib assumptions and to see Theodore Roosevelt as one of the most important as well as one of the most fascinating individuals in American history since the 1890's. Mr. Blum's discerning book is such a literary *tour de force* and achieves its objectives so successfully that it will at once give impetus to the campaign to re-evaluate Roosevelt and take high rank in the literature of recent American history. It is all the more important, therefore, that we assess the author's accomplishments and note the limitations of his work.

In general, Mr. Blum has painted the whole Roosevelt—the man of extraordinary personal warmth and political wisdom as well as the impulsive adolescent so vividly depicted by earlier biographers. But the author has chosen to emphasize two important and usually neglected aspects of Roosevelt's career and contribution—his virtuosity as a political leader and the conservatism that underlay his theory and practice of government.

Mr. Blum proves beyond cavil that

Roosevelt the politician was shrewd, resourceful, and before 1912 successful—in fact, that he ranks with his cousin and nephew-in-law among the great politicians in American history. There was the way in which he used the patronage and personal influence to gain control of the G. O. P. and name his successor, for example, or the way in which he maneuvered to obtain passage in 1906 of the Hepburn railroad measure, in spite of the opposition of powerful interests that heretofore had controlled the party.

In evaluating Roosevelt's basic conservatism—his distrust of violent solutions, his sense of continuity, and his obsession for controlled change as an alternative to revolution, Mr. Blum has made a second important contribution. This reviewer would suggest, however, that he has ridden this theme so hard as to obscure another and equally important Roosevelt—the man who grew in political thought and became a prime, if not the most important, public champion of the modern progressive doctrines that culminated in the New Deal and Fair Deal legislation of our own time.

Mr. Blum does not ignore, but he does fail to give sufficient weight to this contribution. Moreover, he does not sufficiently emphasize the impact on American political practice of Roosevelt's other great contributions—his emphasis upon leadership and efficient administration. In brief, this reviewer would suggest that Roosevelt's contribution was considerably more important than Mr. Blum has indicated.

Mr. Blum's final chapter shows Roosevelt out of power from 1909 to his death in 1919. It is a sort of case study in failure and frustration, and the story that the author tells is not a happy one. Everything that he says is true, but again he overlooks the contribution that Roosevelt made to Wilsonian reform and to the movement to prepare America to play a leading role in world affairs.

However, these are minor criticisms. We must be grateful to Mr. Blum for giving us one of the liveliest, best-written, and most thoughtful books in American history during the year.

ARTHUR S. LINK

Northwestern University

LEOPOLD, RICHARD W. *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition*. Pp. x, 222. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954. \$3.00.

This is a dispassionate account of a dispassionate man. The author is Professor of History at Northwestern University. The volume is one of the Library of American Biography series, which aims to portray each subject "as neither the maker nor the product of his times, but instead seeing each as a force reacting on the other."

It is in this context in which Elihu Root's long and selfless career is treated, thus furnishing a different type of contribution than Professor Philip C. Jessup accomplished in his superb two-volume biography. The author achieves objectivity and readability in weaving his way through the many turbulent issues and events with which Root was intimately associated and on which he left his imprint. The book is well organized and contains a good discussion of the many sources used.

Professor Leopold correctly writes off the first fifty-four years of Root's life as of "minor importance," and measures his contributions from the time he joined McKinley's cabinet as Secretary of War in 1899. One might question the very high rating which the author accords to Root for smoothing out the administration of an efficient colonial system at the turn of the century. The author indicates that for this work Root "receives some credit but little glory." Due credit is given to Root for his pioneer work in creating the General Staff and firmly reasserting civilian supremacy. The author throws fresh light on a little-known aspect of Root's career—his tireless work to strengthen the frayed bonds of friendship with Latin America, for which Root deserves to be remembered as an outstanding precursor of the Good Neighbor policy. Wilsonians may quarrel with the author's sympathetic analysis of Root's conduct during the Great Debate over the League of Nations. Most observers would agree with the author on Root's contributions to international arbitration and his influence in making this country aware of its stake in Europe and Asia.

Some of the most interesting parts of the book deal with the development and application of Root's conservatism. The author concludes: "As the unending battle between liberalism and conservatism surges into the future, the cause of the latter could benefit from a little more daring, imagination, and faith in the people than Root was able to contribute; but it can never do without his integrity and fair-mindedness, his intelligence and good humor, his intuitive judgment and mastery of the facts, his respect for efficient administration and insistence upon balancing power with responsibility."

There is only one significant omission in this book. The author claims that "this book is designed to acquaint the general reader with the significance of Root's public service and its meaning for today." The conservative tradition today has become tarnished by its pussyfooting approach to McCarthyism, an approach fostered and encouraged by the leading conservative of this generation, the late Senator Taft. It is unfortunate that American conservatism in 1954 does not have an Elihu Root to lead the battle for the traditional liberties which are being trampled.

KENNETH W. HECHLER
Washington, D. C.

EATON, CLEMENT. *A History of the Southern Confederacy*. Pp. xi, 351. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$5.50.

American historical literature has long and conspicuously lacked a balanced one-volume history of the Southern Confederacy. The military record, to be sure, had been treated in detail by a number of writers; but the civilian record awaited basic research. By 1950, this research had been done, and E. Merton Coulter was thus able to achieve the first full-scale history of the home front, but he sacrificed overall coverage by crowding the military narrative into a single chapter.

Clement Eaton's study may be described, therefore, as the first concise general history based upon modern research. In such a book, proportion, fairness, and thoroughness are especially to be desired, and Pro-

fessor Eaton displays all three qualities. He presents many topics in very limited compass, but with judicious inclusion of essential information and with the kind of basic explanation that the hopeful reader does not always find in closely-digested accounts. The character sketches of the chief military leaders perhaps suffer somewhat by their brevity, but in general the book gains by its conciseness.

The author has also maintained a discriminating impartiality in his treatment of controversial questions both between North and South and within the Confederacy. For instance, he holds that southerners were justified in fearing that, in ultimate terms, the North threatened their way of life, but he also believes that Lincoln's purpose in sending the Sumter expedition was not aggressive. Or, with reference to Jefferson Davis, he recognizes the confederate President's many defects but points out that "his greatest service . . . was his selection of superior officers from the very beginning."

Most writers, when undertaking to distill and integrate a large body of monographic and periodical material, would feel no responsibility to add research of their own, but Professor Eaton has used manuscript sources very effectively—especially the highly-illuminating papers of Katherine Ann Edmondston and Robert Keen. He has combined this new material with his printed material so well that any criticism is, perhaps, captious. I, personally, wish that he had recognized the value of Clifford Dowdley's *Experiment in Rebellion* and that he had emphasized more the division between the upper South and the lower South just before Sumter. Various readers will perhaps wish for changes of emphasis at various points. This is inevitable. But no one is likely to question the sound craftsmanship, the admirable conciseness, and the justice, both in matters of proportion and in matters of treatment, of this valuable history.

DAVID M. POTTER
Yale University

HYMAN, HAROLD MELVIN. *Era of the Oath: Northern Loyalty Tests During the Civil War and Reconstruction*. Pp.

xiv, 229. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954. \$5.00.

The title of this book was suggested by an address delivered by Alan Barth to the American Association of University Professors. Mr. Barth hazarded the guess that historians of the future would refer to our troubled and suspicious times as "the era of the oath." Professor Hyman believes, with much justification, that the same phrase can be applied with equal accuracy to the Civil War and Reconstruction periods.

This work, a doctoral dissertation at Columbia, is another of the books appearing in the last few years that have dealt with relatively unexplored research fields in Civil War and Reconstruction history: medicine, ordnance, and legal and constitutional developments. The gaps in our knowledge of these areas are slowly being closed by the efforts of people like Mr. Hyman. His book is a welcome companion piece to J. T. Dorris' recent volume on pardon and amnesty. Together they provide a new and authoritative account of the constitutional aspects of the Civil War and its aftermath.

In the years of which Professor Hyman writes, and apparently also in our years, the dividing line between loyalty and disloyalty was vague and was often confused with the line between conflicting political opinions. That is, an unpopular opinion was sometimes defined as disloyalty. The great difficulty was, as the author shows in his descriptions of test oaths being administered to civil servants, military personnel, jurors, lawyers, and a host of others, that nobody knew how to define loyalty and nobody knew how to frame an oath that would measure loyalty. Most of the oaths of the period and especially the famous ironclad oath, to which Mr. Hyman rightly devotes most of his attention, required that the swearer not only promise good conduct in the future but pledge that he had done nothing wrong in the past.

The motive back of the wartime oaths was legitimate enough, but in the Reconstruction period they were used frankly by the Republicans for partisan purposes. It is the author's conclusion that the oaths

failed to identify the disloyal and might as well never have been created.

Professor Hyman has written a sound book based upon solid research. For this he deserves commendation. The general excellence of the work is marred by careless proofreading and by fuzzy identifications of the characters. As examples of the latter, on page 125 a mysterious "Sheridan" is quoted. Only by turning to the notes in the book can the reader learn this is General Philip Sheridan. On page 145 Samuel S. Cox is introduced as the leading opponent of test oaths. Four pages later he is introduced again at greater length and rises to the dignity of Samuel Sullivan Cox.

T. HARRY WILLIAMS

Louisiana State University

CATTON, BRUCE. *U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition*. Pp. x, 201. Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1954. \$3.00.

Even the notable success of Mr. Catton's trilogy on the Army of the Potomac will hardly have prepared his readers for this superb little volume in which the triumphs and failures of Grant's career are presented not only as a means to understand the man and his profession, but as clues to the inner secrets of the American character. A soldier against his will, Grant was able to achieve success only in two wars which he believed should never have occurred. But, contrary to the popular impression, he was an intelligent and articulate commander, a master of speed and finesse who had learned his trade soundly. From the Mexican War he obtained a grounding in logistics. In the first year of the Civil War he completed his education. He learned not to overestimate the enemy, McClellan's besetting sin; and, at Shiloh, not to underestimate him, a shortcoming that much later ended the military career of our most spectacular recent commander.

But military experience not only failed to qualify Grant for the presidency, it served actively to disqualify him. Handicapped by the professional soldier's awe of Congress, of men of wealth, and by the habit acquired in wartime of accepting presents from grateful civilians (starting

with the cigars to which a reporter at Donelson had erroneously declared him to be addicted), he not only failed but to a degree was disgraced. Only at the end with bankruptcy and inoperable cancer in his path did he rally for one last heroic victory before the dark closed in. Keeping himself painfully alive by an exercise of will he wrote the *Personal Memoirs* that left a fortune to his family and rehabilitated his reputation.

In this first volume to appear of the new Library of American Biography edited by Professor Oscar Handlin of Harvard, Mr. Catton proves beyond question his competence to complete the definitive biography of Grant begun by the late Lloyd Lewis. In his preface Mr. Handlin calls attention to present day parallels.

WOOD GRAY

George Washington University

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

ROOSE, KENNETH D. *The Economics of Recession and Revival: An Interpretation of 1937-38.* (Yale Studies in Economics, Vol. 2.) Pp. xi, 280. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954. Price \$4.00.

Dr. Roose has made a careful study of the short but sharp depression of 1937-38 which interrupted so alarmingly the recovery of the thirties. He uses mainly the tools of national income analysis, interpreting the movement of national income in terms of its three major components: household consumption, private investment, and government expenditure. His main conclusion is that the government and investment sectors, rather than the consumption sector, were responsible for the decline. The decline in the government contribution was associated directly with the rise in government cash receipts as a result of the introduction of social security and the consequent reduction of the cash deficit to zero. The decline in investment is associated with a decline in profits, and is further attributed to various unfavorable factors such as a rise in costs,

the hostility of government to business, the undistributed profits tax, and the trauma produced by the recent Great Depression.

There is an extensive discussion of the various theories and opinions which have been put forward concerning the episode, which points towards a certain lack of unanimity among professional opinion. The evidence which the author presents in support of his main thesis, though not conclusive, is certainly impressive, and his general point of view that depressions are not to be regarded as part of a regular cyclical phenomenon, but that each depression is in an important sense unique and must be analyzed with the tools of national income analysis, is one with which the reviewer has much sympathy.

It is in a study of this sort, however, that the weaknesses as well as the strengths of national income analysis emerge. The principal weakness seems to be the absence of any adequate over-all view of the causes of distributional shifts. In particular, the absence of any adequate explanation of the decline in profits in 1936-37 is a marked defect of the study—a defect, however, which reflects the present state of received economic theory. To attribute the fall in profits to a rise in costs, as Dr. Roose seems to do, surely merely states the problem in other words.

The style of the work betrays its origin in a Doctor of Philosophy thesis. One sometimes wonders if the main function of a doctoral committee is not to remove any trace of humor, lightness, or interest from the work. The presentation of the data is not always done in a way that makes it easy for the reader. Nevertheless, a great deal of interesting material has been collected, and one hopes that Dr. Roose's interest in this area will inspire him to continue a similar type of analysis for other depressions because the value of this type of study grows by the availability of comparisons.

K. E. BOULDING

Ann Arbor, Michigan

GROSS, BERTRAM, and WILFRED LUMER. *The Hard Money Crusade.* Pp. xiv, 178. Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1954. \$2.00.

Here we have a throwback to the eighteenth-century tradition of pamphleteering in political economy. This little book combines the lively and sometimes vituperative style of campaign oratory with a scholarly treatment of a serious economic problem—the role of interest rates and credit restrictions in the control of inflationary booms.

Such attempts are to be encouraged, although this particular volume is less an outstanding success than a dive between two stools. It contains too much economics for *Boobus Americanus*, but the economics is not quite of specialist quality.

Hindsight makes it easy to argue that the Eisenhower Administration was wrong to inaugurate a "Hard Money Crusade" by tightening credit and raising interest rates in the Spring of 1953. (The Administration reversed its policy in the summer.) But when one looks at the figures for the fourth quarter of 1952—a sudden rise of \$7.2 billion in consumption and another rise of \$5.6 billion in private investment (seasonally adjusted annual rates)—it seems a pardonable error to have concluded that more inflation was in the offing, and to have acted on this conclusion.

But Gross and Lumer are not concerned with this mundane problem of timing and forecasting. Their thesis is the broader and bolder one that tight money should never, NEVER be imposed on an economy regardless of price movements, and that only wicked men on Wall Street can possibly think otherwise. An introduction, a foreword, and a preface (by Dr. Dewey Anderson, Rep. Wright Patman, and Prof. Seymour E. Harris) serve mainly to underline these points.

The supporting case is part of the orthodoxy of the Fair Deal, with which both the authors were associated for considerable periods. Its Point I is essentially this: Money, credit, and interest rates cannot be used in controlling inflation. In small doses they do no good, and in large doses they kill the patient by provoking depressions. There is nothing in between. Point II of the supporting case is essentially this: The aim of financial policy should be continuous full employment, and

economic growth at the maximum possible rate, with prices controlled directly if they get out of hand.

A brief review is not the place to argue Point I, although I suspect that it implies a highly peculiar (discontinuous) relationship between interest rates and other economic variables. Point II is a matter of choice rather than of economic analysis. Gross and Lumer, however, either fail to see the full implications of their system or fail to be candid in presenting it. Under this system, the threat of unemployment and underproduction will no longer be effective in restraining the wage and price demands of organized labor and the farm bloc. The financial authorities are to guarantee full employment and production, whatever wages and farm prices may be. In such a case, the economy will require something like permanent price controls to prevent a runaway inflation. These controls will presumably operate largely to force the business group to pay wages and farm price increases out of profits, instead of passing them on to the consumer. We need not argue whether such a system is or is not "socialism," or whether the resulting income distribution would be more or less "equitable" than the present one. Our points are only that major institutional change is implied by Fair Deal monetary philosophy, and that it is less than completely frank to conceal the implication from the reading and voting public.

Academic discussions of the criteria of monetary policy usually omit bank profits as unclean and unworthy. They are a little like Victorian anatomy textbooks, with the reproductive system omitted. Bank profits can be an important factor in determining monetary policy, as economists with Treasury or Federal Reserve experience can testify. Gross and Lumer have done a service in stressing the financial community's interest in dear money, although they have gone to the opposite extreme (like an anatomy 99 44/100 per cent sexual) in ascribing the "Hard Money Crusade" to Wall Street and its Washington agent, Mr. Randolph Burgess. Students will also find the statistical appendices useful, especially where they assemble in one place data on

money rates not easily obtainable elsewhere.

M. BRONFENBRENNER

University of Wisconsin

SUNDBORG, GEORGE. *Hail Columbia: The Thirty-Year Struggle for Grand Coulee Dam*. Pp. xvii, 476. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$5.75.

Between the covers the reader will find three fascinating and important stories.

First there is a detached recital of the myriad steps, some of them heart-rending, made inevitable by our democratic ways in building the world's most powerful power plant. With a capacity of two million kilowatts it is the biggest one-piece structure ever built by man. The crusade for this public improvement began with an idea, pure and simple, entertained by only a few unlettered but loyal souls who believed that the Columbia's mighty flood could and should be harnessed for the service of man. The vision of pouring these limitless waters through irrigation works over two million acres of fertile but thirsty land provided the boundless enthusiasm which put through a plan over a thirty-year period which any gambler would have rated as not better than one in a thousand.

Secondly, threading through the book, the author has given us a graphic and carefully annotated story illustrating the tragic part electric power politics plays in the life of our people. There is no other place where the details of the techniques used by the commercial electrical industry in seeking to have its own way, regardless of what may be the real public interest, have been so adequately described. The test for an electrical enterprise should be the efficiency with which the property is operated, not who owns it. But at times it seems as if a publicly owned system may be the only way by which we can escape private power company conniving and lobbying.

But thirdly, and by all odds the most unique feature of this book, is the moving delineation of the towering figure of James O'Sullivan, without whose indefatigable and wholly competent labors the project would have been neither started nor completed.

O'Sullivan was a model servant of the Republic. He had character to burn and an integrity always evident. He avoided being chummy with the opposition but always held their respect. He never let up, sought always to keep one step ahead of the opposition whatever it might be, and had no vestige of personal interest which had to be safeguarded. Without a formal engineering education he always seemed to turn up with unanswerable arguments. In these days of fabulous compensations for recent technical graduates, one stands in respectful awe of one who kept going with or without food and enduring privations of all manner of things which most humans consider essential. He won and kept the confidence of those he most cared about. The author wisely dedicates his book

To

All Jim O'Sullivans

whatever their names and causes.

MORRIS LLEWELLYN COOKE
Philadelphia, Pa.

GOULDNER, ALVIN W. *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*. Pp. 282. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. \$4.50.

This case history in industrial sociology offers a satisfying balance between theory and concrete factual observations. The starting point is Weber's recognition that norms in a bureaucracy "may be established by agreement or imposition." Gouldner hypothesizes that differences in the source of rules, the values which legitimate them, and the status of those whose interests are affected by them lead to significant differences in the way the system operates.

Working with a team of students, Gouldner observed the operation of a gypsum mine and factory. (An appendix describes the field work procedures, among which a partially nondirective interview played a large part.) They found impressive differences between an earlier, indulgent, flexible administration, and the regime of the successor whose suspicion that men might be loafing led to efforts to tighten up and to check up. Gouldner explains why such efforts were inaugurated in the factory but not in the mine, where a stronger tradition of independence prevailed.

