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
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THE

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[July, 1953

A Critical Examination of Descartes

by

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University of Dacca

11 AUG 1953

Descartes has justifiably been called the father of modern philosophy. He lived in a period which marks the threshold of these last three centuries whose inner unity and coherence have caused them to be given the common designation of "modern". This inner unity and coherence can, to a large extent, be traced directly to Descartes himself; although when we read him today we find it difficult to catch the radical note which this statement would imply. This is only further proof however, for it indicates that his philosophy has become so much a part of our present way of thinking that we are not able to see it in its full and independent significance. It is only by using the historical perspective that we are able to judge Descartes fairly in terms of the challenges he had to meet and the obstacles he had to overcome. We must be concerned not only with the technical, but also with the human aspects. This tells us something about the man and of his philosophy as a living force; and further, there is the question of what his philosophy can mean to us today. An honest evaluation demands that we employ both the historical and the contemporary perspectives. We are rewarded with the observation of a remarkable similarity, at least in certain key respects, which leads us to conclude that the voice of Descartes well deserves to be harkened to in this the twentieth century.

A glimpse of the intellectual atmosphere of the early seventeenth century reveals to us the daring advance which the phi-

losophy of Descartes represents in the intellectual development of man. The Europe of his time was harassed by prejudice and bigotry of a religious nature which inhibited, and indeed sought to prevent, the growth of free scientific inquiry. There is one particular example of this attitude which is often cited. It is the incident in which Galileo invited one of his learned colleagues to look through his telescope to observe the newly-discovered sun spots. This distinguished doctor emphatically declined the invitation on the grounds that Aristotle had never mentioned sun spots and therefore they must either be in the lens of the telescope or in the imagination of Galileo.

Such an event reveals to us the practical consequences of a dogmatic outlook. There is a reluctance to incorporate within the reaches of one's established knowledge anything which might serve to challenge the foundation upon which it rests. A challenge that involves a critical examination of basic tenets is something that a dogmatist can never accept without ceasing to be a dogmatist. Descartes lived in a period whose intellectual atmosphere was permeated by the dogmatic attitude.

Aristotle, as the source of inspiration for the thirteenth century theology of Aquinas, was revered by many Christians on a level with Augustine and other Church Fathers. This gave an unusual sanctity to aristotelian philosophy and caused it to be sustained and protected by officialdom. Evidence of this was provided when an attempt was made in 1624 to debate publicly fourteen theses against the philosophy of Aristotle. One of the best halls in Paris had been secured for the purpose, and almost a thousand persons attended. Just as the program was about to begin, an order came from the government to disperse the meeting. Shortly afterwards, another order was issued forbidding — on pain of death — any teaching against the ancient authors.

There was one European country which was an exception to this state of affairs. Holland had come under the influence of the protestant spirit of individual conscience, and one could find there a land of citizens who were primarily concerned with their own affairs and not with giving or receiving advice. It is no wonder that Descartes, travelling through Holland at this time, wrote back how much he liked the country "and especially the liberty".

It was during this same trip that Descartes put himself to writing a short treatise on metaphysics (which was revised in later years to form the *Meditations* we know today), but before he

could complete it, he was distracted by the news of further astronomical discoveries and he shifted his attention to the study of these phenomena. This led to the writing of a comprehensive work on natural phenomena which he called *Le Monde* (The World) when referring to it in his letters. However, before it could be published, a crisis emerged out of the conflict between the rising tide of scientific inquiry and the intransigent attitude of those authorities who sought to protect the established dogma. Giordano Bruno had already been burned at the stake for holding views inimical to the Church. Then, in 1633, Galileo was condemned by the Inquisition for the book he had written on the Copernican theory of the universe.

Descartes' first reaction upon learning of the condemnation of Galileo was to drop all thought of circulating his recently completed treatise, *Le Monde*, and he even went so far as to resolve upon the general principle of publishing nothing. Fortunately, this frame of mind did not long endure, and within a few years he produced a book containing essays on Dioptrics, Geometry and Meteors, which were intended to serve as demonstrations for a new method set forth in the preface. The first part of the book was later detached, and forms what we today know as the *Discourse on Method*. It is an eloquent plea on behalf of scientific inquiry struggling in the face of unrelenting dogma.

As the author himself indicates, the *Discourse on Method* may be divided into six distinct parts, each treating of a different subject matter. Together, they are intended to form a continuous argument, but the continuity is not nearly as evident as in the *Meditations*. This is due to the intrusion of certain extraneous material, for the most part extracts from *Le Monde*, which Descartes wanted to make public on a trial basis, in order to determine the propriety of releasing the full body of the text.

In most philosophical writings of worth, we note that the first sentence is highly significant and serves as a key to understanding the whole. This is certainly the case with Descartes. His first sentence in the *Discourse* is the well-known, "Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée..." (Common sense is the most equally distributed thing in the world), upon which he concludes that all men have the capacity to distinguish between the true and the false. Differences of opinion come about only because men use this faculty to poor advantage, choosing to think about different things and to conduct their reasoning about these things in diverse ways. Error is not inherent in man's thinking,

it comes from the abuse of his powers (i.e. common sense which is the capacity to know the true from the false).

This provides us with the central motif of the *Discourse*. If man has the capacity to know the true, and if differences in opinion are due solely to faulty reasoning, then the task at hand is to make a careful examination of the way in which we reason in order to ascertain the means for arriving at common agreement. Mathematics reveals to us that uniform conclusions can only come from a uniform method. All mathematicians use the same method, and regardless of who they are or what the circumstances may be, they always arrive at the same conclusions. Their method is universal and necessarily valid. A method of similar validity must be devised and applied to scientific questions. The application of such a method, and not the Inquisition, is the proper way to determine the relative merits in such disputes as between the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories.

In the second part of the *Discourse*, Descartes suggests four rules to serve as a basis for such a method. There is a remarkable similarity between these four rules and the five principles established by Bacon in his *Novum Organum* which was first published in 1620, or about seventeen years before the publication of the *Discourse*. There has been considerable attempt to demonstrate the dependence of the latter on the former, but the evidence seems to indicate no such relation. In fact, if the rules did have their origin in the short metaphysical treatise that Descartes started to write while on his trip to Holland in 1619, then his method is contemporary with that of Bacon or even antedates it by one year. Of greater importance is the observation, based on a comparison of the two, that there is a fundamentally incompatible distinction between them. Bacon argues for synthesis and tabulation, while Descartes urges analysis and orderly arrangement. This distinction makes them the respective founders of modern empiricism and rationalism.

Descartes, as also Bacon, makes a fresh start and then resolves "never to accept anything as true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid haste and prejudice, and to include in my judgments nothing which is not so clearly and distinctly presented to my mind that I can have no occasion to doubt it". Just as a house that is no longer habitable is normally torn down completely in order to make room for a new one to be constructed from the very foundation, so too, our confused

and obscure ideas must be completely removed in order that we may be able to begin again with only sound "building materials" or true ideas. This is the first rule. Actually, it can be divided into two separable parts, each of which raises its own problems. The first part tells us never to accept anything as true unless we are sure that it is so; which leads to the question of whether, and how, it is possible to know that we know something as true. Descartes probably had in mind the kind of self-evident truths that we find in Euclidian geometry, such as that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. But the validity of such "self-evident truths" is not absolute, as shown in this very example, for today we recognize that the shortest distance between two points may well be a curved line. This tempts us to accuse Descartes of violating his own rule by accepting as true that which he only *thought* to be such. This gets to the heart of the problem. Descartes believed that such "self-evident truths", obtained by our ability to judge between the true and the false, revealed a way of knowing that is infallible and which he called *intuition*. It is the ability to have such *intuitions*, or the immediate grasping of a truth without reference to any criterion other than its own sense of certainty, that Descartes called the faculty of common sense or the capacity to judge between the true and the false. The belief that such a way of knowing does exist is the basic premise of his philosophy and is the assumption implied in his first sentence (common sense is the most equally distributed thing in the world...). This notion is both the key-note of his method and its greatest weakness. At no time does he furnish us with conclusive proof that man is capable of knowledge through intuitive truths. He accepts it as "self-evident" and proceeds to build his philosophy.

The fact that Descartes does not really introduce anything new by his method is further demonstrated in the second part of the first rule where he names haste and prejudice as the obstacles to truth. The significance of this statement can be understood best in the light of the fourth meditation in which Descartes states that God cannot be a deceiver, and therefore error comes about only because man makes improper use of the faculties which have been so generously granted to him. Man has the freedom to know the truth, but he does not use it properly, choosing instead to make hasty judgments about matters which are only partially or confusedly conceived. The fault lies in man's perverse will which is always leading him astray, and not with the Creator. This heavy shadow of augustinian theology is not the only indication we have that Descartes wanted to remain within the general framework of

Christian tradition although striving to modify the rigidity of its position.

The second of the four rules prescribes that all difficulties should be divided into as many parts as possible, and as may be necessary for a better solution. This is the Cartesian analysis. As the well-known French philosopher, Etienne Gilson, has written in his commentary on this work, "Une difficulté, au sens technique de ce terme, est donc un complexe de questions, d'où la nécessité proclamée par le deuxième précepte de la méthode de le ramener à une question simple." (A difficulty, in the technical sense of the word, is a cluster of problems, which is why the second rule declares that we must go back to a simple problem). A plurality of elementary or simple problems which are seen in their combined form produces confusion in the perceiver until he is able to sort out the separate parts, whose individual truth he is able to cognize readily through *intuition*. Thus the haste and prejudice which Descartes calls the barrier to truth is nothing other than the tendency to make judgments before there has been a reduction to the simplest—and hence truly knowable—parts. Once the analysis or division is made, the task is to reassemble the parts in such a way that the combination will be equally self-evident.

This is the concern of the third rule which advises us to conduct our reasoning step by step so that from the knowledge of the simple we may arrive at a knowledge of the more complex. Once again Descartes has resorted to mathematics in forming this notion of serial progression. His logic consists in sequential reasoning based on the atomism of ideas. The first step must be a wholly self-evident truth in the light of what has preceded. The passage from one to the other, from simple to more complex, is made by *intuition*. This kind of logic suffers from what we shall call the "geometrical fallacy". It is the error of assuming ideas to be simple absolute parts or substantial entities, a prejudice which inclines towards the adoption of methods used in mathematics. The study of geometry is based on the notion that each given entity has certain fixed and invariable relations, which can then be generalized into universal propositions. But ideas are not substantial entities, and do not have such fixed relations, and therefore cannot be treated in the same way. Ryle, in his recent book *Concept of Mind*, has shown the difficulties involved in the Cartesian theory of mind as a substantial entity. The same criticism needs to be levelled against Descartes' treatment of ideas. Once it is clearly established that ideas are not substantial entities, the whole notion of reasoning in

serial progression (or what the French call *enchaînement des idées*) is rendered invalid. Reasoning is not an additive process, it is a creative synthesis of experience. Curiously enough, Descartes also lends himself to this interpretation. The greatest weakness in his mathematical-type reasoning is his employment of *intuition*. However, *intuition* can also be understood as an act of creative synthesis. Thus, as a means for obtaining certainty it is fallacious and deceptive, but as a means to enlarge our cognitive horizons it is fundamental.

The "geometrical fallacy" is the tendency to liken thinking to the piling of blocks on top of one another, as children do to form towers. Although the blocks are soon conceived to be parts of the tower, they may still be distinguished as individual entities. The fourth rule that Descartes gives us indicates that this is analogous to his conception of the relation between simple ideas and the whole argument. To avoid error in our reasoning we should make enumeration so complete, and review so general, as to assure that nothing has been omitted. This reference to enumeration means that once we have reduced the complex problems to their simplest parts, we should give to each simple idea or self-evident truth a numerical designation in order to facilitate the re-grouping in serial order. The review should assure us that each idea or self-evident truth is in its proper place. This notion of re-grouping ideas, as well as the belief that they can be numerically distinguished, is clearly based on the fallacious notion that ideas are substantial entities and thus have the same character as physical things.

As Descartes candidly states, in geometry and arithmetic we discover relations which permit us to move from any one part to any other and it is only plausible to assume that the same is true of knowledge. If, however, as we have tried to show, ideas are not quantitative, then they do not possess relations analogous to geometry and arithmetic. Yet we continually find ideas treated as substantial entities with the accompanying effort to move among them as though they were connected with fixed and determinable relations. In fact, we are able to distinguish two distinct fallacies, the geometrical and the arithmetical. The "geometrical fallacy" is the tendency to spatialize ideas and deal with them as substantial entities; the "arithmetical fallacy" follows from this, and is the attempt to organize the ideas in serial order. These two fallacies have been responsible for considerable obfuscation in metaphysical inquiry, particularly since the time of Descartes. This was his

most unfortunate contribution and one from which we must now strive to liberate philosophy.

The general application of Descartes' method begins in the fourth part of the *Discourse*. In accordance with the first rule, which holds that we should never accept anything for true which has not been clearly shown to be such, Descartes asserts the necessity for doubt as the starting point of his meditations. However, the very act of doubting makes clear and evident to him his own existence (*je pense, donc je suis*). This is a truth which is so clearly and distinctly presented to his mind that he can have no occasion to doubt it, that is to say, it is the perfect *intuition*. It is the simplest element of human knowledge (*ego cogito, ergo sum, est omnium prima et certissima*) and hence provides the archimedian point upon which to construct his universal metaphysics.

The logic of this argument has been seriously questioned. In the second objection to the *Meditations* we find the statement that the activity of thinking itself does not indicate the nature of the source of that thought. The thinker might just as easily be all body, of which the movements comprise thought, such as Hobbes would have us believe. In other words, logically, thinking as such does not give us the grounds for concluding the existence of the ego or of a mental substance. The correct form would be "thinking, therefore thinking exists."

The second step towards the more complex is the proof of the existence of God. For this purpose, Descartes employs two principles which he accepts as self-evidently true. One is that every effect must have a cause, and the other is that the cause must be at least as great as the effect. Of all the ideas he has, there is one that is distinct from all the rest, and that is the idea of a perfect Being. This idea must have a cause, just as all the others, but it cannot be the mischievous demon. Since it is an idea of perfection, the cause must likewise be perfect, and therefore God exists. The fallacy in this argument has been repeatedly demonstrated. It hinges on the distinction between the idea of perfection and a perfect idea. The former is imperfect because it is in a finite mind, and the latter is not knowable by a finite mind. In addition, the two supposedly self-evident postulates upon which this argument is based have been seriously questioned. Once again Descartes resorts to *intuition* as his ultimate criterion.

The third step towards completing his philosophical system is the proof for the existence of material things. This is summed up

in the Fifth Meditation with the argument that, "after recognizing that there is a God, I recognized that everything depends on him and that he cannot be a deceiver, and consequently I realized that everything that I conceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true." Hence, error can only be attributed to haste and prejudice or the perverse use of man's free-will. The weakness in this argument is readily seen. The existence of God has not been proven, nor have the attributes been logically derived. No solution has been given to the problem of how everything can depend on God, while man continues to employ free-will. The only possible defense is another resort to *intuition*. This we can now recognize to be nothing more than the "spontaneous" entry of our prejudices and preconceived notions in such forceful manner as to convince us of their certainty. The tendency to accept beliefs in such manner because they are emotionally satisfying has been subjected to very competent criticism by Charles S. Peirce.

The remainder of the philosophy of Descartes is concerned with developing our knowledge of physical and mental things into the various sciences. The metaphysical foundation for these sciences is summed up in the various *Principles*, some of which are as follows: 1. In order to examine the truth, it is necessary at least once in our lifetime to put everything in doubt to the extent possible. 2. It is also useful to consider as false everything which we can doubt. 6. We have a free-will which enables us to abstain from believing doubtful things and thus prevents us from being deceived. 7. We are not able to doubt without existing and that is the first certain knowledge we are able to acquire. 14. We are able to prove that there is a God just because the necessity of being or existing is included in the notion we have of him. 29. God cannot be the cause of our errors. 30. Consequently, everything is true that we know clearly to be true, and this delivers us from the doubts proposed above.

In conclusion, we observe that the metaphysics of Descartes is based on his theory of knowledge (in which he attempts to demonstrate that we are capable of knowing the truth), which in turn rests on his theory of *intuition*. This latter we have rejected as being a subjective criterion, and the former we reject for this reason and for being based on faulty logic.

If we are to refuse to accept Descartes' metaphysics or his method of reasoning, what is left in his philosophy? A division can be made between the technical and the human aspects. We have subjected the former to critical examination and find it un-

satisfactory for reasons of a purely technical nature. On the other hand, we have indicated at the beginning some of the motivation which led Descartes to philosophize as he did, and this leads us to the human part. Descartes the man vigorously attacked the dogmatic attitude, and this attack is required once again in the contemporary world where religious, social and political dogmas are becoming more and more rigid. Again today we experience another Inquisition, but more subtle and efficient; and more than one condemnation of a Galileo has occurred in this the twentieth century. The future of free inquiry, and with it the future of civilization, today hangs in the balance. It remains to be seen whether we shall fall back in a "blocked intellectual universe", or whether we shall move forward towards greater and broader heights of cultural achievement.

Another lasting contribution of Descartes lies in the stress he has placed on the individual. Although we may not agree with his logic in establishing the individual as a thinking being capable of knowing the true from the false, still we must approve the results. Descartes has clearly shown that, regardless of how we proceed, we must begin with the individual. Indeed, the emergence of the individual out of the dark night of universality is the salient feature of modern history. It remains to be seen whether the emancipation of man as a being of independent value will be preserved and enriched, or whether he will fall again into the obscurity of the mass.

The struggle against intellectual frigidity, and for the development of creative individuality, is the supreme challenge of our time. We can look with profit on the humanistic achievements of Descartes and the lead he established in this endeavour.

* Note: All quotations have been translated directly from the original texts as edited by Adam and Tannery.

