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Clive and Usury in Bengal

BY

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During his second administration Clive was called upon to grapple with the evil of usury which had recently reached alarming proportions among the servants of the Company. The latter lent large sums of money to Zamindars and farmers at a high rate of interest, and on the pretext of realising the debts due to them interfered in the collection of the Diwani revenues and caused undue obstruction to the work of the *amils* and other subordinates of the Naib Diwans.

Clive's attention was drawn to this evil by Muhammad Riza Khan himself during his visit to Murshidabad. (Beng. Sel. Com. Oct. 5, 1765). In the letter, received on Oct. 4, 1765, he complained to Clive, "There are many persons, who, with the pretence of debts being due to them, making use of the name of the factory, disturb the zamindars and obstruct the revenues of the *Sarkar*. Moreover, several evasive zamindars and *taaluqdars* borrow more or less from the dependents of the factories, and when their rents are demanded from them, go and shelter themselves under their protection, so as to be out of the power of the *amils*. With the pretence of debts being due from them, they carry their creditors into their districts, and embezzle the revenues, so that the money of the *Sarkar* remains unpaid; and spreading about reports that numbers of villages are rented to the dependents of the factory, they practise villainous tricks". (Trans. P.L.R., 1765, No. 148, p. 132).

At a meeting of the Select Committee held on October 5, 1765, Clive got the following resolutions passed on this subject (Beng. Sel. Com., Oct. 5, 1765):—

1. "Resolved, that positive orders be issued to the Chiefs of subordinates, and commanding officers of brigades, prohibiting them from lending money to the zamindars, or other servants of the government, on the security of lands by lease or mortgage, and also from exerting any degree of influence in the appointment

to the public offices, or otherwise interfering, directly or indirectly, with the business of government, on pain of suspension”.

2. “Resolved, that the above orders be sent by the Chiefs of subordinates and commanding officers of the brigades to the several gentlemen and others acting under them in inferior stations, who are in like manner prohibited from lending money, holding lands, etc., under the same pains and penalties”.

Soon after these resolutions were passed, Clive informed Muhammad Riza Khan that none of the Company’s servants, their agents, *bantias*, or dependents would be allowed to lend money without his consent or that of the other ministers. (Letter to Muhammad Riza Khan, Oct. 8, 1765. Trans. P.L.I., 1765, No. 46). In a letter to the Directors, Clive thus justified these resolutions, “It was the earnest request of the ministers, that we should impose such restrictions; and we thought compliance but reasonable as we were well assured that the revenue had suffered from the excess to which these practices were carried”. (Letter to Court, January 31, 1766).

This prohibition, however, had no effect, and the Company’s servants in the interior districts violated the orders of the Select Committee. Clive therefore got a more stringent resolution passed at a Select Committee meeting held on December 31, 1766. (Beng. Sel. Com. Dec. 31, 1766). The resolution ran as follows:— “Resolved, that we now enforce the above order, that no money shall in future be lent, except on respondentia, upon any pretence whatever, at a higher interest than twelve percent per annum: that all sums of money outstanding at a higher premium, shall be recalled on the 11th day of April next”.

In pursuance of this new resolution, Clive and his Select Committee wrote to the Chiefs of all the factories and the Residents at Burdwan and Midnapore in the following terms:—

“Sir,

On the fifth of October, 1765, the Select Committee issued orders that no civil or military servant of the Company, their banyans, or dependents, etc. should, after that date, lend money upon lease, mortgage or otherwise, to the zamindars, or other officers of the government, without the knowledge and consent of Muhammad Riza Khan and the ministers.

It is with concern we now understand that this order has been disregarded to the great prejudice of the revenue and injury of the Company; we therefore direct that you will make strict enquiry who are the transgressors and transmit to us the names of all such as have lent out money without obtaining the approbation of the ministers, and contrary to the injunctions of the Select Committee. At the same time, it is our positive resolution, that henceforward no British subjects in or out of the Company’s service, or their dependents, shall lend money, unless upon respondentia, at a higher rate of interest than twelve percent per annum; and that such sums of money as has been lent at a higher interest shall be recalled on the 11th day of April next, on pain of immediate dismissal and forfeiture of the Company’s protection; of which resolution, we direct you will make publication in due form, taking the most effectual steps to see it strictly obeyed”. (Vide. Circular letter, dated December 31, 1766).

At the time of his final departure from Bengal, Clive expressed the hope, in a letter to the Directors, that this regulation of usury would tend to improve the revenue collections. “As the success of the Durbar resident’s endeavours to complete the annual collections depends in a great measure upon the punctual observance of this highly necessary regulation”, he wrote, “you may rest assured, that nothing in our power shall be wanting to exact implicit obedience; and that we shall, without regard to persons, punish the offenders with the utmost severity”. (Letter to Court, January 24, 1767).

Minto, Baillie and Saadut Ali, 1807-1813

BY

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It is curious how the destinies of Oudh and the rise of the British power in India came to be linked together since the battle of Buxar, 22nd October, 1764. What is obvious, however, to any student of this period is how each particular instance of British contact with Oudh from this date right down to 1857, when it was finally annexed, serves to bring out only the darker and more unpleasant traits of the characters of some of the best administrators and statesmen produced by a nation which justly prides itself on the strength of its national character.

Asafuddowlah, then Nawab-Wazir of Oudh, had been assured in 1787 by the Marquis of Cornwallis, the Governor-General, that on the part of the British Government 'no interference shall take place in the details of the affairs of your Excellency's Government'.¹ In the same engagement he had been told regarding the subsidy payable by him, "Your Excellency shall not be charged with any excess on this sum of fifty lakhs of Sicca Rupees, and that no further demand shall be made".²

In 1797 Sir John Shore, the successor of Lord Cornwallis, personally went down to Lucknow and persuaded Asafuddowlah to defray, over and above his former subsidy, the expenses of one native and one European regiment, provided that they shall not exceed the sum of rupees five and a half lakhs per annum.³ Tuffuzul Husain Khan, a man who had once been agent at Fort William and who enjoyed the confidence and favour of the Governor-General, was appointed the Nawab-Wazir's minister.⁴ Thus both

1. Aitchison: "Treaties, Engagements and Sanads" 1863 Edition—Vol. II, p. 101.

2. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 100.

3. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 114.

4. 'Papers relating to India', printed by the House of Commons in 1806, p. 28.

the promises solemnly made by Cornwallis, i.e. that of not increasing the subsidy any further and that of not interfering with the internal government of Oudh, were quite non-chalantly broken by his immediate successor.

Hardly a few months had elapsed after this incident when Asa-fuddowlah died. He was succeeded by his son Wazir Ali, who was recognized Nawab Wazir of Oudh by the British Government. Soon enough, however, on the representation of Meer Saadut Ali Khan, the eldest surviving brother of the late Nawab Wazir regarding the dubious paternity of Wazir Ali, Sir John Shore came down personally to Lucknow, made some investigations and pronounced that Wazir Ali was not really his own father's son.⁵ Saadut Ali was, therefore, made the ruler of Oudh and Wazir Ali was pensioned off to Benares. The terms given to the new Nawab-Wazir were: (a) subsidy to be raised to seventy-six lakhs per annum, (b) the surrender of the fort of Allahabad for the use of the Company's troops, (c) twelve lakhs to be paid to the Company as compensation for its efforts to place him on the throne, (d) eight lakhs to be paid to the Company for the repairs of Allahabad fort and three lakhs for those of Fategarh fort, (e) various amounts in pension to be paid to the deposed Wazir Ali, the various Begums and princes of the Oudh royal family, the reputed children of the late Nawab-Wazir and to the Farrukhabad princes, etc.⁶ This arrangement was approved of, and one may whisper, even eulogised, by the Home authorities who put on record their appreciation of Sir John's 'temper, impartiality, ability and firmness.'⁷ Sir John Shore, who was now Lord Teignmouth, had indeed reason to congratulate himself and feel complacent.

Soon, however, he was succeeded by Lord Wellesley, who felt far from complacent and was full of new plans about this principality. He was eloquent over the necessity for 'military reforms' in Oudh. The Home authorities supported him in these considerations.⁸ The next logical step was that Saadut Ali should be persuaded to see eye to eye with the British authorities in this matter of 'military reforms'. Lord Wellesley decided that Mr. Lumsden, who was at that time Resident at Lucknow, was not an efficient enough lever to persuade the Nawab-Wazir, and also

that a military officer would be better qualified to talk of 'military reforms'. He was, therefore, to get the benefit of unsolicited assistance from Colonel Scott who had been appointed to be attached with Lumsden at Lucknow, without the latter's concurrence or even previous information. Naturally enough, Lumsden resigned and Scott was appointed in the vacancy.⁹

Negotiations with the Nawab-Wazir, for these 'military reforms' went on from January 1799 right upto November 1801, when at last poor Saadut Ali was forced to sign a treaty, through the joint efforts of the Governor-General, the Resident, and the Governor-General's brother, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, who had been sent to Lucknow towards the last stages of these negotiations, in order to bring greater pressure to bear upon this poor ruler. By this treaty the Nawab-Wazir was made to cede in perpetual sovereignty to the Company just a little less than two-thirds of his dominions yielding a gross revenue of one crore and thirty-five lakhs. In return the Company promised not to charge him with any further subsidies, and to defend against 'all foreign and domestic enemies' the territories which still remained with the hapless Nawab-Wazir. The Company reserved to itself the right to station British troops in any parts of the Oudh dominions. He was made to dismiss all his army except for an infinitesimal portion for purposes of state, and attendance on Amirs, etc. The crowning stipulation, however, of all these, was contained in the Article VI which said, ".....and the Honourable the East India Company hereby guarantee to His Excellency the Vizier and to his heirs and successors, the possession of the territories which will remain to His Excellency after the territorial cession, together with the exercise of his and their authority within the said dominions; His Excellency engages that he will establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration, to be carried into effect by his own officers, as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants; and His Excellency will always advise with, and act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the said Honourable Company."¹⁰

During the thirty-three months that the negotiations were in progress, many a time Saadut Ali was given the alternative to hand over his kingdom to the British in exchange for a handsome

5. Mill J: "History of British India", Vol. VI. Fifth Edn. (1858), pp. 35-39.

6. Aitchison: Op. Cit. pp. 114-120.

7. Papers printed by the House of Commons: Op. Cit. p. 31.

8. Papers: Loc. Cit. I. p. 3.

9. Papers: Loc. Cit. III. pp. 4-6.

10. Aitchison: Op. Cit. pp. 120-126.

pension for himself and his family and many a time did he desperately propose abdication, but that could not be, since the terms given to him even for abdication were far too stiff for him to acquiesce in. At last when he signed this treaty, which had been pressed upon him with an element of inevitability, he believed, or he deluded himself into believing, that having made this cession, in his remaining dominions, he would be free to rule according to his own ideas and feelings and even caprices.¹¹ At the same time it would be wrong to believe that he did not have any misgivings on the point of the presence of the British troops inside his dominions.¹²

He was, however, to realise later on in the evening of his life that this treaty of November 1801 was sinister not only in its direct consequences but much more so in potentialities. It was left to Minto to make Saadut Ali realise that the treaty into which he had been forced was a trap from the meshes of which there was no escape; and the more he tried to wriggle out of it the tighter the meshes grew.

The noble Marquis Wellesley was not content to let things rest here. He followed up the ratification of this treaty by going down himself to Oudh where he camped during the first two months of the year 1802. This opportunity was utilised in explaining and dilating upon certain terms contained in the treaty recently concluded. At the same time the Bhow Begum (also called the Begum of Fyzabad) who was the widow of Shujaud-dowlah, the mother of Asafuddowlah and the step-mother of Saadut Ali, offered to constitute the Honourable Company her heir.¹³ Against the acceptance of this offer militated the law of the land, the law of nations and the opinion of Wellesley himself previously expressed. She had hardly any right to dispose of the property which should have been left to return to her sovereign and son, in case of her decease. But Wellesley decided to accept the legacy and even had the presence of mind to put forth his own reasons for it.¹⁴

This explanation and elucidation of the Treaty was embodied in a written and authenticated document in the form of a Memo-

randum of propositions on the part of the Nawab-Wazir duly answered by the Governor-General.¹⁵ That it was the result of long and tedious negotiations is a fact pertinent in this reference, but a sketch of these negotiations would be out of the scope of this short essay.

Some of its contents are too important for us, however, to be neglected, especially because when, under Minto, the Resident and the Nawab-Wazir wrangled over several issues, both of them quoted, quite often, passages from this document. It was agreed that in 'the recovery of just balances from the Aumils and others' the Nawab-Wazir shall be assisted by the Resident. It was also accepted that in case the Resident had any disagreements with the Nawab-Wazir they were not to be made public and to be mutually adjusted between them.¹⁶ The Nawab-Wazir proposed to set up a new structure of judiciary for Oudh, in doing which he was encouraged by Wellesley who further agreed and declared that the administration of justice in Bhow Begum's Jagir also was to be under the Nawab-Wazir's authority and 'the Begum's servants must be subject to it.' This authority was to be enforced by British power. By agreeing to all this, in effect, the British Government had accepted also the principle underlying these arrangements, which the Nawab-Wazir, in the same document expressed as: "A partnership in Government is inadmissible".¹⁷ The Governor-General also promised to take under consideration all the disputes between the Nawab-Wazir and the Bhow Begum, and to effect a settlement between them 'on just, equitable and permanent principles.' The second son of the Nawab-Wazir, Mirza Ahmad Ali, was accepted as Minister for the affairs of Oudh Government.¹⁸ It was declared that the advices and counsels of the British Government to His Excellency would be offered 'in the form of friendly advice and in the spirit of reciprocal confidence and of mutual regard and respect.'¹⁹ The genius of Wellesley in framing vague and apparently harmless terms was undoubtedly great. On the most important of all points, important at least from Saadut Ali's angle of vision, he simply stipulated that, "In cases requiring the aid of the British Government, or the

11. "Oude papers" (January 1808—December 1815). Published by the Court of Proprietors 1824, p. 387.

12. Papers: Op. Cit. IV, p. 39.

13. Mill's 'History of British India'. Op. Cit. p. 187.

14. Mill's 'History of British India'. Loc. Cit. p. 185.

15. Aitchison: Op. Cit. p. 127.

16. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 128.

17. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 129.

18. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 133.

19. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 135.

assistance of the British troops, they shall be employed according to the exigency of the occasion."²⁰

He was more specific while laying down, in this agreement, the code of behaviour for the Resident at Lucknow. "The Resident must conduct himself to the Nabob-Vizier, on all occasions, with the utmost degree of respect, conciliation and attention, and must maintain cordial union and harmony in all transactions, and must endeavour to impart strength and stability to His Excellency's authority.

"The Resident must never proceed to act in the affairs of the reserved dominions, without previous consultation with His Excellency or with his Ministers, and the Resident must, in the first instance, observe strict secrecy with regard to the subject of such consultations, until the measures to be adopted shall be finally determined."²¹

In the last paragraph of this document Wellesley tactfully expresses the confident (and pious?) hope 'that no future vexation can occur in the transaction of affairs.'²² And this when he ought to have realised that he had stripped the Nawab-Wazir of his dominions, and as Mill says, placed things 'in such a form; that it may still be affirmed he possessed them.'²³ This treaty, which stipulated that the ruler of Oudh should in future exercise his sovereign powers under the supervision and counsel of the British Government, disturbed—nay, destroyed, that equilibrium of rights and obligations between the ruler and his people on which all governments have to depend for their own authority and for their peoples' prosperity. This treaty, and the agreement that followed it, tried in effect to provide some kind of compromise between sovereignty and intermeddling; needless to say that the author of it, who has been acclaimed as a great statesman and administrator, must have known that just as there is no half-way house between truth and falsehood, there is no compromise between independence and interference.

On Wellesley's recall from India, Lord Cornwallis was sent out for the second time to bring back the affairs of the East India

Company in India to normalcy, after the extraordinary events of his predecessor's administration which had been too glorious and too expensive for the tastes of the merchants of Leadenhall Street. He proved, even in his relations with Oudh, during the short time he was allowed, that the strain and stress of the previous regime could not be permitted to persist, and that tension had to be eased. Wellesley had, immediately before his retirement, suggested to Saadut Ali that the British troops in pursuit of rebels and fugitives from British territory might be permitted to enter Oudh territory and a reciprocal advantage might also be enjoyed by the Nawab-Wazir, i.e., his troops also, might, on occasion of need, be permitted to enter British territory. This proposal was turned down by Saadut Ali. Cornwallis, who had by this time taken the reins of administration in his hands, hastened, through the Resident, to assure the Nawab-Wazir on August 12, 1805, that the proposal was not intended to 'trench, in the slightest degree, upon His Excellency's rights and independence. That the British Government fully admits His Excellency's right to withhold his concurrence in the proposed arrangement, and that it is not the intention of the Governor-General to urge upon His Excellency's concurrence against his decided aversion to the adoption of that arrangement.'²⁴

Saadut Ali was too shrewd a person not to notice the change in the tone and consequently try to take advantage of it. So things drifted on during the brief regimes of Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow. It was now that Saadut Ali started assuming a rather superior air in writing to the British Resident. He worded his letters as if they were mandates of a ruler addressed to a subordinate, and omitted the words 'saheb' after the name and address of Colonel Collins, the Resident.²⁵

From the experience of his two immediate predecessors, Wazir Ali and Asafuddowlah, Saadut Ali had taken one lesson: he was not going to have any Tuffuzul Husain Khan²⁶ or Hyder Beg Khan²⁷ as his Minister. He foresaw the danger and avoided what his son and successor Ghaziuddin Hyder could not. Saadut Ali thus escaped falling into the thralldom of mean and corrupt servants

24. Oude papers: Op. Cit. p. 352.

25. Oude papers: Loc. Cit. pp. 572-575.

26. Appointed Minister in 1797 by Sir John Shore. He was the person, who along with another, Tuhseen Ali Khan, was responsible for Wazir Ali's deposition.

27. Prime Minister of Oudh for a long time up to 1795. Irwin: "Garden of India", pp. 90-98 details his activities.

20. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 137.

21. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 137.

22. Aitchison: Loc. Cit. p. 138.

23. Mill's 'History of British India': Op. Cit. p. 174.

like Agha Mir and Raja Daya Krishna.²⁸ In the agreement of February 1802, which we have already noticed, Saadut Ali took care to get his favourite son, Mirza Ahmed Ali Khan acknowledged as his minister, by the British authorities. This, however, was merely nominal. In point of fact he was like all capable and self-willed despots of the times, his own minister. Being his own minister was a satisfaction as well as a source of embarrassment to Saadut Ali. It was a satisfaction because he saved himself from facing the two almost equally unpalatable alternatives: either having a minister of his own choice and confidence and, therefore, obnoxious to the Resident; or having a minister imposed upon him by the Resident enjoying the latter's support and, therefore, irksome to him, for by now it was clear that the views and interests of the British Government represented by the Resident at Lucknow were, if not entirely irreconcilable, at least fairly at variance with those of the ruler of Oudh. It was a source of embarrassment, however, because now there was no buffer between him and the Resident, thus necessitating his exchanging views with the latter directly, a process which was more often unpleasant than otherwise,²⁹ and Saadut Ali who was sensitive on points of honour, was sometimes sorely stung.

So far Saadut Ali had dealt with Sir John Shore, a civilian-specialist in revenue affairs; Lord Wellesley, an imperious and domineering imperialist; Lord Cornwallis, weary, aged, infirm and dying; Sir George Barlow, an efficient, cold, unimaginative civilian for whom obedience to authorities in England was the be-all and end-all of his administration. Now, however, he was faced with a man of a different metal. Minto was shrewd, as only a Scotsman could be; considerate, as a Liberal, lieutenant of Burke, prosecutor of Warren Hastings had to be, suave, as his training as British Ambassador in Vienna and Viceroy in Corsica, had made him; and firm, as his position of being the guardian and protector of an important outpost of the British Empire against the Napoleonic menace obliged him to be.

All through Minto's regime the Resident at Lucknow was John Baillie, belonging to that peculiar class of politico-military

career diplomats in the Company's service the best and most representative of whom was General Sir John Malcolm. Baillie was well-versed in the Persian³⁰ and Hindustani³¹ languages; and could read, write and speak them without embarrassment. He was also well-versed in diplomatic forms and ways of behaviour,³² besides being efficient,³³ hardworking,³⁴ and intelligent. Endowed with all these qualities, in contrast he was mean,³⁵ vindictive,³⁶ meddlesome,³⁷ intriguing,³⁸ and generally an impossible person to work with;³⁹ in short he was a bully.⁴⁰

30. 'Oude Papers': Op. Cit. p. 340.

31. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. p. 337, Writes Baillie to the Nawab Wazir "Our conversation was entirely in Hindoostanee".

32. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. p. 338—Where he defends his own behaviour. p. 244, Baillie, in manifestation of joy at Saadut Ali's recovery from illness and as a mark of respect for his Excellency offers a charitable donation of 1000/- on behalf of the British Government and 500/- on his own part.

33. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. pp. 194-205—he never delays sending any reports or copies of documents and papers to the Supreme Government. At times when the Nawab Wazir sends him a preliminary draft or a letter which he on a second thought or on remonstrance, withdraws subsequently—Baillie never fails even in sending copies of such drafts and withdrawn letters with his own comments thereon, to Fort William.

34. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. p. 225—He writes most of the confidential letters in Persian himself and copies them too himself for the sake of security.

35. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. p. 390—In his letter to the Government written Feb. 28, 1813, Baillie describes his interview with the Nawab—Wazir on 20th Jan. 1813. In this he mentions that during this interview at a time when the poor Saadut Ali was feeling particularly helpless and forlorn, had in fact tears in his eyes "in a manner unmanly and unbecoming" Baillie "took advantage of this state of feelings" by driving greater fear into his heart.

36. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. Baillie was by nature unforgiving. Since Shamsuddaulah was the favourite son of Saadut Ali, trained and declared to be the heir apparent, Baillie saw to it that he was prevented from succeeding to the Masnad, after his father's death.

37. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. pp. 331-337, 341. He carried his interference in Saadut Ali's personal matters to an absurd extreme. This episode of his stopping the Nawab Wazir from going on a hunting expedition.

38. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. p. 410. He kept spies in the inner most circles of the Nawab Wazir. It is obvious that he took his full share, not so much in resolving them as in complicating the intrigues of the Khoord Mahal ladies.

39. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. pp. 331-332. Even Saadut Ali while knowing well enough that he would have to continue his intercourse with Baillie, was so fed up that he lodged a report against Baillie, with the Governor General.

40. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. His technique was first to frame his policy on a subject, then to get the Supreme Government's sanction for it and then to assume a hectoring tone in his talks and negotiations with the Nawab Wazir. This happened again and again.

28. Peshkar and Diwan of Oudh, respectively, due to Baillie's patronage, during Ghaziuddin Hyder's reign. Irwin, H. C: "Garden of India; Chapters on Oudh: History and Affairs" (1880). Op. Cit. p. 111. Heber, R: "Narrative of a Journey through the upper provinces of India" Vol. II, (1829), p. 80-81.

29. 'Oude papers' Op. Cit. p. 376, Mr. Edmonstone's Minute of 27th February, 1813.

Apart from the troubles and bickerings that arose owing to personal equations, or the lack of them, between the Nawab-Wazir and the Governor-General, Nawab-Wazir and the Resident, and Governor-General and the Resident, we can discuss the diplomatic troubles round which all negotiations in this period revolved, broadly under the following heads :

I. Concerning the proposed reforms in the civil and revenue administration of Oudh.

II. Concerning some members of the Oudh Royal House, and a few other individuals whom the British Government, for different and various reasons, felt pledged to support against real or supposed persecution on the part of the Nawab-Wazir.⁴¹

III. Concerning the marauders and banditti who infested the British territories and took shelter in the Oudh dominions.

Perhaps it will be wrong to convey an idea that the negotiations, exchange of letters, and conferences between the Nawab Wazir on the one hand, and the Resident, representing the Company's Government and the Governor-General on the other, dealt with only one of the above classified topics at a time. In point of fact they tended to fuse with each other, and almost each one of the notes, exchanged between the two parties, was a strange cocktail comprising all these.

(To be continued)

The Mughul-Maratha Treaty of April, 1752

BY

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Introduction

Under the dashing lead of Peshwa Baji Rao I, the Maratha armies swept over the whole of Central India and acquired Malwa in 1728, Bundelkhand in 1729 and Gujarat in 1730—all by force of arms. His son and successor Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao (1740-61) wanted to get these three acquisitions legalized by a treaty with the Mughul Emperor whereby they may be conferred upon the Marathas by their legal sovereign, the Emperor.¹ But the Emperor of Delhi was suspicious of the policy and motives of the Marathas and, therefore, did not agree to do the desired. Consequently the hostilities between the two powers continued.

From the year 1737 onwards the populace of Delhi found itself placed on a volcano, for that very year Peshwa Baji Rao I attempted an onslaught on that Imperial seat and the Maratha arms seemed knocking at the gates of Delhi. The fears of the men in the street were not without foundation. The annual Maratha expeditions into Northern India continued even after the death of Baji Rao in April, 1740. After him his son Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao tried to persuade Emperor Muhammad Shah through Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur to appoint the Peshwa governor of Malwa and thus deliver it officially to him. The Emperor did not agree to this proposal and used dilatory tactics and, therefore, as a last resort Balaji Baji Rao had to use force.

The Marathas in North India

Between 1741 and 1748 Balaji Baji Rao personally led four important expeditions into Northern India and also kept a watchful eye on the motives and activities of his generals there. But as a consequence of the death of Chhatrapati Shahu in December,

41. 'Oude Papers': Loc. Cit. p. 27.

1. V. G. Dighe: Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion.

1749, Balaji's preoccupations in the politics and intrigues of Southern India left him little time to attend to the affairs in Northern India for the next eleven years, i.e. upto the year 1760. During this period the two Maratha chiefs Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia were left in Northern India to decide matters in any way they thought fit. Though Raghunath Rao, the Peshwa's brother, was sent twice to the north, he could not do anything of importance there.

The First Invasion of the Abdali

Nadir, Shah, who invaded India in 1739, was assassinated in June, 1747, and his throne was usurped by one Ahmad of the Sadozai section of the Abdali or Durrani tribe of the Afghans. Ahmad Abdali laid claims to Nadir Shah's Indian conquests. He led his first expedition into the Panjab in 1748 on the invitation of the younger son of the late governor Zakaria Khan.

On hearing of the Abdali invasion, Emperor Muhammad Shah called for the Maratha help; but before this relieving force could arrive, the invader was defeated at the battle of Manupur by a Mughul army under the command of Prince Ahmad, son of Muhammad Shah, and Safdar Jang, the Nawab of Awadh. This victory, however, proved to be the last Mughul success against the Abdali.

Ahmad Shah Abdali retaliated by invading the Panjab next year (1749) and compelling the new governor of that province, Mir Mannu or Muin-ul-mulk, to pay him annual revenue for four districts of the province. Meanwhile, prince Ahmad Mughul, who had fought against and defeated Ahmad Abdali at Manupur, had succeeded his father Muhammad Shah as Emperor Ahmad Shah on April 29, 1748, after the latter's death on 26th April. Safdar Jang, the Nawab of Awadh, was appointed Wazir of the Empire besides continuing as Nawab of Awadh.

Party-Politics at the Delhi Court

Safdar Jang's uncle who came to India as a Persian adventurer was the first man in the family to have joined the Imperial service. It was not possible for a foreigner to have established aristocratic connections in one generation. Being a Persian, Safdar Jang was considered to be an interloper and an intruder by the Turkish families having a long history of Mughul service. Intizam-ud-daulah, the son of the late Wazir Qamr-ud-din Khan considered that Safdar-

Jang had robbed him of his patrimony, the office of the Wazir of the Empire. Besides this personal interest, the two rivals—Safdar Jang and Intizam-ud-daulah—belonged to different racial stocks. Safdar Jang was a Persian, while Intizam-ud-daulah and other aspirants to the post of the Prime Minister were Turks of Turan and Central Asia. The Iranians and the Turanians have a long history of antagonism and enmity in India and outside. Again, while Safdar Jang was a Shia, the Turanians were Sunnis. In short, there were racial, cultural and personal clashes between the two parties.²

Thus very soon after the accession of Ahmad Shah to the throne of Delhi, two well-knit political parties grew up in the Delhi Court—the Turanian party and the Iranian party—both of which were at daggers drawn with each other. The position of Safdar Jang became very difficult and unenviable soon after his appointment as Wazir due to this party-politics at the court.

Problems before the Nawab-Wazir

The Rohilas with their seat at Bareilly and the Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad turned against the Wazir practically at the same time when he was facing his enemies at the court. The Pathans in India, according to Dr. A. L. Srivastava, "were in treacherous alliance with the Abdali invader."³ Ahmad Khan Bangash suddenly attacked Safdar Jang's camp near Farrukhabad on 13th August, 1750, when the Wazir was busy in the Imperial capital. The Wazir's general and commander Raja Nawal Rai was killed and his camp plundered. The Nawab-Wazir could not tolerate the existence and dangerously evil activities of an ambitious power on his western boundary. He sent for the Jat and the Maratha help and himself started immediately to punish the Pathans.

Before the requested Jat and Maratha help could arrive, Safdar Jang was defeated on 24th September, 1750, by the Rohila and the Bangash allies at the battle-field of Ram Chitauni, 5 miles from Kasganj in Etah district. Ahmad Khan Bangash and Hafiz Rahmat Khan Rohila ran over the Wazir's territory upto Lucknow and laid siege to Allahabad. Ahmad Khan's son Mahmud Khan

2. Sir Jadunath Sarkar: *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, chapter VIII; Dr. A. L. Srivastava: *The First Two Nawabs of Awadh*.

3. Dr. A. L. Srivastava: *The First Two Nawabs of Awadh*, p. 177.

ravaged the whole of Awadh and perpetrated cruelties at Bilgram, Shahabad and Khairabad.⁴ The Pathans also took possession of Jaunpur and Ghazipur.⁵ The Wazir lost all prestige at the court at Delhi.

Since his defeat at Ram Chitauri the Wazir was desirous of wiping off the disgrace. He felt so much dishonoured and humiliated that in shame he did not come out of his closet for many days.

Bal Ram the Jat ruler of Ballangarh was another chieftain who created troubles in the area around Ballangarh and defied the authority of the Emperor. The Wazir had to devote his attention towards suppressing this recalcitrant chieftain also.

Above all, Javid Khan, the real power behind the throne those days, was favouring the Turani party at the court. By engineering a clever plot, this eunuch got Ghazi-ud-din appointed to the post of the Mir Bakshi and Intizam-ud-daulah to the post of the governor of Ajmer. These were the two highest offices in the Empire after that of the Wazir. The two Turani noblemen acted to checkmate the authority and power of Safdar Jang whose prestige had been greatly shattered by his recent defeat.

The Wazir invites the Maratha help

It was in time of such a danger and crisis that on the advice of his wife Sadr-un-nisa Begam and other friends Safdar Jang decided to call the Marathas to his help. He wrote to the Peshwa in the following words:....“This is the time for testing our alliance” and requested Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia repeatedly to come quickly to his aid. He even sent his Diwan Raja Ram Narain and agent Jugul Kishore to receive them so far as Kotah in Rajputana and bring them to him. Safdar Jang, as Dr. A. L. Srivastava rightly comments, “had to make his choice between two evils—a foreign invader assisted by enemies at home and selfish hereditary rebels whose attitude for some years past had been distinctly loyal and who had been his own friends since 1747.”⁷ The Wazir chose the second alternative, a choice which was definitely far better of the two. He purchased the Maratha

alliance for a daily allowance of Rs. 25,000 in March, 1751. Along with the above Maratha help Safdar Jang also engaged the aid of Raja Suraj Mal the Jat ruler of Bharatpur on a payment of Rs. 15,000 per day.

The Pathans crushed: the Maratha appetite whetted

The sequel of the above-mentioned Wazir-Maratha-Jat alliance was that the Marathas and the Jats entered the Doab and defeated the Rohilas and the Bangash Nawab in a number of engagements. First of all they attacked Aligarh and Jalesar. In April, 1751, a bloody battle was fought in which the Pathans were crushingly defeated at Fatehgarh and 10,000 of them were cut down. Safdar Jang devastated the Bangash territory. Both the Marathas and the Jats helped the Nawab-Wazir in this battle.

When peace was made in June, 1751, the Marathas secured the lion's share of the gains and spoils of war. They acquired half of the Bangash territory as indemnity for war and realized the agreed daily allowance of Rs. 25,000 from Safdar Jang. They also extracted Rs. 50,00,000 from the Bangash Nawabs for “saving them from complete ruin.” This half of the Bangash territory “was the first territorial acquisition of the Marathas beyond the Yamuna.”⁸

Along with these monetary and territorial gains, the Marathas gained very greatly in prestige. The success of the Wazir with the Maratha help opened a new chapter in the history of Northern India. The Maratha share in this warfare had established the fact beyond doubt that they were the only power with whose help and co-operation peace in the North could be maintained on the point of bayonet. Not a bird could flutter its wings without their consent and no change in the political firmament could take place without the Maratha assistance. At the same time their ambition became more lofty than before and they began to dream of dominating over the Mughul Empire. Their appetite was greatly whetted and it did not know any satisfaction.

The Abdali invasion: the Pathans turn fifth-columnists

The Pathans of India secured a very capable leader named Najib-ud-daulah, when the Abdali repeated his invasion on India. Najib-ud-daulah had invited Ahmad Shah Abdali when the Pathans

4. Sir Wolseley Haig: The Cambridge History of India, Volume IV, p. 430.
5. G. S. Sardesai: New History of the Marathas, Volume II, p. 361.
6. Sir Jadunath Sarkar: The Fall of the Mughal Empire, Volume I, p. 358.
7. Dr. A. L. Srivastava: The First Two Nawabs of Awadh, p. 177.

8. H. G. Rawlinson: Cambridge History of India, Volume IV, p. 415.

had been surrounded on all sides (by the Wazir, the Marathas and the Jats) in April, 1751. The Abdali accepted this invitation and started for his third expedition to India in December, 1751, and appeared in the Panjab. Safdar Jang was still busy in punishing the Bangash Afghans and Raja Balwant Singh of Banaras.

Emperor Ahmad Shah was alarmed at the progress of the Abdali and his successes in the Panjab. He sent urgent messages to the Nawab-Wazir Safdar Jang to reach Delhi with all haste and to check the invader. But the Wazir delayed his departure intentionally, because he wanted that Muin-ul-mulk, his rival and governor of the Panjab, should be completely crippled by the Abdali.

Muin-ul-mulk requested for help from Delhi, but received none. Consequently, he lost all confidence in his army. Lahore fell on 15th March, 1752, and the news reached Delhi on 23rd March. The same was the fate of Multan. Consternation and terror spread all over Northern India, specially so in and around Delhi. People began to run away for their lives and flee from Delhi to Central India and the interior of the Doab. Business was practically at a stand-still for some days and the supply of food and fodder to Delhi was stopped.

The Maratha help purchased by the Wazir

Emperor Ahmed Shah became desperate under these circumstances. He sent urgent summons to Safdar Jang who was staying at Lucknow, and in an angry letter in his own hand-writing, written on 23rd March, 1752, implored him to reach Delhi without loss of time along with "a powerful Maratha force at any price,"⁹ and face the danger from the Abdali. The Wazir received the letter on 27th March and on its receipt he patched a truce with Raja Balwant Singh of Banaras.

Doubly convinced that the Maratha help was most essential, Safdar Jang sent fast messengers to stop the Maratha army which was then on its way home. The Nawab-Wazir himself started towards Delhi on 3rd April, 1752, and met the Maratha chiefs Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia near Kanauj. Here the Emperor of India and the Peshwa, represented by their chiefs Safdar Jang on the one side and Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia on the other, entered into a formal defensive alliance on April 12,

9. Dr. A. L. Srivastava: *The First Two Nawabs of Awadh*, p. 199.

1752, whereby the Marathas undertook to protect and save the Mughul Empire both from internal rebellions and dangers and from external invasions and attacks. In exchange for the Maratha promise for armed assistance, the Emperor also agreed to give some money and the privilege to collect Chauth as well as some jagir to the Peshwa.¹⁰

The Terms of the Treaty

1. The Peshwa agreed to defend and protect the disintegrating Mughul Empire from all its enemies, both external and internal. Among the external enemies of the Empire at that time the most important was the Abdali, and among the internal enemies the prominent ones were the Rajputs, the Pathans and other rebels. As a result of this treaty, the Marathas were to recover all territories in the possession of these external and internal enemies and, after the reconquest, these territories were to be restored to the Emperor. In order to defend the Empire the Marathas had to maintain a strong, permanent army.

2. In return for the above-mentioned support and protection the Mughul Emperor agreed to pay to the Peshwa a sum of Rs. 50,00,000. Of this sum Rs. 30 lakhs was the honorarium for defending the Mughuls from foreign enemies, i.e., driving the Abdali out of India, and Rs. 20 lakhs for suppressing internal rebels and maintaining peace and order and Mughul supremacy within the country.

3. The Emperor granted to the Peshwa the right to collect the *Chauth* ($\frac{1}{4}$ of the usual Imperial revenue) from the two provinces of the Panjab and Sindh which had already been ceded to the Abdali. The idea seems to be that the Marathas were entitled to *Chauth* only after their capture of the Panjab and Sindh from the Abdali's hands. The Peshwa was also given the right to collect *Chauth* from four districts of the Doab. Another quarter of the revenue from these districts was to be paid to Safdar Jang and Javid Khan from which these two officers were to maintain and pay the salaries of the soldiers in their contingents. Only half of the land revenue of the four districts was to go to the Emperor.

4. The Peshwa was to be appointed Subahdar or the governor of Agra, including the faujdari of Mathura, and the governor of

10. V. K. Rajwade's *Marathiyanchia Itihas* (the History of the Marathas), Volume I. chapter I.

G. S. Sardesai: *Marathi Risayat*, Madhya Vibhag. Panipat Prakaran chapter XXVI, p. 9.

Ajmer, including the faujdari of Narnaul. These two provinces and two Sarkars were to be administered in the usual Mughul way. The Peshwa was to enjoy all remunerations, allowances and privileges which were assigned to these two governorships.

5. The Peshwa had to administer his jagirs according to the age-long practices and regulations of the Mughul administration and like an ordinary vassal of the Emperor. He or his agents were not to interfere in the administration of the directly-governed forts and strategic places in these governorships. He had to observe all regulations and decorum of the Mughul administration.

6. On behalf of the Peshwa, who could not go to the Mughul court due to distance and pre-occupations, some Maratha generals had to attend the Delhi court in his place. These generals were required to obey the orders of the Emperor, just like all other mansabdars. They had to join the Mughul army on march along with their contingents.

In order to save the face of the Emperor it was decided that the Peshwa should submit a petition to the Emperor to the above effect and that the latter grant the request of the Maratha chief. The Peshwa called upon God and other Hindu deities like the Sun, the Vedas, Bel Bhandar, Tulasi and the river Ganga to attest to the fidelity of his words and promises.¹¹ Safdar Jang accepted

11. In his book *Marathi Risayat*, Madhya Vibhag, Panipat Prakarana (Section on Panipat), G. S. Sardesai writes as follows:—

“The Emperor entered into a special treaty with the Marathas to get their help. This was an important treaty . . . Jayappa Sindhia and Malhar Rao Holkar agreed on behalf of the Peshwa.

In this treaty, it is said: ‘Sri Iswara (the Blessed God), the Sun and Siva are the witnesses. The sacred books (the Vedas), the Bel Bhandar (the leaves of the bel-tree and turmeric that are put on the image of the deity and are taken off for swearing by them a solemn oath), Tulasi and Ganga are direct witnesses.’ For the purpose of maintaining the dignity of the Emperor, it was decided that the treaty should be in the form of a petition and answer. In the treaty, the name of the Peshwa is mentioned and not that of the king. Under this treaty, the Marathas agreed to undertake the responsibility of protecting all the territories from Sind to Kasi (Banaras). The important clauses of the treaty refer to the Rohillas and Abdali. Sindhia and Holkar took upon themselves the task of quelling the Rohillas. The effect of this treaty was to provoke Abdali. In the Emperor’s court, two parties sprang up in consequence, viz. (1) that of the Marathas and (2) that of the Afghans. The ambassador and agent of Abdali remained in Delhi and kept himself informed of the news there. It was this treaty that led to the open entry of the Marathas in the territory of the Rajputs.”

the petition on behalf of Emperor Ahmad Shah and the treaty was thus entered into by both parties on April 12, 1752.

Developments at Delhi: the Abdali bribed by the Emperor

Meanwhile the agent of the Abdali, Qalandar Khan, reached Delhi on April 11, 1752, and demanded of Emperor Ahmed Shah that the Panjab and Multan, which had already been conquered by Ahmad Shah Abdali, be formally handed over to the Afghan conqueror. The anti-Wazir Turani party at Delhi was anxious to come to some settlement with the invader before the arrival of Safdar Jang with the Maratha help, for they were afraid as well as jealous of his influence and power. Hence on April 23, 1752, Javid Khan, the eunuch, introduced Qalandar Khan to Emperor Ahmad Shah and recommended to the latter an early settlement of the dispute and the concluding of a treaty satisfactory to the Abdali. The weak Emperor was taken in and he formally ceded the Panjab and Multan to Ahmad Shah Abdali.¹² The Afghan invader appointed Muin-ul-mulk, the ex-governor of the Panjab, as his governor and viceroy of his Indian acquisitions.

Safdar Jang embarrassed: the Marathas clamour for money

Accompanied by the 50,000 Maratha soldiers, Safdar Jang reached Delhi on May 5, 1752, but he was twelve days too late. The Wazir had expected to drive the Abdali out of the Panjab and Multan with the Maratha help. His idea was to put the Marathas in charge of the North-Western frontier of the Mughul Empire and thus safeguard the country as well as the Emperor on his throne. He wanted the Maratha help to serve three purposes:—

- (i) to drive the Abdali out of the country,
- (ii) to relieve the Emperor of a constant headache from the big and difficult problem of defending the frontiers of the country on the north-west and
- (iii) to extend the boundary of the Mughul Empire in the north-west so as to include in it Kabul and Afghanistan with the aid of these new allies.

But all his expectations were dashed to the ground when he found on reaching the capital that in his absence the Emperor had already ratified a treaty with the Abdali satisfactory to the invader.

12. Sir Wolseley Haig: *The Cambridge History of India*, Volume IV, p. 434.

Javid Khan's agreement with Ahmad Abdali made the Maratha-Mughul treaty of April 12, 1752, a scrap of paper. The Nawab-Wazir's scheme was annulled, as it were, and he felt greatly frustrated and disgusted with the shape the matters had taken.