From the analysis emerge three types of bureaucracy:

(a) "*Mock*" Bureaucracy, in which rules are imposed upon the group by some "outside" power; neither management nor workers want these rules and they are not enforced. The "no-smoking" rule was of this type.

(b) "*Representative*" Bureaucracy, in which both management and workers want the rules; both see value in them; both cooperate in enforcing them. Some safety rules are of this type.

(c) "*Punishment-centered*" Bureaucracy, in which either management or workers initiate the rules while the other group does not recognize them as rational, necessary, or legitimate. One party enforces; the other evades. In this company, a system of open bidding for jobs higher up was forced on a reluctant management by the union.

Weber's concept of bureaucracy as based on recognition of the expert role accords with Gouldner's representative bureaucracy, although it is inadequately defined in terms of the expert only; his concept of authoritarian discipline in democracy arises from Gouldner's punishment-centered "type."

Bureaucratic measures do not arise, as some earlier writers have implied, simply for the welfare of the institution as a whole. Rules function to reduce certain tensions for certain people in one or another status. This more differentiated analysis is the significant step which Gouldner takes.

The book reads easily. Direct quotations keep the atmosphere of realism. The theoretical discussion is fairly simple. Undergraduates should have no trouble with it.

GOODWIN WATSON

Columbia University

HOYT, ELIZABETH E., MARGARET G. REID, JOSEPH L. MCCONNELL, and JANET M. HOOKS. *American Income and Its Use*. Pp. xxi, 362. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$4.00.

This volume is one of the series on "Ethics and Economic Life" sponsored by the Federal Council of Churches. This

sponsorship helps to account for the very considerable space devoted to ethical aspects of consumption trends and differentials.

Part I, by Elizabeth E. Hoyt, treats various aspects of "The Ethics of Consumption." Part II, by Margaret G. Reid, deals with "Distribution of Income and Consumption" and presents the principal statistical materials in the book. Part III, "The Changing Family and Its Dependents," by Joseph L. McConnell and Janet M. Hooks, indicates the ways the changing size and kinship structure of the family affect consumption. Part IV consists of a "Conclusion" by Elizabeth E. Hoyt, and Part IV, which paradoxically follows the "conclusion," presents comments by Walter G. Muelder on "Ethical Aspects of Income Distribution and Consumption."

The book is primarily intended for the general reader, rather than for specialists in the economics of consumption, family sociology, or social stratification. Its usefulness to the specialists is likely to rest solely on the circumstance that it provides some bridges among these fields.

Aside from the obvious circumstance that a book by many hands will be uneven in style and somewhat inconsistent in point of view, one additional critical comment is in order. In virtually all of the textual and appendix tables relating to Part II, the author has failed to provide summary or total figures appropriate to the statistical universe that the tables describe in terms of various categories. This lack of tabular tidiness is not uniformly unfortunate, but occasionally does make the data difficult to interpret.

WILBERT E. MOORE

Princeton University

JONES, LAWRENCE A., and DAVID DURAND. *Mortgage Lending Experience in Agriculture*. Pp. xxii, 248. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. \$5.00.

This study is the result of co-operation between the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture. It is a well documented readable account of mortgage lend-

ing experience for farms in the United States with emphasis on the period between World Wars I and II, although the introduction briefly summarizes appropriate data since 1800 through 1953.

The authors have no axe to grind or thesis to prove. They let the forty-nine tables and thirty-nine charts tell the story with careful analysis pointing out the limitations of each set of data. The volume is especially valuable to those responsible for the investment policies of banks and life insurance companies.

However, the book will interest the thoughtful general reader who often wonders whether to be annoyed at pressure groups in Congress who may be making it possible for even inefficient farmers to get rich, or whether to remind himself that food at stable prices is the most vital single need of all human beings, not only farmers. Part I covers farm mortgage distress by areas and gives state data so that each reader may see how his state compares with others. Part II covers farm mortgage distress by individual farm organization. The conclusions are, as would be expected, that farm mortgage distress is due to many causes—each carefully analyzed. The stepped-up agricultural production during the two world wars of course set the stage for trouble, but many contributing factors added to the distress.

One complication which is a characteristic of American agriculture is the fact that real estate speculation has been tied in with farming. Farm land has been purchased not with an eye on its productivity, but with the expectation that price per acre would rise along with the general price level. In addition the decentralization of metropolitan areas has created the "farm" which is primarily a residence and whose value does not lie in its productivity.

The reader puts down the book with increased respect for the complexity of the problems faced by the farmer and his financial backers who have to forecast long range price levels, and allow for the hazards created by nature in weather and pests as well as man-made hazards such as technological changes.

NAOMI RICHES

Social Security Administration

JENSEN, VERNON H. *Nonferrous Metals Industry Unionism, 1932-1954: A Story of Leadership Controversy*. (New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell Studies in Industrial and Labor Relations, No. 5.) Pp. xv, 328. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1954. \$4.00.

To those who have read Professor Jensen's *Heritage of Conflict*, the present volume continues and brings up to date part of the story of the earlier work—that of the union itself, and touches only incidentally on labor-management relations. For those who are unfamiliar with *Heritage of Conflict*, the new volume stands as a self-contained piece of writing. For here is the story of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, descendant of the Western Federation of Miners, a union of militant workers, proud of their democratic ways and faced nearly always with bitter employer opposition, rising from the ashes of depression only to succumb to an unwanted Communist domination. Carefully, and step-by-step, Professor Jensen shows how the machinery of democracy is captured and manipulated by a small minority. Playing on the vanity of some leaders, and on the fears and ambitions of others, the disciplined single-purposed minority slowly and surely, and despite temporary setbacks, takes over the lines of communication between member and union, brings in seemingly innocent outsiders to fill key staff positions, and soon the simple unionists find themselves enmeshed in a web. Physically and mentally they are surrounded by a group which meets with Communist party functionaries to take orders and plan strategy. And when the Executive Board meets, the unionists find not discussion and persuasion ahead of them, but a solid pre-determined front already under orders on every matter.

The awakening is not only rude, but too late. The unionists are neither united nor disciplined. The whole official machinery of the union is thrown against them. By now the Communist officials are *the* union, and the fight in which the anti-Communists need help from the Congress of Industrial Organizations and other unions is hampered by all the niceties of inter-union courtesy,

consideration of international autonomy, and so forth. Secession seems to be the solution, but secession to a variety of other CIO unions still keeps the anti-Communist hard rock miners separated, and leaves MMSW even more firmly in the captor's hands. And it is here that Professor Jensen scores the failure of the CIO. It is notable that the only real success of the CIO in fighting the expelled unions has been in the electrical field where money and men went into a new and separate union—the International Union of Electrical Workers—and where local leadership was utilized effectively. By contrast, the attempts in the non-ferrous metals field have been little more than a series of fumbles.

There is, of course, much more to the story, as Professor Jensen elucidates. Paradoxically, but as others have also pointed out, the long employer tradition of crying "Red" at every militant unionist has inured the MMSW members to the point where the accusation is taken as meaningless. And now, as Jensen also points out, the employers prefer the MMSW to a much better heeled and stronger union such as the Steelworkers.

This is a fascinating account, necessarily in detail, for it was by attention to many seemingly unimportant details that the web was spun. And when the victims began to struggle, it became clear how well the Party had done its job.

HERBERT J. LAHNE

Washington, D. C.

DEARING, CHARLES L. *Industrial Pensions*. Pp. x, 310. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1954. \$3.75.

The persistent quest for economic security in old age is nowhere more clearly manifested than in the industrial pension movement of which the present volume is an up-to-date description and analysis.

The author's purposes are clear. He seeks, first, to appraise the industrial pension method of providing money income for retired workers as (1) a means of solving the problem of old-age security, (2) a method of supplementing federal social security benefits for those covered by that program, and (3) a minimum guarantee of income for the workers involved.

A second principal purpose is to measure the financial impact of such pension programs both on industry and on the economy in general. The final purpose is to weigh critically the basic economic and social issues that emerge from the industrial pension movement.

Within the framework of these major objectives, the first three chapters review the economic and social problems characteristic of an aging population and the traditional distribution of responsibility for solving these problems. The following three chapters analyze the principal factors and forces responsible for the accelerated growth of the industrial pension movement in recent years, describe the structure and functioning of pension plans, and project estimates of the number of industrial workers who may eventually be covered under such a program and the amount of money required annually to support the program. The balance of the study comprises a presentation and evaluation of the basic economic and social issues which may emerge if the industrial pension program develops as indicated in the author's analysis.

Through carefully reasoned analysis, amply supported by statistical data and other quantitative evidence, the author presents the inescapable economic burden which is rapidly issuing from an increasingly large aged population produced by increasing longevity, the inadequacies of a non-contributory pension system, the deficiencies of all plans which contain no vestment of rights for the workers and only insufficient financial protection for the corporations involved, and the urgent need for a reappraisal of the whole industrial pension system in relation to the federal security program. The author's findings indicate with unmistakable clarity that the primary responsibility for the provision of old-age security is a joint responsibility of government and the individual, but that in the development of old-age income industrial management has a major role to play.

This study is a worthy representative of the high quality of research which we have come to expect from the Brookings Institution. Moreover, it is the best addition to the literature of industrial pensions that has appeared in a very long time. The

data have been carefully collected, the analysis of facts and points of view is scholarly and brilliant, and the conclusions are drawn with admirable frankness and objectivity. This is a volume which should be read carefully and thoughtfully by labor leaders, representatives of management, legislators concerned with the solution of the old-age security problem, labor economists, and the interested citizen who seeks reliable enlightenment on one of the nation's most difficult and perplexing problems.

GORDON S. WATKINS

University of California
Riverside Campus

TAYLOR, HENRY C., and ANNE DEWEES TAYLOR. *The Story of Agricultural Economics in the United States, 1840-1932*. Pp. xxvi, 1121. Ames: The Iowa State College Press, 1952. \$10.00.

The Story of Agricultural Economics in the United States, 1840-1932, written by Dr. Henry C. and Anne D. Taylor, is a signal service to the agricultural economics profession. Much of the historical background pertaining to men and their contributions would be lost to younger men in the profession except for this type of treatise prepared by one closely identified with the field during its early history. The book represents a patient, painstaking search of historical documents to trace out the sequence of events and contributions that entered into the shaping of ideas, theories, and trends in teaching and research pertaining to agricultural economics.

Only persons who have been closely associated with the pioneers in the agricultural economics field and who have the historical approach which is well represented in the combined effort of the Taylors can give glimpses of the interplay of personalities and events in past generations. This is particularly true of Parts I and II which the student of current problems would not find time to discover for himself.

Part III devoted to an "Economic Analysis of Farm Management Problems," including choice of a farm, choice of farm enterprises, intensity of culture, size of farms, variations in production factors, and the national viewpoint, while reflecting the

historical approach probably gives a closer view to the things that Taylor, the teacher, considered of major importance.

In treatment and scope, parts IV and VIII reflect the Taylor concept of the field of agricultural economics which took form when he became the head of the agricultural economics work of the United States Department of Agriculture in the Office of Farm Management in 1919 and especially after all agricultural economics work was co-ordinated into the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in July 1921.

The contribution of Norman J. Wall in Part VIII, on "Farm Finance" covering the same period of time, is well done. Some of the other more recent history presented by the Taylors hardly lends itself to the same detailed treatment as that found in the earlier chapters of the book, merely because the work in individual states was becoming too far flung to be treated in the same detail; nor can points of view of individuals be as intimately treated as in the days of a few leaders of independent lines of work.

The Taylors have done a good historical study. Agricultural economics is a difficult field to discuss in a detached way and particularly since the senior author was closely identified with controversial points of view in a period when these views needed to be harmonized in order to weld the disassociated parts into an orderly arrangement identified as agricultural economics. Some readers will consider that there are some omissions which participants from other vantage points would have given emphasis. Also, even a 1,100-page book must omit some matters of historical interest, and the author must select those he considered most important.

The Taylors chose a good stopping point, 1932. It would be interesting, however, while facts can readily be obtained, for someone to prepare the agricultural economic history following that date. Present day federal administrators might well consider some of the historical background that gives reason to the specific co-ordination of agricultural research work in the period 1922-32.

H. C. M. CASE

University of Illinois

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

BERGER, MONROE, THEODORE ABEL, and CHARLES H. PAGE (Eds.). *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*. (Van Nostrand Series in Sociology.) Pp. 326. New York: Van Nostrand and Company, 1954. \$6.00 trade; \$4.50 text.

Freedom and Control in Modern Society, edited by Monroe Berger, Theodore Abel and Charles H. Page, is a collection of fourteen original essays written in honor of Robert Morrison MacIver, Francis Leiber Professor Emeritus of Political Philosophy and Sociology, Columbia University, by his colleagues and former students.

The tribute is well justified by Professor MacIver's distinguished contributions to political and social thought. David Spitz examines Professor MacIver's political philosophy and presents an incisive critique of his theory of political obligation, while, in a separate essay, Harry Alpert examines and evaluates his sociological contributions.

The twelve other essays explore important areas of political and social thought but have no direct reference to the work of Professor MacIver. Perhaps the most rewarding of these is "The Internationalization of Social Controls" by Gardner Murphy of the Menninger Foundation. Professor Murphy presents impressive experimental evidence concerning the effect of social situations upon the individual process of perception.

In a joint essay on "Friendship as a Social Process," Paul Lazarsfeld makes a methodologically formal analysis of Robert Merton's substantive examination. Whatever its ultimate merit, I cannot help feeling that the formalization did not justify the authors' present belief in its effectiveness.

Robert Bierstadt's paper on "The Problem of Authority" seems to encounter semantic difficulties. However, Milton Gordon of Haverford College presents an interesting paper on the role of the subculture in modern society and its relationship to alternate goal possibilities, while Florian Znaniecki gives a lucid account of the motivation of social groups. Nathan Glazer makes a contribution to the under-

standing of the social role of ethnic groups in society.

Seymour Lipset presents a provocative account of the political process in trade unions and J. M. Clark of Columbia presents us with a distinguished discussion of the relationship between the economic and political processes which undermine the old wives' tale that the economic system functions according to iron laws which are or can be independent of politics. Kingsley Davis employs the science of demography in a survey of national power.

Thomas I. Cook and George Catlin provide discursive observations on the subjects of political values and political science.

It is not possible to give an illuminating account of so large a project in so brief a review. The editors state that the contributions were aimed at the general reader, the student, and the professional social scientist and they hope that it will also prove useful for classroom purposes. It would have been impossible to satisfy these divergent criteria with equal success, although the authors have made a reasonably successful attempt. The quality of the contributions is uneven and several of the essays are not up to the high standards of the others. The book may not be too useful as a text, but several of the articles should be excellent for classroom purposes. However, with a few exceptions, the specialist will have little new to learn from the volume.

MORTON A. KAPLAN

Haverford College

ROSE, ARNOLD M. *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences*. Pp. xii, 351. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954. \$5.00.

As the author admits, the title of this book misrepresents its contents. In it Dr. Rose, who is professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota, has collected twenty-two essays addressed to a variety of theoretical, methodological and technical issues in social science research, particularly within the fields of sociology and social psychology. Thus, although there are linkages between the individual chapters, the treatment is neither systematic nor comprehensive. Rather, the intent is primarily

to "encourage research in sociology along certain neglected channels and with certain relatively neglected research tools" (p. v).

In Dr. Rose's view, much current sociological research is unduly trammled by a narrow preoccupation with methodology at the expense of research oriented to practical problems of contemporary social importance. Moreover, the present emphasis on technical rigor and objectivity has led, the author feels, to the comparative neglect of nonquantitative methods such as are exemplified in history, case studies, and functional and logical analysis, to the distrust of personal observations, and to the unwarranted aloofness of the researcher from the social phenomena he would scrutinize. Proponents of a similar position will find in these pages numerous arguments to buttress their views; opponents will find therein an unequivocal statement of a widely held orientation to social research against which they may tilt their lances.

Thirteen of the papers are based on previously published articles, the majority in familiar journals, but most of them have been extensively revised for the present book. One of these, "Problems in the Sociology of Law and Law Enforcement," originally printed in 1953 in a more recent periodical, the *Journal of Legal Education*, is of especial interest in the light of a budding rapprochement between law and the more traditional social science disciplines.

Of the hitherto unpublished papers, two are particularly noteworthy. The first, "A Theory of Social Organization and Disorganization," which won the 1952 prize awarded by the American Association for the Advancement of Science for an essay on social theory, attempts to articulate a theory drawn from work in the tradition of such scholars as Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, Cooley, Sumner and the Chicago sociologists. In skeleton form, the theory, from which Professor Rose derives sixteen hypotheses for research, states (1) that social organization depends upon the persistence of internalized meanings and values in a society on the basis of which its members can accurately predict one another's behavior, and (2) that social disorganiza-

tion occurs "when a significant proportion of meanings and values are no longer sufficiently internalized to guide the behavior of a significant proportion of the individuals still in physical contact with one another" (p. 12). The second is a long paper on voluntary associations in France, prepared while the author was a Fulbright research scholar in that country, in which an historical-legal approach is convincingly employed.

JOSEPH B. CASAGRANDE
Social Science Research Council
Washington, D. C.

LOGAN, RAYFORD W. *The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877-1901*. Pp. x, 380. New York: The Dial Press, 1954. \$5.00.

The Negro, a minority in the U. S., has shaped the character of American life profoundly, even though his influence has been indirect and often negative. He has divided political parties. He has split the Protestant churches into factions. He is the reason for countless laws, and three amendments to the Constitution. But perhaps most important, he is indeed the cause of sectionalism, a development which reached a crisis with the Civil War and had violent overtones in every decade since.

Rayford W. Logan, a professor of history at Howard University, undoubtedly had this in mind when he wrote this well-documented and lucid history of the period 1877 to 1901, described inaccurately as "The Reconstruction Period." He speaks of the period as "The Nadir." For much was done during those tragic days, which must be now undone to enable the Negro to enjoy the privileges of full citizenship and justify the nation's great democratic promise. The fact is, a wide understanding of the period would give perspective to the present, and even indeed indicate what is possible in the future.

Thus, Mr. Logan's book is a first-rate instrument for gaining insights into the era, as well as the forces that were at work. Not since *Black Reconstruction* by W. E. B. DuBois, has a more comprehensive analysis of the Negro in the period been made. But where Mr. DuBois laid

his emphasis upon the economic factors working to bring about a decline in the Negro's social status, Mr. Logan has stressed the political aspects, thus lighting up a whole new area.

He has meticulously explored the Congressional Record, the messages and papers of the presidents, and the platforms of the two major political parties. Even more revealing, perhaps, are his direct quotations from some of the most representative newspapers and literary publications of the day, both North and South. He found them "shocking," particularly those published in the North where it is presumed racial prejudice is less violently articulate.

But Mr. Logan is no crepe hanger. He concedes that Negroes have made notable progress toward first-class citizenship, so much so that he believes it should even encourage the faint-hearted. But it is clear that he is not an admirer of Booker T. Washington, who advocated a policy of gradualism. And he subjects his position to searching inquiry.

He comes to the conclusion, though Washington received national acclaim for his "Atlanta Compromise Speech" in 1895, that actually the Negro leader renounced "social equality" and political participation by the Negro, and even offered Negroes to industry as strike breakers. His analysis of the southern newspapers immediately before and after Washington's famous address brings him to the conclusion that they do not entirely justify Washington's assertion that the southern white man was the Negro's best friend.

