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
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Unity and Difference

by

G. R. MALKANI

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1. The problem of "being" is the most important problem of philosophy. Not that the concept of "being" is itself difficult or mystical. Perhaps it is the most evident concept we have in philosophy. "Being" is the correlate of knowledge; and we all certainly claim to have some knowledge. But while the concept is quite intelligible and evident, there are certain questions about 'being' which are not easily answered, and which constitute the very core of metaphysics. They are questions such as, "what things have being?", "What is the relation between things and their being?", "Is there any such thing as unity of being?", etc. We shall begin with the last question, which is the most important.

2. Differences of things are known and accepted as a matter of course. Nobody seems to doubt difference or to have any question about it. There is question only about the nature of the unity that constitutes the common being of things. Indeed, one entity, as a particular existent, can have nothing in common with another. They are just existentially, and so numerically, different. If anything is common to them, it is in the region of the concept. Things have common attributes, such as *red*, *square*, *soft*, etc. Similarly, they are supposed to have the common attribute of being.

3. Let us suppose that the analogy is complete, although we shall later find reasons against it. The question can still be asked, what is a thing apart from its attributes,—the qualities and the

relations? This question has been rather too unceremoniously and too uncritically answered. Substance can be nothing apart from its qualities. They are its filling. What can it be without its filling or its content? The latter constitutes its nature. There can be nothing without its nature. We must be able to say, *what it is*. Substance is therefore something only *together with* its qualities.

4. That, however, leaves unanswered the question, why any substance at all *as distinct from* the qualities and the relations, if it has no nature of *its own*? Why can we not stop with the qualities and the relations, which we empirically know? Why go beyond them to a substance which we do not know? If it is true that qualities and relations do not float in the air and cannot exist on their own account, if they must be grounded in something that is not a quality or a relation, then there is a radical distinction between qualities and relations that have no being in themselves on the one hand, and substance that lends an appearance of being to them on the other. It would seem that substance alone *is* or *exists* in its own right. If that is so, it must have a nature of its own, which we must investigate. We can no longer confuse substance with its qualities and its relations. It might appear to us mysterious, something behind the screen of qualities and relations. But it constitutes a real problem, which is not answered by saying that qualities and relations constitute the nature of substance as it is *in itself*.

5. An important indication of the nature of substance is given by the fact that substance *in itself* must be *without any* differences. We no doubt distinguish one substance from another. But all the difference that we know can be reduced to the qualifying epithets. Each different substance is differently described. It is the description that we give that distinguishes one substance from another. But all description is in terms of the language of concepts or in terms of universals, which have no part in the *being* of substance. If that is so, there can be no difference in substance itself, which transcends the concept. All differences are conceptual, never substantial. It is impossible to conceive a substance which is *different in itself* without reference to conceptual differences, or *particular in itself* without reference to conceptual determinations. All substance is one and without differences. It is that which sustains qualities and relations, and thereby *appears* diversified itself; but it only so appears.

6. Another indication of the nature of substance is provided by another set of facts. *Substance is the ground of all action and change*. Change cannot take place in a complete vacuum where no entity suffers change. A completely discontinuous succession, even if it were conceivable, cannot make for change. It is *something* that changes or suffers change. Similarly, action requires to be initiated, and it can only be initiated by something outside the action. It requires an actor. More than that. It requires to be carried, transferred and deposited. If this language is not quite appropriate, we might say that it is the very nature of action to arise, to reach a certain maturity, and then to decline and to disappear. All these moments of action can only appear in something that contains the action as a whole with all its moments. There is no such thing as *pure action* that can dispense with the notion of substance. It is substance that gives it unity and integrity. This substance is necessarily *immutable*. It is the ground of action and change. The world, as a series of events, must be supposed to arise from substance, to be supported by it, and to disappear into it. It is the reality behind all movement and change, which is only an appearance that hides what does not move and does not change. Thus substance is *one* and *immutable*. It is the reality behind everything that appears to us, whether in the form of qualities and relations, or in the form of movement and change.

7. This substance is as empty of all content as our notion of *pure being*. There is no difference between what is called *vastu* and what is called *sat*. Thus "being" is the stuff of all things. It is the reality behind them, sustaining an appearance of diversity, and of action and passion. But this appears outrageous to common-sense. We have no experience of *pure being*. We have experience only of concrete things, or actual things, or things with a content. The emptiness of pure being makes it indistinguishable from *pure nothing*. Why not then return to the common-sense view that *being* is an adjective of things as we suggested earlier? To reverse their role is to say what is non-sensical.

8. Let us suppose that "being" is an adjective only. An adjective is always something universal, and so necessarily ideal in character. If this is so, and *being* is only an idea, all the different varieties of *being* or of *existence* become varieties of an idea only. To the already ideal content, in which a thing can be analysed without leaving any residue, we have added one more

idea, namely, the idea of *being*. There is nothing left that can be called being-in-itself or reality that is independent of every ideating subject. Indeed, to cover up one mistake we can make another. We can argue that the idea of being is nothing subjective. For is it not the basis of the ideating subject and all the ideas that he may think? It is therefore not a psychical entity that requires to be thought by some-one. It has objectivity. It is the common objective essence of all things, including the psychical processes of an individual.

9. But if this objectivity of the idea of *being* has any meaning, is it not to be conceived on the analogy of the objectivity of things such as tables and chairs? Tables and chairs are at least particularised entities, that can sustain an ideal content and still transcend it. They can be said to exist or to have substantial being. Can a universal essence be said to exist? Then how is it universal? Existence and universality are as poles apart. A universal can only be thought, and has meaning only in the thinking of it. Existence is independent of thought, and sustains thought and its creations. Like Plato's ideas which were the archetypes of visible things, Hegel's whole metaphysical system rests on the flimsy ground of the objective reality of an idea, the idea of being, and all that the idea contains or implies.

10. Let us however concede that *being* can be an adjective of things. But then a thing must be before it can have an adjective. An adjective is dependent upon the thing to which it belongs, not the thing upon the adjective. When therefore we say that a thing exists, we add no adjective to the thing. It is a tautologous proposition. There is nothing distinguishable from *being* to which *being* can belong, while everything can belong to *being*. It is the real substance. This is further evident from the fact that while we can treat all the content of a thing as adjectival, being always partial, detachable and empirically distinguishable, we can never treat 'being' itself in the same way. It cannot be detached or attached from outside as an *accident* of a thing. It is the thing itself.

11. It may be said here that being is a *criterion*-adjective. We decide what empirical character a thing should have in order that it should be said to exist. We can say, for example, that to exist or to be real a thing should be related to time, or it should be sensible, etc. But it is quite evident that every criterion is bound to be arbitrary, while we have a perfectly intelligible

meaning for *being* independently of every criterion. We can be quite certain, for instance, that to be related to time is not the same thing as to be or to exist. For why is it not possible for something to exist without being related to time? Why is not existence out of time possible? And then a thing must be before it can be related to time. A non-existing thing cannot begin to exist by entering into a relation. In fact, all its relations will be quite as unreal as itself. No thing can ever *achieve* its own reality or its own existence through a relation. The same reasoning can be applied to all other criteria. It is not for us to *decide* what things should or should not have reality. It is for the things themselves to *declare* whether they are real or not, and for us to recognise the fact.

12. "Being" is not an idea only, nor is it an adjective. It is the thing itself or what is called substance. This "being" runs through all things. Nothing, either positive or negative, can fall outside of it. It is the universal ground. There can be no limit to it, and nothing that is greater than it. For what can include *being* itself? It is verily Brahman, the Great beyond which nothing can be greater. This *being* is in itself undifferentiated. Differences belong to the realm of thought, and are only falsely superimposed upon it. Thus unity is substantival, while differences are false and adjectival.

13. This view, as we said, is a challenge to common-sense. But if we are to accept it, *being* must be distinguishable from non-being; and it can only be so distinguishable when it has a *nature of its own* distinct from the nature superimposed upon it by thought. Here Vedanta comes to our aid. Being is great and undifferentiated. But it is not an emptiness. It may appear to be 'Nil', by the standards of empirical thought, but it is not Nil. For it has a self-nature or *swarûpa*. In fact, nothing else has *swarûpa*; for all other things are relative and dependent. They are self-discrepant in their nature, leading beyond themselves in order to be themselves.

We take a great step forward when we identify the metaphysical reality behind all things with the Self or the *âtman*. For the Self alone has a nature, self-evident and self-evidencing. This Self is not the same thing as the ego or the empirical 'I'. The ego has a necessary reference to the non-ego. Like all objects, it refers to what is beyond itself and is determined from outside.

It is not *in-itself*. It has no *swarūpa*. It is soul-less and self-less, —a mere appearance, without the interiority and the depth of *being*. When we reject the ego therefore, we get to that which is the inner reality of the ego, and which reveals the ego itself as an outer shell, impermanent in its nature, and foreign to the real Self. This inner reality of the ego reveals itself as formless and incapable of any determination. It alone has a nature. We know this nature completely when we know it as non-dual and blissful.

14. We have so far raised the question, what is the unity behind all things? We have got the answer,—the unity is of *being* itself or *sat*, and this *being* is identical with the true Self. We can now answer the question, what things have *being*? The question is illegitimate. For things do not have *being*. It is *being* that has things super-imposed upon it and adjectival to it. Still the question is quite legitimate so far as common-sense is concerned. We shall take it as such, and seek to press out its implications.

15. It is evident that *being* or reality is indicated by some form of cognitive experience or intuition, and by nothing else. Our only genuine intuitions of reality relate either to some object given from outside and appropriately called 'this or *idam*, or to the Self that is never given and never an object and that is essentially *not-this*. The former comprises all empirical entities that constitute our world, both physical and mental. The latter comprises only one entity, and that entity is essentially non-empirical and super-sensible. But once we have accepted these two kinds of reality, which exhaust all forms of possible being, we cannot rest there. For the reality of the one is a direct challenge to the reality of the other.

(a) Firstly, we note that they are so exclusive that there is no common ground between them. The common ground must be something neutral as between the Self and the not-Self. If there is any such thing, the question will arise, what sort of intuition is proper to it? Since we have no third kind of intuition of reality, we are thrown back on the ultimate dualism of the Self and the not-Self, without any kind of unity between them. Even the subject-object unity, howsoever inclusive we make it, will be found, on analysis, to fall within the category of the not-Self; for the finitude and the determinateness of the object will infect the whole.

(b) Secondly, these two forms of *being* are not only exclusive, but they are also *opposed* to each other. They can never reside in the same locus. One and the same thing cannot be both a Self and a not-Self. If anything is *this* to me, it can never be my Self. I can never *consciously* confuse my Self with what is only an object to me, including my body and my mental life. The opposition is accordingly radical and complete like the opposition of light and darkness.

(c) Thirdly, and this is the most important consideration, while there can be no neutral or a more inclusive reality, the two cannot coexist side by side or independently of each other. The reality of the one is simply a challenge to the reality of the other. While in the realm of the not-Self, entities are related to each other and determined by each other, it is not so with regard to the whole realm of the not-Self on the one hand and the Self on the other. The Self cannot tolerate the reality of an *other* to it. If there is an *other* to the Self, the Self is to be distinguished from it. This entails objectivity for both. For only objects can be distinguished. The moment therefore the Self is distinguished from anything, it is degraded to the not-Self. It ceases to be the Self. The reality of the world is thus incompatible with the reality of the Self. We cannot stop with an ultimate dualism,—a world in time and in space, and a Self outside of it. We must choose. We cannot indeed annul either form of being altogether or refuse to recognise it. We can only subordinate one form of being to the other; and subordination in the sphere of *being* can only mean "treating the one as an appearance of the other."

16. When the question is put in this form, it is not difficult to decide which is the reality and which an appearance. That which demands the *other* in order to realize itself is an illusory appearance of *this other*. If both demand each other, as subject and object do in ordinary experience, both are illusory appearances of some other unrelated reality. *Reality must be essentially unrelated and in itself*. It must have a *swarūpa*. We have seen that the Self alone has *swarūpa*. If it is related, it is degraded. It assumes the form of the 'I' or the ego, which is only an alienated form of the Self. The world on the other hand has no *swarūpa* or self-nature. Relations are the very essence of it. It is dependent for its nature upon the intelligent Self and upon the form given to it by thought in the process of its objectification. It is an appearance only sustained by its relations. Take away these rela-

tions, and the appearance collapses completely, leaving nothing but the Self behind.

17. We can now conclude that unity is real and difference illusory. The unity is realized as the pure object or as *pure being* at the level of metaphysics, which seeks to know the reality behind sensible appearance. The same unity is known more completely at a higher level as the Self, the only spiritual reality that we directly intuit. Thus the Absolute Spirit or the Self, that is without any differences, either internal or external, is the reality behind all things and the only reality there is. The world, full of differences, has no being-in-itself and no nature of its own. It is wholly illusory. Those who know the Self know the truth about it. For the Self is the Truth. It is the only thing that is fit for knowledge, a higher kind of knowledge that is not yet given to us, and that can only be achieved through an intellectual and spiritual discipline. Thus there are levels in the knowledge of the Truth. From empirical knowledge we go, through reflective thought, to metaphysical knowledge; from metaphysical knowledge, through cancellation of objectivity, we go to the knowledge of the spirit; lastly, from the knowledge of the spirit we go, through cancellation of its supposed personal or individual character, to the Knowledge of the Truth. The Truth makes us free.

Rasa as Aesthetic Intuition

by

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".....the total effect of the work of art is an intuition".

— Benedetto Croce (*Aesthetic*, p. 3)

The elaborate discussion on the nature of *rasa*, particularly on the uniqueness of the experience, by the Indian aestheticians may appear to a modern student of aesthetics as mere quibble. The comparison of *rasa* with the recognized kinds of knowledge in order to show that it is not a kind of knowledge at all¹ may be regarded as pointless. Aesthetic experience is one thing: any kind of logical understanding is another. How could the one be confused with the other?

But, if we closely examine the general tenor of their discussions we will find that it is not mere love of argument that is responsible for these. The Indian aestheticians want to drive home a particular point viz., that the aesthetic apprehension of the beauty of a work of art is unlike the cognitive apprehension of any object. In other words, their aim is to indicate the *uniqueness of the mode of apprehending* that a responsive spectator (*sahridaya*) employs. This is done negatively by contrasting this type of apprehension with the usual, well-known modes of apprehension of an object. Logic studies and classifies the latter under specific heads. If the former could be contrasted with these and shown to be different, the uniqueness of the aesthetic apprehension becomes clearly defined. This is the aim of the Indian writers who undertake to compare *rasa* with the various types of knowledge.

