

401

Philosophical Quarterly

April 1953



JL

Qm2, N25

NS3.26.1

123903

286
2.53.

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY


Vol. XXVI, No. 1]

[April, 1953

AN ORGAN
OF
THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
AND
THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

Managing Editor :
PROF. G. R. MALKANI


Editorial Board :
DR. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN
DR. B. L. ATREYA



Yearly Subscription Rs. 4
For Congress Members Rs. 3
Foreign 8 Shillings or 2 Dollars Single copy Re. 1 or 2 Shillings

CONTENTS

To God Through Self by Rev. A. De Mendonca, S.J.	.. 1
Virtue and Virtues by S. G. Hulyalkar	.. 19
The Spirit of Vedantic Philosophy by G. R. Malkani	.. 25
The Standpoint of Philosophy by P. R. Damle	.. 35
The Theories of Drishti-Srishti and Srishti-Drishti by Chandrodaya Bhattacharya	.. 43
Philosophy of Shrimad Rajchandra by D. M. Patel	.. 51



OL

Q.11m2, N25

11-3-26-1



THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXVI, No. 1]

[April, 1953

To God Through Self

(or St. Augustine's proof for the existence of God)

BY

REV. A. DE MENDONCA S.J., PH.D., D.D.

Professor of Philosophy
St. Xavier's College, Bombay

I may know me,
That I may know Thee;
Augustine: Sol. II, 1, 1

Though St. Augustine's mind is multifarious, and his many-sided intellect embraced all branches of learning, and practically controlled the western mind for thirteen centuries and so,¹ we cannot deny that there is a point in his writings to which the great African doctor seems to give particular prominence, namely, the knowledge of God.

Augustine's chief work 'On the Trinity' is not a mere speculative treatise, a dry exposition of Theological doctrines; on the contrary, it is a practical effort to know God 'inwardly'² by following an original method. Almost 7 of the 15 books which make up the whole of this treatise, for the composition of which Augustine spent 15 years, are consecrated to this 'interior' way of knowing God, not to say anything about his discourses, his letters, his commentaries and his earlier treatises. "My whole desire is to know myself and to know God", Augustine writes in his 'Soliloquia', "Nothing else? Absolutely nothing".³ This

double aspiration has evidently a religious and moral bearing, but it is not exaggerated to see in it an index of the method preferred and followed by him in his ascent to God. It is through his own self, through his own mind that Augustine tries to know God; and we may suggest that it was for this reason that in the expression of his most ardent desire, he mentioned the knowledge of the self before the knowledge of God. "Dive deep into the depths of thy own self", again he writes in his book 'On true Religion'; "do not go outside thyself, but return to within thyself; for truth lives in the innermost part of man".⁴

These profound words of Augustine seem to be, indeed, a remote echo of the doctrine of the 'Mahavākya', 'Tat tvam āsi'. In ancient India, as it is well known, the realization of the Absolute was made conditional on the right knowledge of the self; and the perplexities which were born of the various controversies led to the formulation of a number of theories, in connection with the nature of the self, some of which are very similar to those that are still in the forefront of contemporary philosophical thought. On the other hand, it is significant that there is not a single system of western thought worthy of the name, which has not been illustrated and evinced with Augustine's ideas and writings; hence, it is not surprising to see modern critics and historians, eminent philosophers and theologians of diverse opinions, such as Descartes, Pascal, Hegel, Maine de Biran, W. James, M. Blondel, Bergson, Schleiermacher, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Spengler, Toynbee, Ritschel, Hermann, Sabatier and many others, so rigorous and so sparing in eulogy, almost conspiring to extol this incomparable African, and to weave round his brow a perennial crown of praises, Harnack calls him the foremost modern man.

In this equivocal context, in which friend and foe are at one, an inquiry with regard to the positive content of Augustine's thought becomes urgent. In fact, to-day, more than ever, the doctrines of Augustine are being studied, explained, expounded, interpreted, discussed, with more ardour and enthusiasm than would be accorded to a contemporary author. To confirm this fact it is enough to bear in mind the large number of exquisite books which his centenary has provoked throughout the world.

In the interpretation of Augustine's doctrine, besides the difficulty of dealing with a thought which is dispersed and scattered in the immense amount of his writings, there is a further difficulty due to the method he uses in treating his problems.

He seems to resolve them rather 'interiorly' by a kind of sympathy than rationally by the intellect. Perhaps he was conscious of this fact when he defined intelligence as a mere 'sound of the heart,—"*Sonus enim cordis intellectus est.*"⁵

In this short paper I intend to examine only one point, namely, in what way, according to Augustine, the knowledge of the self leads to the knowledge of God. In the development, I shall avoid all controversial matters and cling only to those texts which are unanimously recognized as plain and obvious.

In order to place the subject in its proper context a close and summary notion of its origin is necessary; for this, it will suffice to keep before one's eyes the following main points which I set down here.

The point from which Augustine starts his search of God is essentially psychological and modern. It is the 'restlessness of the human heart'. "Our heart knows no rest",⁶ he writes in his *Confessions*. Strange as this result may sound, this restlessness is not so very different from the 'Sorge' (fret) of Heidegger, the 'Angst' (anguish) of Kierkegaard or the 'Misere' (distress) of Pascal. "And why is man so restless?" asks Augustine in the midst of an engaging discussion he had with his friends towards the end of his dissolute life.⁷ "It is because", he says "the end of man's life is happiness."⁸ Indeed, to be happy is man's most ardent desire. This desire is absolutely common to every man, good and bad, for he comes to this world with the notion of happiness imprinted in his heart. Hence he can never give it up; and if any man says he can, you may be sure it is just an empty boast. The good man is good because he wants to be happy, and the bad man would not be bad if he had no hope to be happy. The difficulty lies in finding out the object which will satisfy that desire; for, this object must fulfil two conditions: it must be permanent or durable; it must be independent of the changes of fortune.⁹ If we say that the love of this world is wearisome, that it cannot make us happy, it is precisely because what the soul seeks, namely permanence and immutability, both of which are necessary to true human happiness, cannot be found therein; for the loveliest beauty is destroyed by the passing of things. Is there then nothing that is permanent? Yes, indeed, truth. For what can be more lasting than the unchangeable truth? No-one, therefore, can be happy unless he be in the possession of truth; "perfect happiness therefore", Augustine declares in the book of his 'Confessions', "is the joy that follows the possession of truth".¹⁰

As is evident from the preceding text, it is not truth considered in itself that is the object of man's desire. If man longs for truth, it is because he takes for granted that truth is the giver of happiness. In his book 'On the City of God', Augustine makes it clear that it is unwise for a man to become a philosopher if he does not find happiness in philosophy.¹¹ Augustine admits that there are philosophers in the world who profess to seek truth for the sake of truth. He does not envy the condition of such men; for them, he observes, there is not a moment of rest when they can say that they know enough; and so absorbed they are in their eternal investigations, that their search for truth becomes a new source of misery. They live entirely in their heads, whilst the claims of the heart are neglected.

If according to Augustine happiness is conditional on the possession of truth, it follows that for him happiness is intimately linked with knowledge; nay, more, it is knowledge itself, since happiness is the possession of truth and truth is possessed by the very fact that it is known.¹²

It must here be noted that, for Augustine, the knowledge of truth does not coincide with the conceptional or scientific knowledge of truth as we now understand it. This abstract knowledge Augustine describes as the "evening darkness of speculation." To his way of thought, knowledge is the same as self-realization, the essential feature of which lies not in the mind, but in the heart; "by love it is sought" he writes, "and by love it is achieved." True knowledge, Augustine explains, is vision, and true vision is attained not through our bodily eyes but through the eyes of the heart, that is by *becoming the object seen*. To see means to realize in oneself the similitude of the object seen. It is through our likeness in the object seen that we see it, and the greater is this likeness the higher is the vision. It is love that gives us those mysterious "eyes of the heart", infinitely more penetrating than the eyes of the body; once they are open, they scan heaven and earth and do not rest until they attain the supreme object of love. Indeed, true knowledge is nothing but love.¹³ In this sense, the mind truly is the expression of the heart, as Augustine beautifully puts it in his commentary on Psalm 99. Though the possession of truth is an essential condition of perfect happiness, it is not every truth that can give it to us; hence the restlessness of the human mind in passing from one object of knowledge to another. As long as we are on the quest, though we acquire a great amount of knowledge in the process, there is no peace, and therefore no happiness. It is only

when we shall have attained to that truth, the acquisition of which will free us entirely from further inquiry, because there would be no other truth besides it, only then shall we be perfectly happy.

It is hardly necessary to say that this supreme truth is not what we call the subjective or logical truth, which may be described as self-consistency, but objective and ontological truth, that first and sovereign truth which in common with all religious thinkers Augustine ultimately identifies with God. The reason why this is so can be inferred from Augustine's definition of truth as conformity of the mind with being.¹⁴ Now, only in God mind is identical with being. Consequently God is truth itself.¹⁵

Here, however, the great question arises: How shall we attain to this supreme truth which alone can make us perfectly happy? How shall we know and possess it? This supreme truth is God Himself, the Absolute, the Infinite; and an unbounded abyss separates the finite from the Infinite; how can we leap across the abyss? "Descend into thyself" answers Augustine, "there thou wilt find thy God".¹⁶ And why so? Not because the human self is God or a mode of God, but because man is the image of God. "It is rightly said", Augustine observes in his book 'On true Religion', "that man is made in the image and likeness of God; for, in no other condition would he be able to perceive the immutable truth".¹⁷ We are not going to follow the African doctor in his rich and minute analysis of the famous text of the Genesis, the first book of the Jewish revelation, which he accepts without reservation. It may however prove useful to state here that Augustine does not exclude a knowledge of God derived from the contemplation of the Creation: "Thou, fool", he reproaches himself in his commentary on Psalm 73, "by the operations of the body I know thee to be living: canst thou not by the works of creation know the Creator?"¹⁸ Yet, he not only maintains that this knowledge is less perfect than that which flows from the fact of man being the image of God, but further suggests that the former pre-supposes the latter, as is evident from the following beautiful passage taken from his 'Confessions': "I love thee, my God", exclaims Augustine, "thou hast stricken my heart, and I have loved thee But yet, when I love thee, what is it that I love? I asked the earth, and it said 'I am not thy God', and all things that are in the earth confessed the same. I asked the sea, the deeps and all creeping things, and they answered, 'we are not thy God, seek him above us'. I asked the subtle air, and with all its inhabitants this air made answer, 'I am not thy God'. I asked the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars. 'Neither

are we', said they, 'the God thou seekest'. And to all who stood before those portals of my soul, my five senses, I said, 'As to my God, you say you are not He; but tell me now somewhat of what He is'. And with mighty voice did they cry out, 'It is He that made us' . . . And I turned me into myself, and to myself I said, 'What art thou?' and I answered, 'a man'. And behold, I have here within me a body and a soul, one of them external and the other internal. By which of these ought I to seek my God, whom now I have sought among corporeal things, from the earth to the heavens, as far as I could send these beams of mine eyes as my ambassadors? But the *internal* is the better part . . . External things speak to all but their voice is understood only by those to whom truth speaks from within."¹⁹

We now come close to the crucial point of this paper; namely, how man from the fact of being made in the image and likeness of God, can know God. It is not my purpose to lead the reader through the long and dreary considerations which Augustine makes in order to bring to light all that is implied in the concept of the image. It is enough for us to bear in mind the following conclusions:

First, an image is a means of knowledge by likeness, an intermediary through which objects which sometimes cannot be apprehended, may be known.²⁰ A man unable to see his own face uses a mirror in order to apprehend it through its image. The concept of the image implies three things: (a) The original or the exemplar of the image, (b) the copy, the likeness or the image itself and (c) the knower or the interpreter of the image. From this it is obvious that for Augustine every picture is not an image, but only that picture, which has an original of which it is a copy. The original or the exemplar can never be identified with its own image, i.e., the original cannot be at the same time its own image. We should be highly amused if a man said to us that he is the image of himself. An image might be a most perfect similitude of the original, yet the opposition between them will always remain absolute. The reason of this inconceivable opposition is found in the very nature of the image. An image is essentially a relation;²¹ it is not for itself but for the other, the exemplar. It does not express itself but the exemplar, and by itself it has no individuality. In order to stress this non-individuality of the image, St. Augustine goes so far as to call it a mere tendency towards the original, a movement towards it; "*esse tendit et non est*". "Is it not absurd to say that an image exists for itself?"²² he asks. On the other hand, the original or the

exemplar may be the very knower or the interpreter of his own image.

Secondly, the knowledge which is derived from an image or likeness is not by mere demonstration or immediate representation, but by suggestion. The image is a sign, the sight of which reminds us of something else. The famous definition of the sign composed by Augustine is still in use in *Logic*.²³ The distinction between an image and a sign is condensed by Augustine in the following concise lines: "A sign is an instrumental sign, the perfection of which increases with the individual notes. An image is a formal sign, the perfection of which decreases with the individual notes." The less individual notes an image has, the more perfect it is; for, it becomes more similar to the exemplar; whilst the multiplication of the characteristics of the sign, in other words, the amplitude of its connotation, makes it more distinct and precise and gives it greater aptitude to signify. If we take smoke as the natural sign of fire, the more distinct is the smoke, the more evident is the fire.