Mr. Logan, a disciplined and industrious historian, has performed a distinct service in filling a gap in the story of Negroes in the U. S.

ROI OTTLEY

Chicago, Illinois

SAENGER, GERHART. *The Social Psychology of Prejudice*. Pp. xv, 304. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. \$4.00.

Written primarily as a guide for those interested in improving racial and ethnic relations, Professor Saenger's book succeeds in achieving its purpose. Many of its most recent findings of sociological, social psychological, and anthropological re-

search are brought together in convenient and readable form in this relatively brief treatment of prejudice and discrimination. Less technical and less comprehensive than G. W. Allport's recent work, *The Nature of Prejudice*, it is exceedingly valuable for the audience to which it is addressed.

Saenger discusses the nature, extent, and costs of prejudice in American society, the determinants of prejudice, and the principles and techniques of reducing prejudice and combating discrimination. Current scientific viewpoints on races as biological groups, race mixture, alleged racial superiorities and inferiorities, differences in emotionality and other personality characteristics according to ethnic origin, are reviewed and appraised. Saenger's excellent discussion of social perception drives home the effects of stereotypes held about Negroes, Jews, and other minorities.

The author of this book recommends concentrating the attack on discrimination in areas of life where there is least resistance, and, where several possibilities are open, using the approach "most likely to have the most far reaching consequences." Merton's suggestion that strategies might be varied according to the types of persons addressed, and Lillian Smith's recommendations for action in terms of the kinds of individuals who are interested in attempting to reduce prejudice and discrimination, are not mentioned. Thoughtful sections on propaganda, re-education, contacts, self-surveys, integration in industry, and the legal approach—including the effectiveness and the shortcomings of existing laws—constitute important parts of this book.

The scientific studies of prejudice and discrimination have multiplied in recent years, and research techniques have improved greatly. In reading a book like Saenger's, the conclusion can hardly be avoided that our understanding of ethnic relations is considerably greater than it was twenty years ago. Also, despite some critical situations, especially in the field of housing, it appears that the over-all situation in racial and ethnic relations in the United States shows a great deal of improvement in the middle fifties as compared with the middle thirties. The be-

havioral sciences have already begun to have a practical impact, but, as Professor Klineberg points out in the Introduction, much remains to be done before the United States lives up to its democratic ideology.

GEORGE E. SIMPSON

Oberlin College

ROSENBERG, STUART E. *The Jewish Community in Rochester, 1843-1925*. Pp. xv, 325. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. \$4.50.

The year 1954 marks the tercentenary of Jewish settlement in North America. Though the publication of this volume was not necessarily planned for this year, the date enhances its significance. The facts it marshals and the story it tells add up to further proof that Jewish life on this continent has been far from static, but that, on the contrary, a new type of Jew has come into being as well as a new form of Jewish community living.

The Rochester Jewish community is, of course, neither the largest nor the most important in the United States. Its beginnings go back to only 1843, when a certain Myer Greentree (could his name have been Gruenbaum?) removed his peddler's pack and chose Rochester as his permanent home. Yet, in this brief time this comparatively small Jewish group has built religious, social and educational institutions, contributed its share to local and even international philanthropies, and in general made its influence for good felt in the wider community. Its sons and daughters have Americanized themselves, not only in language, but also in thought, habit, interests and sympathies. Dr. Rosenberg has labored assiduously to trace the steps by which the transformation has been achieved. But spiritual transformations do not lend themselves to factual documentation. Perhaps the second volume of his history, which will carry the story of the community from 1925 to the year of its eventual publication, will offer statistics or find some other means of showing how the existing situation has evolved and what the changes have meant in terms of gain or loss to Jewish religious tradition and personality.

In those areas of life to which Dr.

Rosenberg devotes most attention, he is eminently successful. In the economic sphere the Jews of Rochester have played a role of importance to the entire country; they built up the clothing industry of Rochester as well as its obverse, the labor unions. Dr. Rosenberg also describes the painful accompaniments of the process. The latter were the more unpleasant in that they emphasized the social breach between the two parts of the Jewish community: that of German origin and that of the later arrivals from Eastern Europe. This socioethnic division is the scarlet thread that runs through the entire story. The religious history of the Rochester community was especially affected by it. Not that division between Reform and Orthodox, and later also Conservative was peculiar to Rochester; but in the earlier days an intensity about the religious cleavage seems to have manifested itself there which may have grown out of economic hostility in addition to the purely theological differences. This in turn affected community life, each group building institutions of its own, social and philanthropic as well as religious.

In time the misunderstandings were overcome, the people learned to live with one another, and a community spirit emerged out of the common Americanism within which the second and third generations grew up. This is the interesting, encouraging, and promising story of the book. It is also the point which Professor Salo W. Baron makes in his brief preface to the volume. This is why the Jewish community of Rochester may serve as an illustration of what has taken place in every town and city where Jews settled during their first three hundred years in America.

SOLOMON GRAYZEL

Philadelphia, Pa.

FRIEDMANN, EUGENE A., and ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST with others. *The Meaning of Work and Retirement*. Pp. vii, 197. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. \$3.75.

Encouragement of public and private annuity and pension systems for all older workers acquired the status of a national policy about twenty years ago. The basis

lay in recognition of the hazards leading to unemployment in old age and in the conviction that a surplus of workers made it desirable to move the older ones out of the labor force in favor of youth and of those with family responsibilities. Underlying the whole matter was the convenient and common belief that, for most persons, work meant nothing more than a means of earning a living.

During the past decade, however, studies of old-age and survivors insurance beneficiaries and of several other groups have shown that there is considerable reluctance to retire, and that many retirees are poorly adjusted, even when retirement income is sufficient to provide reasonable security. These exploratory studies have led to the development of hypotheses regarding broader meanings of work, and of the importance of satisfying these meanings in other ways if workers are to accept retirement.

The Committee on Human Development at the University of Chicago was among the first to develop these hypotheses. A Committee for the Study of Later Maturity, consisting of Ernest W. Burgess, Robert J. Havighurst, and Ethel Shanas, supported with funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, initiated a series of studies related to work and adjustment in the later years. *The Meaning of Work and Retirement* is the first comprehensive presentation of objective data on this subject.

Central to the report are chapters dealing with the meanings of their jobs to samples of workers in five occupations: steelmaking, coal mining, printing, retail selling, and private medical practice. Preceding these analyses, a frame of reference is developed in terms of the function of work in American culture and the corresponding significance or meaning to the individual. In addition to income, work provides a means of expending time and energy, affords identification and status in the group, brings one into association with others, and gives purpose to the life experience.

The studies yield several important conclusions: the job does, indeed, have these additional meanings; there are variations among occupations; variations are still greater among individuals within occupa-

tions; and attitudes toward retirement vary significantly among occupations and individuals. Among occupations, there appears to be a clear progression to desire to continue at work and the variety of meanings attached to the job, even when retirement is assured.

This study, together with those of Hall and Lorge and Tuckman, should put an end to some of the generalizations freely made about work and retirement. Hopefully, it should lead to the focus of more attention on finding new sources of satisfaction for the years in the postwork period. For, as Havighurst suggests, we may be shifting to an economy of consumption in which not all who can earn are needed as workers, and we may find other activities that yield even greater satisfaction than work in the later years.

CLARK TIBBITTS

U. S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare

HOWELL, TREVOR H. *Our Advancing Years: An Essay on Modern Problems of Old Age*. Pp. 192. London: Phoenix House, 1953; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$3.50.

Dr. Trevor Howell has called his latest book on Gerontology "an essay on modern problems of old age." This is too modest a title for such a broad and enlightened study, which is both practical in its application and full of insight into the problems discussed.

As Dr. Howell states in the Preface, his viewpoint is that of a physician whose daily professional work lies mainly among the aged and chronic sick, and he has written this book to draw attention to the problems of old age and to make certain recommendations for the solution of some of these problems.

In his first chapter emphasis is laid on the waste of the productive capabilities of men and women retiring at the traditional ages of sixty-five and sixty, and an appeal is made for a reexamination of the whole question of retirement and the capabilities of the older generation. The importance of a correct assessment is not confined to the older generation but affects the community as a whole, if the burden of main-

taining the elderly people is not to become intolerable for the working age group. "In fact," he says, "the continued productive activity of older workers will act as a financial safety valve to the country. Otherwise we shall be unable to afford the money needed to provide the pensions which should be paid to elderly people."

Money, however, is not enough and Dr. Howell stresses the importance of adequate housing and of practical services to enable older people to remain independent. Among these services emphasis is particularly laid on the work of the district nurse, the home help and the need for more laundry services to relieve old folks at home of the weekly wash.

One of the interesting characteristics of social work in the United Kingdom is the multiplicity of agencies which concern themselves with social problems; this is especially the case with the welfare of old people. A great merit of this book is that it gives a complete and accurate picture of the voluntary societies (private agencies), both social and medical, which are concerned with old people and pays tribute to the co-ordination of these services by the National Old People's Welfare Committee. It should just be noted that the figures for the latter are rather out of date as there are now well over 1,000 branches.

When Dr. Howell comes to trace the development of the old Public Assistance Institution into the modern home for the old, he speaks with considerable personal experience. Particularly interesting is his account of his work at The Royal Hospital, the home of the famous "Chelsea Pensioners," originally founded by Charles II in 1682, which provides for 500 pensioned soldiers right in the heart of London.

The last part of the book traces the story of Geriatrics and again here his story becomes alive as he names and describes the work of some of his pioneer colleagues. While the medical section of his story will be of great practical value to other doctors working in this field, it is also of absorbing interest to the layman interested in the welfare of the older generation, and to the individual facing old age.

Throughout, practical advice is given about hazards to be avoided "as we slip

into the smaller life of the older man," and an unusual and erudite history of old age provides us with something approaching a philosophy.

Dr. Howell has written a book of real value full of sensitive understanding of the attitudes and wishes of old people. A visit to one of his wards is an exciting and stimulating experience as the reviewer knows, and we should be grateful that Dr. Howell has found time to pass on some of this excitement to those who read *Our Advancing Years*.

DOROTHEA RAMSEY

Cumberland, England

McGraw, PEG, and WALTER McGRAW. *Assignment: Prison Riots*. Pp. xii, 270. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954. \$3.95.

During the last two or three years there has been an epidemic of prison riots without precedent in American penal history—over forty of them altogether.

This upsurge of violence brought no surprise to veteran penologists. The conventional prison system keeps the convicts on the verge of rebellion at all times. Any considerable increase in the tensions of prison life brings actual rioting. Conditions which inevitably produce greater tensions have been general in prison experience all over the country since the end of the war.

Prisoners were rather fully employed during the later years of the war, but prison industry has gone into a slump since hostilities ceased. This has meant loss of work for prisoners and the resulting demoralizing idleness. Appropriations for prison service have remained static or have been reduced while costs have skyrocketed as the result of inflationary trends. This has meant poorer food, inferior service, and a lower type of custodial force.

Hence, it is no wonder that we have been treated to a rash of riots. These will continue until economic conditions within prisons are improved and, along with this, better and more humane living conditions are provided.

It was natural that the spectacle of widespread prison rioting would produce a good

book dealing with the situation. The volume by Mr. and Mrs. McGraw has been the answer and it serves the need very well indeed. It has a special appeal for a popular audience, and this is the only audience which requires a book to explain the morbid situation and to indicate possible remedies to bring about an amelioration.

The authors give evidence of a respectable knowledge of the essentials of enlightened penology. They did a great deal of hard work in assembling the material they present. They demonstrate a high order of repertorial ability. If much of the material they give us is sensational, it is always cogent and interesting. It invariably serves to drive home an important truth or principle. The public now possesses an adequate guide to prison riots and their possible remedies.

The authors show clearly enough that the real culprit is the repressive prison system which has changed only slightly in over a century. There is no rational place for this system in a civilized society except for the segregation of the small fraction of incorrigible and nonreformatable prisoners—not over thirty per cent of the convict population. Even in dealing with these, the system should be humane and self-supporting, while properly stressing custodial security.

The traditional prison system neither protects society nor reforms convicts. At least three-fourths of the dangerous criminals are at any given time roving about freely without either arrest or custodial restraint. If any convicts are reformed in the course of their prison experience, it is more likely to be the result of increasing maturity than of penal treatment. Crime and criminals are a medical, psychiatric, and social work responsibility in which the conventional prison has no rational role whatever.

It is regrettable that a book of such merit was printed without an index.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Cooperstown, N. Y.

DANDEKAR, V. M., and KUMUDINI DANDEKAR. *Survey of Fertility and Mortality in Poona District*. Pp. 191. Poona,

India: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1953. Rs. 5 or 7s. 6d.

One of a series of inquiries into population problems in India under the auspices of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, this study contains an analysis of survey data on births and deaths; knowledge and use of family planning and limitation; and attitudes toward reproduction. The material was derived from a sample of about 2,000 families located in Poona City and in five towns and thirty villages in the Poona District. Although, as the title indicates, information was obtained on mortality, the investigators' central problem was that of differential fertility.

Perhaps the most unique feature of the inquiry is the section concerned with family planning and limitation, although it suffers from the most serious methodological shortcomings. Some of the more interesting results of this part of the work are: the concern shown by males over the education of their sons and the general weight of responsibility felt by males for their children's welfare; the considerable proportions of the urban and rural samples of both sexes who expressed a desire for knowledge of birth control methods; the further substantial number of these who volunteered that they would adopt such methods immediately; and the low level of positive opposition to family planning expressed by the respondents. In addition, the incidence of sterilization (male and female) among the very small proportion of birth control users is striking.

Certain drawbacks of the study must, however, be mentioned. First, the family planning and limitation questions were not, in many cases, asked of matched husbands and wives. Given the subject matter of the interview, a far superior type of analysis is possible if this matching process is adhered to, especially as it does not add greatly to field problems. Second, there are, in this reviewer's opinion, too many respondents who refused to answer the knowledge-and-use questions because they claimed these questions did not concern them—either because they had no children, were too old, or for similar reasons. The investigators accept these refusals as "understandable" in view of the reasons given.

The refusals are somewhat "understandable" in regard to the questions on use of birth control, but are inadmissible in regard to knowledge of family limitation practices. Over a quarter of the males, rural and urban, and well over a quarter of the urban females did not answer the knowledge questions because they considered them irrelevant. Two further criticisms, perhaps minor, concern the presentation of the tables and the general form of the analysis. It is often very difficult, if not impossible, to relate the figures in the tables to those in the text. This problem is particularly evident in regard to the no-answer and not-concerned categories. In addition, there is a lack of both conceptual focus and selectivity in the analysis; the reader is confronted by a somewhat dreary rendition of the results of the "next question" in paragraph after paragraph.

In spite of the above criticisms, it must be remembered that studies of this type are relatively new to the field of population and can, therefore, be counted on not only for their share of errors but for much valuable information not obtainable in any other way.

JUDITH BLAKE

Columbia University

MURRAY, CLYDE E., MARX G. BOWENS, and RUSSELL HOGREFE (Eds.). *Group Work in Community Life*. Pp. x, 245. New York: Association Press, 1954. \$4.75.

Here reported are a series of interesting and annotated experiences questionably termed "group work experiments," all developed to meet specific community need and not confined to the usual building operations. Learnings for group work practice are summarized and analyzed briefly.

This book seems to express a sort of yearning for what might be characterized in the universe of social work as a general practitioner unshackled either by the chains of agency setting or by narrow specialization, but dedicated to helping people meet those priorities of social welfare need as may be determined by appropriate and responsible groups in light of local community subcultures and need. This calls for professional problemsolving competence

and statesmanship of the highest order. It is not here suggested that we should do away with specialization, but that it should follow a comprehensive social work education.

Group work almost always takes place in agency building facilities of one kind or another, but it is often disassociated from community life. Groups always consist of individuals, and communities always consist of groups as do neighborhoods. At least, so this reviewer contends. He also maintains that there is no such thing as group work method, nor casework method, nor intergroup work method as such. Generalized knowledge we believe may be classified as theoretical knowledge and as applied knowledge. In the realm of applied generalized knowledge are certain methods such as scientific method, interviewing method, group discussion method, project method and the like. All these are used as deliberate methods in various combinations and directed toward initiating, developing, sustaining and even terminating certain processes (social processes to be sure) dominated by a distinctive value system we identify as "social work philosophy." These particular processes we term social casework, social group work, and social intergroup work.

The methods employed are *not* unique to social work either singly or in combination, but the processes are because they embrace philosophy, methodology, and purposes of worker; responses of clientele; interaction between these two; and social agency function. The methods are employed by the disciplined professional worker, but the process developed is as much the creation of clientele as of the worker and therefore are different or may be different in every culture or subculture.

Social work discovered Freud some few years ago, but as yet has not really discovered social process with all of its implications and ramifications including the contributions of social psychology and social anthropology. It is hoped by this reviewer that it will be the next big social work discovery. To the extent that it is, then as day follows night, discourses on group work, group workers, and group work method will largely give way to discussions

of social work, social work methods, and the like.

In our opinion, there are no methods now utilized in group work not also utilized in casework and intergroup work as well. These methods are also employed in many other nonsocial work efforts as is a common core of basic theoretical knowledge. But the use of knowledge and methods made by social work practitioners is unique, *not* the methods.

This volume should be required reading for all social work educators, students, practitioners, and board members. It is interesting and provocative.

W. I. NEWSTETTER, DEAN

University of Pittsburgh

MCCORMICK, MARY J. *Diagnostic Casework in the Thomistic Pattern*. Pp. xii, 239. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. \$3.50.

Diagnostic Casework in the Thomistic Pattern is a real contribution to the literature on the theory and philosophy of social work. Dr. McCormick is to be congratulated for handling the subject with intellectual maturity and philosophical sophistication. It illustrates a point made by Hollis and Taylor in their well-known study of *Social Work Education in the United States* (Columbia University Press, 1951)—Catholic scholars have given special consideration to the philosophy of social work.

Dr. McCormick's study attempts to relate Thomistic philosophy to one of the methods of social work, social case work. Inasmuch as the basic theory of case work has been built almost exclusively upon Freudian psychology, she had to relate Freudianism (both as a philosophy and as a therapeutic system) to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The author was very skillful in selecting citations from the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas, various works of Sigmund Freud, and the statements of friendly commentators on these subjects. She did not consider Mortimer Adler's opinions on Freudianism; she merely quoted, on occasion, from his volume on *Art and Prudence, A Study in Practical Philosophy* (1937). She was not embarrassed by the critique of Freudianism written by the

Catholic psychologist Dr. Rudolph Allers (*The Successful Error: A Critical Study of Freudian Psychoanalysis* (1940)); she ignored it. She was not concerned with the brilliant work of Joseph Jastrow (*The House That Freud Built* (1932)) comparing psychoanalysis with the confessional; she did not mention it.

The result, from a literary point of view, is a production that in many places is as dull and uninspiring as a Doctor of Philosophy thesis. Fortunately this is not true of the entire book. In the chapters on "Diagnostic Method and the Habit of Prudence: Interpretation and Choice" and "The Perfection of Prudence" Dr. McCormick rises to heights that approach originality. Here she is concerned primarily with relating Thomas Aquinas' concept of prudence to case work, rather than in justifying Freudianism in the light of Thomistic philosophy. There is also an excellent appendix on "The Philosophical Basis of Functional Casework" wherein she deals with the Rankian concept of personality development in casework.