The Concrete Universal and Bosanquet's Critics

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The doctrine of the Concrete Universal propounded by Bosanquet was originally formulated by Hegel under the influence of Kant's distinction between understanding and reason. It was taken up by Bradley whose restatement forms the starting point for Bosanquet. Bradley's discussion centres round the question, what makes an entity real. He tells us that "the real is self-existent. And we may put this otherwise by saying, the real is what is individual"¹ Individuals for Bradley are not simple, indivisible entities. They contain diversity and complexity and are yet single entities. They are universals since they retain an identity amid differences. And he proceeds to show that there are no particulars, if "particular" means something that would be simple, indivisible, and exclusive of other particulars. We are never aware of particulars as totally distinct from universals. Thus we are never aware of patches that have no qualities. That is, if there are particulars divorced from universals, we can never be acquainted with them. It is unthinkable that there can be particulars with no qualities. Such a particular which is an unqualified particular cannot exist. It is therefore not easy to say what a mere particular is. Every entity, on the other hand, occupies some space or time, and exists in more spaces or times, retaining its identity. And since it is characterised by identity in difference, it turns out to be a universal. The abstract particular then cannot and does not exist; and nothing that exists is so simple or atomic. This denial of the simple entities is fatal to the theory of external relations.

Sometimes a universal is taken to be abstract. It is abstract if it involves or stands in need of a particular or individual for its

¹ Principles, p. 45.

manifestation or existence. It does not have a substantial being, for it is a quality and therefore abstract. Abstraction implies exclusion which is untenable. But have the abstract universals any existence? Bradley himself came to remark in the second edition of his *Logic* that "everything conceivable has existence in some sense."² If the abstract universals exist, they are not the same type of objects as individuals. But how do they enter into the constitution of the world?

Abstract universals are conceivable and they must have some existence. It is also evident that everything is dependent upon its context. As such, qualities are not unaffected by the individuals they belong to. As Bosanquet puts it, "the animality of man is quite different from the animality of beasts."³ This implies that there can be no qualities that can be said to be common to a class. That is, there can be no abstract universals; and yet they must exist, since they are conceivable. This conceivability only implies that we are making a superficial application of the universals for purposes of formal classification. In other words, for purposes of knowledge we have to recognise degrees of dependence upon contexts. The smaller the dependence we effect, the greater the abstraction.

Bosanquet argues that thought has a tendency to become universal. When we find that a particular object has a certain property, we try to discover other objects having the same property. Then we formulate general rules and link them together. This endeavour might result in the 'discovery' of abstract universals. But it is a result of the tendency of all experience "to carry us beyond any given piece of itself by exhibiting a character which throws light upon further and different contexts, and receives light from them."⁴ These general rules or abstract universals represent only the uncritical stage where one is lured by the recurring similarity to the exclusion of all difference. This process of abstraction is gradually corrected and supplemented as we proceed in knowledge and experience. But as our knowledge becomes more general, it gets out of touch with the real. On the other hand, the real is that which is given in experience with all its rich meaning, gathered from its infinite ramifications in the context in which it is placed. But "a general statement is an extract or an

2. *Ibid.* p. 195.

3. *Logic*, I. 58.

4. *Principles*, p. 31.

abstract".⁵ It is a bare identity with no meaning, for there is no identity that is 'common' to different things or situations. It offers only a bare knowledge of the classes, where we omit the individual differences that are more important than the similarities. The knowledge of a 'class', then, tells us very little of its members. As a result the schematic pattern represented by the generic concept is spoken of as "a mere individuality".⁶ To use a well-known phrase, the abstract universal is the real universal in the making.

Prof. Kemp Smith questions the right of Bosanquet in identifying the abstract universal with the class concept. The abstract universal, he argues, is a character that is "applicable as a predicate to any and every concrete existence in which the character is found".⁷ We do not select the character for classificatory purposes, but only for investigating the character in and for itself.

This contention proceeds on a misinterpretation of Bosanquet's position and ends in an unjustifiable conclusion. The class concept does facilitate classification, and it is usual to regard classification as one of the special forms of logical thought. But Bosanquet observes that this appears "to be merely an external consequence, reappearing in every kind of universal, of the relation between universal and differences".⁸ It is an external consequence in so far as it presents extreme diversity and absence of all connection between the things wherein it is found. This feature of the class concept is the same as that of the abstract universal which offers a monotonous uniformity of recurrent instances, for it stands merely in external relation to its differences. It refers to a class, and the character or property represented by it has no existence in and for itself. It always stands in need of an embodied state where alone it becomes intelligible. To investigate such a character, we have to examine the objects in mutual relation. But such an examination refuses to yield the abstract universal, since the character is intelligible in terms of the differences that penetrate the identity and in terms of the differences that are controlled by the identity. In other words, the abstract universal is essentially a class concept and is useful for classificatory purposes. The moment this classificatory nature

5. *Ibid.* p. 33.

6. See Bosanquet: *Logic*, I. 229, cp. I. 135, II. 257

7. *Mind*, N. S. 36. 149.

8. *Logic*, II. 198.

is amended and corrected, it ceases to be abstract.⁹ To put it in another way, if the meaning of a genus-name omits the properties in which the species differ, it is no longer true of the species; for by omitting these properties, it is compelled to omit all other properties. But humanity, for instance, is more rich in content than Frenchmanity. In the idea of humanity we do not omit all reference to the qualities of the English, the Greek, the German and the like, to their mutual differences, and to their bearing and interaction on one another.¹⁰ Thus properties which may be absent in some of the particulars or subclasses are at times included in the concept; but in those subclasses or particulars these properties have a zero value. It is only on this principle that the straight line and the circle are taken as the limiting cases of the ellipse.

Prof. Kemp Smith argues that Bosanquet's argument conceals three distinct contrasts. One such contrast refers to the abstract universal. According to him Bosanquet uses the distinction of abstract and concrete to suggest the contrast between the unity of particulars in a class and the unity of elements within a system.¹¹ The former is only a formal unity based on the omission of differences between the things that are classed together owing to some common feature. The latter refers to the concrete universal which is a system. In this system each element has its own specific function. The parts mutually imply one another, they belong together. That is, the abstract universal is adjectival to its differences, while in the concrete universal the differences are adjectival to the identity. The latter is a self-conditioning being, and it is the subject of all the judgments into which it is seen to enter. But nowhere does Bosanquet imply that these two are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, he insists only on the superficial nature of the abstract universal. When we make an unnatural severance between the existence and the content of the concrete universal, we get at the abstract universal which has no being of its own.¹²

The second contrast assumed by Bosanquet, according to Prof. Kemp Smith, is the distinction between abstract and concrete within the domain of the abstract universals. A universal is said to be concrete if its content is complex. This implies, according to Prof. Kemp Smith, that the generic universal is con-

9. See Logic, I. 58-59.

10. See Essentials, pp. 95-96.

11. Mind, N. S. 36. 147-150.

12. See Logic, I. 230.

crete. But when its content increases, it becomes more schematic and thus moves farther away from sensible reality. The richness and complexity of the generic concept may then vary directly with its extension. This generic concept being abstract, Prof. Kemp Smith argues, "we find him constantly contrasting what he entitles the 'merely abstract' with what, though covered by the phrase 'concrete universal', is really the genuinely abstract."¹³

We should not forget that for Bosanquet 'concrete' is not the correlative opposite of 'abstract'. All concepts have a content. The wider concept may have a richer content. In other words, there is no merely abstract universal. A universal is necessarily concrete. This concrete universal has greater complexity which may appear to be more schematic. But the schematic nature is not one of formal classification, but one of systematic coherence. With reference to such a systematic coherence, no abstract statement can be made, since such a statement is a bald generality. Of course, it is true that even the baldest generality illumines the differences of context which it includes. But it does so by ceasing to be bald; for the most general knowledge is complete emptiness, and hence least instructive. It is empty since it departs from the given in experience and thus abandons fact.¹⁴

So far we have assumed that the concrete universal preserves an identity amidst differences. In establishing this Bradley and Bosanquet reject the formal identity on the ground that nothing can be asserted where there is no difference between subject and predicate. Identity without difference is abstract identity and it makes judgment impossible, according to this logical theory. On this basis alone, so we are told, we can avoid extreme philosophical atomism or pluralism. Each entity is not only self-identical but inclusive of the rest; and any form of identity involves also difference and *vice versa*. On the basis of this principle, the concrete universal turns out to be a system. Now, objects are inter-related. They form a totality and breathe the spirit of the whole; for self-transcendence is the mark of all finitude which the members of any totality exhibit. Quite apart from the totality, we can at times think of an aspect of something. But this does not mean that this aspect can exist apart from its totality and yet retain its full significance. That is, it is the system called the concrete universal that is capable of determining its own specific determinations. When

13. Mind, N. S. 36. 270. See also pp. 150-155, 260-273.

14. See Principles, pp. 32-34.

the universal is taken to be determining the particular being of the separate instances of the species, it is concrete. In other words, the concrete universal renders the sensible world as penetrated by thought. It determines its own specifications and accounts for the unity of the world. In the absence of such a system, the world would be lost in discrete particulars. But the ideal of all knowledge is the apprehension of such a system.

The highest degree of intelligibility is represented by the organic unity that characterises this system, and the ultimate tendency of thought is to move towards this whole. It is only "the nature of a comprehensive individual system of Reality within which other individuals fall" that can offer a satisfactory explanation of all instances including the fresh ones.¹⁵ No finite entity, then, is knowable in and by itself. It can be understood only through understanding of the context. The context refers to the place and the function within the system. The kinds of individuals wherein the system is to be actualised are determined by it. Here we have to note that the specific character is related to its individual instances as the abstract universal to its particulars. But in relation to its species, the genus is concrete; and in relation to its particulars, the species is abstract. The generic concept determines the species. If we know the species to which a given object belongs, then on the basis of our knowledge of the generic nature we can predicate of its specific characters. This knowledge extends only to the specific characters of the objects, not to its individual characters. Thus knowledge of a generic concept is a ground of necessary predication.¹⁶ The generic concept manifests its nature in successive specific differentiations; and these differentiations form an intelligible system. Such an articulated system is shown by Wundt and Lotze to be the ground of all necessary predication.

Here the species is a differentiation of the generic nature; and it is the generic nature alone which determines other characteristics whence it is called concrete. Now this generic nature can be expressed only as a system which is always a real individual system. By this Bosanquet means that the species are not simple thought-determinations but actual existents.¹⁷ The genus exists, and it is a real system of species. Each member is an actual member of the actual system. Here Bosanquet asserts that necessary connection

15. Logic, II. 169.

16. Logic, I. 212-223; II. 86-108.

17. Ibid. I. 225 ff.

implies an articulated system or a totality, and that such a system has a historical existence in the real world. Both these assertions are misunderstood by Prof. Kemp Smith.

Let us take the first assertion. Necessary connection means that every particle of the universe is closely related to every other. Prof. Kemp Smith states that "it is seemingly a system so highly unified that a child's shifting of the sand on the sea shore alters the centre of gravity of the Milky Way".¹⁸ He then argues that the unity of the physical order is not of the more complex kind exhibited by an organism. But this connection does not imply a system as Bosanquet understands the term, for it is not a morphological unity. By a system is meant that in which a single generic nature gets itself differentiated in its species. The physical system, to which reference is made by Prof. Kemp Smith, is not differentiated in its instances and it does not influence the other characters that coexist in its instances. In other words, it is an abstract universal. On the other hand, the necessary connection exhibited by the morphological unity is real and operative. If so, how can we proceed from this necessary connection to the articulated system which is its ground? The knowledge of the generic character alone enables us in determining the further features of a subject. As such the ground for necessary predication about the subject is only this knowledge. This knowledge is the knowledge of the system of its differentiations. That is, the ground of that necessity is this system. Prof. Kemp Smith therefore errs when he contends that according to Bosanquet's theory a necessary predication may be based on a character of the subject which is not a generic character. And the instances quoted by him only represent that form of necessary connection known as causal connection. Bosanquet's concept of the individual system is an attempt to go beyond the causal law.

The second assertion of Bosanquet refers to the historical existence of the system. The Universal is embodied in space and in time. This might appear to be reducing the universal to the level of a particular. But it is not exactly this that is achieved here. Thought arises from a contact with the given, and therefrom it goes on developing. One of the conditions of this development is to divorce thought from reality and to bring it back to reality apprehended as a whole. In such a case it might be difficult to expect the ideal system to have an exact counterpart in reality. However,

18. Mind, N. S. 36. p. 275.

as Bradley argued, in order to make logic possible, we have to presume it. That is, the ontological argument for Bradley is no better than a postulate.¹⁹ But if the ideal system has no counterpart in reality, the former cannot actively determine the latter. The ideal system is the generic concept which in the absence of its counterpart in reality cannot determine any particular reality, cannot pass into the domain of reality. In other words, the ontological argument must be and is more than a postulate. With the help of this argument we can arrive at the principle of the determining activity of the generic concept, and thus set at rest the clamorous doctrine that physical causation is the only active determinant. It is thus that the ideal system turns out to be an historical reality. Thus when Bosanquet started with the ideal system of determinations and began predicating reality of it, he was only emphasising the development of the species through actual generations. From the organised complexity of the system, he proceeds to argue the necessity of its real existence. This is the ontological argument presumed by him throughout.²⁰ He distinguishes concreteness as meaning real existence from concreteness as signifying articulated content. The former is said to follow necessarily from the latter. That this distinction is emphasised by him is clear from his *Logic*.²¹

The next argument advanced by Bosanquet is that judgment and inference are rendered possible only by the coherent system. Judgement, inference and recognition are impossible without the concrete universals. He argues that the close connection between inference and concrete universals accounts for the superiority of the concrete to the abstract universals.

The system is a group of members who are related to one another in such a way that any change in the properties of one member would bring about changes in the properties of all others. Each member, then, is significant or has a value to every one else in the system.²² Such a system is a perfect one, and this means that there are degrees of perfection among the various systems. From such a perfect system alone inference becomes possible, since all genuine inference is a form of implication; and this implies that the members of the system are not self-contained, that the mem-

19. *Principles*, III. ii. 4.

20. *Logic*, I. 225.

21. *Ibid.*, I. 214.

22. See *Implication*, pp. 7, 8.

bers exhibit self-transcendence without losing their identity, for that would violate the close connection.

However, Mr. H. B. Acton argued that "what has made philosophers believe that there are universals is the fact that many different individuals appear to possess the same quality, and this fact has no direct connection with inference."²³ But is not inference a mere child's babble in the absence of any difference entering into the identity, in the absence of any implication from a coherent system? Prof. Kemp Smith states first that "the universal is in all its various forms abstract"; and then in the same paragraph he observes very complacently that "it is not identity in difference, but relatedness within a system, which is the more ultimate category."²⁴ But what is a system if it is not based on identity in difference? Prof. Kemp Smith himself observes that "system conditions both characters and relations, and therewith the types in which they recur,"²⁵ and he concludes by saying that Universals are in all cases *conditioned* modes of existence. It is clear from this that Prof. Kemp Smith has no objection to propounding a view which he will not allow others to enunciate. Bosanquet's concrete universal is a system which "leads us in thought towards the unity of an ordered and variegated system."²⁶

Another curious criticism comes from Mr. R. E. Stedman who argues: "So long, therefore, as the conditionedness of a being is not forgotten, and we do not judge of it as of a being self-existent and self-maintaining, but with due regard to the system—whether spatial, moral or some other—within which it stands, we can claim to make assertions which are ultimately true or false. The subject of our predication is not reality, nor the system with which the being is connected, but the being itself."²⁷ But how do these assertions become true or false when we exclude the reality of the system? If there is a total severance of the system from being or existence, it is no longer a system. The refusal to recognise the ontological status of the system leads Mr. Stedman to contradict himself. He admits that each member of a system is conditioned, that it is not self-existent and self-maintaining, and that we judge it with due regard to that system. In other words, our assertion

23. *Mind*, N. S. 46, 6.

24. *Mind*, N. S. 36, 280.

25. *Ibid.* 36, 422.

26. *Principles*, p. 37.

27. *Mind*, N. S. 40, 170.

refers to the system with reference to which the member exists. Then the subject of our predication is bound to be the system which is real and which therefore exists. This system is concrete since it is a comprehensive and consistent unity.

Such a system exhibits conscious purpose which is the highest conception of the mind or spirit. Carried to its logical conclusion, this theory lands us in Spinozistic Reality which is consciously rejected by Bosanquet but which is unconsciously accepted by him. The concrete universal as a spiritual reality has serious consequences which are repugnant to the spirit of British Idealism, but which are of utmost importance both for Logic and for Ethics. Bosanquet appears to be conscious of these now and then. In the first instance, there cannot be a plurality of spiritual realities when the universal is declared to unify differences, and when the members of the universal are stated to exhibit the tendency towards the whole. Ultimately there can be only one concrete universal, one self-identical being, one consciousness, which is coextensive with its differences and which is manifested in the differences as such. This consequence tends to eliminate all differences as differences and explain them as the manifestations of the activity of the conscious being.

The second consequence is more serious. Any system is relational, and relation is riddled with contradictions. This implies that any system is a self-contradictory type of unity; and as such the system cannot be ultimately real. Bosanquet writes: "I quite see for myself that (identity in difference) must go 'in the end', that is to say, in any experience for which objects are self-contained and cease to transcend themselves. Undoubtedly the Real is self-complete and self-contained. But I insist on the words 'in the end'."²⁸ That is the ultimate concrete universal does transcend the all-pervading Hegelian identity in difference.

Identity in difference cannot be the nature of the real, for reality cannot be both *is* and *is not*. We cannot even say that the apprehension of identity in difference is a fact of experience and therefore real; for in such a case we cannot account for the reality of an erroneous perception. The universal is apprehended only in a medium in which it is supposed to be implicit, and in such cases it is the medium that fulfills the function of a universal. The medium varies from class to class; and from particular to parti-

28. Logic, II. 279.

cular of the same class too it varies preserving a specific identity. If the universal were to be treated as different from the medium, it is impossible to relate the medium to the universal. The universal must be the same as the medium or the finite centre; and the medium is not a quality which is a qualification *per proprium*, but a qualification *per accidens* which while present distinguishes without any syntactical relation to the predicate. That is, the universal affirms itself through names and forms, through particulars. It does not mean that the universal is something different from, and something that runs through, the particulars.