(1)

Not merely Cognitive

If aesthetic apprehension is not like any of the logical types of apprehension or ways of knowing, can we on that account

1. See P. P. Śāstri, *The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure*, (Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, No. 8) Chap. VIII.

deny that we apprehend something when we experience beauty? The sahrdaya does cognise many details in the aesthetic object and this cognition is necessary for his getting the experience of rasa. So there is some 'cognition' even in aesthetic experience. If it is not of the well-known logical type, what kind is it? Where lies the difference between these two kinds of apprehension?

The difference lies in this: in apprehending an aesthetic object we not merely cognise the object but also bring into play other functions of the personality. There is no mere "cognition" in the logical sense. Aesthetic apprehension is apprehension of a value, viz., beauty. This "valuation" is a complex process in which cognition enters only as one element. Valuation is the result of the reaction of the whole personality, where, in addition to cognition, feeling tones and other mental dispositions play a part. They merge into one another: "thought enters, and imagination, and all the motives, conscious or hidden which stir the mind".² That is why aesthetic experience is said to "move" us.³ This integral experience naturally defies classification as a logical type of knowing. It is impossible to squeeze a complex totality into a simple mould.

(2)

Not Analytical

Aesthetic experience does not arise from the perception of parts and units and elements as such. It arises from detecting similarity in difference, observing the mutual dependence of parts and their subordination to the whole, perceiving proportion, symmetry, balance and harmony. The aesthetic attitude is not the analytical attitude: it perceives not variety, but unity in variety.

It is this synthetic character of the aesthetic experience that is emphasized when it is said to bring us a sense of unity, totality and self-completeness. It creates harmony out of discord and reconciles within itself all antagonisms. Conflict gives place to peace and all contradictions are resolved.⁴

2. S. Alexander, *Beauty and other forms of Value*, p. 130.

3. Cf. H. Read, "We say that a work of art 'moves' us, and this expression is accurate". (*The Meaning of Art*, p. 18)

4. Cf. Lord Listowel, "No where else does the sharp boundary vanish between the realms of the organic and the inorganic, no where else does the seemingly insuperable barrier between subject and object collapse, no where else does matter raise itself to the level of mind and mind descend

This complex, synthetic experience is not like any cognitive apprehension which can be analysed to fit into logical categories.⁵ It is to emphasize this aspect of aesthetic experience that rasa is defined as a 'unique' experience which is not a 'kind of knowledge'.

(3)

Not Sentiment

In this context, the translation of the term 'rasa' as 'sentiment' may be considered. Dr. Haas of Columbia University,⁶ Dr. Keith⁷ and some others have popularised the usage but its psychological accuracy has not been determined.⁸

A sentiment involves an individual tendency "to experience certain emotions and desires in relation to some particular object".⁹ The sentiment is stimulated by the object and engenders the emotions.¹⁰ It is a complex, structural formation of the mind which may remain latent till brought into play.

Rasa, on the other hand, is not a structural organization of the mind. It is an experience. All the writers are agreed that it is ineffable, a composite, blissful experience, transcending direct expression.¹¹ Rasa is, therefore, not the same as a sentiment. To call it a sentiment is psychologically inaccurate and aesthetically misleading.

humbly to the level of inert substance, no where else do the sensuous and the spiritual in the human soul, its instinctive, intellectual and moral faculties, co-operate as naturally and harmoniously as the separate voices in a single jubilant choir". (*A Critical History of Modern Aesthetics*, p. 277)

5. Cf. R. Tagore, "Our intellect can count the petals, classify the scent, and describe the colour of the rose, but its unity finds its expression when we rejoice in it". (*The Religion of Man*, Appendix III)

6. See *Datarūpaka*, translated by G. C. O. Haas (Columbia University).

7. See *The Sanskrit Drama*.

8. Dr. Ballantyne's rendering of the term as 'flavour' is most unpoetical: to say that the soul of poetry is its capacity to produce 'flavour' or that a "sentence informed by 'flavour' is poetry" (vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam, *Sāhityadarpana*, Chap. I, 3) is certainly infelicitous. Besides, it fails to bring out the aesthetic quality of the experience of rasa. For the same reason, 'taste' and 'relish' which are sometimes used as equivalents of rasa are inadequate. See also S. K. De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol. II, p. 170.

9. W. McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 419.

10. Cf. W. McDougall, "The more complex the sentiment, the wider is the range of emotions it may engender....." (*Energies of Men*, p. 224).

11. See *Sāhityadarpana*, Chap III, 24, text and commentary.

Perhaps the writers we mentioned above came to regard *rasa* as corresponding to a sentiment because of the 'kinds' of *rasa* enumerated by the Indian aestheticians.¹² Comparing these with the kinds of sentiments mentioned by western psychology, they might have thought of *rasa* as sentiment. But a study of Indian aesthetic theory will show that *rasa* refers to the aesthetic experience of the *sahṛdaya*, and that the mention of kinds of *rasa* does not indicate that there are different species of *rasa*. They are intended to mark off "the various colourings of one experience, and are arbitrary terms of rhetoric used only for convenience in classification; just as we speak of poetry categorically as lyric, epic, dramatic etc., without implying that poetry is anything but poetry".¹³

(4)

Not Aesthetic Category

Rasa is also not to be equated with the so-called "aesthetic category" of western aesthetics. As Listowel points out,¹⁴ the aesthetic categories represent certain important and distinct aspects of our experience of the beautiful. They are *divisions of beauty based on the differences between beautiful objects*, and have a status similar to that of the species of a higher biological genus in natural science. Some minor aesthetic categories are the romantic, the classical, the pretty, the lyrical, and the dramatic or the pathetic. The major categories, which he discusses, are the sublime, the tragic, the comic, the beautiful and the ugly.

Collingwood's account of the aesthetic categories under the title, "Forms of Beauty" also emphasizes the same point.¹⁵ He begins by pointing out that there is an aesthetic significance in the distinction between the different categories. It is not mere convenience that dictates the classification, as in the case of the alphabetical arrangement of a dictionary. "If we call a work of art sublime, or idyllic, or lyrical or romantic, or graceful, we mean to call attention to something in the character of the work itself.....".¹⁶

12. Cf. "Śṛṅgāra etc., are the eight *rasas* in *Nāṭya*", (*Nāṭyaśāstra* Chap. 6, 16). See also V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasas*.

13. A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Dance of Śiva*, p. 32.

14. Op. cit., Chap. XIX.

15. See R. G. Collingwood, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Art*, pp. 30-45.

16. Ibid, p. 31. Italics ours. Cf. also S. Alexander, "The character of the subject-matter accounts for certain distinctions current in aesthetic theory...." (op. cit., p. 152).

It is clear from the above that the aesthetic categories are based on the nature of the *aesthetic objects*. *Rasas*, on the other hand, are differentiated into eight or ten according to the nature of the aesthetic sentiments or *sthāyibhāvas*.¹⁷ They thus emphasize the *sahṛdaya*'s sentiments, attitudes and experiences. They are not 'kinds of beauty' determined by the nature of the objects: the classification is subjective rather than objective. *Rasas* are not "aesthetic categories".

(5)

"Intuition"

What, then, is a *rasa*? "It is difficult" says M. R. Anand, "if not impossible, to define the word *rasa* positively, because the conception implied in it is intuitively realized rather than sensibly experienced".¹⁸ What the Indian writers in their discussions on the nature of *rasa* want to emphasize is this intuitive character of aesthetic apprehension. Although they put it negatively by pointing out how it differs from the logical types of apprehension, the implication of their discussion is that *rasa* is the aesthetic intuition.

The word 'intuition' is derived from a verb which means 'looking at'. "It would stand, presumably, for a mental inspection in which a direct revelation is made to the mind, comparable to the direct revelation which accompanies the exposure of a physical object to the eye".¹⁹ Whether this form of cognition is a rival to reason and whether it can be regarded as superior to reason are questions which have no relevance here.²⁰ What is at all relevant is the characteristic of discursive consciousness to analyse and proceed from the parts to build the whole. In the type of consciousness that may be called intuitive the whole is apprehended before the parts are apprehended. This characteristic is summed up by H. H. Price thus: "And when we have discursive consciousness of a whole or complex of any sort (as in counting), although the whole may be vaguely present to the mind from the first, yet definite consciousness of the whole comes after consciousness of the

17. See *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Chap. 6, 18.

18. *The Hindu View of Art*, p. 148.

19. See J. L. Stocks, *Reason and Intuition* (ed. Dorothy M. Emmet), p. 3.

20. Bergson contrasts intellect with intuition and makes that the cornerstone of his philosophy. See *Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution*. For a clear statement of the relation between reason and intuition, see J. L. Stocks, op. cit., pp. 1-18.

parts. In intuitive consciousness, on the other hand, consciousness of the whole comes before definite consciousness of the parts".²¹

This synthetic experience of the whole is the characteristic of rasa.²² The *sahridaya* apprehends the object of art in its totality and is not aware of the several parts that go to make up the pattern. This may be emphasized by calling rasa, the 'aesthetic intuition'.

(6)

Bergson's View

It is interesting to note in this connection, two well-known attempts to designate aesthetic awareness as intuition. The first is that of H. Bergson. Although his main work is the building of a metaphysical system on the contrast between intuition and intellect,²³ he does indicate the application of intuition to aesthetics. There is, according to him, a faculty which exists in man alongside of normal perception: by means of this the artist places himself within the interior of the object. This faculty is 'aesthetic intuition'.²⁴ It is a kind of sympathy. According to him there is intimate relationship between the feeling of beauty and the feeling of sympathy.²⁵

The defect in this account of aesthetic intuition is the identification of intuition with a kind of sympathy. Sympathy is merely a function which opens the door to aesthetic experience either of the creative artist or of the responsive experient. It enables us to feel ourselves in the object and apprehend its pattern and ex-

21. See *Perception*.

22. See section 2 above.

23. Intuition is Bergson's *novum organum*: a special mode of thinking appropriate to philosophy. The philosopher in pursuit of truth must substitute this mental procedure for that procedure called intelligence, which only serves the practical necessities of life. This represents his main contention. For an examination of his system see W. Carr, *The Philosophy of Change* and J. M. K. Stewart, *A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy*.

24. Cf. "By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself with an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible", (*Creative Evolution*, p. 192.)

25. Cf. Listowel, "...we sympathize with nature whenever she exhibits the faintest sign of a human feeling or mood. Any emotion whatever can become aesthetic in this way; there is no specific feeling of beauty", (op. cit., p. 64).

pression. The doctrine of *Einfühlung* or Empathy calls attention to this aspect of aesthetic experience. Though sympathy is thus necessary for the apprehension of beauty in a work of art, it is not correct to regard intuition which is a peculiar type of apprehension as merely a kind of sympathy.

(7)

Croce's View

The second account of aesthetic perception as intuition is associated with the name of Benedetto Croce. Unlike Bergson's theory, Croce's is a fully-developed aesthetic doctrine which has world-wide influence. It, therefore, deserves more detailed examination.

In Croce's philosophy Aesthetic is the science of the mental activity which gives us knowledge of the beautiful. Man's knowledge is not simple. It consists of two forms: imagination and thought. By imagination he gives shape to single things; by thought, he relates images in universal concepts. There can be no thought unless there be first imagination. Art is imagination, the most immediate form of knowledge, the "intuition".

This knowledge is also the lowest of all. How can we say that in art we have the lowest knowledge? "...low, weak, simple, elementary are terms which in the philosophy of mind have value only as a scientific terminology. The forms of the mind are all necessary, and the higher is higher only because there is a lower, and the lower is only of less or of greater worth than the higher in the same sense in which the first step of a ladder is of less or of greater worth than the one above".²⁶

Every 'intuition' is also 'expression': it is impossible to separate the image from its physical embodiment. "That which does not objectify itself in expression is not intuition or representation, but sensation and mere natural fact. The spirit only intuits in making, forming, expressing. He who separates intuition from expression never succeeds in reuniting them".²⁷

Beauty is successful expression or mere expression, for unsuccessful expression is not expression at all. To have aesthetic experience we must ourselves be actively creating: our own mind

26. *Problemi di estetica*, p. 13.

27. *Aesthetics* (2nd edn.), p. 8.

must be giving birth to an intuition and finding its expression. It is that expression which is beautiful. "Each of us, as a matter of fact, has in him a little of the poet, of the sculptor, of the musician, of the painter, of the prose-writer,.....".²⁸

Thus, Croce regards 'intuition' as the 'aesthetic fact, and the intuitive attitude as the aesthetic attitude. "I observe in myself" says he, "that in the presence of any sensation whatever, if I do not abandon myself to the attractions and repulsions of impulse and feelings, if I do not let myself be distracted by reflections and reasonings, if I persist in the intuitive attitude, I am in the same disposition as that in which I enjoy what I am accustomed to call a work of art..... Artists are those who have the power of persisting longer than other men in the moment of intuition or sensation, and of helping others to persist in it".²⁹

Any detailed criticism of Croce's theory is unnecessary for our argument. We have indicated the main points of his theory known as *Expressionism* or *Intuitionism* in order to bring out the aesthetic sense in which Croce uses the term 'intuition'. Although the theory has proved to be "illuminating",³⁰ there is a certain vagueness³¹ in the meaning given to the term 'intuition'. Intuition is identified with beauty and with expression. No difference is recognized between the intuitions of an artist and a non-artist.

Intuition is used in the sense of the *image-making power* of the artist. The artist's intuition is his vision. Now, to ignore the difference between the intuition and its external 'expression' in the work of art is to deny the significance of a specific material to the creative activity of the artist. The artist has to master his material in order that his expression should be successful. In the course of his handling of the material his 'intuition' itself gets more vivid, clearer and more defined. It is not as though the mental rehearsal of the artist is finished before he takes up the chisel or the brush so that his subsequent execution is merely a reproduction of that image in suitable material. The creative process, in fact, colours his inner experience. His 'intuition' gets

28. Ibid, p. 11.

29. *Problemi di estetica*, p. 484. Quoted by B. Bosanquet, in "Croce's Aesthetic", (*Proceedings of British Academy*), p. 3.

30. See H. Read, op. cit., p. 4.

31. Cf. Volkelt, "He (i.e., Croce) works invariably with inexact, ambiguous, and unanalysed concepts". (*System der Aesthetik*, Vol. III, p. 378. Quoted by Listowel, op. cit., p. 151.)

developed even as he puts the picture on the canvas, or as he sings the song. It continues to be influenced by every new touch of colour or addition of line to the picture; by each new note that he adds or vibrant melody that he imparts to the singing. It is a common experience of the creative artists that the picture as it finally stands or the song as it is finally sung is far different in its richness and from the original conception of the artists. The picture paints itself as it were: the song seems to sing itself. To this growing, changing content of the aesthetic consciousness Croce does little justice when he makes it unrelated to the material of expression.

While Croce is concerned primarily with the immediate vision of the artist which he calls "intuition" and only secondarily with the appreciation of art by an experient (which he regards as only quantitatively different from the creative experience of the artist), we are concerned with designating aesthetic appreciation as 'intuition'.