When the Marathas learnt of these developments at the court, they became furious and clamoured for the money promised to them by Safdar Jang. They began to plunder and ravage the country-side as far distant as 40 miles around Delhi. Fortunately for the Wazir, Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao was in difficulties in the South at this time, as he had been defeated by Salabat Jang at Talegaon Dhamdhera near Poona and the struggle between the Peshwa and Salabat Jang, the Viceroy of the Deccan continued from December 1751 to April 1752.¹³ Malhar Rao Holkar wanted to go to the South to the help of the Peshwa. The recent developments at Delhi aided him in this project. The cunning Ghazi-ud-din Khan, son of Nizam-ul-mulk and brother of Salabat Jang, offered the Emperor a solution. The Emperor was to request the Marathas to go to the South and help him in securing the Viceroyalty of the South as he was now entitled Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf Jah. He was later poisoned by his step-mother on October 16, 1752. The Emperor also got rid of the 50,000 Marathas who were taken to be a nuisance when there was no war to be fought. With the demand reduced to Rs. 30,00,000, the Marathas left for the South.

The Marathas come permanently in the North

The Mughul-Maratha treaty of April 12, 1752, brought the Marathas permanently into the North Indian politics and from that time they became not only important but also indispensable there. Though they had to return to the Deccan very soon after the treaty was concluded, they had become a permanent power and an influential interest to be reckoned with in the settlement of affairs in the North.

The relations between the Emperor and the Wazir did not improve once they had taken a bad turn; they continued worsening and each one of them was anxious to get the better of the other. The Wazir held Javid Khan, the Khoja eunuch, responsible for his disgrace at the court. He invited Javid Khan to a dinner on August 27, 1752, and had him killed at the banquet, thus setting

aside his greatest enemy at court.¹⁴ But the death of Javid Khan did not improve the relations between Emperor Ahmad Shah and Wazir Safdar Jang.

Meanwhile, the news of the proposed invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali on the Panjab arrived in Delhi in November 1752. On 5th. February, 1753, an Afghan envoy arrived in the Mughul Court in Delhi and demanded the tribute of Rs. 50,00,000 due to his master, the Abdali. The Mughul noblemen who were opposed to Safdar Jang taunted the Nawab-Wazir: "The Marathas have undertaken to fight the Abdali . . . Ask *them* what should be done now . . ." ¹⁵ The Wazir sent urgent calls to the Peshwa for armed help, but was driven to rebel against the Emperor on March 26, 1753, before any news could arrive from the Peshwa.

Both Emperor and Wazir court Maratha help

Before his open rebellion both the Wazir and the Emperor appealed to the Marathas for help. The Peshwa received agents from both of them and they made a bid for the Maratha armed aid. Antaji Mankeshwar was incharge of a small Maratha force stationed at Delhi and the Hingane brothers were the Maratha envoys at the Mughul capital. Feelers and agents were sent to both of these Maratha officers by the Emperor as well as by the rebel Wazir.¹⁶

The Peshwa agreed to support the Emperor (Imad-ul-mulk representing him) against the rebel Wazir and placed at his disposal 5,000 Maratha soldiers on the condition that Awadh and Allahabad, which belonged to the ex-Wazir, be given to the Marathas for this help. Thus Balaji Baji Rao helped the Emperor against the Wazir and cut at the roots of his former ally—he struck a blow at the very tree on which he stood. He did not remember even for a moment that Safdar Jang was primarily instrumental in giving the Marathas an access to the North Indian politics. He rejected the Wazir's offer of a big jagir yielding a revenue of Rs. 16,00,000 a year.

This was only the beginning of the Maratha influence in the North Indian affairs. They had realized that the Mughul Empire was

14. Jadunath Sarkar: *The Fall of Mughal Empire*, Volume I, pp. 272-3.

15. G. S. Sardesai: *Selections from the Peshwa's Daftar*, Volume XXI, letters 53, 54 and 55.

16. G. S. Sardesai. *Aitihāsik Patravāvalar*, p. 89.

13. Sir Jadunath Sarkar: *Cambridge History of India*, Volume IV, pp. 387-8.

rotten to the core, that it was standing on its last legs and that it could not be held together for long without their help. Safdar Jang, who had been loyal to his master so far, had to turn against Emperor Ahmad Shah mainly because the latter had become a tool in the hands of Ghazi-ud-din and Intizam-ud-daulah. The rivalry among the different members of the Turani Sunni party was no less. The Marathas had realized that there were divisions in it long before the rebellion of Safdar Jang.¹⁷

The Marathas 'sit on the fence'

During the Civil War between the Turani and the Irani parties in which Emperor Ahmad Shah was made a tool by the former party, the policy of the Marathas in the North had been "to sit upon the fence, watch for the end of the civil war and then join the victor or take advantage of the exhaustion of both sides, so as to increase Maratha domination in the North."¹⁸

Exhausted and weakened, the two sides ceased warfare on November 7, 1753. The Maratha contingent consisting of 4,000 soldiers under the command of Malhar Rao's son Khande Rao Holkar arrived in Delhi on 21st November, that is, two weeks after the peace was restored and the two parties reconciled. Safdar Jang was pardoned and Awadh and Allahabad were returned to him, thus nullifying the Emperor's promise for these two provinces made to the Marathas.

The Marathas involved in North Indian politics

The necessity of the Maratha armies in the North was nullified soon after an agreement was made to that effect between the Marathas and Imad-ul-mulk, as the Civil War came to an end 14 days before the Maratha armies arrived in Delhi. Now that they were no more required in Delhi, the Maratha commanders sought other quarters for war and plunder. Delhi and its environs attracted them, but Imad-ul-mulk diverted their attention towards the kingdom of Raja Suraj Mal Jat of Bharatpur. Soon after this we find Khande Rao Holkar plundering the Jat villages near Palwal. He started his war against Suraj Mal in January, 1754,

17. G. S. Sardesai: Selections from the Peshwa's Daftar, Volume XXI, letter No. 55.

18. Sir Jadunath Sarkar: The Fall of the Mughal Empire, Volume I, p. 515.

but was killed by a chance bullet. Some time after the march of Khande Rao, Jayappa Sindhia also invaded Marwar. He was killed at Nagaur in 1755.

The treaty of April 12, 1752, had granted the Marathas the provinces of Agra and Ajmer. The ambitious Maratha chiefs attempted to establish their sway over these provinces even after the above-mentioned treaty was reduced to the importance of a scrap of paper. The province of Agra became a bone of contention between Khande Rao Holkar and Raja Suraj Mal Jat of Bharatpur, as it lay so near Bharatpur and Mathura and was considered by Suraj Mal to be in his field of activity. The province of Ajmer became an apple of discord between the Raja of Marwar and Jayappa Sindhia. The Mughul-Maratha treaty of 1752, therefore, was mainly responsible for Maratha entanglements with the Jats and the Rajputs.

Malhar Rao Holkar allied with the new Wazir Imad-ul-mulk. The climax of this alliance was the dethronement of Emperor Ahmed Shah. Malhar Rao made a surprise visit to Delhi in May, 1754, along with his 20,000 cavalry, captured Ahmad Shah at Shivrampur near Sikandrabad and threw him into the dungeon.¹⁹ The Maratha hold over Delhi was complete and even Imad-ul-mulk felt ashamed for his disloyal acts and for bringing disgrace upon the Mughul royal family. Thus by 1756 the Marathas had become supreme in the whole of India.

The Marathas achieve further successes: their results

The Maratha supremacy in India received a temporary setback when Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded our country in 1757. But this time he did not come to stay in India and went back to Afghanistan within four months.

After the departure of the Abdali, the Marathas under Tukoji Holkar and Sabaji Sindhia took their sword right upto Attock in the Panjab. The Maratha Empire thus reached its largest extent in May, 1758. This success, however, proved to be the main cause of the Maratha downfall in the Peshwa period. Though the ambitions of the Maratha leaders, politicians and administrators soared sky-high, they failed to crush some of the most dan-

19. G. S. Sardesai: Selections from the Peshwa's Daftar, Volume XXI, letter No. 60, and Sir Wolseley Haig: The Cambridge History of India, Volume IV, p. 436.

gerous internal foes like Najib-ud-daulah, the Rohila leader. They also failed to conciliate the Jats and the Rajputs. The result of the escape of Najib-ud-daulah was the re-appearance of the Abdali who re-visited our country in 1761 in order to help his brethren in plight. This small mistake cost the Marathas the disaster of Bara-rightat and the death of Dattoji Sindhia. Finally, Sadashiva Rao Bhau was despatched to drive the Abdali out of the country. Bhau did not understand that the Afghan invader had no intention of establishing his dominion in India, but that he was only prevailed upon to stay here during the summers at the request of Najib-ud-daulah. Moreover, as Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai has pointed out, "If Bhau Saheb had agreed to cede the Panjab and make the Satlej the boundary line between the two claimants, a negotiated peace was quite possible."²⁰ Unfortunately, Bhau Saheb dreamt of a far flung Maratha Empire from Attock to the Bay of Bengal—a dream which was born in April 1752, but never fulfilled !!

The Mughul-Maratha Treaty of April, 1752, thus not only gave rise to a strong Maratha power in Northern India, it was also responsible for giving rise to their lofty hopes and ambitions to build up an all-India Maratha Empire. The natural corollary was that it gave rise to many new problems and complications in the Indian politics—the Rajput-Maratha conflict in Rajasthan, the Jat-Maratha conflict in Central India and the Afghan-Maratha conflict in the Panjab. This ambition of the Marathas was mainly responsible for Sadashiva Rao Bhau's tragic failure in the game of diplomacy and beating for allies on the eve of the third battle of Panipat.²¹ The Rajput resentment against the Maratha actions in Rajputana were too fresh for them to go to the aid of Bhau Saheb even in a national cause; the Jats kept aloof because their homes had been ravaged by them. Thus the treaty which was the main source of Maratha legal footing in the North became eventually responsible for their notoriety and their final tragic fall at the hands of a foreign invader in 1761.

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The Second Afghan War and the Patriotic Fund

BY

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While recently engaged in investigating into the official records in the possession of the U. P. Government, relating to the Second Afghan War, I came across valuable data regarding one of the War measures which have escaped the attention of the historians. It will be a news to the students of history that the authorities initiated a plan which in those days was as unorthodox as it was novel. The Government sponsored what was styled the Patriotic Fund of India. The very name of the Fund would sound strange at the present day. In any case, it serves to illustrate the manner in which the Government sought to exploit the loyalty of the Indian people. The details regarding the Fund are interesting enough, and a study thereof would throw a flood of light on contemporary war propaganda and on the financial requirements, which forced the Government to ask for and collect public donations all over India as a war measure.

At the outset, a public meeting was held at Simla on the 14th September, 1880, over which His Excellency the Viceroy himself presided. In this meeting the scheme of the Patriotic Fund for all India was put forward and adopted. (Vide Letters from the Office of the Central Committee, Simla, 5th October, 1880, etc.). His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief moved a resolution proposing the inauguration of the Fund in order to mark the high appreciation in which the people of India held the gallantry displayed by the troops in Afghanistan, and the courage and endurance with which they had borne the hardships of the campaigns. (Vide. Letter from J. Clarke, Superintendent-General, Government Secretariat, N. W. P. and Oudh, forwarding the Circular from Sir D. M. Stewart, President, Patriotic Fund, 1880). Subscriptions were invited for the Fund from princes of India and from the general public. The money collected was to be utilised for the relief of the disabled and for the help of all mem-

20. G. S. Sardesai: *New History of the Marathas*, Volume II, p. 423.

21. Dr. A. L. Srivastava: "Afghan-Maratha Diplomatic Tussle on the Eve of Panipat", in *Sardesai Commemoration Volume*, 1938.

bers of the military classes, whether combatants or non-combatants, Europeans or Indians.

The following gentlemen were invited to act as a central working committee under the patronage of the Viceroy (Vide. the Proceedings of the Patriotic Fund meeting, 14th September, 1880):

Lieut.-General Sir Donald Stewart,

Mr. A. C. Lyall,

The Hon'ble C. Grant,

Col. A. B. Johnson,

Col. J. E. Gordon,

Col. S. Black,

Lt. W. J. B. Bird (Secretary).

The central committee decided to take steps for organising local committees to receive subscriptions in the various provinces and arrange a concerted plan of action throughout the country. The Provincial authorities were invited to support and popularise the movement in their respective areas. (Vide. Circular No. 16/290 of 31. 1. 81).

The official records in Lucknow show that special sub-committees were formed in the various divisions and also districts of the N. W. Provinces and Oudh in promotion of the interests of the Patriotic Fund. A letter from the local Government at Allahabad, 4th January, 1881, (Vide Letter from W. Tyrrell), makes this clear:—

“The object of such sub-committees will be to make the Fund and its purposes known to the public; and, in so doing, to invite and receive subscriptions thereto”.

To obviate undesirable misconceptions in the mind of the Indian public, the authorities took care to announce that all contributions would be purely voluntary. (Vide. Letter from the Local Secretary, Patriotic Fund, Allahabad, 28th January, 1881).

In an issue of the *Pioneer* of Allahabad (Vide. the issue of the 6th December, 1880), Sir George Couper, Lieutenant Governor of the N.W.F. and Oudh, made a plea for the Fund, and emphasised the need for care that was to be taken by the District authorities to see that there was no undue compulsion in the matter of collections. (Vide. also Circular No. 24/465 of 16. 2. 81).

It appears that a local committee was formed at London to receive subscriptions in England. (Vide. Circular from the Central Committee, 5th October, 1880).

How far the aims and objects of the Fund were eventually realised is not clear. One of the Circular letters from the President of the Central Committee runs thus:—

“Donations to the amount of over Rs. 3,22,000 have already been placed at the disposal of the Central Committee; and it is believed that subscriptions, amounting to nearly a third of that sum, have been raised, independently, in the Bombay Presidency”.

(Vide. Circular of 4th February, 1881, and also Circular No. 84 A).

The official papers do not indicate any marked measure of success in the matter of collections. The public response does not appear to have been very encouraging, even though the local authorities were frequently instructed, as the circular letters show, to convene public meetings as often as possible for the purpose of advancing the cause of the Fund. There were a number of reasons why the Patriotic Fund did not arouse much enthusiasm in India. The official control and management of the Fund could not have inspired public confidence. Besides, the Central Committee and all its local committees were not fairly representative, and the representation of the non-official or Indian sections of the public on these committees was insufficient. Furthermore, there was little public enthusiasm in India for the aims and objects of the Second Afghan War itself. It is well-known that the opinion of the Indian intelligentsia was against the costly military adventure outside India at the expense of the Indian tax-payer. Lord Lytton's Government was already unpopular on account of the Vernacular Press Act and other undesirable measures. Facts such as these go to explain the failure of the Patriotic Fund. Barring a number of loyal Indian princes and gentlemen, few came forward to donate money for the relief of war sufferers.

Gwalior Diary

(December 1850 to December 1852)

BY

K. SAJUN LAL, M.A.

Daulat Rao Sindhia had no male issue and when he died in 1827, Mugat Rai, a lad of 11 years, being the nearest relative of the late Maharajah was declared the sovereign, under the title of Alijah Jankoji Sindhia. He was married to the grand-daughter of Daulat Rao Sindhia by Baiza Bai.

The rule of Jankoji Sindhia was weak and feeble. During the greater part of his reign Mama Sahib the maternal uncle of the Maharaja occupied the post of the Minister,¹ and for a long time Baiza Bai carried on her intrigues. The Court was one of constant intrigues and no wonder the army was in a rebellious mood.

Jankoji died on 7th February 1843 without a male issue. Rani Tarabai, the Maharajah's widow, a girl of 11 years of age, with the consent of the Chiefs and Military of the State, adopted Bhagarat Rao a lad of 8 years and son of Hanwanth Rao who assumed the title of Alijah Jayaji Sindhia.

At this time Lord Ellenborough the Governor-General of India wanted to take undue advantage to appoint his own man to be the regent. Mr. Hope, in his sketch of the House of Sindhia, writes thus :

“As Lord Ellenborough had firmly resolved, though his resolution was not then made known, first to disregard the rights of the State, and afterwards deprive it of its independence, the preliminary step would necessarily be to set aside the Maharanee on the ground of her infancy, and to put up in her place as a Regent a person who would cheerfully do the bidding of the British Government. The election was in the hands of the Durbar. Now

1 Mama = Maternal Uncle, Sahib = Lord. According to Thornton “This corresponding title of honour resembles that of Monsieur of the elder branch of the French Royal Family, vide, Thornton, Gazetteer of India Vol. II. Gwalior, p. 63.

there was only one individual in that Council who would lend himself to carry out an anti-national policy, and he was called Mama Sahib".² His name was Krishna Rao Kadam.

Proceeding further Hope gives us not a good picture of Mama Sahib and speaks about his repulsive manners.

He says that had it not been for Lord Ellenborough's meddling, Dada Khasji Walla would have been elected by acclamation. It was just at this time the Governor-General's letter arrived to the effect that he would gladly see the regency conferred upon Mama Sahib.

So Mama Sahib the pro-British man became the regent. He got his niece married to the Maharajah.³

Then started the intrigues to oust him from the regency. At first in these intrigues a woman named Nurengi^{3a} took a leading part. She was the favourite of Tarabai and acquired so much control on the Maharani that the regent Mama Sahib felt his position and authority to be in danger and was considering how best he might remove her. However, Nurengi was induced to retire after making an excellent bargain for herself.⁴

But as said earlier there was Dada Khasji Walla, who had originally aspired to the regency and was successfully working to undermine the authority of Mama Sahib. Perhaps Tarabai too felt her authority slipping away and hence her hatred of Mama Sahib increased in proportion to her liking for her Chamberlain Dada Khasji Walla, who was an able man. As a result factions at the Court became deep rooted. After discussions which lasted for a fortnight, the regent was dismissed and the British Minister at Gwalior advised Mama Sahib to retire from that place in obedience to the order of the Maharanee.

It is said that Dada Khasji Walla wanted to get rid of Mama Sahib when the regent halted at Seronj.⁵

2. J. Hope: *A sketch of the House of Scindhia 1863*, p. 42. The other Mama Sahib who succeeded him was a far better man as the perusal of this diary will reveal.

3. B. D. Basu, *Rise of the Christian Power in India*, Vol. V, pp. 116-123.

3a. This name has been spelt in various ways in almost all the Books. At one time it reads as Mowrangi.

4. Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India*, Vol. II, p. 475.

For more details, read J. Hope, *Op. Cit.* pp. 46-49.

5. Beveridge, Vol. III, *Op. Ch.* p. 475.

Thus the vacancy caused by the dismissal of the Mama Sahib was to be filled. The Maharanee with the advice of the Durbar appointed Khasji Walla, but then the British had yet to recognise him as regent. The regent's anti-British policy was quite apparent to the Governor-General, who quietly asked Col. Spiers, the Resident to move out of Gwalior territory.

In his letter to the Queen on June 27, 1843, he wrote: "The retirement of the late regent from Gwalior has removed all present apprehensions of collision with the troops of Gwalior. The British Resident has in pursuance of his instructions removed to his house at Dholpore, about 30 miles from Gwalior and out of the Gwalior territory".⁶

He was replaced by Col. Sleeman, the man of his heart. Ellenborough wanted some excuse or other to reduce Gwalior to a mere vassal state. He did not approve of the activities of Dada Khaji Walla and took every action of his to be something like a defiance of the British Government. That is why in his letter of 19th September 1843, he informed the Queen as follows:

"The Dada Khasjeeewala with whom every measure of an offensive or hostile character originated, still retains his influence over the Ranee, and directs affairs. It would appear that he now conceals from Her Highness the real purport of the communication and addressed to her by the British Minister".⁷ The fact is that Khasjiwalla opened and read the letter of the Governor-General addressed to the Rani which made matters worse. As Hope puts it "It was said that the Minister of the State had intercepted a letter from his Lordship to his dear young 'Sister' the Maharanee". The fact is that as the Minister he was the only person who could open, read and explain its contents to the Maharanee.

This incident was very much resented by the Governor-General. That is why he became adamant for "the mere dismissal of the Dada Khasjiwalla, after all that has passed, would not be sufficient to afford security against similar intrigues to State in which he has been the mover, and to place the relations between the two Governments upon a satisfactory footing".⁸ The Governor-General demanded that Khasji Walla should not only be dismissed but

6. B. D. Basu, Vol. V, *Op. Cit.* p. 120.

7. *Ibid.* p. 124.

8. Beveridge, *op. cit.* p. 476.

banished for ever beyond the limits of the Gwalior territory. The hostile Minister Dada Sahib Khasji Walla was immediately delivered by the Maharanee on the receipt of the Governor-General's letter. But that was not sufficient. The Governor-General thought that the Military of Sindhia was too unwieldy and out of the control of the Rani and as such it should be crushed.

Thus we find that the British stepped in with their guns and armies. Ellenborough who was bent upon a war, had a lame excuse to declare a war. We need not describe the events of the War as they are sufficiently dealt with elsewhere.⁹

Jayaji Sindhia was forced to accept a treaty which was signed by the British Government and Gwalior on 13th January 1844. Among other things, its clauses 8, 9 and 10 are useful for our present purpose.

Clause 8 fixed that the minority of the Maharajah was to terminate on his attaining the full age of 18 years, i.e. on 19th January 1853. While clause 9 appointed a regency Council consisting of Rao Ram Rao Phalkia Bahadur Shamshir Jung as the President and with the following as members. Deo Rao Jadhav Mama Sahib, Dabir-ud-daulah Munshi Rajah Balwant Rao Bahadur, Oodaji Rao Ghatgia, Moollaji, and Narayan Rao Bhau Yumaji Potnowis.¹⁰

Article 10, fixes 3 lakhs of rupees a year for the maintenance of Darbar and her Court.