Thirdly, from the preceding two points, it is obvious that an image is a unique way of knowing its original or exemplar; and that the knowledge of the original, at least in 'abstracto', is simultaneous with the knowledge of its image; in other words, the apprehension of the image at once brings to our mind the original, or as Augustine puts it, the image is the capacity to make known the original; to see the image is to see the original.²⁴ This assertion, however, is contradicted by our actual experience. In fact, in our daily life, we never come across an image so perfect that its knowledge is simultaneous with the knowledge of its original. For us the knowledge of every image of which we have experience always pre-supposes the knowledge of the original.²⁵ As a matter of fact, no-one will recognize a most perfect image, unless the original is previously known to him. This contradiction however, writes the African doctor, is extrinsic to the proper connotation of the image. It is true that an ideal image has no individuality; it is essentially a relation to its original.²⁶ However, in order that a relation be predicated, it must exist. Now, only substance exists; and as relation is not itself a substance, in order to exist, it must subsist in a substance.²⁷ Therefore, every relation pre-supposes a substance in which it inheres. On the other hand, in nature there are no two perfectly identical substances. The reason why natural substances distinguish themselves one from another, declares Augustine, is because they participate in various degrees from the one supreme substance, God. The degree of their reality corresponds to the

degree in which they resemble that supreme substance, from which they differ as finite from the infinite. In nature, therefore, there are no two perfectly identical substances; they may be similar in certain particular aspects, but there is always an element of dissimilarity in them.²⁸ Consequently, in nature, an image, though a pure relation, by the very fact that it subsists, includes in itself an element of disparity and becomes a degradation of the original.²⁹ As we have noted above, this degradation is not a consequence that flows from the very notion of the image, but from its realization in nature, its position in time and space. This degradation may be further increased by the imperfect imitation of the original. To the mind of Augustine, therefore, no perfect image, i.e. an image which itself can reveal the original, is found in nature. The only one which he admits, namely the Christian Logos, the most perfect and exhaustive expression of the Absolute, rests outside creation in the infinite bosom of God.³⁰

Fourthly, Augustine maintains that man is the image of God with regard to that which is the highest in him.³¹ In his book 'On Behaviour', the African doctor tries to find out what is the highest in man. He accepts the traditional definition of man as a unity composed of soul and body, but the special feature of his thought consists in the fact that accent is put on the soul. "Man is a soul", he writes, "using a body".³² Man is a soul, if we consider his vegetative, sensitive and intellectual life together. He is a mind or self, if we consider only his intellectual being, that which is proper to him and by which he distinguishes himself from inferior beings. Though all creatures resemble God, only man is God's image; whence it is obvious that he is an image with regard to that part in which he distinguishes himself from the other creatures, namely with regard to the mind. Consequently, it is in the mind, i.e. in the intellectual part of the soul, the seat of self-consciousness, that man is the image of God.³³ It is his mind, that is capable of knowing God. The human mind has an intrinsic and positive inclination of nature to the vision of God.

If the first 3 conclusions were to be applied to man in so far as he is the Image of God, it would follow that man would never be able to know God unless he was previously instructed about Him. Once instructed, he could realize his knowledge by introspection and reflexion. St. Augustine, however, denies this consequence. His contention is that unless man had in himself some initial knowledge of God, he would not be able even to understand the meaning of the word God. "Thou who dost not know God,

how dost thou know what thou dost not know?" asks Augustine in his 'Soliloquia'.³⁴ Pascal interpreting the mind of Augustine expresses it in his famous saying in connection with the quest of God: "Thou wouldst not seek me if thou hadst not found me". Augustine maintains that Plato was right when he postulated a 'divine sense' in man. In order to guarantee his claim, Augustine adduces two conclusive facts; the first is the innate longing of man for happiness, to which we have already alluded in the beginning of this paper. The second is the existence in man of some constant and undeniable certitudes which do not depend upon the mind, but dominate it, overwhelm it, impose themselves upon it and confound it in spite of all the efforts to the contrary. It would take me very far to explain here Augustine's doctrine of the Illumination in connection with those certitudes. Once we know, he says, that our mind is imperfect and restless, it becomes clear that we can never attain to a certitude unless by the communication of an extrinsic help. To seek immutability in the contingent is clearly to condemn oneself to sure failure. The only solution is to conceive an immediate action of God upon the mind, an action which at the same time conceals the agent. The object of this action would be to make certitude possible by exerting a constraint upon our thought, when a judgment is formulated, fixing it, and submitting the restlessness of our mind to an inevitable law. It would impose upon our thought that unchangeableness and necessity that characterize the divine essence; by so doing, it would enable the mind to detect in all things the absolute, the necessary, the eternal, the immutable truth which alone can offer a foundation to the certitude of judgments. This immediate action can only be compared to an Illumination.³⁵

It is useful to bear in mind that the Augustinian Illumination is a corollary to the Platonic theory of the Ideas. Augustine's admiration for Plato and for the Platonists was so great that it has been found that a few moments before he gave up his soul to God, the great African remembered Plotinus and murmured a few words of the 'Eneades' about the eternal happiness.

It is in Augustine's fourth and last conclusion, that we find the explanation of this innate knowledge of God in man. If we accept the sequence,—man is the Image of God with regard to his mind, the mind is a self-conscious substance, a substance transparent to itself,—then we shall find that the image of God imprinted in this substance, though imperfect as all natural images are, must consciously reflect its original, God. Hence, the fact of man possessing an immanent knowledge of God, as spontaneous as

the knowledge of his own self, with which it is intimately connected, is obvious. It is the apprehension of God through the image imprinted in his mind that man becomes aware that something within him leaps, like a child in the womb, in the presence of anything true, fair and good. Augustine expresses this fact most vividly when he writes: "The continual presence of God is the sap of the life and of the soul of man. Though he may be very far from God by thought and by affection, yet he always feels the attraction of the supreme good by a kind of a mysterious remembrance of something unknown, which can never be entirely ignored."³⁷

Here, however, we are confronted with a difficulty. A self-conscious image, as we said above, must have an explicit knowledge of its original.³⁸ But the innate knowledge of God, to which Augustine refers, is not explicit, but only implicit in the human knowledge of happiness or in the notion of certitude. How to account for this deficiency? Augustine, who had deeply meditated upon this point, asks himself: "How can I not see what I cannot but see? . . ."³⁹ He maintains that the deficiency of knowledge in man, of which we are perfectly aware, is not only with regard to God but also with regard to man. Man's knowledge of himself is entirely imperfect. In his book *'Soliloquia'*, in a curious dialogue between himself and his own reason, from which Descartes deduced his *'Cogito ergo sum'*, Augustine is asked by the Reason: "Do you know whether you exist?" Augustine answers: "I know". The Reason continues: "How do you know it?" Augustine: "I do not know". Reason: "Do you know if you think?" Augustine: "I do". Reason: "Is it true then that you think?" Augustine: "Absolutely true". Reason: "How do you know it?" Augustine: "I do not know."⁴⁰ We may count in all his writings at least seven different examples in which the African Doctor affirms the habitual existence of self-knowledge in man. "It is a fact which I can never deny," he writes in his book *'The City of God'*, for in the very fact of denying it I affirm its truth. Surely, the soul always knows itself, but this knowledge is not self-satisfying. Its origin is unknown.⁴¹ It has neither intensity nor growth. It is a kind of a faint and continual remembrance obsessing the mind, similar to the presence in our memory of those things which have vanished and of which we do not actually think.⁴² Hence, man's knowledge of God is imperfect; and man's knowledge of himself is also imperfect. The only difference between the two is the fact, that the former is implicit, whilst the latter is explicit but obscure. Augustine attributes their deficiency to a state of self-forgetfulness.⁴³ How then can we explain the existence of the actual knowledge of self and consequently of God? Augustine dis-

tinguishes two kinds of forgetfulness. There is a forgetfulness which is irreparable; and there is a forgetfulness of which we retain the memory. The forgetfulness of the self and consequently the forgetfulness of God is not of the first kind, but of the second. "I have forgotten myself and my God", he writes in his *'Confessions'*, "yet I have a faint memory of both—of myself and of my God."

Here a new difficulty presents itself: Is it possible to keep a remembrance of a forgetfulness? St. Augustine discusses the point in his *Confessions*. "What is forgetfulness", he asks, "but a mere privation of memory". How then is forgetfulness to be remembered, since it represents the absence of a thing which one cannot remember? If we remember anything, it is by keeping it in the memory. Yet if we did not remember forgetfulness, we would not seek the thing we forget; and when we find it, we would not acknowledge it to be the same. Forgetfulness, therefore, is retained in the memory. The mind may possess a knowledge which is present and actual, yet half-conscious. Such is the knowledge man has in his present state, of his own self and of God.⁴⁴

But what is the cause of this strange aberration? St. Augustine suggests a disaster at the very beginning of the human race.⁴⁵ He accepts the Christian doctrine of the original sin, which for Augustine is nothing but a distention of the human tendency towards God, a falling back of man upon himself, and which he tries to prove historically in his great work *'The City of God'*, the very first attempt of the human mind towards a philosophical interpretation of history. "Man was created perfect" Augustine writes, "he had perfect self-knowledge and consequently a vivid intuition of God; but he fell, and in consequence of his fall, the image of God in him was deformed, vitiated, discoloured, darkened, deflected, almost effaced."

In virtue of this degradation, man not only does not know God as he should know, but even cannot recognize himself as an image of God. In the terminology of Augustine, a self-conscious image, a conscious tendency, love, remembrance are one and the same thing, and the human soul is all this. It is a self-conscious image of God; it is a conscious tendency towards God; it is love of God; it is memory of God: the human soul is nothing but memory, he writes in the 10th book of his *Confessions*. Consequently this degradation cannot be absolute or irreparable; for, a spiritual substance can never lose entirely its nature. The image of God in man can be reformed, and is reformed by love.

Love, writes Augustine, not only can redeem man but it can change the earth into heaven. Love melts away every defect, every sin, every suffering, every problem, every mystery. There is no difficulty, no power that can withstand love. It dominates the universe. It is almighty. Love is the criterion of truth. It is its most exact test. Truth never harms anybody. A truth that creates hatred or is detrimental to others is no truth at all.

Even a broad sketch of the Augustinian magnificent metaphysics of love would fall beyond the scope of this paper. For our purpose it is enough to keep in mind that in its context, the human self is of the nature of love; hence, an insignificant exercise of love is organic, and leads to a prompt and efficacious reaction in the innermost depths of the lover's being. Love puts a man in touch with his own self. In this light, even what we call the sinful love, considered in a higher sense, may not perhaps entirely be detrimental to the subject; for love has a secret nature that transcends all the sensible objects.

We catch many glimpses of this secret nature of love in the books of Augustine. "Love", writes Augustine, "is a purifying and redeeming element. It makes man transcend himself and tend to the highest ideal, not by moving and agitating him in space and time, but by transforming him interiorly and assimilating him to that highest ideal which is nothing but love. Love is the most powerful dissolvent. It reduces to nothing the most ponderous inequalities, just as the sun melts the iceberg in the sea. It is the greatest creative force in the universe, it makes all things alive and significant. Once it is excited, it knows no rest until it reaches the object to which it tends. "Show me a love that is idle", asks Augustine, "a love that is inactive; the greatest crimes, the greatest tragedies are the deeds of love. Let us also remember the most sublime miracles of strength and courage, and the noblest virtues and sacrifices inspired by love. To what great difficulties does not love condemn itself to attain its end? In love there is no pain, for the very pain of love is loved. Indeed, its greatest suffering is not to suffer at all; for all other pleasures are not worth its pains. Love respects neither law nor obligation; it "bloweth where it listeth, and no man can tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth." It is so supreme, so overwhelming, that nobody can say that he is worthy of anybody's love. Its seat is the innermost self of man. It has no patience with the dull, lifeless, formal and hypocritical systems of behaviour. It scorns the exterior worth and outward recompense; and its highest pleasure is to give itself to the poor, to

the contemptible, to the unworthy, even to the ungrateful. It is the greatest self-revealer; truly it is not thought but love that makes a man present to himself; for, love extends further than vision. Give me a man who loves . . . , exclaims finally St. Augustine, and he will feel what I mean.⁴⁶ It has been pointed out that in all the writings of Augustine, the word love is the most repeated one.

To judge a thought, not with regard to its conformity with reality, but in connection with the mentality of its author, as an expression of his spiritual experience and of his situation in space and time, is the idea that obsesses contemporary mind. The mysteries of subjectivity are to-day more appealing than impersonal truth. Hence, in the examination of a doctrine we are more interested in testing its sense and importance as a testimony of the human consciousness, by appreciating its wealth of experience and its sincerity in expression, rather than its logical coherence and its intellectual significance.

It is in this frame of mind that modern critics approach the writings of St. Augustine. It has been said that Augustine represents a conflict: the conflict in which the new life, like a mighty wave resounding with initiative and vitality comes to break against the gigantic wall made of traditions of a world in the clutches of death. This conflict is obvious in his life and in his writings. He feels the triumph of the new life; yet, he is unable to believe in it. He sees the old world wringing under the pressure of a power bent on its annihilation, yet he cannot understand how the great and glorious Roman civilization can suddenly come to such a disreputable end. He has exhausted all the secrets of the old culture, but he feels impelled to visualize the strength and vicissitudes of the future generation. Augustine belongs neither to the old nor to the new world. He is a link between the two. This contrast gives prominence to his personality. An ardent thirster after truth, and at the same time, an eager taster of experience, capable of a wide range of reactions; a profound intellectualist, and at the same time a man who has loved, sinned and endured; indulged his passions without remorse, and used his mental powers without humility, —such was the stuff of which Augustine was made. The fact that everything in his intense and tempestuous life is contained in the most celebrated of his utterances, "Our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee", is evident. Indeed he inaugurates that literature in which the author's individuality reveals itself in the most abstract matters, the 'Confessions' being an inimitable example of it.