Rasa is not simple cognitive apprehension. In its totality are mingled cognitive factors consisting of sense-perception or imagination of objects, feeling-tones of pleasure or 'pain' evoked by the objects, comprehension of the unitary pattern and the contemplative enjoyment of the object. It is thus totally different from the ordinary sensuous or memory cognition.

Rasa is not imagination either, if by imagination is meant mere fancy which manipulates ideas. It is also not a bare feeling. The word 'intuition' regarded not as a faculty or an instrument of knowledge, but as an insight or an experience expresses it fairly adequately.³²

The measure, balance, rhythm and harmony which a *sahṛdaya* perceives in an object of art appear as such only when analysed later. At the moment of apprehension their total effect is perceived only intuitively. Intuition gives us the sense of the unitary structure and meaning of the work of art. It takes us straight to the heart of an aesthetic object and makes us perceive its pattern and expression. In this experience, as we have seen, is the play of feeling and imagination and artistic sympathy, and we feel the joy and the peace of contact with the Beautiful.³³

32. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, "We cannot truly appreciate if we are not guided by a higher insight". (*An Idealist View of Life*, p. 196.)

33. Cf. "Rasa is indivisible, self-manifested, made up of joy and thought in their identity", *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chap. III, 33.

Comprehensive Conception of Logic

by

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The formation of any science depends upon some data which are taken for granted. What are the data for the science of Logic ? The Logic with which we are familiar accepts as its data the methods or the ways that the exact and empirical sciences follow for the acquisition of knowledge in their spheres. Logic analyses these ways of knowledge and brings into relief the structure which is revealed by them. Deductive logic is based upon mathematical sciences and inductive logic is based upon empirical sciences. Logic studies the structure of propositions, inferences, observation, experiment, hypothesis, explanation, definition, classification and applications of various methods as actually found in these sciences. These data are not created by logic but assumed by it. And, therefore, whatever their merits and defects, these characterize the nature of the science of logic too. The norm which logic lays down for the science to follow is really the normal feature of the various sciences. The norm of logic is not produced by it but only manifested by it as revealed in the sciences ; so that instead of the various sciences depending on logic to be logical, logic itself depends upon them for its scientific character. Methodology of the various sciences is not superimposed upon them by the science of logic, rather they have furnished logic a model which it is its business to analyse and describe. In this sense logic is as descriptive a science as any other science is. It is wrong, therefore, to emphasize the 'normative' character of logic. There is something dictatorial in the term normative, which suggests that the norm of method which logic dictates must be followed rigorously in all spheres of knowledge. But if logic has derived its norm of method, which is known as the logical, the rational or the scientific method, from the model of the exact and the empirical sciences, it has a right to dictate to those sciences in the sense that if there are errors in the procedure, those must be corrected in the light of that norm. In this procedure what logic does is that it asks the science to stick to its own credentials. It does not superimpose anything upon science which is not its own from the beginning

to the end. The dictation of logic is in the form of a counsel which science accepts because it knows that logic knows its secrets. Logic only brings science to its self-consciousness in order that it may not err from its own legitimate path.

The term normative as descriptive of the nature of logic has played a mischief from which philosophers ought to guard themselves. It is an instance of how language is a great hurdle in the acquisition of right knowledge. It has led the philosophers astray by its unwholesome suggestion. It appears to them that the norm of method which logic has described is ideal in the sense that whatever field of knowledge we enter into, we must follow the same as obligatory. I believe that it is a great mistake.

The nature of the method followed for the investigation of truth differs according as the nature of the subject-matter changes. Mathematical procedure and the procedure of empirical sciences differ only because the character of the subject-matter that is studied in these respective spheres is not the same. Depending upon these differences we have two branches of logic, deductive and inductive. Mere deductive procedure found to be successful in mathematical sciences was found to be inadequate in the acquisition of knowledge in empirical sciences. Hence a formulation of inductive logic or methodology of empirical sciences, as opposed to mathematical sciences, was found to be necessary. There was no insistence upon deductive logic as a universal procedure for all departments of knowledge. Logic, identified first with deductive logic of Aristotle, had to be made comprehensive for making room for Bacon's and Mill's inductive logic. With the development again of the social sciences, further modifications in the original procedure had to be done. For, each specific group of sciences, and even each science within those groups has its own peculiarities. And rather than make these sciences yield to a stereotyped logic, logic itself had to yield to the specific procedure of those sciences and bring into relief the structure of that procedure. All sciences are logical, not because they follow a set logic, but they follow a procedure which is consistent and adequate to their problems. All sciences follow a logic of their own.

Logicality or rationality consists in this that a specific sphere of knowledge having its specific problems uses its own specific methods adequate for the solution of the same. Dogmatism consists in insisting upon universalisation of a specific logical method and extending it to spheres beyond its own.

Philosophy too has its own procedure irreducible to the procedure of other fields of enquiry. Collingwood in his book on "Philosophical Method" has done a great service both to logic and philosophy for bringing out into bold relief the alterations which traditional logic has to undergo when it comes to deal with philosophical subjects. If there is a deductive logic adequate to meet the needs of empirical sciences, and if there are phases of this deductive logic combined together with inductive logic to meet the demands of social sciences, then, should there not be a philosophical logic adequate to meet the demands of the philosophical sciences? Collingwood has well brought out the nature of philosophical logic in the book referred to above.

But Collingwood's account of it is incomplete. His insistence upon intellectual method indicates only his refusal to think boldly. Philosophy is not merely an unusually persistent effort to think systematically as W. James said, it is primarily a universally persistent effort to know *reality*. There might be other fruitful ways of knowledge than the intellectual. The Philosopher is not so much interested in insisting upon a certain stereotyped method as he is interested in reality itself.

The mystics claim a better knowledge of reality than the intellectualists; and a philosopher ought to respect their authority though he may examine their authoritativeness as critically as he can.

The logic of philosophy must make the mystical procedure the data on which it is to build itself. It will have to admit intuitive methods for the acquisition of knowledge. It will have also to study the method of developing intuitive faculties, particularly the moral and spiritual efforts on the part of the mystic who alone is a philosopher in the truest sense of the term.

Ordinary logic describes the nature of the categories employed by the mathematical and the empirical sciences. Philosophy may employ those categories with certain modifications, or it may not make use of the same at all, or even may employ categories of its own wholly irreducible to those of the various sciences. To describe the nature of these exclusively philosophical categories is the business of the logic of philosophy.

The categories that we employ are ultimately dependent upon the nature of the subject-matter and the specific sphere of our experience. If we respect only the old logical categories, we would not accept any evidence which does not fit in with what we know.

But if we respect evidence against the logic we use, we will have to forgo that logic which refuses to accommodate that evidence. It may perhaps be said that there is no conflict between evidence of experience and logic as such. Both modify each other and try to seek adjustment. No true evidence of fact lies beyond logic, and no true logic can afford to discard any evidence of fact. A true fact must be viewed as an element in a logical system. We may have to change a logical system to cope with the novel evidence of experience. But once the fact is admitted to it, it is as logical as other facts. A logical system is, therefore, always based on fact, and a fact is an element within the logical system. Logicality or rationality consists in adjusting logic and experience to each other, and not merely in a one-sided emphasis on either of them.

The progress of science and philosophy shows that, laying always a premium on the irreducible nature of facts, we have to develop new categories, by means of which we admit them to a logical system. We are always logical, but we have always to employ a new logic. In this light, dogma would be a name given to a logic which does not countenance new categories required for an adequate explanation of new facts of experience. Dogmatism consists in making a new fact of experience a victim of the old logical categories, when there is no real adjustment between the two.

In philosophy and mystical experience we are dealing with new sets of facts, and we will have to find new categories for describing them. The new experience is irreducible to previously known categories. Hence we will have to conceive of a different logic suitable for the problems of philosophical investigation. Absolute, infinite, substance, God, self, immortality, eternity, liberation, bondage, action, freedom, immanence, transcendence and such other categories may have to be used for the adequate solution of philosophical problems. Even faith, love, revelation, grace might be adequate categories. There might be some spheres of experience where adequate categories could not be found, and then ineffability, transvaluation, supra-rational, supra-relational, supersensuous, over-mind, super-mind and such other categories may be the best possible description.

The physicist complains of mysticism in biology for its categories of life, growth, adaptation, instinct, heredity and death. The physicist and the biologist both complain of mysticism in psychology for its categories of mind, purpose and psychic energies. Old psycho-

logy complained of mysticism when new psychology made use of the unconscious as a psychological category. It is quite possible that they complain of mysticism in social sciences for using categories of society, social institutions, religion, tradition, culture, civilization and the like. According to them, mysticism consists in not explaining any fact of experience by reducing it to physical, chemical or biological categories. Yet we know that these higher sciences are not mystical in any vicious sense. They are as logical and as rational as any science could be.

If there is any meaning, then, in the reversibility of philosophical procedure, unlike that of science, as Collingwood has pointed out, then this idea of reversibility could be completed by questioning the very assumption that philosophy is an intellectual investigation of reality. Then alone can we justifiably say that philosophy ought to rise above all prejudices, including the prejudice for reason. The logic of philosophy must take cognisance of the absolute reversibility of philosophical procedure and make room for non-intellectual ways of knowing.

Now the question is, is logic one or many? In so far as each science follows its own logic adequate for its subject-matter, there is a sense in which we may say that there are many logics,—as many as there are different spheres of investigation. The traditional logic first admitted to its fold mathematical sciences and developed a deductive logic. Then it admitted empirical sciences of the physical type and developed an inductive logic. Then it admitted social sciences and developed a logic adequate to them by a combination of the first two. Every science has its own shades of difference, which had to be reflected in the science of logic which took note of those differences. Logic will have to admit the philosophical science in the same manner and make room for its peculiar procedure.

These many logics, therefore, are not really many, but they are only branches of the same logic. Deductive and inductive logic are the branches of one and the same logic. Combining these two under the title "logic of non-philosophical sciences," we may have another branch called "logic of philosophical sciences."

Logic in this comprehensive sense is not to be defined as a science of thought or of inference or of proof. It is a science of the ways of knowing in all spheres of investigation. Or it is a science of the operations of the human mind in its pursuit of knowledge.

The words "operations of the human mind" signify that there may be intellectual, affective and conative operations, thus making room for logic that we are familiar with, and also allowing other ways of knowledge besides the intellectual. The phrase "in its pursuit of knowledge" restricts it to logical and epistemic aspects of these operations, and bars out a mere psychological study of them.

The Search for the Real

by

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The search for the real is the recognized pre-occupation of Philosophy. I shall try in this paper to determine, somewhat roughly, what it is that we seek in Philosophy.

At first sight, the search is apt to appear meaningless. We are not only surrounded on all sides by the real, it is pressing upon us from every direction. We do not know anything except as real. When the real is given in every act of knowledge, a search for it, with the implication of its present unavailability, seems meaningless and absurd.

It may be argued that the things, which we find around us, are particular material objects and not the real as such and, secondly, although we take them to be real, we do not and cannot know them to be so.

We find chairs and tables, houses and trees, but nowhere do we find the real. It may be said that the real exists in the forms of these objects, and there is no naked reality anywhere to be discovered, which possesses no particular character.

We should concede that the real by definition is not characterless, but we have to consider whether the character, with which it is supposed to appear before us, is consistent with its reality. The characters, which things of everyday knowledge present to us, are all vanishing characters. If they were real, or were the actual characters of the real, they would not of themselves become unreal.

Moreover the characters of things we perceive are mostly relative, dependent on various factors and on our sense organs. And it is obvious that a character, which a thing possesses only in relation to something else, does not belong to it in itself. Thus the fact of change and relativity seems to disqualify every perceivable object for the status of reality.

Secondly, it is argued, the reality which we associate with any object that we see or hear is only attributed reality. The reality

of no perceivable object is given in clear knowledge. We cognize some characters and take them to belong to some real object. These characters may as well be presented by an illusory object which, of course, is not real at all. Even apart from clear cases of illusion, we know that an object of perception can always be doubted. If its reality could be given in the very act of perception, it would never be an object of doubt. Doubt and knowledge can not pertain to one and the same object at the same time. Thus it is made to appear that we do not get reality in ordinary perception.

I do not know how to evaluate this argument. It is based on the assumption that knowledge must be indubitable. I know there are philosophers who hold that knowledge, properly so called, must be indubitable, so that what we take to be knowledge in ordinary life is nothing but mere belief, which is distinct in kind from knowledge. I am only tempted to ask, where do we find such indubitable knowledge? Tautologies or analytical propositions may be self-evident, but do not determine any given object and therefore do not constitute a case of knowledge. We agree with Kant in supposing that the object of knowledge must be given. That is to say, knowledge must determine or relate to some actual given object. But since the object has an independent being of its own, not constituted by any act of knowledge, you cannot guarantee that when I am having the experience of knowing, the object must exist also. True, my knowledge will not be real knowledge if the object is not there. But as far as I know, there is no reliable means of distinguishing real knowledge from an appearance of knowledge, at least at the time when the appearance occurs. There is no epistemological device by which mankind can be ensured against all chances of error. With due care, we can no doubt diminish the chances of error, and by applying various tests, we can achieve a large measure of certainty. But theoretically we cannot eliminate the possibility of all doubt. We should therefore be content if we could attain to any piece of knowledge with the same degree of assurance as we experience in the case of an ordinary object of perception. In Philosophy even, if I could know the real, as I know the table in my room, I should be entirely satisfied. But the first argument is still on our hands which sought to justify the philosophic search for the real, on the ground of the change and relativity which characterize all presented objects.

That argument seemed to suggest that a thing which is liable to change is not real, because change implies an incapacity on the

part of the changing thing to maintain itself in being, and it is inconceivable that the real should be unable to remain real.

Against this argument, it has been maintained that since change is universal, it should be taken as the only form of reality and so, instead of searching for some real behind change, we should rather try to apprehend change directly as the ultimate reality.

This position is not quite intelligible. We understand change only in the case of a thing which changes and which is more than mere change. Change, merely as such, without reference to any thing beyond it, is not intelligible and cannot be accepted, by philosophy at least, as the form of reality.

When we take change in connexion with something changing, we find we are presented with different forms which follow upon one another. The change is real in the sense that the different forms actually come and go, and change is the name for their successive appearance and disappearance. A particular form is not taken to be ultimately real because it passes away and appears to vanish into nothing. We are therefore compelled to search for the real behind the vanishing forms.

We are inclined to agree with this view. But some comments however seem necessary here. When we say that the vanishing forms are not real, we seem to imply that we know the real already and we know it to be changeless. But if the real is already known, the search for the real again turns out to be meaningless. And further, there seems to be no justification for supposing that the real must be changeless. Let us consider these two points.