With this introduction to serve as a background, we skip over a period of 6 years, and now take our readers to 1850 to give our readers an idea of the life of Gwalior—nay a picture of the activities at Gwalior, week-to-week from December 1850 to December 1852.

If we like, we could continue it further, enlarge its range from 2 years to 10 or 20 years. As said elsewhere, the monotony of the subject and the lack of time, has forced us at present, to limit it to a short period of two years.

So far to the best of our knowledge and belief, this material has not been placed before scholars. We feel that this material,

an inevitable mine of knowledge, will be of great use, to post-graduate students and scholars and more so to those who are working for the Ph.D. or D.Litt. degrees.

Now, we request our readers to pass on as to what was happening week by week for two years at Gwalior, prior to the Maharajah assuming full reins of Government.

20th December 1850: The Assistant Agent attended the Durbar. After the usual ceremony, he had a private interview for an hour with the Maharajah and Mama Sahib the Mukhtar-i-Riyasat (Regent). For a few minutes the Diwanji, too, was closeted with them.

The Agent accompanied with the Sarishtadar of the Maharajah arrived at Chawni gana (Military camp at Gana).

The Mukhtar-i-Riyasat has purchased 19 high breed horses for his Paigah.

It is understood that Chaudri Murlidhar who absconded from the pargana Ambhawalla accompanied with two hundred armed soldiers, is staying at Dholpur. From here he has been pestering the English officers and complaining about the work of Amils.

The daughter of Baba Sargur was married. One day he invited all the courtiers to a dinner party. The Mukhtar-i-Riyasat accompanied by courtiers attended the party. He conferred a Khilat upon him.

To-day (20th December) being an auspicious day, the Maharajah and Maharanee celebrated it by throwing open a grand dinner party.

Khanda Rao Bhau who is to accompany the Assistant Lieutenant Bahadur has been awarded a Khilat of 5 *parchas* with *sarpech* and *Malla-i-Marwarid*.¹¹

It is understood that in place of Late Gopa Shastri, Gopal Rao Shastri, has been appointed as a temporary Judge of the Adalat-i-Alia, of Gwalior. All the officers have been ordered to obey the orders of Gopal Rao Shastri.

9. Gwalior papers 1844, pp. 15-18. vide Law "India under Ellenborough p. 28, also Calcutta Review, I, 1844, p. 535.

10. C. U. Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds, Vol. IV, pp. 266.

11. Akhbar-ul-Haqaiq, 25th January, 1851. For Akhbar-ul-Haqaiq, read my paper published in the Pr. of the Ind. Hist. R. C. 22nd Session, 1945, pp.68-69.

In honour of the marriage of Tulsaji, one day, a grand party was held in the Sarkari Bada. Thirty or thirty-two Khilats were presented to the Mukhtar-i-Riyasat and others.

The "Barat" (marriage party) accompanied by the Maharajah moved to the palace of the Mukhtar-i-Riyasat.

Chaudri Murlidhar Ambahwalla approached the Residency, in connection with his case which he has been discussing with them. We do not know what would be the result of the discussion.¹²

The Mukhtar-i-Riyasat has re-instated the dismissed sepoy and now the people are happy over it.

When a party was given to Bapu Sahib Satovella Deshmukh and Lachman Rao Phalkia, all the Sardars, Aslahdars of the State assembled in the Sarkari Bara (Bada) when 4000 persons partook the feast.

In honour of the marriage of Tulsaji, for a number of days, Khilats and presents poured in from all sardars and kamaisdars.

People of some parganas have lodged bitter complaints against their Amils and Tahsildars. The Mukhtar-i-Riyasat has ordered an enquiry.

Two months pay of sepoy is now being disbursed.

It is the talk of the town that one Thakore with 500 sawars has been creating disturbances in the pargana of Sabhalgadh.¹³

There is nothing to report except that in the Illaka of Narvor, a new district is now being formed. Various other names of places were suggested but in vain.

Many of the Chubas and Brahmans of Mathura have arrived in Gwalior. It is understood the Durbar would render them help.

Khanda Rao Bhau who accompanied the Assistant Regent has returned. He has submitted his report to the Maharajah.¹⁴

On the 22nd January 1851, the birthday celebrations of the Maharajah were held in the afternoon and a Durbar-i-Am. Bapu

Sahib Satovella Deshmukh and the Mukhtar-i-Riyasat with staff were present. According to his rank, each one of them presented Khilats to the Maharajah.¹⁵

On 26th the Chubas of Mathura were entertained in the Bada with dinner and sweets. Each one of them received Rs. 5/-. So also the Brahmans of the Himalayas were fed and presented with Rs. 7/- each as well as Razai (cotton blanket) by the Sarkar.

It is expected that the Maharajah will leave shortly for Shikar.¹⁶

Maharajah Hindu Rao is expected to arrive from Delhi at Gwalior, as Maharajah Jayaji Rao is anxious to see him. Due to the good offices and efforts of the Mukhtar-i-Riyasat Janab Mama Sahib, this visit has been arranged.¹⁷

12. Ibid, 29th January, 1851.

13. Ibid, 5th Feb. 1851.

14. Ibid, 19th Feb. 1851.

15. Ibid, 26th Feb. 1851.

16. Ibid, 22nd Feb. 1851.

17. Ibid, 5th March, 1851.

Career of Bishop Noronha (1752-1762)

BY

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The part played by Don Antonio de Noronha, Bishop of Halicarnasus, in the history of Mysore, nay his career in India between February 1753 and 1762 is little known. His Portuguese biographer frankly confesses that from "the letter of Viceroy Marquis de Tavora dated February 3, 1753 to 1762 the archives of Goa do not contain any information on Fr. Antonio".¹ But he goes on to say that "he continued to reside on the Coromandel Coast, by an agreement with the French, the Mahrattas and the noted ruler of Mysore, Hyder Ali Khan." It is the purpose of this paper to supply the missing link. But before attempting this a brief sketch of his career in India prior to the period under review is necessary.

I

His Antecedents

He was born of poor parents in July 1720 at Goa. He was soon left an orphan. He was put under the tutelage of his maternal grandfather to be ordained a priest; and so he was forced to enter the Convent of St. Francis at Goa. Perhaps no man could have been more ill-fitted to be a priest than he. He was an 'indisciplined boy and not a very edifying seminarist. Yet he was ordained a priest under the name of Fr. Antonio de la Purification before the prescribed age of 16, and was soon on his way to the Coromandel Coast as a member of the Franciscan Mission. There politics attracted him and he soon got in the good books of Dupleix by 'cooking up' a relationship with Madame Dupleix, who was Portuguese from her mother's side. Hence he is called 'pseudo-neveu' (pretended nephew) of Madame Dupleix. In violation of the edict he was appointed Inspector and Commis-

1. J. A. Ismael Gracias: O Dispo de Halicarnasse, D. Antonio de Noronha. French translation by D. Closet D'Errey, Dom Antonio de Noronha, Eveque D'Halicarnasse, p. 67.

sioner of his Order at Meliapour. Noronha was appointed to the Vicaire of Notre Dame de Luz. It was while holding this office that he supplied valuable information regarding the weak state of the defence of Madras to Dupleix, during the war of the Austrian Succession in Europe.²

In 1746 he was appointed a Prelate and Inspector of his District parishes. As head of the Parish of De Luz, his conduct was most scandalous. He stooped low enough to sell away the belongings of the Church. He went to Goa to obtain for Madame Dupleix the title of 'Senhora dos Castros et Noronhas', for a certain sum of money, leaving his parish without a soul. On his return he went his own scandalous ways again, which formed the subject matter of three sessions of the Ecclesiastical Tribunal, between September 1747 and May 1748. The whole order of the Franciscan Mission paid for the licentious life of one of them. To please Dupleix the whole mission was withdrawn from the Coromandel Coast. In addition Noronha was allowed to be one of the officiating priests at Bardez. In February 1748 the provincial fathers held Dupleix guilty of shielding Noronha, who had by now gone to the extent of imprisoning the two fathers of his mission for disobeying him. He was suspended and asked to return to Goa, on pain of expulsion. When Dupleix became supreme in the Deccan, he did not forget his wife's 'pseudo-nevue', and succeeded in having him appointed Attorney of his Nation. As a reward for the help given to the Nawab Chanda Saheb, Dupleix obtained for his protegee the Amildarship or Governorship of St. Thome, and its dependencies with precedence over the military commandant and all other officers. On assuming this office the Commission of the Attorney of the Nation on the Coromandel Coast was sent to him. He was cleared of the charge of having ever hindered or troubled the royal service. On the rendition of Madras to the English, as per Treaty of Aix-Chapelle, Admiral Boscawen invested San Thome, as Noronha had already signalled his attitude by stopping provisions going into Madras. Chanda Saheb having failed to secure his release, Noronha and his companions were taken captives to Madras, from where the Bishop was carried a prisoner to London. Moreover Noronha's papers were said to have proved him 'a secret enemy of and a stimulator of the animosities between the French and the English. Dupleix pleaded Noronha's innocence and high relations, with Boscawen,

2. Dodwell: Dupleix and Clive, p. 7.

with a view to secure his release. The reply, as terse as a telegram and in keeping with the official style of the English, ran, "I have had reason to arrest him. I have asked my superiors in Europe to set him at liberty."³ The action of Boscawen was objected to by the authorities at Goa on grounds of international law. Ultimately he was released on the application of the Portuguese minister. From London Noronha went to Paris, where before the French King Louis XV he made tall claims of the services rendered by him to the French. The King rewarded him by appointing him Chevalier de St. Lazare and Mont Carmel. On the recommendations of the French king, he was appointed Bishop of Halicarnassus 'in partibus infidelium' (in non-Roman Catholic countries). The despatch of the bull to him was objected to, but before the question could be settled Noronha embarked for Pondicherry, where his services were required in the cause of the Most Christian Majesty. He was back to the scene of most of his former exploits, in August 1752. Ultimately we are told his appointment was not confirmed, chiefly due to the opposition of the Jesuits. Noronha, however, continued to make full use of the honour.

II

Noronha continued to reside at Pondicherry for a number of years following his return. He was in Pondicherry when Duval de Leyrit arrived as the successor of M. Godeheu in the early part of 1755. Later in the year he turned a negotiator, first going to Balaji Rao on behalf of the Viceroy of Goa and then to Mouzaferkhan, a noted Partisan, to treat of some affairs of the State, allegedly under instructions of M. Bussy, then in charge of the French affairs in Hyderabad, though the allegation was an 'inexplicable riddle' to the latter. On the 9th November, 1755 Bussy informed De Leyrit that Noronha was following Mouzaferkhan and ravaging the countries of Vizapour, half of which he gave to the Foujdar of Sanur Bancapour.⁴

Noronha and Morari Rao

But soon we find Noronha being mentioned in connection with Bussy's negotiations with the Maratha Chief of Gooti, Morari Rao Ghorpade. Morari Rao had occupied the state of Gooti and

3. Closet D'Errey, p. 36.

4. Bussy to De Leyrit, dated Nov. 9, 1755.

held it against the wishes of his superior, the Peshwa, relying upon the protection of Salabut Jung. In 1756 Salabut Jung and the Peshwa being on good terms, they agreed to withdraw the support which each gave to the dependents of the other. The combined armies marched to reduce Savanur. Morari Rao, as adept in statecraft as in warfare, decided to help Savanur and thereby defend his own possessions behind the walls of the chief city of his Mahomedan ally. But despairing of the odds against him he started negotiations with Bussy. He used a bond given to him by the French for his services before Trichinopoly, which however the policy of Godeheu had deprived them of the power of fulfilling, as a pawn in the bargain. His vakils were already at the camp of Bussy and negotiations were progressing satisfactorily, when Noronha appeared on the scene. Noronha gave Morari Rao to understand that his relations with Dupleix enabled him to do anything at Pondicherry. Morari Rao, who was inclined to give up the bond if districts of Gooti could be obtained for him, wrote to his vakils, promising a definite reply after he had spoken to Dilawer Jung. But how did Noronha come to be known as Dilawer Jung. He himself explained it in a request to the king. He said that he had been charged with a mission from the Portuguese Government to the chief of the Mahrattas, a task he fulfilled at his expense, and that the Grand Mogol (the Nizam) as a reward for his good offices conferred on him the title of 'Nawab Xamadar Bahadur Dilavar-Genga'.⁵

Bussy foreseeing that Noronha's inexperience and boasts might hinder his negotiations with Morari Rao, wrote to de Leyrit requesting him to recall Noronha to Pondicherry. The negotiations were, however, concluded, whereby Bussy received back the bond and the Mahrattas the district, and these subsequently led to Bussy's dismissal by Salabut Jung. At the same time Noronha boasted of his great influence with the French and the Portuguese, and proposed to Shah Nawab Khan, the Nizam's minister, to bring him several thousand Portuguese, with whose help he undertook to destroy Balaji Rao, but he asked for an advance of a lakh and a half of rupees. Mouzaferkhan, whom Dupleix considered to be the most noted intriguer of his times, supported Noronha in his loud pretensions.⁵ Though Noronha's dealings with Morari Rao and other Indian Potentates, seem to have surprised Bussy, to

5. Bussy to De Leyrit, dated Dec. 5, 1755.

de Leyrit, they were 'affaire ordinaire'. But what surprised him was that Morari Rao astute statesman that he was, had allowed himself to be taken in by this adventurer. Noronha was known to have only one aim and that was to take out as much money as possible from the Moors or from the Mahrattas.

In February 1756 Noronha went to Goa to obtain for Morari Rao the services of one thousand Portuguese troops. They were to be paid for immediately on their arrival. His failure showed him in his true colours. The Viceroy of Goa had not the thousands of Portuguese troops to lend out to Noronha. Though known to the Viceroy, Noronha was not the accredited agent of the Portuguese, with authority to make large promises. In April, Noronha returned empty-handed, and he was confined to the citadel of Bancapur. He obtained his release but unable to deliver the goods he embarked for Pondicherry. On his way back he met Bussy, who forgetful of the past, wrote to De Leyrit, to obtain some relief for the Bishop from his creditors, by having their proceedings against him stayed. At first he had requested Bussy to write to De Leyrit for his house at Oul'garet to be restored to him, but on second thought, he preferred not to risk going there. To keep himself at a safe distance from his creditors he took up his residence at Alumparava. Here he lived until Lally found a new field for his activity—that of a diplomat in 1760.

Lally found himself in a tight corner towards the end of 1759, and despairing of receiving any help from Bazalut Jung of Adoni, he turned for help to Morari Rao. On whom could his eyes turn to play the role of a negotiator, but on our Bishop in 'partibus infidelium'. As a result of Noronha's diplomacy, a body of three thousand Mahratta horse joined Lally in January 1760. But on Coote's defeat of Lally at Wandewash on January 22nd, and his conquest of Chitpet, a week later, and of Arcot on the 10th February, this body left the French general. Now Lally decided to follow the methods of Dupleix for the last time. He now turned for help to the newly formed power of Hyder Ali in Mysore.

The negotiations were opened by Noronha, whom Wilks calls 'a church militant prelate of doubtful history'.⁶ Noronha himself

6. History of Mysore I. 460. Ram Chander Rao tells us 'But in the year Pramadi (1758) the English attacked Pondicherry (Phoolcheri). Then the French set a trusty officer of theirs, who came to Patam and paid his respects to Hyder and to the Kartar and requested that they would aid the French

has left us an account of his negotiations with Hyder Ali.⁷ He sent a Portuguese Captain of the infantry in the service of the French Captain José Pedro Robeiro to Hyder to ask for the help of 5000 men—infantry, cavalry and artillery. Hyder, thereupon sent Mughdum Saheb with 2000 horses and 3000 foot,⁸ in return for a present of 12 pieces of artillery, the cession of the fort of Thiagar and Eleanasur, which the French still occupied; 2 lakhs of rupees to be paid two months after the troops joined the French, and assistance in conquering Madura, Tinnevely and Trichinopoly on the termination of the hostilities with the English. When this help reached Thiagar, Noronha tells us, he left Pondicherry accompanied by 25 dragoons on horseback, while Captain Ogle (Hugel) crossing the English troops at the third watch of the night, reached Thiagar and gave them as hostages as agreed to by José Pedro Robeiro, to Hyder Ali. Then with 5000 men and the garrison of the Thiagar fort which consisted of 100 men, Mughdum Saheb crossed the river Trivedi and there meeting with a part of the English army commanded by Mezermors (Major Moore) forced him to retreat after having been completely defeated. The engagement took place on 17th July 1761. This enabled Don Antonio Noronha to continue his march, bringing help and he was successful in entering the city of Pondicherry. Within five months that these troops were in alliance with the French, Hyder came to grief. He was forced to recall Mughdum Saheb to help him recover his position at Seringapatam. The latter rejoined his master at Bangalore in October 1760.

Noronha and Beenee Visaji Pandit

In December 1760 two astute negotiators—Noronha and Beenee Visaji Pandit—were pitted against each other. Of Noronha as a negotiator we know. As for the Maharatta, it must be admitted that about this time he proves himself to be an arch-

with troops and he added many promises. Hyder agreed and sent his brother-in-law Mukhdum Saheb and his minister with the messenger, giving him 3000 horse, 6000 foot and 10 cannons, sending them by the Baramahai Road (*Memoirs of Hyder and Tippoo—Rulers of Seringapatam*. Tr. by Brown, pp. 6-7).

7. P. Pissurlencar, *Antigualhas*, p. 148.

8. The number of troops that Mughdum Saheb carried with him are variously given, Wilks and H. Rao mention 3000 horse and 5000 foot. Malleison says 10000 of which half were horse. Ananda Ranga Pillai and Dodwell give the number as stated above.

negotiator. In August 1760, he agreed to despatch 6,000 of his 20,000 horses under the command of Gopal Hari to the help of Khande Rao against Hyder Ali. In return two years tribute and three lakhs of rupees were to be paid to the Maratha, who was also to receive back the posts taken by the Mysore Raja. Noronha mentions that the total sum paid to Visaji Pandit was 25 lakhs, of which 20 lakhs were paid down. On the 16th August Mughdum Saheb received orders from Hyder Ali to march back to Bangalore. Noronha, foreseeing the dangers to France if Mughdum Saheb left Thiagar abruptly, arranged with him to hand it over to the French.⁹ Summoned from Gingee, the French left 200 European foot and 5 companies of sepoys to garrison the fort, after taking possession of it on the 13th Sept. About the end of September Mughdum Saheb crossed the Changama Pass. Khande Rao aiming at the destruction of this force, sent Gopalhari with 6,000 Mahratta horses, reinforced by his own troops to oppose him. Beenee Visaji Pandit sent a further 4000 horses to his help. Mughdum Saheb had a very hard time and was at last blockaded at Anchittydroog. From there he informed Hyder Ali that he was in a critical position and that he could not march to his assistance unless reinforced. Hyder detached 4000 men with 5 guns under Faizulla Khan to his relief. The latter reached Anicul, but failed to relieve Mughdum Saheb's plight. At this juncture, when Hyder's good fortunes seemed to have deserted him Hyder heard to his great delight and astonishment that for a payment of just five lakhs of rupees, the balance due from Khande Rao, and the cession of the Baramahals, Visaji Pandit was willing to withdraw his troops towards Poona. Hyder clutched at the opportunity and thus effectively crippled his enemy. Mughdum Saheb was enabled to rejoin his brother-in-law, who soon retrieved his lost fortune and much more. The moderation displayed by the Maharatha general is partly explained by his negotiations with Noronha.

In December 1760 Coote was besieging Pondichery. Lally-Tollendal, the French Governor and his council, despairing of receiving any further help from Hyder Ali, started negotiations with Visaji Pandit, and deputed the Bishop of Halicarnassus to go

9. M. M. D. L. T represents Mughdum Saheb to have been guided by motives of justice. He says: 'Mughdum, on his return, passing by Thiagar, withdrew his garrison and the French replaced some sepoys in the same; Mughdum saying, with a generous spirit of integrity, that as the place was to have been the reward for delivering Pondocheru, justice required him to restore it, since he had failed in the attempt.'

and arrange terms with him, though Noronha would have us believe that the Mahratha 'before he agreed to help wanted to consult Don Antonio Jose Noronha personally'. It was at great hazards that he succeeded in reaching his destination. Pondichery was besieged on land by Coote's army and on the sea by 7 warships and 12 other patrol vessels. Don Antonio was smuggled out on a small ship with 130 soldiers. He carried an order from Mons. Eixer, the French Resident at Tranquebar, to supply with all the soldiers and naval officers available. The ship eluded the blockading fleet at the third watch of the night and reached Tranquebar. But disappointment awaited him. Fearing the wrath of the English, he was not allowed to land. But in the end he managed to land and joined the soldiers and naval men kept ready at an appointed place. But before he could meet Visaji Pandit, he had to traverse land belonging to the English and their allies. Some posts he took by force, others he passed by deceiving the English by posing as the leader of an English detachment. This was not difficult, for he and several of his men knew English. But at last on reaching Atoor he was attacked by the English cavalry. He managed to defend himself and took shelter in the neighbouring jungle. He proceeded to Tripatore where in the first week of December, he was joined by the French cavalry. This body of 200 under Major Alain, one of the officers of Lally's regiments, was in the Thiagar fort, when it was restored to the French. On the 3rd December, they pushed out of the pettah and went to the west of Trinomali, intending to stay there until the success of Noronha's negotiations with Visaji enabled them to march to Pondichery in company of the Mahrathas. Here they were joined by 100 European infantry under Hugel, whom to alleviate the consumption of food, Lally had sent out of Pondichery by boat. Noronha was at the head of this body of 200 European Cavalry and 100 European infantry when he reached the camp of Visaji at Kadampattam. This is mistaken for an escort by Stewart, for he says 'A short time previous to this surrender of Pondichery to the British arms, M. Lally had deputed a priest, generally called the Bishop of Halicarnassus to Vizvazy Pant, the Mahratta general, then in the Carnatic, to solicit his assistance and in order to give dignity to the embassy, he sent with it an escort of 300 Europeans under the command of M. Allen'.¹⁰

10. Stewart: *Memoris of Hyder Aly Khan and his son Tippoo Sultan*, prefixed to a "Descriptive catalogue of the Oriental Library of the late Tippoo Sultan of Mysore." p. 15.