Harnack admires the African Doctor's gift of psychological observation and a captivating facility for portraying his penetrating observations, the accuracy of which is endorsed by modern explorations. "This talent" he says, "is the secret of Augustine's originality and greatness". On the other hand, Augustine's ambiguous position in the history of the development of the human consciousness puts him in a state of self-diffidence. A short time before his death, which occurred in 430 A.D. at the moment when on every side the hordes of Northern barbarians were breaking the frontiers of the Roman Empire, he reviews minutely all his books, detects his own errors and exposes them in his last book "Retractions". No writer was ever so conscious of his own deficiencies. Rudolph Eucken says: "Never could Augustine have exercised all the influence he has exercised, if it had not been that, in spite of the rhetorical artifice of his utterance, absolute sincerity reigned in the inmost recesses of his soul. His writings are of foremost importance, not in what he says, but in what he does not say; not in what he expresses, but in what he suggests; not in what he achieves, but in that to which he tends. Thus may Augustine's universal influence in all succeeding ages be explained." His doctrine of man, the image of God, is at the same time a proof of God and a way to God. It is, as I mentioned above, dispersed and scattered in an immense amount of writings. It has passed through many phases of development. It has been constantly revised and corrected; but each revision or retraction, as Augustine likes to call it, is not a mere confession of errors, but a renewed effort to express what is inexplicable. It corresponds to a new degree of clarity in his inward search of God through his own self. Did Augustine entirely exhaust his thought in the process of these retractions? We do not know. In his doctrine of man, the image of God, there are obscurities and gaps which his followers have tried to mitigate. But the symbolic value of the doctrine is universal. If we leave out its theological and conceptual bearing, and try to grasp its original intuition, we find that its object is to persuade man that he must look for God within his own self rather than without. It is not because God is so far away that it is difficult to find Him. The difficulty lies in His intense nearness, that makes Him imperceptible to the senses and inexpressible in thought and language. "There is nothing in the whole creation nearer to God than the human soul", writes Augustine in his 'Confessions'. "He is more interior to me than my innermost part, and superior to the highest part thereof." But the self of man knows His nearness and feels His presence, even as the body reacts to the beating of the heart.

St. Augustine admits that at present this innate knowledge of God is extremely dim and obscure; but he is confident that it can be vivified by love. The two-fold function of love is to know and to serve; we are inclined to emphasize the latter, but to forget the former. Love is not blind. Passion may be blind, but love is clear-eyed; love sees and discerns where reason looks vaguely. "The eyes of the heart are keener than the eyes of the body" writes Augustine, "they discern beyond the soul and mind itself". "The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know", said Pascal, commenting on Augustine's doctrine. "Love extends further than vision", writes Bonaventure, the greatest of all the disciples of Augustine. Love puts a man in touch with his own self. This fact is the explanation of that mysterious insight, characteristic of every sincere lover,—an insight which generates a deep understanding. Indeed, the benefits of love are more significant to the lover than to the beloved.

The symbolic meaning of Augustine's doctrine, as it has been pointed out, is universal. It is at the same time philosophical and religious. It oversteps the boundaries of time and space. It finds an echo in the aspirations of the east. It constitutes the basis of the Idealism of the west. Though we do not grasp it in all its details, we feel that behind it stands a man who has touched the very depth of the human being. Augustine is a philosopher, but a philosopher of a unique kind. There is always an eternal freshness around him; his writings are free from that dry rigidity and aggressiveness that characterized the philosophers of his days.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

Since "C.S.E.L." has not published all St. Augustine's works, to secure unity and also to facilitate the work of reference, I have adopted the "MIGNE" edition which, though not perfect, has been used in all the great modern commentaries on St. Augustine's writings at least till 1938.

In the references, the Roman number indicates Augustine's book or treatise; the second number the Chapter, and the third the number of the Chapter. In the fraction, the first number corresponds to the volume of the series of "MIGNE" Edition; whilst the second number of the fraction gives the column of the volume.

1. History of Philosophy by Coplestone, Vol. II, p. 40. London, Burns Oates & W. Ltd.
2. De Trinitate: VIII, 1, 42/947.
3. Soliloquia: I, 2, 7, 32/872.
4. De Vera Religione; XXXIX, 72, 34/154.
5. In Psalmos: XCIX, 3; 37/1272.
6. Confessiones: I, 1, 1; 32/661.

7. De Vita Beata: I, 2, 10; 32/964.
8. De Civitate Dei: X, 1, 1; 41/278.
9. De Vita Beata: I, 2, 11; 32/965.
10. Confessiones: X, 23, 33; 32/793.
11. De Civi. Dei: XIX, 1, 3; 41/23.
12. De diversis Questionibus: XXXV, 1-2; 40/23-24.
13. In Joannem: XXVI, 6, 4; 35/1609; Conf: VII, 10, 16; 32/742.
14. XCIX, 3; 37/1272. For Augustine the human mind is of the nature of an inclination, a will, a tendency, an appetite; we are nothing but wills, he writes in his great work "The City of God". It is obvious that this tendency must have an end; its ultimate end is the supreme truth, God, as we shall see in the course of the essay. A tendency implies the idea of similitude for, it is by being similar to the end that one tends to it. "It is by resembling that one tends" explains Augustine. A self-conscious tendency is designated by what we call love. Love is interested in knowledge in two ways: First, it engenders knowledge. Bergson in his "Creative Evolution" has explained the process how love or intuition is converted into conceptual knowledge. Secondly, love attaches itself to this knowledge in order to enjoy it. (De Civitate Dei: XIV, 6; 41/410 De Trin. IX, 12, 18; 42/972; *ibid.* X, 1, 2; 42/937).

15. "There are two ways of knowing" writes Augustine in his famous letter 'On the Vision of God', "there is a knowledge which we acquire through the senses; and there is a knowledge which is derived from the very soul." Regarding the former, it would be to misrepresent St. Augustine's doctrine if we were to conceive the sensation as derived from the union of the soul and the body. Augustine's definition of man as a 'soul using a body' shows the falsity of this interpretation. "We must not think", writes Augustine, "that the body can impose itself upon the soul. It cannot, since it is inferior to the soul. The inferior can never act upon the superior". The sensation therefore comes entirely from the soul. It is of the substance of the soul. It is entirely spiritual. The body is simply a means to draw the attention of the soul. This conclusion is very important; indeed, if the sensation is of the substance of the soul there is no need of any abstraction to be intelligible. Here by soul Augustine means the human soul, the mind. "If our knowledge consisted only in what we receive through the senses scepticism would have been invincible", writes Augustine. By this he does not want to say that the senses deceive us. The senses produce what they can produce, and in so far as they produce they are true. What Augustine wants to declare is that the knowledge of the senses does not correspond to the exterior world. The reason is because the world is in continual change, whilst the knowledge of the senses is static.

The second kind of knowledge is by Illumination, which is able to produce perfect certitude. We shall speak of it in the course of this paper. There is a third kind of knowledge by being, by likeness or image. This last constitutes the subject of this paper.

16. Confessiones: X, 24, 35; 32/794.
17. In Joannem: XXIII, 5, 10; 35/1588.
18. De Vera Religione: XLIV, 82; 34/159.
19. In Psalmos: LXXIII, 25; 36/944.
20. Confessiones: X, 16, 9; 32/783; Conf: X, 6, 10; 32/783.
21. De Trinitate: XV, 11, 15; 42/1068.
22. De Trinitate: VII, 1, 1; 42/934; Epistola: CLXX, 7; 33/750.

23. De Trinitate: VII, 1, 2; 42/934.
 24. Doctrina Christiana: II, 1, 1; 34/35.
 25. De Trinitate: IV, 19, 26; 42/905.
 26. De Magistro: X, 33; 32/1214.
 27. De Trinitate: VII, 1, 2; 42/934.
 28. De Trinitate: VII, 5, 10; 42/942.
 29. De Genesi ad litteram lib. imp.: XVI, 60; 34/244; De Civitate Dei: XII, 2, 3; 41/350.
 30. De Trinitate: VII, 1, 2; 42/935.
 31. De Trinitate: VII, 1, 2; 42/934.
 32. De Genesi ad lit. lib. imp.: XIV, 60; 34/243.
 33. De Moribus: IV, 6; 32/1313.
 34. De Trinitate: XIV, 4, 6; 42/1040.
 35. Soliloquia: I, 2, 7; 32/873.
 36. De Diversis Quaestionibus: XLVI, 2; 40/30.
- In his theory of Illumination, in order to explain the phenomenon of certitude, Augustine does not recur to the actual vision of the ideas in God as Malebranche pretended, or even to our vision of them previous to our bodily existence, nor to their infusion in the soul at the moment of our creation, but to a contact of the soul with a certain light. For Augustine certitude always means an interior experience, a light. In Joannem: XXXV, 4; 35/1659; De Magistro: XII, 40; 32/1277.
37. De Trinitate: X, 3, 5; 42/975; De Musica: VI, 13, 40; 32/1185.
 38. De Trinitate: XIV, 12, 15; 42/1048.
 39. De Trinitate: XV, 9, 15; 42/1069.
 40. Soliloquia: II, 1, 1; 32/885; De Civit. Dei: XI, 26; 41/340.
 41. De Trinitate: X, 8, 11; 42/979.
 42. De Trinitate: XIV, 6, 8; 42/1912.
 43. De Trinitate: X, 5, 7; 42/977.
 44. De Trinitate: XIV, 13, 17; 42/1049.
 45. De Civitate Dei: XIV: 13; 41/421.
 46. In Joannem: XXVI, 6, 4; 35/1608.
- Sermones: XCVI, 1 + 2; 38/384-385.
In Psalmos: XXXI, 2, 5; 36/260.
Sermones: CLIX, 3, 3; 38/869.
Epistola: CLVII, 11, 9; 33/677.

Virtue and Virtues

by

PROF. S. G. HULYALKAR, M.A. LONDON

As said by Sidgwick, Ethics is not only the science of knowing what good is but also of doing what good is. The practical importance of Ethics is to be seen more significantly in the discussion of virtues which are the chief forms into which the moral life of an individual expresses itself. In fact, the discussion of virtues is an attempt to indicate how the good life will actually be lived when it is turned to a certain ideal. In this sense it may be said that virtue is a passage between the actual moral life of an individual and his ideal life.

If we study the question of virtue historically, we find that the meaning of the term 'Virtue' does not seem to be the same for all times. Originally it only meant manliness or valour, and in general it was thought to be a good habit of character, and was distinguished from duty which denoted rather some particular kind of action that we ought to perform. Thus, a man *does* his duty, but he *possesses* virtue or *is* virtuous. Virtue is essentially concerned with the inner habits of mind. It represents what a man essentially *is*.

According to Aristotle, virtue is a habit of deliberate choice. To be virtuous means to have a character so developed that we habitually choose to act in the right way : the right action *merely* always stands between two possible bad actions, one erring by excess and the other by defect. In this sense, virtue is a habit of choosing a mean between two excesses. This mean is relative to the individual, and also to the particular circumstances in which the individual is placed. The mean is to be determined by its conduciveness to the general development of social life. To hit upon it rightly is often a problem for the individual tact and insight. However, the study of the greatest examples of human history serves as a valuable aid in deciding the conduct in any particular given case. Thus in this sense, "virtue is the habit of choosing the relative mean, as it is determined by reason and as the man of practical wisdom would determine it". It can be seen easily that Aristotle's treatment of moral life is essentially based

on a concrete psychology which takes into account the whole nature of man, and the conception of virtue as an expression of the whole self in its threefold aspect of knowing, desiring and choosing, implicitly contains the idea of the unity of man's moral life.

From the earliest periods of ethical speculation attempts have been made to enumerate the various forms of virtue. The most celebrated forms of virtue are the cardinal virtues as given by Plato and Aristotle. In morals, the name cardinal is applied to those virtues to which all the rest are subordinate or which comprehend all the others. These cardinal virtues are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice. This division appears to be peculiar to the old Pythagoreans. Aristotle, divided them still further. The Stoics, too, made the same division in their system of morals, and Cicero introduced it into his 'De Officiis'. Plotinus and many Neo-Platonists divide the virtues into four classes,—Civil or political, philosophical or purifying, religious and lastly divine or pattern virtues. In Roman Catholic theological systems, the cardinal virtues follow Plato. But there is a prior division into theological and moral virtues, the former being Faith, Hope and Charity.

Thus, the cardinal virtues have come to hold an acknowledged place. But, baptized into the spirit of Christ, they are endowed with a new meaning and worth. The religion of Jesus has so profoundly modified the moral ideas of the past that they have become new creations. The old moral currency was gradually minted anew. The imagination of artists has represented the cardinal virtues under sensible images. In modern times, however, this division is regarded as useless in the treatment of Ethics.

The above mentioned list of the cardinal virtues has the merit of simplicity, as it contains only four virtues (wisdom or prudence, courage or fortitude, temperance or self-restraint and justice or righteousness). However, this list creates difficulties of its own; for, the first of the virtues (wisdom) includes all the others; for every virtuous activity consists in acting wisely in some particular relationship. Similarly, justice also seems to be too comprehensive in its meaning since it is used to include all the social virtues.