The book is recommended reading for all students of social work. Many of them will find it to be more meaningful for our time than the scientific humanism and economic dissenting of the interwar years. It is doubtful, however, if they will all be convinced that the mechanistic and instinctive psychology of Freud is wholly compatible with any Christian philosophy, Thomistic or otherwise.

ARTHUR P. MILES

University of Wisconsin.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

HOWLETT, DUNCAN. *Man Against the Church: The Struggle to Free Man's Religious Spirit*. Pp. viii, 247. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. \$3.50.

The theme of this book by the minister of the three-century old First Church in Boston is the contradiction between religion, which represents the highest and most noble of man's aspirations, and the church, which so often reflects the most base and ignoble of man's motivations.

Throughout the ages, says the author, religion has been leading man toward a nobler vision, a better day, a higher hope, and a fuller life. The church, on the other hand, has been worldly, obscurantist, arrogant and predatory.

What the church lacks, Dr. Howlett says, is integrity. Integrity is consistency between what it preached and what is practiced, and the church through the ages has had none or precious little of it. The church preaches honesty but practices duplicity; it preaches the laying up of treasures in heaven while it accumulates the treasure of the earth; it preaches humility but is full of pride and arrogance; it preaches peace and love but foments hatred and persecution against those who will not submit to its authority.

What, too, the church lacks is democracy. This is but an aspect of its lack of integrity. For it preaches the equality of all before God, yet is authoritarian, hierarchical and dominating. It preaches the priesthood of all believers but at the same time claims exclusive possession of the keys to the kingdom. It suppresses all independent expression within it and casts out the doubters and the questioners. It equates itself with God by condemning as atheists all who challenge its dogma and question its letter of authority from God.

Moreover, this lack of integrity in churches is congenital and ineradicable. Whenever men of religion and integrity within a church, after a vain effort to purify it, separate themselves and establish a new church purged of the evils of the predecessor, it is only a matter of time before the new church acts like all ill bred churches and behaves with duplicity and arrogance.

In view of this sorry state of affairs, it would seem that the only solution is the elimination of churches. Man in the state of religion is noble; only the church corrupts. Hence logic would seem to require that the church be gotten rid of. Dr. Howlett, however, stops short of the logical conclusion. Anarchy in the religious society is as undesirable as it is in the secular world. We need a church no less than we need a state. Authoritarianism is bad; but authority is needed and is good.

The solution, says Dr. Howlett, is not the elimination of the church but the establishment of a church of democracy and integrity. It is a church which churches best because it churches least. It is a church wherein the goal, not the starting point, is truth; where every man is a prophet and in equal communion with God. It is a church where practice is in harmony with precept and where what is taught and what is done are identical. It is a church with religion but without creed or dogma. If this church happens to bear a striking resemblance to what the Unitarian Church is or would like to be, the fact that Dr. Howlett is Minister of the mother church of Unitarianism in America is perhaps only coincidental.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. I have found this an absorbing book, written out of deep conviction by a person of integrity—in the generally accepted sense of the word as well as in the sense used by the author. The indictment rings true; the problem presented is real and disturbing. My quarrel is only with the author's conclusion. Essentially, his solution amounts to little more than an admonition to the churches to do good and eschew evil. The churches have been getting that at least since Amos and Isaiah. But perhaps a little more won't hurt.

LEO PFEFFER

American Jewish Congress

OXNAM, G. BROMLEY. *I Protest*. Pp. 186. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$2.50.

On July 21 1953, G. Bromley Oxnam, Bishop of the Methodist Church, and a symbol of militant, progressive elements within Protestantism, entered into public combat with the House Committee on Un-American Activities. After a gruelling ten-hour session, the articulate cleric was widely acclaimed the victor. Already several contemporary prophets have suggested that history will judge the "Oxnam hearing" as the turning point in the continuous battle of this generation against wholesale character assassination through the application of indiscriminate labels.

In *I Protest*, the Bishop presents an absorbing, informative, and compact sum-

mary of his encounter; gives further evidence of his own integrity; and shows the shameful incompetence of the Velde Committee. Verbatim extracts from the hearing, interspersed with interesting commentaries, comprise the major part of the book. The Bishop organizes these data around eight specific protestations, beginning with an acrid denunciation of the use of the House floor to broadcast falsehoods under the protection of congressional immunity. In this connection, he singles out Representative Donald L. Jackson's crass accusation that Oxnam "served God on Sunday and the Communist front for the balance of the week"—a charge that led the Bishop to demand a public hearing to clear his name. In characteristic fashion, the author does not mince his words in dealing with Jackson; he flays the California Republican as "a smooth talking, superficial opportunist."

The Methodist prelate condemns many other undemocratic and unethical practices as well. He gives abundant testimony to the Velde Committee's ignorance and inefficiency, its "Big Bully" attitude, and its frantic efforts to manufacture headlines. He castigates its practice of releasing, under its letterhead, unverified and incomplete material which is frequently inaccurate and usually misleading. He points out a fact generally unknown to the public: that the Committee obtained much of its "information" on alleged subversion among the clergy from the American Council of Christian Churches, a fancy title shielding a tiny group of self-styled "Bible Believers" led by a deposed preacher.

I Protest is a small book and it does not pretend to analyze adequately many of the broader issues which it raises. Bishop Oxnam is not only objecting to the treatment he received at the hands of the Velde Committee; he is speaking out against the whole spectacle of irresponsible red hunting today. He freely acknowledges that there is a "rightful and necessary place" for congressional inquiries, and he is fully aware that the Communist party is a conspiracy and that conspirators "ought to be discovered, tried in due process, and, if found guilty, punished." He objects to unfair procedure, however, and to reliance

upon the professional informer, described by Oxnam as "a man of the shadows, born of fear and contributing to it . . . a creature of the police state, and alien and malignant growth."

Like millions of other citizens, the Bishop fears for the future of America's unique experiment with democracy. *I Protest* serves to arouse the complacent and to give new hope and inspiration to those who share the author's concern. Perhaps it will prove to be one of the most significant tracts of our generation. Certainly, every serious student of current trends will find it indispensable to his understanding of our age.

RALPH L. ROY

Union Theological Seminary

BRADSHAW, MARION J. *Free Churches and Christian Unity: A Critical View of the Ecumenical Movement and the World Council of Churches*. Pp. xiv, 225. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. \$3.50.

It is surprising that such a book should not have appeared before this since the traditional position of all congregationally governed churches is opposition to "man made creeds" and any overhead control. These, the so-called "free churches," are the Congregationalists, the Baptists and the Disciples, to name only the largest and most influential. Besides these large bodies there are numerous small sects, many of them of recent origin, that are also congregational in their form of church government, and none of which have had any part or interest in the ecumenical movement. The Congregationalists, the Northern Baptists, and the Disciples have been active participants in church union movements, but the great Southern Baptist denomination has had no part in it.

The author of this able criticism of the ecumenical movement has been for many years a member of the faculty of Bangor Theological Seminary. He was ordained as a Christian or Disciple Minister and for thirty years has been a Congregationalist. Thoroughly ecumenical in his personal relationships, he has come to think that the ecumenical leaders in his own communion are finding centralizing tendencies irresistible and are willing that all Congregational churches be destroyed in the interest

of one world-wide church. He quotes a distinguished professor of ecumenical Christianity as stating that there can be no question, whatever, but that the ultimate goal of the ecumenical movement is a complete, organic union of the various branches of the existing churches of Christ throughout the world. In a chapter entitled "Is the World Council Totalitarian?" he quotes the General Secretary, Dr. W. A. Visser't Hooft, at length to show that from his utterances the Council is definitely tending in that direction, a conclusion which to this reviewer seems unjustified.

The author notes the common tendency to exaggerate the value of unity. Quoting William E. Barton in the heading of Chapter Five "Let us stop wailing about our divisions and emphasize our unity. . . . Whatever unity the Church possessed in . . . the Apostolic Age . . . was unity of the Spirit, manifest through widely differing modes of organization." The author fears that great unity movements will almost invariably take on a theological basis which will exclude or compromise honest liberals, and that other things may become more important than unity.

It is safe to say that none of the ecumenical leaders are thinking in terms of creating an organic union of the World Council of Churches. If some of them have said things which when taken out of context seem to indicate otherwise, it undoubtedly needs correction, and the author of this book has done well to bring such statements into the open.

In closing, it may be appropriate to call the author's attention to the fact that the Congregational Church was established by law in the three New England colonies and was the only American Church that ever exacted the death penalty for heresy.

WILLIAM W. SWEET

Dallas, Texas

SHUSTER, GEORGE N. *Religion Behind the Iron Curtain*. Pp. xxi, 281. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$4.00.

Dr. Shuster's scholarly book consists of a series of narratives about the religious or, more exactly, antireligious effects of the overflow of Communism into the area of the satellites, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic

states which technically form part of the Soviet Union. Each story is preceded by a clear and concise description of the social and religious situation of the country prior to its "liberation" by Soviet armies. Of course, the author analyzes the measures taken by the new rulers to curb religion. They have been somewhat different in the various countries, depending on the religious composition of the population and the peculiarities of the national culture. However, all could be explained (though the author does not do that) as a rational application to a newly conquered area of the experience accumulated in Russia prior to the Second World War, and to the turn from direct persecution to the somewhat milder, but probably more effective, practices of our day. Of course, the author also tells, in well chosen instances, the story of the resistance of the believers, in the beginning fiery, but later on concentrating on efforts to preserve for religion whatever could be preserved; this second phase seems to have coincided with the spread of the conviction that the Western powers would not intercede in favor of the peoples of the satellites. And, of course, the author does not conceal the many cases of subservience, servility, even treason which he explains in terms of the general climate of hopelessness now prevailing in the part of the world studied by him.

Time and again, Dr. Shuster asks the question, "how could such a catastrophe happen? The proximate cause is obvious; this was the inability of the western powers to establish themselves in positions of strength in Central Europe. He looks however for a deeper cause and finds it in the failure of the victors of the First World War to preserve Austria-Hungary in the form of a federation.

The conclusions of the author are rather pessimistic. First, he sees no indication that a Christian view of how to make industrial society function to the advantage of the majority of men has gained in popularity. Second, although the Marxian faith has lost many followers in many parts of the world "the dominant intellectual caste" continues using it as their master-plan. At the very end, Dr. Shuster rather unexpectedly asserts that an international

code of minority rights would in the long run become truly revolutionary. The reviewer disagrees with this idea; much stronger ideas than a code of minority rights have proven impotent against the brutal force of a totalitarian dictatorship.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

Fordham University

BARNES, WILLIAM WRIGHT. *The Southern Baptist Convention, 1845-1953*. Pp. 340. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press, c. 1954. \$3.75.

The social organization of the Baptist church in the United States is divided into two major conventions, the American Baptist, formerly the Northern Baptist, and the Southern Baptist. At the time of its organization in Augusta, Georgia in 1845, the Southern Baptist Convention was established to give formal associational relations to that group of churches in the southeastern part of the country which had what then seemed to be fundamental disagreements with their sister churches over theological, missionary, and slavery questions. (Presbyterian and Methodist churches experienced a similar bifurcation during the mid-nineteenth century.)

At its San Francisco meeting in 1951, the Southern Baptist Convention proposed that "whereas, the Convention has defined its territorial position . . . by removing territorial limitations, and, whereas, the Northern Baptist Convention has changed its name so that it is continental in scope, the Home Mission Board and all other Southern Baptist boards and agencies be free to serve as a source of blessing to any community or any people anywhere in the United States."

Barnes' history of the Southern Baptist Convention is a report of the various actions and activities that attended the development of this the largest of indigenous religious groups. With a membership of approximately 10,000,000 communicants, the convention now exceeds the territorial limits suggested by its name and follows its church constituents and the communicant market into the North and the West. From four to five times larger than its sister convention, the Southern Baptist Convention has successfully invaded the areas of new

population concentration with its "Simultaneous Crusade" of evangelism and its "Five Year Crusade" for more conferences, more mission stations, and more effective witnessing. In the process, the Bible Belt has shifted.

The Southern Baptist Convention is essentially a conservative religious organization, despite the fact that the Baptist church in the United States finds its spiritual heritage in the radical wing of the European Protestant upheaval of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Barnes' history of the convention validates without emphasizing this conservatism. The recital of "facts"—names, dates, and excerpts from "proceedings"—does permit the student to conclude that the role of the association of churches, so common to early European Baptist history, the belief in the autonomy of the local church and in the priesthood of believers, continue to be significant tenets of Baptist church organization within that convention. These beliefs have been able to withstand the ideological onslaughts of Unitarianism, Universal Restoration, Millerism, Landmarkism, and slavery. And though Dr. Barnes gives more attention to the names of those who vied on these issues than to the contextual meaning of the issues themselves, one can discover their significant relationships in denominational history in the more lucid and interpretive writings of A. H. Newman, W. W. Barnes, Robert G. Torbet, and others.

IRA DE A. REID

Haverford College

GOGUEL, MAURICE. *The Birth of Christianity*. Translated from the French by H. C. Snape. Pp. xviii, 558. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$7.50.

The author of our book is the well-known senior and master of French protestant scholarship. Less interested in theological implications and philosophical problems, he presents historical facts in an excellent way, reconstructing the past as far as possible. *The Birth of Christianity* is the second volume of a planned trilogy, which began with *The Life of Jesus*. The present volume thus presupposes the historical Jesus and his teaching. It begins

with "The Birth of the Belief in the Resurrection of Jesus" and follows the historical development under different viewpoints up to the first half of the second century A.D. The caesura between Vol. I and Vol. II is well chosen.

We are not going into detailed criticism of Goguel's book; comprehensive handbooks like this will always present us with a good deal of places where individual judgment differs. No doubt that the author who has dealt with the chief problems of earliest Christianity in many articles, is excellently acquainted with all questions of the period. • The scholarly apparatus of the book is the reference to the most important sources, quotes, and other studies of the period, primarily European ones.

Yet when dealing with the history of the early, indeed the earliest church as an intramundane development as our author does, the question comes up: where lies the chief interest of the historian? Is it *the beginning as such* and therefore the viewpoint: how did all the different phenomena come to pass and how have they set forth such and no other consequences? Is our historical development a linear, logical result of causes? Or does the primary interest of an author lie in *final results* of history, so that we search for different reasons? Here we carry with us the general assumption of unity and an inherent logicism behind the surface of historical phenomena. In this case the scholarly interest searches for teleological forces and the constructive imagination designs a well-balanced, unified historical picture.

To illustrate these two historical aspects we may point to *Harnack* with his primary interest in final results on the one side, and to *Bultmann* on the other side, whose main concern is the question of the very beginning and how things came into existence.

What about *M. Goguel* who, born in 1880, belongs to the generation between *Harnack* and *Bultmann*? His approach presents some kind of a *via media*, that is, he tries to bring into balance the divergent aspects. This attitude can be seen also in his methodology, where he prevents extreme positions, for instance, a fundamen-

talistic lack of criticism as well as critical radicalism. The general line of Goguel's book may perhaps be characterized as a synthesis of liberalism and conservatism, making use of psychology and psychological explanation more often than I personally can agree with.

Yet, the present volume of Goguel as well as his *Life of Jesus* is an outstanding masterpiece of greatest importance for modern historical research. For nontheologians, the *Birth of Christianity* represents a reliable handbook of facts.

ERICH DINKLER

Yale University, Divinity School

KIMPEL, BEN. *The Symbols of Religious Faith: A Preface to an Understanding of the Nature of Religion*. Pp. xxiv, 180. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. \$3.75.

A Criterion of Religious Phenomena would be a more accurately descriptive title of this work. The author is concerned throughout with the problem of what constitutes religious phenomena in contradistinction to the nonreligious. He professes entire disagreement with the school of Rudolf Otto which finds a concept of the holy the distinguishing trait in religious manifestations. As the author points out, there is a circular procedure in empirical studies of religion.

One must have a definition, that is to say, a concept of religion before he can select those phenomena from which he will adduce the traits that are peculiar to religion.

He will then find that these phenomena do exemplify the characteristics which he believes constitute the religious.

Underlying all religious life, we are told, is acknowledgement of "man's total dependence upon an ultimate reality. An understanding of behavior, whether it be institutional ritual or individual prayer, is a definition of religion" (6). "Religious life includes all that men do to acknowledge their ultimate dependence upon a reality, or realities, which control, directly or indirectly, whatever they regard as the essential goods of life. Whatever is regarded as essential to life, therefore, may acquire religious significance" (28). Later

the author adds the criterion that religion "includes all that men do to acknowledge their ultimate dependence upon a reality revered as transcendent both of human resources and the physical world" (30). "There would be no motive for man to turn beyond his resources to another reality if every requirement of his life were fulfilled within his own resources" (136). "Religious faith is not a philosophy of the nature of human life, or the human soul, or even of the destiny of human life. It is an affirmation about the existence of a reality which is supremely worthy of man's trust, both in this life, and in another—whatever such a life may be" (145). The thesis is throughout illustrated by examples drawn from some primitive cultures and to a greater extent from the early historic civilizations of the Near East and Far East.

WILSON D. WALLIS

South Woodstock, Connecticut

STEVENS, DAVID H. *The Changing Humanities: An Appraisal of Old Values and New Uses*. Pp. xiv, 272. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. \$4.00.

In this volume the former Director for the Humanities of the Rockefeller Foundation puts to use a lifetime of varied experience as he analyzes the nature of the humanities, what has happened to them in the last fifty years, and what they can contribute to the lives of men in the world both now and in the future. Mr. Stevens opens his discussion with a review of the patterns of humanistic research and teaching. This is a more or less theoretical section, which identifies the sources of the humanities as falling under four categories: languages, histories, philosophies, and literatures. He then devotes a chapter to each of these categories and concludes with two chapters which treat new areas of research and teaching, and the need for balance in studies.

The tone of the book is vigorously optimistic, so much so that often when the author is describing in general statements the condition of the humanities in American education, one feels that the declarative "is" should be changed to "ought." In particular, when he asserts that departmentalism in universities is

much less powerful than it used to be, he seems to be flying in the face of much relevant evidence. On the other hand, it is high time that some one brings to the attention of the gloom mongers among the humanists the record of concrete achievement which has been wrought in the last half century.

Mr. Stevens is unwavering in his insistence upon the supreme importance of the human individual, whose freedom and responsibility it is the task of the humanities to serve. Perhaps a clue to his attitude can be found in his central chapters which deal with languages, not Language; histories, not History, and so on. This bespeaks Mr. Stevens' profound belief that the highest obligation of the human being is to make up his own mind by exercising a discriminating sense of values as he chooses his own course of action out of the plurality of alternatives available to him.

Mr. Stevens is at his best in the sections on languages and literatures in which he shows how the humanist scholar and teacher, whether he is dealing with problems of simple communication or with a master work of literary art, really occupies a position of the highest significance, for through him ultimately as an interpreter comes the public understanding of the material in question. Although the deep relationship between history and philosophy is explored with nicety, the section on philosophies leaves something to be desired because it concentrates too much upon the thought of the recent past without establishing its connections with the whole tradition of philosophical speculation. In the chapter devoted to new possibilities for research and teaching, Mr. Stevens gives a complete conspectus of the area study programs now in existence in the country with an indication of the needs in the future. Unfortunately, he has little to say about the role of the fine arts and music as humanities.

Anyone who believes that the humanities are the concern of all men can understand the grounds of his belief much better by reading this book.