The independent reality of the universal is monstrous. If it has an existence of its own, it cannot apply to objects that have not yet come into existence. The universal in an existent particular cannot be related then to a particular that has just sprung into existence, for activity can be predicated of the individual alone. Moreover, if the universal is to be present in the second particular, the former may have to lose its universal element. Nor can the universal divide itself infinitely since there can be no parts in it. The universal, being real, cannot come into existence at any moment; nor can it disappear when all the species become extinct. Hence, devoid of a relation to a particular and devoid of a locus or a medium, the universal is a non-entity. The universal is differentiated neither in itself nor in its parts. Each class of objects has its own universal and the universal is here seen to get itself limited or restricted. That is, the universal is a limiting concept. It is finite since it is embodied in the form of the finite.

In this context Sankara has something remarkable to say.²⁹ We have the object moon which is one and indivisible. The word refers to the object. It cannot refer to the universal moon because of the absence of the alleged necessary particulars. And yet it is clear that no word can denote a particular directly. Hence we have to take it for granted that by moon we mean the object which occupies a definite position or place, which place or station provides the key to the nature of the object. The word moon reveals the object as manifested through an embodiment or medium of articulation. Here it is evident that the universal has no need to repeat itself. A single individual can afford to be a universal so long as the true universal is taken to be appearing as

29. On Vedānta Sūtra, I. iii, 28.

conditioned or determined. It is the imperfect and inadequate universal that is satisfied with repetitions. The concrete universal, then, is always one and it is the individual.

The concrete universal which is an individual is apprehended by that activity which comprehends both thought and sense. Bosanquet observes that the best example of a universal is not a quality but a person.³⁰ Now Julius Caesar is a universal, since he is the same individual whatever he might be doing. Apart from his activities he is nothing. But to speak of these activities as the differences that make him identical with himself is to use the word 'difference' equivocally. These are not differences but the manifestations of his spirit or individuality. This equivocation in the use of the word 'differences' is at the basis of Bosanquet's identification of the system with individuality. Individuality transcends all differences, while in the system unity is achieved in and through differences. Individuality alone is the ultimate category of thought. However, Bosanquet states that system and individuality are only different degrees of one and the same ultimate type. The system is no doubt a wider whole; but it is not a higher type of unity than the individual.³¹

Much of the trouble in Bosanquet's theory arises from the word 'difference'. If the true universal is best described as a world or cosmos because it is a meeting point of differences, Bosanquet can only say that to constitute an individual, differences of kind must meet. But as Mr. Stedman asked, how is difference of kind compatible with the continuum of the whole?³² We may get an answer from a careful consideration of Bosanquet's doctrine of negativity. Negativity, he says, "is fundamental in all that is real. It is the same characteristic which has been described as the fact that experience is always beyond itself — the character, indeed, which we have described from the beginning as that of the universal, or in other words, the tendency of every datum to transcend itself as a fragment and complete itself as a whole".³³ This self-transcendence means that here differences are assimilated to the unity of the individual; and the differentiated wholeness is that feature of individuality which rejects all differences of kind. All difference is only a difference of degree.

30. See Principles, p. 40; Logic, II, 257.

31. See Kemp Smith, *Mind*, N. S. 36, 275.

32. *Mind*, N. S. 40, 302.

33. Principles, p. 231.

The reality of which every difference is a degree is really continuous or homogeneous. That is, no universal is actual except as embodied in particulars. These embodied units are not true universals. When they are absorbed in the whole, they realise the universal. The differences characteristic of these units are merely differences of degree in the same scale. And the doctrine of negativity proves that the category of difference is applicable only to finite entities. It is a vanishing form, for it merges in identity as and when the existence and the content of individuality realise a mutual harmony.³⁴

Now we can have only one type of identity and this is the concrete or lateral identity. It is expressed in the character of the individual. It is the identity of the continuant individual where differences are assimilated or absorbed in the unity of the whole. But when differences tend to dominate the identity, we have the lower form which is an imperfect manifestation of the true form. It is here that Prof. Kemp Smith discovers the third hidden contrast in Bosanquet's theory. This is the distinction, he says, between "identity of character as found recurring in numerically distinct particulars, and the self-identity of each continuant thing or self".³⁵ The concrete universal as the individual represents "the self-identity of each continuant thing or self", or "the continuant as found in things, and in selves and in all change".³⁶

To this charge two answers are possible. In the first instance, individual does not mean the particular substance that changes, but the historical individual that is capable of development. That is, the concrete universal of Bosanquet includes both essence and substance. He nowhere identifies substance with essence, as Prof. Kemp Smith imagines. In the second instance, Prof. Kemp Smith has drawn a distinction between identity of continuant and identity of type, and has remarked that "the problem of universals bears only on the latter, and not on the former type of identity".³⁷ The latter is the abstract universal which we have already disposed of. But Mr. Stedman, who too considers these two identities, observes that "neither can be ignored in an adequate theory", and adds that "this is the popular attitude the

34. *Ibid.* pp. 230-239.

35. *Mind*, N. S. 36, 266.

36. *Ibid.* p. 280.

37. *Ibid.*

distinctions persistent in language between thing and character certify".³⁸

But if both are identities, there should surely be something in common between the two. Do these two identities present differences in kind? They differ only in the degree of complexity, comprehensiveness, and unity. As Prof. Joachim argued, the identity of the continuant qua identity has to be the same as the identity of type qua identity. These presuppose a common universal identity, of which they are the forms. So did Prof. Joachim ask: 'What is this identity which, being itself neither concrete nor abstract, is divided or differentiated into the two types?'³⁹ If they differ in kind, one identity must be totally and utterly other than the other identity. Then the term identity is used equivocally. The truth, therefore, seems to lie in the fact that the abstract identity presumed by the abstract universal is a lower form of the concrete universal considered not as a system but as an individual.

Prof. Blanshard argues that "the idea is its object partially realised".⁴⁰ This doctrine might be interpreted to mean that the idea is a simple abstraction from the given. This is precisely what we reject. The idea is that which is faintly embodied in its object, whence we are able to speak of a certain universality of the idea. Prof. Blanshard himself happily rejects the reality and existence of an abstract universal. A true genus cannot be abstracted from its differentiations, nor can it be embodied in characters alien to it. In other words, there can be no generic quality that can be said to run with unvarying identity through all the species of one genus. But can we not form the idea of it? Prof. Blanshard as a strict Hegelian tells us that they neither exist nor can be thought.⁴¹ Here he admits that he parts company with Nettleship, Joseph and Bosanquet. And he believes that the inability to conceive an abstract universal proves its non-existence. This takes us to the question whether there can be a complete severance of the idea from its symbolic presentation in fact. What is it to which an abstraction like triangularity can refer? But prior to the question about its reference, are we not entitled to say that we do have such words and that we do mean something by them? If they do mean something, they undoubtedly refer to something; and this takes

38. *Mind*, N.S. 40. 300.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 533.

40. *Nature of Thought*, I. 581.

41. *Ibid.* I. 600.

us to the view that identity in differences exists in various degrees. The real existent universal may be one of perfect identity in difference; but at the bottom of the scale there can be, and is, a universal wherein the differences are at a minimum; as Bosanquet would say, the differences are negatively present. It is this negativity that is for the time ignored in Prof. Blanshard's view. And negativity tells us that there can be no absolute identity of an idea with its object. This factor must be reckoned with in any theory of the universal.

We cannot dictate the way in which a universal should be embodied; and Joseph seems to be essentially correct in maintaining that generic identity is a matter of degree.⁴² This is admitted by Prof. Blanshard himself when he says that any theory of the universal should give an account of the two facts, viz. that the differences of a universal do have something in common, and that this common essence fails to appear when we examine the object of the general idea.⁴³ The universal is present in its differentiations, is identical with them and is yet distinct from them. It is said to be something like the potential power that subsists in its actual species. And there are then a variety of degrees in which it is manifested. There are various degrees of perfection amongst the universals. An imperfect universal carries with it an imperfect particularity; and a perfect universal carries with it, as Nettleship said, its possible modifications. It is this that drives Bosanquet to the conclusion that all distinctions in Logic are in the end distinctions of degree. This is absolutely true of the various forms of the universal. At the very beginning we have an abstract universal which we can conceive and which does have some meaning for us. Next we arrive at the differences which certainly exist not as mere differences but as the modifications or specifications of the identity. It is unique and completely determinate only when there is the fullest development of the individual entity. The fullest development is all-inclusive and specific. Even here that which is emphasised is essentially a unification or synthesis of the differences in terms of a pervading identity. We may classify the universals into abstract, generic, qualitative and specific. But we cannot deny existence to the first three, for we can and do have various degrees of existence; and it may be that only the specific

42. See Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supplementary Volume XI (1932), p. 143. See also Blanshard's *Nature of Thought*, I. 606-7.

43. *Nature of Thought*, I. 610.

universal has the fullest existence. Yet even the differences of the specific universal cannot in the end remain.

In this connection there is a significant passage in Prof. Blanshard's "Nature of Thought" where he seems to urge that the particular and the universal are the same when we omit from the particular what is alien and irrelevant.⁴⁴ The alien and the irrelevant can only refer to the differentiations of an identity. If this is what is meant, then he is not far from the position of Bosanquet which he seems to criticise now and then. But his criticism of the position held by Prof. Montague on the question of the universals seems to make his position self-contradictory.⁴⁵ If it is not the spatio-temporal limitations that finitise a universal, what else is it that makes us refer to the particulars as the embodiments of the universal? The rejection of this doctrine would easily lead us to the doctrine that the universal is only a mental idea and therefore an abstraction. And his rejection of Joseph's account of predication is also unconvincing.⁴⁶ The wisdom that I predicate of Socrates is not any universal wisdom, but that wisdom which is the characteristic of Socrates. That is, the wisdom may be a universal, but I predicate that specific or unique wisdom which only Socrates has in him. This is similar to Bosanquet's argument about the animality of man being different from the animality of the animal. The wisdom is that which is necessarily implied in the being of Socrates. It is a wisdom that is identical with the being of Socrates; and yet it is only implicit in the being of the individual. Prof. Blanshard's position is Hegelian; and though he is at pains to absorb the essentials of the doctrine as developed by Bosanquet and others, his Hegelian preoccupation makes him insist on the idea of a system, on the concept of identity in difference, on the mental character of the universal. Some of these characteristics are also found in Bosanquet's theory; but there we are able to separate them from the real doctrine.

The concrete universal coincides with the individual. Individuality, with its two correlative requirements of comprehensiveness and unity, is the sole criterion of truth and reality. Comprehensiveness does not mean mere complexity, but all-inclusiveness. Such a concrete universal is the proper culmination of the actual development of thought. But this is not realised as thought, but

44. Nature of Thought, I, 641.

45. Ibid. I, 635-642.

46. Ibid. I, 645.

as Art, Religion, or Love.⁴⁷ It does not stand in need of repetitions. It is essentially spiritual. In other words, it is self-consciousness. As Bosanquet well put it, it is natural "to suppose that our brief existence is the temporal appearance of some character of the whole, such as, in any case, constitutes a very great part of the finite individual's reality as experienced in the world. For what appears as a passage in time, the Absolute has need to express itself through us as very subordinate units. And there are indications which point in this direction, and suggest in what kind of worlds, or higher complexes, we might find our completion. While we serve as units, to speak the language of experience, the Absolute lives in us a little, and for a little time; when its life demands our existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervasive features or characters, which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasise, and in which our reality enriches the universe."⁴⁸

The universal is a substantive. It gets itself limited in an embodiment. It is one and yet appears as many universals even. The universal pot, for instance, is only a particular in the universal substance. That is, the same object can belong to many universals; and a universal can become a particular by becoming a member of a more comprehensive universal, thereby ceasing to be a universal. The true or the concrete universal is one and eternal. It appears as many because of the manifesting media. There are as many media as there are, and as there can be, particulars; and the members of a class have more or less a similar medium. The differences between the various classes are no more than the differences between the manifesting media. Hence a universal which is relative to one class is a specific medium, and therefore a particular when it is viewed in relation to the one universal. Consequently, the universals which are objective entities must be many if they are to answer to the various classes of objects. But being only specific modifications of the universal, they are not in reality many. Their multiplicity is only an appearance. The differences amongst the various media are essential in this manifestation since they provide the degrees of revelation; and all these revelations are united by a common foundational principle.⁴⁹

The Universal is strictly objective, and is a unifying principle assuming specific forms. Thus the apparent universal number can

47. See Principles, pp. 62-63, 120, 121.

48. See Science and Philosophy.

49. See Vedānta Paribhāṣā, pp. 69-71.

be only either odd or even. Its unity from its species cannot be dissociated; and so is its reality from its particulars. The differences between its species are resolved within it. This doctrine then makes out that the universal is felt in apprehension as an embodied particular, and realised in thought.⁵⁰ When Antisthenes remarked, "I see a horse, but not horseness", Plato well replied that it was so because, he had eyes but no intelligence. The Universal, moreover, stands not in need of repetitions. The Individual reveals the plan of the whole and thus is the concrete universal. Each particular is a centre of articulation for the true universal, and each apparent universal does the same. Consequently, the particular member of a class owes his specific nature to his being an embodied universal. The nature of the true or concrete universal is not affected by the number of its particulars. Its presence in the multiplicity of particulars is a sheer accident. A universal endeavours to bridge the differences obtaining within the particulars, and it can achieve this task only when the multiplicity of particulars is not a necessary corollary of the universal.⁵¹

We can then conclude that each particular is a conditioned universal for its *nisus* is towards the whole. This feature which is a characteristic mark of finitude is pregnant with rich suggestions as each particular fulfills its existence by suggesting and realising its potential nature of true Individuality which is the whole. And this concept of the embodied universal is also revealed in words which make a poem highly suggestive and pregnant with deep thought and feeling. Such a state is at the very core of all higher immediacy.

50. See Apohasiddhi, p. 12.

51. See Citsukha: *Tattva Pradipikā*, pp. 303-306; Bosanquet: *Logic*, II, 184, Principles; and Bradley: *Principles*, p. 175.

Ethical Determination of Knowledge

by

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There being an interrelation between Epistemology and Ontology, philosophers have given their attention to epistemological problems to make sure as to what the sources of knowledge are, what knowledge is true and what false, how knowledge is related to being, and whether there are any limitations to knowledge; so that they may not make any unwarranted claims about their metaphysical theories.

The history of epistemology shows that there have been psychological approaches to the problems of knowledge in the hands of Locke, Berkeley and Hume; logical approach in the hands of Kant, and very recently sociological approaches in the hands of Lukacs, Scheler, Mannheim, Grunwald, Arthur Child and others, all of whom seem to have been indirectly influenced by Marxian dialectical materialism and economic determinism in all spheres including philosophy and epistemology.

Each later school of epistemology has shown the defects of the earlier school, and has tried to improve upon it. The psychological approach leads to agnosticism, subjective idealism or solipsism, and scepticism. The logical or critical approach leads to utter dualism and agnosticism, paving the way to varieties of objective and absolute idealisms. The sociological approach is now in vogue, but I think that it has paved the way to what could legitimately be considered as ethical approach to knowledge.

We have always stressed psychological, logical and sociological conditions of knowledge. But we have altogether neglected the ethical and spiritual conditions of knowledge. There is such a thing as ethics of epistemology, studying the ethical foundation and significance of knowledge, defining truth in terms of the ethical and spiritual discipline of the knower or the subject, and above all suggesting a methodology of conquering the regions which ordinarily lie beyond the sphere of human capabilities.

Just as 'Social determination of knowledge' is the postulate of social epistemology, 'Ethical determination of knowledge' is the postulate of ethical epistemology. But while the social theories of knowledge are deterministic and relativistic, the ethical theory of knowledge gives free scope for independent progressive acquisition of absolute truth. Again, while sociological epistemology is historically descriptive in its results, ethical epistemology is both autobiographically descriptive and ideally normative in its suggestions, in so far as its object is to search for an ideal method of the acquisition of knowledge as well as a method of idealising the knower.

While psychological epistemology studies the origin and development of knowledge in the individual knower by following a plain historical or genetic method, the sociological epistemology too studies in the same manner the origin and development of individual knowledge as determined by the socio-historical forces. Logical epistemology, again, studies the conditions of the validity of knowledge, and attempts to define truth and error. Its function lies in evaluating knowledge rather than describing the origin of knowledge. Ethical epistemology, on the other hand, concerns itself with the problem of the right method of getting at truth. It defines the qualifications of one who can know the truth, and lays down a process as to how he can acquire those qualifications and how he can know the truth. In this, unlike the previous epistemologies, it is dynamic in its conception; for it is not content with showing the limits of human knowledge, but suggests a method of overcoming them.

The old epistemologies were concerned with the sources and means of knowledge. Their attention was shifted from the object to be known to the ways and means of knowledge in the cognitive situation, and its interpretation of the status of the object known, whether it is dependent on knowledge or independent of it. So too they speculated about the criterion of truth,—whether it consists in correspondence, coherence or successful activity, etc. But they did not take into consideration the most significant part played by the knower himself. The moral and spiritual character of the subject influenced the possibility of his acquisition of truth. What in most cases we have is opinion which cannot be ultimately and absolutely regarded as true, because the knower is incapable morally and spiritually to know the absolute truth. The history of philosophy brings out the medley of opinions held by various philosophers on various different topics of philosophy. Where is

the truth? Is it in all of them or none of them? In any case, it points to subjectivism and relativism and scepticism. The history of philosophy is a history of illusions, which points to the 'Poverty of Philosophy' as Marx has expressed it. I do not want to say that it is all an illusion and a dire poverty of philosophy; there are elements of rich truth in the philosophy of the past; yet the diversity of philosophical interpretations, the diversity of methods used, and the diversity of conclusions reached is so very flabbergasting that it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that each one has his own absolute philosophy, as if there are many absolute truths. It behoves us, therefore, to see whether instead of studying the measures or *pramāṇas* of knowledge, we should not measure the measurer of knowledge. The *Prameya-siddhi* is said to be dependent upon the *pramāṇas*, but much more is it dependent upon the *pramātā*. The problem of interest for the epistemologist now is this *pramātā* or the philosopher himself. Once our attention was shifted from the object of knowledge to the means of knowledge. Now we must again shift our attention from the means of knowledge to the knower himself. Instead of losing ourselves in the meshes of diverse philosophies, we should concentrate upon the philosopher, and study why he fails and how he can make himself equal to the task of knowing the indubitable absolute truth. If Descartes has laid down the subjective trend of modern philosophy, the task is not yet complete. It is no use indubitably establishing the existence of the self as the knower; if we are to make the right use of this firm foundation of knowledge, we must further ask how we can make this self or subject of knowledge perfect, so that he can know everything else in the same indubitable fashion. Self-certainty must pave the way for self-realisation which, in fact, consists in the idealisation of the lower into the higher. Such an ideally perfect philosopher alone can give us an indubitable truth. All others can give us nothing more than mere opinions, and therefore, only doubtful knowledge. Shaftesbury says, "To philosophise in a just signification is but to carry good breeding a step higher." This evidently means that moral and spiritual idealisation of the philosopher is a condition of his justly philosophising about the Ultimate Reality.