It seems desirable to make a distinction between the concrete real and the abstract quality or character of being real. It may be an open question whether reality can at all be conceived as a quality like other qualities which are present in some objects and absent in others. But it cannot be denied that we take various things to be real which are widely different from one another, and this would be hardly intelligible, unless we supposed that they possessed something in common. The common character present in all existing things is the character of reality. It is not necessary for our purpose to decide how the character of reality should be defined or whether it is definable at all. It will be enough if we can recognize that reality in one sense is a character. And I contend that we all know this character. Unless we accept this, the search for the real would be absurd. We cannot possibly look for

a thing about which we have no idea. But although we have an idea of reality as such, we may not know any thing quite real. We may know what it means to be a perfect square, but we may not, and indeed do not, know any concrete perfect square. Thus it seems that although we know what is meant by reality, we do not yet know the real in its concrete fulness.

There is no *a priori* reason why the real should be changeless and in fact change has somehow to be accommodated within the real. But our question is whether any character, which is liable to change and is going to be replaced by another, can fitly characterize the real as such. We may not deny reality to the character as long as it lasts, but the very fact that it disappears and is succeeded by another character, which is incompatible with it, clearly shows that it cannot properly define or describe the nature of that which provides home for it as well as for its successor. Neither youth nor old age can be a fit description of man as such. Thus it appears that to know or understand the real adequately we need a changeless form which would manifest itself amidst all change of characters.

Similarly what is relative cannot be said to characterize the real as such, although we have a sense of objectivity in regard to it, and cannot condemn it as nothing. In fact, the relative by itself cannot be conceived; it requires completion from something else, apart from which it would have no meaning or being. We are therefore required to go beyond the relative and arrive at some absolute being which would satisfy our sense of the real.

One could be content with a plurality of independent things, if such a conception were warranted by the facts. There is no obvious self-contradiction in the idea of a pluralistic universe. But as a matter of fact, we are never presented with isolated entities, having no connexion with one another. Things and events, by the fact of their spatial and temporal character, i.e. by their falling within a spatio-temporal system, get inevitably related with one another, so that there is no one thing or event which does not influence, or is not influenced by, other things and events. No particular thing in the universe can be called real by itself when it is bound indissolubly with so many others. The absolute independent real of which we are in search, cannot be short of the all-comprehensive whole.

We cannot be said to know any one thing fully until we have known the whole of which it forms part. It seems as if we could

know nothing at all, unless we knew everything. This would prescribe an impossible task for Philosophy. Since it is not possible for anybody, who is not omniscient, to know everything, true knowledge would be impossible for ordinary mortals. But there are some relieving considerations.

Although everything is influenced by everything else, there are differences in the degrees of influence which different things exercise upon a particular object. A particular thing does not affect all other things in the same way. It does not e.g. affect the distant parts of the world in the way it affects its immediate neighbours. Particular regions have a kind of relative self-containedness, which allows us to know them as relative wholes, disregarding the influences of remoter objects. The different parts of my body, e.g. are affected by one another, in a way they are not affected by what is happening in a different body. Although my body is being affected by what is happening in distant stars, I or a physiologist, can manage to have some practical knowledge of my body, without taking into account the influences of stars upon it. Thus we find that we can know particular things but we have to add that our knowledge is never theoretically complete.

There is another consideration. We may be said to know a thing even when we do not know all the details about it, or all its parts in their particularity. I may know a particular object to be a dog although I do not know all the different parts of its body—how they act and react upon one another to make its life possible. I may perfectly recognize it to be a dog without knowing at all what geometrical propositions would correctly describe its canine shape. Thus we may have a synoptic view of the whole without going into infinite details. What is needed in a philosophical knowledge of the real is not our direct acquaintance with its infinite parts, but a universal concept which would comprehend them all and fit them well.

In our own being, we have an intuition or sense of the real which is never lost. What we lack is an adequate concept or series of concepts which would illumine or articulate our intuition or intuitions of the real in various forms of experience. There is no experience without some sense of the real. The various experiential data, in so far as they are not disbelieved, require to be coordinated and explained. Philosophers in all ages have tried in their different ways to supply us with such explanatory concepts or comprehensive views of reality.

We are all in a sense philosophers inasmuch as we all have some view of reality which informs all our beliefs and guides our conduct. This modicum of philosophy is enough for many. But some acuter spirits among us cannot remain content with the rough and ready view of reality which we inherit from common-sense and science. They feel distressed by the vagueness and uncertainty, the utter inadequacy of such a view, and are impelled by a necessity of their nature to a serious search for the real, as adumbrated above.

Searching means also a sifting. The search for the real involves an examination of the *prima facie* views of reality which are current in a society. The energies of certain thinkers are quite absorbed in the critical work and they may be unable to reach any positive view of their own. They may even find that with the intellectual resources at our disposal it is not possible to arrive at a satisfactory view of reality. They are the sceptics and agnostics who too are genuine philosophers. Only the boldest among us can hazard a view about the sum-total of things with any degree of confidence. And even they, if they are mere philosophers, unsupported by any religious or other faiths, are liable at times, so I imagine, to be haunted by serious doubts.

On Means and Ends

by

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The problem of means and ends like many other problems is in a sense artificial, and arises only at a comparatively developed stage of experience. When experience first came to be consciously studied probably men first attended to ends. Soon however it was realized that there is many a slip between the end and the means and therefore regard was soon had of means as well. Later the pendulum moved from one side to another at different times and will ever continue so to swing as long as man is finite and must normally work with parts of his personality rather than the integrated whole.

As life and thought developed both ends and means came under further scrutiny and our notions of both showed progressive change. As to the end, the most important thing to be realized was that they differed in inclusiveness and ultimateness. Only a few of the many ends which men pursue seem ultimate and inclusive, or self-sufficient, most being achieved only as stepping stones to one or more inclusive and lasting goals. The distinction of proximate from ultimate, and instrumental from intrinsic ends and the attempts to relate them constructively summarizes all our study of ends. With regard to means, the most important quality in means is of course efficiency for securing the relevant end. But the question was also gradually considered from the point of view of their intrinsic worth, so that certain means were supposed to be good under all situations and certain as wrong ones at all times.

At different times in history and in different places one or the other side of this complex situation came in for special attention and emphasis. When means were neglected, they had to be emphasised; so abouts ends. When some ends were over emphasised, others had to be stressed, and finally it was realized now and again that means have qualities of their own apart from being less or more serviceable for ends.

I believe that we have got to take this consideration on to a further step and synthesis. Ends and means are of course clearly parts of a single situation and are interdependent. Similarly the ends not being separated and discreet entities but facets or aspects of the single human ideal of Progress or Perfection and Peace must be looked at as a unity and harmony, and none attempted to be developed to the exclusion of others. It should also be realized that first things first must come first even amongst ends and that every end is not qualitatively the equal of every other. Most of our difficulties will vanish if all this is clearly appreciated but we must also go further and point out that in still another and a somewhat disconcerting way ends and means are related. And that is in the way that *all ends* even so called ultimate ones get their meaning and reality because they are in a sense means. Virtue has been well defined as that which produces and leads to all other kinds of goods to the maximum extent. Instrumental ends may still be relatively distinguished from ultimate ends provided we grant that all ends are in a sense instrumental—as leading to other and usually so-called lower ends, or means.

The practical justification of the position is in our actual experience of ends. The best instances are of these who are really advanced moral souls. While on the one hand they are not mercenary in their outlook, not one of them is puritanical or negative in his attitude to other things. The truly religious man whose end, God or Religion, is the highest conceivable is more tolerant and more constructive in his attitude to everything than any one else. This is because he truly realizes that if the world without God is nothing—so in a sense is God without the world, that while Dharma is needed to uphold everything, it needs everything in order to do its own task of upholding. The best moral agents have been men of wide sympathies, tolerant and appreciative of all points of view, of all kinds of desires, and their rigour and discipline and self-denial have been positive in import.

The theoretical justification for this stand is that unless this is so, the pursuit of ends becomes irrational. An end cannot be a mere formal or verbal matter if it is to evoke loyal and ardent response. It must *mean* something and to get its meaning it must look forward and *lower*, because there is no higher; ends being the highest in their situations and particularly ultimate ends. As said above, Virtue or ultimate goodness can only mean an experience which includes, leads to and is inclusive of all other ends inclu-

ding material ones. It is for this reason that Socrates said that Virtue is Prudence, meaning to say that it will lead to all kinds of goods men care for in a balanced and harmonious manner. This is the thesis I advance about the meaning and interrelationship of means and ends. How far it is justifiable and selfconsistent is for you to judge. The test is not even so much of formal consistency as fidelity to moral experience, for as Sidgwick points out in his *Methods of Ethics* the moral situation may have undeniably aspects which we cannot satisfactorily synthesize into a single whole.

In the remainder of the paper I shall in different ways seek to justify my thesis as stated above.

Let us start with—the much discussed controversy as regards whether end justifies means in which certain utterances of Tilak and Gandhi have been the subject of considerable ingenuous interpretation and argument. It may here be briefly dealt with as throwing light on the nature of ends v. means. Tilak interpreting what he considers to be the position accepted in the Gita is believed to have held the view that provided one's ends are proper, what means we use for achieving those is immaterial, and that such use is not only practically efficient but even morally justified. Gandhiji, on the other hand, held that the use of improper means such as violence or dishonesty can never be justified. He had announced that he would not care to have Swaraj for his country through wrong means.

The theoretical question involved deserves careful analysis. I think it is undeniable that if improper means are used the goal is affected. Ends and means are parts of a single situation from whatever point of view one may look at the question and therefore the quality of means must affect the end. But to say this is not necessarily to agree with Gandhiji in saying that all cases of use of physical force, or use of tact are improper. Diplomacy gets its moral quality from its motive, and if the motive is not to deceive another into something against his own real interests then it like education can and may include statements which are not literally true. Physical force too becomes violence when actuated by ill-will, selfishness, vanity etc. So while violence and falsehood are wrong, not all cases of physical force constitute violence, nor all tactful utterances are instances of falsehood. Tilak's position stated as maintaining that *what means* are used is immaterial provided ends are correct is indefensible for the reason mentioned above namely that means are not external to

ends but together form a single situation. On the other hand understood as maintaining that *any* means can under suitable circumstances be *right* means, that what makes them right or wrong is not the physical and material character but the motive and inner attitude it is a correct position and provides the much needed corrective to the sentimental exclusiveness of some votaries of truth and non violence. This also lays further and needed emphasis on the importance of ends, for just as ends without means are unreal, means without ends are meaningless.

The emphasis on the purity of means except as part of the total situation, and the insistence that *certain* means are always right or wrong is mistaken. Let us take even such activities as kindness or truth-speaking. There are cases of mistaken and wrong kindness, and occasions when the defence that what was spoken was true is *not* enough even in a court of law. In times of unrest the conveying of news likely to unsettle the minds of people cannot be justified on the ground that the news is true. And perhaps half the mistakes in life are due to mistaken kindness, and courtesy. Of course, this means that in a sense these acts are not truly kind or truthful, but to say that is to admit that the qualities of actions do not depend only or chiefly on the actual physical and objective activities they consist of, but on the inner situation, the attitude, the motive and in some ways also the nature of the environment.

Exactly the same thing applies to so-called wrong means. Let me take an instance of topical interest—the habit of drink. Whether it is correct to describe it as means, and in what sense is not clear, but it is certainly one of the activities which Gandhiji and his followers both sincere and diplomatic consider to be irretrievably wrong and wicked. As we know, Prohibition is one of the directives of our constitution and some State Governments for example our own have given its first priority in their programme of national reconstruction. Outside the Congress also are many sincere followers of Gandhiji (I am not saying there are none inside, but they are not perhaps in a position to be effective). I might say immediately that I feel in much larger agreement with the views about national welfare expressed by them than with any other views expressed in the press or on the platform and I feel that it is only the Gandhian way properly understood and lived that can see us

through and enable us truly to help the other nations perhaps in due course.

And yet these views express some positions which seem to be theoretically erroneous and which arise out of a mistaken understanding of the nature of means and ends. I shall take for instance their attitude to the question of drink. I have in mind one of the latest editorials in the Harijan. It is forthright and able as usual but most certainly mistaken. Of course hypothetically, it is all right to say that since Prohibition is a directive in the constitution we must see to it that it succeeds. But was it wise to make it such a directive? Are drinking, theft and adultery really on the same level so that we must in the same sense and manner and without reference to the practical situation ban all of them? I do not think they are on one level. Except in an idyllic simple world in which men live with and like nature, alcoholic drink is by no means the only stimulant or intoxicant taken in. There are several other stimulants in drink and food and there is tobacco, and there are sensational films and speculation and betting; many of these in excess certainly as bad as drink could be. As in many other matters so here lacking intellectual orientation and the scientific outlook Gandhiji took positions which are not justifiable if taken literally. One might go even further and say that not only drink but even the worst vices referred to above are not such as to need or justify a 'mere no'. Every desire and every voluntary activity howsoever deficient has its value and use and the ideal moral life is the one in which every desire gets its proper satisfaction in a harmonious system of fulfilments. Personally I believe that a suitable modification of the directive would have been suggested by Gandhiji himself, for although his theoretical equipment was not all-sided Gandhiji was a practical genius and had an uncanny flare for knowing what to do and what to avoid, and how to modify one's positions! I have so far thus tried to show that the position that certain means or actions are always necessarily good or necessarily bad is unsound.

The corresponding mistake to be committed about Tilak's view that means do *not* matter if ends are right is to imagine e.g. that because *force* is sometimes justified, violence is, or because tact is, therefore selfish dishonesty is. Violence and selfishness are *wrong* because they vitiate the quality of the action, while mere use of force does not necessarily do it.

Gandhiji's understanding of the character of means was defective but I think he had practically a fuller notion of ultimate

ends than Tilak, although philosophically Tilak's position does suggest a very deep foundation in metaphysical theory. In a very true sense Gandhiji more explicitly than Tilak appreciated Internationalism, and also the need of subordinating material to other ends, and of the ultimate unfailing efficiency of active non-violence. His ideas were mis-understood and misused by many of his followers most of whom were merely political agitators, some patriots but very few had use or need for his real universal message.

As a practical politician Gandhiji had often to compromise his high ideals about ends and means and was responsible for a good deal of quibbling about the meaning even of such a term as 'non-violence'. What India gained in politics by Gandhiji's participation in politics she undoubtedly lost in spirituality, for there is ground to believe that without his politics he would have been a fuller and more flawless spiritual personality if a less known one. The same is true in a sense of Tilak in the world of scholarship and research. These two great men sacrificed careers for which they had special gifts and aptitude, for social work as they judged it to be more urgent and we have all benefitted by their choice and sacrifice. Although who can say for certain that it might not have been better in the long run if each has stuck to his own special mission! Swaraj would probably have come later than it did, but perhaps it might have been a better Swaraj. For we cannot help feeling that our intellectual and philosophical backwardness, and our lack of spirituality are proving very great handicaps to us in our freedom and affect its quality substantially.