WHITNEY J. OATES

Princeton University

BLACKHAM, H. J. *The Human Tradition*. Pp. vii, 252. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1954. \$3.00.

Here is a deep-running treatment of what Blackham considers to be the chief ideological schemes competing for contemporary loyalty. Marxian Communism, Christianity, and secular or scientific humanism are re-examined with a penetration and breadth of perspective that commands respect. It is an "iceberg book," most of its significance lying beneath the surface.

Blackham demonstrates that he is thoroughly at home in the humanist tradition. As secretary of the Ethical Union in England, editor of *The Plain View*, a humanist periodical, and co-author of *Living as a Humanist*, he has become an authority on the humanist point of view. Those who line up with the Marxians or the Christians, who believe in the church, must reckon with him.

In order "to inspire a will to civilization and inform a vision of it" (p. vi), one must realize that science and democracy unencumbered by theology or dialectical materialism are the two wheels which make human progress practicable (p. 237). The "heady idea of progress" as something inevitable in nature is "clean gone" (p. 236). Blackham confesses with due modesty that humanism has not yet reached "an intellectually coherent and compelling form" (p. 210), yet he believes its critical "love of culture" (p. 208), its orientation in actual human problems, provides the most persuasive incentive for providing such remedies as evils may ever have (p. 188).

To reject Marxianism for any but the strongest reasons would be frivolous for it, not the thought of Hegel and Bergson, constitutes the watershed of modern thought (p. 100, cf. 97, 140). It is "a grand vision and none has been so near the truth" (p. 109). Consequently, it is "a threat to something considerably better" (p. 143), presumably humanism. But Blackham rightly shows that Marxianism vitiates itself by holding up such an inspiring ideal of vigorous effort at social reform, when the dialectic of history is then held to be necessitarian. Ideals as consciously chosen ends are basically irrelevant in such a scheme. His conclusion is acute that Com-

munist is the response of backward people to the challenge of the industrial revolution as they seek quickly to equip themselves for survival in such a vastly changed world (p. 243).

Blackham's indictment of historical Christianity as a destroyer of civilization (p. 171) gives only one side of its course. His conclusion that its lasting contribution has been its challenge to man's confidence in himself and the self-sufficiency of things (p. 172) lies much nearer the truth. Nevertheless, this is a negative conclusion which ignores its tremendous power of inspiration for personal morale and social reform. That Christianity has become a complex private philosophy in which the masses are not interested or sufficiently competent to comprehend (p. 201), raises wrinkles in one's brow. This thesis may have enough truth in it to hurt.

One might quarrel with Blackham's definitions of such terms as "ideology," "science," "morality," "philosophy" (pp. 61, 70, 74, 55), but none is trite. All illuminate the subject, and that is of course the chief purpose of definitions. Yet when he comes out with a purely empirical theory of ethics where the good life is taken largely to be what is actually chosen to be good by the greatest number (pp. 81-83, 87), this is only psychology. Humanism here reveals its thinness. Its frail love of ideals posed as what life *ought* to become, to say nothing of its disdain of theism and metaphysics, leaves most of us cold.

LOUIS WILLIAM NORRIS

MacMurray College

HALLOWELL, JOHN. *The Moral Foundation of Democracy*. Pp. x, 134. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. \$3.50.

The early decades of the Twentieth Century saw the devotees of values and faith in intellectual circles fighting a defensive and rear-guard action. This makes the unmistakable change of the last ten years all the more significant. The atom bomb and the march of Communism have sent more than the natural scientists to their knees. While the physicist unloosed the atomic age, it was the task of the social scientist to control it, and it is no exaggera-

tion to say that he was almost totally unprepared.

Professor Hallowell's excellent book is symptomatic of the new trend. His main thesis is that the democratic way requires the Hebraic-Greek-Christian faith to undergird it.

In a succession of critiques of varying potency he attacks the anti-intellectualism of Pareto, Arnold, Freud and others, basing this attack on their necessary reliance upon intellectual weapons to demonstrate the fallacy of rationality. He then turns his attention to their opposites: the positivists and the modern liberals. The positivists by limiting their methods and "knowledge" largely to the natural sciences knocked out the props of ethics, faith, and conscience. These latter had subjected man's desires to refining and restraining forces which were required if he were to be a good citizen. Liberalism, influenced by positivism, had degenerated until natural rights had become merely legal rights—and the latter had no norm other than the will of those in power. Pragmatism subjected truth to the domination of human desire, erecting "wishful thinking" into a philosophy of life. Here the reviewer believes the author has slipped a bit, for later on he holds, "Man does not make his nature; he must conform to it." If our nature is true to the purpose for which we were created, then experience would validate this truth. While pragmatism is dangerously weak as a basic argument, it may well be useful to buttress conclusions as to the essence of morality arrived at on other grounds.

Professor Hallowell's affirmative case is powerful. Democracy must be grounded in the kind of individual that will make it work. That individual must believe he has responsibilities transcending the demands of the natural world. As a free man, he must accept principles of conduct as universally valid, and the obligation to discover and abide by these principles. In this he needs the help of a Higher Power, to turn his redemption from evil into an effective reorientation of his personality. He must regard his fellows as moral and rational beings, equal in the sight of God. Freedom is freedom under the laws of the universe by which laws human enactments

are to be judged. We submit to the will of the majority only on the basis of the latter being reasonable and devoted to the common good. A Christian theology is a necessity if democracy is to survive and spread.

ERNEST S. GRIFFITH

Library of Congress

HALLGARTEN, GEORGE W. F. *Why Dictators? The Cause and Forms of Tyrannical Rule Since 600 B.C.* Pp. xiii, 379. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$5.50.

"Hardly anyone," writes author Hallgarten, "has as yet published a comparative analysis of the political technique of dictatorship and of the social and political chances that favored the careers of a few dozen mortals at the expense of other candidates less assisted by Fate. The present book is meant to fill this gap."

It is apparent that Mr. Hallgarten takes a dim view of most other studies of dictators and dictatorships. Of Jonathan Chambers' book on *Dictators*, for example, Mr. Hallgarten laconically says it "does not meet expectations raised by its title." After reading his own book I am inclined to repeat after him, "does not meet expectations raised by its title or its declared purpose." At any rate, Mr. Hallgarten hasn't answered the question his title poses, "Why Dictators?"

This is not to say the book is without interest. Indeed, it is filled with an astounding miscellany about dictators. Tales are told of Caesar's love life, and of the loves (natural and perverse) of Pisistratus of Athens, Dionysius I of Syracuse, Caesar Borgia, Napoleon, Hitler, and others. Their addiction to pomp and splendor, to monument building, censorship of art and thought, is described. We are told of their deeds and misdeeds in the fields of law and administration, taxation, foreign policy, war and peace. Mr. Hallgarten reminds us that although dictatorship is a hazardous and often short-lived trade, it is not unremunerative. "In the year X of the [French] Republic," he writes, "(1801-1802) the fortune of the former penniless lieutenant [Napoleon] was already 17,000,000 gold francs [sic] (well over \$5,000,-

000)." Giangaleazzo Visconti is reported to have had an income in excess of £4,000,000 a year, and many another dictator did almost as well. Some dictators, we are told, are downright sadists, although it isn't quite clear whether it is sadism that makes for dictatorship or vice versa.

For the most part, Mr. Hallgarten's book is one of just such bits and pieces without much in the way of theory or structure. The Soviet dictatorship of Russia—more particularly under Stalin—comes in for more extended treatment, but without much that is new in either fact or theory.

According to the author, dictatorships assume one or more of four basic forms. These are (1) the "Classical," associated with a rising and flourishing money economy; (2) the "Ultra-revolutionary" or Communist dictatorships; (3) the "Pseudo-revolutionary" or fascist dictatorships; and (4) the "Counter-revolutionary" dictatorships, like those of military juntas in Spain or Latin America, which are more or less legitimate offspring of the fascists.

In describing these basic forms, Mr. Hallgarten paints on a large canvas. Every dictator he or anyone else ever heard of is here, if only for a word or two. The result is a book not unlike those heroic paintings in which hundreds of minor figures not only blot out the landscape but one another as well. In the end, this reader at least was left still searching for an answer to the question Mr. Hallgarten posed at the beginning—Why Dictators?

PETER H. ODEGARD

University of California, Berkeley

MUNK, ARTHUR W. *A Way of Survival*. Pp. 164. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. \$3.00.

As the cold war has unsettled the minds of men and fear has created psychological fox holes, philosophy and religion have been re-emphasized to expand horizons, give new perspectives and reaffirm a shaken faith in the future. It might be expected, therefore, that an author who tends to view all problems in terms of "social philosophy, ethics, and theology," and who writes on the international crisis of our time has an attentive and ready-made audience. Dr. Munk is the chairman of the

Department of Philosophy at Albion College and has recently written *History and God*.

Part I of this book looks toward an adequate philosophy of peace. The author surveys and deplors such dangerous philosophies as materialism, fatalism, escapism, relativism and dogmatism. Cromwell's injunction against dogmatism is noted: "By the bowels of Christ, I beseech you brethren to remember that you may be mistaken." The author's own philosophy would be universal and comprehensive and it would support the absoluteness of truth and moral law, affirm a central humanism, and be characterized by a realistic idealism.

Part II of Mr. Munk's essay is concerned with an adequate peace strategy. He distinguishes between the supposed enemy, Russia, and the real enemy, the third world war. His approach to the prevention of war is synoptic and he is optimistic in noting "signs of hope." His "stars in the night" include the United Nations, neutral nations, and peace-minded minorities. Finally, the author believes that the crucial hour has come when not less than eight significant steps must be begun toward peace. These one must read for himself to appreciate. Mr. Munk concludes:

"Rough and difficult as the way to the temple of perpetual peace may seem during our darker hours, yet we must never despair of finally reaching it. . . . business, labor, the farmer, certainly all teachers, and above all the mothers of men whose sons the terrible Mars ever and anon demands in bloody sacrifice—all these must be rallied in one mighty endeavor for survival and a better day."

To support his case the author is generous in his citation of the *Bible*, various religious and philosophic writers, and the *Detroit Free Press*. It is to be hoped that these authorities together with the homespun style of Mr. Munk will be sufficient to arouse the ordinary reader, if not the scholar, to the danger and possibilities inherent in the present world situation. If the author's peace strategy has the ring of appeasement rather than peaceful conciliation, it would only suggest how far Ameri-

can opinion has drifted toward world war III.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.

Stanford University

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

HUGHES, PHILIP. *The Reformation in England*. Vol. II: *Religio Depopulata*. Pp. xxv, 366. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$7.50.

This is the second of two large volumes designed to retell the story of the English Reformation. A third is yet to come. The extent of the work provides something of a key to its fullness. The table of contents—eleven pages of fine print—is reminiscent of the Victorians. The illustrations, photographs of portraits and documents are numerous, handsomely executed, and fully annotated. Documentary appendices, a bibliographical note, and an excellent index complete the book. It is rather refreshing in this age of short cuts and the tyranny of high printing costs to see scholarship reclaim these externals of its time-honored kinship with leisure and contemplation.

The author works within the traditional framework, but does not, in the main, follow traditional interpretations (traditional at least in some countries). Not all of his contentions are new. Mary Tudor has already had a good deal of rehabilitation. Only the wholly prejudiced fail now to recognize harshness towards heretics as a malady of the age, not a single group. The myth of Edward VI as patron of education was long ago exploded. And few will rush to the defense of Henry VII, though there will be more who are reluctant to see Lady Jane Grey shorn of her timorous glamor.

Still there is much to offer new food for thought. Pollard, whom the author selects as a spokesman of the views he wishes to refute, is challenged again and again. His treatment of Bishop Gardiner's defense is labeled a "complete misunderstanding" (p. 94) and that of Cranmer's views on heretics a "masked apologetic" (p. 132). His interpretations of Cardinal Pole, the mar-

riage negotiations of Philip and Mary, John Foxe's use of "facts," Mary Tudor's motives for punishing heretics, and other key points are all refuted. Some corrective was certainly needed; but it is doubtful whether as stalwart a giant as Pollard can be so completely demolished, and because of its controversial nature the chapter on "Changes in Belief" will probably not prove wholly acceptable to everyone, though its presentation of the contents of important documents will surely be welcomed by all scholars.

Students particularly interested in the interaction between the Reformation and contemporary social and economic developments will find especially rewarding the chapters that deal with the popular reaction to the ecclesiastical changes, the uprisings, and the role of the "new men"—"My father made the more part of you out of nothing" (Mary Tudor—p. 174)—all adding fresh material if not wholly new interpretations. The final chapter "Disension in Both Camps" is one of the best and should go far towards breaking down stereotypes that have grown up among the descendants of both camps. Whether regarded as a corrective or as a new challenge this book is an important contribution that no scholar of the period can ignore.

MILDRED CAMPBELL

Vassar College

GIPSON, LAWRENCE HENRY. *The Great War for the Empire: The Culmination, 1760-1763*. (The British Empire Before The American Revolution, Vol. VIII.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. \$7.50.

In a recent essay on historical scholarship Professor W. Stull Holt decries the vogue of specialization and monographic preoccupation on the part of contemporary American historians. He mentions Professor Gipson's great study of *The British Empire Before the American Revolution* as the outstanding exception to this trend and the most distinguished multivolumed history written thus far by an American historian in the twentieth century.

The volume under review is the eighth in the series with three more to come.

Starting with the threat of French invasion of the British Isles in 1760, which was averted by the great English naval victory at Quiberon Bay, the historical narrative then proceeds to narrate the rising fortunes of Britain against France and her ally, Spain. The scene of battle is world-wide as the author recounts accurately and in detail the British conquests of Montreal, Guadalupe, Senegal, Pondicherry, Havana, and Manila. The reviewer, whose main interest is the British period in Indian history, was impressed with Professor Gipson's two chapters dealing with Anglo-French rivalry in India. One finds an accurate and comprehensive picture of the complex state of Mogul politics and the interaction of the designs of native potentates with those of French and English leaders.

The author seeks to destroy the old historical myth that British victory in the colonies was won in Germany, that Pitt's Prussian alliance was the major factor in the defeat of France. The real reason, the decisive factor, according to the author was superior naval power in the hands of Britain. This was the major key to victory.

In this volume one feels Professor Gipson's love of his subject, his admiration for the heroism and reliance of the "embattled island kingdom." He writes always with sympathy and often with admiration for the various British statesmen and commanders who played a leading part in the exciting duel for empire. Even George III, formerly so severely castigated by our older school of historians, ceases to be an ogre and appears as a king temperate in his habits, deeply religious, conscientious in his royal duties if mistaken in his policies. The volume concludes with a justification of the claim that the so-called Seven Years' War was one, not for empire, but for the empire; for the preservation of the British Empire. This point is buttressed by showing how moderate and reasonable were the peace terms incorporated in the Peace of Paris.

Three additional volumes dealing with the theme of the Triumphant Empire have been planned by Professor Gipson. The reviewer speaks not for himself but for the larger fraternity of historical scholar-

ship when he expresses the hope that the author, septuagenarian as he is, will be able to complete his magnum opus.

T. WALTER WALLBANK

University of Southern California

UPTHEGROVE, CAMPBELL L. *Empire by Mandate: A History of the Relations of Great Britain with the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations*. Pp. 239. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. \$3.50.

Nonsell-governing territories present many difficult international problems, even if it seems evident that traditional colonialism is suffering a slow but certain death. The "in-between" period of transition from colonialism to nationalism is made less difficult for such areas whenever the international trusteeship system is permitted to function: orderly evolution and not revolution is thereby offered as the means to eventual independence.

Back of many recent developments is the tendency of other powers to follow Britain in surrendering the ties and the philosophy of outmoded colonialism.

A concise history of the relations of Great Britain with the Permanent Mandates Commission which operated under the League of Nations has been long overdue. *Empire by Mandate* fills this gap, being a detailed analysis of British experience in policy and practice in administering the several nonsell-governing territories mandated to that empire following the First World War.

The book explains the mandate system and discusses the general problems affecting the British mandates down to 1941. Separate chapters concern the island of Nauru, British Togoland, the British Cameroons, Tanganyika, Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan. The creation of a free Iraq was the greatest achievement in the relations between Great Britain and the Mandates Commission, the latter's contribution being to set up criteria for determining Iraq's capacity for independence. The greatest difficulties, conversely, came over Palestine. As for Palestine, the Mandates Commission approved neither Britain's proposal of 1937 to divide that country into three parts nor

its plan of 1939 to grant independence to it after ten years.

Yet one looks in vain for anything of current developments in this study. Nowhere is the Trusteeship Council mentioned. The work simply covers an historical interval and is presented almost as it was first written. The present tense, which is widely used, consistently means 1941 and not 1954. Thus the reader himself must draw contrasts and comparisons with the developments since 1941. But even this earlier interlude suggests that a reader might well speculate, to discern what lessons can be learned now from the situations of the 1920's and 1930's. This reviewer's speculation makes the contrasts seem more striking than the comparisons, because colonialism, nationalism, and Communism are all involved (as best illustrated in Indochina) in the present widespread moves for national independence.

VERNON J. PURYEAR

University of California

RITCHESON, CHARLES R. *British Politics and the American Revolution*. Pp. xv, 320. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. \$4.00.

For some time it has been a complaint among British students of the eighteenth century that their American colleagues have not yet fully appreciated the difference their researches have been making to the generally held view of British politics in the reign of George III, and so to our understanding of the causes and nature of the American Revolution. To some extent Professor Ritcheson's study will provide an answer to criticism of this kind, though it is to be regretted that the limitations of space which he has imposed upon himself prevent him from doing more than indicating the lines upon which he has been working and put considerable obstacles in the way of the general reader. The book will thus hardly stand comparison with the first volume of Professor V. T. Harlow's *The Founding of the Second British Empire* which appeared in 1952, but it not referred to in the bibliography. Furthermore Professor Ritcheson is inclined to take for granted a perhaps oversimple interpretation of the Revolution of 1688 and

would have done well to check his views against another work which he omits from the bibliography, Professor G. H. Guttridge's *English Whiggism and the American Revolution*. Professor Pares's *King George III and the Politicians* was presumably published too late for Professor Ritcheson to use, but it would have helped to clarify the constitutional issue. It suggests that Professor Ritcheson attaches too much importance to the view that there was opposition to the strengthening of the Crown in America largely on the ground that it might then be too independent of Parliament at home. Again, Miss L. S. Sutherland's *The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics* (1952) would have been usefully referred to in connection with Professor Ritcheson's allusion to India as an alternative source of imperial revenue after the Seven Years' War.

The chief criticism against Professor Ritcheson must however be that he has got himself involved in a confusion of his own making. His thesis put briefly is this: the answer to the problems of Anglo-American relations in the second half of the eighteenth century should have been a federal one. This was not possible because although British opinion moved under pressure in this direction—a process culminating in the Carlisle Peace Commission of 1778—it would have meant the abdication of the monarch from a direct role in politics, and his willingness to become a mere symbol of unity between the different parts of his dominions. This did happen, so Professor Ritcheson assures us, but only after America was lost. There is thus a direct connection between the modern Commonwealth and the American Revolution. In reality this line of argument breaks down for the simple reason that the modern evolution of the Commonwealth has not been in a federal direction at all. Federalism—meaning the distinction between "local" and "imperial" affairs—had a long and subsequent history but every time proved unworkable. To call the association of independent nations which form the Commonwealth a federal system is strange doctrine from a countryman of the authors of the *Federalist*. Professor Ritcheson has made admirable use of British archives and

drawn many plums; perhaps the process left him no time for a study of our contemporary institutions.