The postulate of ethical determination of knowledge signifies that the 'ethos' of the society in which the individual is born and brought up, and the formation of a unique character by the free agency of the individual himself, are the chief ethically determinant factors of his opinions. Whatever beliefs the individual holds are the product of the two factors of social and cultural back-

grounds, which have no meaning apart from the ethical ideology of the social group, and the moral character of the individual himself, who determines himself from within as much as he is determined by society from without. The social and other environment has an influence upon the formation of the individual character as well as his opinions and beliefs. The Marxian and other social theories are deterministic in their conception. But there is something in the individual which is irreducible to the influence of external circumstances; in fact, nothing is a circumstance to the individual which he does not recognise as such. His independent activity of selection and rejection, his allowing the circumstances to influence him or not, in short his free will is an important condition of the formation of his unique moral character. This individual character too determines his philosophy, his opinions and beliefs, his knowledge in general.

The beliefs of society as of the individuals are merely opinions and not knowledge or truth, though subjectively they may be regarded as true; for, they vary not only from individual to individual, or from moment to moment in the same individual, but also from society to society in the same time. We cannot legitimately say that all these beliefs and opinions are true; possibly all these are false.

Now the most important question is, how is true knowledge determined and acquired? Whatever other conditions of truth there may be, the most decisive condition seems to be the moral and spiritual perfection of the person who is intent upon the knowledge of the truth. He alone has the capacity to know what is real from what is illusory who has built in himself an ideal character. All that is conditioned by passions, sentiments, prejudices, interests and such other falsifying and divergent elements in human personality cannot be true. The soundness of the sense-organs, the keenness of intelligence, the various weapons of knowledge and of methodology play their part in the acquisition of knowledge, but at the root of all these is the knower, who can make a good use or a bad use of them, and thus attain either truth or falsity. The weapons of knowledge in the hands of an immoral and imperfect knower would lead only to false knowledge. The same weapons would yield correct knowledge in the hands of the knower with moral and spiritual integrity. Purity of the self is the arch-stone which supports all other factors involved in knowledge. A morally and spiritually imperfect knower is a great falsifier, and therefore most unreliable in the field of

knowledge as he is in the field of practice. The height of his audacity is that he should claim to have known the truth in spite of his living under an illusion. The whole history of philosophy bears this out.

The knower, to begin with, is full of imperfections, limitations and ignorance. Whatever he knows and does would have this imprint of imperfection. The problem is: can such an imperfect knower be the cause of perfect knowledge? The process of knowledge is fundamentally a process of idealisation of the knower. In this sense, true knowledge is essentially a process of becoming or being. The process of realisation of reality is, in essence, the realisation of the self. For, to realise is to *make* something real. The ignorant, the imperfect, the limited, and so far unreal self undertakes, in the process of knowledge, the activity of making himself more and more real. In the long and incessant physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual effort, there is a process of the realisation of true being of the knower. There is in fact a transformation and purification of the whole original being. This seems to be the meaning of the terms *Satvasamshuddhi* and *Vishuddhātma* in *Geeta*; *Dhātuprasāda*, *Dnanaprasāda*, *Vishuddhasattva* in *Kātha* and *Mundaka*; *Vaishāradya*, *Adhyatmaprasāda* and *ashuddhikshaya* in *Yoga*. The purport of all these terms is that knowledge in the ultimate analysis is a way of being.

Now the question is: Is all knowledge ethically conditioned? Or there are only some fields of knowledge which require ethical qualifications in the knower? There is ordinary empirical knowledge which is the basis of our ordinary conduct of life. Take for example the proposition, this is a paper. It does not seem to need any moral training to assert the truth of this proposition. There is, again, the field of scientific knowledge about physical reality such as the propositions, 'heat is a form of energy', 'oxygen is essential for life', etc. Here, too, it seems that moral preparation on the part of the scientist is not necessary. But it must be said in this connection that though a morally and spiritually imperfect scientist may discover a truth, it cannot be said that a research worker in the scientific field does not require some sort of moral discipline. Hard labour, sincerity, impartiality, even a sort of asceticism are essential on the part of the scientist, at least in his own field, though his conduct otherwise may be objectionable. Biographies of the great scientists will bear out the truth of their strong character. A sort of disciplined life is indispensable for the discovery of an unknown truth or for the conception of a great idea.

What, again, about the knowledge of social phenomena studied in the social sciences? What about the judgments of an economist, a politician, a lawyer, a judge in the court of law, a sociologist and the like? In many cases, here, the judgments may be true in spite of the moral imperfections of the persons who pass these judgments. Yet the differences in the judgments in the social field are mostly due to moral imperfections of the workers in that field. In this connection I would like to quote at some length a passage from an article entitled "Towards a Theory of Social Knowledge" by Mr. W. Stark of the University of Edinburgh.

"It proposes, first of all, a clear consciousness of the fact itself in the spirit in which Goethe calls self-knowledge the beginning of all improvement. It demands, next, a much higher degree of care and attention in the handling of the materials of knowledge than naive, philosophically untutored approach will ever deem requisite. And it also calls for an unrelenting self-criticism which constantly keeps an eye, not only on the object of study, but on the *student himself*, to prevent his accustomed modes of thought from surreptitiously slipping into the mental image he endeavours to build up. For one who is aware of the necessity of a social theory of knowledge, and of a philosophical critique of social perfection, a historical, anthropological, or even merely sociological investigation can never be anything but a very painful understanding. In other words, all social study requires a *moral* as well as an intellectual effort, and to that extent it is decidedly more difficult than purely scientific research. It necessitates—if it is to be successful—a large measure of genuine *good-will* towards the outsider, and his strange, apparently so often irrational and even uncivilised world, which is more difficult to provide than many will realise. It is possible only through continual *self-conquest* and *self-denial*."

The whole passage is very eloquent from the point of view of moral and spiritual equipment indispensable for the student of social sciences, who is interested in the true knowledge of societies and social phenomena. Similarly Professor E. E. Evans-Pritchard, President of the Royal Anthropological Institute, writing on "Social Anthropology: Past and Present", has criticised all functional determinist theories of society which reduce knowledge or truth to a mere function of the social organism, expressible in terms of natural law. He says, "In its extreme form functional determinism leads to absolute relativism and makes nonsense not only of the theory itself but of *all thought*." Then he makes a plea for "the thesis that social anthropology is a kind of historiography,

and therefore ultimately of philosophy of art", which "implies that it studies societies as *moral systems* and not as natural systems, that it is interested in design rather than in process, and that it therefore seeks patterns and not scientific laws, and interprets rather than explains. These are conceptual and not merely verbal differences." It is clear from this conception of society as essentially a moral pattern that its phenomena have a moral significance. Social knowledge, therefore, in its last analysis is morally conditioned.

What now about the highly philosophical knowledge? Whatever speculative and interpretative elements are involved in it, it could hardly be doubted that high moral and spiritual integrity is necessary on the part of the philosopher. He is a spectator of all times and all existence, and has an ambition of grasping ultimate and absolute reality. If he lacks in these qualifications, he cannot overcome his prejudices, partial interests, selfishness, egotism, passions, fickleness and a hundred such deficiencies which are bound to vitiate his knowledge of the real. Hence Indian Philosophers have stressed the need of *Sādhana* *chatusṭayasampannatā* before one launches upon the most difficult of all tasks. A strict moral and spiritual discipline as is laid down in Yoga alone would qualify anyone to become a philosopher. One well-versed in *Ashtāṅgayoga* attains *Ashuddhikshaya* which results in *Jnyāna-dīpti* as the 28th Sutra of *Sādhana* *pāda* of *Yogasutras* says. By the gaining of Victory over *Samyama*, consisting of *Dhāraṇā*, *Dhyāna* and *Samādhi*, one attains what is called *prajñā* which is the instrument of indubitable knowledge of ultimate reality.

But have we left any sphere of knowledge beyond the ken of moral qualification? We have made reference to judgments of ordinary empirical knowledge and of scientific knowledge in the physical sphere, judgments of social sphere and of philosophical sphere. We have exempted ordinary knowledge from moral determination, and have allowed the other spheres of physical and social phenomena some amount of knowledge independent of moral determination, though, there too, we have seen that more and more moral qualifications are necessary for the knower. And finally we have concluded that philosophical knowledge worth the name must absolutely be conditioned by perfect moral and spiritual integrity of the philosopher. But it could be pointed out that all knowledge without exception is in its ultimate analysis philosophical. Whatever statement made in whatever sphere, if it claims *absolute* truth for itself, is philosophical in its significance;

and hence must be ethically conditioned. If the statement is only relative, made from a definite point of view, its truth is relative to that point of view alone. The statement, for instance, 'this is a paper', is a simple case of perception, and true as a matter of fact from the practical point of view. But if it claims absolute truth, it becomes a philosophical judgment, and therefore questionable. For the problem of perception is itself philosophical, and it involves many interpretations. What happens in perception? There may be physiological and psychological and logical solutions of it, and many diverse views may be held. The judgment itself may be pulled to pieces, and various theories about its import, about the relation of the subject to the predicate and of both to reality are there. There is an idealistic logic, a realistic logic, a positivist logic, a symbolic logic, a pragmatic logic and so on. In the end, it is the most difficult of all tasks to decide as to what ultimately is true about the fact of perception. If this is the case about the simplest of perceptions, how much more variety of philosophical views there would be about all the rest of the judgments whether made in physical, social or philosophical sciences? Which is the most rational view? Is it not true that to be rational is to be moral? The basis of rationality is in morality.

The case of ethical knowledge is most convincing in connection with the ethical determination of knowledge. Only a man of a dutiful character like Kant can advocate a theory of duty for the sake of duty. Only a Chârṡākā given to a life of pleasure can advocate a hedonist theory of morals. They cannot exchange their theories and still retain their character. There is a consistency between the life and the theory of a moralist. It follows, therefore, that at least in the ethical sphere of knowledge there is an ethical determination of that knowledge.

But to admit this is to admit ethical determination of knowledge in all spheres. For, it is a historical fact borne out by all the self-consistent philosophies of the various philosophers, that there is a certain internal harmony in the views regarding various allied spheres of knowledge. The hedonist in ethics, broadly speaking, will necessarily be a materialist in philosophy, and an empiricist and a realist in epistemology. The idealist in ethics will also be usually an idealist in metaphysics, logic and epistemology. If it is not so in some cases, there surely is inconsistency in their doctrines. If now the ethical life of a person determines his ethical theory, and if all other philosophical knowledge is in harmony

with the ethical knowledge, all knowledge must be regarded as determined by the ethical personality of the philosopher.

It may be asked, what ethics ultimately determines the possibility of the acquisition of absolute truth? The objection may be answered on the following lines. Firstly, the moral theorists are not perfectly moral, and hence the variety in their theories. There is a moral progress in the theories of the moral ideal from Hedonism, through Formalism to Eudaemonism or Self-realisation; and also in the theories of the moral standard from Heteronomy, through Theonomy and Cosmonomy to Autonomy. This progress shows that the moral theorist himself goes through these ideals and standards, and thus reaches both a supreme moral life and a supreme moral theory. The variety of theories are only stages in the development; they all are not absolutely valid. Secondly, the moralist is not always strictly moral even according to his own theory; and being immoral, he does not see the defects in his own moral theory. If he tries to live up to his theory, he would see the contradictions involved in it; and if sincere, he would remove those by developing a new moral theory in consistency with his own experience as a moral agent. Thirdly, there is a consensus of opinion regarding concrete moral virtues, though theories might be divergent. Truth, Temperance, Justice, Courage, non-violence, wisdom, chastity and such other most important virtues are universally accepted by people of enlightened consciousness. Perfection of moral and spiritual life consists in the sincere practice of these virtues which would enable a man to enlarge his vision of truth.

There is a certain internal mutual relationship between virtue and knowledge; both condition each other. As we grow in virtue we grow in knowledge, and as we grow in knowledge we grow in virtue. It is not a vicious circle but a 'virtuous circle' if the phrase may be allowed. It is not a plane circle but a spiral, which leads to an evolutionary process both of knowledge and virtue. Thus not only the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge is true, but its converse that knowledge is virtue is also true. There is no doubt that virtue is conditioned by knowledge. But this cannot be a dry theoretical knowledge, but a knowledge which has taken possession of the will and has so modified the soul that it cannot but be virtuous. There are some men, as Socrates himself was, for whom to know the truth is to be the truth,—that is, to have lived up to it. Knowledge is not for them merely an external accretion, but an essential and

spontaneous purification and elevation of their inner being. Just as virtue is conditioned by knowledge and is itself an index to it, knowledge too is conditioned by virtue and is revealed by a virtuous life. It is in this sense that in Gita there is a description of the virtues that are the true external index of the soul that is in possession of absolute truth.

Virtue is, then, the alpha and the omega of a philosopher's life. Knowledge has its origin in virtue and its culmination too is in virtue. It is my belief that instead of giving barren philosophies to the world, the philosopher should look within himself, and make sincere efforts to idealise himself and to know himself, before he utters a word.

Studies in Tagore's Aesthetics

By

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Avanindranath Tagore is primarily an artist and only secondarily a critic of art. However, his Bagisvari Lectures are an achievement in the field of art-criticism and certainly a contribution to the literary world. He lacks the consistent logical thinking that we can expect of a Hobhouse or a Dewey. Here and there even a casual reader may find fault with his way of putting things. But that does not in any way affect his position as a critic of art, much less as an artist.

In the present paper we are concerned with his philosophy of beauty. His notion of the 'supremely beautiful' is objective and in that sense somewhat Platonic.¹ It is absolute beauty, and its faint adumbrations are to be found in the beauties of nature and art. Our enterprise is to approach the supremely beautiful. The artist's pilgrimage is towards this goal. But the pilgrim's progress always falls far short of the ideal, and this truth was realised in Greece, Egypt, China and India.² Everywhere the notion of the Absolute Beauty guides the destiny of the art-movements. When an artist thinks that he has reached finality in form, he has touched the supremely beautiful through his art and sits contented; the dynamic movement of art led by others overtakes him. He becomes a back-number. This is how Dürer could lead the art movement in Germany when it had a seemingly final shape in the hands of Leonardo. "Dürer had much of Leonardo's scientific and intellectual equipment. On to his harsh native German realism he grafted something of Italian scholarship."³ Like the Flemish artists, he had none of the Italian grace, but unlike them he tried hard to catch at some of the Italian nobility. In most of Dürer's work one feels the mediaeval world is not far below the surface, though it rarely breaks through. The movement did not stop at that; old forms gave place to new ones. New schools developed,

1. *Rūpa*, p. 335 (Bagisvari Lectures).

2. *Saundarjer Sandhān* p. 85 (Bagisvari Lectures).

3. *European Painting and Sculpture*, p. 126 by Eric Newton.

agreeing with and differing from the older schools. The mediaeval world peeped through Dürer's work. "Monet, at the end of his life, was producing work that had a strange resemblance to Turner's, though he arrived at it by a different set of means."⁴ Monet's 'Rouen cathedral' is an instance in point. The west front of the cathedral, seen through the red haze of sunset by the analytical eye of Monet was very like the same scene viewed by the romantic eye of Turner. These glimpses into the history of art amply justify Tagore's remark that man's imagination and with it his art-creation are ever-progressing towards the supremely beautiful,—one movement leading to another, a great wave culminating in a greater one. This lure of the supremely beautiful inspires the artist to create new forms, wherein it is sought to be adumbrated.


Tagore's notion of the supremely beautiful mainly helps him in explaining the evolution of the history of art. This objective notion of the absolute beauty is not consistently maintained throughout. His utterances⁵ go to show that he believes in the subjectivity of beauty. Beauty depends on the individual's mental make-up. Our education, culture, taste, in a word our personal disposition, determines what is beautiful. The idea of beauty is always accompanied by an agreeable feeling.⁶ We never call anything beautiful which does not agree with our mental prepossessions. Our attitude towards the beautiful must be a pleasant one. Herbert Read stresses this aspect of pleasure in our appreciation of the beautiful. That can never be considered as 'beautiful' which grates our imagination. To quote Read: "But all artists have this same intention, the desire to please; and art is most simply and most usually defined as an attempt to create pleasing forms. Such forms satisfy our sense of beauty, and the sense of beauty is satisfied when we are able to appreciate a unity or harmony of formal relations among our sense-perceptions."⁷ This element of harmony is of primary importance in the appreciation of any beautiful object. Alfred North Whitehead defines beauty in terms of such harmony. "Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience. Thus in its primary sense Beauty is a quality which finds its exemplification in actual occasions: or put conversely, it is a quality in which such

4. European Painting and Sculpture, p. 150, by Eric Newton.
5. See Bagisvari Lectures, pp. 203, 93, 328, and 373.
6. Ibid., p. 82.
7. The Meaning of Art, p. 16.

occasions can severally participate."⁸ This adaptation or harmony conclusively leads to a subjective philosophy of beauty. But as we have already noted, his notion of the "supremely beautiful" speaks of an objective entity, lying outside and independent of us. The glimpses of this objective beauty, contends Tagore, inspire the artist to perpetuate them in the works of art. He chooses suitable forms to enshrine these temporary glimpses for ever.⁹ Here there is an apparent conflict between the subjective and the objective notions of beauty. If the beautiful be a mere adumbration of the 'supremely beautiful'—whether it be in nature or art—then certainly it cannot be characterised as subjective. The notion of beauty becomes determined from without. What we call beautiful in nature is a faint copy of the 'supremely beautiful' that dwells in the arid region of intellectualism. The beautiful in art becomes 'a copy of a copy' as the artist follows nature in his own way. This copy theory holds good if we consider the 'supremely beautiful' as objective in the sense of the 'Platonic Idea'. Then the charges levelled against art by Plato that it is mimetic become substantiated and the value of art as creation is totally ignored. But this was far from Tagore's mind. He did not really mean that beauty in art or nature should be a mere replica either of the supremely beautiful, the Absolute Spirit, or of the pantheistic deity of Wordsworth. It should neither symbolise the supremely beautiful nor hint at that. The absolute that is colourless, shapeless and formless is not the subject matter of any real work of art. Nor is it the business of the beautiful in art to be a mere symbol of this absolute spirit.¹⁰ The pervading thought of Tagore throughout his writings is 'subjectivity' in art. Art is subjective,—it is the desubjectification of subjective feelings. Beauty is subjective and it is relative also. There is no absolute standard of beauty. It depends on time, place and the person who enjoys beauty.¹¹ It is our subjective reaction that determines the beauty or ugliness of a particular object. Only our minds are competent to say the last word in matters of such aesthetic evaluation.¹² As has been rightly pointed out by Prof. Collingwood,¹³ beauty has always a subjective reference, and if anybody asks for an objective standard, he may get anything but a proper aesthetic evaluation.