Noronha's Failure

Noronha's mission was about to succeed, when events took a sudden turn for the worse. Visaji Pandit had agreed to help the French provided Gingee was ceded to him and five lakhs of rupees were paid when the Mahrathas were in sight of Pondichery. Alain and Hugel had agreed to the cession of Thiagar also. Noronha was agreeable. On the last day of the year 1760, intelligence was received and credited by the English that the Mahrathas with Major Alain's horse were already on their way to Pondichery. Mahomed Ali of the Carnatic saw in the success of the Bishop's embassy, an insurmountable obstacle to the success of the English besieging Pondichery. His vakils were soon in the camp of Visaji Pandit and they began their offer where the Bishop had ended his; and in the end the Nawab's agents promised 20 lakhs, half of the sum to be paid in 20 days and the rest within 9 months. For once Noronha's casuistry failed. He was told by the Mahratha general not to expect any help from him. Noronha himself relates, 'But this Mahratha had not the least intention to help the French and wanted by the coming of the envoy to take advantage of the situation to take more money from the English envoy, who was in this state to prevent any help which the Mahrathas might give to the Pondichery fort. Don Antonio, who understood this cunning design did not like to waste more time there and took his leave on the pretence that he had not the permission to remain more than four days, with the result that the Mahratha chief had to satisfy himself with the money that he had received from the English and the English envoy, seeing that Don Antonio had already left, began to entertain the Mahratha chief with his own politics'.¹¹ Thus Visaji Pandit's retreat from the Carnatic was already bought for 20 lakhs by the allies of the English; the five lakhs from Hyder were an addition to his booty, without imposing any additional obligations on him.

III

Noronha Invited to Mysore

Noronha continued his quest for help from other rulers, and decided to obtain it from Morari Rao, who had already helped the French once. But as these troops were the followers of Visaji

11. Pissurlencar: *op. cit.* p. 149.
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Pandit he could not obtain it, But Dame Fortune smiled on him as soon as he reached Vencatagherry. Khande Rao invited him to join the Raja of Mysore against Hyder Ali; Hyder Ali also invited him. Hyder reiterated the help he had given to the French in the past and the fact of his having given Thiagar, which he had conquered back to the French. He attributed his plight to the fact that his strength had been reduced by Mughdoom Saheb's departure to help the French, and this had encouraged his enemies in their fight against him. He now asked that the French should help him in return, now that he was in distress. In addition he promised to help the French once more if his fortunes improved. In view of this it was quite natural that Noronha should have chosen to help Hyder Ali. But now the fall of Pondichery was imminent. The Bishop was encouraged to go to the Mysore country, for otherwise he ran the risk of being captured by the English. So he headed the 200 French cavalry under Alain and the 100 French infantry under Hugel towards Bangalore, and on hearing of the actual fall of the French capital on 16th January 1761, had joined Hyder at Tyoor.

Arrival in Hyder's camp

Peixoto thus describes the arrival of Noronha and party in Hyder's camp: "then Hyder encamped in the fort of Taiur, where he remained for some days, and during our stay there arrived the Bishop Fres. Antonio de Noronha, with a party of French horse and Foot all Europeans about 100 in number with a Lt. Colonel by name Mons. Alens, one Captain of Horse Monsieur Higel and some more officers of Horse and Foot, all these came under the direction of the said Bishop, whom Hyder Ally received with great honour and satisfaction, and allways have him the right hand until the time that I will relate at its place. Hyder Aly was very much contented with this succour, tho' they did not come properly to succour him, but as they were shutt out of Pondichery by the circle of the English camp and could not enter it, therefore, they came to the camp of Hyder Ally as a friend and ally of their nation, as he had already shown at the siege of Pondichery which he succoured, without the view of any interest with 8000 horse and foot and with them caused the English great destruction, took from them the Fort of Trivety and would have delivered Pondichery if it had not been for his success at Siringapatam, which not only disabled him from sending more succours but also obliged him to order his brother-in-law to retire, who had gone to succour the place. We

marched from the fort of Taiur to that of Ardenaly, the place where all the French officers with their men joined for in Taiur only the Bishop arrived, he having been some days' march ahead of them".¹²

Since the arrival of Noronha, Alain and Hugel in the camp of Hyder Ali followed in the wake of Mughdoom Saheb's return from Pondichery, the former are supposed to have come with the latter. M.M.D., L.T., tells us, "He returned to Hyder bringing with him all the French cavalry under the Sieurs Alain and Hugel and such workmen as were at Pondichery; a precious acquisition, which has highly contributed to the success of Hyder, by furnishing him with skilfull armourers, carpenters and other workmen from the arsenal of Pondichery, collected with such expense and trouble by the French".¹³

The Portuguese account of Noronha's coming to Mysore is slightly different. It runs:—"As Aider Naique entertained the design of persecuting his sovereign he easily secured to his side a detachment of the French troops commanded by M. Alens, which probably accompanied the Bishop of Alicarnasse, who had gone up (the mountains) to conduct some negotiations with the neighbouring princes, as they had no where to go when they learnt of the loss of Pondichery".¹⁴

Noronha at Chickbalapur

While Hyder Ali was at Hardanhally he held several councils to decide on the best way of destroying Khande Rao's army, and he always took advice of Noronha. One day Noronha proposed to Hyder that given a few men to reconduct the artillery and some to reinforce his small number, he would go and take Khande Rao's artillery. He pledged his own life and those of his men for the success of it. But Hyder's thoughts were running in another direction. He did not want to risk any lives, when he could be

12. Peixoto, Capt. Eloy Jose Correa: *Memoirs of Hyder Ally from the year 1758 to 1770*, p. 18.

13. *History of Hyder Shah alias Hyder Ali Khan Bahadur and of his son Tippoo Sultan*, p. 42 M. M. D. L. T. is Mons. Maistre De La Tour, who was a cavalry commander under Hyder.

14. P. Pissurlencar: *Antigullhas*, p. 141. Sen: *Earlier Career of Kanhoji Angria and other Papers*, pp. 82-3. I am indebted to a portuguese knowing friend of mine for translating all the Portuguese documents quoted in this paper.

master of Khande Rao's forces by other means. He deceived Khande Rao by spreading a rumour that he was marching against the small force under Ramarao at Irur. Khande Rao went to Mysore, while Hyder accompanied by Noronha and Hugel with 70 of his Hussars and some of his own horse went to Nanda Raj at Cunoor, leaving the camp at Hardanhally under Faizulla Khan and Mughdoom Saheb. He persuaded Nanda Raj to accept his penitence and apology and to accompany him against Khande Rao. The combined armies marched against Seringapatam and Hyder entered it after Khande Rao had been frightened into a flight. After he had settled affairs in the capital, he reduced Hoskote and Sera and then marched against Chickbalapur, lured by the great name that he would obtain by conquering it. He ordered trenches to be opened and batteries to be made; and when the guns were mounted he decided to advance, supported by the firing of the guns. Noronha advised him to wait till breaches had been made in the fort, for the citadel was very defensive and the soldiers defending it very brave. Hyder 'did not doubt of this being a good counsel, and that he might not disoblige the Bishop nor deviate from his own opinion, he ordered one breach to be made, but before it was perfect, he ordered an assault, and after our people had mounted they were repulsed again and lost some men. When the Bishops saw these disorders, he said to the Nabob, "it is necessary to keep possession of the breach. I am going there, you send me some troops", and departed instantly with two of his servants, and in mounting one of his servants was shott with the cannon ball, but he kept the breach till troops arrived which the Nabob immediately brought himself and mounted also. The Bishop then wanted to remain there but the Nabob did not consent to this and both retired to our trenches",¹⁵ Hyder continued sending reinforcements into the breaches and after 11 days the citadel was gained. In spite of vigorous approaches, the prize was still far from being won, for the Raja and those inside took care to see that 'all his works and approaches that he made against the fort serve for nothing'. Nothing intimidated the Raja and Hyder decided to use mines. "All the necessaries belonging to the mines the Bishop provided, he also ordered how they were to be made and the people that were to work them, in such a manner that they were soon finished". Hyder's final warning to the Raja to yield having been disregarded, the mines were set fire to. Of the 13 two failed

to fire and 6 made no breaches, for the defenders had dug wells behind the bastions. Three made large breaches. But still regardless of risks the men made desperate resistance, and Hyder came to terms with the Raja. He went to Deohally and later taking advantage of the Raja's absence came and captured Chickbalapur.

Then he captured Coodiconda and Penukonda and then advanced on Madaksira. The fort was very strong and well garrisoned. A breach was practicable in four days. Hyder ordered an assault on the third day. Hyder and Noronha were assisting in the assault. But for their presence the besieging soldiers would have turned back. At last the citadel was reached and the garrison retired into the fort below. The Nawab chose to enter the citadel through the gate and while he waited outside for the gate to be cleared of the rubbish, a terrible slaughter took place. Hyder and Noronha were besprinkled with blood all over. After a hard fight, the fort was captured also. The death of two of his Portuguese officers Jose Reiz and Bento de Campos, grieved Hyder very much. But a further shock was still in store for him. While at Madaksira Hyder and Noronha fell off with each other and Hyder had the misfortune to see Noronha leave his services.

Noronha Leaves Hyder

Noronha himself in his account of the Career of Hyder Ali thus explains why he left Hyder. "After this (capture of Madaksira), he left his associations with Hyder against the latter's wishes, as he could no longer tolerate his insolence and witness his tyranny. He had also learnt of the wars between Portugal and France, and knew also the intentions of Hyder, who was attempting to the capture of Bedrul (Bednur), state of Canara, which would have been very harmful to the Portuguese state. D. Antonio did not like any longer to be witness of the insolence of Hyder as he had to accompany him to all the expeditions, attacks and sieges. Besides he had now found a better opportunity in Goa to serve his nation, and sacrifice his services, while for all these years he had served foreigners and offered to work for them". But Peixoto has left us the following interesting account of the incident at Madaksira which precipitated Noronha's departure.

"During the time that the Nabob remained at Marke Sira, after it had surrendered", he wrote in his memoirs of Hyder, "he (Hyder) gave everybody audience in his palace, according to custom, where the Bishop for the most part assisted and who

15. Peixoto: op. cit., p. 28.

seated himself equally with the Nabob, he being the only person who had that distinction. When the Bishop wanted to go and speak to the Nabob, he used to send a servant called a Chubdar (who carried a silver rod in his hand as an ensign that he belongs to a person of authority and no person however rich, can have this Distinction, except given by the Nabob himself), who delivered the message the Bishop had sent, which was one day to know if the Nabob would go out, and if not he would come to see him, which message the Nabob received and sent word that he was not going out. At the customary hour the Bishop went and on entering where the Nabob was, and a Jentoo Padre, a principal person of the Kingdom of Patana, seated in the Bishop's place, and as the Nabob always rose from his seat when the Bishop entered, the Padre also got up, but the Bishop went straight on, without taking notice of him, and seated himself at his proper place, by which the Padre was obliged to get himself down at another place which put the Nabob all on fire, and tho' he strove and used all his art to hide it, the Bishop soon perceived the same. It being a custom in those places to sit upon the ground for which reason the floor is always covered with precious carpets, and to sit in any other manner than cross-legged is reckoned very indecent, of which custom the Nabob and the Bishop had sometimes discoursed, and the Bishop had told him, how troublesome it was to Europeans to sit in that manner, and the Nabob told him to sit as he liked best, as he wanted him always to be unmolested, and that it was not just that he could be mortified while he was with him. Wherefore the Bishop extended his legs very often without ceremony when he found himself tired of sitting cross-legged. That same day the Bishop happened to extend one leg when the master of the ceremonies came immediately close to his feet and told him he had a leg extended to which the Bishop answered with stern voice, 'it seems your brains are turned, if so, go to sleep,' and saying this he stretched out the other leg, and all those who knew this care cannot comprehend why the Nabob was silent, and as the Nabob entered into no conversation but seemed rather displeased the Bishop said to him, 'I have already given instructions to execute those orders you gave,' to which the Nabob replied, 'it is well' and was silent again. When the Bishop said, it seems to me 'you have no more business with me, so I may go about my business, to which the Nabob replied 'then go'. On which the Bishop got instantly up and then said, 'as soon as I am at home I shall send for a pass,' and the Nabob said 'do so'. The

Bishop did so and sent for a pass and the Nabob gave him one immediately.¹⁶ And so after a little more than two years and a half Noronha prepared to leave Mysore.¹⁷ Then Hyder tried to frighten him on his march. But the Bishop lavishly bribed the Nabob's own servants who took a road different from that mentioned in the Nabob's orders and hence free from all dangers. Noronha's safe arrival in Sonda made Hyder repent for having allowed him to go. He asked Peixoto often if the Bishop would return and when the Portuguese expressed a doubt, he strove to please the Captain of the Horse and other French Officers.

His Last Years

After leaving Hyder he helped in the capture of Ponda and Zambaulin, by the Portuguese and later Count de Ega appointed him Governor of the two places. He was removed for unbecoming conduct and sent to Lisbon under an escort. He managed to obtain an 'acquittal' and returned to Goa triumphant over all his enemies. He was given Darzo and the twin lands of Sassurpani and Chicolpani and the entire alde of Cundaim. But the authorities at Goa would only give him a part of the last, and the final decision was adverse to Noronha. He was appointed a Brigadier, commanding the legion of volunteers and Commissioner of the Province of Ponda in January 1775.

On the 7th February 1776 he came to Panjim and dined with the Governor, Jose Pedro de Camara. He was found dead in the carriage which carried him back to his country house 'Bellevue' at Panjim.

I shall conclude this paper with an estimate of his character by his Portuguese biographer :—

"Thus ended a life full of adventures and deceptions. When one looks at him either as Fr. Antoine de la Purification or the Bishop of Halicarnassus the Nawab Dilawar Jung or as Brigadier Antoine de Noronha, one is always in the presence of a being eaten up with insatiable ambitions. After 127 years he appears to us as a human document, lending itself to an interesting psychological study. His life has been, in fact, a poignant drama, with

16. Peixoto: op. cit, p. 35.

17. Noronha's Portuguese biographer gives December 1761 or January 1762 as the date when Noronha left for Goa, but it was nearly the end of 1762.

ups and downs. Thus ended the life of a man, who had performed such diverse duties and who had some merits about him. Intelligent but without conscience, courageous but without steadfastness, he had in his blood at the same time germs of heroism which enabled him to accomplish great things and germs of degeneracy which led him to commit gross blunders. He evidently represents a strange type of man with singular contrasts, shaped doubtless by the infallible laws of Atavism, subjected to the influence of his environments and twitched about ceaselessly between the impetuosity of his passions and the inflexibility of obligations which his sacramental character imposed on him.

The Date of Pallava Paramēśvara II*

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It is well known that the dates of the Pallava rulers of Kāñchi can be fixed, even approximately, only with the help of synchronisms of these monarchs with those of the kings of other dynasties as no Śaka dates are given in Pallava inscriptions. Almost from the very beginning of their political career the kings of the Simhaviṣṇu line, with whom we are concerned in this article, were engaged in constant wars with the Chālukyas of Bādāmi, so much so that the Pallavas are referred to in some records of the Chālukyas as their 'natural enemies' (*prakṛity-amitra*). This fact is of great advantage in working out the chronology of the Pallava rulers of this line particularly for the reason that a large number of the inscriptions of the contemporary Chālukya kings bear Śaka dates with corresponding regnal years.

In spite of this factor, it has not been possible to determine with any degree of exactitude the actual periods of reign of individual kings of the line. All that is definite about their dates is the contemporaneity of some of them with certain kings of the Chālukya dynasty as recorded in literature or inscriptions. Simhaviṣṇu, the founder of the line, is known to have been living at the same time as Chālukya Viṣṇuvardhana (I) and the Gaṅga king Durvinīta.¹ Of the time of his son and successor, Mahēndra I, we have no specific mention of any contemporary ruler. The next king Narasiṃha I is described in the Kūram copper plate inscription of his grandson Paramēśvara I² as having defeated the Chālukya king Pulakēśin, i.e. Pulakēśin II. As a result of this victory he

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1. (*Avantisundarikathā-Sāra*). Edited by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri, *Dakṣiṇabhāratigranthamālā*, No. 3 (1924), Introd. pp. 2-3, text pp. 3 ff. See also *J. O. R.*, Vol. I, p. 199.

2. *S. I. I.*, Vol. I, p. 148, text-line 16.

3. *An. Rep. on S. I. E.*, 1932-33, p. 55; Narasiṃha's inscription at Bādāmi, (*S. I. I.*, Vol. XI, pt. i, p. 1) not only confirms this fact but also proves that he was in actual occupation of this city.

appears to have captured Bādāmi and become famous as Vātāpi-konḍa Narasiṅgapōttaraiyar³ i.e., Narasiṅgapōttaraiyar who took Vātāpi). He is also mentioned in the inscriptions⁴ of the Chālukya monarch Vikramāditya I (A.D. 655-681) as the latter's adversary. Similarly the two kings who came after him viz., Mahēndra II and Paramēśvara I are known both from Chālukya and Pallava inscriptions⁵ to have fought with Vikramāditya I. But we have no such evidence establishing the contemporaneity of either Narasiṃhavarman II (Rājasimha)⁶ or Paramēśvara II,⁷ the son and grandson respectively of Paramēśvara I. Recently a stone inscription has been found which shows that Paramēśvara II was living towards the end of the reign of the Chālukya king Vijayāditya. The object of this paper is to ascertain with the help of this record, as nearly as possible, the period of rule of Paramēśvaravarman II and incidentally that of his predecessor Narasiṃhavarman II.⁸

This inscription was discovered in the village of Ulchāla about 10 miles to the west of Kurnool, the headquarters of the district of that name in the Madras State. It states that in the 35th year of the reign of the (Chālukya) king *Mahārājādhirāja-Paramēśvara Vijayāditya, Vikramāditya-Yuvarāja* after he returned from Kāñchī having raided that city and levied tribute from Paramēśvara-Pallava, made a gift of (the villages) Uḷchaḷu and Pariyaḷu to Durvinīṭ-Ere-

4. Gadval plates: *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. X, p. 103, verse 3.

5. *Ibid.*, Kūram grant, S. I. I., Vol. I, pp. 146 ff.

6. It may be noted, however, that the Kēndūr and Vokkalēri plates (*Ep. Ind.*, Vol. IX, p. 206 and Vol. V, p. 204, text-lines, 45-46) of the Chālukya king Kīrtivarman II say that his father Vikramāditya II 'acquired high merit by restoring heaps of gold to the stone temples of Rājasimhēśvara and other gods which had been caused to be built by Narasiṃhapōttavarman'. That this statement of the Chālukya plates is no mere boast is proved by the existence in this very temple of an inscription of Vikramāditya (II) himself recording the very same gift. This Narasiṃhapōttavarman has been rightly considered to be Narasiṃha II. This is the only mention of this Pallava king in a Chālukya record though it is not a contemporary document.

7. Venkayya and other scholars are of the opinion that Mahēndra III, another son of Narasiṃhavarman did not probably rule at all. He is known only from a single inscription in the Kailāsanātha temple at Kāñchipuram which describes him as the son of king Rājasimha (i.e., *Narasiṃha* II) and the grandson of Lōkāditya (i.e., *Paramēśvara* I) and records the fact of his having built the shrine of Mahēndrēśvara.

8. As already pointed out (f.n. 7, above), Mahēndravarmān III the brother of Paramēśvara does not appear to have ascended the throne. It is not even known whether he was the elder or the younger of the two brothers. Mr. Venkatasubba Aiyar, however, regards him as the predecessor of Paramēśvaravarman II.

yappōr of the Koṅguṇi (family). The latter finding that the villages were not in a flourishing condition granted certain concessions to the inhabitants of the places. Uḷchaḷu, one of the gift villages is of course Ulchāla the find-spot of the inscription and Pariyaḷu is the modern Parla a few miles south of Ulchāla both situated not far from the southern bank of the river Tuṅgabhadra.⁹ The wording of the epigraph would indicate that the historical events recorded therein, namely, prince Vikramāditya's invasion of Kāñchī and the collection of tribute from Paramēśvara were of recent occurrence on the date of the inscription, i.e., the 35th year of the reign of Vijayāditya. On the basis of the Aihole inscription of this king, Fleet has fixed the date of the commencement of his reign as falling in the month of Śrāvaṇa (August-September) of A.D. 696.¹⁰ Accordingly, his 35th regnal year should have begun about August-September A.D. 730. Allowing about a year or so for the Chālukya prince's march on Kāñchī and the subjugation of the Pallava ruler from whom he levied tribute, the Chālukya invasion of Kāñchī may be placed about A.D. 729-30. It has to be observed here that a copper-plate inscription of Vijayāditya dated in the 36th year of his reign¹¹ does not, however, mention this expedition to Kāñchī undertaken by his son Vikramāditya. For the following reasons the absence of any mention of this event in this record need not be regarded as incompatible with the information found in the Ulchāla inscription. The Ulchāla inscription which is dated in the 35th regnal year of the king is set up in the village which was the object of the grant. And it is clearly stated therein that the gift was made after the return of *Yuvarāja* Vikramāditya from Kāñchī. A glance at the map would show that this place lies on the way from Kāñchī to Bādāmi, the capital of the Chālukyas. It is thus evident that Vikramāditya made the gift while still on his way home, before reaching the capital. Apparently the interval between the time of the Ulchāla inscription and that of the copper plate under reference was too short for this exploit to be incorporated in the approved official draft of the preamble of

9. A village named Pariyaḷa is mentioned as one of the battle-fields where Narasiṃha I defeated Pulakēśin II (Kūram plates of Paramēśvara I, S. I. I., Vol. I, p. 148, text-line 16). Various identifications have been suggested for this place. (*Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XV, p. 40; *Proceedings etc. of the Seventh Oriental Conference*, Baroda, p. 623, n.). It is not certain whether this Pariyaḷa is the same as the Pariyaḷu of the Ulchāla record, though their identity is not improbable.