MAX BELOFF

Nuffield College
Oxford

BOWLES, CHESTER. *Ambassador's Report*. Pp. x, 415. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. \$4.00.

It has been apparent for some years that American opinion regarding the untoward course of events in Asia has reflected considerable frustration and fear. It has also been apparent that the policies of the government of India, since the attainment of independence in 1947, have contributed to public bitterness in this nation. To many of us it also seems apparent that public bitterness about Asia has in large part been the product of public ignorance regarding the mainsprings of thought and action in that distant part of the globe.

For this reason, if for no other, a new book dealing with part of the contemporary Asian scene demands careful reading from the reviewer before it can be recommended to the public. When a work covers India and other aspects of current events in Asia it merits even greater attention. If the book proves to be illuminating it merits considerable approbation and support. If it goes so far as to explain to Americans how important segments of Asians think and why they think that way, it is almost a miracle.

Chester Bowles, recently our Ambassador to India and Nepal, provides such a volume, and it certainly merits careful and extensive reading from Americans. His book will also receive this reviewer's constant support, even though he may have to quibble with bits of it. For, writ large, his effort is to explain to an American public that is increasingly unhappy about the course of events in Asia, what the Indians are about and why they are motivated as they are. I can think of few tasks that need doing more urgently.

Since Mr. Bowles tries to say a great deal in a few pages he has, at times, to oversimplify . . . cut his explanation so short that it distorts some of his implications. In other places he allows his natural

optimism to carry him away, as in his chapter on the Indian village development program. In spite of this the bulk of *Ambassador's Report* is thoughtful, acute, and perceptive.

We are faced with the task of leading a coalition of free nations and in order to measure up we are required to comprehend the views, attitudes, and aspirations of the millions of people who should be part of our coalition. Mr. Bowles's book does a fine job of explaining to this country what the people of South Asia think. At the same time his constructive proposals merit the most serious attention from our public. Finally, the very tone of his book constitutes a primer for Americans in the difficult task of working with other freedom-loving nations in defense of a common value—liberty.

ROBERT I. CRANE

University of Chicago

ANGUS, H. F. *Canada and the Far East, 1940-1953*. Pp. x, 129. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1953 (released 1954). \$3.50.

To attempt in just 119 pages both an account and an interpretation of Canada's relations with the Far East and Southeast Asia since 1940 (pp. vii & 3) may be fashionable, but two careful readings of Professor Angus's slim volume have caused this reviewer to wonder whether brevity is not just another of the false idols to which historians have paid homage in the past.

Canada's hitherto unimportant role in the Pacific Professor Angus ascribes to the operation of three factors. First, Canada is not Pacific-oriented—"the primary interests of Canadians . . . lie elsewhere" (p. 101). Second, because of its traditional Atlantic orientation and small-to-middle power status Canada has no distinctive Pacific policy—it is merely "the resultant of Canadian policies in general" (p. vii). Third, Canada's position on any particular Pacific issue is "inevitably" influenced by its Commonwealth membership, but most of all by its close proximity to the United States—Canadian policy, "if it is to be

effective, cannot deviate far from that pursued by the powerful neighbor" (p. 40). Canada's involvement in the Korean war, its participation in the Japanese peace treaty, and its current most-favored-nation trade treaty with Japan seem to indicate an increasing Canadian interest in the Pacific region.

The account of Canada's relations with "the countries beyond the Pacific" that Professor Angus has given is thin, disjointed and unbalanced as compared to that which appears in Professor A. R. M. Lower's *Canada and the Far East—1940* (which, incidentally, this reviewer has just reread). For example: Can Canada's postwar "contacts" with Indonesia and Indochina be truly described in just thirteen and forty lines, respectively? If the special "qualities" of Canadian nationalism have influenced Canada's attitude to the new Asian nationalisms, why is so important a theme given but two-thirds of a page (p. 9)? If "trade . . . has been traditionally at the heart of Canadian interests in the Far East and the principal determinant of Canadian policy there" (p. 67), why is there no description of either the character or value of this trade? Finally, is there actually so "little Canadian opinion about the Far East" (p. 101), that parliamentary debates, newspapers and public opinion polls can be completely ignored in favor of a lengthy exposition of the official point of view?

MURRAY G. LAWSON

Arlington, Virginia

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

GRANICK, DAVID. *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR: A Study in Soviet Economic Planning*. Pp. xiii, 346. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. \$5.00.

The symbolism of planning has exerted an enormous attractiveness in the modern world since it conjurs up a vision of accurate and orderly prevision in men's affairs by contrast with the painfully visible muddling of our present mixed economy. Technicians of the Central Planning Board

will somehow, it seems, establish consistent instructions for every unit in the economy, and each firm will only have to carry them out. A plant manager, here, would bear no resemblance to the old decision-making capitalist entrepreneur.

But in the USSR, where a planned economy is said to have been established, is this the way plant managers operate? The evidence presented in the highly rewarding study under review shows clearly that it is not.

Professor Granick has made a pioneering study of industrial administration in a totalitarian society, carefully based on inductive evidence from primary sources. His analysis will permit all those who are interested in planning, socialism, decision-making, public administration, or institutional economics, to add the flesh of experimental evidence to the bony abstractions of previous speculation. And they will probably be forced to revise at least some of their views.

The book applies the tools of an interdisciplinary social scientist to evidence collected, not only from hundreds of Soviet operating decrees, but also from thousands of day-to-day cases of management activity reported in the newspapers and journals published for domestic circulation within Soviet industry. It is a good example of the kind of research which is gradually putting our understanding of Soviet society on a solid foundation. And its general findings, based on internal literature for the 1934-41 period, are given dramatic confirmation by an independent analysis of Soviet firms based on exhaustive postwar interviews with a group of former Soviet plant managers (see Joseph S. Berliner's report in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* of August, 1952). The two scholars do not reach identical interpretations, but they are clearly describing the same system.

After an opening survey of the organizational framework within which the Soviet firm operates, a sketch of typical personality types found among plant managers, and an excellent description of the process of plan making, the author devotes eight chapters to analysis of: (a) interaction between centralized controls and independent activity by the directors of firms, (b)

criteria for the evaluation of managers' performance and devices for stimulating maximum effectiveness, and (c) party and worker participation in the decision-making process. He concludes with a stimulating twenty-four page discussion of bureaucracy, performance criteria, and the role of "politics" in economic affairs.

To this reviewer, at least, it seems clear that the vague slogans of "State ownership of the means of production" and "a planned economy" fade away when confronted with the complex problems of a modern industrial society. Certain arrangements "work"; others do not. Professor Granick's evidence suggests that the Soviet plant manager is not utterly unlike his capitalist counterpart. Yet the two systems are by no means identical, and it is important both scientifically and ideologically that we should be deeply informed concerning the differences. The contribution of this book toward improving our understanding in this field is a substantial one.

HOLLAND HUNTER

Haverford College

GUINS, GEORGE C. *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*. Pp. xv, 457. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. Guilders 27.50.

The author, a former Imperial Russian judge now teaching Soviet law at Berkeley, has set as his task the preparation of a manual contrasting Soviet legislation with the fundamentals underlying the law of the West. Soviet law is described as an instrument of politics whose detailed study is valuable only as an indication of Soviet policy and current trends in the Soviet Union. The principal trend is found to be increasing centralization of authority with consequent reduction in personal freedom. No student of Soviet politics will quarrel with this finding. The author then goes further to declare that he expects no reversal because socialism cannot produce the abundance promised. Consequently, the continuing poverty of a large segment of Soviet society will evoke ever increasing harshness to preserve order for the benefit of a favored few on whom the top leadership must rely for support. Proof of this thesis is found especially in recent in-

creases in penalties for crimes of violence and for theft.

To cover the whole field of public and private law and the economic conditions of Soviet society in brief space, the author has necessarily had to compress his material greatly. There is no room for shading or speculation. Perhaps for this reason, the valuable case material available is omitted almost entirely with a consequent loss in reader interest to those trained in the common law. Perhaps also, it is necessary to adopt the view of a single school of jurisprudence as representative of the western thinkers. This leaves Dr. Guins saying that the West rejects Soviet law because it contradicts the psychology of the ordinary man. For proponents of other schools, no less hostile to Marxism, this may seem to be an oversimplification.

For political scientists the chapters on international law will probably have primary interest, for the author has demonstrated with abundant references that the Soviet position shifts to meet the needs of the occasion. The chapters on the structure of the state and the Communist party plow fields which have already been crossed several times in good English language books.

Dr. Guins' study should be judged for what it is—an instrument for use in winning literate men without legal training to our side in the cold war. As such, it has undoubted value as evidenced by the fact that its publication in Holland was instigated by the Secretary of the International Commission of Jurists. If judged as a contribution to what is known already by American political scientists and lawyers, the book is able to add little of depth to present knowledge because it treats of too many subjects in too little space.

JOHN N. HAZARD

Columbia University

KÁLLAY, NICHOLAS. *Hungarian Premier: A Personal Account of a Nation's Struggle in the Second World War*. Pp. 518. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. \$6.00.

Kállay's book is essentially an *apologia* justifying Hungary's politics since 1918 and defending his own wartime policies. In

addition, he ascribes the present plight of Hungary to Allied decisions preceding, during, and following two world wars. The author explains how at the end of World War I the Allies "mutilated" Hungary, although neither she nor Austria, he says, is responsible for the war. The students of prewar diplomacy will learn that Germany "presumably had imperialist objectives" but that the Dual Monarchy entered the War in "pure self-defense" (44).

The author's observations on prominent personalities, political parties, and social classes in interwar Hungary are both interesting and illuminating. He has nothing but scorn for those who exaggerate the evils of Hungarian feudalism. Hungary, according to the author, could not become a democracy because her enemies "called themselves democrats" (28). Kállay speaks of his nation's neighbors with an air of arrogance and conceit. Hungary in his opinion represented an eastern extension of the western and Roman system; other peoples in eastern Europe were "Oriental pseudodemocrats" (27). He regards Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as historical "fictions" (54-55), and his hatred of Edvard Beneš is indistinguishable from his hatred of Communism. The author presents his version of the history of Transylvania to disclaim any Rumanian rights to the territory (57-58).

Kállay goes to great pains to justify his wartime policy of attempting to preserve Hungary's independence and her peculiar system. The massacre of the Serbs at Ujvidek (Novi Sad) was openly discussed in the parliament, a situation which in his opinion would not have been possible in a satellite country (107-111). Incidentally, our author insists, the massacre of the Serbs was perpetrated not by the real Hungarians but by the Hungarians of "German origin" (109); nor was the repugnant leader of the fascist Arrow Cross (Francis Szálasi) a real Hungarian but a Hungarian of Armenian-Austrian origin (93). In contrast, Kállay writes, the good and honorable Hungarians like the Zrinyis were "a noble Hungarian family of Croatian origin" (468).

The author describes Hungary's part in World War II and especially her difficult

position on the Eastern front. Together with the Italians, he writes, the Hungarians defended long stretches of the front alone, while the Rumanians were favored by the presence of supporting German troops. The author tells us how he provided his Axis allies with the minimum of economic and military assistance, ordered the newspapers to circulate news from the West, and accorded the most humane treatment possible to war prisoners and the escapees. He distinguishes his reasonable anti-Semitic policy from the more ruthless program of the extremist groups.

The summary of the author's conversations with Hitler and Mussolini and the description of the author's visit to the Vatican are of some interest. Perhaps the most important part of the book is the author's discussion of the wartime contracts between his country and the western powers and the nature of the secret accord he had reached with the British in September 1943.

The book is an epitome of the beliefs and desires of the Hungarian gentry, and the author belongs to that group of prominent refugees who, while striving toward the liberation of Europe, have weakened their cause by perpetuating the old country nationalistic and religious squabbles on which the Communism they hope to destroy feeds and thrives. Indeed, he deliberately promotes the divisive forces and mutual antagonisms among the people of enslaved Europe instead of espousing the supreme goal of liberation from Communism.

The foreword sketches the interwar period of Hungarian history; it is sympathetically presented by C. A. Macartney, noted for his many works on Hungarian history.

WAYNE S. VUCINICH

Stanford University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

KOHN, HANS (Ed.). *German History: Some New German Views*. Pp. xi, 224. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1954. \$4.00.

The distinguished historian, Hans Kohn, has performed a notable service in col-

lecting and editing these essays written by German historians since 1945. The outcome of two visits Professor Kohn made to Germany in 1951 and 1952, the book includes two of his own introductory essays written in that superb style that has made the author famous as one of our great American historians.

The scholars represented in this book range from the recently deceased nonagenarian, Friedrich Meinecke, to his biographer, the thirty-four year old Walther Hofer, now *Dozent* at the Free University of Berlin. Eight of the historians represented are German, Dr. Hofer is Swiss, and Hajo Holborn, born and educated in Germany, now occupies the Randolph W. Townsend, Jr. chair at Yale University.

The essays are uniformly excellent. Karl Buchheim discusses the *via dolorosa* of the civilian spirit in Germany. Franz Schnabel, the leading spokesman today of non-Prussian German historiography, re-evaluates the Bismarck problem, concluding that the Iron Chancellor, despite his achievements, never realized that in history only those forces are preserved which devote themselves to world and historic goals. In another essay on Bismarck, Alfred von Martin tells his countrymen that they have trod the path of error, "because they are always impressed by the cavalryman's boot and a fist banged upon the table" (p. 100). Of equal merit are Hans Hertzfeld's treatment of militarism, Ludwig Dehio's review of Germany and the epoch of World Wars, Johann Albrecht von Rantzau on the glorification of the state in German historical writing, and Walther Hofer on revisionism in German history. Meinecke gives a penetrating picture of his predecessors, Ranke and Burckhardt, but fails to emphasize their misunderstanding of the moral and historical resources of Western modern democracy. In a brilliant concluding essay, Hajo Holborn calls for the formulation of a new German concept of history and new forms of social and political organization.

The importance of this book lies in the encouraging fact that German scholars have started seriously to face the trends and ideas of the recent German past. They have begun to understand the meaning and

consequences of State worship and blood-and-iron implicit in the rigid conservatism of Bismarck and the irrationalism of Hitler. They are now asking themselves whether the road followed by professional historians since Ranke has not been a wrong one, not as far as facts are concerned, but on the crucial matter of value judgments.

Professor Kohn's judgment of his collection of essays is a valid one: "There are some hopeful signs at present that several German historians are seeking ways which will help to integrate the Germans into the West and thus provide a new opportunity for their creative contribution to a common civilization based on a common heritage" (p. 43). The new trends of rethinking German history, evident in this book, may well be one of the factors deciding Europe's future. Professor Kohn's significant volume is indispensable for the large public interested in Germany's future as a member of the Western community of nations.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

The City College of New York

PETERSON, EDWARD NORMAN. *Hjalmar Schacht, For and Against Hitler: A Political-Economic Study of Germany, 1923-1945*. Pp. 416. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1954. \$5.00.

Dr. Peterson has written a highly diverting account of the economic and political career of Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, and of the vast backdrop against which he was to display his talents and record his failures. Schacht is portrayed as a man of many contradictions; a man courageous and able, but willing to compromise his principles if the occasion seemed important enough; a man of great vanity, but on occasion daring to speak out against the excesses of the party and the policies of the Führer; a very politically conscious economist who was, however, capable of misjudging much of what was going on around him. Politically astute in many ways, he nevertheless, in 1936, was urging increased output of consumers' goods in order to sustain the demand for investment goods on which his conception of economic recovery depended; yet this at the moment when Hitler was about to order the Ger-

man nation to make itself ready for war, including "economic rearmament in depth," within four years. The surrender of economic power by Schacht, the sponsor of colonies, trade, and sound money, to Goering, the autarchic planner, was inevitable.

It was perhaps the misfortune of Schacht that his special talents lay in the realm of monetary control and international currency problems at a time when aggressive elements of the National Socialist party were becoming convinced of the essentially subordinate role of money and international trade in a dictated economy. Inflation, said Goebbels, could be made acceptable to the public by propaganda. International trade and the balance of payments, said Goering, were of little importance in a nation skilled in the art of Ersatz. Indeed, at times the recital of events in the not so distant past has a somewhat archaic ring; as, for example, Schacht's belief that Hitler would permit a restriction of Reichsbank credits to the government to hinder the pace of rearmament, or even to put a brake on the excessive spending of the Nazi party.

Interesting figure that Schacht is, the author's purpose is not primarily to attack or defend him, but rather to help the reader "better to appreciate the past and present problems of Europe, political and economic" (pp. 15-16). This is a large order, which would seem to require a much longer book; but the author has succeeded in presenting a series of highly readable summaries of important political and economic issues. What is inevitably lacking in the treatment of such a broad subject in relatively limited space is sufficient detail to permit the reader in every instance to evaluate properly the author's opinions.

The author is to be congratulated for his thoughtfulness in preparing an extensive and very useful critical bibliography. Similar approval cannot be granted to the practice of relegating footnotes to the back of the book.

KENYON E. POOLE

Northwestern University

BRANDT, KARL. In Collaboration with OTTO SCHILLER and FRANZ AHLGRIMM. *Management of Agriculture and Food in*

the German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe: A Study in Military Government. Pp. xxxiv, 707. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1953. \$10.00.

During the war years, Festung Europa provided the Reich and the Wehrmacht with about fifteen per cent of their total grain supplies and a larger proportion of their meats, edible fats, and vegetables. But the normal surpluses of European countries were scarcely easy takings. First, Hitler's Europe contained important deficit areas; for these, new sources of food imports had to be provided in order to assure the bare minimum of subsistence or to maintain the flow of some surplus products, both agricultural and industrial. In addition, Germany supplied a large corps of agricultural advisers, managers and supervisors to assure necessary changes in the agricultural pattern and a flow of produce from the rural areas. This also required the formulation and management of a large number of incentive devices, and the establishment of some working relationships between occupying authorities and conquered, often unsympathetic, populations. Add to all this the unrealistic expectations and pressures on the part of the high command in Berlin, and one gets a general measure of the difficulties which the Germans encountered in establishing some more or less systematic inflow of foods and fibres.

It is indeed surprising not that exports from the occupied areas failed to achieve some theoretically attainable level but that enough were actually obtained to assure that food supplies would not interfere with the German conduct of the war. This achievement was partly a reflection of the skills of the German-appointed officials. It was also related to the degree of success with which German administrators were able to shield the economic and emotional realities in their individual areas of responsibility from the unreasonable expectations, attitudes and demands of Berlin. If there are general lessons to be learned from the German experience, they concern the importance of establishing programs in which both the foreign and indigenous authorities will want to co-operate for

mutually acceptable goals. In general too, the German experience supports the proposition that it is the advanced, intensive, productive agriculture which tends to be responsive to change, while it is in the underdeveloped areas, where technical practices and levels of output are relatively low, that adaptation is most difficult.

Dr. Karl Brandt and his associates tell the story of objectives and achievements with great skill. To understand performance, however, one needs not only the actual record of wartime food and agriculture developments, but also a full picture of the facts and interrelationships of European agriculture before occupation. Indeed, I would consider this last one of the most valuable contributions of the study. The book becomes one of the best references, at least in English, on European agriculture.