It may usefully be noted that virtues have also been classified as self-regarding and altruistic. But such a distinction seems to be misleading, as the individual has no life of his own, independent of his social relations and having reference to the general social well-being. However, if we want to understand this intelligently,

we can do so only by distinguishing the life of an individual from the wider world to which it is related. Against the list of Platonic virtues it is maintained that it is arbitrary; the several virtues are not specifically distinct, and the basis of the division is unsound as they overlap one another.

Courage and temperance are the two virtues that bear most directly on the life of the individual. If we understand courage (fortitude) in the wide sense of resistance to allurements of pleasure, these two virtues (courage and temperance) will include all forms of opposition to temptations in the individual life.

Courage includes both valour and fortitude, i.e. the active courage which pursues its course in spite of the probability of pain, and passive courage which bears inevitable suffering without flinching. But these are not the same virtues, and are indeed perhaps not often found together in any high degree. Besides, courage seems to include in man, the qualities of decision, diligence and perseverance in resisting the natural inertia of human nature. Thus, a confident and cheerful view of life seems to be presupposed in the highest forms of courage. The lives of Socrates, Martin Luther and Bhagat Singh illustrate the point in question.

Temperance is concerned more or less with food, drink and sexual intercourse. Now-a-days, it means various forms of self-denial. However, it is not a negation or annihilation of the impulses, but their coordination to utilize the impulsive energy of the individual in the interest of some total purpose of life. Culture is a full and symmetrical development of various capacities in man. Temperance is a pre-supposition of a true culture.

Thus, broadly speaking, four kinds of virtues are to be found bearing on the conduct of the individual life. Wisdom in the choice of life's general course, decisiveness in pursuing it, and courage and temperance in resisting the solicitations of pain and pleasure.

The virtues that relate to the individual's dealings with his fellowmen are summed up under justice and benevolence. One is civic excellence, and the other philanthropy. When we do not repress others, we are just to him; and in helping him to fulfil his moral task we are exercising towards him benevolence.

Justice must include not only the fulfilment of contracts and the performance of every duty required by the laws of the community to which one belongs, but also perfect honesty and fidelity in all one's relationships with others. The Christian ideal (also

the Greek) has taught us that in our dealings with others the mere discharge of obligations is not sufficient, but generosity and love are also involved in the conception of justice. Man is to be treated not as a thing but as a person; hence friendship and love are also necessary in dealing with him.

So, it would be wrong to regard the above-mentioned virtues as disparate and unconnected; or that any one of them may be attained without the cultivation of the rest in the life of an individual or in the life of a society. There is in truth an essential unity running through all virtues. They are different aspects of a good life, the various colours into which the perfect spectrum of goodness breaks. In realizing one of them we inevitably attain the rest. Thus, the neglect of one would mean the neglect of all. It is, therefore, correct to speak of one cardinal (cardo-hinge upon which others depend) virtue, e.g. practical wisdom, and to regard all particular virtues only as special forms in which a right attitude of the mind manifests itself. In this sense, virtue is one. It is moral excellence.

It is also advantageous to study the virtues genetically, as has been done by some writers, i.e. to consider how the virtues grow up and come to be recognized in the development of individual life. From this point of view, courage and loyalty were first recognized to be important at the tribal stage of consciousness. Loyalty was meant to be fidelity to the tribal unity, but gradually came to include perseverance and enthusiasm in any work that may be undertaken. Beyond the tribal consciousness, when we have a definite recognition of individual life, we find the virtues of temperance and prudence, and from them the growth of individual consciousness leads to the virtues of fairness (justice) and friendliness in dealing with others ultimately giving rise to the forms of self-respect and respect for fellow-men. Finally, wisdom comes to be seen as the virtue that underlies all others. Thus, what is important as regards the cardinal virtues is not to have a classification of them, but to understand the general significance of virtue as moral excellence, enabling us to act in a suitable way in situations of all kinds.

Theological and religious considerations also throw some light on this view, namely that, essentially virtue is one because of its aim, and it cannot be classified. The so-called virtues are at most the different facets of the inner and fuller life of men, and when properly cultivated they enable a man to realise his own true self.

St. Augustine was the first to recognize the great Christian truth that it is man's relation to God that gives cohesion and unity to the moral life; and he was true to the spirit of Christianity when he re-affirmed the Pauline triad—Faith, Hope and Charity, as the primary and coordinating elements of Christian character. According to him and later moralists, these qualities were not simply added to the classical virtues, but so fused and incorporated with them as to create the spiritual disposition, which penetrates the entire personality, and which qualifies every one of its thoughts, and acts. They are but different manifestations of one virtue, three facets of one gem, the supreme passion of the soul and like justice in the Platonic theory, this passion is the intimate spirit of order alike in the individual and the society, harmoniously binding together all the other virtues.

407

Strictly speaking, there cannot be any water-tight division between the various virtues; for, a man who may be just but at the same time intemperate, or prudent and unjust, will have no value from the point of view of the moral ideal. Hence, it is urged that the cultivation of all the virtues is most necessary from the point of view of morals and religion. There is an essential unity running through all the virtues. Virtue by itself, as a trained faculty, enables a man to cultivate a certain form of moral conduct. What shall be fitted into that form will depend on the ideal moral requirements of the individual. This form cannot be essentially different and separate from the moral ideal itself. If the question of virtue is understood in this sense, the moral ideal becomes significant and meaningful to us. We can understand the statement that 'Virtue has its own reward'. It appears to me then, that in the ultimate analysis, the relation between the virtues and the moral ideal is a relation between means and the end, where both are interdependent. Thus understood, virtue as moral excellence is one,—one with the moral ideal itself.

The Spirit of Vedantic Philosophy

BY

G. R. MALKANI

1. Some people have attacked Indian philosophy as no philosophy at all. Both its problems and its methods have been called in question. Certainly they are not the problems and the methods of European philosophy. But that does not mean that they suffer in comparison on that account, or that they are valueless. It is all a question of philosophical standards. What may be real philosophy to me may be no philosophy to you, and vice-versa. That all genuine philosophy must be based on reason and must appeal to reason may be granted. But reason can have different sets of problems and different methods to tackle them. It all depends upon where you stand and what questions you ask. Some of those questions may be quite unreal and spurious. Others may be most important for the well-being of the individual who asks them. In any case, a genuine question must have an answer,—and a completely satisfactory answer. But if a question has no answer, or if the answer is doubtful, uncertain and incapable of resolving the question completely, we may be sure that we are reasoning on wrong lines, and that philosophy has missed its mission.

We now contend that Indian philosophy has concerned itself solely with questions that are important and capable of being resolved completely, while European philosophy, throughout its history, has concerned itself with questions of the other kind. Indian philosophy seeks a higher kind of knowledge, called metaphysical knowledge, and succeeds in giving it to those who accept its methods. There is a note of finality about it. Metaphysical knowledge, *in the most sophisticated sense*, is possible. The super-sensible and the metaphysical can be known, and known in the very best sense of the word “knowledge”. Truth must be not only evident, but self-evident, so that there is no room for any doubt or uncertainty. If there are any who are dissatisfied with the results of Indian philosophy nevertheless, it is because they have not accepted whole-heartedly and in good faith either the problems or the methods of Indian philosophy.

2. It is different with European philosophy. It seeks no final solutions. It is hesitant, uncertain and often sceptical. There is no earnestness in its search for a higher kind of knowledge. Most often it discounts the very possibility of metaphysical knowledge; and where it is more confident, the knowledge vouchsafed is just a pale shadow of the philosopher's own mind, and leaves one cold and unconvinced. It is valueless as knowledge. It does not affect life and its activities. It can only be contemplated aesthetically as an ingenious construction of thought. It is all imagination. The questions which European philosophy asks remain unanswered, and only change their form. The reasoning is endless and unconvincing. Small wonder it is that there is reaction against such metaphysical knowledge, and metaphysics easily gets into disrepute with the more discerning among the thinkers. Those who are acquainted with the history of European philosophy can readily realize that it is condemned out of its own mouth, or let us say out of its own practice. Speculative boldness and cock-sureness is only followed by a period of criticism and disbelief in the very possibility of metaphysical knowledge. The much-vaunted reason, as used in European philosophy, leads nowhere. Where it is most constructive, it is the poorest in philosophical content, and naturally gives rise to a reactionary movement that is both negative and destructive. Reason is at its best when it criticises, not when it builds up. When it builds up, many minds will be prone to regard the product as some kind of rational humbug. It makes too much of certain rational principles, and seeks to deduce the nature of reality from those principles. But there is not a principle of reason which is not itself open to criticism, if it is anything more than verbal; and there is not a principle of reason which can give any clue to the nature of reality itself as something positive. If reality is rational, it is not because it bows to the structure of thought or to the categories of thought. Both these can be criticised. It is rational only in the sense that reason can be made to realise its own limitations and to see that truth lies beyond it in a higher kind of knowledge which is more properly intuitive than rational. If it is rational at all, that is because reason finds its own fulfilment in it.

If we are serious about metaphysical knowledge, we must have recourse to a method of knowledge which is more adequate for its purposes than reason, and to which reason is only a subsidiary instrument. This method is the method of *direct intuition*, elicited by an authoritarian pronouncement from above (or what may be called *sabda-pramāṇa* or revelation) and confirmed by

reason. Reason fixes unalterably what begins as a vague and doubt-ridden intuition of a higher and super-sensible truth.

3. There is a difference between mere knowledge and wisdom. Mere knowledge is purely theoretical. Wisdom is knowledge that is practical. It is knowledge that controls our will and all the activities of life. Indian philosophy seeks this kind of knowledge. It may be thought that knowledge is not always competent to control the will. Many times our will refuses to conform to our knowledge, and we seem to be acting against our better reason. But it will be found that the state of our knowledge itself in all such cases is clouded and confused by contrary reasonings. Where this is not the case, we act through the dead weight of habit, which gives no room to us for being masters of our will. But that will be an abnormal case, requiring drastic remedies. As normal human beings, our knowledge is all-powerful. When we really and truly know, or know with absolute certainty, all mental uneasiness and conflict is at an end. No man can have the will to challenge the truth if he *sees* it. What the average man lacks is seeing the truth. That is at bottom the cause of all his ills. He is ignorant and confused. He needs to know that truth which will remove all his doubts. He needs to know the truth face to face. Seeing is believing. That is the very ideal of knowledge. There is no higher ideal. It is peculiar to Indian philosophy alone, which has a passion for a direct knowledge of the truth. Can we say the same thing about European philosophy, which seeks philosophic truth in certain structures of thought or theories with which it dresses up reality? All mere theories partake of the frailties of human thought and understanding. They are man-made, while truth cannot be man-made. European philosophy is a stranger to the notion of "seeing the truth face to face" or *darśana*, which is a common enough idea behind all systems of Indian philosophy, particularly Advait Vedanta, which carries this ideal to perfection.

4. Knowledge is power. But is it the end? Like power, it is only a means to an end. We desire knowledge for an ulterior purpose. That purpose is the highest goal or end of human life. We shall call it 'mokṣa', which means freedom from bondage and the resulting pain, and the attainment of the highest possible joy or bliss which is the only positive goal of life. This is the practical aspect of philosophic knowledge, which can have no other use. Indeed, most European philosophers will reject this view of knowledge as a means. For them, knowledge is an end in itself. It is desired for its own sake. It is an intrinsic value.

This view, in our opinion, is uncritical. It confuses the means with the end. We are not interested in knowledge as such, but in the subjective value that it realizes for us. If I am ignorant, and if I am conscious of ignorance as a dis-value, knowledge becomes valuable to us,—it drives away ignorance. If I do not know a mathematical problem, I am unhappy; when I know how it is done, I am happy. The disvalue has changed into value. Taken by itself, the knowledge how a problem is done makes no difference to me or to my life. If there is any difference, it is due to subjective causes. There is a demand, and the demand is satisfied. So far as the *content* of knowledge itself is concerned, I am absolutely indifferent to it. The same may be said about the laws of nature. What is it to me how nature works, and whether one set of laws is true or another. The knowledge by itself is immaterial, and represents no value. It gains value, once again, through subjective causes. I can *utilize* the knowledge for my well-being or the well-being of the human race. Because of this utility, I have *created* a value which attaches not only to the actual laws discovered by me and which are capable of being put to use, but also to all those means and methods which indirectly lead to the discovery, but which by themselves seem to be without any utility and to be pervaded by the so-called disinterested search for truth for the sake of truth.

5. Indian philosophy does not indulge in half truths, such as the so-called intrinsic value of knowledge. Knowledge must have a use; and philosophical knowledge, if it is superior to every other species of knowledge, must have the highest use. We suffer from certain ills which no human agency can cure. They are part of our lot as human beings. We want to be free from such ills; and we want to know the truth, because the truth shall make us free. Indeed, we may not all know, or appreciate the idea, that we are bound and want to be free. But there is no doubt that we all positively desire freedom from pain and the attainment of the greatest possible joy. Pain, or evil in general, is something which we automatically reject. It is a dis-value. Joy is that which we accept, and which we desire to possess evermore. There is no value greater than this. Value is just a name for the greatest possible joy or bliss. It is the only unconditioned or absolute value.