10. *Bom. Gaz.*, Vol. I, part ii, p. 370, n. 5.

11. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXV, p. 21.

Vijayāditya's grants recounting his achievements.¹² It may be added that no inscription of Vijayāditya before his 35th regnal year mentions any victory over the Pallavas during his reign and this would support the conclusion that prince Vikramāditya's invasion of Kāñchī was an event which occurred either during the 35th regnal year of his father or immediately before that year. The Paramēśvara of the Pallava dynasty who was ruling on this date could be no other than Paramēśvara II. The Narwan plates¹³ of this very Vikramāditya II which are dated in the 8th year of his reign (i.e., A.D. 741 or 742) state that he defeated a Pallava king but his name is given as Nandipōtavarman (i.e., Nandivarman Pallavamalla). As the Pallava defeat mentioned in the Ulchāla epigraph should have taken place before the date of the Narwan plates, the Paramēśvara from whom Yuvarāja-Vikramāditya II levied tribute in 729-30 must be Paramēśvara II, the predecessor of Pallavamalla.¹⁴ It is thus clear that Paramēśvaravarman was the ruler of Kāñchī in 729-30.¹⁵

There is only one dated record, assigned to this king, in the Viratānēśvara temple at Tiruvadi in the South Arcot District.¹⁶ Scholars are agreed that his reign was short and uneventful. And

12. It is a matter of common knowledge that copper-plate documents were based on such drafts to which additions were made as and when necessary.

13. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXVII, p. 125 ff.

14. From one of the Paṭṭadakal inscriptions of the time of Vikramāditya II (*Ind. Ant.*, Vol. X, p. 164) we learn that Vikramāditya II conquered Kāñchī thrice. Though it was known from the Kēndūr and Vokkalēri plates of Kirttivarman II and more recently from the Narwan plates of Vikramāditya II himself that there were two campaigns on Kāñchī during his reign, one led by himself and the other by his son Kirttivarman, as Yuvarāja, there was no information about still another invasion until the discovery of the Ulchāla inscription which tells us in unequivocal language that even while he was Yuvarāja Vikramāditya II raided Kāñchī. The three campaigns recorded in the Paṭṭadakal inscription are thus accounted for and they took place in the following order: the first in 729-30 as shown above, the second some time before 741-42, the date of the Narwan plates, and the third between this latter date and the end of Vikramāditya's reign i.e., 746-47; the last one was led by prince Kirttivarman after obtaining the orders of his father.

15. Though Pallavamalla was called Paramēśvara before his coronation, he was crowned king under the name of Nandivarman. The Vaikunṭhaperumāl temple inscription (*M.A.S.I.* No. 63, p. 54) is definite on this point. And it is this name Nandivarman Pallavamalla that is found in his inscriptions.

16. *S.I.I.*, Vol. VIII, No. 331.

the well-known Vaikunṭhaperumāl temple inscription¹⁷ at Kāñchī states explicitly that since after his death the country had no ruler, Nandivarman Pallavamalla of a collateral line was chosen by the people to succeed Paramēśvara. The third regnal year of Paramēśvara may therefore be regarded as the last year of his sovereignty. The three years of his rule may consequently be taken to have started one year prior to the date of Vikramāditya's first invasion of Kāñchī and to have continued for one year after the invasion. As the date of this campaign has been shown to be A.D. 729-30, Paramēśvara may be considered to have ruled from Circa A.D. 728-29 to 730-31. Having fixed the period of the reign of Paramēśvara we may try to find out the date of his predecessor Narasimhavarman II, who, as noted above, is not referred to in any contemporary document other than his own inscriptions which, as usual, do not contain a date in any known era. It is needless to say that A.D. 728-29 which was the first year of the reign of Paramēśvara was also the last year of the reign of Narasimha II. From the Gadvāl plates of Chālukya Vikramāditya I,¹⁸ it is known that Paramēśvara I was this Chālukya ruler's contemporary in A.D. 674. Consequently the interval between A.D. 674 and 728-29, i.e., about 55 years, must have covered a part of Paramēśvara's reign and the whole of the reign of Narasimha II. Since Vikramāditya I (A.D. 655 to 681) claims victory over three successive Pallava kings, namely, Narasimha I, Mahēndra II and Īśvara (Paramēśvara I), the last of them could not have come to the throne long before A.D. 674, the date of the Gadvāl plates. Obviously then, this period of 55 years was made up of a major portion of the reign of Paramēśvara I and the entire reign of Narasimha II. Assuming that Paramēśvara's reign started about 670, the period of 59 or 60 years between this date and 728-29 may be apportioned almost equally to the two rulers. Thus we may not be wrong if we place the initial year of the reign of Narasimhavarman II in A.D. 700; that is to say, he ruled from Cir. 700 to 728-29.¹⁹ It is indeed remarkable that this date arrived at on inscriptional evidence is corroborated by the notices of certain Chinese embassies of the

17. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 117; *M.A.S.I.*, No. 63, p. 54.

18. *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 103, verse 6.

19. The only dated record of this king is a copper-plate inscription which came to light about five years ago. It is the Rēyūru grant issued in the 12th year of his reign published in the *Journal of the Śrī Venkatēśvara Oriental Institute*, Vol. VIII (Telugu section, pp. 82 ff.), by the late Veturi Prabhakara Sastri.

8th century. According to them, in A.D. 720 the Pallava king Narasimha or Narasimhapōtavarman II sent an ambassador to the Chinese emperor who in turn sent an ambassador to the Pallava court in the same year.²⁰

Now that A.D. 728-29 to 730-31 has been arrived at as the date of Paramēśvara II the dates of Nandivarman Pallavamalla and his successors until the final overthrow of this dynasty by the Chōla king Āditya I will have to be reconsidered. This and allied chronological problems will be discussed in my forthcoming paper on the Ulchāla inscription in the *Epigraphia Indica*.

History of Chambā State in the Later Middle Ages

(ca. A.D. 1190 to 1623/41)

By

H. GOETZ, BARODA

Introductory Remarks: Until its recent absorption into Himāchal Pradesh, Chambā has been one of the major states in the Panjāb Himālaya. Its influence has varied widely, as it depended very much on the general political constellation of the times. For because of its situation in the upper Rāvi and Chandrabhāga (Chenāb) Valleys, behind the snow-clad wall of the Dhaulā Dhār Range, Chambā was both protected from invasions from the plains, and also debarred from the trends of cultural progress coming via the same routes. Thus, whenever the exterior hill states flourished, it became backward and insignificant. And this happened when those latter had become the peaceful vassals of a great power dominating the Panjāb, or when conditions in the plains had become so chaotic that even the kingdoms of the exterior valleys were left alone, i.e., when the great powers fought over the possession of the Panjāb, and when international trade was forced to find a safe alternative route through the Himālayan Valleys. But whenever the states of the outer hills stood exposed to the pressure of a conqueror from the plains, Chambā could extend its influence over a considerable area, thus rising to a dominant position at least twice, in the 11th—12th and in the 18th century A.D.

Seen in the general context of Indian history, even those periods of local supremacy have not been very important. And yet they are of the greatest interest to the modern historian. For just because Chambā had been so well protected, and just because the state and its civilization had been so conservative, the records of the past have been preserved in a completeness hardly existing anywhere else. And because of the same circumstances this history had been comparatively simple so that its reconstruction from those records—neither very comprehensive from the point of view of our modern age of paper—is not too difficult. In consequence, we are able to follow the development of Chambā state through

20. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *Foreign Notices of South India*, pp. 16 and 116-17.

centuries which in most parts of India form a "dark age". Under these circumstances this history is not of local interest only. For we may interpret it as a sample and indicium of what then had been going on also in other parts of India for which the documentation is lost or at least very fragmentary.

It is true, Chambā has not completely escaped war and invasion. But as most of these invasions came from neighbour states of similar cultural background, the damage seldom was serious and beyond the possibility of repair. Thus already towards the end of the 16th century a Vamsāvali could be reconstructed by Ramāpati and Lakshmikānta, the rājgurus and ministers of king Balabhadravarmān, which is exceptionally rich in information. And this Vamsāvali can again be checked up with the help of a considerable number of copperplate grants, stone inscriptions and archaeological monuments. On these Prof. J. Ph. Vogel and J. Hutchison have based their history of Chambā State.¹ But only the inscriptions of pre-Muslim times were systematically edited² whereas those of the subsequent period could be consulted only cursorily. Some references to them, however, can be found in the same publications and short summaries, also of the paper documents (since the 17th century A.D.) in the Catalogue of the Bhuri Singh Museum at Chambā, Calcutta 1909. In 1939-40 the later inscriptions were re-examined by Dr. B. Ch. Chhabra, the present Government Epigraphist, whereas I myself undertook a detailed study of the archaeological monuments. The following historical outline is the product of the incorporation of all this new material, and of its co-ordination with the history and archaeology of the surrounding valleys for which the pioneer work had likewise been done by Professor J. Ph. Vogel and Mr. Hutchison.

On this evidence we may divide the history of Chambā State during the Muslim Period into three phases: 1). The restoration of the mediaeval monarchy and feudal state to its original power and expansion (A.D. 1330-1623). 2). The growth, under Mughal influence, of a centralized state (A.D. 1641-1764). 3). The struggle for supremacy with Jammū and Kāngra, as the suzerain power of the interior Himālaya (A.D. 1748-1812) and the struggle for survival against the Sikhs and Dogrās (A.D. 1812-1846). The first of these phases witnessed a remarkable revival of mediaeval Hindu cul-

1. J. Punjab Historical Society, Lahore, X, pt. 2, p. 5 ff., 1929, and in History of the Punjab Hill States, vol. I, pp. 268-339, Lahore 1933.

2. J. Ph. Vogel, Antiquities of Chambā State, I, Calcutta 1911.

ture and art, the second the growth and the last the flourishing of Mughal-Rājput civilization.

The Crisis of the Muslim Invasion (A.D. ca. 1190-1330): The high and late mediaeval periods not only in Chambā, but in the whole Western Himālaya, are separated by a blank interval of ca. 100-150 years. However, the gap covers a very crucial time. For, previous to it Chambā had been a strong and flourishing kingdom of approximately the same size as in the 17th and 19th centuries, whereas thereafter we discover innumerable estates of independent rānās and thākurs, rājās powerless outside their own capital, and a society relapsed into barbarism. How this collapse happened, we can, in the absence of direct evidence, only reconstruct from various traditions and circumstances.

There were a series of immigrations caused by the advance of the Ghaznavids into the West Panjāb, and of the Chāhamānas into the East Panjāb, and later by the destruction of the old Hindu powers of the plains since the battle of Tarāin near Patialā A.D. 1192.³ When in the 11th century the last Śāhīs of Ohind found shelter in Kashmīr, a brāhmin refugee turned also up in Chambā.⁴ In the 12th century the Tomārs, Chandellas, etc., came and founded Jaswān State (A.D. 1170), Dhāmeri-Nūrpur (A.D. 1176), Suket, the second Chand dynasty of Kumāon, etc. The Gaddīs of Brahmor claim to have immigrated at about the same time;⁵ and in fact they are descendants of the old Gadhaiyās, once found in many parts of North-Western India.⁶ The overwhelming majority of Rājput and Brāhmin refugees, however, flooded in after the conquest of Delhi, Benāres and Bengal, mainly via Prayāg.⁷ Yet the Gaur Rājputs of Chambā claim to have come from the later Bikāner area in A.D. 1267.

These aristocratic immigrants had to find some livelihood in harmony with their social status and traditions. They became mercenaries, feudal lords (thākurs, in distinction from the indigenous aristocracy, the rānās), and sometimes even independent

3. Developments in the Himālaya, esp. in Trigarta, in these years are understandable only if we accept the identification of Tarāin by M. A. Cheena in Proc. 4th Ind. Hist. Congress Lahore 1940, p. 227.

4. Vogel, Antiquities, I, p. 101.

5. Chambā State Gazetteer.

6. Cunningham, Arch. Survey Reports, II.

7. Durga Singh and H. A. Rose, Report on the Punjab Hill Tribes, Ind. Antq. 36, p. 264, 1907.

rulers, e.g. Suket,⁸ or Bir Chand of Kumāon. Naturally, they formed a very unruly element favouring social unrest from which they could only profit, and dangerous to the existing powers. This probably explains two other developments, the decline of the royal power and the emergence of Trigarta as the sole surviving state east of Kashmīr.

In A.D. 1101 king Harsha of Kashmīr was, after a terrible struggle, overthrown by the combined forces of the landed gentry, the damaras, under the leadership of the princes of Lohara. Since Āṣaṭavarman (ca. A.D. 1070-90) Chambā had been drawn into this struggle, and in the 12th century, especially since Lalitavarman (A.D. 1143/4-1170), a similar social revolution there is evident in the rapidly increasing number of fountain stones, the funeral memorials of the landed aristocracy. Next, Vijayavarman (A.D. 1175-?) is reported to have defeated the Kāśmīras, Kiras (Ladakhis) and Mudgalas (Mughals, i.e. Muslims) and to have brought home immense booty. But thereafter Chambā disappears from the historical scene for ca. 150 years, except for the names of eight shadowy rulers.

However, quite a number of other states, from Balor (Vallapura) in the West to the Sutlej in the East, disappeared at the same time; in the case of Kulū we have definitive information that rājā Narendrapāl (who has to be placed approximately into these years), had been made a vassal of Trigarta. Trigarta, however, continued to flourish, as the coins and the archaeological monuments, e.g. the temple of Baijnāth near Pālampur and the Indrēsvar in Kāngrā proper prove. On the other hand, when in the second quarter of the 14th century Trigarta was successively attacked by the Muslims, the two invasions of Tātār Khān A.D. 1325 and 1342, and Muhammad Tughlaq's expedition against "China" A.D. 1337,—all these kingdoms, including Chambā, re-emerged, and again the more explicit Kulū chronicle mentions that rājā Indarpāl threw off the yoke of Trigarta. From all these facts we have to conclude that all these states had been incorporated into Trigarta.

As to the circumstances of that conquest and of its termination the following may be said. In the battle of Tarāin the rājās of Trigarta had fought as allies of Prithvī Rāj III Chauhān. When after the disaster A.D. 1192 the Himālayan valleys were flooded

with Rājput and brāhmin refugees, the local princes had to keep those latter occupied, and thus Vijayavarman of Chambā probably used them for his amazing expeditions. But the rājās could not rely on the loyalty of these mercenaries who would easily change sides, and support the strongest and most promising ruler. Trigarta, however, was the strongest kingdom and that which had the first claim on the refugees, as the guardian of the Himālayan valleys. But when the Muslim invasion swept to the East and South, the newcomers, not needed against the Turks, were probably used against the other hill rājās.

After one and a half centuries, however, the Rājput refugees had been absorbed. The Muslim invasion of the 14th century, therefore, had a very different effect. It is obvious that the Hindus of the hills could not withstand the massive Turkish armies. Barānī reports that the strong fort of Nagarkot-Kāngrā was taken and occupied by Muhammad Tughlaq's army. And yet only ten soldiers returned from the march of his expeditionary force of 100,000 men up the Sutlej Valley and over the hills into that of the Beās. Only guerrilla warfare, for which the Himālaya is immensely suited, could grind down such an overwhelming force. But as guerrilla warfare loosens also the organization of the victor, the rājās of Trigarta, weakened by the temporary loss of Nagarkot, were forced to acknowledge the de facto independence of the once annexed states, though they seem to have been acknowledged as nominal overlords for much longer. Chambā, e.g. threw off this nominal allegiance not before the reign of Ānandavarman (A.D. ca. 1475-1513).

The First Stages of Recovery (A.D. 1330-1513): The Chambā kingdom emerging under Vairasivarman (Vairasimhavarman) in A.D. 1330 was very weak. It comprised no more than the middle Rāvi Valley and its nearest tributaries, i.e. Chambā town, Gurola, Lilh, Sāho and the lowermost tip of Churāh. The Bhaṭṭi wazārat, south of the Dhaulā Dhār, was under the suzerainty of Kāngrā and Dhameri-Nūrpur, Churāh was controlled by Vallapura-Balor (later Baśohli State), Pāngī and Lāhul in the Chandrabhāga Valley were tributary to Ladakh, Brahmor and Trehtā in the upper Rāvi area were independent, though possibly in some religious connection with the Chambā rulers who regarded Brahmor as the original home of their family. The state was poor and backward. Chambā town was hardly more than a village. Most of the old temples were in ruins, looted and desecrated. Art and education were almost forgotten. Vairasivarman's copperplate grant was drafted

8. S. R. Sharma, *The Beginnings of the Sukhetri Dynasty*, J.A.S.B. n.s. 26, 1930, p. 279, 1933.

in a very faulty language and executed by an ordinary blacksmith. The grants of his next three successors are hardly better formulated, but were the work of coppersmiths. And only since Ānandavarman an effort was made to introduce a more correct style engraved by goldsmiths.

The power of the rājās was most precarious. Though Vairasivarman (A.D. 1330—ca. 1370) claimed a “victorious reign” and assumed the royal title, he and his next successors still were vassals of Trigarta. Under his son Mānikyavarman (ca. A.D. 1370-1396) the royal title again fell in abeyance. Bhoṭavarman (A.D. 1396-1442) appointed a certain Jadhika Aṭala “to attend upon and look after the king as a personal servant.....as a reward for assistance in danger.”⁹ The fact that Bhoṭavarman in his later reign and Samgrāmarman (A.D. 1442 to ca. 1475) again dropped the royal title, proves that that danger which made a sort of permanent bodyguard necessary, came from the feudal lords who saw with displeasure the consolidation and expansion of the royal power. The final showdown, however, came much later, in the abortive revolution of A.D. 1575-79. For notwithstanding all those difficulties the Chambā rājās consolidated their position step by step. Vairasivarman married his son to Jugyāradevī of Juṅgurārā in the Jassaur pargana. Apparently she was the heiress of a mighty line of feudal lords wielding much influence in Lower Churāh. For although rājā Udaipāl of Balor invaded the country in order to reassert his suzerainty, Lower Churāh since that marriage remained under the direct control of Chambā. Then Bhoṭavarman (married to Jijilī Devī) extended his realm beyond the Chuārī Pass into the Hubār district, probably at the cost of Dhameri which then had been weakened by the two invasions of Tātār Khān. Possibly he regained also some control over Brahmor, in case we may attribute to him the authorship of the hardly readable inscription in the floor of the Mānimaheśa temple at Brahmor, dated S. 1474 A.D. 1417-18.¹⁰ Under Sangrāmarman (queen Sampūrṇa Devī) this progress was temporarily halted, probably due to internal difficulties. It looks as if his formal Abhisheka,

9. The copper plate grant is spurious, but as it had later on been acknowledged, it seems to have been a substitute for a lost genuine grant based on then well-known events and customs.

10. A. Cunningham, Arch. Survey Report 14, 1882, p. 105. On the analogy of Rāj Singh's inscription in the floor of the Lakshmī-Nārāyan at Chambā A.D. 1782. Moreover, in that barbarian time the rājgurus of the kings of Chambā were the only persons able to compose any suchlike inscription.

the first one mentioned in the late Mediaeval history of Chambā, had again aroused the resentment of the nobles.

But under his son Ānandavarman (A.D. ca. 1475-1513) a decisive step forward was achieved. By exploiting an internal crisis in Kāngrā, Ānandavarman succeeded in being acknowledged as an independent and equal ally of Trigarta, marrying Prayāgdevī, the daughter of Suvīrachandra Katoch. In Kāngrā the widow of Narendrachandra, then enceinte, had been expelled by other claimants to the throne and had found a refuge in Prayāg.¹¹ When her son Suvīrachand had grown up, he returned, apparently with a very small retinue, as he could take Kāngrā only by a stratagem. Under these circumstances he needed an ally and apparently found him in Ānandavarman, who on this occasion obtained also more districts south of the Dhaulā Dhār, as part of the dowry.

Under Ānandavarman we learn, for the first time, also of cultural activities. In contrast to the predominant Vaishnava tradition of his family, he was an adept of Tāntric Śaivism. Snakes are said to have come out of his nostrils, or, according to another version, out of the spouts of his drinking vessel. One of his grants endows an astrologer with lands near the Hirmā (Hiḍimbā-Chāmundā) Temple at Mehla “by order of the goddess Jalamukhī [the special patroness of the Katoch dynasty] and of the king”; the other sons of a learned Śaiva priest, mentioning the repair of an unidentified Śiva temple and the consecration of a linga.