It would be useful in view of what is said above to look around ourselves and see in what directions our ideas and practice need and can be improved. It appears to me that today we are erring in the first place in a general apathy to and disinclination for dispassionate thought on this as on many other matters. For various reasons, an important one of which was the dominance of slogans in public life, it has become our habit unreflectingly to assume things about ourselves and others and then sentimentalize about them either in elation or depression. Public men in all walks of life and even scholars and thinkers who might know better are found for example to lay stress on the fundamental spirituality of our outlook. No other single assumption has I think done more harm to us than this one and that is *not* because the assumption has no truth at all but because it is made without circumspection and is easily exaggerated and misunderstood. In the

first place, spirituality of outlook is not a quality which can be easily handed down and because it was once amongst some people would continue to be with them in any significant manner even if they take no trouble about it. Thus, even if it is true that we in India did once set the spiritual above everything in our valuations, whether or not and how far we may be doing it today is another matter altogether. It is a fallacy into which one is apt to fall and I think we have often done so.

Honestly I believe, that it would be difficult today to find any nation which is more materialistic in outlook and because materialistic, narrow, intolerant and competitive. When one dispassionately surveys our private and public life no other conclusion is possible. Of course, there are and have been exceptions. Further, there is no doubt that Gandhiji's leadership properly understood and seriously and sincerely accepted would have introduced real spirituality in our lives. But I do not think that was ever done. Pandit Nehru's outlook is spiritual in a very general and not very profound sense. It is the spirituality represented by the normal refinement of a modern educated person, it is nothing more if nothing less. I do not think that except in superficial and often irrational ways there is any systematic or courageous attempt to establish or follow spirituality in any walk of life. There is perhaps some vague aspiration or wish in the direction but nothing more active or genuine. Unfortunately, this mere wish and the occasional enthusiastic homage in words paid to spirituality by leaders small and big has deceived us (if not others) and therefore we are not even making a genuine if small beginning in the spiritualization of life individual and social, that is in the selection and pursuit of proper ends.

A proper realization of our present lack of spiritual ends is therefore the first corrective we need. That takes me to what I feel is a more general correction we Indians temperamentally need, although in our best days we were probably not neglectful of it. I am referring to the fact that of the two factors, aspects or sides of the total situation, namely means and ends, we have always tended to give less attention to the 'means' aspect. Now that the two civilizations have met it is possible and desirable for us to supplement our natural standpoint. Theoretically, as I have pointed out in the early part of this paper ends depend on and are related to means both because means lead upto, realize and affect the quality of ends, and also because ends get their meaning from being in a sense means only and that this applies even to

socalled ultimate ends. Possibility of progress in India will depend on our clear realization of this character of the relationship of means and ends. Namely that they both in different ways lead to each other and imply each other, that, as in all fundamental dualisms here too we must constantly shift from onside to the other to make it progressive and real and that we must not neglect either. Without such concrete understanding of ends they cannot become objects of devoted pursuit and tend to become mere high sounding words. The highest end is in a sense the most efficient means for all ends. It is this that is meant by saying that Dharma which is the final value or end also means and results in well being here as well as hereafter.

On Departures from Two-Valued Logics

by

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(1)

Without raising too many questions at the outset, I shall accept the view that a logic is specified by its fundamental matrices or that it is an exercise in permutations and combinations. The device of 'truth-tables' or T, F tables was invented by C. S. Peirce, but its importance was realized only when Wittgenstein and E. L. Post rediscovered it. The domain of significance or meaning is ordinarily delimited to linguistic forms which are 'true' or 'false'. Wittgenstein suggested that all propositions express agreement or disagreement with 'truth-possibilities', or truth-functions of atomic propositions. The atomic propositions may be determined as values of a certain propositional function. The propositional function ' x is red' determines a collection of propositions which are its values and we can assert that all are, or at least that one of the values is, true by saying 'For all x , x is red' or 'There is an x such that x is red'. 'If something is red, something is coloured'. There are three conditions, being red and coloured, being coloured and not red, and being neither red nor coloured, of which it is true that everything must satisfy one, nothing can satisfy more than one, and whether one is satisfied or not is logically independent of the question whether another is satisfied or not. There are 3 corresponding existence propositions each to the effect that one of the conditions is satisfied and 8 possible combinations of the truth-values of these propositions.

Given n atomic propositions, there are 2^n mutually exclusive truth-possibilities and we can agree with any of these and disagree with the remainder. There is an extreme case in which we agree with all the truth-possibilities and disagree with none, and another in which we agree with none and disagree with all. The former is a tautology and the latter a contradiction. A tautology may accordingly be defined as the truth-function of n propositions which has the truth-value 'true' for every possible combination

of truth-values in the n propositions. Tautologies are more valuable than contradictions; for we can get up an abstract algebra or a calculating machine for grinding them out 'like sausages', as Professor E. T. Bell¹ has put it, provided we do not widen the definition of a tautology to mean a 'tautology in all possible worlds'.²

Writing T and F for 'true' and 'false' respectively, T being regarded as the higher of the two values, the matrices of the classical two-valued logic may be written:

		p		$\text{not-}p$	
		T		F	
		F		T	
p	q	$p \text{ and } q$		$p \text{ or } q$	$p \text{ or not-}p$
T	T	T		T	T
T	F	F		T	T
F	T	F		T	T
F	F	F		F	T

The first two columns exhibit the four ways of combining T and F. The third column defines ' p and q ' as the function of p, q , whose value is the lower of the values of p and q , and the fourth column uses the higher value to define ' p or q '. There are sixteen different ways of correlating a column of T's and F's with the first two columns; in other words, sixteen functions of p, q ; six of them are $p, q, \text{not-}p, \text{not-}q, p \text{ and } q, p \text{ or } q$. It can be easily shown that the remaining ten are expressible in terms of these six. The three functions $p, q, \text{'neither } p \text{ nor } q\text{'}$ suffice in fact.

It is worth noticing that, in this logic, not-not- p , has the same value as p and that the truth-values of the function ' p or not- p ' are all T's; that is to say, p or not- p is true whether or not p is

1. *Mathematics: Queen and Servant of Science* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1951), Ch. 5, p. 63.
2. The number of 'possible worlds' is unlimited. Neither the method of truth-tables nor any known alternative general method can establish a tautology for an unlimited number of 'possible worlds'. Cf. G. H. Von Wright, *Form and Content in Logic* (Cambridge University Press, 1949).

true or false. It is not necessary for the proof that p should be an elementary proposition; the proof holds when p is any finite combination of elementary propositions. The *tertium non datur* can be demonstrated for propositions which have just two values. The laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle assure us that a two-way switch is closed or open but not both. A binary mechanism involves a 'Yes-or-No'. Professor Bell³ has observed that the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle figure as the brains of the modern 'digital' calculating machines.

We can now see that disputes about the unrestricted validity of the *tertium non datur* are disputes about the number of truth-values of a proposition. Why should the values be restricted to 'true' and 'false' only? In an earlier paper published in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*,⁴ I have explained how the mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer was led to envisage a three-valued logic by admitting propositions that are neither 'true' nor 'false' but 'undecidable' or 'half-true'. The law of excluded middle, in the opinion of Brouwer and his followers, can be applied to infinite manifolds only when its validity has been established with reference to the principles according to which the manifolds are constructed. Cantor had assumed that it is in principle possible to ascertain whether something is an element or not of a manifold. The Intuitionists contend that this is not enough.⁵ If the number of possibilities is enumerably infinite, then a property proved for the possibility r ought to be capable of being proved for $r + 1$. A systematic proof of every possibility should be constructed even though we may not specify which of the possibilities is realized. In Intuitionism we cannot prove the theorem 'If a, b are real numbers, and $ab = 0$, then either $a = 0$ or $b = 0$.' We can only say 'If $ab = 0$, then $a \neq 0, b \neq 0$, cannot hold simultaneously' from which we are not allowed to infer that either $a = 0$ or $b = 0$, since we cannot always assert the truth of a specifiable one of two alternatives. Professor E. T. Bell, following Brouwer, suspects that the law of excluded middle 'like some of Euclid's postulates for elementary geometry, was probably an abstraction from sensory experience of one kind or another, specifically in Aristotle's case with reference to finite collections of things like heaps of pebbles. What

3. *Op. cit.*, Ch. 5, p. 64; Ch. 11, p. 250.
4. Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (July 1951), pp. 59-73.
5. See Jorgensen, *A Treatise of Formal Logic* (Oxford University Press), Vol. III, pp. 53 ff. Cf. K. Chandrasekharan, 'The Logic of Intuitionist Mathematics', *The Mathematics Student*, Vol. 9.

grounds would there be for inferring that experience at this finite level could be consistently extrapolated to the infinite, for which it was not designed, without the possibility of engendering contradictions? ⁶

Kurt Gödel's achievement, to which I have referred in my earlier paper, consisted in showing that no proof of the non-contradictoriness of an object language S can be furnished in a syntax which uses only the means of expression available in S .⁷ The following brief statement⁸ may serve the purpose of the present discussion. The domain of the variables in the *Principia Mathematica* deductive system may, without much loss of generality, be regarded as the domain of the natural numbers. The nature of the deductive processes involved ensures that the aggregate of demonstrable formulae must be enumerable. We may adopt some scheme for enumerating them. These demonstrable formulae define propositional functions of a single variable the aggregate of which must likewise be enumerable. Suppose such propositional functions are enumerated and suppose that $R(n)$ denotes the n^{th} such function. As we have assumed that the domain of the variables is the totality of the integers, the propositional function $R(n)$ defines a class of integers which may likewise be denoted by $R(n)$. Let K denote the class of integers n which do not belong to $R(n)$, that is, of integers n such that $n \in R(n)$ is not demonstrable in the system. It can be shown that the propositional function corresponding to K is constructible in the system itself; hence K is an $R(q)$. Then the proposition $q \in R(q)$ is neither demonstrable nor refutable in the system. For, if it were demonstrable, it would be true and q would belong to K . By definition of K , $q \in R(q)$ is not demonstrable in the system. If, on the other hand, it were refutable, the negation of $q \in R(q)$ would be demonstrable; hence q does not belong to K and belongs to $R(q)$. Therefore, both $q \in R(q)$ and its negation would be provable which is impossible.

6. Bell, *op. cit.*, Ch. 20, pp. 410-411. Łukasiewicz has pointed out, however, that Aristotle did not accept the law of excluded middle without reservations when dealing with propositions which refer to future contingent events. See Leon Chwistek, *The Limits of Science* (Kegan Paul, London, 1948), p. 130.

7. R. Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language* (Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 219; H. Reichenbach, *Elements of Symbolic Logic* (Macmillan, New York, 1947), Ch. IV, § 33.

8. I owe it to an illuminating discussion by Dr. R. Vaidyanathaswamy of the Madras University, *The Mathematics Student*, Vol. 6, p. 8. See also Dr. Vaidyanathaswamy's paper, 'On Disjunction in Intuitionist Logic', *Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc.*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (January, 1943), Sec. A.

Much earlier than Gödel, the Russian philosopher N. A. Vassilyev had issued a warning against conceiving the principle of non-contradiction in too general a fashion. He speculated on the possibility of a logic in which there would be no negation in the sense of our incompatibility, in which we can admit that S both is and is not at the same time P . Vassilyev called such propositions 'neutral' and sketched a theory of the syllogism on the basis of a logic which provides for positive, negative and 'neutral' propositions. He attempted to show how the first figure of the syllogism in the new logic would differ from the traditional first figure of the Aristotelian syllogism. A hypothetical illustration of the application of his non-Aristotelian logic given by Vassilyev may be of some interest in view of what I am going to urge. He suggested that in our world of ordinary experience all sensations are positive, even those that are due to negative causes like black. Negation is something external to our ordinarily describable sensations, something which they acquire only in relation to other sensations. But Vassilyev argued, we could conceive of a world with pure negative sensations, say non- A . In such a world, some object S might at one and the same time give rise to both A and non- A , and we should require 'neutral' judgments.⁹

S. A. Łukasiewicz, rightly regarded as one of the greatest authorities on the calculus of propositions, has demonstrated the possibility of devising multi-valued logics which reject the unrestricted validity of the law of excluded middle. The matrices of a logic, with the truth-values 'true' (T), 'undecidable' (U) and 'false' (F), corresponding to those of the two-valued logic we noticed, may be set down thus:

p	not- p
T	U
U	F
F	T

9. See the citations from Vassilyev's paper 'Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic' (*The Journal of the Ministry of Education*, St. Petersburg, August 1912) by N. O. Lossky in his *History of Russian Philosophy* (International Universities Press, New York, 1951), Ch. 19, pp. 315-317. Chwistek (*op. cit.*) says that Vassilyev's 'neutral' proposition ' S is both p and non- p ' is 'undecidable.' P. 7

p	q	p and q	p or q
T	T	T	T
T	U	U	T
T	F	F	T
U	T	U	T
U	U	U	U
U	F	F	U
F	T	F	T
F	U	F	U
F	F	F	F

(2)

It should be obvious that any truth-table for a three-valued logic is an abstract scheme which becomes a system of logical truth only by interpretation. Whether a particular interpretation of a three-valued logic is needed in a phenomenological investigation must be settled in the light of the investigation itself. In my earlier paper I have noticed Hans Reichenbach's contention that quantum physics can be assimilated to a three-valued logic. He maintains that the world of physics includes the results of observation, what we infer in a simple and direct fashion from observation and certain 'interphenomena' which are posited by an interpolation based on definitions. The 'interphenomena' of modern quantum mechanics cannot be constructed without causal anomalies. In Reichenbach's three-valued logic, propositions about the 'interphenomena' are neither 'true' nor 'false', but carry the value 'indeterminate' (I).¹⁰

Whether or not a three-valued logic ultimately justifies itself in modern physics—Bohr¹¹ and Margenau,¹² without disputing the technical logical possibility, say that it does violence to ordinary habits of scientific thought—I venture to think that something like it may be needed, at least as a *pis aller*, in dealing with those extrapolations which the modern psychologist groups under the perplexing term 'unconscious'. 'Unconscious' is a negative; the point of the negative, as used by Freud and especially by Jung, is that the characteristics of 'unconscious' mental processes are sup-

10. *Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics* (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, second printing, 1946), § 37, pp. 176-177.

11. "On the Notions of Causality and Complementarity", *Science*, 111 (January, 1950), pp. 51-54.