The real achievement of the study is in the analyses by individual country. Less was done in integrating these analyses. They are tied together partly regionally, partly by the chronology of Nazi occupation. There is of course some comparison of policies and performance in different areas. Could this be carried to a point where the effects of different kinds of specific incentives might be contrasted? The study has a brief concluding chapter in which German imports from all the occupied areas are aggregated. It would have been valuable to have a comparable total of the "exports" which Germany had to provide for these. This would also serve to highlight the purely domestic aspects of Germany's foreign agricultural activities. Some answers, particularly on this last, may be provided in another Food Research Institute volume, soon to appear, on the food and agricultural operations within Germany.

WILFRED MALENBAUM
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

SMITH, D. MACK. *Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict*. Pp. xii, 458. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. \$8.50.

When this book came to my desk, I held doubts about \$8.50 and 458 pages for ten

months of Italian unification, all in good solid prose little relieved by sprightliness. I am now a convert. With the detail usually reserved for May, 1789 and July, 1914, Mack Smith has written an exacting, archival narrative of the Cavour-Garibaldi relationship during the exclusion of the Bourbons from the Kingdom of the Sicilies. This is a sharply delimited book. Scarcely is there mention of events before April, 1860 or after the following December. Rigorously excluded also are Cavour's general diplomacy, papal politics, economic development; Mazzini is peripheral. Minute actions of Garibaldi, or say Crispi or Depretis, are documented; whereas major actions of Napoleon III are merely reported.

After Piedmont under Cavour had annexed in 1859 and 1860 Lombardy, Parma, Modena, Romagna, and Tuscany, Garibaldi and his Thousand took advantage of a Sicilian revolution to seize the island and then the mainland south of Rome. This he did in full loyalty to Victor Emanuel and his minister Cavour in the expectation of adding the whole Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to Piedmont in the name of nascent Italy. Smith makes it clear that for many reasons Cavour, though committed to unification, feared Garibaldi's successes to the extent of doing all in his power to limit or block them. He feared regional autonomy, radicalism, and republicanism; for Cavour's liberalism stopped far short of manhood suffrage. He feared, too, French intervention at Naples or Rome precipitated by Garibaldian recklessness. Smith holds that Garibaldi and his followers were more able, generous, realistic than they are usually represented. Cavour, by preventing Neapolitan and Sicilian autonomy favored by Garibaldi, made Italy's "Southern problem" difficult. Although Garibaldi never considered revolt against Cavour or his king, Cavour willingly planned to stop Garibaldi by force. Hence Cavour's armed intervention in the papal states to forestall a loyal but "filibustering" Garibaldi. No wonder the book closes with a breach between Cavour and Garibaldi; the former triumphant, the latter broken in power and dejected.

Smith's researches, which include recently

available Cavour papers, are confirmatory more than revisionary. For individuals to whom the risorgimento and its international setting are well known, this book is rewarding and, indeed, almost imperative.

GARLAND DOWNUM

Arizona State College
Flagstaff

TURNER-HIGH, HARRY HOLBERT. *Château-Gérard: The Life and Times of a Walloon Village*. Pp. xviii, 297. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1953. \$5.50.

Most sociological and anthropological studies originating in this country deal either with primitive cultures or with "Yankee cities." In the present book, an American sociologist applies the "Middletown" approach to a community belonging to a non-American, yet highly civilized culture. Château-Gérard is the fictitious name of a real village in the French-speaking part of Belgium not far from the industrial city of Liège.

The smallness of this village (population 877) enabled the author to rely almost exclusively on his own observations and informal talks rather than on sample interviews, informants, and questionnaires. Historical analysis was the only nonobservational tool used extensively; justifiably so, since many of Château-Gérard's present day customs, beliefs, and attitudes can best be explained by tracing them back to their origins in feudal or even Roman times. The author was well aware of the danger that the object of his study might be modified by his studying it. To reduce self-consciousness and suspicion among the inhabitants, he became familiar with the region's dialect, a foreign language even to many French-speaking Belgians. Professor Turner-High combined the scientist's skill of precise observation with the artist's gift of sympathetic understanding to describe Château-Gérard's family, class, and occupational structure, as well as its social, political, and religious activities. So vivid and accurate is the picture which emerges, that this reviewer felt at once transplanted to this region which he has known since early youth.

Some of the generalizations, on the other

hand, are open to challenge, for example, that the Belgian party structure corresponds to class divisions (p. 180), or that secularism is less prevalent in Belgium than in the United States (p. 271). However, this is essentially a descriptive study. And yet, it provides much more than the description of the folkways of a particular village. Like Middletown, Château-Gérard is a typical community. It typifies rural life, not merely in Wallonia, but to some extent in many other parts of Western Europe. This book should therefore be of interest not only to the social scientist, but even to the American tourist traveling in Europe. It might help him to overcome some of his prejudices and to understand some characteristic aspects of the European way of life.

FELIX OPPENHEIM

University of Delaware

GRÉGOIRE, ROGER. *La Fonction Publique*. Pp. 360. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954. 1,200 fr.

M. Roger Grégoire is the first director of the Fonction Publique founded in 1945, the French counterpart of the British Treasury and the American Budget Bureau. La Fonction Publique serves the national administration to assure, through harmonious relations, the efficacy of personnel and agencies.

The author has an active part in intellectual organizations such as the Institut d'Études Politiques and the École Nationale d'Administration. He officiates as emissary to the Organization of the United Nations. War, combat, citations, and captivity enhanced his stature as man and patriot.

The book tends primarily to emphasize the human factor in French public administration. The title *La Fonction Publique* "designates the ensemble of personnel which incarnates the administration." In the past one spoke impersonally of state employees, agents, and functionaries. Under the new formula the author accentuates their role in the compass of a social approach to their personalized official life and labor.

Stability of French officialdom rests basi-

cally on royal grants built around the corporative system of the *ancien régime*. It has survived the Reign of Terror; Napoleon I; the Revolution of 1848; the Second Empire of Napoleon III; World Wars I and II; and the implications of the syndicalist movement of the twentieth century foreshadowing the socialist state. But, with the enactment of the Labor Code of 1946 historic factual stability is no longer one of *garanties octroyées*, guarantees bestowed by gracious authority motivated by enlightened self-interest. Instead, stability has come to flow from *garanties légales*, statutory guarantees buttressed by formal legislation enacted with legalized participation of syndicalized public functionaries. The result is a new pattern of stability growing out of an itemized expansion of formal legal rights and duties comprising: schooling, examination, appointment, selection, training, advancement, tenure, toleration of conflicting political affiliations, formal recognition of syndical organization of functionaries, provision of social personal and familiar welfare, and retirement pension. *La Fonction Publique* is enriched by a comparative treatment of relevant developments in major countries of the West.

In a pregnant Preface M. Louis Camu, President of the Banque de Bruxelles and experienced in administrative legislation, protests that one should not write a preface to a book one would have liked to produce oneself. Yet, warmly sponsoring M. Grégoire's work, he justifies and supports the author's abiding faith in stability of France and her public functionaries despite the all-too-evident instability of French multiparty government.

JOHANNES MATTERN
Johns Hopkins University

PADOVER, SAUL K., with the collaboration of FRANÇOIS GOGUEL, LOUIS ROSENSTOCK-FRANCK, and ERIC WEIL. *French Institutions: Values and Politics*. Pp. vi, 102. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954. \$1.50.

MÉTRAUX, RHODA, and MARGARET MEAD. *Themes in French Culture: A Preface to the Study of French Community*. Pp. xi, 120. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954. \$1.50.

These monographs form part of the Hoover Institute Studies of the "world revolution of our time," Dean Padover's in the Institutions Series, Drs. Métraux's and Mead's initiating the Communities Series. They approach from different and, to a certain extent, complementary angles the complex problem of analyzing the French community.

To this reviewer Dr. Padover's study represents an extremely valuable contribution to the understanding of contemporary France, but one in which the element of originality perhaps diminishes progressively. The first and most interesting section, based on a manuscript by Erick Weil, attempts to make explicit basic French values and to relate the difficulty and conflict encountered in reconciling them with the creation of effective political institutions. The ensuing section, written by François Goguel, traces more familiar ground discussing lucidly and succinctly the reflection of disagreements over the idea of democracy in the political structure of the Fourth Republic. Sections III and IV contain a largely factual exposition of social and material conditions, which the reader might wish had been more explicitly linked to French values, institutions, and policies. The title of the final section, "Foreign Policy," conveys the impression of an evaluation of France's external relations in the light of the ideas previously presented. Instead it is primarily a reprinting of an assessment of the reasons for France's defeat in 1940, plus highly condensed remarks on French Communism, neutralism, European Defense Committee, and Franco-German relations. There are useful appendices on parties, elections, and premiers.

The reviewer must of necessity consider the Métraux-Mead monograph with reference to its contribution in the field of political science. As such it is, like so many others of similar genre, alternately suggestive and questionable. Three sections focus on the foyer, the interacting locale of the family group, emphasizing the child's place therein, the process of his education, and the emergent individual's conception of the outside world. Additional sections present background papers analyzing the French Civil Code as it relates to the family,

analyzing certain French movies, and presenting French projective tests. The careful reader will find many insights into the origins of French attitudes toward political, social, and economic issues. In this sense the second study complements the first. Inevitably the reader will be troubled, however, by the fact that he must make these links himself on the basis of highly impressionistic evidence. He will also be constantly nagged by questions as to the extent to which the data presented is: a) common to most Western cultures, b) common to all French social and economic classes, c) common to French urban and rural environments. Finally, the reader will be both annoyed and amused at the inclusion of innumerable French phrases beside their English translations. If the authors wish to translate, let them do so. If they fear misunderstanding will result, let them leave the material in its original form. French, in short, might be treated as a less esoteric language than, say, Urdu or Bantu.

EDGAR S. FURNESS, JR.
Princeton University

OTHER COUNTRIES

CAMPBELL, ALEXANDER. *The Heart of Africa*. Pp. xii, 487. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. \$5.00.

The Heart of Africa, written by the Johannesburg Bureau Chief of *Time and Life*, is perhaps the best of the recent accounts on the social, economic and political situations and trends in that vast and variegated region of the world known as Africa South of the Sahara. Mr. Campbell is a knowledgeable and sophisticated reporter who, from his South African base, has traveled widely in the continent. In this volume he gives vivid and dramatic reports, varying in scope and depth, on selected developments in the Union of South Africa, Southwest Africa, Bechuanaland, Portuguese East Africa, the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, British East Africa, the Belgian Congo, French West and Equatorial Africa, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. The best account is that on

the Union of South Africa; the reports on other areas are uneven in coverage and quality. Thus the reporting on Mau Mau in Kenya is superb and the interpretation of the realities in the Congo is perceptive, while the portrayals of Portuguese East Africa and French Africa are less adequate. The reports on the vital political developments in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, particularly the latter, are somewhat disappointing. Considering, however, the fabulously diverse and complex character of the territories surveyed, Mr. Campbell has done a remarkably good job.

In the final chapter, "Continent in Crisis," the author attempts to isolate the more important problems common to the areas surveyed and to generalize the basic trends observed. He quite properly places special emphasis upon problems of labor migration, land use, population pressures observable in some regions, the disruption of indigenous societies, and race relations. He is impressed by the profound social transformations occurring in Africa and emphasizes the revolutionary implications of these changes for the continent and the rest of the world. While he may overstate the extent and depth of these changes, his interpretation is essentially correct. Mr. Campbell perhaps occasionally overdraws the grim aspects of situations described. For example, he gives only limited attention to the forces in South Africa which may effect a more rational resolution of the tensions existing in that country, though admittedly the most optimistic observer would find it difficult to prove that a peaceful resolution of these tensions is certain.

In general, while Mr. Campbell's report does not penetrate "the heart of Africa," it does illuminate many facets of the African scene; and should, therefore, be welcomed both by the novice and the specialist in African affairs.

WILLIAM O. BROWN
Boston University

DAVIDSON, BASIL, and ADENEKAN ADEMOLA (Eds.). *The New West Africa: Problems of Independence*. Pp. 184. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954.

This is a lively and at times penetrating review of Britain's colonial showpiece—West Africa. Her experiment at styling political and economic institutions in Nigeria and the Gold Coast according to her own historical development is watched by many with caution and by some, south of the Equator, with fear and dismay. The authors deal primarily with Nigeria's thirty million people and the four million inhabitants of the Gold Coast.

Geographically, West Africa is defined as that region lying to the south of thirteen latitude and to the west of thirteen longitude. Here dwell some sixty million Negroids of extraordinary diversity, ethnically and linguistically, in an environment ranging from dense and steaming tropical forest to barren desert wastes.

The aim of self-government is not a new one to the peoples of West Africa. Powerful despotic rulers of numerous kingdoms and tribes have for centuries battled one another in an endless series of subjugation and rebellion. Historical records, dating back to 957 A.D. when Arabian and Moorish travelers visited West Africa, give this region considerable time perspective and challenge seriously the conception of primitiveness. On the eve of European conquest, the Vai people of Liberia had virtually perfected the art of writing.

Nationalism in West Africa, as everywhere, is motivated by an economic seeking for improved standards of living. This motive has produced a solid ideological clash between the established chiefs and the commoners. It is against the former that the nationalist movements have thrown themselves with almost as much force as against the men of "sound administration"—the British colonial servants.

The authors establish a continuum of nationalism ranging from the tribal variety to a regionalism to nationhood and, finally, to a West African Federation. Politically, both Nigeria, a federal state based on a series of regional governments and the Gold Coast, a unitary state, have developed articulate party machines of both the right and the left, a civil service, and a hierarchical system of administration which remains so far somewhat top heavy and biased in

favour of an elite of lawyers, chiefs, wealthy farmers and traders.

Although political independence is round the corner, the authors insist that economic enslavement remains in the form of foreign investment and a policy of extraction without refunding by the United Kingdom. Purchasing power remains very low while wages are calculated on a subsistence minimum. The wisdom of accumulating forced savings for the African farmer-producer by numerous marketing boards, who pay the grower well below the world price, is seriously questioned. In 1950 all the British colonies earned more than was allocated by the British Government for colonial development over a ten-year period. Could this be the spark which fires the tinder?

PETER C. W. GUTKIND

Makerere College
Kampala, Uganda

TINLEY, J. M. *South African Food and Agriculture in World War II*. (Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Studies on Food, Agriculture, and World War II, No. 6.) Pp. xii, 138. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954. \$5.00.

Although South Africa is best known for its mineral wealth, vital to its economy are exports of maize, deciduous and citrus fruits, hides, and skins which go largely to Europe. Its food imports include rice (which is important in the diet of the quarter-million Asians), tea, coffee, and wheat needed to supplement a small wheat harvest in the Cape.

Thus in 1939, when shipping was severely restricted, the Union faced the dual problem of agricultural surpluses and shortages.

South Africa fed most of its troops overseas as well as Italian prisoners of war brought to the country and furnished stores for enormous convoys calling at Capetown when the Axis blocked the Mediterranean. Wartime jobs were plentiful, and wages rose under competition for labor leading to marked changes in the consumption patterns of both European and non-European. They bought increasing amounts of fresh fruits, meat, eggs, bread, and butter. All this helped mate-

rially to solve the surplus crisis in agriculture but intensified the shortages. Even some vegetables which South Africa usually produced in abundance were scarce, and for a time no maize could be used for livestock feeding.

Food supplies held up well the first three years of the war but deteriorated the last three years—partly due to poor harvests. The government was loath to impose formal rationing, but after the war shortages became more serious and ration books were distributed. A last minute improvement in both domestic productions and imports staved off the actual operation of rationing.

Professor Tinley generally confines himself to a careful discussion of problems and how they were met. He implies that formal rationing would have been difficult but would have meant a more equitable distribution of food; that fertilizers were distributed where they did the most good; that the national diet shifted toward choicer and more expensive foods; and that in general the food situation was improved during the war years.

Students of agricultural economics and of South Africa are indebted to Professor Tinley, of the University of California Davis Campus, and to Merrill K. Bennett, director of the Stanford Food Research Institute, for this fine contribution.

EDWIN S. MUNGER

American Universities Field Staff

OSBORNE, HAROLD. *Bolivia: A Land Divided*. Pp. 144. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954. \$2.50.

PENDLE, GEORGE. *Paraguay: A Riverside Nation*. Pp. 115. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954. \$2.50.

LINKE, LILO. *Ecuador: A Country of Contrasts*. Pp. 173. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954. \$2.50.

Among them, these small, but excellent volumes published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs present a good start for an understanding of the complexities of agricultural countries caught in an indus-

trial age. Of these Bolivia is, because of the importance of its mining industry, most involved with the outside world. But even here, "the majority of the Indians are still living entirely outside the money economy, on a self-sufficient agricultural basis." Out of 3,500,000 people, only 45,000 work in the mines, and at most another 150,000, including women and children, find an occupation in some industrial pursuit. The few cities, the middle class, and the government depend upon the outside world. The rest of the population has little need for, and less knowledge of, the nations beyond their immediate horizon. This indifference to the world is reflected in the fact that, out of 200,000 registered voters legally required to vote, only 50,000 cast their ballots in the election of 1951.

These three agricultural economies, with their large landholding systems and primitive techniques, have to abide in a world of expanding industrialization, increasing costs, and a continuing inflation. The demands for a higher standard of living go hand in hand with an ardent nationalism and a zest for social reform that makes it difficult to find the capital required for new industries. The economic and social history of these countries has discouraged capital accumulation, and shunted what was saved into nonproductive channels. The ruling groups have been luxury rather than productivity minded. These facts, combined with political instability, have put obstacles in the path of economic development.

But apart from these shortcomings, the cultural contrasts, and the great difficulties of transportation would have proven formidable barriers in an effort to combine the tropics and the highlands in a way that would have satisfied the needs of a national economy.

Of the three volumes under consideration, the one on Ecuador is most nearly a compendium of facts with little reflection upon their meaning, while the one on Bolivia is written out of wide contacts and unusual insight into the nature of the country, its people, and its problems. It is one of the best books on Bolivia available in English. The author is fully aware of the essential tragedy of the Andean

highlands entangled in an Indian heritage and a never fully assimilated Spanish conquest, and wedged against the demands of modern social reform movements and an impassioned nationalism. Mr. Pendle makes some reflections on Paraguay which deserve fuller treatment. Of these three countries, Paraguay is probably the most fortunate, not because it is richer or politically more stable, but because Paraguay has achieved what the others have not—national homogeneity and racial identity. All the Paraguayans are bilingual, sing their songs and write their best poetry in Guaraní. Good indices and selected bibliographies add to the usefulness of the volumes.

FRANK TANNENBAUM
Columbia University

LONGRIGG, STEPHEN HEMSLEY. *Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development*. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Pp. xiii, 305. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. \$4.00.

No words better describe this work than Brigadier Longrigg's own statement on page v of his preface in which "he hopes that his historical and factual method of approach and his intention of objectivity may give to these pages at least the value of a reference book which may be found to assemble and synchronize conveniently the practical oil history of a group of countries and companies. . . ." Both Brigadier Longrigg's hope and intention are admirably and expertly realized.