8. The Adventures of Ideas, p. 290.
9. Bagisvari Lectures, p. 82.
10. Bagisvari Lectures, p. 244 (Arup na Rup).
11. Sundara, p. 203.
12. Saundarjer Sandhān, p. 84.
13. Vide his Principles of Art.

P. 4



Tagore in his numerous papers told us repeatedly that beauty is subjective. Mind is not a camera, and as such it never cares for an exact imitation of what is there in nature. It always looks at things from its own point of view. If there be unity or harmony of formal relations among our sense-perceptions, we experience what is called the beautiful. So this apprehension of harmony is followed by the sense of beauty. Here Tagore agrees with Keats. "It is now elaborately clear that beauty means with Keats not an externally existent, physical and sensuous entity. Nor does it mean what Keats calls in one of his letters 'an exquisite sense of the luxurious'. It is an act of the mind. It is simply the pleasure of intuitive apprehension".¹⁴ It depends on our way of looking at things. And our looking at things is always determined by our personal likes and dislikes. There is always a discrete selection and rejection. If nature in its entirety were presented in art, it would have been no better than photography; and photography is certainly not the best type of art. It is dead, it is a finished product. A good specimen of art develops in the appreciator's mind. The play of suggestiveness works there and it is ever developing like the craggy hill of Wordsworth. A poet's experience is presented as unique, though not in content but always so in form. Tagore speaks of this uniqueness in art and that is why he definitely tells us that beauty in art is not amenable to rational analysis.¹⁵

But Tagore contradicts his own statement and tells us again that mere subjectivity will make art parochial, and it will lose its universal appeal. Art, worth the name, should be universal and all tendencies towards individuality should always be discouraged.¹⁶ The really beautiful must always rise above personal likes and dislikes.¹⁷ Individual taste should not be respected when the question of creation comes in. We should so create as to satisfy all, and hence it must not be purely personal. If it be purely personal, it will fail to be appreciated by all. Moreover, the enterprise of an artist should always respect the traditions. No artist is a Melchizedek. Men must suck at the breast of universal Ethos, and artists are no exceptions. Rolland also held similar views with regard to the universality of art. It should not presuppose a high standard of education and culture in the teeming population who live on the black soil. That is why he thought of a 'People's

14. Keats's Idea of Beauty by Prof. T. N. Sen.

15. See p. 91 (Saunderjer Sandhān)

16. See p. 99.

17. See p. 218 (Asundar).

Theatre'. The drama that is to be presented there should always represent man's struggle with the elemental forces of nature. Thus universality of art, in the vulgar sense, was ensued at the cost of artistic excellence. And Rolland himself admitted in his older age that art, if it is to be democratic, is sure to lose much of its nobility and grandeur. We would like to point out to Tagore also that he ensures universality in art at the cost of its excellence. The dish that suits the taste of all, the refined and the vulgar alike, is sure to lose much of its flavour and nicety. A peasant and an intellectual aristocrat should not be asked to dine from the same plate. There is nothing like universal taste that can be taken as an objective standard of beauty. Taste is always personal, and universal taste is a mere abstraction. This was realised by Rolland afterwards, and that is why we hear him say that art is not the common *ren-dez-vous* of all.¹⁸

We fully agree with him and believe that universality in art does not mean a negation of individuality. Neither does it mean a sacrifice of the excellence of one's own personal ideas and individual forms lest it may not be appreciated by the 'hewers of wood and the drawers of water.' Art can only be truly appreciated when the appreciator can come very near the artist, and can fully recreate in his own imagination what the artist once created. If that be true, universality in the ordinary sense becomes a misnomer at least in the aesthetic world. So universality should always be taken in a very limited sense whenever it is used with reference to any work of art. It only means that people who are similarly endowed as the creator will appreciate him. The appreciator's intellectual attainments and emotional susceptibilities must be like those of the creator. If we do not appreciate any artist for lack of training on our part, we cannot blame him for obscurity. We cannot say that his art is not universal. Take for example, a painting by Salvador Dali entitled 'Landscape: the Persistence of Memory'¹⁹ (Museum of Modern Art, New York). Because we do not understand it, we cannot accuse the artist in any way. Tagore tells us that it may be that we do not understand the language of painting. It has a technique of its own. And if anybody is not familiar with the language of the painter, the painter or the artist is not to be blamed.²⁰ If we learn the alphabet only and accuse Shakespeare

18. Vide John Christopher.

19. See 'The Meaning of Art' by H. Read, plate 64.

20. See Śilpa O Bhāṣā, p. 53.

of obscurity it will be simply ludicrous. The same holds good of painting. It has a language of its own, and it has developed enormously in recent years. If we fail to read it and understand it properly and go on accusing the modern artists for their obscurity, their acceptance by the people who know their language remains unaffected thereby. Enlightened contemporaries and intellectually advanced posterity will give them recognition which we may deny them out of ignorance. So universality in art is never an 'unqualified universality'; it is qualified and restricted, so long as the whole of mankind does not reach the apex of intellectual eminence.

Origin of the Sankhya*

By

SHRI MANUBHAI C. PANDYA, M.A., LL.B., B.Sc

Genesis of the Sankhya Philosophy

From references to Sankhya doctrines in the later Upanisads as well as post-vedic literature such as the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad Gita, Manu Smṛti and the Puranas, it appears that the Sankhya at one stage was a very widely influential school; and one finds a mixture of Vedantic ideas with ideas borrowed chiefly from the Sankhya and the Yoga. Modern Scholars however are divided in their opinion as regards the origin of the Sankhya. All agree that references to what appear as the Sankhya-Yoga doctrines, such as those relating to evolution of categories, the three gunas or constituents of Prakṛiti (nature) and so on, can be traced in the Upanisads, especially the later ones; among them the Katha, the Svetasvatara and Maitrayani Upanisads. Yet, while some are of opinion that the Sankhya system is independent of the Vedas in origin and almost as old as the Upanisads, others maintain that it is an off-shoot of the teaching of the Upanisads. There is a reference in the Svetasvatara Upanisad¹ to Kapila Rṣi, the supposed founder of the Sankhya according to tradition; but both old Indian thinkers as Sankara² and present-day scholars as Prof. Keith and others agree that the reference to Kapila in the said Upanisad does not relate to the founder of the Sankhya, but the expression there means the red vizard and denotes Hiranyagarbha, the first-born embodied spirit. It may be stated in passing that whatever may be the true origin of the Sankhya, there was one stage in the history of the system when its adherents traced it to the Upanisads and even prior thereto to the Rg Veda.³ Badarayana the author of Brahma Sūtras has again and again raised the question whether the Sankhya is the teaching of the Upanisads as stated in the prima facie view, and answered it in the negative.

* The Indian Philosophical Congress, Silver Jubilee Prize Essay.

1. S.U. 5-2.
2. Sankara on Br. S. 2-1-1.
3. Rg. Veda 10-121; 10-122.

Badarayana's repeated allusions in the *Brahma Sutras*⁴ to the *prima facie* view that the Sankhya doctrines represent the doctrines contained in the Vedas and the Upanisads and his refutation of the same cannot however be satisfactorily accounted for without assuming that there were Sankhya thinkers in his time who contended that the Sankhya was the teaching of the Upanisads. A similar view was maintained so late as the 16th century A.D. by Vijnanabhiksu in his commentary on the Sankhya Sutras. This may however be due to the later Sankhya teachers trying to find support for their doctrines in the Upanisads whose authority had come to prevail.

*Dualistic realism of the Sankhya as a Reaction
against Absolute Idealism of the Vedanta*

The Sankhya system seems to have got its name from Sankhyā, number, and meant enumeration of the categories of cosmic evolution. It was originally nothing more than a nomenclature for the principles of the philosophy of the Upanisads. The Sankhya seems to have been in its earlier form only a fresh clear statement of the successive emanations out of Prakriti (nature), the first cosmic principle,—a precise series of terms to denote the primitive philosophy of the Upanisads. The distinctive tenets of what is now known as the Sankhya Philosophy are later developments.

The divergence of phraseology must subsequently have led to a divergence of views; and thus the Sankhya philosophy formulated itself with its repudiation of Isvara as world-projecting deity, its affirmation of the reality and independence of Prakriti or Pradhana (nature), the reality of emanations of Prakriti, and the plurality of Purusas or individual selves. When Sankhya became a system of philosophy later on, it meant a theoretical investigation of truth and knowledge by reasoning, and not merely an enumeration of emanations of Prakriti as originally understood. The formulation of Sankhya as a system of philosophy, based on reasoning as distinguished from the Vedanta which was based mainly on the Upanisads, made a land-mark in the history of Indian Philosophy by giving more prominence to reasoning than to Revelation as a means of knowledge to explain the riddle of the universe and of human existence. Though by refusing to recognise Vedic Revelation or Sruti as the highest means of knowledge and by its

4. Br. S. 1-1-5 to 11; 1-4-1 to 6; 2-1-1 to 3; 2-2-1 to 10.

disbelief in personal God, the Sankhya failed to secure popular support (and it was even censured as unvedic by the orthodox), yet attempts were made by exponents of the Sankhya, such as Vijnanabhiksu and other scholars, to secure popular support therefor on the authority of the Vedas by a new interpretation of certain texts of the Upanisads, so as to derive therefrom Sankhya doctrines. An opinion has been expressed by Professor Weber that the Sankhya was the oldest of the existing systems of philosophy, which has been supported by Richard Garbe so far only as the systematic form of the Sankhya was concerned; but Garbe differs from Weber, if we advert to "the fundamental ideas"; for in his opinion, "the idealistic doctrines of the Upanisads regarding the Brahman-Atman—a doctrine which has grown from the Vedas and which is the nucleus and centre of the later Vedanta system,—is an older product of philosophical thinking than the leading ideas of the other systems." Garbe further says that "the foundation of the Sankhya philosophy is to be sought in a reaction against the propagation of the consistent idealism which began to be proclaimed with enthusiasm". A similar opinion has been also expressed by Professor Maxmullar in his six systems of Indian philosophy. Thus he says, "We can understand how out of the seeds scattered about in the Upanisads there could arise in course of time the systematic arrangement and final representations of systems such as have been handed down to us in the Sutras of the Vedanta, the Sankhya and other schools. It cannot be denied that in the Upanisad period Vedantic ideas are certainly more prevalent than those of the Sankhya." He further adds: "I go even a step further and admit that the Sankhya philosophy may have been a kind of toning down of the extreme monism of the Advaita Vedanta at least as interpreted by the school which was represented rather than founded by Sankara." Dualism is generally more popular than rigorous monism; and people readily accepted the Sankhya doctrine of dualism when it postulated Prakriti (nature) and Purusa (individual spirit) as two independent principles and its teaching that one could secure liberation by a discriminating knowledge of Purusa and Prakriti. The denial of Isvara or personal God was not a part of the original Sankhya, but seems to have been a subsequent development only.

Whether the Sankhya is derived from Buddhism?

The essential fact of the atheism of the Sankhya in the classical form as propounded in Sankhya Karika and the atheism of Buddhism naturally raised the problem whether the view is bor-

rowed by one of the systems from the other. In definitely historical times there was clearly a lively interchange of views between Buddhism and the Brahmanical schools. Mr. Keith is of the opinion that it is most improbable that Buddhism is the source of the Sankhya, since the divergence of the two systems suggests that Buddhism represents a further advance in the disintegration of the earlier philosophy of the Upanisads. It is true that the Sankhya abandons the idea of the Absolute, but it is on the other hand careful to retain the idea of spirit as eternal intelligence, independent of nature. "The doctrine of Buddhism, on the other hand, has in effect abandoned both these conceptions, and has left itself with only the fleeting series of mental states as a quasi-reality from which the development of the doctrine of the void (sunya) is a natural step. It is impossible to prove that from so developed a doctrine as that of Buddhism there could have grown the Sankhya which does not believe in the Buddhist view that the only existing principle is the law of movement." Mr. Garbe in his Sankhya philosophy has also expressed the same view, and he has stated that the Sankhya system belonged to the pre-Buddhistic age, and that Buddha was dependent on the Sankhya for the several doctrines preached by him. Priority of the Sankhya also appears from the fact that Kapila the founder of the Sankhya and the teacher Panchasikha, both historical personages, are mentioned as the predecessors of Buddha. In Buddhacharita of Asvaghosa there is reference to a meeting between Buddha and his former teacher Arada, who held Sankhya views based on theism as modified by the belief in the supreme personal divinity of the Viśiṣṭadvaita Vedanta. "It appears" as observed by Sir Radhakrishnan "that the earliest Sankhya was realistic theism like the qualified monism of the upanisads." It had not attained the form of a regular system until after Buddhism, when a challenge was given by the Buddhists to the realism of Purusas (subjects) and objects evolved from Prakriti (nature). The Sankhya took up the challenge and argued for the reality of these two principles on strictly rational grounds. When the Sankhya was developed as a regular system on rational grounds, it was obliged to concede, like Kant, that the existence of God could not be proved by logical arguments.⁵ The Jain legend places Kapila before the time of Buddha and Mahavira, mentioning him along with Rsabha, Bharata and Marichi, who are, of course, persons incorporated from Brahmanical traditions.

5. S.S. 1-92; S.S. 5 to 11.

Kapila the Founder of Theistic Sankhya

Kapila is the reputed founder of the Sankhya which was at first a theistic Philosophy, but later on, in about the Fourth century A.D., became atheistic in the time of Isvara Krisna the author of Sankhya Karika. Kapila was a historical personage of an age not later than 700 B.C. distinguished from the mythical figure of the same name mentioned in the Svetasvatara Upanisad,⁶ where it stands for Hiranyagarbha. In the Bhagavadgita,⁷ Kapila is mentioned as a sage who had obtained perfection and liberation, and as a Vibhuti or partial manifestation of the Lord. The Ramayana also refers to Kapila as a historic personage and a great sage. Further light is thrown on his personality by Vyasa, the author of the commentary on the Yoga Sutra,⁸ and Vachaspati Misra author of a gloss on the commentary of Vyasa, both of whom refer to a tradition according to which Kapila the historic personage was called Adividvan (the first of the knowers) and Bhagvan Paramarishi (the revered great sage). Lastly, the Bhagvata⁹ Purana lays special stress on his being the first in line of the Siddhas (perfected souls) who had by spiritual enlightenment secured liberation. In the Bhagvata Purana,¹⁰ Kapila is mentioned as the son of the sage Kardama by Devahuti, who was married to him by her father Manu Svayambhu. There is an account in the said Purana of the religious discourse of Kapila the son of Kardama and grandson of Manu to his mother Devahuti, whereby Kapila imparted to her discriminating knowledge of the highest spiritual principle identified with Vasudeva as distinct from Prakriti (nature), which teaching was received by him from his grandfather Manu Svayambhu. Thereafter Kapila is said to have renounced the world and retired to a lonely place.