12. *The Nature of Physical Reality* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1950), p. 462.

posed to differ vastly from those of the mental processes available to ordinary introspection. *Praeter-conscious* would be perhaps a better term than 'unconscious'; for the not ordinarily introspectable mental processes seem to have much to do with the 'extra-sensorial' or 'paranormal' cognitions which are being investigated in Europe, Britain and America. I shall not attempt to discuss here the scientific status of the research; I have done it elsewhere. Professor C. D. Broad has drawn attention to a prevailing misconception among philosophers that these 'paranormal' phenomena are merely odd and uncommon occurrences, like two-headed cobras and calves with six legs, which are of little value in constructing an ontology. It is not yet realized by many that the phenomena of psychical research depart from very general and widely accepted postulates relating to human cognition in the context of spatio-temporal and causal description.¹³ Those who see in the new field of enquiry a lingering medievalism cannot be aware, I think, of various technical advances in it. A. G. N. Flew, the enterprising editor of the *Essays on Logic and Language*,¹⁴ who cannot be accused of any partisan interest in the investigation of ESP or 'Extra-Sensory Perception', has pronounced recently: '... ESP does occur ... the scientific handling of ESP phenomena may well call for some revision of, or innovation in, the basic explanatory concepts'.¹⁵ I would go much farther than that. I contend that supernormal non-inferential foreknowledge or precognition presents a far greater anomaly than any alleged 'interphenomenon' of quantum physics. Contemporary analysis¹⁶ tends to show that time with all its tenses, the 'was', the 'is' and the 'will be', is woven into the texture of ordinary human experience in a fashion which makes all the older attempts to discredit it by the use of non-temporal copulas joined to temporal adjectives and nouns a muddle if not an impertinence. I make bold to say that the precognition of psychical researchers raises the gravest issues about the categorial nature of time which

13. See the discussion of some philosophic issues of psychical research by H. H. Price, R. H. Thouless, C. W. K. Mundle, C. C. Stevens, A. G. N. Flew and C. T. K. Chari in the *Journal of the Society for Psychical Research*, London, Vol. XXXVI, No. 668. (January-February, 1952), pp. 537-557.

14. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1951).

15. *Journal S. P. R.*, op. cit., p. 553.

16. See, for instance, D. F. Pears, 'Time, Truth and Inference', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, Vol. LI, 1950-1951, pp. 1-24 and Miss Anscombe, 'The Reality of the Past' in *Philosophical Analysis*, edited by Max Black (Cornell University, New York, 1951).

can neither be explained nor explained away.¹⁷ Various hypotheses, purporting to account for the anomalous cognition, have been proposed; without entering into the technicalities, I shall content myself with the statement that they do not go even half way.¹⁸

I suggest that in at least one respect, though probably in more, attempts to lodge extrapolated praeter-conscious process and ordinary psycho-physical processes in a single system of explanation will necessitate a radical departure from two-valued logics. The temporal position of the deeper, or the ordinarily inaccessible, praeter-conscious states, relative to the familiar psycho-physical processes, may not only in practice but in principle be 'undecidable'. It is curious that notable descriptions of mystical transports and ecstasies neither unambiguously affirm nor unambiguously deny time. The following utterance, ascribed to Eckhart, is fairly typical. 'The soul is contained in a place, as it were, betwixt time and eternity, touching them both. With her higher powers she is in contact with eternity; in her inferior powers she is in contact with time. Thus, mark you, in time she does not function according to time, but in her eternal nature which she has in common with the angels.'¹⁹ Angelus Silesius, whose *Der cherubnische Wandersmann* has been described by Karrer as 'a seventeenth century edition of Eckhart', expressed the same paradox about a soul which is in time and yet is not temporal.

Eternity may be as time
Time as eternity.²⁰

17. D. F. Pears (*op. cit.*, p. 19) has observed: 'precognition cannot differ from memory only in telling us about the future. For, if it tells us about the future, it tells us about something which usually has not yet been determined; whereas memory, which tells us about the past, tells us about something which has always already been determined'.

18. See my 'Note on Precognition', *Journal S. P. R.*, London, Vol. XXXVI, No. 667, (November-December, 1951), pp. 509-518; *The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, New York, Vol. 46, No. 3, (July, 1952); and my article 'The Psychic Quest for the Self' in *The Aryan Path*, Vol. XXIII, No. 7, (July, 1952), pp. 312-317.

19. *Meister Eckhart*, Vol. I, adapted from Pfeiffer's edition of 1857 by C. De B. Evans (John Watkins, London, 1924), *Sermons and Collations*, XXII, p. 73.

20. *The Spiritual Maxims of Angelus Silesius* (H. Bett's translation, C. H. Kelley, London, 1914), p. 52.

And even a devotional mystic like Jacopone da Todi may be found singing about the enigmatic transition from the experience of time to mystical rapture:

When the mind's very being is gone,
Sunk in a conscious sleep,
In a rapture divine and deep,
Itself in the Godhead lost:
It is conquered, ravished, and won!
Set in Eternity's sweep,
Gazing back on the steep,
Knowing not how it was crossed—²¹

Not knowing how it was crossed? Aye. No language that takes time with all its tenses as a categorial feature of human experience will fit the mystical intimations of our immortality.

Ours is an age in which each investigator picks up one or two strands of a tangled skein leaving to his successors what he fears is the hopeless task of unravelling the whole. We have heard it said that the century of all-inclusive theories, whether of mathematics, or science, or history, or philosophy, is past. C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford cautioned philosophers against 'falling into a state of mystic wonderment about nothing'.²² But there may be, I would insist, situations which are intractable to all ordinarily recognized language-habits. 'In logic', Carnap has assured us, 'there are no morals'.²³ Its business is to lay down conventions and not prohibitions. I have suggested in this paper that, if we operate with a two-valued logic and the ordinary canons of 'verifiability' based on sense-perception and the familiar kind of introspection, there may be certain directions in our explorations of Human Selves in which we cannot find 'coherent' or 'intelligible' explanations. The re-

21. Mrs. Theodore Beck's translation of *Lauda* 91.

Se l'atto de la mente,
è tutto consopito,
en Dio stando rapito,
ch'en sé non se ritrova,
de sé reman perdente
posto nello 'nfinite,
ammira co c' è gito,
non sa como se mova.

Evelyn Underhill, *The Mystics of the Church* (James Clarke, London), p. 99.

22. *Symbolic Logic* (The Century Co., New York and London, 1932), Ch. VII, p. 212.

23. *The Logical Syntax of Language*, § 17, 'The Principle of Tolerance in Syntax', p. 52.

cognition of such intrinsic limits to our ordinary language-habits and scientific thought should compel us to turn our gaze from analysis to presuppositions and from presuppositions to the attitudes lying behind them. Two acute critics of contemporary European philosophy, G. N. M. Tyrrell²⁴ and Angus Sinclair,²⁵ have urged the need for a criticism of epistemological bases. The current analysis of material-object sentences into sense-data sentences presupposes a metaphysical position, and one that is not invulnerable. I maintain that the great mystical philosophies, whether of the East or the West, seek to bring to us an awareness of the limitations imposed by our unobtrusive, but nevertheless pervasive, attitudes. The mystic glimpses That which transcends all conditions of logical 'assertability';²⁶ he sees that, in constructing scientific or philosophical 'explanations' according to patterns approved by our culture and age, our gaze is contracted. To attempt, as Karl Jaspers²⁷ has done, 'within the confines of object-thinking, the only thinking of which we are capable, to go beyond the object' will not do. The only 'existential' thinking which is legitimately a 'beyond' to object-thought, which is legitimately characterized by negatives, and which legitimately can never become a field for systematic construction, is the thinking which springs from mystical experiences. The experience of the comprehensive (*das Umgreifende*) reality transcending the subject-object dichotomy, of which Jaspers speaks, is the surest report of much mysticism.

24. *Homo Faber* (Methuen, London, 1951).

25. *The Conditions of Knowing* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1951).

26. See my articles in *The Vedanta Kesari*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 7 (November, 1951), pp. 257-261; *Prabuddha Bharata*, Vol. LVI, No. 6 (June, 1951), pp. 243-248; No. 10 (October, 1951), pp. 403-408; Vol. LVII, No. 1 (January, 1952), pp. 21-25; No. 2 (February, 1952), pp. 84-90; *The Maha Bodhi*, Vol. 60, Nos. 3 and 4 (March-April, 1952), pp. 108-111.

27. *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy* (tr. Ralph Manheim, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London).

Sense-Data and Judgment in Perceptual Knowledge

by

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The question whether sense-data have any existence apart from judgment in our perceptual experience, when taken with all its ramifications, will be found to involve an entire metaphysics. Without raising ultimate metaphysical issues, we propose to discuss the idealistic doctrine which answers this question in the negative. Since the days of Kant, idealistic philosophers have persistently maintained that knowledge presupposes a synthetic activity on the part of the subject, and that this synthetic activity manifests itself in the form of judging which consists in interpreting the materials of sense. If all cognition must be necessarily mediated by judgment it follows that a sense-datum, if there be any such thing at all, can never appear to us in its pure form but must be modified by judgment. We can go even further and say that the so-called sense-data have no existence apart from judgment. "We can get at no data unqualified by judgment" (Bosanquet—*Essentials of Logic*, p. 28). If, however, sense-data have no existence apart from judgment, it seems that they must be produced by our thinking activity. This is a conclusion which modern idealists are unwilling to accept. While maintaining that sense-data have no existence apart from the activity of thought, they will refuse to concede that these are produced by the activity of our thought. The world which we know through, and in terms of, sense-data can have no independent existence, since the latter have no existence apart from thought; but at the same time, the world cannot be said to be constructed by a finite mind, since the thought apart from which sense-data do not exist is not the thought of a finite mind, but the universal thought which is immanent in the activities of all minds.

Such a doctrine is obviously open to a criticism of the following type. If sense-data presented to me are neither produced by my thought, nor have they any existence apart from thought, then

it seems that we have to fall back upon the view that they are modified by thought. "These data themselves are modified through and through by habitual interpretation" (Ibid, p. 28). Now, modification implies construction, and construction implies a distinction between a material and a finished product. If judgment is an act of constructive interpretation, it must have a material on which it is to act, and we seem to be justified in supposing that what appears in sensation is the material. Following the analogy between physical activity and the activity involved in thought, we can say that the data which are given to us in immediate experience must be known as such, and it should be possible for us to make a distinction between these data as originally given and the finished products which thought makes of them. Hence sense-data cannot be altogether dependent on judgment, they must have being apart from judgment. If the function of judgment is to reconstruct sense-data by interpreting them, the sense-data must be capable of being known by themselves, and the mode of apprehension through which they are known must be separate from the act of judging.

The argument sketched above is the substance of the objection urged by Hobhouse against Green who maintains that the so-called immediate intuition has any content only in so far as it depends on its relations to objects not now presented in intuition at all, that is to say, in so far as it is modified by the relating activity of the subject. If to be aware of the content of an intuition (i.e. sensation) is to judge its relations, how do we know "what the 'it' is whose relations we judge?" (Theory of Knowledge—p. 25). This is also essentially the objection which Prof. Price urges against the doctrine which denies the existence of sense-data apart from judgment. It is contended by idealists that it is impossible to apprehend something without apprehending some at least of its qualities and relations. We cannot apprehend just A. For instance, we cannot apprehend a round patch without apprehending that it is red and round and has certain spatial relations. But if we apprehend that it has these qualities and relations, we are not passively 'receiving' or (as it were) swallowing; we are actively thinking, judging, or classifying; and hence what we are supposed to apprehend immediately is in every case modified by the thinking activity. To this Prof. Price answers, "The argument only proves that nothing stands merely in the relation of givenness to the mind, without also standing in other relations:

i.e., that what is given is always also thought about in some sense or other of that ambiguous phrase. But this does not have the slightest tendency to prove that nothing is given at all. The fact that A and B are constantly conjoined or even necessarily connected, does not have the slightest tendency to prove that A does not exist. How could it, since it itself presupposes the existence of A?" (Perception, p. 7).

Mr. A. D. Campbell writing in *Mind* (October, 1947), repudiates the suggestion that the view referred to by Prof. Price is really the idealistic view, or that the idealistic view is supported by the argument given above. The authentic idealistic doctrine asserts that all sensory apprehension involves judgment, but does not assert that the judgment involved is one which accompanies the apprehension and is about the immediate object of that sensory apprehension, i.e. is about a 'sensus'. "On the idealist version the judgment involved is not a judgment which accompanies the sensory apprehension but a judgment which is the sensory apprehension. Every apprehension, on this view, is (in so far as it is a mode of cognition) a judgment which ascribes to a subject in reality a certain sensory character. There is no question whatever of the Idealist argument accepting a sensum in the premise as an entity about which we judge and then denying it in the conclusion. The whole point of the Idealist argument is that the cognised sensible — the so-called sensum — in sensory cognition has no status save as an element within the unity of the judgment. In other words, it is not a sensum at all, not an 'actual existent' known through sensing" (*Mind*, Oct. 1947, p. 313).

The essentials of the authentic idealistic view, as expounded by Mr. Campbell, can be summed up as follows:—

- (i) There is no cognitive act called 'sensing' as distinct from an intellectual act.
- (ii) 'Sensing' as a mode of cognition is judging.
- (iii) There are no existents to which the name 'sense-data' can be properly applied.
- (iv) What we ordinarily call sense-data (patches of colour, sounds etc.) have no existence apart from judgments.

If to deny the existence of sense-data is to deny the existence of colours, sounds etc., then the third proposition would appear to

be palpably false. Evidently, therefore, sense-data must refer to entities other than colours, sounds etc., which are perceived by us. The term sense-data would be properly applicable only to those entities which, supposing that they existed, could be cognised by a mode of immediate awareness different from the intellectual act of judging. But there are no such entities. The very fact that in spite of an apparent unanimity among sense-data philosophers as regards the existence of sense-data, very few of them agree among themselves as regards the exact nature of the relationship between these sense-data and physical objects shows, according to Mr. Campbell, that sense-data do not exist, that they are just "the fictitious products of a faulty epistemological analysis".

Sense-data can appear only as elements in judgments. A judgment is an intellectual act by which a predicate is ascribed to a subject in reality. When, therefore, it is asserted that sense-data have no existence apart from judgments, what this means or ought to mean is that our conscious life consists only of judging. Now, an intellectual act is regarded as a spontaneous act in the sense that its course is mainly directed by its own inner force. But when we make a perceptual judgment we invariably feel that we have to submit to an external compulsion. Hence the conclusion seems to be inevitable that perceptual experience involves a mode of awareness different in nature from an intellectual act, and this mode of awareness must be 'sensing'. If there is 'sensing', there must be sense-data which are objects of 'sensing.' But if we are convinced, on other grounds, of the non-existence of sense-data, we must deny the existence of 'sensing' as a mode of awareness. This raises the question whether we always judge or think and never 'sense' at all.