Oil in the Middle East is a painstaking, precise, and compact account of the development of the world's greatest oil reserve. It traces the industry from its establishment as a modern enterprise in the late nineteenth century to its present spectacular achievement. The book is skillfully organized on a combined chronological and geographical basis, thus enabling the author to give full justice to the effects of the exigencies of two world wars and the opportunities of peace upon the successes and failures of each country and company. The search for oil in the currently nonproducing countries receives the same consideration as for their more for-

tunate neighbors. Much attention is devoted throughout the work to the organization of companies, their political negotiations with the governments concerned, the terms of their agreements, and their field operations. The work is greatly enhanced by statistical appendices, which give measure to the magnitude of Middle East oil operations, and a set of maps which fix the necessary spatial relationships. From the point of view of coverage the book leaves little to be desired.

In recording the history of Middle East petroleum, the author tends to give precedence to the British position somewhat at the expense of recent American accomplishment. This is a natural consequence of the long period of British tenure in the area, strong feelings engendered by the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Chapter X entire), and the author's own background (British) as civil servant, military officer, and oil company negotiator and executive in the Middle East. There are few persons of any nationality, however, who are sufficiently experienced to provide the comprehensive view that Brigadier Longrigg has here accomplished. It is simply this reviewer's opinion that more stress on the significance of American participation in the Middle East petroleum industry, particularly in the realms of government and labor relations as well as technology, would have sharpened the focus of a volume already well trained on its objective.

DOUGLAS D. CRARY
University of Michigan

BARCLAY, GEORGE W. *Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan*. Pp. xviii, 274. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. \$5.00.

The reviewer is delighted to have the opportunity to make a few comments on this book since it presents a case history of the effects of traditional colonial development on population change in which he has been greatly interested for more than a generation. In his *Danger Spots* (1929), he wrote, on the basis of 1920 and 1925 census data for Formosa, that "the very conditions necessary to increase considerably the productive capacity of natives

in the tropics also make inevitable a rapid increase in their numbers" (p. 40). The author has shown beyond question that the type of colonial exploitation followed by Japan, which was typical of pre-World War II colonialism, had a tremendous effect on the rate of growth of population in Taiwan because it reduced the death rate without in any significant degree altering the family and social culture of the Taiwanese which in turn determined their birth rate. The author points out, however, that although the introduction of more modern methods of production and of more efficient forms of organization had this effect in Taiwan, there is no reason to assume that the modernization of an agricultural society must necessarily issue in such a rapid population growth that it will endanger the maintenance of relatively low death rates and such improvement in the level of living as may have been attained when better methods of production first came into use. The reviewer is in full agreement with the view that in Taiwan, and he would add, *elsewhere*, the problem of changing the cultural pattern so that the reduction of the death rate, which is now a relatively cheap and easy matter, would be accompanied by a reduction in the birth rate is very complex and is but little understood.

That the author emphasizes the essentially Chinese character of Taiwanese culture also seems highly important to the reviewer since it suggests the probable early effects of the modernization of the economy of China if little attention is paid to the reorganization of the cultural pattern that would make a simultaneous reduction in the birth rate probable.

The author's statement that "the results of Japanese rule in Taiwan are of little consequence to social science as an isolated series of events," but that "they gain their strongest claim to importance by revealing some social and demographic implications of policies that are often urged and undertaken towards non-industrial peoples" seems quite to the point. The reviewer would like to add, however, that those who are skeptical of the importance of population growth as a factor of the highest significance in looking to the future betterment

of life in underdeveloped areas, would do well to read this careful and factual case study of what happened in Taiwan when no attention was paid to the demographic consequences of industrial modernization.

WARREN S. THOMPSON

Director Emeritus
Scripps Foundation

PANIKKAR, K. M. *Asia and Western Dominance: A Survey of the Vasco Da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 1498-1945*. Pp. xxx, 530. New York: John Day Company, 1954. \$7.50.

When a distinguished statesman and ambassador of one of the world's great powers writes his story of a major event in history, the book must needs be of concern to everyone. In *Asia and Western Dominance* we have an Indian interpretation of Indian and Far Eastern history from the opening of the sea routes in the 15th century up to the 1930's. The sections dealing with the history of India during the British period are especially valuable and will be revealing to those Americans who have thought of English imperialism as only a force for ill in India's development.

Three-fifths of the book is concerned with the development of international relations from the coming of Vasco da Gama in 1498 in the "Age of Expansion" to "Europe in Retreat," 1918 to 1939. A wealth of interesting detail on the progress of the maritime powers and their effect on eastern Asia has been brought together. But the presentation is weakened by many obvious errors in names, dates, and so forth. Such slips as: Yoshimitsu referred to as an "Emperor" of Japan, British relinquishment of Indonesia in "1826," Chinese taken as "slave labour" to California, Korean kings sending "tributes to the Japanese Emperor," the Manchus "quietly" occupying Mongol territories, together with many misspellings of proper names necessitate caution in using the book.

Obvious bias is shown in the author's condoning Russian expansion at the expense of the Manchu empire, in a general disparagement of the maritime powers, and in overstressing the social chaos caused by "the missionary aggression to which China was subjected." Japan's actions are those

of "an apt pupil of the great powers in their policy of expansion."

A special section of the book is devoted to "Christian Missions." The style here is more objective and the analysis of the reasons for failure is generally sound.

The section containing the most original interpretation of modern events is entitled "The Recovery of Asia" and is devoted to a history of the change of ideas in various countries including the socio-religious revolution in India.

The optimism of Mr. Panikkar's "Conclusion" is well summarized in one sentence. "The period of European control of the States of Asia is a dividing line in their history, for both by resistance and by adaptation they have had to call forth new vitality and consciously adapt themselves to new ideas by which alone they were able gradually to recover their independence and strength."

WOODBIDGE BINGHAM

University of California
Berkeley

HAMMER, ELLEN J. *The Struggle for Indochina*. Pp. xvii, 332. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press (published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1954. \$5.00.

Dr. Hammer's detailed account of the struggle between France and the Communist-led Viet Minh for domination over Indochina will be of value as the only full study of the conflict in English. The sordid story, distinguished by blundering and bad faith on both sides, moves like a Greek tragedy towards its denouement. Dr. Hammer brings her study to a close just before the Geneva Conference was to show the extent of the division and indecisiveness of the western nations regarding Indochina.

The study seems not to have got to the root of the issue. Dr. Hammer makes much of the shift of the Viet Minh into the Communist camp in 1949. She repeatedly calls it disastrous, which it undoubtedly is for those who must live with it; but Dr. Hammer believes that the "disaster" was for the nationalist goals of the Viet Minh itself, in that it alienated many Vietnamese nationalists and brought

American military aid to the French. "The Vietnamese Communists thereby made a military victory impossible," she comments on page 247.

Here Dr. Hammer walks into the trap that stultifies American policy not only in Indochina but in all Asia. What offends us, she seems to think, must necessarily offend everybody else. If she had spent even a little time in Vietnam she would have discovered that the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese see no conflict at all between Communism and their goal of independence. For them Ho Chi Minh is not a stooge of Communism but a dedicated patriot and their best hope for independence. It is hard to believe that the Viet Minh forfeited much appeal by a shift to the Communist camp. Could any French-sponsored regime have captured this loyalty? Is it possible to "save from Communism" those who do not want to be saved? Can America form a successful anti-Communist alliance in Asia when the peoples immediately concerned consider themselves threatened not by Communism but by *ourselves*?

Dr. Hammer hardly approaches these questions, although it should have been clear long before July 20 that they are basic, and that the answer to all of them is NO. Americans cannot escape responsibility in the struggle for Asia, yet they can expect only continuing disaster until they realize that they are at cross-purposes with the peoples of Asia. Unless Americans can equate Asian anti-colonialism with their own anti-Communism, the inevitable consequence will be either capitulation or war.

WILLIAM B. DUNN

United States Department of State

LINEBARGER, PAUL M. A., DJANG CHU and ARDATH W. BURKS. *Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan*. Pp. x, 630. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1954. \$6.50.

Far Eastern Governments and Politics contains two separate historical accounts of the Chinese and Japanese governments and politics. The instructive thesis is maintained throughout the book that in spite of frequent and intensive foreign im-

pacts upon both systems, their politics have always been consistent with fundamental native characteristics. Thus, today the Soviet-inspired Communist regime of China and the American-inspired democracy of Japan are shown to possess typical Chinese and Japanese qualities. This thesis is more successfully worked out in Japan's than in China's case. One reason for this is that the fundamental factors in Chinese government or their effects have not always been fully treated. The Confucian doctrine of the state and society is incompletely summarized. The lasting impressions of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion upon China's government are hardly mentioned. The regime of Communist China and its place in Chinese political and cultural history are discussed too briefly. A detailed comparison of Communist institutions and practices with those of preceding regimes would have been a new and needed contribution to an understanding of China's government. The contemporary Japanese situation has received fuller and less formalistic treatment. The chapters on Japan, covering the years since 1941, are clear and lively. This cannot be said of all the chapters dealing with prewar Japan.

The authors are using an analytical and interpretative method, an assurance of enduring value. But it has induced them to state or imply some principles of Far Eastern governments or of history in general which occasionally approach the mystical and seem to need more substantiation to be convincing. There is, for instance, talk of "inevitable" events (pp. 120, 121); of China "suffering gigantic trauma from clash of cultures" (p. 25). The inexactness of this language is matched by the use of many terms which are bound to leave the student puzzled. What is an "unsystematic" civil war, what is a "brilliant" and a "lunatic" economy (pp. 347, 322)? Altogether the style of the book is often annoyingly pseudo-sophisticated, for instance when Japan is described as a modern nation-state "*sans le savoir*" when later the same statement is made in perfectly adequate English; or when "in terms of" is used *ad nauseam* and mostly unnecessarily if not wrongly in the second section of the book. Perhaps this disre-

spect for language is responsible for the misspelling of almost every French and German book quoted in the footnotes.

This is a useful book for the student with some background in Far Eastern affairs who wishes to get a summary of Chinese and Japanese politics. It is distinguished by the use of Chinese and Japanese sources.

WERNER LEVI

University of Minnesota

NU, THAKIN. *Burma Under the Japanese*. Edited and translated by J. S. Furnivall. Pp. xxviii, 132. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. \$3.00.

It is always a privilege to have a work of history written by one of its participants. To see the relation of the actor to great historic events and the vision of these events in his perspective provides a special illumination obtainable in no other way. Asia, unfortunately, has so far given us little in this genre, principally because the national revolutionary leaders remain too deeply immersed in affairs to be able to write with the leisured reflectiveness granted only by time and distance.

It is therefore particularly welcome to have this brief memoir of the Japanese Occupation from the hand of the Prime Minister of Burma, Thakin Nu (now called U Nu), one of the chief actors of that period. Written in the flush of the events themselves, within the few months immediately following the end of the war, it is not to be compared with the considered, ripe reflection of a Trotsky, Churchill or Nehru. It has the rawness and the intimacy of the diary; it provides brief and enlightening glimpses, not finished analyses; it is a raw document of history, not history itself.

Three portraits emerge most sharply from these memoirs. The first is the attitude of Burma's leaders toward the Japanese occupiers. U Nu's memoirs make it quite clear that the Burmese leaders were not completely taken in by Japan's "Asia for the Asiatics" propaganda. For most of the leaders, the decision to go along with the Japanese was a carefully calculated risk, qualified by a readiness to break with them whenever it might appear necessary.

The differences among the Burmese leaders on this question were essentially matters of tactics rather than of basic outlook on national independence. The division between those who remained behind to operate the government and those who went into guerrilla opposition to the Japanese was not so sharp as has been assumed by the black-and-white moralistic attitude of the West. Ba Maw, the "puppet" himself, was no more motivated by a craven submission to the Japanese than Than Tun, the Communist leader, or Aung San, later the national hero of Burma's independence, or U Nu himself. There was constant communication between the divided segments of the independence movement, and Ba Maw himself could be called upon by the rebels in the field for all kinds of assistance. If Ba Maw overstayed the game on the Japanese side, it was because he misread the power and direction of the wave of history, not because he preferred the Japanese.

Another important picture that emerges from these pages is that of the Japanese as occupiers. For Americans, Japan has always been enemy, pupil, or conquered people. But for the Burmese, the Japanese as the wielders of power were a different animal. From an initial disposition to accept the Japanese as "liberators" or perhaps as the opportune instruments of their liberation, they quickly came to look upon them as arrogant, wily, and ruthless. The adjectives that recur over and over again in U Nu's description of his dealings with the Japanese are: tricky, stolid, expressionless, inscrutable, greedy. Racial similarity did not seem to make the Japanese any more palatable or more understandable to U Nu than they were to non-Asians who had occasion to deal with their harsher side.

Finally, we are given a brief glimpse of U Nu himself, the remarkably dedicated leader of Burma: a man of peace who found himself in the middle of war and an age of war; a quiet literary man who was thrust into the vortex of activity by events; a man capable of embracing both Buddhism and Marxist socialism simultaneously. His warmth, his richness of feeling, his generosity, as well as perhaps a fatal

hesitation to be ruthless when ruthlessness is called for, all stand out strongly from these warmly personal pages.

Mr. Furnivall, the British economist who has prepared this book for the English-reading public, is to be congratulated on yet another act of devotion to Burma.

HERBERT PASSIN

Ohio State University

WILDES, HARRY EMERSON. *Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath*. Pp. v, 356. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. \$4.50.

This study of the occupation of Japan is the most comprehensive and thoughtfully critical treatment which has yet appeared of an incredibly ambitious effort to bring about basic changes in the ideas and institutions of a conquered state. Its author is an "old Japan hand" who took part in the administration of the occupation as a member of Government Section of Supreme Command, Allied Powers. He knows whereof he speaks; consequently, his book is an authoritative treatment written for the layman, but crammed with interesting data for the specialists. Mr. Wildes is critical, but not captious nor moralistic in his examination of the reform program. He sets the "occupationaires" neatly within the extremely difficult living conditions which the Japanese had to endure. It is apparent that much of his source material has come from Japanese in various walks of life.

The text is arranged in thirty-one chapters, beginning with "Occupation Atmosphere" and concluding with "In Retrospect." Concisely and clearly Mr. Wildes examines the effect of the occupation program upon the emperor, the Diet, the cabinet, the police, public health, and many other political, economic and social institutions. He shows that in numerous instances the publicity of the SCAP sections was unduly optimistic or unblushingly erroneous. General MacArthur himself receives comparatively little attention, credit for his measures being given in many instances to General Whitney, Chief of Government Section. This reviewer would not agree that Whitney rather than MacArthur was the principal inspirer of the new con-

stitution, nor that MacArthur was inclined to be satisfied with the old one. He would prefer "Tycoon" to "Typhoon" in the book's title. The reviewer does agree that major credit for such success as the occupation attained should go to the Japanese people and that the G. I., for all his sins, deserves to rank as the true symbol of freedom.

Mr. Wildes concludes that "despite the occupation and despite the cancellation of its edicts, important changes had occurred. The Bourbons had been discredited; war leaders deflated; the bureaucrats had been jolted out of their insufferable arrogance." One may believe, however, that these results would have followed defeat, occupation or no occupation.

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY

University of Minnesota

ADUARD, BARON E. J. LEWE VAN. *Japan From Surrender to Peace*. With a Foreword by John Foster Dulles. Pp. xv, 351. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (published in U. S. by Frederick A. Praeger), 1953. \$7.50.

After relating chronologically the principal events leading up to the San Francisco Conference for the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the author, referring to the Conference opening, aptly remarks: "The drama would begin at the scheduled time." Indeed, the story of the American Occupation and the forces at work behind it has been dramatically and powerfully told, and the reader is carefully led up to the climax. Unfortunately, the plot has been revealed so many times before that it has lost its novelty, and the final denouement can scarcely be called startling. Most people are aware of the fact that "if Japan were denied the necessary economic freedom for the rehabilitation of her overseas trade," the resulting economic crisis might imperil the progress made by democracy in Japan, as might also "rigid state control which might result from an overestimation of the communist menace" (p. 293).

The highlights of the reforms instituted under the Occupation are well set forth and an interesting account is rendered of Japanese political parties, but all in much

too brief a fashion to be of great value. In general, the guesses of the author seem to be educated ones such as when he asserts that the then British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, was convinced by John Foster Dulles of the soundness of an early American compromise formula regarding the signing of the treaty by the Chinese. This Hollander's appraisal of American plans, policies and administrative actions also seems objective and fair. However, the lack of footnotes is disturbing to the scholar, and one may question some of his conclusions such as that "some (farmers) have even reverted to the old practice of selling their daughters as preferable to selling their rice fields" (p. 284).

Although of minor importance, the failure to give more than the surname of many of the personalities mentioned is regrettable and the number of errors of orthography in this highly priced volume is amazing. This is particularly noticeable in the spelling of proper names such as "Pauly" (p. 84) for "Pauley," "Marquet" (p. 242) for "Marquat" and "Conally" (p. 251) for "Connally" et cetera, and one may well wonder for just what audience this book was intended. Nevertheless, one must agree with Mr. Dulles' judgment, expressed in the foreword, that despite being written without benefit of access to important source material not yet available, the book does give a most interesting and, on the whole, reliable account of the Occupation and the steps toward peace as seen by an experienced diplomat in Tokyo.

ALBERT E. KANE

Washington, D. C.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

On May 10, I sent Messrs. Don L. Kookan and Loren D. Ayres a lengthy letter citing important errors in their January 1954 ANNALS article, "Police Unions and the Public Safety." A summary of that letter follows.

The authors elaborate their ideas of craft union activities, attempting to show that some are illegal or incompatible with

police responsibilities. They are unaware of the present nature of police union organization, its methods or its successes.

While I disagree with the estimate given of craft unions, it is important to point out immediately in the limited space allotted me that there has been no attempt in the last twenty years to apply the methods the authors described to police organization.

The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, American Federation of Labor, is the only union to successfully organize thousands of policemen. In structural terminology, ours is an industrial union which has adapted its approach to special police needs.

Our union's membership pledge is quoted as "... an example of the potential incompatibility of unionism and the professional ideal. ..." This pledge went out of date with our 1940 constitution. With proper research at the time their article was written, the authors would have found that the union policeman pledges to his union "... to perform faithfully all the duties assigned to me. ..."

The authors say that the "... checkoff system ... cannot be legally applied to police service. ..." Many of the police locals do have the checkoff system.

The closed shop is not an issue in police unionization. We do not ask for it. It is not necessary to our successful operation. I believe at the time the article was written, the closed shop was even illegal in private industry. Then why discuss it in an article on police unions?

The authors state: "The courts have declared, however, that municipalities ... are without power to enter collective bargaining agreements. ..." There exist hundreds of such agreements, some approved by court action, others by attorney generals and city solicitors. Are these a myth?

Now the one way to make people worry about police unionization is to raise the bogus of strikes as the authors do. Police charters issued by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees forbid strikes. We can prove that where there is a history of public employee strikes, unionization has reduced or eliminated them.

The authors refer to professional organizations "in contrast with the selfish interest of craft unions." It appears to me that the authors have rationalized themselves into attacking the non-existent tactics of a mythical craft union of police employees. I know of no such creature.

The article says of unions, "They evince little concern over how their demands will affect the employer." The AFSC & ME is second to none in devotion to public causes, advocating a career service, and higher standards of morality and performance in public service. Our constitution states these objectives.

If the authors say they were not applying these remarks to the AFSC & ME, then they were operating in a vacuum. Essentially there is no other American union among police employees.

LEO KRAMER

*International Representative,
New England Region*

American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees

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