The Theistic Sankhya of Kapila based on the Vaisnava cult of the Bhagvatas Developed into the Doctrine of Qualified Monism

Manu Svayambhu, the maternal grandfather of the sage Kapila, who imparted knowledge of the highest principle of religion and philosophy to Kapila as stated above, seems to have been a religious teacher of the Vaisnava cult of Bhagvatas, who believed in Bhagvat Vasudeva, at first identified with Hari or Vishnu

6. S. U. 5-2.

7. B. G. 10-26.

8. Y. S. 1-25.

9. Bh. P. 1-3-10.

10. Bh. P. 3-24 to 33.

and later on with Krisna-Vasudeva, as the highest deity. In the Bhagvata Purana there are many stories of devotees of Vishnu having attained spiritual wisdom through the grace of Vasudeva identified with Visnu, the Supreme being. The earliest of them was Svayambhu Manu the grand-father of Kapila, the founder of the Sankhya. The said Manu was also called *Kapila* perhaps because of the brown colour of his skin. But he was a historic personage distinct from Kapila mentioned in the Svetasvatara Upanisad,¹¹ where it stood for Hiranyagarbha, a mythological person who was probably deemed the first promulgator of the Yoga doctrine as stated by Vachaspati Misra, the author of a gloss on Vyasa's Bhasya on Yogasutras¹² of Patanjali of the 5th century A.D. As Kapila the grandson of Manu was reputed to be the first founder of the Sankhya, which meant theoretical knowledge based on the Vaisnava cult of the Bhagvata, Hiranyagarbha was believed to be the founder of the Yoga which meant practice of works, self-discipline, and strenuous endeavour. The Yoga-Sutras¹³ of Patanjali tell us at the very beginning that Yoga means the effort of restraining the activities or distractions of the mind, and the effort of concentration on a definite object. Manu Svayambhu was later on identified with Vasudeva-Visnu, the Supreme Deity of the Vaisnava Bhagavatas. He was also identified with Agni (fire) and Mahesvara. He seems to have devoted all his life to the investigation of the nature and powers of the Supreme Deity Visnu, by the practice of deep meditation. His grandson Kapila on his part devoted all his life to the investigation of the problem of the cause of evolution of the different species of beings, by meditation on the Supreme Lord Mahesvara, and became the founder of the theistic Sankhya which meant theoretical knowledge of the Supreme Reality, based on the old Vaisnava cult of Bhagavatas, to which a belief in the 4 Vyuhās (forms) was added later on in the period shortly after the compilation of the Bhagvadgita in the Narayaniya section of the Mahabharata. The four Vyuhās or forms of Narayana-Visnu, the Supreme Deity, were Vasudeva, Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, who were worshipped by the Bhagvata Vaisnavas. From the religious side of the epic, the Sankhya system is strangely taken up into the Bhagvata faith by the equation of the four Vyuhās of Visnu to four of the principles of the Sankhya philosophy, viz., the Supreme Spirit, the

11. S. U. 5-2.

12. Y. S. 1-1.

13. Y. S. 1-2.

Individual Soul, the Mind, and Individuation respectively. The last three emanate each from its predecessor. The wise reach the unity with the highest by way of return through Aniruddha, Pradyumna and Sankarsana to Vasudeva, and it is stated that the Sankhyas as well as the Bhagavatas hold this belief. In the Bhagavadgita, the unity of Sankhya and Yoga is insisted upon, and the Sankhya doctrine is over-laid by the two-fold doctrine that both spirit and nature are ultimately derived from the one and the same source viz., Brahman from the point of view of the Vedānta, and Vasudeva-Krishna or Purusotama from the religious point of view. According to Dr. Radhakrishnan,¹⁴ the earliest form of Sankhya was realistic theism like the qualified monism (*Viśiṣṭādvaita*) of the Upaniṣads. It was not a regular system until after Buddhism, when the latter challenged the realism of selves and objects. Mr. Keith¹⁵ in this connection observes as follows: "But while this system (qualified monism as the basis of theistic Sankhya) can be seen in the Upaniṣads, it would be an error to suppose that it is more properly the doctrine of the Upaniṣads than the illusion theory (*Māya-Vāda*) of Sankara. Neither system in its completely self-conscious form is to be found in the Upaniṣads, but the germs of both are present and both in a real sense can claim the authority of the Upaniṣads." The Vaisnava Bhāgavatas however laid special stress on devotion, with knowledge and renunciation as means, to Divine Grace leading to emancipation. In course of time, it developed into the doctrine of qualified monism (*Viśiṣṭādvaita*), allowing a certain reality to matter and a still more definite reality to the individual souls. The said doctrine, according to Thibaut, forms the theme of the Brahma Sutras of Bādarāyana. This opinion of Thibaut however is controverted by Gough and Deussen, according to whom, Absolute Monism which looks upon the world as an illusion (*Māya*) is the theme of the Brahma Sutras as interpreted by Sankaracharya in his commentary thereon. In the epic of the Mahābhārata also, we find predominance of theistic Sankhya which recognised a 26th principle, Isvara (God), the Supreme Being and subject of knowledge, in addition to Purusa (individual spirit) the 25th principle set over against Prakriti (nature) and other 23 principles evolved from it as objects of knowledge. It will be thus seen from the above that Jacobi's charge of materialism levelled at Sankhya falls to the ground, as even eliminating the 26th principle, viz., personal God,

14. Ind. Phil. Vol. II. p. 253.

15. The Sankhya System p. 7.

there is always left Purusa (spirit) eternal, pure and intelligent, independent of Prakriti, set over against her, and never identified with matter.

Doctrine of the Sankhya Teachers based on Vedic Teaching

Kapila has been recognised by tradition to be a historic personage and founder of the Sankhya, which was theistic at first as stated above. The said fact also appears from the Mahabharata, the Bhagavadgita and the Ramayana as contrasted with the Sankhya Karika of Isvara-Krishna of the 4th century A.D., wherein the Sankhya was atheistic without a belief in God. From a quotation in Vyasa Bhasya on Yoga-sutras,¹⁶ traced by Vacaspati Misra in his gloss thereon to a work of Panchasikhacharya, it appears that according to the tradition, the revered great sage Kapila had out of compassion taught the tantra, i.e., the science of Sankhya, to his pupil Asuri who was anxious to be enlightened." Asuri on his part gave the knowledge to his pupil Panchasikha. The said tradition of Sankhya teachers in the same order is mentioned in the Sankhya Karika¹⁷ of Isvara Krishna, who derived knowledge of the Sankhya doctrine handed down to him by a tradition of successive teachers and pupils as stated in the Karika.¹⁸ As regards Asuri it may be mentioned that, he is one of the teachers whose name is mentioned in the Vansa Brahmana at the end of the 6th Chapter of Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. All these 3 teachers were revered by the orthodox Vaidikas as theistic and not atheistic. Though there is a controversy and doubt among several European scholars about the historic existence of the said personages, yet from sources of contemporary literature it appears that there is no reason for doubting the correctness of the said tradition, and that the verse in the Sankhya Karika quoted above reiterating the same teachers and in the same order is a merely versified form of the statement of Panchasikha, whose views were more akin to the Vedanta of the Upanishads. The original Sankhya, as taught by its founder Kapila, the perfected sage, as well as the other teachers mentioned above, was theistic as contrasted with that taught by Isvara Krishna in the Sankhya Karika known as the classical Sankhya which was atheistic. The classical Sankhya was clearly of a later age. It has eliminated the 26th principle Isvara, God, though recognised in the Yogasutra of Patanjali, and has

16. Y.S. 1-25.

17. S.K. v. 70.

18. S.K. v. 21.

enumerated 25 categories only, including 23 emanations of Prakriti (nature), and 2 eternal principles of Prakriti (nature) and Purusa (spirit) set against one another. Mr. Keith¹⁹ in this connection observes, "With this accords the fact brought out by Professor Jacobi, that the presence in the list of Rishis invoked in the Tarpana ceremonial (daily religious practice of the Orthodox Brahmanas) includes names of Sankhya authorities (viz.: the teachers Kapila, Asuri and Panchasikha), and that at one time the Sankhya appears to have been studied in communities based on the same principles as Vedic schools, whose members were united by the ideal of attaining self-perfection by spiritual discipline."

First Stage of the Sankhya in the Upanishads in the form of fragmentary elements and ideas

The first stage of the Sankhya is traced in the Upanishads where we find some of its doctrines scattered here and there in a fragmentary stage, and from which it has grown as a system, which was later on built and developed as an extreme carrying out of the realistic tendency, whose appearance and gradually increasing influence are traced within the Upanishads. Yet it differs from the Upanishads in respect of its essential doctrines, and even goes beyond the teaching of the Upanishads in propounding its later tenets, viz., the reality of the emanations of Prakriti (nature), the plurality of Purusas, and the negation of an Isvara or world-projecting deity. The Upanishads are essentially devoted to the discovery of the highest spiritual principle, Brahman the Absolute, and the doctrine of spiritual unity as opposed to Sankhya dualism. "There are, however, (in the Upanishads) elements here and there which mark the growth of ideas which later were thrown into systematic form in the Sankhya, but it is impossible to see in these fragmentary hints any indication that the Sankhya philosophy was then in process of formation."²⁰

A brief summary of the leading tenets of the later Sankhya teaching

It is proposed to give here a brief summary of the leading points of the later Sankhya teaching contained in the classical Sankhya, since this is essential for a proper understanding of the following discussion as to the origin of the Sankhya doctrines.

19. The Sankhya System p. 22.

20. The Sankhya System, p. 7.

The fundamental doctrine of the Sankhya which distinguishes it from the Vedanta is the dualism²¹ of Puruṣa (spirit) and Prakṛiti or Pradhana (material nature) as two entirely distinct principles, which appear closely connected together from eternity as knowing subject and objective existence opposed to it. But no attempt is made to derive them from a higher principle of unity like Brahman (the Absolute) of the Vedanta or to trace them back to it. The sufferings of existence are dependent on this apparent connection, the removal of which is the proper aim of man as laid down in the Sankhya. This object is attained as soon as the Puruṣa recognises its entire distinctness from the Prakṛiti.²² Once this saving knowledge has been gained, none of the sufferings of the universe are any longer its sufferings. Deliverance is found in the dissolution of the bond between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. Deliverance does not concern the Puruṣa but the Prakṛiti, whence is derived the strange assertion that not Puruṣa but the Prakṛiti only is fettered, is a wanderer and is delivered.²³ The process of deliverance is to be conceived as individual. The Prakṛiti, in order to bring about in the Puruṣa the recognition of its distinctness and therewith its own release, unfolds itself repeatedly before the eye of the Puruṣa. This unfoldment consists in the evolution²⁴ of the Mahan (the great i.e., the intellect) from Prakṛiti as the first move; and thereafter, in the evolution of Ahankara (individuation) from the Mahan, and from the Ahankara on the one hand Manas (mind) and the 10 Indriyas (organs of sense and action), and on the other hand the 5 tanmatras (subtle elements) and from these finally the 5 bhutas (elements). The 18 first products of Prakṛiti viz., Mahan, Ahankara, Manas, Indriyas (10) and Tanmatras (5) form the subtle body (lingam),²⁵ which envelopes the soul and accompanies it in all its wanderings until there is spiritual knowledge or discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti.²⁶ All lingas originate from the one Prakṛiti, which consists of 3 Gunas (which means constituents or factors of Prakṛiti and not qualities) viz., Sattvam (the light which reveals and causes pleasure to man), Rajas (the active, the strenuous, the emotional which impels and moves) and Tamas (the dark, the gloomy, the inert, which pro-

21. S. K. v. 37, 64, 68.

22. S. S. 6-67 to 70.

23. S. K. v. 62.

24. S. K. v. 3, 22; S. S. 1-61.

25. S. K. v. 40; S. S. 3-4, 5, 9.

26. S. K. v. 63, 64, 68.

duces indifference and inactivity); and the different qualities of the lingas depend upon the different combinations of the three gunas. Every life-history is a new self-unfolding of the Prakṛiti before the Puruṣa conceived by means of the lingam. The more closely this system is investigated, the more unsatisfactory and incomprehensible from a philosophical point of view will it be found to be. The whole becomes intelligible for the first time when we regard it as the final resultant and the blending together of very heterogeneous ideas which have been handed down from earlier times and the origin of which is detailed below.

Origin of Sankhya Dualism

As there can be only one God and no more, so it is involved in the nature of a philosophical principle to be a unity from which the variety of the phenomenal universe is derived. It follows that Monism is the natural standpoint of philosophy. The Sankhya doctrine is to be conceived as the consequence of a natural disintegration of the doctrine of the Upaniṣads.²⁷ The main teaching of the Upaniṣads consists in absolute idealism, and it establishes the identity of the individual self with the absolute self, and the illusoriness of the empirical world of names and forms. In its pantheistic form, which allowed a certain reality to the phenomenal world from a relative point of view, it asserted that Brahman created the universe and then entered into it.²⁸ The individual soul is in no respect different from Brahman, but is the very Brahman itself. Individuality as well as plurality of souls is mere appearance and not real, from a philosophical point of view; though it has phenomenal existence in fact and a relative reality. This appearance however was transferred to reality, as the method of empirical knowledge gained acceptance. Pantheism in course of time became theism, according to which the individual soul makes its appearance over against the supreme soul with a reality of its own; and the result is the plurality of individual souls,—the first dogma which divides the Sankhya from the Vedanta. A further consequence of theism is atheism. The division of the Atman (self) into supreme and individual souls led to the destruction of one branch, viz., the supreme soul, since it had derived its vital force solely from the Atman (self) existing in the individual, Puruṣa (spirit), which indeed alone exists. After its separation

27. S. S. 5-61 to 69.

28. T. U. 2-6.

from the latter, it could only with difficulty be maintained at all. No more was necessary than to transfer the creative powers (the *gunas*, viz., *Sattvam*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*) to matter itself, and God became superfluous. The *Svetasvatara Upaniṣad* protests in vain against the realistic tendency, in vain asserts that it is divine power that lies hidden in its own *gunas*,²⁹ that the threads of the web of the *Pradhana* proceed only from God,³⁰ that indeed the entire *Prakriti* is only an illusion (*Māya*) wrought by God³¹ (*Maheśvara*). When the existence of God was no longer certified by the individual spirit, *Puruṣa*, the attestation of Him in general ceased to be strong enough to prevent his being abandoned by the unscrupulous realism of the *Sankhya*. In this way, from the ancient trinity of God, universe and soul as aspects of *Brahman*,³² which was in reality a unity, a dualism of *Prakriti* and *Puruṣa* originated. It is true that the dualistic conception of *Puruṣa* (subject-self) and *Prakriti* (object or not-self) is natural; yet really the two are not entirely distinct. If the two are really independent principles, a *tertium quid*, a third principle, would be required as a medium to connect the two, but for which no provision is made in the *Sankhya*; nor is any satisfactory explanation given as to the origin of movement or activity in creation. The real truth is found in the *Vedānta* which asserts that the two seemingly opposed principles of *Puruṣa* (subject) and *Prakriti* (object) are aspects of one ultimate consciousness called *Brahman*, the Absolute. Failure to recognise this ultimate unity is a fundamental mistake of the *Sankhya*.³³

Origin of the Evolutionary Series

As early as the cosmogony of the *Rigveda*, there usually appears at the head of the development of the universe, a triad of first principles. Thus it is stated in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* of the *Rigveda*³⁴ that (1) the primal being, all-pervading spirit (*Puruṣa*), evolves from out of himself (2) primitive matter, (*Nirat*, which is a female principle); and (3) himself takes form in the latter as the first born of creation (*Ādi Puruṣa*, *Hiranyagarbha*, *Brahma*). The same three principles are called in the *Nasadiya Sūkta* of the

29. S. U. 1-3.

30. S. U. 6-10.

31. S. U. 4-10.

32. S. U. 1-7, 12.

33. *Ind. Ph.* by Radhakrishnan vol. ii, p. 328.

34. R. V. 10-90.

Rig-Veda,³⁵ (1) *Tad ekam*, (that one impersonal Primal Being), (2) *Apraketam Salilam* (indistinguishable water, i.e., primitive matter), and (3) *Tadajayataikam* (that one who was born, i.e., *Hiranyagarbha*). This series of the three first principles is the ultimate basis of the three highest principles of the *Sankhya*, viz., (1) *Puruṣa* (spirit), (2) *Prakriti* (nature), and (3) *Mahan, Buddhi* (intellect). It may however be stated here that the *Puruṣa* in consequence of its division into supreme and individual souls, and the subsequent inevitable destruction of the first, i.e., the Primal Being, God, continues to exist only in its derivatives, the individual souls. The individual souls, being derivatives, are no longer the first principle, but appear contrasted from *Prakriti*. An early foreshadowing of this view may be found already in the *Bṛihadaranyaka Upaniṣad*,³⁶ where it is said: "This only 'food' (*Anna*) and 'Eater' (*Annada*) is this entire universe". These words are interpreted as *Prakriti* and *Puruṣa* in the oldest exposition of the *Sankhya* philosophy known to us. This origin of the three highest principles of *Sankhya* explains also the phenomenon which was formerly unintelligible, that the intellectual element after having been assigned to the *Puruṣa* (the knowing subject), and thereafter apparently dissolved, reappears on the objective side as *Buddhi* or *Mahan*, the great. This term appears to be masculine and is found as early as the *Upaniṣads*, being called "*Risirbrahmamayo Mahan*",³⁷ "*Ātma Mahan*",³⁸ and "*Agryan Puruṣam Mahantam*",³⁹ meaning "The First arisen great *Puruṣa*" identified with *Hiranyagarbha*,⁴⁰ *Risim Prasutam Kapilam Agre Jayamanam*,⁴¹ and the *Brahmanam*,⁴² to whom the Primal Being delivered the *Vedas*, and from whom ancient wisdom has issued forth. *Hiranyagarbha* is further described in the *Rigveda*⁴³ as the first born from the primeval waters. A comparison of these passages proves that *Hiranyagarbha*, the first born, the intelligent principle of the universe, the mind, as sustainer of the phenomenal universe and divested of the mythological form, comes forth in the *Sankhya* as the *Mahan*, the cosmic *Buddhi* (intellect), from the

35. R. V. 10-129.

36. B. U. 1-4-6.

37. Kau. U. 1-7.

38. K. U. 3-1, 13 and 6-7.

39. S. U. 3-19.

40. S. U. 3-4, 4-12.

41. S. U. 5-2.

42. S. U. 6-18.

43. R. V. 10-121.

Prakriti. From this, Ahankara as the principle of individuation is evolved, on which again depend the organs of knowledge (Manas and ten Indriyas) and their objects (five Tanmatras and five Bhutas, elements). By its entrance into the lingam (the psychical organism), the Mahan or Buddhi acquires a psychical significance as the organ of judgment by the side of its original cosmic being. Thus we have 25 principles for cosmic evolution in the classical Sankhya.⁴⁴ This evolution proceeds from Prakriti or Pradhana, the first principle, by union with Purusa which is never evolved from Prakriti but independent of it. The mind is the first emanation out of Prakriti.

Whether the Sankhya Prakriti as an independent first principle, Avyakata, is derived from a Vedic text in the Katha Upanisad

The Sankhyas deny the existence of the Supreme Spirit, and propound the view that it is not the Supreme Being of the Upanisads but Prakriti or Pradhana (nature) called *Avyakta* in the Upanisads, an independent first principle, which evolves the world by a series of emanations twenty-three in number. They rely on the following passage of the Katha Upanisad⁴⁵ in support of this thesis:—

"The objects are beyond the senses, the mind beyond the objects, the intellect beyond the mind and the great soul beyond the intellect."

"The undeveloped principle is beyond the great soul, and Purusa the self is beyond the undeveloped principle. Beyond Purusa there is nothing; that is the goal, that is the final term".