To such a question Mr. Campbell would answer that there is certainly a mode of experience to which the name 'sensing' can be properly applied, but he refuses to regard it as a mode of cognition. "I do not believe that there is a sensing whereby we apprehend a significant *sensum*. But I do not for a moment dispute that there is in the experience of sensory cognition something besides sheer intellection, something for which the title 'sensing' is appropriate. I believe this sensing to be highly important not as a mode of cognition but as a basis of cognition." "There is an extra-logical compulsoriness in the judgment in sensory cognition..... If the source of this compulsion is taken to fall outside the field of the intellect and yet to fall (as presumably it

must) within the field of experience we are clearly driven to recognise in sensory cognition the operation of some kind of non-intellectual mode of experience. This non-intellectual mode of experience is sensation" (Mind,—Oct. 1947, p. 303).

Let us now examine the authentic version of the idealistic doctrine relating to the nature and status of sense-data as expounded here. Mr. Campbell is prepared to retain the term 'sensation' in the vocabulary of idealistic epistemology provided that it is used in the proper sense. 'Sensation' or 'Sensing', we are told, is not the mere re-action of a sense-organ to a material stimulus nor is it a mode of cognition, i.e., a mental process by which we apprehend something as significant, that is, apprehend it as characterising the objective world and is related accordingly to other constituents of that world. Positively, sensation is "an immediate experience in which sensing and what is sensed are indissolubly one" (*Ibid.*, p. 303). But if sensation is neither a purely physical process nor a cognitive process in which the distinction between the act of sensing and the *sensum* is present, and yet a mental process, then it must be regarded as a sub-conscious mental process. This is indeed what Mr. Campbell himself suggests. "It may be allowed indeed that it is possible for an entity to be in some sense 'present' to the mind and yet not apprehended as characterising the objective world, as e.g., in certain kinds of subconscious mental processes" (*Ibid.*, p. 302). The cognitive process involved in judgment must therefore be based on and determined by a subconscious experience that underlies it. This subconscious experience "evokes in us by extra-logical compulsion, the appropriate judgment which obliges us to ascribe greenness to the tree, smoothness to the billiard ball and so on" (*Ibid.*, p. 303).

Such an account of the process of sensing gives rise to certain fundamental difficulties, the cumulative effect of which must be regarded as devastating to the theory which is sought to be built on it.


If all perceiving is judging and if colours, sounds, etc., which are perceived by us are merely predicates, which have no existence apart from judgment, how can we account for the character of sensory vividness which the perceived world undoubtedly possesses? A conclusion which we reach by what is admittedly an intellectual operation, however convincing it may be, does not present to us an object possessing vividness of this type. There-

fore, perception which presents to us objects possessing this character of vividness must contain an element which establishes a contact between us and something outside us. Mr. Campbell anticipates such an objection but does not consider it to be decisive. According to him vividness does not serve to mark off 'contents' of sense from 'contents' of thought. It only serves to mark off a specific kind of thought-contents, viz., that specific kind which is thought under the direct compulsion of immediate sensory experience from what is asserted by thought under logical impulsion. It is not true that a thought-content cannot be vivid. When I look at a tomato and make the judgment, "This tomato is red", the redness which I ascribe to the tomato must be regarded as a universal, and therefore as a content of thought. "Now", asks Mr. Campbell, "can it be really maintained that the thought-content here, the universal redness, as it functions in my mind lacks the 'sensible vividness' supposed to be the exclusive property of contents of sense?" (*Ibid.*, p. 305). Our answer to this question is that the vividness does not belong to the universal 'red', but to the particular existent which instantiates the universal. It is not a detached universal, a floating adjective, that is vivid but a particular patch of colour to which the universal can be applied. We cannot also accept the contention that sensible vividness is nothing but the compulsion which sub-conscious sensory experience exercises on us when we make a perceptual judgment. If a judgment is essentially an act of thought which refers an ideal content (i.e. an abstract universal) to a reality beyond that act, then its internal structure cannot change with the alteration of the conditions under which it is made. I may make one judgment because it follows logically from other judgments, and another because I am subjected to some extra-logical compulsion, but there is no reason why the latter should present an object to me while the former does not. The latter may be held with a stronger conviction than the former but cannot differ from it in respect of its essential nature.

We are told that when we perceive something as green what really happens is that a sub-conscious non-intelligent experience evokes in us by extra-logical compulsion the appropriate judgment 'That is green'. If however the experience underlying the perceptual judgment is sub-conscious or non-intellectual, we cannot explain at all how we get the predicate, and how we can know whether one particular predicate rather than another fits in with the subject, whether, that is to say, the judgment 'That is green'

rather than the judgment "That is red" would be appropriate on a particular occasion. If sensory experience does not present a content to us, if that is to say, it does not bring us into contact with a specific aspect of reality, the question whether a predicate is appropriate would not arise at all. Moreover, it is an ordinary fact of experience that we are sometimes in extreme doubt as to whether a subject should have this or that predicate or any predicate at all, and this fact shows that we are in some cases at least aware of unattached sense-data unmediated by judgment. There are also experiences (e.g., in the case of a stunning blow on the head) in which all judgment is suspended, and yet some vague awareness of something is left. This something is a sense-datum and the awareness of it the act of sensing. We cannot eliminate sense-data by reducing sensation to a mode of non-intellectual sub-conscious experience and treating it as a 'basis of cognition'.

The assertion is sometimes made that a rejection of the idealistic view regarding the nature and status of sense-data leads to a 'fatal' dualism. But unless it can be shown that dualism as such is 'fatal', the fact that the only alternative to the idealistic theory is dualism cannot be a valid ground for its acceptance.



Nayas—Ways of Approach and Observation

by

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The Jaina philosopher has made some astonishingly original contributions in the field of logic and epistemology, which have not been properly assessed and appreciated by the rival schools of Indian thought. Among those I here propose to deal with a problem which has living interest not only for the professional philosophers, but also for practical men of the world. The problem will have interest for journalists, politicians and administrators who have to arrive at a decision and chalk out a line of action in the midst of conflicting views and demands actuated by diverse interests and inclinations. This problem is called *Nayas*—ways of approach and observation. Even when a problem is a self-identical singular question of fact or act, persons of different interests and inclinations are bound to study it in different lights, and each will claim the infallibility and imperative necessity of his point of view. It is not necessary that all of them should be erroneous or misdirected. It is quite possible that there is truth in each of these conflicting presentations. It is a question of paramount importance that these different views and conflicting assertions and truth-claims should be assessed at their real worth and assigned their proper value in an impartial estimation of the situation confronting a thinker.

The Jaina philosopher asserts that each fact, however trivial it may appear, can be thoroughly understood in the context of the entire reality and only in the light of its inter-connections with the rest of reality. A real thing is possessed of an infinite number of aspects and attributes, which can be thoroughly comprehended only by a person who is directly acquainted with the whole order of reality, in one word, who is omniscient. But this does not mean that the Jaina here offers a counsel of perfection, which amounts to a counsel of despair for persons like us, whose resources are limited. Though the full knowledge of all the possible characteristics even of a particle of dust cannot be claimed by any one of

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us, the knowledge of one attribute or another can be attained, if we are dispassionate and free from bias of a particular angle of vision, and are prepared for approaching it from other standpoints. The standpoints are called *Nayas*. A *Naya* is a viewpoint or a way of approach from which a person looks at a particular aspect of a thing, impelled by a consideration which is in its turn determined by his interest, inclination, and aesthetic, intellectual as well as moral equipment. It is entailed by our mental constitution and the exigencies of the human understanding that we should isolate one aspect of the reality and concentrate upon it. There is nothing to impugn its validity or expediency, provided it does not make us blind or hostile to the other aspects which present themselves to other viewpoints. The conflict becomes irreconcilable when the advocate of a particular aspect develops a fanatic zeal, and refuses to view the subject from other angles of vision. The rivalry and antagonism among philosophers, followers of different religious creeds, and also politicians derive from this exclusive emphasis upon a particular glimpse of the truth.

As we are interested in the logical problem, we select examples of philosophical interest to drive home the truth of our position. An entity can be viewed as possessed of diverse characteristics as they are unfolded to different ways of approach. For instance, a pen is an existent fact, and this shows that it has the character of existence which it shares in common with all other entities. Again, it may be regarded as a pen possessed of penhood which it shares with other pens. Again, it is found to possess a distinctive individuality which distinguishes it from all other things—pens and not-pens. Now the first character of existence is entirely devoid of diversity. The second character is diverse and unitive. So it may be called generic-cum-specific. The third is entirely specific as it belongs to the particular pen. The pen is thus found to possess an entirely generic (*avisuddha*), an entirely specific (*visuddha*) and generic-cum-specific (*visuddhā visuddha*) character. None of these is to be dismissed as an untrue estimation of the character of the pen. This truth is also attested in ordinary assertions of workaday life. Asked about his residence, a man may observe that his residence is in Asia or India or Bengal or Calcutta or Chowringhee or a particular house with a particular number. Ultimately he may observe, for the sake of exactitude, that as a soul he lives within his own body. Now all these observations are true, though the first statement presents a broadly generalized concept and the last the most specific one, the in-

intermediate locations representing a graduated scale of specification. This way of approach has been called *Naigama Naya*—the way of pantoscopic observation.

Now all these different traits are present and real. The philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school approach reality from this point of view, and the result is the discovery of these multiple traits varying in the scale of generalization down to the ultimate limit of specialized content, which does not admit of any unitive common bond. The fallacy of this approach, according to the Jaina philosopher, consists in regarding these diverse traits as numerically and qualitatively different from one another and also from the substratum in which they are embodied. The Jaina philosopher admits the reality of these distinctive traits, but insists upon their integration in a concrete real, which is incompatible with their absolute otherness and diversity. They are necessarily bound with the substratum and one another only by virtue of their being related by way of identity-cum-difference. While appreciating the acuteness of the observation of the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, he accuses them of abstractionist outlook which prevents the consideration of the unitive bond subsisting *inter se*.

The second way of approach is called synthetic vision which ignores the concrete entity in which the unity manifests itself. Now, a concrete entity is possessed of generic, generic-cum-specific and purely specific characteristics. The most generalized character which any entity exhibits is existence which is also the necessary characteristic of all existent facts. This is creditable for the philosopher who discovers the unitive bond in the diversity of multiple characteristics. But when he regards this as the sole and absolute characteristic of reality and dismisses the diverse attributes as unreal appearance, swayed by the dictates of formal logic, he is held guilty of extremism and exclusiveness of outlook. The Vedāntist of the monistic school has approached reality from this angle of vision and arrived at the conclusion that existence is the only character of reality. The diverse characters such as substantiality, cowhood and the shape, magnitude, colour etc. are dismissed as unreal appearance on the ground that they cannot claim reality if they be other than existence. The only reality they can claim is due to their identity with existence. This facile way of condemning the plain testimony of experience and the preferential treatment of a part of its content are regarded by the Jaina philosopher as the result of this way of approach and

observation. If, however, a person stops at this discovery of a common bond, and asserts it to be the character of reality without any commitment regarding the other characteristics, he will not be guilty of an aberration. Certainly the knowledge of a slice of reality cannot be false unless the fanaticism of the observer makes it the sole and sufficient character of it. This is called *Saṅgraha Naya*—the synthetic approach and observation.

All extremism is by its very nature bound to create a reaction in the opposite direction. This has been called the dialectic movement of thought by Hegel. An extremist assertion is compelled by the dialectic of its nature to pass into its opposite. The purely monistic outlook as exemplified in the aforesaid approach and angle of vision finds itself confronted by its diametrically opposite point of view, which is called *Vyavahāra Naya*—the analytic and particularistic approach. The exclusively synthetic approach culminates in positing pure being as the only reality. But pure being is equivalent to non-being because both of them have no character and are as such indistinguishable. It may sound paradoxical that being and non-being should be regarded as identical. But the paradox will disappear if one calmly reflects on both. It is generally supposed that pure being represents plenitude and non-being stands for absolute poverty. But both are abstractions, pure and simple. And when one thinks that being is something positive and affirmative as opposed to the negativity of non-being, one has before one's mind the idea of some concrete real. A pure universal is only an empty idea, if it is divorced from concrete facts of experience. What we experience is always a concrete individual and the so-called universal is only an ideal abstraction. Whatever has no individuality of its own is a chimera. The sky-flower, a barren woman's son, a mare's nest are only names. They are never perceived by anybody. It is only individuals—say a pen, a table, a jar, a coat—that we happen to observe.

Moreover, the criterion of reality is found in causal efficiency. A universal *ex hypothesi* has no causal efficiency. It is the individual cow that yields milk and not the so-called cowhood. It is the pen that writes and not penhood. The so-called universals are only hypostatized concepts which pass for reals only because the mental inertia of the average man prevents him from the labour of judging their worth. Not only the verdict of experience is against these universals but also logic confutes their reality. Is the universal different from the particulars or identical with them?

If it be identical, then it becomes the individual only, and if it be different, it transpires to be an illusory fiction just like the ass's horn. A universal unrelated to individuals is a mere name. What is the tree-universal apart from the trees? If it be different from the particular trees, it will be the negation of the tree and so, like the jar or pen, will cease to have any connection with the tree. No honest thinker can think of a real tree which is not the oak or the mango or the teak etc. Experience is the proof of existence of a thing, and not pure thought. A universal as such is an unperceived fact. The synthetic unity among the particulars of a class, which renders classification possible, cannot be ignored. But the absolute identity of the universals in different individuals is not endorsed by Jaina philosophers. The universal is an empirical concept and must be given a status in the scheme of reality. The close resemblance of the individuals of a class is too pronounced and patent a fact to be dismissed without incurring the charge of infidelity to experience.

Now the particularistic approach which takes delight in the analysis of a real into particular components cannot stop short at the substantive individuals. And if the individual be regarded as an enduring and abiding entity persisting through the past, present and future, it amounts to the assertion of a universal in another way. The past is defunct and the future is unborn. And if experience be the proof of the existence of a thing, the past and the future existence of a fact must be rejected as unreal. What we perceive is the present, and so it is the present that can be real. Furthermore, the past has no causal efficiency and so also the future. The real tree is the present one which exercises causal efficiency. The past tree does not serve any purpose or give any advantage or disadvantage. So logical consistency demands that we should regard only that as real which is existent in the present moment. This line of argument has been pursued by the Buddhist who declares all reals to be momentary in duration.

This approach has been called *Ṛjusūtra Naya*, that is, the approach which gives the straight and direct glimpse of the thing. The present is the real character of the individual. The past and future determinations are as alien to it as the character of other entities.