The Renaissance of the Mediaeval Hindu State and of Its Civilization (A.D. 1513-1623): This religious bent of mind was inherited also by Ānandavarman's successors, Gaṇeśavarman, Pratāpsinghvarman, Virabhānu and Balabhadrarman. It had a most beneficent influence on the development of the state and of the monarchy insofar as it inspired these princes to appoint highly cultured brāhmins from the North-Indian plains as advisers and ministers. These brāhmins not only developed art, literature and science, but were also the brains behind an astute policy of territorial expansion and administrative centralisation. But it proved also disastrous in the long run, as it made most princes indifferent to government during their later years—one even completely,—and prone to squander their revenues on “charities”. As long as

11. The chronicle calls the place “Poona” which makes no sense. As Suvīrachandra's children were named Prayāgchand and Prayāgdevī, and as Prayāg was a holy place often visited by the hill-Rājputs, “Poona” probably is a misreading for Prayāg.

the actual administration could be efficiently carried on by successive young regents, and as long as the great brāhmin statesman *Ramāpati* was chief minister, *Chambā* flourished. When he was succeeded by the pious, but weak *Lakshmikānta* and a host of priestly sycophants, the system degenerated. When in A.D. 1623 the *yūvarāj Janārdan* was assassinated, it collapsed, and *Chambā* was annexed by *Nūrpur State*.

In consequence of these regencies the chronology of this period is rather complicated, but its details are necessary for the understanding of the course of events. A careful analysis of all the available data and of all circumstances yields the following picture:

Gaṇeśavarman, born somewhat after A.D. 1500; A.D. 1513, still a minor, king with his mother *Prayāg Devī* as regent; A.D. 1521 of age, married *Apūrvadevī* (= *Sāhiba Devī*?); A.D. 1558 declared his son *Pratāpsinghvarman* regent; died A.D. 1566.

Pratāpsinghvarman, born about A.D. 1521-22, son of *Gaṇeśavarman* and *Sāhiba Devī* (honorific title of *Apūrvadevī*?); A.D. 1558 co-regent with *Gaṇeśavarman*; A.D. 1559 possibly married to one of the daughters of *Bahādur Singh* of *Kuḷū* (*Suṇu*, *Gaṅgū* and *Raṅgō*); A.D. 1566 king; A.D. 1575 victim of a feudal revolt; A.D. 1579 handed government over to *yūva rāja Balabhadravarmān*; died A.D. 1582.

Virabhānu, born about A.D. 1540, A.D. 1559 married to one or all the three daughters of *Bahādur Singh* of *Kuḷū*, apparently religious maniac and unfit for government; A.D. 1582 king in name under regency of *Balabhadravarmān*; died A.D. 1589.

Balabhadravarmān, born about A.D. 1560, son of *Virabhānu* and *Dharmadevī* (honorific title of one of *Bahādur Singh*'s daughters?; died A.D. 1625); A.D. 1579 leader of the royal faction against the rebels and regent for *Pratāpsinghvarman*; married (A.D.?) to a princess of *Kuḷū*, to *Subhadrā Devī* and *Mathurā Devī*; A.D. 1582 regent for *Virabhānu*; 1589 king; A.D. 1613 removed from government, under regency of his son *Janārdanavarman*; A.D. 1623, after battle of *Dhalog* and assassination of *Janārdan* deposed by *Jagat Singh* of *Nūrpur*; A.D. 1629 restored in name, A.D. 1632 restored as vassal of *Nūrpur*; died A.D. 1641.

Prithvī Singh, son of *Janārdan*, born A.D. 1619; A.D. 1623 secretly brought to *Kuḷū* and at last *Maṇḍī* by (his wetnurse) *Dāi Batlū* (died A.D. 1645); grew up at *Maṇḍī*, A.D. 1640 reconquered *Lāhul* and *Pāngī*; A.D. 1641 returned to *Chambā* as *rājā*; died A.D. 1664.

Most of *Gaṇeśavarman*'s reign (A.D. 1513-1566) was uneventful, but it was not unimportant as a preparatory stage for the reforms of *Pratāpsinghvarman* and *Balabhadravarmān*. Since the *Katoch* marriage the horizon had widened. The ashes of *Ānandavarman* were brought to *Hardwār*, and in A.D. 1558 prince *Pratāpsinghvarman* was sent, as proxy for his sick father, on pilgrimage to *Badrināth* and *Kedārnāth*, in A.D. 1566 to *Hardwār*. More learned brāhmins from outside were appointed, such as *Pandit Tribho*, the founder of the hereditary line of *rājpurohits*, and *Pandit Prabhākara*, the first of the hereditary court astrologers (*rājajyotishi*). The most important appointment, however, was that of *Pandit Surānanda* (*Surottama*) *Śarma* of *Benares*, a Bengali brāhmin of the *Bharadvaja* Gotra, to the post of *rājaguru*. For *Surānanda* and his son *Pandit Ramāpati* very quickly became the leading ministers and the planners of the policy of conquest and centralization pursued in the next half century. And with these newcomers also new fashions were introduced, especially the substitution of the suffix *Singh* for that of *varman*, though first only for the junior princes whereas the rulers retained the old suffix by the side of the new one until the middle of the 17th century.

In the meantime the political situation in the *Beās Valley* had completely changed. After the fall of the *Tughluqs* the Muslim rulers everywhere had tried to obtain direct control over their Hindu subjects. Thus also the *Sayyid* and *Lodī* sultans of *Delhī* had forced the hill *rājās* to acknowledge their suzerainty. A.D. 1540 *Sher Shāh*'s general *Khawāss Khān* had taken *Kāngrā Fort*, About A.D. 1545 *Salim Shāh Sūr* had visited *Guler* (*Gwalior*), erected five strong forts, and compelled the *rājās* to pay tribute; and probably also *Gaṇeśavarman* of *Chambā* had to do so. A.D. 1555 the *Mughal* emperor *Humāyūn* defeated *Sikandar Shāh Sūrī* at *Sarhind*. Whereas the emperor advanced on *Delhī*, prince *Akbar* pursued *Sikandar* through the *Sivaliks*. *Humāyūn*'s death obliged *Akbar* to leave *Sikandar* alone, after the hill *rājās* had made their submission to him at *Kalānaur*. But A.D. 1557 *Akbar* returned; *Sikandar*, besieged in *Maukot*, had to surrender, and *rājā Bakhtmal* of *Dhameri-Nurpūr* who had offered him shelter, was executed. *Dharam-Chand* of *Kāngrā* who had remained loyal to *Akbar*, now believed to be sure of imperial indulgence and immediately started to grab the territories of his neighbours.

This resulted in a new policy in *Chambā*. The *yūvarāj Pratāpsinghvarman*, who had just returned from the pilgrimage to *Badrināth* and *Kedārnāth* in the company of *Pandit Surānanda*, was appointed co-regent and de facto ruler, and represented *Chambā*

in Akbar's durbār at Kalānaur. Surānanda had in the meantime got hold over local superstition, by exorcizing the ghosts of a former cremation ground which were believed to haunt the town quarter in front of the principal state temple, the Lakshmī-Nārāyan, by planting there the Dumukh, a stone column resembling the exorcizing dagger (Phurbu) used by Buddhist magicians. Apparently after Pratāpsinghvarman's return from Kalānaur already a new program was worked out, the general outlines of which still can be reconstructed.

One part of it formed the compilation of the Sanskrit Vamśavalī by Pandit Ramāpati, Surānanda's son. On the model of contemporary activities in Rājasthān the bald pedigree of the royal family was elaborated with many historical and mythological details from traditions collected all over the state or adapted from the sacred books. The long pedigree of the Sūryavamśīs taken from the Bhāgavata Purāna had to endow the king with the glory of divine origin. The inclusion of the early Gurjara princes of Brahmor (7th century A.D.) whose connection with the dynasty of Śaḥillavarman (10th century A.D.) is open to some doubt, had to stop the gap between the latter and rājā Maru, the "restorer of the Kshatriyas" and the imaginary link between the line of Raghu and the Pratihāras of Maru (Mārwār). But it had also to foster the loyal sentiments of the autonomous Gaddis of the upper Rāvi Valley.

Brahmor, already respected as the oldest religious centre of the state, now became the manpower reservoir for the royal house troops. With these Gaddi troops Pratāpsinghvarman could first reconquer Pāngī and Lāhul which Tsewang Namgyal I had brought back under the rule of Ladakh. But Tsewang Namgyal's later years had been filled with revolts of his subjects, so that Pratāpsinghvarman could use the chaos to recover those former provinces of his house. One of the documents of this reconquest is the image of Markulā Devī at Mārkula-Udaipur in Lāhul¹² which thākur Himapāla set up in A.D. 1559-60 in the, hitherto Buddhist, Vajravārāhī temple.

However, such an expansion towards the East was possible only with the consent of the rulers of Kulū. In A.D. 1559 Pandit Ramāpati had succeeded in negotiating such an agreement, sealed by the marriage of the daughters of Bahādur Singh of Kulū, Sunū,

Gaṅgū and Raṅgo, to prince Virabhānu, and possibly also Pratāpsinghvarman himself in A.D. 1559.¹³ The Kulū dynasty was in a position even weaker than the Chambā house. After Kulū had overthrown the yoke of Trigarta, the valley had been overrun by the Tibetans, especially Gugé, the vassal state of Ladakh.¹⁴ Anandavarman's contemporary Siddh Singh had about A.D. 1500 expelled the Tibetans and begun to subject the local rānās. But the invasion of Tsewang Namgyal had shattered his work, and his son Bahādur Singh had again to start almost from scratch. From the North and East he had, like Pratāpsinghvarman, to fear another Tibetan invasion. From the South he had to defend his interest against Sāhib Sen of Mandī (ca. A.D. 1554-75) who had already annexed part of Seorāj (southernmost Kulū), invaded Lag (to the southwest of Kulū) and tried to subject Baṅgāhal (in the corner between Brahmor, Kulū and Mandī). The conquest of that latter, especially would have driven a wedge between Kulū and Chambā. The agreement negotiated by Ramāpati permitted Bahādur Singh to secure most of Seorāj and at last also Lag. To Chambā it gave a free hand in the Kāngrā Valley.

Already in A.D. 1558 the Bhaṭṭi wazārat was protected against the encroachments of Dharamchand by the erection of Gaṇeśgarh, a small fortress of the, then, most modern type. For a counterstroke, however, the time was ripe in A.D. 1563 when Dharamchand of Kāngrā died and was followed by the weak Māṇikyachand. Pratāpsinghvarman invaded the Katoch territory. According to the Chambā chronicles he defeated Māṇikyachand, killed his brother Jayat Singh, annexed the Chaṛī and Gharoh districts, occupied Guler and advanced up to the gates of Kāngrā Fort. Much booty fell into the hands of the Chambā army, and many of the small rānās who had been vassals of Kāngrā, had to pay homage to Pratāpsinghvarman. This account is corroborated by several grants of land in the just annexed territories, issued by Gaṇeśavarman and Pratāpsinghvarman. In the vernacular chronicle there are some indications that an additional campaign was undertaken against the Pālā rājās of Baṅgāhal.

Probably such a conflict between the hill rājās weakening the mightiest of them, had the tacit sympathies of the Mughal autho-

13. J. Ph. Vogel, A Copperplate Grant of Bahādur Singh of Kulū, Ann. Report Arch. Survey of India 1903-04, p. 261.

14. A. H. Francke, History of Western Tibet, London 1907, Antiquities of Indian Tibet, II, Calcutta 1926; L. Petech, A. Study of the Chronicles of Ladakh, Ind. Hist. Qu. 15, 1939, Suppl.

12. Vogel, Antiquities, I, p. 249, pl. 39c.

rities. For Māṇikyachand's successor Jai-Chand was in A.D. 1570 arrested, under imperial orders, by the rājā of Guler, and his son Bidhi Chand, rising in rebellion, was in A.D. 1572 besieged in Nagarkot by a Mughal army. However all these troubles induced Akbar to have a permanent settlement worked out by rājā Todar Mal in A.D. 1573. A special imperial demesne was created by annexing 66 villages from the surrounding states. Chambā lost most of the recently acquired districts including Rihlu, Charī, Gharoh and Paṭhyār.

This collapse of the expansionist policy had disastrous results. Its architects the party of Pandit Surānanda and of his son Ramāpati, had become almighty and rich, but also hated by the old aristocracy. The death of Surānanda and the disappointment of the state's foreign policy, probably also the necessity of disbanding the Gaddi army weakened its prestige so badly, that in A.D. 1575 Pandit Ramāpati was overthrown, soon after he had been appointed rājguru in the place of his father. In view of the dearth of educated persons in the administration he was not dismissed, but Bhavānidās, son of Bāmka, the new "king's minister", treated him as no more than a secretary. Soon afterwards Ramāpati and his family fled to Balor. His possessions, like those of his followers, were confiscated. But in A.D. 1579 he was brought back to Chambā by the yūvarāja Balabhadra-varman, and reinstated in his position and in all his possessions. What had happened, we do not know, though it looks as if the counter-revolution had been a military coup d'état. Bhavānidās is no more mentioned and seems to have been killed. The other descendants of Bāmka were debarred of any future claims against Ramāpati. The very interesting copperplate mentioning the solemn proceedings of this durbār mentions many old grants lost or destroyed by the revolutionaries.

Pratāpsinghvarman's role had been quite passive in the whole affair. It was the mahāyūvarāja Balabhadra-varman who henceforth acted as regent for him and his successor Virabhānu (A.D. 1582-89). That Virabhānu was not set aside, may have been due to Balabhadra-varman's consideration for his unfit father. But after such a revolution it was not less important strictly to adhere to the principles of legitimacy, and possibly a religious maniac such as Virabhānu seems to have been, may have been not so bad as the figurehead of a government claiming religious sanction.

For after the military policy of his father had failed. Balabhadra-varman tried a policy of impressing his people by means

of religious splendour. During the last years of Pratāpsinghvarman the state sanctuary of the Lakshmī-Nārāyan in Chambā Town, the Bhagvatī (Vajreśvari) Temple outside the town, and the Khajināg Temple at Khajiār (on the mountain path to Dalhousie) were repaired, the Trimukh Temple (in the Lakshmī-Nārāyan compound) reconstructed on the foundations of the 10th century, the Chandragupta and Vamsīgopāl Temples re-endowed, whereas a relief group of Sitā, Rāma, Lakshmana and Hanuman was sculptured into a cliff in the Saroṭa Valley, not far from the capital. All this art was rather crude. But the treasures collected during Pratāpsinghvarman's campaigns soon were exhausted. Thus the Lakshmī-Nārāyan could be consecrated in A.D. 1582 only after new revenues had been made available by the discovery of the copper mines of Hol,¹⁵ which, naturally enough, the priestly party used for buttressing its position by attributing it to the personal intervention of the god.

During Bhadravarman's reign (A.D. 1589-1641) the Vamsīgopāl temple was rebuilt and consecrated A.D. 1595. Quite a number of smaller temples were erected in the town and in other places like Ghumsal (Sutkar, Trehtā District), two Garuḍa pillars were set up in the court of the Lakshmī-Nārāyan. Most sanctuaries were provided with new images, jewellery, etc., now in an accomplished style hardly distinguishable from that of the high Middle Ages, and artists from Nepāl, Bengal and South India were for this purpose employed. More scholars from Benāres, Gayā and other places were settled. Much money was spent on religious ceremonies, further temple endowments, pilgrimages to Hardwār by prince Janārdan and prince Sabal Singh, etc. The 42 grants then issued or renewed reveal a good knowledge of Sanskrit. In various documents the Bhāgavata-Purāna, the Durgāsaptasati, the Harivaṁśa are mentioned or quoted.

Slowly Balabhadra-varman's liberality began to assume sickish forms, until at last he gave away part of his property daily to brāhmins who, of course, flattered him as a second Balikarna. At last yūvarāja Janārdanavarman was made regent in A.D. 1613, and Balabhadra-varman removed to a quiet country house.

The Disintegration of Mediaeval Chambā (A.D. 1623-1646): Chambā needed an efficient ruler, as the peaceful times which

15. One grant refers to a tax of "copper taṅkas"—else unknown in Chambā, to be paid by three [contractors?] in the Loh-Tikrī Mandala, on the other side of the Hol Range.

had permitted that leisurely life, had passed. During the last decades Chambā had been spared external difficulties due to several favourable circumstances. Kulū in the East and Bradrawāh in the North-West still were struggling for their consolidation. In the South and South-West Mughal rule weighed heavily on the states of the exterior hills which successively rose in abortive revolts (A.D. 1585 Dhameri, fortification of Balor; 1589-90 Kāngrā, Mānkot, Dhameri, Lakhimpur, Jammū and 8 other states; A.D. 1594-95 other collective rising, Mughal annexation of Pathānkot). Further in the North-West Kashtwār was twice attacked by the Mughals A.D. 1585-87 and 1606. In the North the Ladakh kingdom was torn by rebellions during the reign of Jamyang Namgyal (ca. A.D. 1560-90). But then Dhameri-Nūrpur emerged as the leading state in the Kāngrā Valley, as its rājās succeeded in becoming favourites of the Mughal emperors Jahāngir and Shāhjahān, despite repeated very daring revolts. And the Ladakh kingdom recovered under Sengge Namgyal (ca. A.D. 1590-1620) and Deldan Namgyal (ca. A.D. 1620-40).

The rājās of Dhameri tried to abuse the imperial favour by trying to annex their neighbour states by various stratagems. Thus the rulers of Balor, Guler and Sukhet were removed by means of false denunciations, and their states thereafter occupied, whereas Kāngrā was besieged by a Mughal army. An attempt on the life of the Rājā of Mandī failed. The southern districts of Chambā were invaded, but successfully defended by prince Janārdan. The war dragged on over 12 years, ca. A.D. 1605-17, and came to an end only because of rājā Sūrajmal's (A.D. 1613-18) revolt against the Mughals. The settlement apparently was negotiated by the rājaguru of Nūrpur, Vyās. Thus after his defeat Sūrajmal fled to Chambā in the company of his brother Mādho Singh. His death spared Janārdan the necessity to hand over the refugee to the Mughal commander who had demanded his surrender. The Pathāniā rāj was occupied by the Mughal army; but already the next year Jahāngir installed Jagat Singh (A.D. 1619-46) who had assisted the emperor against his own brother Sūrajmal. For six years peace was maintained, and in A.D. 1622 Janārdan and his younger brother Bishambhar paid their homage to Jahāngir and Nūrjahān during the latter's visit to Dhameri, then renamed Nūrpur. But Jagat Singh had the same ambitions as his predecessors though he tried to achieve them by more cautious and devious means. Imperial favour had given him a high position at the court. In A.D. 1623 the revolt of prince Khurram provided him with a first pretext for another attack on Chambā.

At Dhalog near Saṇḍhāra the combined Nūrpur and Mughal troops of Shāhjahān's party defeated the Chambyālīs in a bloody battle in which prince Bishambhar was killed. Chambā was occupied, Janārdan lured to an interview and assassinated. Janārdan's son Prithvī Singh, a boy of 4 years, was saved and brought by his wetnurse Baṭlū over the mountain passes to Kulū and at last Mandī the rājā of which, antagonized by the Nūrpur princes, offered a refuge to the boy. Chambā was placed under Nūrpur officials, Balabhadravarman deposed. And the strong fortress Tārāgarh was erected A.D. 1625 on the top of an isolated steep mountain near the Chuārī Pass in the Bhaṭṭī wazārat, both to keep down Chambā and to serve as a last retreat in case of a future rebellion against the Mughals. When Khurram's rebellion failed, Jagat Singh was deposed and besieged in Maukot, but at last pardoned. When A. D. 1628 prince Khurram came to the throne as Shāhjahān, Jagat Singh rose high in favour, but was also kept busy as a general or governor far away from his own state.

In consequence Nūrpur control slackened. On the other hand Bhūpat-Pāl of Balor had been released and started on a counter-offensive against Nūrpur. He invaded Churāh, annexed the Chambā districts along the lower Rāvi Valley, and in A.D. 1630 built there a new capital, Baśohlī. The Gyalpos of Ladakh again annexed Lāhul and invaded Kulū. Jagat Singh, therefore, had to make concessions. In A.D. 1629 Balabhadravarman was reinstated, though the administration continued to be in Nūrpur hands. A.D. 1632 also the internal autonomy of Chambā was restored. But it had become a very small state, comprising only the middle and upper Rāvi Valley and even that under the suzerainty of Nūrpur.

Chambā recovered only when the power of Jagat Singh was broken in the desperate rebellion of A.D. 1640-42, when all the Nūrpur fortresses were taken by the Mughal armies, and the Pathāniā rāj reduced to two diminutive states. A.D. 1641 Balabhadravarman, since long senile and harmless, died. A.D. 1640, his grandson Prithvī Singh took Lāhul and Pāngī from the Ladakhīs, A.D. 1641 crossed the mountain passes in the back of the Nūrpur troops, occupied Churāh (where after the death of Bhūpatpāl Baśohlī control had disintegrated) and reoccupied Chambā town, after a bloody battle in which the Chāmundā temple and Nalhorā bridge south of it were destroyed. Thereafter he played a prominent role in the siege of Tārāgarh by the Mughals and was acknowledged as ruler of Chambā by Shāhjahān.