6. We often suppose that the ideal of individual joy or individual freedom is crude. Pursuit of self-interest in any form whatsoever is the very reverse of all moral values. Service of

humanity, self-dedication and self-sacrifice constitute the highest moral and spiritual ideal. But we deceive ourselves through words. We forget that we find our best interest in the very negation of self-interest. No man can help serving his own interest in this higher form. The very fact that we *accept* a way of life is the very best evidence of serving our own interest. We call it our real joy. The pain involved in it is subordinate to the joy. Paradoxically, we may be said to rejoice in pain. However that be, joy is that which we cannot but accept; while pain is that which we cannot but reject. All our values are forms or inadequate expressions of the Absolute Value. Philosophic knowledge has no other use. To be of value, it must be a means to the attainment of the Absolute Value or Bliss Ever-lasting.

7. We have spoken of knowledge as the means and joy as the end. But joy can only be realized in real being. Being or existence is the presupposition of all value. More than that. The being in which joy is realized must be intelligent being; for it is of the essence of joy that it should be enjoyed, appreciated or valued. Joy can only exist in an intelligent self.

A further step is naturally indicated here. What is real joy? We not only want joy; but we want infinite joy, so that more cannot be added to it. We want *niratiṣaya-ānanda*, or joy that cannot be excelled or exceeded. This joy requires being that is itself infinite. Thus Vedānta declares: "That which is Great is joy; that which is small is painful — *yo vai bhūmā tat sūkham; yat alpam tat asūkham*."

8. It follows from the above that infinite joy is not possible without infinite being whose nature it must be. All joy that is experienced by us is limited. It *can* be exceeded. The moment we become conscious of it, it is seen to be finite or limited. We can certainly add to it or go beyond it. It is *that much only*, no more. The consciousness of this limitation is the consciousness of a deficiency, which is naturally painful. The joy that cannot be exceeded must be more than an ordinary experience associated with objects and situations. It must be the very *nature* of being; so that being itself is joyful. *To be is to be joy*. This joy cannot be objectified or known. It cannot arise or terminate. It is always there as being is there. All that we can possibly say is that although it is always there as part of being, it is covered or hidden. When it is uncovered or manifested, it is said to arise. But in reality it does not arise, even as real being does not arise.

9. Vedanta calls this real being that is intelligent, blissful, and great beyond everything that is great, "Brahman". To know Brahman thus becomes the highest kind of knowledge or true wisdom. But how can we know Brahman, the infinitely Great? Is it not an impossibility in the absence of any direct intuition of It? That would indeed be so, if the Brahman that we are seeking to know were outside of us and transcendent to us. In fact, if we could know such a Brahman, it would, by the very fact of our comprehension, be reduced to finite being. We could not possibly know Brahman in this way or as an external entity. The infinitely Great cannot be outside of us; for that would involve a self-contradiction. It must be object of no kind. The only entity that is object of no kind and that is real is our Self. Nobody can deny his Self; and nobody can fail to distinguish his Self from every object presentable to him. Here is something that answers all our requirements,—real being, intelligence and non-objectivity. We can only know Brahman as the Self,—*tat tvam āsi*. There is no other way. The essential identity of Brahman with the Self must be uncovered. It is to us at present hidden from view. This is our great ignorance. The Self does not appear to be infinitely Great, nor blissful in nature.

10. We know the Self in a way. We cannot disclaim all direct intuition of it. It is not a mere concept to us like the concept "Brahman". We have no assurance of the existence of "Brahman" except through the revealed word or *śrūti*. The same cannot be said of the Self. We all use the word 'Self' significantly. Everybody, including the most confirmed sceptic, says, *I am*. Nobody says, *I am not*. It is a universal experience. More than that. Nobody has any experience of his own Self as *this* or as *object*. In fact, if any object were pointed out to him, however subtle and intimate it might be, he would unmistakably distinguish his self from it. What is given is *parāg*. It is unintelligent (*jada*) and of the nature of the not-Self (*un-ātman*). As opposed to it, the Self is *pratyag*. It is never given. It is our inmost being. It knows everything, but none knows *It*.

No one should have any doubt about the *being* of the Self and about its character as *pratyag* or immediate; and because it is immediate, no one should have any doubt about its character as *intelligent*. In fact, nothing else is intelligent. No object can be said to be intelligent; for it is of the essence of the object that it should be *given to intelligence*. What is given is for that reason alone unintelligent. Given-ness, in fact, is the only legitimate

meaning of what is called unintelligent being or *jada*. The Self alone is therefore intelligent; and no line can be drawn between the *being* of the Self and the *intelligence* of the Self. It is just intelligent being or pure intelligence.

Thus we *all* know two things about the Self, namely that it *is* or *exists*, and that it is *intelligent*. These are also the characters of Brahman,—*sat* and *cit*. We can now claim that Brahman is known to us in the Self by these two characters. There is no ignorance in respect of them. They are always uncovered to us. But we do not know Brahman in its infinite greatness or non-duality; and we do not know Brahman in its blissful character. The self appears to be quite finite and full of the miseries of existence. It is the business of philosophical knowledge to reveal the Self as verily Brahman in these very respects. There will then be no distinction between the Self and Brahman. The identity between the two will be complete,—and that will be the consummation of the philosophic quest.

11. We said that the Self as intelligent is always uncovered. It is that to which objects are covered or uncovered, known or unknown. The Self is that which is neither known nor unknown. It is always self-effulgent or self-revealing (*sva-prakāśa*). The self-effulgent cannot be known; for it is no object of any kind,—and only objects are known. It is also not unknown. For it enters into our usage or *vyavahāra* as what is always immediate and non-objective. Thus the self-revealing character of the Self may be understood as the character of "not being known, and yet capable of entering into our use as what is immediate and non-objective"—*ajñāté sati, aparokṣa vyavahāra yogyatvam*.

This leads to an important corollary. There cannot be two Selves that are *svaprakāśa* or self-effulgent in the sense given above. For the moment either of them becomes an object to the other, it loses its character of being *svaprakāśa*. No object can ever be *svaprakāśa*. But if neither can be an object, how can the two Selves be known as two? Only objects can be distinguished, and only objects can enter into any numerical order. Thus only one Self can be *svaprakāśa*, and that Self is the Self of all. We are all one Self. Our differences lie in the non-essential adjuncts that do not constitute our real being. This one Self is literally without a second. For if there is an other to it (except through erroneous perception), there will be duality, and the Self will lose its non-objective or self-effulgent character. The moment the Self enters into relations, it is reduced to an object of a sort. It

is less than the Self or a degraded Self. The real Self can enter into no relations; and because it has no relations, nothing can limit its being. The Self is verily Brahman, the great, the infinite. The not-Self is finite and limited. There is no third alternative between the Self and the non-Self that can conceivably realize the infinitude of Brahman-hood. In short, my own Self is really Brahman.

12. But is this Self blissful? If the Great alone is joy, the Self that is great is indeed infinite joy. This can be easily seen, if we consider the value-character of the Self. The Self is dear to us beyond all things that are dear. Nothing is dearer or more beloved of us than the Self. It is the pure image of love. All other things are dear to us *for the sake* of the Self. The Self is not dear to us for the sake of anything beyond Itself. We like certain things; and when tired of them, we can also throw them away. They are like-able only as long as they serve certain purposes of the self. The Self on the other hand is loved for its own sake. Its very being is joy. We can never therefore cease to love the Self; and when there are appearances to the contrary as in suicide, or even in martyrdom, the same absolute love of the Self inspires our actions. We want the Self to be freed of certain unpleasant or even unbearable experiences, and to attain to *the peace and the pure joy of its own being* without physical or worldly attachments. We all want to be. Nobody ever wants *not to be*. Being itself is joy. It is the only lasting or perennial joy. It is also the purest joy, for it has none of those selfish or immoral motives attached to it that belong to the finite and limited self. Even moral motives have the stamp of human frailty and finitude. The Self is thus the very image of pure Eternal Bliss. It realizes all those characters which man desires and which Brahman alone is supposed to have. The Self is what Brahman is.

13. Those who have followed this argument can easily see that the conclusions of Vedānta, however paradoxical and opposed to common-sense thinking, are based not upon any mystical and so unavailable intuition, but upon a certain analysis of common universal experience. If there are any differences, they are differences as to the way we analyse this experience. But are the conclusions of Vedānta *rational*? That depends upon what one understands by reason. And then there are levels and levels of reasoning. What is a problem to me may not be a problem to you; and so the reasoning by which I resolve my problem will be no genuine piece of reasoning for you, but so much meaning-

less verbiage. The truth is that the problems of philosophy are so personal that it is not always easy to have identical problems. Indeed, we often couch our problems in the same identical language. But we by no means mean the same thing by that language, and we do not, in real spiritual content, ask exactly the same identical questions. Language can be a hindrance as well as a help in achieving general agreement.

We reason on the basis of a problem; and the problem arises on *the basis of certain presuppositions* which we take for granted. We cannot possibly question all along the line. We must accept certain propositions as true before we can formulate a question. And the best way of achieving agreement in philosophical reasoning is to lead back the question to those propositions and to examine their validity in a wider context of experience. Most often it will be seen that we are putting wrong questions; because they are based upon wrong presuppositions. Philosophical reasoning is thus no easy matter. It is too personal for general agreement. It requires great sympathy and power of understanding to see another's problem and to appreciate the way he reasons in order to solve that problem. Since to establish agreement as to the problem and its solution is not easy, the way is open to mutual disparagement and bickering. There is no common and fixed pattern for philosophical reasoning. It depends very much upon the nature and the level of the question. What wonder then that every philosopher thinks himself right and the other fellow wrong! The real truth of the matter is that no philosopher has ever proved another wrong from the latter's point of view. We all stand on different levels and reason from different sets of presuppositions. What we need, in order to get at the truth, is to "liquidate all kinds of pre-suppositions, and to see that truth which has no suppositional element in it and which is direct and self-revealing. The real spirit of Vedantic philosophy lies in this direction. Its reasoning has no arbitrary character. It liquidates every position through an analysis of its presuppositions, and shows it to be self-contradictory. It itself holds no position, but takes its stand on truth which is self-evidently true, and which has no *formulation* that is literally valid. We may indulge in logic-chopping even in connection with Vedānta, but that will not serve the interests of truth.

The Standpoint of Philosophy

BY

P. R. DAMLE,

Nowrosjee Wadia College, Poona

Let us start with a brief statement of the views held on this question.

The common-sense man of course, as we know, is a privileged person, and he can advance just any view he likes as suits him in any particular situation. In his opinion, when he is in a critical vein, philosophy seems to deal with mere words, it is engaged in mere logic chopping without any reference to facts, with a hazy super-sensuous world consisting of mysterious entities like soul, god etc. When, on the other hand, things perhaps have gone wrong with him in life and have puzzled him, he credits philosophy with the capacity to solve all the difficulties of life and science satisfactorily. The scientist, who began his career apologetically and as a subservient camp follower of the philosopher, soon gained such ground in prestige and popularity that in his opinion, whether always frankly expressed or not, the knowledge which philosophy professes to supply does not have either the prevision or the certainty or the utility which real knowledge (as pursued by the scientist) possesses. It is according to the scientist a study on the borderland of ignorance (or knowledge if one wishes to put it constructively), and while in our weaker moments, and in the absence of anything better, recourse to philosophy may be understood. It is true that in recent times some eminent scientists have expressed views which are more friendly to philosophy; but with great respect, I think that there is reason to believe that their support of philosophy reveals a misconception of the characteristic position both of science and of philosophy; and in any case, even today they are not in accord with the bulk of scientific opinion. The artist, being admittedly a man of genius who recognizes and respects no laws or ends but those of his art, considers that philosophy is a study with a marvellous gift for making simple things difficult, and everything dry as dust and lifeless. The moralist is puzzled at, and feels impatient with, philosophy for he suspects that under high-sounding and often incomprehensible names the philosopher creates uncertainty about matters which

are and ought to be clear and certain. He is therefore unwilling to let the philosopher loose among unthinking common men, for he is afraid that far from making them more steady and earnest as moral agents, philosophy often unsettles them and thus affects their practice undesirably. The shallower among men of religion make fun of philosophy as they do of most other valuable human activities. The earnest man of religion accepts philosophy with tolerance, often as a kind of innocent pastime for those so inclined, or at the most as a secondary and less certain approach to the goal of life than the one which religion provides.

Passing now to the philosopher's opinion about himself,—his view about the task, motive, scope and standpoint of philosophy,—we find that like the sciences philosophy began its career at the behest of practice. Our own philosophers of almost every school tell us repeatedly that the study of philosophy is pursued by those who feel the distress of life acutely, and who are so dissatisfied with the remedies which the sciences and the arts seem to suggest, that they are in search of a master-key to the problems of life. In the west, after a brilliant adventure into cosmology, philosophy came to be recognized, with and after Socrates, emphatically as a way of life. Both Plato and Aristotle accepted a very intimate connexion between life and philosophy; and although neither they nor Socrates can be described as pragmatists, philosophical theory was certainly recognized by them all to have very close connexion to practice. During the last stage of Greek and Roman philosophy, Philosophy was even more emphatically practical, and it was undoubtedly so during the middle ages under the influence of Christian thinkers. Among the founders of modern philosophy, we know that Spinoza actually calls his great work on philosophy "Ethics". Hume among the Empiricists following Bacon defines validity as utility, and thus practice becomes in a sense the sole test of a theory. Kant considers his critique of Practical Reason more important than his epoch-making critique of Pure Reason. The Hegelian Idealists, the pragmatists, the positivists, the Bergsonians and the modern realists are too near us for us to point out their different positions on this point. I would here only refer to the most recent tendency in European Philosophy in this matter. In recent contributions to Philosophy, we find that in the *Hibbert Journal* as well as Indian Journals devoted to philosophy, emphasis is being laid on the distinction of philosophy from science, and on the possibility and need of utilizing philosophic achievement for the real betterment of life. This is hailed in India as a long

needed correction of the Western point of view, such as expressed in Bradley's description of metaphysics as an 'intellectual game', and the definition of metaphysics as 'a search for intellectual satisfaction'. Several Modern Indian students of philosophy have suggested that this is a triumph of Hindu wisdom and that after a travail of 2500 years the west has come to realize the real value and nature of philosophic knowledge.