The Sankhyas hold that the undeveloped principle (*Avyakta*) is their Prakriti or Pradhana. Sankaracharya, in his commentary on Brahmasutras,⁴⁶ after critically examining the above-mentioned view, has controverted it, and proved from the context that the undeveloped principle (*Avyakta*) in the Katha Upanisad is not the Pradhana of the Sankhyas, but Maya which is the subtle cosmic body of God, out of which all things emanate. The Upanisad passage gives an allegory in which the soul is compared to a passenger

44. S.K. v. 3, 22, S.S. 1-61.

45. K.U. 3-10, 11.

46. Br. s. 1-4-1 to 7.

seated in a chariot driven to reach the goal of life's journey, identified with the abode of Visnu, the Supreme, which is known to be one and the only self. The body is compared to a chariot and stands for *Avyakta*, the undeveloped principle. It is also called *Aksara* in the Mundaka Upanisad, where it means the power of the Lord to manifest and actualise the appearances of the phenomenal world from their unmanifest and undeveloped state. In the Vedanta, the undeveloped principle or Maya is the creative power of the Lord. It is never independent of the Lord, nor is it a self-subsisting principle as in the Sankhya.

Origin of the Doctrine of the three Gunas and their Development in the Gita

The most characteristic feature of the Sankhya system is the doctrine of the three gunas,⁴⁷ viz. Sattvam (goodness), Rajas (passion) and Tamas (darkness), which constitute the very substance of Prakriti or Pradhana. The Sankhya system attributes the evolution of Prakriti to the activity on the part of the three Gunas of which it is composed. In the unmanifest they lie in equilibrium.⁴⁸ Set moving, they evolve Mahan, i.e., Buddhi (intellect), Ahankara (individuation), and the rest,⁴⁹ and it is their interaction and relative proportion in things that cause the manifold differences of character and function in the world. Gita develops the guna idea very completely. It is the gunas born of Prakriti⁵⁰ that compel all creatures to act.⁵¹ He whose self is deluded by ego thinks, I am the doer; the Gunas are themselves the sole agents;⁵² they deceive Purusa⁵³ and bind him to the body.⁵⁴ Prakriti which is the aggregate of the three gunas is in essence nothing but a germinal principle from which the entire expanse of the phenomenal world of names and forms is evolved. The three gunas are all-pervading and eternal,⁵⁵ and in a state of perfect equilibrium prior to evolution.⁵⁶ They are involved in all existences whether

47. S.K. v. 12 to 16, S.S. 1-61.

48. S.K. v. 16; S.S. 1-61.

49. S.K. v. 22; S.S. 1-61.

50. B.G. 3-5; 13-19; 14-5, 18-40.

51. B.G. 3-5.

52. B.G. 3-27.

53. B.G. 3-29; 7-12 to 14.

54. B.G. 14, 5.

55. S.K. v. 10; S.S. 1-67, 68.

56. S.K. v. 18; S.S. 1-61.

material or psychical, which are evolved from the various combinations of the gunas. The Sankhyas see in the preponderance of any one of the three gunas or constituents the first cause of movement and activity in Prakriti, in fact the beginning of creation. The moral character of a man depends on the expansion of the Sattva guna, and control of the Rajas and tamas gunas; and unless one transcends the three gunas by knowledge and renunciation, one cannot achieve perfect freedom or a state of aloofness (Kaivalya). Character and duty according to Gita depend on them, and vary according to their proportion in each being.⁵⁷ The wise man's aim is to rise through and beyond the Gunas,⁵⁸ to live an eternal life of perfect freedom during life (jivanmukta) as well as on leaving the mortal body (videha mukta). The gunas are not what their name might suggest viz., qualities; but they are constituents of Prakriti, which is in essence nothing but potentiality or active latent force called Avyakta. The gunas have been again and again explained as *Dravyani*, i.e., the very essence of substance, quality and what is qualified being considered in the Sankhya as inseparable. The gunas have played a very prominent part in Indian Philosophy, and have even entered into the sphere of popular thought.

Teleological Conception of Prakriti Inconsistent with the Sankhya Doctrine of Dualism

The gunas are so-called because they make a rope (guna) or forge a chain for binding the self.⁵⁹ This explanation is however inconsistent with the Sankhya teleological doctrine that Prakriti not only binds, but also liberates the self from bondage, which is the ultimate purpose of evolution.⁶⁰ This goes to show that the Sankhya was only a derivation from the Vedanta, according to which spirit or self was primeval, while Prakriti or Maya made of the three gunas was subsidiary and a means for the purpose of emancipation of the individual soul (Purusa).

How far the Sankhya Doctrine of the three gunas is based on the text in the Svetasvatara Upanisad with an Imagery of Aja (She Goat) with three colours

The Sankhyas contend that their doctrine of the origin and evolution of the world from Prakriti or Pradhana is derived from

57. B. G. 4-13; 14-5 to 18, B. G. ch. 17 and 18 *passim*.

58. B. G. 2-45; 14-20.

59. S. K. v. 44, 63; S. S. 1-61.

60. S. K. v. 56 to 60, 62.

the Upanisads, and they rely upon the following passage from the Svetasvatara Upanisad⁶¹ in support of their contention:—

“The one she-goat red, white and black gives birth to many offspring like herself. One he-goat in love embraceth her, the other leaveth her when he hath enjoyed”.

This passage is discussed by Sankara in his commentary on the Brahmasutras.⁶² He seeks to see in the three colours red, white and black a reference to the three colours mentioned in the Chhandogya Upanisad⁶³ as those of the three elements there mentioned viz: fire, water and earth, which are produced from the Absolute, and which are present in all that exists. This view seems to be correct as stated by Mr. Keith because the resemblance in point of the colours is too striking to be an accident. But the passage, in the opinion of Mr. Keith, must also be admitted to have clear traces of what is later the doctrine of the classical Sankhya, for the following reasons stated by him. The imagery of the many he-goats and the relation of enjoyment followed by relinquishment is parallel to the simile used in the classical Sankhya to illustrate the relation of spirit and nature. Moreover, the she-goat is named Aja, which also denotes the unborn, a fact which coincides with the Sankhya conception that the first principle (nature) is not a product. The Sankhya conception of the all-pervading character of the gunas which in diverse measure are present in all the products of nature is as well suited to the description of the progeny of the she-goat as the view of the Chhandogya Upanisad. “It is therefore only reasonable to assume” observed Mr. Keith,⁶⁴ “that we have a clear hint of the origin of the doctrine of the gunas in the threefold material of the Chhandogya Upanisad and there is nothing in this passage nor in the others,⁶⁵ where the gunas are mentioned, to suggest that the gunas are anything other than elements as in the Chhandogya Upanisad”.⁶⁶ Sankaracharya however in his commentary on the Brahma Sutra has denied that the above-cited text of the Svetasvatara Upanisad,⁶⁷ giving the imagery of the she-goat and the he-

61. S. U. 4-5.

62. Br. S. 1-4-3 to 10.

63. Ch. U. 6-4.

64. The Sankhya System p. 12.

65. S. U. 1-3; 5-7; 6-3, 11, 16; Br. S. 1-4-8 to 10.

66. Br. S. 1-4-8 to 10.

67. S. U. 4-5.

goats, is sufficient to prove that the doctrine of Pradhana as an independent first principle has any Vedic justification or represents the view of the Vedanta. According to Sankara, the one unborn she-goat is not the Sankhya Prakriti independent of spirit, but it is Maya or Sakti, the creative power of the Lord, the world-projecting deity, from whom it is never independent or separate. The Chhandogya Upanisad teaches how this creative power of the Lord, the potentiality of names and forms of the phenomenal world which is to be evolved, is developed into fire, water and earth, out of which the bodies of plants, animals and men are fashioned. The unborn souls are not the Purusas of the Sankhya, but the jivas or migrating souls of the Vedanta, who identify themselves with natural products such as body, mind, senses, or external objects, which are Upadhis or limiting adjuncts, born of Prakriti by their inborn ignorance (Avidya), which is the cause of their attachment and consequent transmigration.⁶⁸ The Prakriti of the Sankhya is Maya of the Vedanta, which is nothing but illusion produced by the Absolute or the Lord (Mahesvara) as stated in the Svetasvatara Upanisad.⁶⁹ Maya of the Vedanta is called *Trigunatmika*, and is described in the same way as the Pradhana or Prakriti of the Sankhya. It is the creative power of the Absolute or the Lord. It is impossible to have a vision of the Lord until we pierce the veil of Maya and its three gunas by meditation and self-discipline as stated in the Svetasvatara Upanisad.⁷⁰ The Supreme soul becomes the individual soul, the Vijnanatma or Purusa, when its essential nature of pristine purity is reflected in the three gunas of Maya.

Divergent interpretations of the Text by Badarayana and Sankara

Sankara's explanation in his commentary on the Brahmasutras of the term Aja presents no difficulties; for, Maya is Aja, i.e. the unborn power of the Lord which is primeval and not produced. On the other hand Badarayana, the author of *Brahma Sutras*,⁷¹ feels a difficulty in reconciling the divergent meanings of the word Aja, and he says that the word Aja cannot be understood in the sense of unborn, because the elements fire, water and earth being the three constituents of Prakriti or Maya are produced. Hence

68. B. G. 13-21.

69. S. U. 4-10.

70. S. U. 1-2.

71. Br. S. 1-4-8 to 10.

according to Badarayana, we are thrown back on the Rudha (conventional) as opposed to the etymological (Yaugika) significance of the word Aja, which means she-goat. But the first three elements which are produced constitute only a secondary, i.e., Avantara Prakriti, and not a primeval and unborn first principle called Prakriti or Pradhana by the Sankhyas. Badarayana,⁷² the sutra writer, when confronted with the difficulty of reconciling two divergent meanings of the word Aja opposed to one another, gives another explanation; and he uses the word Aja for the three gunas to denote a she-goat in a metaphorical sense, although it is not a she-goat, and to mean really the causal material just as the word *Madhu* (honey) is used in the sense of the Sun metaphorically though it does not mean a sun, and the word *Vak* (speech) in the sense of a cow (*Dhenu*) metaphorically although it is not a cow. Mr. Gough⁷³ in this connection observes as follows: "The Vedantins have no motive in identifying the red, white, and black with the colours of fire, water and earth, rather than with pain, pleasure and indifference. Sankaracharya's exposition is certainly the natural, no less than the traditional and authoritative interpretation of the text. In fact the teaching of the Svetasvatara is precisely the same as that of the other Upanisads."

The Origin of the Sankhya doctrine of Gunas from the psychic states of individual soul

The Gunas in the Upanisads originally meant nothing else than elements as stated in the Chhandogya Upanisad. The names *Sattvam*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* do not occur until the *Maitrayani Upanisad* which is of a much later date. The *Svetasvatara Upanisad* represents a definite development of the doctrine of the Absolute based on the other Upanisads, from which in due course, the classical Sankhya developed. The Sankhya doctrine of 3 gunas of Prakriti was probably derived from the three psychic states, viz., happiness, pain, and indifference of the individual soul, enveloped in the meshes of Maya or Avidya (ignorance). As regards the origin of the 3 gunas of Prakriti, Mr. Keith⁷⁴ observes: "It is not impossible that the subjective side of the gunas (*Sattvam*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*) meaning thereby *Sukha* (pleasure) *Dukkha* (pain) and *Moha* (indifference), which is clearly marked in these names

72. Br. S. 1-4-10.

73. *Philosophy of the Upanisads* by Mr. Gough.

74. *The Sankhya System* p. 12.

and which originally prevails in the classical Sankhya,⁷⁵ was a development from the conception that the individual self was the result of the envelopment of the Absolute in the three gunas though originally referring to material products. Still the tendency would be to see in them psychic states." This position is accepted by Sankara who however identifies the three gunas of Prakriti with the three constituents of Maya in the Bhagavadgita,⁷⁶—"attachment to which is the cause of birth of the Purusha in good and evil wombs."

Origin of the Doctrine of Emancipation

Both the Vedanta⁷⁷ and the Sankhya⁷⁸ proclaim as their fundamental view the proposition: "Deliverance is gained by knowledge". This proposition is in harmony throughout with the assumptions of the Vedanta, but not with those of the Sankhya. According to the doctrine of Absolute Idealism of the Upanisads, the Brahman-Atman alone is real, while the manifold universe is an illusion (Maya). This illusion is penetrated through the awakening of knowledge, and it is in this that deliverance consists. Thus all is perfectly consistent in the Vedanta. It is however otherwise in the Sankhya. Here matter is as truly real as the soul, and therefore cannot be recognised by the latter as an illusion as in the Vedanta. The illusion which has to be penetrated is concerned in this case solely with the union between Prakriti and Purusa. This however cannot be sustained from a philosophical point of view. For a union either really subsists or it does not. If it is real, no advance of knowledge can lead to dissolution of the union, but at the most to a clear consciousness of it, whereby, however, it is still far from being dissolved. The keen sword of knowledge can cleave the mist of an illusion, but cannot sever an actually existing union. If on the other hand, the union between the two realities Purusa and Prakriti is not real, it has no existence at all. It is then not true that Purusa enlightens Prakriti, nor is it true that "Prakriti is reflected in Purusa,"⁷⁹ and this illumination or reflection may not be employed to explain the phenomenon of suffering, for it does not itself exist.

75. S.K. v. 11, 12.

76. B.G. 7-14; 13-21.

77. T.U. 2-1; ch. U. 7-1-3; S.U. 1-11; 2-15; 3-8; 4-16; 5-16.

78. S.K. v. 63, 64 to 68; S.S. 3-23, 24.

79. S.K. v. 20, 21, S.S. 1-145; 6-27, 28.

Sankhya Pessimism testifies to the derivative character of its Theory of Emancipation

The pessimism also by which the Sankhya system is dominated testifies to the derivative character of its theory of emancipation. Even the ancient Upanishads occasionally refer to the painful nature of existence; and according to them the possibility of suffering disappears on knowledge of the unity of the Supreme Self. This however is still only an indirect result, and the chief stress is laid on the deliverance from natural avidya by knowledge of the Atman. In the Upanisads there is no general pessimism visible in the earlier expositions of the doctrine. The marked pessimism in the Maitrayani Upanisad⁸⁰ in the speech of Brihad-ratha is a clear indication of its posteriority due to the influence of Buddhism. The underlying view of the Upanisads is that the Atman (self) in itself is perfect joy and bliss, and that all else is filled with trouble, as the Brahadaranyaka Upanisad⁸¹ says. There is indeed no lack of references to old age and trouble. But it is one thing to admit this, and quite another to hold that the general tone of the Upanisads is pessimistic. Rather the joy of the discovery of the new knowledge is the characteristic of the teachers, while they regard the self as in itself Bliss as stated in the Brihadaranyaka Upanisad.⁸² In the opinion of Mr. Keith,⁸³ "since the knowledge of the self is open to all and since by that knowledge Bliss is obtained, the older Upanisads could not be and are not pessimistic." The climax of the pessimistic movement is reached in the Sankhya system which regards philosophy as a whole as no more than a search for means to avert the threefold misery.⁸⁴ Such a standpoint is everywhere a symptom of exhaustion. Philosophy is originally based on a pure desire for knowledge and knows no other aim than search for truth. Only when this desire is weakened does philosophy become a mere means to an end, a remedy for the suffering of existence. This was the case in Greece in the schools that succeeded Aristotle, and it was so also in India in the Sankhya system and in Buddhism.

80. Mai v. 1-3, 4.

81. B.U. 3-9-28, 3-4-2, 3-5-1, 3-7-23.

82. B.U. 3-9-28.

83. The Sankhya system, p. 19.

84. S.K. v. 1; S.S. 1-1.

II

Second Stage of the Sankhya-Yoga in the progress of formation in the Mahabharata and the Bhagavatgita, midway between the Vedas and the later classical Sankhya

For the first time we find the doctrines of Sankhya as fragments mentioned in the Mahabharata⁸⁵ in the process of formation side by side with the orthodox systems. The Mahabharata⁸⁶ refers to the philosophies of Sankhya and Yoga as two eternal ancient systems (dve anadi sanatane), taught by Kapila the founder of the Sankhya and Hiranyagarbha the founder of the Yoga respectively. They were then not separated. The Sankhya is mentioned in the Mahabharata⁸⁷ as the highest truth and is theistic with a belief in God as the 26th principle, in addition to 25 principles as taught in the classical Sankhya later on. The Sankhya with Yoga formed one comprehensive system called Sankhya-Yoga in the Svetasvatara Upanisad,⁸⁸ having the meanings of knowledge and devotion with religious discipline respectively. In the Gita,⁸⁹ the Sankhya method of knowledge with renunciation and the Yoga method of devotion with self-discipline are not mutually opposed but are interrelated as theory and practice, which imply each other. Though the Sankhya method of knowledge with renunciation, apart from practice and devotion, is recognised in the Gita⁹⁰ as a means to release, yet Krishna exhorts his pupil to prefer the method of Yoga⁹¹ (works with devotion) as the easier and more successful method for self-purification, without which the method of Sankhya-knowledge is more difficult. At one place in the Gita,⁹² Sankhya has been interpreted by Sankara as Vedanta meaning by it knowledge which leads to release. The Sankhya however in the epic and Gita was in process of formation only, and it differed from the classical Sankhya in certain respects as will be presently pointed out.