The years A.D. 1641-46 witnessed a last flare-up of the Mediaeval state and culture which had flourished under Pratāpsingh-varman and Balabhadra-varman. The Sitārām Temple was erected and Nalhorā bridge reconstructed by Dāi Baṭlū, Prithvī Singh's wetnurse and, now highly honoured, saviour. The Sanskrit Vamśāvalī, composed by Pandit Ramāpati, was restored and completed up to A.D. 1642 by his son Lakshmikānta, the last rājguru of Balabhadra-varman. Soon afterwards both died (A.D. 1646, resp. 1661). But Prithvī Singh, in close contact with the Mughal court, started reforming the state, introducing Mughal administrative and military methods, and superseding the feudal order by a centralized government. Since A.D. 1645 copperplate grants were abolished, only a few being issued on, later, very solemn occasions. Paper documents became common. The Sanskrit chronicle was replaced by one in the vernacular. Rājput art was introduced from Baṣohli. Mediaeval Chambā had come to an end.

Early History of Kurnool

BY

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This paper is meant as a notice of an interesting manuscript in the Mackenzie collection. Wilson lists it in his Descriptive Catalogue (1828) as No. 45 under Local Tracts of the Ceded Districts and Taylor has also noticed it in the third volume of his *Catalogue Raisonné* (1862) as No. CM 841 (L. No. 587) p. 565. The manuscript is available in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, and is classified by them as 15-3-35 of the Telugu collection of Mackenzie manuscripts.

This manuscript is an account of the Kandanaṅṅolu district (Kurnool). It gives a fairly concise history of various dynasties that ruled over Kurnool district from mythic times. The records attesting the genuineness of the history are taken from *kaviles*, that is, village accounts, of various villages in the district and from inscriptions as far as they could be deciphered. Till we come to the actual inscriptions the *kavile* records are not very reliable at least for the dates concerned. The account given is more or less traditional not corroborated by the latest historical discoveries. But the author is sincere in pointing out the incredibility of the records that he has to rely upon and he is careful in most of the cases when he comes to actual inscriptions. The whole volume is a list mostly of inscriptions arranged chronologically pointing out the importance of each individually and the account of how the Muslims ruled over Kurnool is worthy of note.

Mention is made of a place called Kalluru, situated a mile west of the confluence of Tungabhadra and Aghahari, where, it is said, the rishis of yore built a temple of Kalleśvara. South-west of Kallur at a distance of 60 miles, is situated Nandyala, once capital of Emperor Nandana. The foundation of another village called Nandavara is described in the manuscript. Five hundred families of Brahmans who lived in Benares and who belonged to 13 gotras, settled in

Nandavara, granted to them by king Nandana in accordance with a promise which he made to them when the Brahmins brought the king and his wife to his capital from Benares with shoes enchanted by their mantra. The founding of another village near Kalluru is related. The place is known as Rudrakoti as a consequence of Sri Rama having installed a linga on his way from Ayodhya. A temple for God Mallikarjuna was constructed in the place by Nandana. Singanatha Odeya, a pupil of Ganganatha is said to have determined the boundaries of all villages which were granted to god Mallikarjuna. The boundaries of another village known before as Nagesvaram and now called Itikala were determined by Santabhikshavritti, head of Jangama priests and Jangama matha in Śrīśaila.

The origin of Kurnool is then narrated. It was originally called Kandनावrolu. The significance of the name is this. A Śiva temple was constructed at Alampur 10 miles north of Kallur. Stones for construction of the temple were carried in bullock carts. These carts passed a place a mile east of Kalluru and in that place lived an oil-monger who used to supply to the cartmen some lubricant known in Telugu as Kandana. The place came to be known after the Telugu name of the lubricant as Kandनावrolu. This is obviously a mistake for Kandanaپrolu; Kandana meaning the lubricant and prolu town. This place grew with time into a big village and later still it became a town, and Kalluru became a hamlet attached to Kandनावrolu (Kurnool). The oil-monger is said to have constructed temples for God Śiva and Śakti in the place.

The Nandayla Kavile (village account) of the manuscript mentions the founding of Dantivaram now known as Dudyala in Dhatu 964, by Santabhikshavritti who cut off Danti trees for putting up the village. To the west of this place king Nanda is said to have constructed a number of palaces known as Nandanagallu, 360 Śiva temples and 360 wells. He invited one Antarasa from Golkonda who became the karanam of the place. One of his descendants founded a village called Mosalimadugu so known on account of crocodiles in a tank near the place (Mosali in Telugu means crocodile). These villages declined in course of time and in their stead came Patakota where the descendants of Antarasu still continue to be karnams. The Patakota Kavile records that at the confluence of Bhavanasini and Krishna was a holy place called Nivarttisangama and north-east of it on a hillock, one Santa-

bhikshavritti¹ is said to have owned a fortress and maintained a college for Sangama devotees. He conducted the festivals for God Mallikarjuna. Other villages whose boundaries were determined are Anantapura, one of the villages granted to God Mallikarjuna and Nalatimmayapalam *alias* Nallakaluva granted to Śrīśaila God.

The Western Chalukyas ruled over this region. It is said on the evidence of an inscription cited that a queen of Trilokyamalla, named Myladevi made a grant for the maintenance of a college in 980 S.S. The epithets in the record speak of her as the senior queen, a great scholar and a beautiful woman. The head of the institute was one Sureśvarapaṇḍita pupil of Gangarasibhaṭṭa, the priest of Brahmesvara temple and an expert in Lakula Śaivism. In 991 S. S. Kapila Mahādevi the senior queen of Bhuvanaikamalla more accomplished than Myladevi granted villages to some donee for the maintenance of a free feeding house and college. This is also borne out by an inscription.

The places mentioned in the manuscript passed subsequently into the hands of Vijayanagar kings which is attested to by a number of inscriptions. The Muslim attack on Kurnool is dated 1541 Siddharti by Abdul Muhammad and Abdul Wahab, agents under the Sultan of Bijapur. Gopalaraju was then the ruler of Kurnool and he ran away from the place. Though Matla Tiruvengalaraju came to the assistance of Gopalaraju and attacked the Muslim army which besieged the Kurnool fort it was of no avail. He died in battle and the fort fell into Muslim hands.

¹ The doctrines of Santabhikshavritti appear to be similar with those of Basava, probably with Lingayat affinities. The accounts given in all the kaviles do not stand the test of epigraphy or literature. But the incidents might have happened some time later during the palmy days of Bhikshavritti matha.

Reviews

SELECTIONS FROM THE NAGPUR RESIDENCY RECORDS,
Vol. II: By Dr. H. N. Sinha. Published by the Government of
Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, 1952. pp. xxi and 595. price Rs. 15.

Dr. H. N. Sinha has rendered an invaluable service by sifting and editing the cream of the historical material in the Nagpur Residency Records, covering the period from 1807 to 1811. He has maintained the high standard set up by G. S. Sardesai in his *Selections from the Peshwas' Daftar*, and his work marks an improvement on the *Poona Residency Correspondence* published by the Bombay Government. So, the Government of Madhya Pradesh ought to be congratulated on its undertaking the publication of such *Selections* in these days of financial stringency.

The documents selected for this Volume refer to, and often contain valuable information on the affairs of the Bhonsla, the Sindhia, the Peshwa, the Holkar, and the Nizam. Besides, the records reveal certain important facts regarding Sambalpur and Bundelkhand. The section on the Pindaris gives valuable details concerning their depredations, and throws some light on British preparations against the Pindari chiefs. The information supplied by these records is necessarily of a political nature. Yet some interesting details are available on such diverse matters as economic conditions, revenue, currencies and Hindu-Muslim riots.

Dr. Sinha who is a well-known historian himself has given ample evidence of his thoroughness and critical acumen in the manner in which he has executed his task. The Volume is altogether a fine contribution to the study of Indian archives.

— N. C.

PRE-HISTORIC SOUTH INDIA: By V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar (Sir William Meyer Lectures, 1950-51, University of Madras 1951, Rs. 10/-

Professor Dikshitar's objective in the volume before us is to depict the main features of life in pre-historic South India. He attempts to get at the roots of Indian civilisation. To overcome the inherent difficulties of pre-history he pleads for a proper use of imagination (p. 43). He emphasises the importance of geological

and geographical data for a scientific study of pre-history. His approach to the problem before him is threefold: archaeological, ethnographic and linguistic. His views set forth in this volume and summarised here deserve to be carefully considered by scholars. He regards the Puranic story of the ten avatars of Vishnu as profoundly significant. "every avatar . . . represents a distinct stage in . . . the evolution of life" (p. 41). South India is the cradle of mankind (p. 42). The organisation of phallic worship stands to the credit of South Indian Neolithians (p. 89). The custom of boring the ear is connected with snake worship (p. 103). The term *kaṇṇeluttu* mentioned in the *Silappadikāram* (2nd century A.D.) means pictographic writing and is proof definitive of the acquaintance of South India with the Indus valley civilisation (p. 126), which must be anterior to 5,000 B.C. (p. 128). The theory of the Mongolian conquest of South India is clearly untenable (p. 139). The Dravidians were the children of the soil like the so-called pre-Dravidians, who were in reality the advanced Neolithians of South India (p. 170). The ideals of South India influenced not only the Indus valley but also the Mediterranean region (p. 171). "The Dravidian languages have to a great extent influenced the Sanskrit and even Vedic dialects" (p. 190). Writing was known to South India at least about 700 B.C. Brahmi and *Vatteluttu* or better *vetṭeluttu*, originated independently (p. 219). Pre-Columbian America was discovered by the people of South India (p. 233). Each of the six lectures is provided with a bibliography, and the author's conclusions are brought together at the end of the volume, which is well printed and attractive. It contains a good index and a map. But an errata is indispensable.

— R. S.

THE HOYSALA VAMSA: By William Coelho with a foreword by Rev. Heras, S. J. (Indian Historical Research Institute, St. Xavier's College, Bombay, 1950). Pages x and 312.

This book was written some years ago to qualify for the M.A. degree of the University of Bombay. The author explains his purpose in the following words:

"The political history of the Hoysalas received attention from scholars for over half a century and valuable articles on the subject were written from time to time. But not until a large number of Hoysala inscriptions were translated and published was it possible to write a sizable treatise. As there was

sufficient material for the task after the publication of the inscriptions and as the subject was deemed important, the author undertook to write this thesis' (p. viii.).

The political history of the dynasty is narrated in the first fifteen chapters (about 250 pages) and the remaining three chapters are taken up with sketches of political and social life, Features of Religious life and Hoysala Architecture. There is an Index, rather meagre, only one illustration of a sculpture of 'Vishṇuvardhana holding a darbar' from the Keśava temple of Belur, and no map. There is no separate bibliography, but the documentation in the notes is satisfactory so far as it goes.

This is not an easy book to review in a learned periodical which seeks to uphold standards in scholarship. The first impression produced on the mind is very favourable; the work, perhaps the first work, of a scholar who aspires to a research degree, written in the Indian Historical Research Institute, St. Xavier's College, Bombay, neatly printed on good paper with the aid of a grant from the Bombay University, and introduced by Father Heras with a high commendation of its originality, naturally enlists the warm sympathy of the reader and rouses high hopes in him. But long before he reaches the end of the book he begins to feel disappointed. The quality of the writing, never high, is sometimes very defective. The knowledge of the writer on many of the topics is by no means up-to-date or adequate. And there are mistakes of spelling on almost every page, not all of which can be traced to the printer.

It is out of the question to embark on a detailed criticism of such a book or compile a list of its errors of commission and omission. A few samples should suffice: at p. 5, lines 6-7 Satavahanas are mentioned in the place of Chalukyas and an inscription of 1819 A.D. from Belagamve is mentioned on the same page. We are told many inscriptions of early Chālukyas are found north of the Vindhyas (p. 6) and that the Cholas had the lion crest (p. 17). The discussion (p. 32) of the Hoysala contemporary of the Chola general Aprameya (A.D. 1006) is jejune but fairly typical. It is twice affirmed that Vishṇuvardhana conquered Kāñchī and Madura (pp. 75, 86). His death is placed in 1141 though the existence of later inscriptions is admitted (pp. 116-7). The Gajapatis of Orissa are said to have belonged to the Ganga-Pallava line (214)—how errors die hard! The recent literature on the origin of Vijayanagar is ignored altogether (pp. 246 ff.) Adhirājendra, we are assured, can be identified with Virarājendra

(p. 267). Rāmānuja is said to have been born at Tirupati (p. 286) and Dr. S. K. Aiyangar's authority is cited in support; Dr. Aiyangar did not say so, and the mistake is due to a hasty reading of the page referred to.

The book has doubtless meant much effort for the author, and it is a pity that it should have been published without adequate revision or even proper reading of the proofs. It makes no advance in our knowledge of the subject, and leaves several questions of Hoysala history in greater confusion than before. The need for a good up-to-date book on the subject has become much greater on account of this performance.

—K. A. N.

ANCIENT SOUTH-EAST ASIAN WARFARE: by H. G. Quaritch Wales, Ph.D., D.Litt., Bernard Quaritch, Ltd., 11, Grafton Street, New Bond Street, London, 1952. Price £1. 15sh.

From the earliest beginnings of human history, people have engaged themselves in warlike activities; the methods of war followed differed from country to country and age to age so much that they enable us to know something about the national character of different groups of people. A study of warfare in South East Asia for instance should help to broaden our understanding of the peoples in that region. But the study of a subject like that is generally beset with many difficulties on account of the general paucity of reliable material for it. But so far as the subject matter of the book under review is concerned we are fortunate in having considerable wealth and variety of documentary material. Besides the survival of ancient forms amongst living peoples, we have a large volume of epigraphical and sculptural (bas-relief) evidence in addition to literary sources. It is good therefore that Dr. Quaritch Wales who is familiar to students of the history of South-east Asia by his interesting publications like *Ancient Siamese Government and Administration*, *Siamese State Ceremonies and the Making of Greater India* has given us in this handy volume an account of the development of South-east Asian warfare from the earliest times.

The book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is devoted to a description of warfare among the East Torajas of Central Celebes which presents a fair picture of primitive South-east Asian warfare generally. In the second chapter the author analyses the Chinese influence on warfare in the region and says

that we should hardly expect such a basically incompatible system of war as that of the Chinese to find willing acceptance in South East Asia" and that "the Chinese influence had not, however, been firmly implanted and it soon faded before Indianisation" (pp. 27 and 28). In the next chapter the author explains the different lines in which warfare in South-east Asia was Indianised and shows how as part of the Indian cultural pattern Indian ideals and methods of war came to be followed in the area. The Indianisation of warfare to a large extent in the region is best illustrated by the manner of the growth and expansion of the Sri Vijayan and Javanese empires. Such influence was seen in the interest evidenced in war magic (pp. 43-44), the weapons of war used by them, the battle array and war astrology followed. The influence of ancient India on South-east Asia was so complete and persisting that even "Majapahit warfare not only remained Hindu, but to a contemporary Indian might have appeared strangely archaic"; and this archaism continued even into the eighteenth century (p. 55). In the fifth chapter the author describes the warfare of the Khmers and Chams. Except for certain traditional peculiarities particularly in regard to attire and favourite weapons, the strong Indianisation common to both and the necessary give and take among habitual opponents must have led through mutual loans to a fairly homogenous art of war in both cases. To the Khmers war was a religious sacrifice; and both the Khmers and the Chams followed the Indian precepts regarding the choice of battle arrays. Single combats were very common. The last two chapters deal with warfare in Siam and Burma. The author draws largely from the *Tāmra P'ie' ai Sōngk'ram* or Treatise on art of war for Siamese warfare and *Glass Palace chronicle* for Burman warfare. Certain interesting aspects about warfare among them deserve mention. In both the countries forced conscription was followed. Considerable influence was exercised by superstition and religion on warfare. Though the Siamese and Burmans knew the use of *vyuha* or battle array, it appears that in actual fighting they had little place though they were used for defensive purposes. The illustrations of different *vyuhas* known to them and contained in the *History of Java* by Raffles and photographs of illustrations in the Ms. *Tāmra P'ie' ai Sōngk'ram* and reproduced at the end of the book are interesting and useful.

—T. V. M.

EARLY GANGAS OF TALAKAD: by Dr. S. Srikantha Sastri
(R. Hari Rao, 10-11, Cenotaph Road, Bangalore 2 : 1952).
Price Rs. 2-8-0 or 5 sh.

Of the two branches of the Gangas, the Western and the Eastern, the former ruled over large parts of modern Mysore from about the 4th to the 11th century A.D. from their capital at Talakad. On the evidence of some spurious grants of the dynasty Dr. Fleet thought years ago that the Ganga grants were generally undependable and expressed grave doubts about the historicity of the early members of the dynasty. But since then a number of fresh Ganga grants have been discovered and they have rendered a re-examination and revision of early Ganga history possible and necessary. One of them is the Hebbata (near Srinivasapur, Kolar District) grant of king Durvinita which is edited by Dr. Srikantha Sastri with valuable discussion, palaeographic chart of specimen test letters and historical notes. The language of the inscription is a 'curious mixture' of Sanskrit and old Kannada. The author attempts the reconstruction of the history of the Ganga dynasty from about 300 to 600 A.D. with the help of all the Ganga records published till now and with special reference to the Hebbata grant and the chronology of the important dynasties of South India during the period. He rightly comes to the conclusion that "it is possible to accept some of the chronological data found in early Ganga records as reliable in spite of slight differences, which apart from other consideration need not invalidate the charters'.

The author assigns Durvinita to the close of the fifth and the beginning of the sixth century. (491-535 A.D.). But it appears to be too early a date for him in view of the following reasons. Chalukya Vikramaditya I, the grandson of Durvinita is said to have restored his dynasty in 655 with the latter's help. Further it is generally taken that Bharavi was a contemporary of Pulakesin II, Vishnuvardhana, Simhavishnu and Durvinita. Since all of them were contemporaries, the last of them cannot be placed very far before 600 B.C. Dr. Sastri suggests that Vishnuvardhana whose court was visited by Bharavi was not Kubja Vishnuvardhana, the brother of Pulakesin II but Vijayāditya who fought with Trilochana Pallava. (p. 29). But the suggestion requires further investigation. The author considers at some length the religion of Durvinita and thinks that he was "even a more staunch upholder of Vedic dharma and it is highly improbable that he was the disciple of Pūjyapāda." (p. 45). He says that Durvinita fought

against the Pallavas and Kadambas after 510, some twenty years after his accession. But the battle of Andari was fought by him against the Pallavas even before his fourth regnal year. (MAR., 1942 No. 31).

The last section in the booklet is devoted to a careful examination of the paleography, language and orthography of the grant. At the end of the book is given a synchronistic table of the different dynasties that ruled over the different parts of South India between 300 and 600 A.D. such as the Gangas, Kadambas, Punnadu chiefs, Vakatakas, Pallavas, Chalukyas of Vatapi and the Eastern Gangas.

—T. V. M.

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I. *The Aryan Path*, December 1952, Bombay.

1. *Bon — The Pre-Buddhist Religion of Tibet* — by Dr. R. de Nibesky-Wojkowitz.

II. *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute — Annals of the*, Vol. XXXII, 1951-52, Poona.

1. *The Home of the Vakatakas* — by V. V. Mirashi.
2. *Poros* — by Buddha Prakash.

III. *Bharatiya Vidya*, Vol. XII, 1951, Bombay.

1. *Forms of Marriage in Ancient India and their Development* — by Dr. Ludwik Sternbach.
2. *Some Ancient Kings of Kumaun and Garhwal* — by Dr. Dines Chandra Sircar.

IV. *Bihar Research Society—The Journal of the*, Vol. XXXVII, Parts 3-4, September & December 1951, Patna.

1. *Some Inscriptions from Bihar* — by Dines Chandra Sircar.
2. *Vyasa (A Study in Indo-Babylonian Cultural Contact)* — by Buddha Prakash.
3. *Pre-Mauryan History of Bihar* — by Dr. D. S. Triveda (continued from last issue).
4. *Original Home of Imperial Guptas* — by Dr. B. P. Sinha.
5. *The Judicial Administration of the East India Company in Bengal, 1765-1782* — by Dr. Bankey Bihari Misra (continued from last issue).

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- VI. *Calcutta Review* — Vol. 125, No. 2, November 1952, Calcutta.
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- VII. *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute — The Journal of the*, Vol. VIII, Part 4, August 1951, Allahabad.
1. *Date of the Bharata War* — by Prof. Tarakeshwar Bhat-tacharya.
- VIII. *The Indian Archives*, Vol. V, Number 1, January-June 1951, New Delhi.
1. *Diplomatic of Sanskrit Copper-Plate Grants* — by Baha-dur Chand Chhabra.
 2. *Records of Danish Interest in the National Archives of India* — by V. C. Joshi.
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- IX. *The Indian Archives*, Vol. V, No. 2, July-December, 1951, New Delhi.
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- XI. *The Indo-Asian Culture*, Vol. I, No. 1, July 1952, New Delhi.
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- XII. *The Indo-Asian Culture*, Vol. I, No. 2, October 1952, New Delhi.
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- XIV. *Modern Review, The*, November 1952, Calcutta.
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 2. *Govinda III — A Forgotten Emperor of Madhya Pradesh* — by Dr. V. R. Deoras.
- XVI. *Numismatic Society of India — The Journal of the*, Vol. XIII, Part II, December 1951, Bombay.
1. *Presidential Address* — by Prof. V. V. Mirashi.
 2. *The Identity of Toramana of Kasmira Coins* — by Dr. S. C. Ray.
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XVII. *Oriental and African Studies*—*Bulletin of the School of*, Vol. XIV, Part II, 1952, London.

1. *A Glimpse of the Goa Archives*—by C. R. Boxer.

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2. *Aryan Path*, Bombay.
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