In my opinion, while there is some truth in each one of the views advanced above, and while in philosophy like everywhere else we have been progressive on the whole, none of these views really defines the philosophic standpoint correctly. I would in one word describe the standpoint of philosophy as the standpoint of Reflection or self-conscious experience. This gives us at once what is distinctive or characteristic of philosophy and what is not quite common to philosophy and other studies, and it also gives us its limitations as well as excellences. Excluding commonsense of which it is difficult to give the scope, nature or motive specifically, we find that sciences pursue truth or knowledge, art pursues, beauty, morality good, men of religion God. Philosophy may in this way be described as pursuing wisdom.

This explains how philosophy is described as a study which deals with the whole reality, but from a different view-point. Whereas science pursues truth and knowledge, it never thinks about truth or knowledge; philosophy alone does it. The philosopher does not tackle new provinces of experience, but reorganises the provinces of experience annexed by science from a point of view which is wider and higher. Its subject-matter is not different or separate from that of the sciences, but its point of view is. It is analytical as well as synthetic, critical as well as creative and it deals with facts as well as values. Whereas in the different sciences one or the other aspect of the method is relevant, in philosophy the method is characterized by all the qualities revealed in the different scientific method. This is how it comes about that whereas it is true that philosophy must base itself on sciences, and is not true philosophy without such a basis, it is also true that philosophy is not just science.

As I understand the matter, philosophy is not directly concerned with any part of practice, although it is concerned indirectly with all experience including the physical, biological, intellectual, aesthetic and moral. A good deal of confusion has arisen within philosophy because the claims of one or the other

of these have been accepted at their face value; and we have naturalism, spiritualism, and pragmatism of various kinds.

If therefore we define the standpoint of philosophy as that of reflection, what can we say further about the place and the utility of reflection, and therefore of philosophy? Why does man reflect? He reflects, I think, because it is his nature to do so. In a way and to a degree all experience is self-conscious; in characteristic human experience, this self-consciousness comes into its own,—man not only knows, but knows that he knows. That is how science itself and law arise, and out of science arises philosophy. Having the nature that he has man cannot like animals content himself merely with pursuing some objective, but must bring it in reference to his self, or rather must ponder and reflect over it.

Some of the most important of philosophic positions and problems arise, it may be seen, from this peculiar standpoint of philosophy. To define reality as a self-consistent system, or even to reject the definition, we have to assume a position in which the contents of all experience are consciously pondered over. Take even the question whether reality is material or spiritual, one or many. To none who does not reflect or bring in contents of his experience to self reference, do these questions arise at all, as e.g. they do not to the physiologist or the psychologist. Man's strength and weakness both lie in this characteristic of his mind. If, like God, he could see everything directly and completely, he would never reflect and have neither science nor philosophy. On the other hand, he will not have these, if like animals he was content with momentary experience. Knowledge, even scientific knowledge, implies a degree of self-consciousness; philosophic knowledge implies self-consciousness to a much higher degree.

The utility of philosophic knowledge is in principle like the utility of all other knowledge. Wisdom is its own reward in the first place to all who care for wisdom, and in the second place all human progress is ultimately based on and continues with the help of wisdom by whatever name described.

I wish on this point to mention some thing which may not be acceptable to all. I maintain that it is inevitable, and in that sense proper, that men of science and men of philosophy must to an extent be men of inaction. The philosopher has often been described as 'a gazer at the stars'. Unfortunately, protesting against this parody of his task, the philosopher has gone to the other extreme, and claimed direct practical utility to philosophy.

I need not cite instances. The Karmayogin who acts with detachment, the Platonic philosopher who 'should have been the king' are two of the best illustrations of this belief.

It appears to me that while in God-head it may be possible thus to combine perfect wisdom with great and intense activity, it will be rare indeed to find the combination among human beings. Our powers and aptitude as finite beings are limited, and usually if we do one thing well, we have to do it at the cost of other things which other people do well! In the circumstances, it is wrong to suggest that one can be at once good in philosophy and a very active man of action. This is true even of science. Great scientists have seldom been great inventors, not to speak of successful professors or men who got on well in life! It is even more true of philosophy, just because of its wider scope, and the greater complexity and generality of its problems. It is only unthinking rashness therefore that makes people imagine that they can cultivate philosophy well and at the same time do well as men of action. Not only is it true that you cannot at the same time care for Caesar and for God, the flesh and the spirit, but you cannot at the same time care for all aspects and needs of the spirit. The best way is to look after one aspect well, bearing in mind of course the limitations of one's course of action. All roads do meet at the summit; let us therefore follow our own path to the summit and keep to it scrupulously and watchfully.

That is why, Bradley tells us, although there probably are better approaches to the real than metaphysics, such as Religion, yet while one is a metaphysician one should not seek anything else. It is common in this part of the country to misunderstand Shankar's philosophy and hold it responsible for all our problems. Shankar's philosophy makes as much room for action as any other philosophy, but Shankar points out what many other people do not, namely the fact that *psychologically* the dawn of wisdom is a task so absorbing that it leaves little room for anything else, such as action. It may be, and it is indeed the case, that most of us are men of action rather, than of thought; but to the extent that we are men of thought, it is impossible for us to be zealous men of action.

The direct practical utility of philosophy consists in its being itself. Indirectly, it is of great use in enabling one to avoid intellectual errors arising out of narrowness and lack of openmindedness, and moral errors arising out of vanity and lack of sense of proportion. As to the direct utility, it consists in the training of

one's understanding so as to make it truly detached. From my limited personal experience, I can say that contrary to what people imagine, a good student of philosophy is not useless for everything else, but is on the contrary good at everything because of his training in philosophy. Philosophy was rightly considered by the Greeks as the science of sciences. It is the culmination, and organization of all scientific experience; these sciences include the ethical, the historical, the social as well as the physical sciences.

This takes me to the last point I wish to deal with in this paper, the correspondence between Philosophy and Religion. It seems to me that while Philosophy organizes all our theory, Religion similarly organizes the whole of our practice. Like Philosophy, true religion is catholic in outlook. Toleration bordering on mildness and weakness, appreciation bordering on uncritical credulity, characterize the psychology of the religious-minded man. Sometimes we find that the moralist in him or the scientist in him insists on one particular theory with zeal and obstinacy, but as a religious-minded man he is not given to any exclusive insistence.

Religion like philosophy has been mis-understood both by its critics and its friends. India is often described both by Indians and others as a deeply religious country. And on this mistaken assumption regarding our religiousness, it is argued that our failure as a nation is due to our other-worldliness, which in its turn is due to our Advaita Philosophy.

My reply on behalf of religion would be that it is a libel on religion to mistake it for passivity and narrowness in any form. It is clear to any one who reflects even for a moment that not Islam or Hinduism, but politics, economics and material things, places of power and prizes are dividing us and leading to the grievous spectacles of mass frenzy. It is equally true that no truly religious man is other-worldly in the sense of neglecting this world and its calls. He is a man of God, and loves this world as the work of God. Only true religion can lead to wise activity in any sphere. Like all other things, religion has a negative aspect; but the positive aspect is the fundamental one, and that leads not to an other-worldliness in the sense of negating this world, but gives us two worlds—this and the other; or better still, this world itself as the other,—the clouds of dust become transformed by the love of God and become golden!

Philosophy and Religion as attempts in their respective spheres (theory and practice) to organize the whole of experience corres-

pond a great deal, and have similar tasks to perform with regard to their subject-matter. No one can therefore become philosophic unscientifically nor religious by and through failing in life. On the other hand, mere science is not philosophy, nor mere success in life religiousness.

As to the relation between Philosophy and Religion themselves, it is the general relation between theory and practice. Both are in a sense abstractions, and there is no mere philosophy or mere religion. Truth, Beauty and Goodness may be ultimately one, but the higher and wider things which correspond are wisdom (represented by philosophy) and Love of God (represented by Religion). Spinoza seems to combine these in his notion of the Intellectual Love of God, for he means by it that the philosopher's knowledge (wisdom) is Love, that real love is understanding, and vice versa.

The Theories of Drishti-Srishti and Srishti-Drishti

BY

CHANDRODAYA BHATTACHARYA,
Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner

Drishti-srishti and *srishti-drishti* are two different views, within advaitism, in regard to the ontological status of the world which we experience in our wakeful states. Broadly speaking, the theory of *drishti-srishti* maintains that the *esse* of the world is its knowledge, while the theory of *srishti-drishti* holds that it has an existence which is different from and independent of its knowledge. Since it is a fundamental tenet of advaitism that the world necessarily depends, for its existence, on the Absolute which is of the nature of knowledge, therefore, every advaitist must support the theory of *drishti-srishti* from this fundamental standpoint of advaitism. However, the word "knowledge" stands in common discourse not for the Brahmic knowledge which is eternal, but for such particular and finite mental acts of cognition as the perception of a table; and it is by reference to such finite cognitive acts that the distinction between the two theories in question is to be understood. While the theory *srishti-drishti* says that the things of the world are independent of the mental acts by which they are known, the other theory maintains the contrary thesis that they are not so.

Srishti-drishti: Obviously, the first theory seems to have the support of commonsense. The table which I am seeing now existed even before I saw it, and will exist even when I shall not see it. Besides, it is outside, while the act of seeing is inside, my mind. The table, therefore, must be different from and independent of the act. This view seems to go counter to the advaitic doctrine that matter is an appearance and dependent on intelligence; for if the table were real apart from its perception, it could not possibly be an appearance, since an appearance must not be supposed either to precede or succeed the consciousness to which it appears. The theory of *srishti-drishti* meets this difficulty by contending that although the table has an existence which is independent of its perception, still it is not independent of that eternal and transcendental knowledge which is the ground of the world and which reveals it as long as it

exists. It is true that when I saw the table for the first time, I did not feel like having seen it formerly in some other way. I do not seem to be conscious of the table except when I see it or know it by some similar mental act of cognition. But the reason for this is that the transcendental knowledge of the table is not explicit and determinate, like an act of perception. Really speaking, it is the same eternal intelligence which knows the table sometimes transcendently and sometimes empirically, i.e., with the help of a mental act. The two modes of knowing the table are different from each other; yet both of them are modes of knowing. The table does not come into being with the particular act of seeing it, nor does it depend upon the act. Still, the table should be deemed an appearance. For although it exists even when it is not the object of any cognitive act, still it never exists without being apprehended by the transcendental intelligence.

Drishti-srishti.—But the theory of *drishti-srishti* maintains that the table which I am seeing now is not different from my act of seeing it. It neither precedes nor succeeds the act; nor do the act and the table differ from each other.

It may be objected against this that since the table, as has already been mentioned, is an extra-mental object and the act is a mental phenomenon, so the one must differ from the other. Even granting for argument's sake that cognitive acts such as perception are the only evidence for the existence of the table, and therefore there is no ground for asserting that the table exists when it is not perceived or known in some other way, one must nevertheless concede that the table is different from its perception.

The theory of *drishti-srishti* solves this difficulty by pointing out that just as there is no evidence for the existence of the table in an unperceived state, similarly there is no evidence for asserting that the table is different from its perception. To say that their distinction is proved by the fact that the one is an outer, while the other is an inner, object is to beg the question. For the words "inner" and "outer" already imply this distinction. That we feel and believe that the one is inner and the other outer is not a valid evidence. For a belief requires justification by actual knowledge. It would not be proper to think that the act of seeing the table knows also the distinction between the act and the table. For in knowing this distinction, the act must also know itself; but this would seem to be impossible. An act of cognition is a transitive act and, as such, it must necessarily be directed not to itself, but to an object which is other than itself. The act of

cutting, for instance, cannot cut itself but only such a thing as a piece of wood. Of course, advaitism believes that no mental act can exist even for a moment without being known. But the knowledge of the act is no finite and particular act, but that eternal and transcendental knowledge which is the Absolute. It may be contended that the Absolute consciousness reveals not only the mental act but also the distinction of the act from its object. But from the standpoint of advaitism this contention, even if it be true, cannot be accepted as a valid proof for the distinction of a cognitive act and its object; for what the transcendental absolute consciousness reveals may, according to advaitism, be false. Thus no evidence can be cited for proving that the table which I am seeing now is different from my act of seeing it.

It may be contended that the very nature of knowledge is such that it must have some object which must be different from itself. A piece of knowledge which has no object is a mere idea and has no basis whatsoever in actual experience. Every piece of knowledge which forms part of actual experience is found to have some object. If this were not so, we should have failed to distinguish one cognitive act from another. But as a matter of fact, the knowledge of the table is felt by us to be different from that of the chair. Every act of cognition has a specific and determinate character of its own. Yet knowledge as such should be the same everywhere. Its specific and determinate character must, therefore, be due to its object.