85. M.B. 12, 349-67.

86. M.B. 12-349-76.

87. M.B. 12-111-98.

88. S.U. 6-13.

89. B.G. 5-4, 5.

90. B.G. 8-3; 12-3; 4; 13-24.

91. B.G. 5-6; 11-55; 12-2, 5.

92. B.G. 18-13.

How the Sankhya in the Epic and the Gita differs from the Classical Sankhya of later date

It may be mentioned here that when the Bhagavadgita was compiled, Sankhya doctrines were afloat but had not been reduced to a regular system as in the Karika of Isvara Krishna of later date. The word Sankhya is used in the Gita and the epic more in the sense of theoretical knowledge, and not merely that of an enumeration of the categories of Prakriti as in the classical Sankhya. Again knowledge in the Gita is of a different kind from that in the classical Sankhya,⁹³ where it means abstract knowledge of the difference between spirit (Purusha) and nature (Prakriti): according to the Gita,⁹⁴ *jñāna* (knowledge) was of the spiritual unity of all, and the identity of the individual soul and the supreme soul in essence. The practice of Yoga in the epic as well as the Gita involved, a belief in the Supreme Being for whom there was no place in the classical Sankhya. In the Epic and the Gita there is no categorical enumeration of the twenty-five categories. Again, while in the classical Sankhya, Prakriti (nature) was the first principle, it was not so in the Bhagavadgita⁹⁵ which recognised the Absolute or impersonal Brahman as the first principle from which all the twenty-three principles emanated. The Prakriti in the Gita as in the Vedanta meant Maya, which was a creative power of the Lord, and was never an independent or self-subsisting principle as in the Sankhya. It is called *Apara Prakriti* in the seventh chapter of the Gita,⁹⁶ and identified with Maya, which means the power of the Lord; and it was differentiated into eight parts, viz., the five elements, *Ahankara* (egoistic individuation), *Buddhi* (intellect), and *manas* (mind), thus showing that the last three principles had been evolved simultaneously along with the five elements. Again in Chapter 13 of the Gita⁹⁷ there is a mention of twenty-four categories, but they are not the same as the twenty-four principles mentioned in the Sankhya Karika,⁹⁸ nor are they mentioned in the order in which they are supposed to have come into existence. Again no mention is made in the Gita of the five *Tanmatras* (five essences of elements) seen in the Sankhya Karika. Lastly, *Mahat*, the great, being the first evolute in the

93. S.K. v. 64.

94. B.G. 7-19, 13-2.

95. B.G. 7-6, 10-8.

96. B.G. 7-4, 5.

97. B.G. 13-5.

98. S.K. v. 22.

classical Sankhya, is not mentioned in the Gita⁹⁹ except as a female principle in conjunction with Brahman, from which as a matrix the world evolves. All this goes to show that the Sankhya theory of cosmogony was then in the process of formation only, and had not appropriated to itself the meanings of the technical terms as in the classical Sankhya. It can thus be easily seen from the above, that the Bhagavadgita and the Epic contain an earlier fragmentary phase of the Sankhya doctrine, from which the Sankhya fully developed as a system in the Sankhya Karika of Isvara Krishna later on.

III

The third and the last phase in the development of the later Classical Sankhya and Yoga

The Epic of the Mahabharata and the Bhagavadgita represent the middle and second stage from which the classical Sankhya in the Karika of Isvara Krishna (400 A.D.) developed as a regular system and as the third and last phase. The classical Sankhya was atheistic and differed from the Sankhya of Kapila, the founder, which resembled the Vedanta of the Upanisads and was not atheistic. The original Sankhya of Kapila was embodied in a smṛiti work called Kapila Sastra by Sankaracharya, who in the Gita¹⁰⁰ has considered the same as authoritative, so far as it concerns Gunas and their experiencer (Bhokta). The original work however is not available to us at present, as it was destroyed by time (Kalavipluta) as stated in the Bhagavatpurana.¹⁰¹

The Classical Sankhya as formulated in the Sankhya Karika of Isvara Krishna and the later Sankhya

With the Sankhya Karika of Isvara Krishna, we emerge from the region of conjecture and doubt and arrive at the classical statement of the doctrine of the Sankhya Philosophy. It is the oldest exposition of the doctrine in a systematic form. The period of Isvara Krishna is stated to be in the fourth century A.D., when his activity finds an appropriate setting in the great revival of Indian studies under the Gupta dynasty, due to an effort to con-

99. B.G. 14-3, 4.

100. B.G. 18-19.

101. Bh. p. 1-3-10.

102. S.K. v. 1; S.S. 1-1.

fute the heretical doctrine of the void (sunya) of the Buddhists. According to the Karika, the end of Sankhya philosophy is to discover the means of removing the threefold miseries of the world. The practice of religion is insufficient without knowledge of the principles of evolution of the Sankhya, and without a knowledge of discrimination between Purusha and Prakriti.¹⁰³ The union of Purusha (spirit) with Prakriti (nature) is believed to be the cause of transmigration of souls from which one is not freed without knowledge or discrimination. The conjunction of the two principles is essentially not intended to be permanent. It is like the union of a blind man with a lame man.¹⁰⁴ There are serious difficulties in this conception of the Sankhya. The twenty-five principles of the system¹⁰⁵ were made up of twenty-three categories which are evolved from Prakriti in a fixed order by union with Purusha. New technical terms and meanings also seem to have been given in the Karika to some of these principles. The latest work on the Sankhya is Sankhya Sutra (1400 A.D.). It is later than Madhva (1350 A.D.) who has not mentioned the system in his Sarvadersana Sangraha. The sutras differ from the Karika on certain points. The sutras were under the influence of the Vedanta. There are two commentaries thereon, viz., of Aniruddha 1400 A.D., and of Vijñānabikshu (1600 A.D.)

Origin of the Classical Yoga against the heretical doctrine of idealism of the Buddhists

Though the practice of Yoga was developed in the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali later on, yet Yoga in the sense of ascetic practices and meditations existed in India in very ancient times and is even traced in the Rig Veda.¹⁰⁶ We also find the first fragments of this system in the Katha,¹⁰⁷ Svetasvatara¹⁰⁸ and Maitrayani¹⁰⁹ Upanisads, and its rise there belongs to the time when the original idealism of the Upanisad teaching began to harden into the realistic philosophy of the Sankhya. The Yoga Sutra seems to attack the doctrine of the Vijñānavadi Buddhists (subjective idealists) under the leadership of Vasubandhu and Asanga (400 A.D.). It could not therefore be older than the latter, and probably it is younger,

103. S.K. v. 22, 64, 66, 68.

104. S.K. v. 21.

105. S.K. v. 3, 22.

106. R.V. 10-136.

107. K.U. ch. 3 and 6.

108. S.U. ch. 2 and 4.

109. Mai. V. ch. 6.

belonging to 500 A.D. The production of the Yoga Sutra was more or less directly motivated by the revival of the Sankhya and a desire of defending its doctrine against the attacks of the idealistic Buddhists.

The Yoga in the Gita based on the Theistic Sankhya of Kapila distinguished from that in the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali

The word Yoga is derived from the root Yuj, to unite, and meant at first union; but the word very early began specially to denote that control, by which alone union with the Supreme could be attained, as in theistic Vedanta and the Gita;¹¹⁰ and when Patanjali (for whom there was no Supreme Being with which to be united) wrote his Yoga Sutras, he defined Yoga as "restraint (nirodha) of the modifications of mind"¹¹¹ as a means to the supreme end of aloofness of spirit (Kaivalya), of which worship of God was only one among other modes. The word Yoga in the classical philosophy of Patanjali and Kapila did not mean union with God as in theistic Vedanta and in the Gita, but it meant separation (Viyoga) or Viveka (discrimination) between Purusha and Prakriti leading to Kaivalya or aloneness as in the classical Sankhya.

110. B. G. 2-48, 50.

111. Y. S. 1-2.

Discussion

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My attention has been drawn to the amusing discussion initiated by Sri P. J. Chaudhuri on my article entitled 'A comparative study in the aesthetic theories of Benedetto Croce and Rabindranath Tagore' published in the Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIII. May I crave the hospitality of the columns of your esteemed journal for extending my thanks to Sri Chaudhuri, a 'sincere student of Tagore', for his taking pains in pointing out that my interpretation of Tagore is 'overhasty and repugnant to any sincere student of Tagore.'

However in the following lines I will make an attempt to answer the questions posed by Sri Chaudhuri in his 'Discussion' published in the Philosophical Quarterly, April 1951.

I wonder that Sri Chaudhuri failed to understand what exactly super-personal reality means. When man aspires as man, he wants to be greater than man, i.e., he wants to exceed himself as mere man. He wants to be a super-personality in the sense of reaching out beyond the normal personality of his work-a-day life. The sense in which I took the word 'super-personality' or 'super-personal reality' is very clear, and could be easily understood even by a casual reader who chanced to go through my article referred to above. Relevant references have been quoted there, and Sri Chaudhuri would have done well to read it over once again before rushing to the press.

Sri Chaudhuri writes: 'He (Tagore) always speaks of art as expression of human personality and human hopes and aspirations.' Instead of dogmatically asserting that Tagore always speaks of expression, if he had quoted his actual words it would have been more to the purpose. As it does not appear whether his statement expresses his own interpretation of Rabindranath or presents a faithful and authentic view of Rabindranath himself, it is not possible to rebut such statements. I may say, however, there is an evident suggestion of art as aiming at something beyond the normal humdrum personality of man, when one talks of art as the expression of man's hopes and aspirations.

Sri Chaudhuri writes: 'Again, even if a super-personal reality be the content of art, how does it obstruct communication?' The supra-personal is necessarily super-normal and can only be hinted at; it can never be really expressed in human language which is our ordinary means of communication. In this sense, all mystical content is unspeakable.

Sri Chaudhuri writes: "This is strange for we all believe that the universal is expressed through the particular, the abstract is concretised in and suggested by the sensuous particular." Does that 'we' in 'we all believe' include every philosopher, and of every school of thought? The Buddhist nominalist or rather the particularist does not believe in the Universal except as a conceptual void (Vikalpa Vṛtti). The Sankarite Absolute is a negation both of the universal and of the particular and is pure undifferentiated consciousness. The universal is expressed through the particular only for the Aristotelians or a Neo-Hegelian like Bosanquet. Even for Plato, the particular is not an expression but only an imperfect imitation of the universal, entailing distortion and falsification of the content imitated. It is surprising that Sri Chaudhuri should make such sweeping observations about universals without reservation or qualification. It does not follow that what he believes to be the real character of the universal should also be subscribed to by philosophers belonging to other schools. Even supposing, however, that the universal is expressed in the particular, as Sri Chaudhuri says, it does not obliterate the distinction between knowing and willing, between contemplation and action. How does Sri Chaudhuri distinguish between the theoretical and the practical attitudes, between intellection and volition? I would refer him to Bradley's *Ethical Studies* which he will do well to carefully go through, specially as regards the analysis of will in the chapters discussing the pleasure theories. The psychological objection to Kant's good will that wills the law universal is that a law cannot be willed at all, willing being particularised in space and time. Knowing is conceptualising the given particular of experience, it is universalising the particular. Willing is particularising the universal, the concretising of the abstract idea into a particular space-time event.

Sri Chaudhuri writes: 'Moreover, as Croce holds, abstract concepts may be intuited'. Sri Chaudhuri should have thought twice before misrepresenting the views of such an eminent thinker as Benedetto Croce. Croce never says that abstract concepts may be intuited. The *a priori* synthesis of intuition may,

however, undergo a further *a priori* synthesis of concepts. But thereby we leave behind the domain of art and enter the domain of logic. Logic is the categorisation of the aesthetic content through concepts.

In the opening lines of the second paragraph of the 'Discussion' Sri Chaudhuri writes: 'Mr. Nandi says, Tagore does not permit the villain to appear in poetry or drama'. Within the small compass of my article referred to above, I nowhere made such a foolish statement. All that I wrote on the point is this: 'Iago', the villain in Shakespeare's 'Othello' and Brian de Bois Gilbert in Scott's 'Ivanhoe' are certainly not types of characters that could be admitted by Tagore in his kingdom of art, if he remained true to his theory'. The theory referred to in the foregoing lines has been elaborately explained in my original paper. I request Sri Chaudhuri to go through the paper once again so that he may not harbour any wrong impression with regard to my views and ideas.

Book-Review

Philosophen-Lexikon: Handwörterbuch der Philosophie nach Personen. By Werner Ziegenfuss and Gertrud Jung. Berlin, Walter De Gruyter & Co., vol. I, 1949, pp. VII + 700, vol. II, 1950, pp. 959. Price DM 75.—

The German scholar has certainly played a leading role in modern historiography of philosophy. Even some 17th—and 18th—century works on the history of philosophy and theology, such as Gottfried Arnold's *Unparteiische Kirchen-und Ketzerhistorie* (1699f) and Dietrich Tiedemann's three volumes on Stoicism (1776) are still readable and of interest. Not only Hegel and Dilthey but also Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Joël were great historians of philosophy and of *Geistesgeschichte* in general. Even works by Johann Eduard Erdmann, Eduard Zeller, Theodor Gomperz, Wilhelm Windelband, Paul Deussen, Richard Falkenberg and Karl Vorländer, which have more the character of hand-books, are much read to the present day and some of them have been translated into several languages. Especially, however, the latest editions of Friedrich Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* rightly enjoy a very high reputation on account of their detailed historical analyses and their extended bibliographical appendices.

In comparison with the five volumes of the "Ueberweg", the two partly volumes of the *Philosophen-Lexikon* just published have far more limited ambitions. According to the title of the work, they do not give any analyses of historical trends of thought, but present only short biographies of philosophers and condensed surveys of their teachings accompanied by select bibliographies. Within these confines, however, the editors have done extremely useful work. As far as the present reviewer can see, they have filled a lacuna in the literature more successfully than have any other contemporary scholars.

As the editors themselves admit, their work has its shortcomings. Perfection is perhaps not attainable at all in such an enterprise and conditions for concentrated scholarly research have certainly not been favorable in Germany for the last two decades. But, fortunately, these volumes do not exhibit any of the gross distortions of historical truth in which Nazi thought ignominiously

excelled, although the editor-in-chief, Werner Ziegenfuss, was an early member of the party. Even in the first fascicles of the work printed in 1937 no marked traces of Nazi spirit are ascertainable.

Nevertheless, the second volume of the "Lexikon", comprising the letters L-Z, contains, on the whole, far more valuable articles and reveals a more mature international outlook than the first part of the work. Evidently the learning and other remarkable scholarly qualities of Gertrud Jung, the collaborator of Ziegenfuss, made themselves more felt in these later articles.

In these two volumes not only philosophers in the technical sense of the term but also poets, statesmen, astronomers, zoologists, economists, physicians, theologians and jurists are liberally included in so far as their work has bearing on philosophy. Naturally the selection in this respect is not altogether above criticism. To speak merely of a few poets, William Blake, Calderon and even Cervantes (whose "Don Quixote" gave rise to a large philosophical literature) are not represented, whereas many minor figures are. And a similar disproportion exists between the number of articles devoted to German speaking thinkers and to thinkers of other countries. German literature predominates to a large extent.

The articles themselves, however, are in general well written. They try to concentrate on essentials, but give variegated and often rich information, their language being neither too technical nor too popularizing. A number of contemporary thinkers themselves—mainly Germans but also some Americans and Russian refugees—contributed summaries of their philosophical views to the "Lexikon".

Yet there is certainly some need for improvement of the work in later editions. As the editors themselves request suggestions in this regard, I should like to mention, for instance, the following points: there are considerable lacunae in the representation of Anglo-Saxon thought. There are missing names such as those of John Harry Bridges, Richard Congreve, John Grote, John Scott Haldane, R. F. A. Hoernlé, Harold Henry Joachim, Sir Henry Jones, W. R. Boyce Gibson, Karl R. Popper, Alan K. Stout, C. D. Broad, E. F. Carritt, H. W. Joseph, Herbert J. Paton, Henry H. Price, Sir W. D. Ross, L. G. Russell, Edgard S. Brightman, Morris R. Cohen, C. J. Ducasse, Rufus M. Jones, Charles W. Hendel, Cornelius Krusé, John Herman Randall Jr., and Herbert W. Schneider. No less regrettable is the omission of names from French contemporary literature; neither Emile Bréhier, Elie

Halévy, Etienne Gilson nor Alexandre Koyré, Louis Lavelle, René Le Senne or Jean Wahl are listed. Of Italian contemporaries, for example, Guido Calogero is not mentioned. As to Latin-American philosophy, the Brazilians Tobias Barreto de Menezes, Luis Pereira Barreto, Raymundo de Farias Brito, the Cuban Enrique José Varona to whom more and more attention is being paid now, Francisco Romero, the leading thinker of contemporary Argentina, Carlos Vaz Ferreira of Uruguay, the Mexicans Antonio Caso, José Gaos, Adolfo Menéndez Samará, Jose Voscorcelos are not named. Of the younger generation, phenomenologists such as Herbert Spiegelberg, the editors of *Analysis*, A. J. Ayer and A. E. Duncan Jones, the Brazilian Eurialo Canabrava, the Argentinian Aníbal Sánchez Reulet and others are not represented.

On the other hand, two articles are devoted to Michael Psellus, one under the heading "Michael", the other under "Psellus", each of them containing information that is missing in the other. Henry More's, G. E. Moore's and J. S. Mill's ethics are rather disregarded in favour of other parts of their theories. Nor is there appropriate attention given to Schleiermacher's and Schelling's esthetics, to Alexander Bain's ethics; and Leslie Stephen's principal work on moral philosophy, *Science of Ethics*, is, strangely enough, listed as "Science and ethics". The very short article on Wolfgang Köhler, the leading gestalt-psychologist, now at Swarthmore College, U.S.A., does not mention his *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*, his most important philosophical work. Nor is there a reference to A. E. Taylor's Gifford Lectures of 1926, his *The Faith of a Moralist*, 1930. The name of Gustav Hartenstein is misprinted and, as it appears only once in the article in question, this misprint may mislead the reader. The author of the most recent valuable writing on Georg Friedrich Daumer is Agnes Kuehne, not Kühn. Of Karl Marx's writings his doctoral dissertation on Democritus and Epicurus ("Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie," 1841) which is of especial philosophical and historical interest, is not listed. There is some confusion in French and English literature about the date of appearance of Bentham's principal work, the *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. But the dates given by Ziegenfuss are certainly erroneous. Bentham's influential book was not printed in 1730 and published in 1780 but printed in 1780 and brought out in 1789.

Thinkers of mystical and romantic trends have generally been treated with especial perceptiveness in the "Lexikon". Still, such articles as those on Meister Eckhart and Franz von Baader are,

in my opinion, too dogmatizing and have other weaknesses. But none of these minor points—some of them very minor and readily improvable—should detract from the general recognition which the "Lexikon" amply deserves.

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