The advocate of the next *Naya* goes one step further in the process of particularization. He agrees with the assertion that the

present alone is real. But as the real is expressed and characterized by a word, and words are significant and not unmeaning symbols, the real must be understood in the light of the connotation of the term used for it. Each term designates an action, being derived from a verbal root and it is this action which stamps the fact meant with its distinctive character. And so the word *ghaṭa* (a jar), which is derived from the √ *ghaṭ* 'to exert', stands for the thing which is capable of action viz drawing water etc. This is the case with all words. The *king* is one who is possessed of sovereign power. If a man is called by the name 'King', it has not the meaning of the word 'king'. Similarly the portrait or the statue of a man is loosely identified with the man. The heir-apparent to the throne is addressed by the sycophants 'Your Majesty'. These are all unmeaning expressions because they do not possess the function which the word connotes. This emphasis on function constitutes the difference of this *Naya* from the previous one.

The next *Naya* is called *Samabhirūḍha* which goes another step further in the process of specification by identifying the etymological meaning (*vyutpattinimitta*) with the real meaning (*pravṛttinimitta*). Each word has got a distinctive connotation of its own. So there can be no synonyms in the true sense of the term. The jar is called *ghaṭa*, *kuṭa* and also *kumbha* in Sanskrit. They are derived from different roots and each of them has got a distinctive meaning. Thus the √ *ghaṭ* stands for a particular action; √ *kuṭ* stands for crookedness; and *kumbha* which is derived from *ku* + √ *umbh* 'to fill up' stands for the action of filling. The derivative words should therefore be properly affixed to facts which have these acts as their connotation. It is not consistent to maintain that words with different connotations stand for self-identical entities, or have the same denotation.

The last verbalistic approach, called *Evambhūta*, affirms that only the actualized meaning of the word is the real meaning. The word signifies an action, and the fact which actually exercises the action should be regarded as the real meaning. So the word *ghaṭa* should mean the jar which actually draws water and not the jar which remains idle in a corner of the room. The latter does not possess the connotation, and so cannot be designated by the word. Thus the king is the person who actually exercises sovereignty, the minister is one who actually exercises the function of a counsellor and framer of state policy. So when the king is engaged in domestic affairs or talking to his wife, he is not the king proper.

The exponent of the preceding approach hits upon the truth that difference of words entails difference of meaning, but he fails to grasp the real significance of the connotation when he affixes the word to the fact which is bereft of the action connoted by it. The idle jar is as different and distinct from the water-carrying jar as the pen. If however the word could signify a fact devoid of the connotation, there is no reason why it should not be affixed to a different fact having a different connotation. Light, for instance, means an entity which actually illuminates. If it could be affixed to a lamp which has gone out, it could with equal logical propriety be affixed to an opaque stone.

The Jaina philosopher with his characteristic catholicity of outlook and tolerance for other views and readiness to accommodate them and assess them at their proper worth has no hesitation to receive them as estimations of reality. This toleration is however subject to the proviso that they must not be allowed to outstrip their proper jurisdiction. The unitive bond in the midst of diverse attributes is endorsed by the Jaina logician as it is attested by uncontradicted experience. What the Jaina emphasizes is that all these traits are not isolated aspects, but integrated in the concrete fact which we experience. The so-called antinomies conjured up by abstract logic are only figments of formalism. Pure logic suffers from the defect that it ascribes rigidity to the different aspects, and makes them fixed characteristics which come into conflict with their opposites. There is nothing fixed in the world. Everything is impelled to change by the inner dialectic of its constitution. So the opposition of unity to diversity is only a figment. The different approaches only illustrate the truth that the tendency to differentiation and specification, if not checked by reference to other concomitant traits, will culminate in disastrous results. Specification begins from the third approach. The fourth only concentrates the attention of the knower upon the immediate present. The fifth makes the word a determinant factor, and the sixth follows it up by abolishing all synonyms. The seventh asserts the actual presence of the verbal meaning to be the sole determinant of the reality. If however it were conceded that each trait is a real factor and it is indifferent to the other traits, then each of them can be accepted as a true estimation of the reality. Of course each way of approach only succeeds in catching hold of a part. But the actuality of the part is undeniable. If the advocate of these different ways of approach asserts that the several findings are exclusive or mutually incompatible, he will expose himself to the charge of extremism and fanaticism.

In practical life, when a politician concentrates on the immediate need of the hour and refuses to take a retrospective or prospective view, he makes himself guilty of exclusiveness. All dogmatism owes its genesis to this partiality of outlook and fondness for a line of thinking to which a person has accustomed himself. The Jaina logician welcomes all the light that comes from different ways of approach and integrates them in one whole in which all these finite traits can co-subsist. This intellectual clarity will resolve all conflict and rivalry. So whatever may be the calling and avocation a man may be called upon to pursue, he can achieve success and combine it with benevolence and amity if he is alive to the importance and the utility of all the different ways of approach in the study of problems.

Sense and Understanding

by

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It is a common-place of philosophical analysis, which has its origin in Kant, the sense gives the matter of knowledge, which comes from outside, while understanding gives the generic forms which are in it. Sense and understanding combine in knowledge which is thus neither blind matter nor empty forms but a concrete form-content or intelligible matter. But it is a common philosophical problem, how sense and understanding combine, if they are so diverse in nature and function that while the former is passive the latter is active, and while the former gets sensations from outside the latter has its own forms. Again, how the forms that are 'in us' apply to sense-matter that is outside us and independent? Why is nature amenable to our understanding? Kant's answer is that unless it is so, knowledge is not possible, and we do have knowledge. This is understandable, but we need, and may have, a more comprehensive explanation of knowledge and the affinity between sense and understanding, matter and form or nature and mind. It is well known that Kant created gulfs between members in each of these pairs, as well as between the general and the particular, noumena and phenomena, freedom of the noumenal self and the necessity of the phenomenal self.

Our business in this paper is to examine the nature of the relation between sense and understanding, and form and content, so as to arrive at a comprehensive view-point that may solve some of the riddles connected with them.

Let us first briefly inspect what is involved when we have knowledge of some common object. Sense gives sense-data which are particular presentations and as such do not give us any knowledge till understanding recognises them as instances of a general idea and relates them to other sense-data by spatio-temporal relations of co-existence and succession. Recognition of a sense-datum as a member of a previously known class is a condition of its objectivity, and, so, of its being included in knowledge. The knowledge attained at this stage is meagre. The second stage is

to relate a particular group of sense-data amongst themselves to get a percept which is an ordered object out of a disordered jumble of sense-data. In this construction, understanding, does not even require all the sense-data of a house; it fills up the gaps by imagination. The percept of a house is the recognition in the particular sense-data of the general concept of a house. The more an object is found to follow rules of nature, the more is the evidence for its being of nature and not of the mind which has discovered these rules through experience.

That such a process as described above is not a myth is shown by the phenomenon of error or illusion. If we have a sense-datum which we cannot recognise, e.g. a certain colour or sound, the like of which we have never seen or heard before, we withhold our judgment. To verify its objectivity we need other sense-data associated with it. If it is a flower that has the colour or a symphony that contains this note, and we recognise the sense-data,—smell, texture, etc., of the flower or other notes of the symphony—associated with the unknown sense-datum, we then admit this unknown sense-datum to be true or given and not illusory. So objectivity or truth of an object is determined by the extent of its law-abidingness, the laws being those of nature and not of the mind that understands, which can also be freely creative as it is in imagination, fancy and dream.

Thus about objectivity of perceptual knowledge. As to its being a construction out of objective sense-data and objective laws, there is no better evidence for it than the occurrence of anticipated perception leading sometimes to such illusions as, e.g. mistaking of a rope for a snake, reading grape for gripe or bus-number 58 (which one wants) for 56.

But this objectivity of the object is further determined and consolidated by understanding which relates the object to other objects by laws of co-existence and succession. This is the third stage of performance by the understanding. Thus I do not believe in a face to be true if it appears, unattached to a body, all of a sudden in the mid-air of my room. An object to be true and not a figment of my mind must be relatable through well-known natural laws to other objects. Of these other objects, some belong to the environment, while some may be antecedent and consequent conditions of the same object. Thus if I have really seen a flame in my room for some time, there must have been some combustible substance, and there must be some ashes, smoke or smell afterwards. I have to ascertain the existence of these

objects to verify the percept, flame, which, however clear and indubitable it might appear in itself, cannot be taken for reality if these concomitants are missing. Thus the objectivity of an object is finally determined by its capacity to fall into known relations with its surroundings, past, present and future. In other words, an object must be a part of the system of things in space-time we call "the world".

The functions of sense and understanding can now be readily seen. Sense gives the sense-data, the indefinite sense-matter undistinguished from the subject. Understanding gives the specific relations of identity and difference and spatio-temporal order. Sense cannot distinguish the subjective from the objective but understanding can; and it does this through the relations which it first gathers from experience. These relations are the *determinants* of objectivity. But they are so, just because they are found to be in nature, and not in the understanding itself which finds them out.

The specific laws are said to be derived from objective nature by understanding and they are also said to be determinants of objectivity. Is there any self-contradiction in our view? The fact is we do not have an objective system of experience or nature before our knowledge of the specific relations; but as this nature appears with securing knowledge of physical laws, understanding believes in its independent existence. Knowledge implies the independence of the known, and understanding believes that it can and does know. This realistic belief in the possibility of knowledge is the essential characteristic of understanding. Understanding is never aware of any law to be originally in it and projected outside. The sense of external necessity is inherent in it. The laws derived by it are said to determine objectivity in the sense that they confirm and help to concretise the idea of objectivity implicit in understanding.

The recognition of error by understanding further proves its objective attitude. The fact that understanding knows itself to be capable of error reveals two things; *first*, that it constructs, and does not merely passively receive, *secondly*, that it seeks objective truth. These two considerations together tell us that understanding constructs on the basis of objective data and laws.

Understanding is coordinate with and complementary to the senses. They cooperate to give us knowledge of the objective world, sense giving us the matter and understanding the forms.

But in so far as understanding operates in time through memory and coordinates the reports of the various senses, it is a higher order activity than sense. It may be noted in this connection that while understanding (in a person) learns from experience and applies this learning to organise experience, this process of learning and applying starts from one's very infancy; and as it proceeds, the experience of the infant grows in order and objectivity, that is, intelligibility.

We have seen so far that if understanding is to be consulted on the problem of knowledge, we will have a realistic version of knowledge; the form and the content of knowledge are in the object independent of knowing. But epistemological research, such as that undertaken by Kant, reveals a higher order apprehension than that which understanding possesses. For understanding is naively objective or realistic in its attitude, and it is never aware of the categories of the *a priori* forms of all knowledge, the principles of objectivity. That the world is real is as true as that it is ideal; the apparent self-contradiction is to be avoided by recognising that the world is real on the empirical level while it is ideal on the transcendental level of experience.

Rising to a level of apprehension higher than that of understanding we find that the whole world of form-content, and not merely the categories as Kant thought, is in us. But the mind that so finds the world to be within itself is the transcendental mind which realises the world as its idea and which descends to the empirical mode to enjoy the ideas as real. The analogy of the phenomenon of dreams may elucidate this and make it plausible for those who have no direct experience of this kind. In a dream the empirical mind descends to a deluded state such that it then regards the fantasies to be real. In imagination and fancy also, as indulged in ordinarily as well as artistically, we undergo similar self-delusion, for these are essentially dream states different only in the degree of self-delusion. In all these states we find that the lower mind or sense-mind knows as objective what the higher knows as subjective. In the case of the transcendental mind, similarly, the sense-mind takes as objective what the over-mind knows as its own makings; and remaining outside the fringe of consciousness and operating from behind, it takes a vicarious delight in the experiences of the sense-mind. The sub-consciously enjoyed vicarious delight of the transcendental mind is like the aesthetic delight we have in identifying ourselves


in imagination with the characters in a play, or like the delight we are said to experience *unconsciously*, as the psycho-analyst tells us, in dreams.

This transcendental mind, however, has the world as its idea in a time-less 'now' outside our space. For it contains the whole of space-time that we traverse bit by bit as sense-minds. The space-time in a dream is created by the sense-mind that is outside the dream space-time. This view of the absolute matrix of the world as residing outside the worldly time and space is in keeping with what Relativity physics implies. For the time that must be conceived to be there before the beginning of the world-time (that started some three billion years ago with the explosion of the 'closed' world that is expanding ever since) can very well be a time-less eternity of an infinite mind, and the space too that contained this closed world before its appearance must be of a transcendental nature.

However, coming down to sense-mind again and examining it in the light of this transcendental mind we find that the former's business is to know as objective what the latter knows as subjective ideas. Since forms and sense-matter are already united in these ideas, understanding revealing the former factor and sense giving the latter are co-ordinate activities, and the question how the forms of understanding apply to sense-matter is again seen to be a spurious one. Sense-mind has however an inner differentiation. The senses are the lowest mode of the transcendental mind, which has then (in that mode) bare sense-matter not felt as external and, so, not experienced as real. This state of bare sensations is gradually transcended as a higher mode of knowing, understanding, sets out to discover relations in sense-experience and to organise it with the help of these relations. Since it does this, the sense-mind regards the world so known as objective. The transcendental mind adopts willingly such a mode as has an implicit sense of objectivity, and comes to know things by gathering laws inductively. And we can now see why understanding is of such a nature that it possesses inherently the *a priori* principles of the laws. We can now see that it is so, because it is meant to be so by the transcendental mind that adopts this mode in order to know as objective what it otherwise knows as subjective. And to know anything as objective, the specific relations are to be known as derived from the object and not imposed; and this presupposes the prior conception of the forms of specific relations, the categories, which serve as principles of ob-

jectivity, while the specific relations are the determinants of objectivity. The question why the general principles apply to particular cases or why the categories successfully lead to the finding of specific laws under them is simply answered by saying that the same mind that produces the world of specific forms and sense-matter produces understanding and the sense to realise that world in a concrete realistic manner; so it is no wonder that it will pass over to the understanding the keys to these specific forms, thus to enable it to build up a coherent objective world. That this higher mind does not provide the understanding with the specific laws themselves is understandable, for that would take away from the understanding its sense of inductive search for the laws, and, so, would diminish considerably its realistic attitude to the world. We get from nature what we ourselves have put into it, but we get with some struggle, so that what is got may not appear as our own gift. This struggle is self-willed. This is what Kant recognises implicitly when he tells us that the categories are in us but the particular laws are gathered from experience. But why we so gather from experience is not explained by Kant. To the extent we remain naively objective confined to the sense-mind, the empirical mode of knowing, we serve the transcendental mind in its sport of viewing things realistically. But as we become aware of the categories of the understanding, we partly spoil this sport and become more or less identified with the transcendental mind itself which becomes, in other words, self-aware in us.

A phenomenological enquiry such as we have undertaken here exposes the mental conditions of objectivity of empirical knowledge and leads us to transcend them. The knowledge about the knowledge of the empirical world tends to expose the illusoriness of this latter knowledge, and, so, of the empirical world itself. We spoil a splendid dream by becoming aware of it as a dream. Philosophical knowledge of a direct sort, such as phenomenological research, brings us, is thus not external to the personality that knows; it is a knowledge that transforms our being.



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