The theory of *drishti-srishti* removes the above difficulty in the following manner. By saying that a piece of knowledge must have some object which is different from it, is it suggested that unless there be some object to a cognitive act, it is incapable of originating at all? This suggestion must be rejected for the following reason. A cognition comes into being as soon as all its preconditions are fulfilled; and the object of a cognitive act is not found to precede the act invariably. For it is admitted on all hands that the apparent object of an illusory piece of knowledge is not a precondition of that knowledge. Besides, it is possible that an act of cognition is self-differenced, and does not depend on any object which is different from itself in order to maintain its distinction from other acts of knowledge. The knowledge of the table can well be supposed to have a qualitative distinction which falls wholly within its own nature and is not relative to and derived from its object table. Thus this vast world with its diverse ob-

jects can be regarded as nothing but a series of cognitive acts forming the mental history of the knowing subject.

It may be objected that if the above view be true, there should be nothing in the world which could be said to persist for more than a moment; yet we have judgments of identity, based on direct knowledge, which tell us that many objects of the world persist in spite of the fact that their qualities undergo change. The table which I see now is recognised by me to be the same as that on which I was writing yesterday. Such judgments must be considered valid, since they are not contradicted by the rest of our experience.

But this objection is not legitimate. For these judgments are no more valid than similar experiences which occur in the state of dream, illusion, hallucination, etc.

It may be contended that a real snake, which one sees with naked eyes in broad day-light when one is wide awake, clearly differs from the imaginary snake which one wrongly sees in the place of a rope in indistinct light. That there is this distinction is proved by the fact, if proof be necessary at all, that the knowledge of the physical snake is due to objective reasons such as the functioning of sense-organs, while the knowledge of the illusory snake is due to a distorting imagination. Since the sense-organs cannot function except in the presence of the object which is to be known, therefore, there must be a physical snake which exists both prior to and simultaneously with the act of knowing it. Of course, even when we are dreaming, we feel that the sense-organs function in the same fashion. But this is a mere appearance of sensory activity, while in veridical perception, there is actual functioning of the sense-organs. Hence the object of valid knowledge must be different from its knowledge, whatever may be the case of the apparent object of an illusion.

The above contention, however, is based on circular argument. For, here, the validity of a cognitive act is sought to be determined by the presence of sense-activity, while the presence of sense-activity is sought to be determined by the validity of the act. Moreover, the object which is believed to exist even when it remains unknown must be considered to be the Absolute itself, from the standpoint of advaitism; for the word "unknown" in this connection means, for advaitism, "concealed by ignorance" and it is the Absolute alone that can be concealed by ignorance other things originate only after nescience has done its work of con-

cealing the true nature of the Absolute, that is, they are illusory, being products of nescience. Therefore, there is no sense in saying that they are concealed by nescience; for illusory objects can never remain unknown as long as they exist, they must appear to some consciousness. Moreover, since the *esse* of nescience itself is its *percipi* which is the Absolute, it follows that the *esse* of tables, chairs, etc. which are the products of this nescience is their *percipi*. This implies that if there could be anything at all in regard to which the sense-organs could function it would not be nescience or any of its products, but the Absolute itself. But advaitism holds that the Absolute is essentially free from all attributes and parts, and the sense-organs cannot be supposed to function in respect of such an attributeless and impartite entity. Thus although we usually believe that things like tables, chairs, etc. are known with the help of sense-organs still this belief must be rejected by advaitism. For sense-organs, tables, chairs, etc. and the functioning of the sense-organs in regard to tables, chairs, etc. are all illusory and should therefore be understood on the analogy of dream-experience. Their "being", too, just like the "being" of dream-objects depends on their knowledge.

It may nevertheless be objected that the above view does not accept the three-fold distinction between the illusory, the empirical and the transcendental grades of reality a distinction which is usually maintained by the teachers of advaitism. For it does not grant that there is any object other than the Absolute which can ever remain unknown.

But this objection is not tenable. Granting that the table can exist without being known, it still cannot have that grade of reality which is possessed by the Absolute. If the monism of Shankara is to be maintained it would therefore be necessary to ascribe, to the table, that grade of reality alone, which is possessed by illusory objects.

It may still be objected that a grade of reality, simply because it is different from the transcendental grade, need not be identical with the illusory; for it can differ from both the transcendental and the illusory grades; and this would amount to the admission of a third grade, namely the empirical.

But this objection too cannot bear scrutiny. For before accepting such an empirical grade we must first be able to show some actual experience where the concept of empirical (as distinct from

both absolute and illusory) reality is illustrated. It would not be proper to point to our knowledge of objects like tables and chairs as an example of such experience. For commonsense considers them to be absolutely real, although advaitism cannot accept this common-sense view. Being concerned just now to ascertain the grade of reality of these very objects, an advaitist, before he applies the concept of empirical reality to them, should know where else within our experience this concept is applied. But no such experience can be pointed out. The only objects within our experience which we consider to be not real are those which we find to be illusory. So if after rejecting the absolute reality of objects like tables and chairs, we seek to ascertain their grade of reality, we have to do it on the analogy of that of illusory objects. It would appear, therefore, that objects like tables and chairs which we experience in our wakeful states have the same grade of reality as illusory objects, if advaitism is true.

Ordinarily, no doubt, we employ the "term" "real" to indicate material objects such as tables and chairs, while the term "apparent" is used to indicate imaginary things like those which are apprehended in illusion, dream, etc. These are the only two kinds of object which we recognize in ordinary life. And by the word "real", in this connection, we mean what is wholly real. But the *upanishads* declare that the word "real", in the sense of "absolutely real", is applicable only to the Absolute. Those, therefore, who accept the authority of the *upanishads* must not believe that the word "real" is rightly applicable to things like tables and chairs to which we usually apply it. But the only other kind of objects to which the word "real" in some sense is applied by us is illusory objects. So the table should be considered to have the same sort of reality as illusory objects. The distinction, therefore, between a real table and an illusory one has to be regarded as superficial we regard a table to be real as distinct from illusory only as long as its illusory character is not detected.

Still another difficulty against the above position is as follows. It has been maintained that no object can ever exist without being apprehended by an act of knowledge. But this cannot be true of objects which are beginningless, because no act of knowledge is beginningless; and advaitists grant that certain objects such as nescience are beginningless. But this difficulty can be removed if it be maintained that the theory of *drishti-srishti* holds good in the case of all objects except those which have no beginning.

A Comparative Evaluation of the Two Theories

Drishti-srishti and *srishti-drishti* are but different expressions of the same fundamental doctrine of advaita in regard to the ontological status of the world we see around us. Both the theories are at one in maintaining that this world is not absolutely real but only apparently so and that the only reality that there is, is Brahman which is absolutely simple and unitary in nature. Now *srishti-drishti* holds that, within the sphere of this apparent reality, there is a legitimate distinction between what is empirically true and what is empirically false, between what persists in time and what is momentary, what is mental and what is extramental; while *drishti-srishti* maintains that such distinction within the sphere of apparent reality is not ontologically legitimate and significant, that appearance and illusion are identical, that nothing persists in time, that everything is mental, that the entire world of experience is nothing but a series of successive and momentary mental states. While *srishti-drishti* says that world is like a dream, *drishti-srishti* avers that it is a dream. Both the views are logically self-consistent and consistent with the fundamental advaitic position. The merit of *drishti-srishti* is that it is simpler, since it accepts only two (instead of three) grades of reality namely the absolute reality of Brahman and the illusory reality of the world. It would appear, however, that it is not quite adequate to the complexity of human experience, within which falls the distinction between an illusory snake and a real snake a distinction which is not contradicted by any other experience except the final and saving knowledge of Brahman. Of course, if advaitism is true, the word "real" as an adjective of such a thing as "snake" cannot be understood as what is "absolutely real". Nevertheless, it can mean what is "real within the sphere of appearance", without giving rise to any self-contradiction. And since this meaning is compatible with the fundamental advaitic position and at the same time retains the empirically valid distinction between a real snake and an illusory one, it is drastic and even unreasonable to ignore and do away with the said distinction, unless there be adequate ground for doing so. The main argument that *drishti-srishti* offers for rejecting this distinction is that there is no satisfactory evidence for its validity. But the question is: Is there any satisfactory evidence for its invalidity? It would not be proper to urge that the burden of proof lies on those who want to retain the distinction. For this distinction is not a hypothesis, but is what forms part of our ordinary experience. On the contrary, the burden

of proof would seem to lie on those who would reject the validity of what forms part of ordinary experience. Nor can it rightly be maintained that advaitism demands the rejection of the distinction in question. For although advaitism demands the rejection of the common-sense notion that objects like snakes are absolutely real, still it does not demand the rejection of a distinction which falls within apparent reality. Moreover, *drishti-srishti*, too, has to grant, within the domain of appearance, certain objects such as *avidyā* which persist in time although they are not eternal. Finally, he who says that the world is no more than a series of successive and momentary mental states accepts the reality (albeit apparent) of such a series. On what evidence does he do so? Evidently on the evidence that such a series actually appears to consciousness. If so, he should have no objection to accepting the distinction between idea and thing, or that between an illusory snake and a real one as having the same sort of apparent reality, since it, too, appears to consciousness.

Philosophy of Shrimad Rajchandra

By


D. M. PATEL, M.A. (BOMBAY) B.A. (HONS) LONDON.

Reader in Philosophy,

M. S. University, Baroda College, Baroda.

Shrimad Rājchandra was born at Vāvāniā in Saurāshtra in 1868, and he died at Rājkot (Saurāshtra) in 1901. In a short span of 33 years' life he studied the fundamental philosophical doctrines of the various schools of thought well-known in India, and his considered opinion was that the philosophy of the Jaina School of thought was the most rational and the most effective in its suggestion of the method of Self-Realization. He who has controlled his desires, has attained mastery over his mind and senses, can utilise his body and its activities, his speech and its reactions, his mind and its thoughts, for a gradual elimination of all causes that bring about soul's bondage. He who has renounced all possessions, knows, sees and resides completely in his nature as Ātman or the spiritual self, clearly discriminates between the self and the not-self, between knowledge and ignorance, liberation and bondage, merit and demerit, and activities binding the soul and the means of release therefrom. He who knows that the pure being of the Ātman is the only object of contemplation is called a Jina.

Shrimad Rājchandra accepts the Jaina philosophy; for, he says, its doctrines are laid down by the great Tirthankaras who were twenty-four in number, starting from Rishabhadeva and ending with Vardhamāna Mahāvira as the twenty-fourth Tirthankara. A Tirthankara is a great founder and organiser of religion. By his teachings he clears the doubts of his contemporaries in matters of religion and philosophy, and provides an ideal of life and thought in his own person. Every Tirthankara confirmed the metaphysical truths accepted by his predecessor, and advised the people to realize them by a method suitable to the time. A Tirthankara lays down the path of the soul's liberation, and advises other souls to follow the path by which he has himself attained it. He originates a religious discipline, or reorientates it, or reformulates it in consonance with the need of the time, according as he is the first to do it or the successor of one such. A Tirthankara has no



defeated all his enemies,—physical, mental and spiritual; and so he is called an *Arihanta*. Similarly, one who has attained knowledge of absolute reality, i.e. pure Self or Atman and other Dravyas, one who abides in Atman only, one who knows Atman and lives as such, is called *Keval Jnāni*. Absolute knowledge of the real nature of Atman is not possible without defeating enemies of Atman in the form of ignorance, wrong action, infatuation, greed, attachment, excitement etc. Here the term knowledge is used in a special sense, namely the knowledge of the Jiva or Atman, Ajiva, and the relations between them. When a Tirthankara leaves the human body, he is known as a *Siddha*, one who has attained the state of pure unembodied Atman. An *Āchārya* is one who preaches and propagates the message and teachings of the Tirthankara. One who reads and helps others in reading the Jaina Sastras is known as an *Upādhyāya*. One who renounces all earthly attachments and relations, and concentrates on the efforts at liberation is called a *Sādhu*. Shrimad Rajchandra insists that for one desirous of liberation, right God, right Guru to lead one to God, and right religion or a path towards liberation, are very necessary. Of the five types of great souls—Arihanta (Tirthankara and Kevali), Siddha, Āchārya, Upādhyāya and Sādhu, any-one excluding the Siddha can be a right Guru or *Sādguru*. He says that Atman has three attributes,—right knowledge of pure existence as pure Atman, right intuition (*Samyaka Darśana*), and right conduct (*Samyaka Charitrya*).

By ignorance, a Jiva joins with Ajiva atoms, and forgetting his real nature, he regards the qualities of the Ajiva or lifeless matter as his qualities. The composites called *Pudgalās* of Karma atoms come and fix on the pure surface of the Jiva or Soul, invited by the ignorant Jiva; and as a result, an endless chain of merit and demerit, *Punya* and *Pāpa*, is formed which binds the Soul to its worldly life, and to the cycle of birth and death. By stoppage of the inrush of Karma atoms (*Samvara*), and by gradually removing the already admitted Karma pudgalas, a complete purge of attachment of Karmas results in the liberation of Jiva or Atman from the cycle of endless Karmas and of *Samsara*. Bondage is the attachment of Karmas to the Jiva, and liberation or Moksha is the separation of the Jiva from these actions. If it is asked as to why and when does the Jiva invite and get attached to these binding forces called Karmas, the reply is that this story has no beginning, and there has already been an endless chain of birth and death and rebirth for an infinite number of the Jivas. According to the Jaina System, and as accepted by Shrimad Rajchandra, the cosmic exis-

tence is divided into two parts,—(1) Loka and (2) Aloka. Loka is occupied by objects and individuals formed by five bodily forms called *Pancha Astikāyas*; and they are *Jiva*, *Pudgala*, *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāsha*. This Loka is surrounded by pure *Ākāsha* stretching from the bounds of Loka to infinity, and it is called Aloka. These five bodily forms called *Astikāyas* are known as *Dravyas*, which admit of both permanence and change. That which is possessed of many qualities and is capable of assuming many forms is called an *Astikāya*. Every *Dravya* is capable of change and evolution in its qualities and forms. There may be changes in Loka; but Loka as a whole endures through the changes of time. There is no *pralaya* or complete dissolution of the Loka. *Kāla* or an eternal series of moments of time is ever young. It is regarded as real but not possessing any bodily form. The Jiva is capable of extension and contraction along with the *Pudgalas* attached to it. In all there are six *Dravyas* capable of independent individuality. This cosmic reality made up of these six *Dravyas* eternally exists; it was in the past, it is in the present, and it will be in the future. It is not created by any one personality or by an impersonal power. It exists in its own right. Jainism does not believe in God as the creator of the world. God according to Jainism is a perfectly liberated Atman, and since such Atman has no purpose in starting any activity, the world as an activity could not be the work of God. While Vedānta of Shankara admits the oneness of Atman and Paramatman, and dismisses the final plurality of Atmans, Jaina System and Shrimad Rajchandra admit the eternal independent existence of not only the infinite number of Jivas, but also that of the infinite atoms of Ajiva or not-living or non-conscious reality. What is common to all *Dravyas* is their pure eternal independent existence. Excluding the Jiva, the four *Astikāyas* fall in the category of Ajiva.

The nine fundamental *Tattvas* are Jiva, Ajiva, *Punya*, *Pāpa*, *Āsrava*, *Samvara*, *Nirjarā*, *Bandha* and *Moksha*. Shrimad Rajchandra arranges these *Tattvas* in a cyclic order, and suggests that the Jiva by its attachment to Ajiva collects *Punya* and *Pāpa*; and there is the problem of Karmas rushing into the Soul (*Āsrava*), and a difficulty of stopping this rush (*Samvara*), one leading to *Bandha*, the other paving the way for *Moksha* or liberation. If the Jiva gives up its attachment to Ajiva and thinks only of *Moksha* and meditates on it, then the Jiva will attain *Moksha* by adoption of a specific discipline of life and thought. In the states of self-realization and *Moksha* a Jiva has omniscience,—a complete

intuition and knowledge of all the Tattvas and the relations and distinctions between them.

Shrimad Rajchandra in his 'Ātma Siddhi', a composition of 142 verses, states and explains the six fundamental philosophical truths, namely (1) Atman undoubtedly exists; (2) it is eternal, uncreated and everlasting; (3) it is in one sense the originator of its activities; and therefore (4) it rightly enjoys the fruits of its actions; (5) it is capable of liberation or Moksha i.e., freedom from actions and their fruition; (6) the way to liberation is the adoption of right religious discipline.

Shrimad Rajchandra primarily concerns himself with the embodied souls in the form of human beings, and says that a Jiva desirous of liberation must take the human form in order that it can attain right knowledge, the advice of the right Guru, and follow the path of the self-realized souls. The problem before him is how to attain Moksha for a Jiva in the cycle of birth and death. He studies the concept of liberation or Moksha as described by various philosophical systems, and he concludes that liberation means the return of the individual Soul to its own nature by breaking all its connections with the not-soul or Ajiva. Shrimad says that the human soul has had innumerable past lives and suffered miseries, because it could not distinguish between itself and its body. Now in human life there is a chance for reflective thinking on the nature of the real self and knowing it, so that it will no longer be led away by matter and its qualities. Complete happiness and bliss results from Self-knowledge, and that can be achieved by going to a right *Guru* and by adopting a right philosophy of life.

To those who object to accepting the existence of the Self or Atman on the ground that all that exists in the physical world is the object of some one's perception, and that since Atman cannot be seen as we see a jug or a piece of cloth, therefore there is no Atman, Shrimad replies that on proper understanding, Atman and its body are found to be quite different, and they are intuited as such. Atman is neither the living body, nor the senses, nor breath. Atman is the seer in sight, the knower of form, itself incomprehensible in any form. The unconditional experience of the Self or Atman outlives all other experiences. While the senses individually know their appropriate objects, the Jiva knows objects of all the senses. Neither human body nor senses alone nor breath can individually know Atman, but it is by its presence

that they can be known and that the worldly life is possible. Atman is quite independent in the midst of all bodily and mental activities and states. The nature of Atman is self-manifest and is pure consciousness. If you know the objects seen you must accept the existence of the seer who saw these objects and knew them. Besides, if the body and the Atman are to be regarded as the same, then with growth or decay of the human body one will say that the Atman has grown or decayed. On the contrary, we find the best of intellect in a slender body and a very shallow intellect in a fat body. This proves that Atman is something different from the body. It is strange, but painfully true, that the self who is to provide a basis for all rational doubt is itself made the victim of doubt. The conscious and the unconscious are so different in nature that to realize them as such is the prime need of philosophy and life.

Shrimad then points out a clear-cut distinction between the conscious Atman and the unconscious objects. To those who argue that admitting the existence of the Jiva or Atman, it is not necessary to accept its eternity or Nityatwa, since Atman can only be realized in the living body, and with the death of the living body there is no means of knowing the Jiva; and since death and life are subject to limitations of time, the Jiva should also be similarly limited, Shrimad Rajchandra replies that every living body is a composition of atoms which are unconscious, an object of some seer's perception and having some form. We can see how a body is formed, how it lives and how it ceases to function and decay. But we cannot see in the same way the beginning and the end of the conscious element. The Jiva is the recorder of the temporal changes occurring in a living body. The Jiva is the knower of its body, and without the independent existence of the Jiva such knowledge of the bodies, and especially of the living bodies, is unaccountable. In brief, the Jiva is not a result, it has no beginning, and so it is called *Anādi* and *Ananta*; while the Ajiva, the body of the Jiva, has a beginning and an end. None has ever experienced the creation of the conscious by the unconscious or of the unconscious by the conscious, and therefore the completely independent existence of the Jiva and the Ajiva has got to be accepted. This line of thinking is easily comparable to the Cartesian definition of the two substances, Soul and Matter. The Jiva never admits of destruction by any combination of events, and so it is called eternal or Nitya.

Besides, Shrimad Rajchandra argues that since in living beings like serpents we find predominance of certain mental qualities

from the very beginning of their life, it is easy to admit that this is due to their dispositions acquired in their past lives. The existence of exceptionally brilliant men and women, the extraordinary spark of intelligence in some children, the distinctions of status and disposition, — all these are helps to a logical acceptance of the past and the future births of the Jivas. The bodies of the Jiva may come and go, but the Jiva is the common factor and it has a goal to realize. Besides, at death, we say that the body will decompose and return to its elements, but we do not say the same about the Jiva. Hence the eternity of the Jiva.

Shrimad Rajchandra explains the relation of the Jiva to activities or Karmas. He says that some hold that the individual Jiva (Self) cannot start any activity; that the previous activity is the cause of subsequent activity in the bodily life. Jiva by nature being Asanga, i.e. non-attached to anything, would not desire anything. What binds the Jiva is the bodily constitution and mental dispositions which are congenital and acquired, and since all activity is either bodily or mental the non-attached soul will not own it nor originate it. If to act is to be bound, the soul by nature free will not act and invite bondage. Hence the relation of Jiva to Karma is difficult to explain. If Jiva is by nature active, and if activity is bondage, then the Jiva cannot be liberated. If the Jiva admits of liberation, it can only do so if it is not by nature attached to activity. It is, therefore, desirable either to hold that Jiva is by nature active and so there is no question of bondage or freedom for it, or to hold that actions are automatically governed, and that the Jiva has nothing to do with them; or to hold that the great God inspires the Jiva to start some activities, and as Jiva acts under God's inspiration, it is not responsible for the results of these activities. The question of liberation arises only when it is admitted that the Jiva, the individual embodied self, starts certain activities and so is responsible for their good or bad results, enjoys them, and after reflection and under advice of a right Guru follows a discipline to be free from all attachment to activities. The Jiva must realize that the path of bodily and mental action leads to bondage, and keeping away from it leads to liberation.

Shrimad Rajchandra's reply to this argument is that the Jiva is the sole inspiring agent behind all its activities. The unconscious is incapable of automatic action. Machines move by the will of the mechanic. A good machine implies good planning, and that is with an intelligent purpose. Since the liberation for

a Jiva is a philosophical reality, we cannot consistently say that Jiva as a pure substance is unattached to Ajiva and all activities. But we can say that the Jiva in Samsara, in the cycle of birth and death, and in its embodied state of existence, is the author of its actions and so a free agent, and by good choice it can pave the way for the proper understanding of its noumenal nature. Besides there is no need to bring in God as the author of human actions. God or Iswara is a reality, but he is pure Atman, self knowing self as existing and all-knowing. God is the ideal for the Jiva to be. If God is limited to actions as man is, then where is the Godhood of God? God is the Atman who has attained perfection in knowledge, intuition and pure existence. When the Jiva turns to its own nature, it is the author of its own nature, i.e. self-knowledge, self-intuition and self-existence. When the Jiva contacts Ajiva by ignorance, it is the author of its mental and bodily actions; it has therefore to enjoy or to suffer the fruits thereof, and finally to think of a release from the cycle of worldly existence. Activities having a beginning have their natural termination, and they lose the power of limiting the Jiva if they are allowed natural termination without any attachment. It is by suffering the activity throughout its course that the Jiva can be free from it. Here it is admitted that the Jiva is capable of changing its states when in contact with the Ajiva. The cause of this contact is found in ignorance, but such a contact is supposed to be from endless past.

Shrimad Rajchandra holds that though a Jiva's contact with Ajiva may be of endless past, it can be terminated with the help of right God, right Guru and right religion. Complete happiness of the Jiva lies in its retirement to its own nature, and not in its attachment to matter or Ajiva. Good and bad actions are both binding the Jiva; elimination of both of them is required for one desirous of liberation.

Shrimad suggests that it is only right knowledge of the nature of the real,—the Jiva and the Ajiva,—that will bring liberation to the Jiva. The beginningless ignorance of the Jiva can vanish at the dawn of right knowledge as the long enduring dream will be dispelled by a return to wakefulness. The knots that bind the soul of Jiva are those of *Rāga* or attachment, *Dwesha* or malice and ignorance or *Ajñāna*. Loosen these three knots, and liberation is attained. The pure conscious eternal existence is the nature of Atman; it is free from all appearances. We can attain it by keeping away from all appearances.

The discipline of self-liberation

After firmly establishing the six fundamental philosophical truths about the Atman, namely its existence, eternity, power of origination and enjoyment of activities and the fruits thereof, its liberation and the right religion as the path of liberation, Shrimad Rajchandra proceeds to elaborate the method of self-liberation. He says that it is no use wasting one's time after the theoretical discussions as to which of the many philosophical systems is the best and most logically exact. What one should do is to remove ignorance by knowledge, anger by piety and kindness, false sense of honour by humility, attachment to sense-pleasures and sense-objects by developing an intense spirit of non-attachment to bodily and mental activities; to quell in one's being the waves of emotional thoughts and activities, and to fix one's mind on the nature of eternal Atman as pure endless unchanging conscious and blissful existence. No particular sex nor a definite code of external manners need be considered favourable for liberation. No religion should monopolise the exclusive right to speak for liberation. One who removes all coverings thin or thick, good or bad, right or wrong, from his self is a liberated soul. One who pines for liberation is in a mood to approach and appreciate the teachings of a right Guru. The right Guru will enkindle in the aspirant for liberation a search for happiness and peace in his own internal being, and with his help the aspirant will succeed. When the soul is freed from its bodily attachment, it realizes its real nature and attains everlasting knowledge, peace and bliss. By this method one in the end realizes that the pure self is neither the author of bodily actions nor the enjoyer of the fruits thereof, and so the bondage and the liberation were the dual facts within the limits of the worldly existence of the Atman. Srimad Rajchandra says that one who is an aspirant for liberation must cultivate in himself seven virtues, i.e., *Dayā*, *Śanti*, *Samatā*, *Kshama*, *Satya*, *Tyāga*, *Vairāgya*; sympathy and piety, peace, equanimity, forgiveness, truthfulness, a spirit of renunciation and self-resignation.

Knowing in the human life that one is only pure self, one should constantly search for its liberation from worldly entanglements and bodily associations. One should be non-violent and sympathetic towards all fellow-travellers on the path of liberation. Then one should find peace in the advice of the right Guru, who will guide him to his liberation. One should feel tired of feverish activities and endless pursuits in the external world. With gradual

development of peace, one can maintain equanimity of mind and be a Sthitaprajña.

When the equanimity of mind is disturbed by adventitious anger, the aspirant should quell anger by forgiveness. Then such an aspirant will speak and act upto truth and nothing but truth. Truth in life is difficult to practise. Mahatmaji has rightly insisted on truth and non-violence as the fundamental virtues a man should practise both as an individual and as a member of society.

By constantly retiring to one's own nature as Atman, it will be easy to be free from worldly deceptions, and find peace and bliss where they really are.

